


# 「Course」 RISC-V Computer System Integration

Lecture 07 Introduction of Cryptosystem and Cybersecurity

Phạm Công Kha Hoàng Trọng Thức Tháng 9/2023





# Outline

- 1. Pillars in Cybersecurity
- 2. Typical Cryptosystem
- 3. Current State of Hash
- 4. Current State of Cipher
- 5. Current State of Crypto-key





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#### 1. Pillars in Cybersecurity (1/5) Introduction



1. Confidentiality:

2. Integrity:

3. Availability:

4. Authentication:

the data is ciphered → un-authorized party cannot read the data

the data is original → un-authorized party cannot modify the data

authorized parties can access the data anytime without difficulty

verify sender and/or reader identification

→ Reader knows who the sender is, and vice versa

**5. Non-repudiation:** the data is sent only to an authorized party

→ un-authorized party cannot copy the data

\*Note: number 1, 2, and 3 are also called the CIA triad.


#### 1. Pillars in Cybersecurity (2/5) TPM

#### **TPM** = Trusted **P**latform **M**odule

- **TPM** became a standard in 2009: ISO/IEC 11889:2009
- The latest updated was in 2011 with the **TPM** version 1.2
- **TPM** is for solving the **authentication** problem of a computer system.
- The main feature of **TPM** is the remote attestation:

Through attestation, the verifier can trust that the platform/module/chip is "clean" (i.e., its vital data is safe and its critical software are not tampered).

Phen, based on the trusted platform/module/chip, we now can develop other applications for **confidentiality**, **integrity**, **availability**, etc.




### 1. Pillars in Cybersecurity (3/5) TEE

**TEE** = Trusted Execution Environment

- **TEE** is the next step after **TPM**.
- TPM is for a trusted hardware, TEE is for a trusted Operating System (OS)
- TEE needs TPM for the Root-of-Trust (RoT). Based on the RoT, the Chain-of-Trust (CoT) is developed, thus creating TEE.

  REE


  TEE
- The most common <u>commercial</u> **TEE**s are ARM TrustZone, AMD SEV, and Intel SGX; the most common <u>open-source</u> **TEE** is Keystone.



TPM - Root-of-Trust HW Primitives

Hardware

#### 1. Pillars in Cybersecurity (4/5) Secure boot




#### Secure boot in **TEE**:

- Root-of-Trust (RoT): the first verification at reset, the starting-point for CoT. This should be provided by TPM.
- Chain-of-Trust (CoT): a series of signatures & certificates started from the RoT up to the Rich OS.

#### **Secure boot guarantee:**

- All TEE-related assets (code, trusted OS/drivers, hardware primitives) are installed and at the initial states (as expected by designers).
- Means: EVERYTHING is signature checked, and EVERY sensitive data are immutable or held in isolation.

## 1. Pillars in Cybersecurity (5/5) Final thought








# Outline


- 1. Pillars in Cybersecurity
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### 2. Typical Cryptosystem (1/16) Cryptosystem introduction

Every cryptosystem begins with the <u>Eavesdropping</u> problem:

• Eavesdropping: a hacker intercepts, deletes, or modifies data that is transmitted between two parties.







# 2. Typical Cryptosystem (2/16) Cryptosystem introduction

#### **Symmetric encryption:**

Same key for encryption and decryption (key k)



- **Symmetric** encryption: favor <u>speed</u>
- **Asymmetric** encryption: favor security



## 2. Typical Cryptosystem (3/16) Cryptosystem introduction

We need to transfer data <u>securely</u> over the *untrusted* transmission line.

- ⇒ Use a cipher algorithm to encrypt/decrypt the data before/after the transmission.
  - $\Rightarrow$  The key **k** of a cipher algorithm needs to be agreed upon before the transmission.
  - $\Rightarrow$  We need to transfer the key **k** <u>securely</u> over the *untrusted* transmission line.

This is a classical *chicken-and-egg* problem


In-a-nut-shell:

**Sender** and **Receiver** need to share the <u>key</u> k before transmission: How we can do that?

Solve this problem is the main goal of a cryptosystem

### 2. Typical Cryptosystem (4/16) The hash concept

**Hash** function, also called **digest** function, is a function that converts a given string (or any data alike) with any length to a fixed-length result.



The input length could be *10GB* or even *null*, the output length is always fixed.

#### For example:

- CRC-32: always output 32-bit
- SHA-256: always output 256-bit
  - MD5-128: always output 128-bit

## 2. Typical Cryptosystem (5/16) The hash concept

**Hash** function is a <u>one-way</u> function  $\Rightarrow$  We cannot restore the original data after hashed.

Imagine the *meat grinder*:



The process is irreversible.

