

Week 3 WP - Veritas501

RE

Security Window

没壳，先OD上跑跑熟悉一下，然后无情丢到IDA里：
定位关键函数（带注释）：

```
BYTE *sub_401200()  
{  
    BYTE *result; // eax@1  
    signed int i; // eax@2  
    int _ch; // ecx@3  
    char v3; // dl@3  
    int v4; // ecx@3  
    char v5; // dl@3  
    int v6; // ecx@3  
    signed int j; // eax@4  
    char v8; // cl@5  
    int v9; // eax@6  
    char *v10; // ecx@6  
    signed int k; // esi@6  
    char v12; // dl@7  
    signed int l; // eax@8  
    int v14; // edx@9  
    char v15; // cl@9  
    int v16; // edx@9  
    char v17; // cl@9  
    int v18; // edx@9  
    unsigned int v19; // edi@10  
    void *v20; // esi@10
```

```

    result = (BYTE *)strlen(pt_input_0);           // input length = 3
2 , pt = 0x403420
    if ( result == (BYTE *)32 )
    {
        i = 0;
        do
        {
            _ch = (unsigned __int8)pt_input_1[i];
            pt_input_0[i] = byte_4021D0[(unsigned __int8)pt_input_0[i]];
            v3 = byte_4021D0[_ch];
            v4 = (unsigned __int8)pt_input_2[i];
            pt_input_1[i] = v3;
            v5 = byte_4021D0[v4];
            v6 = (unsigned __int8)pt_input_3[i];
            pt_input_2[i] = v5;
            pt_input_3[i] = byte_4021D0[v6];
            i += 4;                                // 4 bytes 一组
        }
        while ( i < 32 );                          // (变换1)从byte_402
1D0[255]到pt_input 做字符映射
        j = 0;
        do
        {
            v8 = __ROL1__(pt_input_0[j], 4);        // (变换2)对每一位:ch
= (ch << 4) ^ 34
            pt_input_0[j++] = v8 ^ 34;
        }
        while ( j < 32 );
        v9 = 0;
        v10 = (char *)&pt_input_31;                // v10为第32位(下标3
1)
        k = 16;
        do
        {
            v12 = *v10;
            *v10 = pt_input_0[v9];
            pt_input_0[v9++] = v12;
            --v10;
            --k;
        }
        while ( k );                                // (变换3)倒序重排
        l = 0;
        do
        {
            v14 = (unsigned __int8)pt_input_1[l];
            pt_input_0[l] = byte_4021D0[(unsigned __int8)pt_input_0[l]];
            v15 = byte_4021D0[v14];
            v16 = (unsigned __int8)pt_input_2[l];

```

```

    pt_input_1[l] = v15;
    v17 = byte_4021D0[v16];
    v18 = (unsigned __int8)pt_input_3[l];
    pt_input_2[l] = v17;
    pt_input_3[l] = byte_4021D0[v18];
    l += 4;
}
while ( l < 32 ); // (变换4)从byte_402
1D0[255]到pt_input 做第二次字符映射
sub_401000(); // (变换5)base64加密
v19 = 43; // 加密后43位
v20 = &flag_enc; // 0x402154
result = sub_401140(); // (变换6)CryptEncry
pt加密
while ( *(_DWORD *)result == *(_DWORD *)v20 )
{
    v19 -= 4;
    v20 = (char *)v20 + 4;
    result += 4;
    if ( v19 < 4 )
    {
        if ( *(_BYTE *)v20 == *result && *((_BYTE *)v20 + 1) == res
ult[1] && *((_BYTE *)v20 + 2) == result[2] )
            result = (BYTE *)MessageBoxA(0, "You won!", "congratulati
on", 0);
        return result;
    }
}
}
return result;
}

```

```

BYTE *sub_401000()
{
    int v0; // esi@1
    signed int i; // ecx@1
    unsigned int j; // eax@1
    unsigned __int8 v3; // dl@3
    unsigned __int8 v4; // bl@3
    unsigned __int8 v5; // dl@4
    char v6; // si@5

    v0 = 1 - (_DWORD)pt_input_0;
    i = 0;
    j = 0;
    while ( 1 ) // 猜测 base64
    {
        v3 = 16 * (pt_input_0[i] & 3); // v3 = 16 * (input[i] & 3)
        *(&des_0 + j) = asc_402188[(unsigned int)(unsigned __int8)pt_input_0[i] >> 2]; // des[j+2] = asc[input[i] >> 2]
        v4 = v3; // v4 = v3
        if ( (signed int)&pt_input_0[v0] + i ) >= 32 ) // if(i+1 >= 32)
        {
            des_1[j] = asc_402188[v3]; // des[1+j] = asc[v3]
            des_2_3[j / 2] = '=='; // des[j/2+2] = des[j/2+3] = 0x3D
            des_4[j] = 0; // des[j+4] = 0
            return &des_0; // << break && return
        }
        v5 = 4 * (pt_input_1[i] & 0xF); // v5 = 4 * (input[1+i] & 0xF)
        des_1[j] = asc_402188[v4 | ((unsigned int)(unsigned __int8)pt_input_1[i] >> 4)]; // des[j+1] = asc[v4 | input[1+i]>>4]
        if ( (signed int)&pt_input_0[2 - (signed int)pt_input_0] + i ) >= 32 ) // if(i + 2 >= 32)
            break;
        v6 = pt_input_2[i]; // v6 = input[2+i]
        LOBYTE(des_2_3[j / 2]) = asc_402188[v5 | ((unsigned int)(unsigned __int8)pt_input_2[i] >> 6)]; // des[j/2 + 2] = asc[v5 | input[2+i] >> 6]
        *((_BYTE *)&des_3 + j) = asc_402188[v6 & 0x3F]; // des[j+3] = asc[v6 & 0x3F]
        i += 3; // i += 3
        j += 4; // j += 4
        if ( i >= 32 ) // if(i >= 32)
        {
            *(&des_0 + j) = 0; // des[j] = 0
        }
    }
}

```

```

        return &des_0;
    }
    v0 = 1 - (_DWORD)pt_input_0;
}
LOBYTE(des_2_3[j / 2]) = asc_402188[v5];        // des[j/2 + 2] = a
sc[v5]
*(_WORD *)((char *)&des_3 + j) = '=';        // des[j+3] = 0x3D
return &des_0;
}

```

```

BYTE *sub_401140()
{
    DWORD pdwDataLen; // [sp+0h] [bp-10h]@1
    HCRYPTKEY phKey; // [sp+4h] [bp-Ch]@1
    HCRYPTPROV phProv; // [sp+8h] [bp-8h]@1
    HCRYPTHASH phHash; // [sp+Ch] [bp-4h]@1

    CryptAcquireContextA(&phProv, 0, "Microsoft Base Cryptographic Pr
ovider v1.0", 1u, 0xF0000000);
    CryptCreateHash(phProv, 0x8003u, 0, 0, &phHash);
    CryptHashData(phHash, pbData, strlen((const char *)pbData), 0);//
pbData = 'vidar_aaa'
    CryptDeriveKey(phProv, 0x6801u, phHash, 0, &phKey);
    pdwDataLen = 44;
    CryptEncrypt(phKey, 0, 1, 0, &des_0, &pdwDataLen, 0x2Cu);
    CryptDestroyKey(phKey);
    CryptDestroyHash(phHash);
    CryptReleaseContext(phProv, 0);
    return &des_0;
}

```

dump出的flag_enc :

```

0xAF,0xA5,0x92,0x3C,0x0C,0xB1,0x1C,0x33,0x56,0x66,0x3F,
0x37,0x17,0x3E,0x2A,0xE0,0xFF,0xE9,0x97,0x29,0xEC,0x76,
0x85,0xF8,0xA7,0x5F,0x85,0xCB,0x7B,0x42,0xC9,0x04,0xCB,
0x9D,0x12,0x58,0x2D,0x25,0xA4,0xB0,0xC7,0x0F,0xB9,0xE0