The more chaotic the **result** is, the better the **hash** algorithm.

SHA256 online hash function

1234567890

c775e7b757ede630cd0aa1113bd102661ab38829ca52a6422ab782862f268646

SHA256 online hash function

1234567890.

37a82583eeff5905aa8d96e429cb186aacd44466a14a5a2c3795a84b5404381c

## 2. Typical Cryptosystem (6/16) The crypto-key concept

Crypto-key scheme will use an asymmetric encryption algorithm and have three functions: gen-key(), sign(), and verify()

```
(k,k') = gen-key(x)
```

- Input x : called a seed, usually a random number
- Output k and k': called a pairkey, interchangeable, have the same fixed-length

```
s = sign(m,k)
```


- Input m: called a message, could be anything
- Input k : called a key, retrieve from genkey ()
- Output s: called a signature, has a fixedlength

```
m' = verify(s,k')
```

- Input s: called a signature, retrieve from sign()
- Input k': called a key, retrieve from gen-key()
- Output m': called a retrieved-message, suppose to be identical with m

# 2. Typical Cryptosystem (7/16) The crypto-key concept

The **pair-key** is interchangeable



From the pair-key of k and k', one will be chosen as public key P, and the other as secret key S.

The only different is, after one has been chosen as public key P (publish for everyone to know), you have to conceal the secret key S (only known to yourself).

## 2. Typical Cryptosystem (8/16) Completed solution

Back to the initial problem...

Let's both parties have their own pair-keys

Side A

$$(P_A, S_A) = gen-key(a)$$

 $P_A$  is know by everyone on the internet. On the internet, only **A** know its  $S_A$ . Side **B** 


$$(P_B, S_B) = \text{gen-key}(b)$$

 $P_B$  is know by everyone on the internet. On the internet, only **B** know its  $S_B$ .

- This step usually run <u>offline</u> with the **highest** security settings.
- The generated pair-keys now become their identities.

### 2. Typical Cryptosystem (9/16) Completed solution


Side A wants to start the secure channel.



- The body of message, m, is not encrypted (yet).
- The A-signature, s, is attached to m for later verification on the B side.

#### 2. Typical Cryptosystem (10/16) Completed solution


Side **B** receives the message and checks its source.



- **B** will know if *anyone* try to <u>fake</u> **A**'s **identity**.
- **B** will know if *anyone* try to <u>modify</u> the **original message**.

### 2. Typical Cryptosystem (11/16) Completed solution


Side **B** acknowledges the initial message.



- Using the same mechanism to send and check data.
- Until now, the body of message, m, is still not encrypted (yet).

#### 2. Typical Cryptosystem (12/16) Completed solution


Side A ready for the key k transmission.



- Using the same mechanism to send and check data.
- Until now, the body of message, m, is still not encrypted (yet).

#### 2. Typical Cryptosystem (13/16) Completed solution


Side **B** sends the key **k** over to **A**.



- From everybody, only **A** can unlock the ciphered key **c** to retrieve the **k**.
- The attached **B**-signature is still needed for checking its source.

#### 2. Typical Cryptosystem (14/16) Completed solution


Side A tests the key k.



A tests the newly received key k.
 Now, the body of message, m, is encrypted for the very first time.

#### 2. Typical Cryptosystem (15/16) Completed solution

Side **B** acknowledges, thus finishes the handshake.



- From everybody, only **A** and **B** have the key **k**.
- Now, the handshake is over. Typical cipher algorithm is now used.

## 2. Typical Cryptosystem (16/16) Final thought

- The primary goal of a cryptosystem is about solving the <u>eavesdropping</u> problem.
  - ⇒ Thus, solving the *Integrity* and *Confidentiality* problems.
- A cryptosystem usually assumes that the **sender** and **receiver** themselves are <u>trusted</u> (i.e., the sender and receiver **devices** are <u>not compromised</u>).
  - ⇒ Therefore, a <u>truly completed</u> cryptosystem needs a **TPM/TEE** with *secure boot*. Furthermore, **TPM/TEE** + *secure boot* also solve the *Authentication*, *Non-repudiation*, and *Availability* problems.
- A typical cryptosystem needs a *hash*, a *cipher*, and a *crypto-key* scheme.

  If we view cryptosystem as a stage, then *hash*, *cipher*, and *crypto-key* are <u>roles</u> to be played, **not** <u>actors</u>. ⇒ <u>Actors</u> can be **changed**, but the <u>roles</u> are **not**.