```

dump出的byte_4021D0[255] :

```
0x07,0x0E,0x15,0x1C,0x23,0x2A,0x31,0x38,0x3F,0x46,0x4D,0x54,0x5B,0x
62,0x69,0x70,0x77,0x7E,0x85,0x8C,0x93,0x9A,0xA1,0xA8,0xAF,0xB6,0xB
D,0xC4,0xCB,0xD2,0xD9,0xE0,0xE7,0xEE,0xF5,0xFC,0x03,0x0A,0x11,0x1
8,0x1F,0x26,0x2D,0x34,0x3B,0x42,0x49,0x50,0x57,0x5E,0x65,0x6C,0x7
3,0x7A,0x81,0x88,0x8F,0x96,0x9D,0xA4,0xAB,0xB2,0xB9,0xC0,0xC7,0xC
E,0xD5,0xDC,0xE3,0xEA,0xF1,0xF8,0xFF,0x06,0x0D,0x14,0x1B,0x22,0x2
9,0x30,0x37,0x3E,0x45,0x4C,0x53,0x5A,0x61,0x68,0x6F,0x76,0x7D,0x8
4,0x8B,0x92,0x99,0xA0,0xA7,0xAE,0xB5,0xBC,0xC3,0xCA,0xD1,0xD8,0xD
F,0xE6,0xED,0xF4,0xFB,0x02,0x09,0x10,0x17,0x1E,0x25,0x2C,0x33,0x3
A,0x41,0x48,0x4F,0x56,0x5D,0x64,0x6B,0x72,0x79,0x80,0x87,0x8E,0x9
5,0x9C,0xA3,0xAA,0xB1,0xB8,0xBF,0xC6,0xCD,0xD4,0xDB,0xE2,0xE9,0xF
0,0xF7,0xFE,0x05,0x0C,0x13,0x1A,0x21,0x28,0x2F,0x36,0x3D,0x44,0x4
B,0x52,0x59,0x60,0x67,0x6E,0x75,0x7C,0x83,0x8A,0x91,0x98,0x9F,0xA
6,0xAD,0xB4,0xBB,0xC2,0xC9,0xD0,0xD7,0xDE,0xE5,0xEC,0xF3,0xFA,0x0
1,0x08,0x0F,0x16,0x1D,0x24,0x2B,0x32,0x39,0x40,0x47,0x4E,0x55,0x5
C,0x63,0x6A,0x71,0x78,0x7F,0x86,0x8D,0x94,0x9B,0xA2,0xA9,0xB0,0xB
7,0xBE,0xC5,0xCC,0xD3,0xDA,0xE1,0xE8,0xEF,0xF6,0xFD,0x04,0x0B,0x1
2,0x19,0x20,0x27,0x2E,0x35,0x3C,0x43,0x4A,0x51,0x58,0x5F,0x66,0x6
D,0x74,0x7B,0x82,0x89,0x90,0x97,0x9E,0xA5,0xAC,0xB3,0xBA,0xC1,0xC
8,0xCF,0xD6,0xDD,0xE4,0xEB,0xF2,0xF9
```

dump出的asc_402188字符

串：“ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/-”

解密就是加密的反函数，加密的最后一步是调用CryptEncrypt，所以我们调用CryptDecrypt将flag_enc解密第一层，由于我此时并不会使用上面的一系列函数，所以我可以通过OD修改原程序，使他调用CryptDecrypt来解密flag_enc。

查询

[https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa379913\(v=vs.85\).aspx](https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa379913(v=vs.85).aspx)

和

[https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa379924\(v=vs.85\).aspx](https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa379924(v=vs.85).aspx)

得：

```
BOOL WINAPI CryptDecrypt(
    _In_     HCRYPTKEY    hKey,
    _In_     HCRYPTHASH  hHash,
    _In_     BOOL        Final,
    _In_     DWORD       dwFlags,
    _Inout_  BYTE        *pbData,
    _Inout_  DWORD       *pdwDataLen
);
```

我们这样修改程序：

并在合适时机把flag_enc写入0x004033DC：

地址	HEX 数据	反汇编	注释
004011AE	FF15 1C20400	call dword ptr ds:[<ADVAPI32.CryptDeri	advapi32.CryptDeriveKey
004011B4	8B55 F4	mov edx,[local.3]	
004011B7	90	nop	
004011B8	90	nop	
004011B9	8D4D F0	lea ecx,[local.4]	
004011BC	51	push ecx	
004011BD	68 DC334000	push security.004033DC	
004011C2	6A 00	push 0x0	
004011C4	6A 01	push 0x1	
004011C6	6A 00	push 0x0	
004011C8	52	push edx	
004011C9	C745 F0 2C00	mov [local.4],0x2C	
004011D0	FF15 1020400	call dword ptr ds:[<ADVAPI32.CryptEncr	advapi32.CryptDecrypt
004011D6	8B45 F4	mov eax,[local.3]	
004011D9	50	push eax	
004011DA	FF15 0820400	call dword ptr ds:[<ADVAPI32.CryptDest	advapi32.CryptDestroyKey
004011E0	8B4D FC	mov ecx,[local.1]	
004011E3	51	push ecx	
004011E4	FF15 0420400	call dword ptr ds:[<ADVAPI32.CryptDest	advapi32.CryptDestroyHash
004011EA	8B55 F8	mov edx,[local.2]	
004011ED	6A 00	push 0x0	
004011EF	52	push edx	
004011F0	FF15 1820400	call dword ptr ds:[<ADVAPI32.CryptRele	advapi32.CryptReleaseConte
004011F6	B8 DC334000	mov eax,security.004033DC	
004011FB	8BF5	mov esp,ebp	
004033DC=security.004033DC			
地址	HEX 数据	ASCII	
004033DC	AF 05 92 3C 0C 01 1C 00 56 66 3F 37 17 3E 20 E0	?.?30f??>#	
004033EC	FF E9 97 29 EC 76 05 F0 07 5F 05 08 70 42 C9 04	(関)関吐 叶(0?	
004033FC	08 00 12 50 20 25 A4 00 C7 0F 09 E0 00 00 00 00	00000000	
0040340C	77 02 00 00 C7 01 00 00 DC 09 00 00 01 00 20 00	w...?..?..	

接着跑完这段代码，flag_enc成功解密(第6层)：

=00192AD8, (ASCII "悲")			
止	HEX 数据	ASCII	
0033DC	44 08 72 65 58 77 34 5A 65 68 30 67 54 39 4C 69	DHreXu4Zeh0gT9Li	
0033EC	56 64 4C 31 48 64 34 4F 48 52 41 5A 48 64 4A 56	VdL1Hd40HRAZHdJV	
0033FC	30 73 00 67 77 65 49 67 54 38 68 3D 00 00 00 00	0skgwelgT8k=....	
00340C	77 02 00 00 C7 01 00 00 DC 09 00 00 01 00 20 00	w...?..?..	
00341C	00 00 00 00 A6 96 A3 93 3C 2C 71 61 A6 96 A3 93 <,qa	
00342C	3C 2C 71 61 A6 96 A3 93 3C 2C 71 61 A6 96 A3 93	<,qa <,qa	
00343C	3C 2C 71 61 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	<,qa...■■.....	
00344C	BA 24 E8 BF BA 24 E8 BF 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	http://blog.csdn.net/veritas501	

flag_enc_5:DHreXw4Zeh0gT9LiVdL1Hd40HRAZHdJV0skgwelgT8k=

由于之前做过base64相关的re，看的还是比较准的，直接base64解密（第5层）：

flag_enc_4：

```
0x0c,0x7a,0xde,0x5f,0x0e,0x19,0x7a,0x1d,
0x20,0x4f,0xd2,0xe2,0x55,0xd2,0xf5,0x1d,
0xde,0x0e,0x1d,0x10,0x19,0x1d,0xd2,0x55,
0xd2,0xc9,0x20,0xc1,0xe2,0x20,0x4f,0xc9
```

第4层直接用py搞定（第4层）：


```

a=[0x07,0x0E,0x15,0x1C,0x23,0x2A,0x31,0x38,0x3F,0x46,0x4D,0x54,0x5B,0x62,0x69,0x70,0x77,0x7E,0x85,0x8C,0x93,0x9A,0xA1,0xA8,0xAF,0xB6,0xBD,0xC4,0xCB,0xD2,0xD9,0xE0,0xE7,0xEE,0xF5,0xFC,0x03,0x0A,0x11,0x18,0x1F,0x26,0x2D,0x34,0x3B,0x42,0x49,0x50,0x57,0x5E,0x65,0x6C,0x73,0x7A,0x81,0x88,0x8F,0x96,0x9D,0xA4,0xAB,0xB2,0xB9,0xC0,0xC7,0xCE,0xD5,0xDC,0xE3,0xEA,0xF1,0xF8,0xFF,0x06,0x0D,0x14,0x1B,0x22,0x29,0x30,0x37,0x3E,0x45,0x4C,0x53,0x5A,0x61,0x68,0x6F,0x76,0x7D,0x84,0x8B,0x92,0x99,0xA0,0xA7,0xAE,0xB5,0xBC,0xC3,0xCA,0xD1,0xD8,0xDF,0xE6,0xED,0xF4,0xFB,0x02,0x09,0x10,0x17,0x1E,0x25,0x2C,0x33,0x3A,0x41,0x48,0x4F,0x56,0x5D,0x64,0x6B,0x72,0x79,0x80,0x87,0x8E,0x95,0x9C,0xA3,0xAA,0xB1,0xB8,0xBF,0xC6,0xCD,0xD4,0xDB,0xE2,0xE9,0xF0,0xF7,0xFE,0x05,0x0C,0x13,0x1A,0x21,0x28,0x2F,0x36,0x3D,0x44,0x4B,0x52,0x59,0x60,0x67,0x6E,0x75,0x7C,0x83,0x8A,0x91,0x98,0x9F,0xA6,0xAD,0xB4,0xBB,0xC2,0xC9,0xD0,0xD7,0xDE,0xE5,0xEC,0xF3,0xFA,0x01,0x08,0x0F,0x16,0x1D,0x24,0x2B,0x32,0x39,0x40,0x47,0x4E,0x55,0x5C,0x63,0x6A,0x71,0x78,0x7F,0x86,0x8D,0x94,0x9B,0xA2,0xA9,0xB0,0xB7,0xBE,0xC5,0xCC,0xD3,0xDA,0xE1,0xE8,0xEF,0xF6,0xFD,0x04,0x0B,0x12,0x19,0x20,0x27,0x2E,0x35,0x3C,0x43,0x4A,0x51,0x58,0x5F,0x66,0x6D,0x74,0x7B,0x82,0x89,0x90,0x97,0x9E,0xA5,0xAC,0xB3,0xBA,0xC1,0xC8,0xCF,0xD6,0xDD,0xE4,0xEB,0xF2,0xF9]
b = [0x0c,0x7a,0xde,0x5f,0x0e,0x19,0x7a,0x1d,0x20,0x4f,0xd2,0xe2,0x55,0xd2,0xf5,0x1d,0xde,0x0e,0x1d,0x10,0x19,0x1d,0xd2,0x55,0xd2,0xc9,0x20,0xc1,0xe2,0x20,0x4f,0xc9]

for chb in b:
    for i in range(len(a)):
        if a[i] == chb :
            print(i+1,end = ',')