  For example: *SHA*, *AES*, and *RSA* are <u>actors</u> to play the <u>roles</u> of *hash*, *cipher*, and *crypto-key*, respectively.





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### 3. Current State of Hash (1/2) Popular algorithms

There are many **hash** algorithms were developed.

- MD5 (Message Digest 5) held the top position for a very long time since its both fast and efficient. However, since its security vulnerabilities have been discovered, MD5 is now discontinued and not recommended for any application.
- SHA (Secure Hash Algorithm) so far the most popular hash algorithm. SHA-1 has only the 160-bit option; both SHA-2 and SHA-3 have 224, 256, 384, and 512-bit options. SHA-2 is de-facto choice in SSL/TLS protocols, which is widely used in HTTPS. SHA-3 is the latest update in the SHA family since 2012.
- **CRC** (*Cyclic Redundancy Check*) is a widely used hash function, not for cryptographic applications, but for error detection in data transmission. **CRC** provides a very fast and efficient hash solution, just not for security.

Link: <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\_of\_hash\_functions">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\_of\_hash\_functions</a>

## 3. Current State of Hash (2/2) Latest algorithms

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So far, the **SHA** family continues to be the <u>latest</u> recommendation.

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
#### **Hash Functions**

Other choices: the **SHAKE** family.

		Collision Resistance Strength in bits	Preimage Resistance Strength in bits	Second Preimage Resistance Strength in bits
	SHA-1	<80	160	160 – L (M)
	SHA-224	112	224	min(224, 256 – L (M))
	SHA-256	128	256	256 – L (M)
	SHA-384	192	384	384
	SHA-512	256	512	512 – L (M)
	SHA-512/224	112	224	224
	SHA-512/256	128	256	256
	SHA3-224	112	224	224
	SHA3-256	128	256	256
	SHA3-384	192	384	384
	SHA3-512	256	512	512

Link: <a href="https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/hash-functions">https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/hash-functions</a>





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## 4. Current State of Cipher (1/6) Popular algorithms

There are even more **cipher** algorithms were developed.

- **AES** (*Advanced Encryption Standard*) is the most popular cipher algorithm. Due to its efficiency and relatively low complexity, it is widely used in various applications from civil to military. Even now, although many security risks of **AES** have been discovered, it is still considered "good-enough" for day-to-day applications.
- **Triple DES** (*Data Encryption Standard*), also called **3DES** or **TDES**, can be viewed as the successor of the original **DES**, which was discontinued since 2005. By looping three **DES** together with some other modifications, **TDES** brings the security level up to modern-day requirements.
- **GCM** (*Galois/Counter Mode*) is one of the **AEAD** (*Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data*) family. The primary goal of the **GCM** is about high-speed communicating applications.

## 4. Current State of Cipher (2/6) Popular algorithms

There are even more **cipher** algorithms were developed.

- MAC (*Message Authentication Code*) is an idea that using a short piece of information attached to the original data for the authentication of the data itself. There are three main variations of the MAC, including HMAC (*Hash-MAC*), KMAC (*Keccak-MAC*), and CMAC (*CBC-MAC*).
- ChaCha20-Poly1305 is the latest update in the AEAD (Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data) family. It is the combination between the two formal algorithms of ChaCha20 (using as a stream cipher) and Poly1305 (using as a MAC).

#### 4. Current State of Cipher (3/6) Latest algorithms



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#### **Block Cipher Techniques**

For block ciphers, **AES** and **Triple DES** with *theirs variations* are <u>still recommended</u> for a typical cipher application.

#### **Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)**

AES is specified in <u>FIPS 197</u>, <u>Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)</u>, which was a <u>modes of operation</u> designed specifically for use with block cipher algorithm

NIST <u>announced the approval of FIPS 197</u>, <u>Advanced Encryption Standard</u> in 2 FIPS-approved symmetric-key algorithm that may be used by U.S. Governme information.

The AES Development details have been archived.

#### **Triple DES**

Triple DES is specified in <u>SP 800-67 Revision 2</u>, <u>Recommendation for the Triple</u> was approved in November 2017. This revision supersedes <u>SP 800-67 Rev. 1</u>,

Link: <a href="https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/block-cipher-techniques">https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/block-cipher-techniques</a>

### 4. Current State of Cipher (4/6) Latest algorithms



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#### **Message Authentication Codes MAC**

For message authentication, **HMAC**, **KMAC**, and **CMAC** are recommended.