```

得到flag_enc_3:

```

148,54,178,233,2,223,54,187,224,121,30,142,195,30,35,187,178,2,187,112,223,187,30,195,30,175,224,247,142,224,121,175

```

数组倒序（第3层），继续py：

```

a=[148,54,178,233,2,223,54,187,224,121,30,142,195,30,35,187,178,2,187,112,223,187,30,195,30,175,224,247,142,224,121,175]

for i in reversed(range(len(a))):
    print(a[i],end=',')

```

得到flag_enc_2：

```
175,121,224,142,247,224,175,30,195,30,187,223,112,187,2,178,187,3
5,30,195,142,30,121,224,187,54,223,2,233,178,54,148
```

第2层和第1层由于计算量不大，我直接一位一位用的爆破，py:

```
a=[0x07,0x0E,0x15,0x1C,0x23,0x2A,0x31,0x38,0x3F,0x46,0x4D,0x54,0x5B,0x62,0x69,0x70,0x77,0x7E,0x85,0x8C,0x93,0x9A,0xA1,0xA8,0xAF,0xB6,0xBD,0xC4,0xCB,0xD2,0xD9,0xE0,0xE7,0xEE,0xF5,0xFC,0x03,0x0A,0x11,0x18,0x1F,0x26,0x2D,0x34,0x3B,0x42,0x49,0x50,0x57,0x5E,0x65,0x6C,0x73,0x7A,0x81,0x88,0x8F,0x96,0x9D,0xA4,0xAB,0xB2,0xB9,0xC0,0xC7,0xCE,0xD5,0xDC,0xE3,0xEA,0xF1,0xF8,0xFF,0x06,0x0D,0x14,0x1B,0x22,0x29,0x30,0x37,0x3E,0x45,0x4C,0x53,0x5A,0x61,0x68,0x6F,0x76,0x7D,0x84,0x8B,0x92,0x99,0xA0,0xA7,0xAE,0xB5,0xBC,0xC3,0xCA,0xD1,0xD8,0xDF,0xE6,0xED,0xF4,0xFB,0x02,0x09,0x10,0x17,0x1E,0x25,0x2C,0x33,0x3A,0x41,0x48,0x4F,0x56,0x5D,0x64,0x6B,0x72,0x79,0x80,0x87,0x8E,0x95,0x9C,0xA3,0xAA,0xB1,0xB8,0xBF,0xC6,0xCD,0xD4,0xDB,0xE2,0xE9,0xF0,0xF7,0xFE,0x05,0x0C,0x13,0x1A,0x21,0x28,0x2F,0x36,0x3D,0x44,0x4B,0x52,0x59,0x60,0x67,0x6E,0x75,0x7C,0x83,0x8A,0x91,0x98,0x9F,0xA6,0xAD,0xB4,0xBB,0xC2,0xC9,0xD0,0xD7,0xDE,0xE5,0xEC,0xF3,0xFA,0x01,0x08,0x0F,0x16,0x1D,0x24,0x2B,0x32,0x39,0x40,0x47,0x4E,0x55,0x5C,0x63,0x6A,0x71,0x78,0x7F,0x86,0x8D,0x94,0x9B,0xA2,0xA9,0xB0,0xB7,0xBE,0xC5,0xCC,0xD3,0xDA,0xE1,0xE8,0xEF,0xF6,0xFD,0x04,0x0B,0x12,0x19,0x20,0x27,0x2E,0x35,0x3C,0x43,0x4A,0x51,0x58,0x5F,0x66,0x6D,0x74,0x7B,0x82,0x89,0x90,0x97,0x9E,0xA5,0xAC,0xB3,0xBA,0xC1,0xC8,0xCF,0xD6,0xDD,0xE4,0xEB,0xF2,0xF9]
```

```
b=[175,121,224,142,247,224,175,30,195,30,187,223,112,187,2,178,187,35,30,195,142,30,121,224,187,54,223,2,233,178,54,148]
for j in range(len(b)):
    for i in range(30,128):
        if ((a[i]<<4)%255)^34 == b[j]:
            print(chr(i+1),end='')
```

得到flag_dec : `hctf{there_is_no_perfect_window}`

思维混乱的出题人

说句实话，我做完后感觉这题的确有些混乱，我尽量简单的说。

先随便跑跑，发现随便输入最后会显示 `What do you his mother's want to do!`，OD 载入，查找字符串，发现3个比较可疑的字符

串 `tutushigecaiji`，`aGN0ZntpdF9pc19ub3RfZmxhZyF9` 和 `What do you his mother's want to do!`，第一个字符串让我感觉到了出题者和土土某种微妙的关系。动态调试后可知 `0x013E2B70` 是一个 `gets` 之类获取用户输入的函数，不是重点，略过。

013E130F	- 8D8D 24FEFFFF	lea ecx,dword ptr ss:[ebp-0x1DC]	
013E1315	- E8 66FEFFFF	call What_the.013E1180	
013E131A	- 8D85 10FFFFF	lea eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp-0xF0]	
013E1320	- 50	push eax	
013E1321	- E8 4A180000	call What_the.013E2B70	gets
013E1326	- A1 D0843F01	mov eax,dword ptr ds:[0x13F84D0]	ZyF9
013E132B	- 8F1005 B8843	movups xmm0,dqword ptr ds:[0x13F84B8]	aGN0ZntpdF9pc19ub3RfZmxhZyF9
013E1332	- 0945 A8	mov dword ptr ss:[ebp-0x58],eax	
013E1335	- A0 D4843F01	mov al,byte ptr ds:[0x13F84D4]	
013E133A	- 6A 4F	push 0x4F	
013E133C	- 8B45 0C	mov byte ptr ss:[ebp-0x54],al	

比较微妙的是，当我们f8小心单步后可以发现：

013E1374	- 8D4D 90	lea ecx,dword ptr ss:[ebp-0x70]		ESP 010FF980
013E1377	- E8 F4FCFFFF	call What_the.013E1070	hctf{it_is_not_flag!}	EBP 010FFC70
013E137C	- 8D95 8AFDFFF	lea eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp-0x25C]		ESI 013FA0FC What_the.013FA0FC
013E1382	- 8D8D 10FFFFF	lea eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp-0xF0]		EIP 013FAE00 What_the.013FAE00
013E1388	- E8 E3FCFFFF	call What_the.013E1070		EIP 013E137C What_the.013E137C
013E138D	- 8D85 24FDFFF	lea eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp-0x20C]		C 1 ES 0020 32 0 (FFFFFFFF)
013E1393	- 50	push eax	%s	P 1 CS 0023 32 0 (FFFFFFFF)
013E1394	- 68 10853F01	push What_the.013F8510		A 1 SS 0020 32 0 (FFFFFFFF)
013E1399	- E8 72FCFFFF	call What_the.013E1070		Z 0 DS 0020 32 0 (FFFFFFFF)
013E139E	- 68 14853F01	push What_the.013F8514	What do you his mother's want to do!	S 1 FS 0053 32 0 F26000FFFF
013E13A3	- E8 68FCFFFF	call What_the.013E1070		T 0 GS 0020 32 0 (FFFFFFFF)
013E13A8	- 8B4D FC	mov ecx,dword ptr ss:[ebp-0x4]		D 0
013E13AB	- 8D84 18	add esp,eax		0 0 LastErr ERROR_SUCCESS (00000000)
013E13AE	- 33C0	xor ecx,ebp		EFL 00000297 (NO,B,NE,OE,S,PE,L,L)
013E13B0	- 33C0	xor eax,eax		ST0 empty 0.0
013E13B2	- E8 04000000	call What_the.013E13B8		ST1 empty 0.0
013E13B7	- 8BE5	mov esp,ebp		ST2 empty 0.0
013E13B9	- 50	pop ebp	010FFB14	ST3 empty 0.0
013E13BA	- C3	ret		ST4 empty 0.0
013E13BB	- 3B0D 0A03F0	cmp ecx,dword ptr ds:[0x13FA004]		ST5 empty 0.0
013E13C1	- F2	prefix repne;		ST6 empty 0.0
013E13C2	- 75 02	jnz short What_the.013E13C6		ST7 empty 0.0
013E13C4	- F2	prefix repne;		
013E13C5	- C3	ret		
013E13C6	- F2	prefix repne;		

地址	HEX 数据	ASCII
013F3000	00 00 3C 77 30 D0 3A 77 C0 5F 3A 77 80 89 30 77	.2w0?u6u:u0?u
010FF988	010FFB14	ASCII "hctf{it_is_not_flag!}"