#### **Approved Algorithms**

Currently, there are **three** (3) approved\* general purpose MAC algorithms: **HMAC**, **KMAC** and **CMAC**.

#### **Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)**

FIPS 198-1, The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) (July 2008), specifies a mechanism fusing an approved hash function. The approved hash functions are specified in FIPS 180-4, Secure Hash Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions. Specific guidelines in comprehensial properties are provided in NIST SP 107 Revision 1, Recommendation for Applications Using Approved F

#### **KECCAK Message Authentication Code (KMAC)**

KMAC is specified in <u>SP 800-185</u>, <u>SHA-3 Derived Functions: cSHAKE, KMAC, TupleHash and ParallelHash</u> keyed hash function based on <u>Keccak</u>, which is specified in <u>FIPS 202</u>, <u>SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Output Functions</u>. There are two variants of <u>Keccak</u>, KMAC128 and KMAC256.

#### The CMAC Mode for Authentication

Link: <a href="https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/message-authentication-codes">https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/message-authentication-codes</a>

## 4. Current State of Cipher (5/6) Latest algorithms

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#### **Lightweight Cryptography**

For lightweight cryptography, **Ascon** just has been selected for a standard.

The selection is very recently, at Feb. 2023.

The main goal of lightweight cryptography is for small systems such as in low-power IoT applications.

- Round 1. In March 2019, NIST received 57 submissions to be cor lightweight cryptography standardization process began with the August 2019. <u>NISTIR 8268</u> explains the evaluation of the first-rou to the second round of the evaluation process.
- **Round 2.** The second round of the NIST lightweight cryptograph Round 2 in August 2019 and concluded when the finalists were a of the second-round candidates and names 10 finalists.
- Final Round. The final round of the process began with the ann the selection of the Ascon family in February 2023. <u>NISTIR 8454</u> selection of the Ascon family.

Link: <a href="https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/lightweight-cryptography">https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/lightweight-cryptography</a>

## 4. Current State of Cipher (6/6) Latest algorithms



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**Post-Quantum Cryptography PQC** 

New frontier for cryptography developers: **P**ost-**Q**uantum Cryptography (*PQC*).

#### **Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization**

Call for Proposals

Example Files

Round 1 Submissions

**Round 2 Submissions** 

**Round 3 Submissions** 

Round 3 Seminars

**Round 4 Submissions** 

**Selected Algorithms 2022** 

**Workshops and Timeline** 

**PQC Seminars** 

External Workshops

Link: <a href="https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography">https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography</a>





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## 5. Current State of Crypto-key (1/2) Popular algorithms

In contrast with **cipher** and **hash** algorithms, there are not many **crypto-key** schemes have been standardized.

- **RSA** (*Rivest-Shamir-Adleman*) is the oldest, the most popular, and also the most currently widely used crypto-key scheme. Invented by three cryptography specialists named Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman, thus the name **RSA**. In **RSA**, increasing the *number of bits* will increase the level of *security* (and *complexity*) exponentially.
- **DSA** (*Digital Signature Algorithm*) can be viewed as the successor of **RSA**. Based on the **RSA** idea, **DSA** modified some procedures to decrease the level *complexity* (thus enhancing *speed*) while trying to maintain the same level of *security*.
- **ECDSA** (*Elliptic Curve DSA*) is the most popular variant of **DSA**. It uses <u>elliptic curves</u> for *gen-key* instead of <u>prime-factor modular</u> as in the conventional **RSA**.

## 5. Current State of Crypto-key (2/2) Latest algorithms



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RSA, DSA, and ECDSA are all <u>recommended</u>. ECDSA will <u>completely replace</u> the old RSA in the *near future*.

#### **Digital Signatures**

As an electronic analogue of a written signature, a digital signature provides assurance that:

- 1. the claimed signatory signed the information, and
- 2. the information was not modified after signature generation.

<u>Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 186-4, Digital Signature Standard (DSS)</u>, specifies three NIST-approved digital signature algorithms: **DSA**, **RSA**, and **ECDSA**. All three are used to generate and verify digital signatures, in conjunction with an approved hash function specified in <u>FIPS 180-4</u>, <u>Secure Hash Standard</u> or <u>FIPS 202</u>, <u>SHA-3 Standard</u>: <u>Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions</u>.

**February 3, 2023** 

NIST published Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 186-5, <u>Digital Signature Standard (DSS)</u>, along with NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-186, <u>Recommendations for Discrete Logarithm-based Cryptography: Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters</u>.

Link: <a href="https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/digital-signatures">https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/digital-signatures</a>





# THANK YOU