当我们执行完 `CALL 0x13E1070` 后，字符串 `hctf{it_is_not_flag!}` 出现在了我们的堆栈区，所以我用IDA看了一下这个 `CALL`，发现 `0x61 ('=')` 这个字节：

```
if ( v2 < result )
{
    v7 = v2 + 2;
    v8 = ((result - v2 - 1) >> 2) + 1;
    do
    {
        v9 = *(_BYTE *)(v7 - 1);
        v7 += 4;
        *(_BYTE *)a2 = 4 * dword_418540[4 * *(_BYTE *)(v7 - 6)] | (*(DWORD *)&v9 <> 16 * dword_418540[4 * *(_BYTE *)(v7 - 5)] | (*(DWORD *)&v9 <> 16 * dword_418540[4 * *(_BYTE *)(v7 - 4)] | (*(DWORD *)&v9 <> 16 * dword_418540[4 * *(_BYTE *)(v7 - 3)] | (*(DWORD *)&v9 <> 16 * dword_418540[4 * *(_BYTE *)(v7 - 2)] | (*(DWORD *)&v9 <> 16 * dword_418540[4 * *(_BYTE *)(v7 - 1)] | (*(DWORD *)&v9 <> 16 * dword_418540[4 * *(_BYTE *)v7];
        a2 += 3;
        --v8;
    }
    while ( v8 );
    result = v10;
}
if ( *(_BYTE *)(result - 2) == '=' )
{
    *(_BYTE *)a2 - 2 = 0;
}
else if ( *(_BYTE *)(result - 1) == '=' )
{
    *(_BYTE *)a2 - 1 = 0;
}
,
```

理所当然的想到了base64，拿 aGN0ZntpdF9pc19ub3RfZmxhZyF9 进行base64解密得到了我们看到的字符串 hctf{it_is_not_flag!}，合理推测flag应该是由某个base64字串解密得到。

回头看一下，我们现在还有一个字符串没有用到：tutushigecaiji，我们总不能把出题人想的这么坏，写个和题目无关的字符串只为了吐槽一下土土吧？我们到字符串的附近下断，动态跟踪一下，发现此处：

013E1249	. 45	inc ebp
013E124A	. BF 00000000	mov edi,0x0
013E124F	. C645 C3 00	mov byte ptr ss:[ebp-0x3D],0x0
013E1253	> 8A01	mov al,byte ptr ds:[ecx]
013E1255	. 41	inc ecx
013E1256	. 84C0	test al,al
013E1258	. 75 F9	jnz short What_the.013E1253
013E125A	. 2BCE	sub ecx,esi
013E125C	. 74 22	je short What_the.013E1280
013E125E	. 66 90	nop
013E1260	> 8A4415 A8	mov al,byte ptr ss:[ebp+edx-0x58]
013E1264	. 304415 E0	xor byte ptr ss:[ebp+edx-0x20],al
013E1268	. 304415 C4	xor byte ptr ss:[ebp+edx-0x3C],al
013E126C	. 8D45 E0	lea eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp-0x20]
013E126F	. 42	inc edx

堆栈 ds:[0059F6E4]=3D ('=')
al=31 ('1')
跳转来自 013E1258

地址	HEX 数据	ASCII
0059F684	07 00 00 00 7F 00 00 00 10 24 9F 00 60 02 9D 00	■...■...■\$?`~?
0059F694	7B 01 04 7E 00 00 9D 00 00 AE 3F 01 FC AD 3F 01	{f~..?.?f ?f
0059F6A4	88 FF FF FF 74 75 74 75 73 68 69 67 65 63 61 69	?ÿÿtutushigecai
0059F6B4	6A 69 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	ji.....
0059F6C4	15 32 3A 45 29 06 1D 2D 01 25 59 11 09 58 00 00	■2:E)■-?Y■.X..
0059F6D4	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4D 45 15 31ME■1
0059F6E4	3D 0E 33 0A 1D 0B 33 10 2C 50 00 00 00 00 00 00	=■3.■3■,P.....
0059F6F4	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 14 FA 59 00mæud■鵓.
0059F704	1A 13 3E 01 38 F7 59 00 00 00 00 00 80 00 00 00	■■>鰩.....■.
0059F714	B8 F7 59 00 00 00 00 00 80 00 00 00 24 F9 59 00	各v.....\$鵓.
0059F724	00 00 00 00 80 00 00 00 38 F8 59 00 00 00 00 008鵓.....
0059F734	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	■.....

程序在循环利用写在0x0059F6E4出的字节码进行某种解密，我们就在跳转的前面轻轻摁一下F4，发现此时数据窗口出现了两个可疑字符串：

eax=0000000E

地址	HEX 数据	ASCII
0059F684	07 00 00 00 7F 00 00 00 10 24 9F 00 60 02 9D 00	■...■...■\$?`~?
0059F694	7B 01 04 7E 00 00 9D 00 00 AE 3F 01 FC AD 3F 01	{f~..?.?f ?f
0059F6A4	88 FF FF FF 74 75 74 75 73 68 69 67 65 63 61 69	?ÿÿtutushigecai
0059F6B4	6A 69 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	ji.....
0059F6C4	61 47 4E 30 5A 6E 74 4A 64 46 38 78 63 31 00 00	aGN0ZntJdF8xc1..
0059F6D4	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 39 30 61 4490aD
0059F6E4	4E 66 5A 6D 78 68 52 79 46 39 00 00 00 00 00 00	NfZmxhRyF9.....
0059F6F4	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 6D 40 75 64 14 FA 59 00mæud■鵓.
0059F704	1A 13 3E 01 38 F7 59 00 00 00 00 00 80 00 00 00	■■>鰩.....■.
0059F714	B8 F7 59 00 00 00 00 00 80 00 00 00 24 F9 59 00	各v.....\$鵓.
0059F724	00 00 00 00 80 00 00 00 38 F8 59 00 00 00 00 008鵓.....

我们把它拼起来，得到 aGN0ZntJdF8xc190aDnfZmxhRyF9，base64解密一下得到 flag：hctf{It_1s_th3_flg!}

Crypto

explorer的奇怪番外3

该Google的先Google，知道是Feistel结构，直接用py写出反函数解密：

```
# -*- coding: cp936 -*-
from hashlib import sha256

def xor(a,b):
    return ''.join([chr(ord(i)^ord(j)) for i,j in zip(a,b)])#简单的异或

def HASH(data):
    return sha256(data).digest()[:8]#取前8位

def bes_encrypt(subkeys, data):
    i = 0
    d1 = data[:8]
    d2 = data[8:]
    for i in subkeys:
        d1 = xor(xor(HASH(d2),i),d1)
        d1,d2 = d2,d1

    return d2 + d1

def key_schedule(key):
    subKeys = []
    subKey = key
    for i in xrange(16):
        subKey = HASH(subKey)
        subKeys.append(subKey)#len(subKeys)=16
    return subKeys

def bes(key,data):
    subKeys = key_schedule(key)
    return bes_encrypt(subKeys, data).encode('hex')

def bes_de(key,data):
    subKeys = reversed(key_schedule(key))
    return bes_decrypt(subKeys, data.decode('hex'))
```

```
def bes_decrypt(subkeys, data):
    i = 0
    d1 = data[8:]
    d2 = data[:8]
    for i in subkeys:
        d1,d2 = d2,d1
        d1 = xor(xor(HASH(d2),i),d1)
    return d1+d2

#the result is "rEvers3_tHe_kEy!"
if __name__ == "__main__":
    print bes_de('explorer','1fde6a7b2ff15d0abad691215ca5d470')
```

加上 `flag{}` 得到最终的flag : `flag{rEvers3_tHe_kEy!}`

explorer的奇怪番外5

题目提到了CBC，自然就想到了CBC翻转字节攻击，话不多说。

首先，我们sign up，比如我提交的是badmin，密码和原来一样，是alvndasjncakslbdvlaksdn。得到了token:

```
dbc290e4acefd383cd4bb93a0ee020e6169513e29fd7e5452f955b945cab77cf334
8a76d1ea5cfc9278c8e2ad3539498
```

观察程序源码可知，前面的16位（decode之后）是iv：

```
def signin():
    token = raw_input("give me you token:")
    iv = token[:32].decode('hex')
    cipherText = token[32:].decode('hex')
    aes = AES.new(key,AES.MODE_CBC,iv)
    plainText = aes.decrypt(cipherText)
    name,passwd = checkPad(plainText).split(':')
    if name == 'admin' and passwd == 'alvndasjncakslbdvlaksdn':
        print flag
    else:
        print "you are not admin"
```

CBC是16位一组进行加密的，因此我们编写代码在破坏iv的情况下把badmin改成admin：

```

a='dbc290e4acefd383cd4bb93a0ee020e6169513e29fd7e5452f955b945cab77cf
3348a76d1ea5cfc9278c8e2ad3539498'
b=a.decode('hex')
b=list(b)
b[0] = chr(ord(b[0]) ^ ord('b') ^ ord('a'))
b = ''.join(b)
c=b.encode('hex')
print c

```

得到构造的token：

```

d8c290e4acefd383cd4bb93a0ee020e6169513e29fd7e5452f955b945cab77cf334
8a76d1ea5cfc9278c8e2ad3539498

```

提交得到flag：`hctf{cRypT0_ls_1nteRestlng!}`

进击的 Crypto [1]

这题怎么说呢，可能是题目有点坑，也可能是我有点傻，最后那个在网页中的flag_enc我一直复制不好，最后用了python才解决，迟了一点，分数也没拿到。不过那都是后话了。

首先我们随便输入，发现每次加密的结果都不一样，我猜测加密的key不可能无限长，所以我输入了非常长的一串‘1’，试出来key的长度为128bytes。然后观察加密后网页的源码，可以发现下面有flag_enc：

```

11         <input type="submit" value="encode">
12     </form>
13 </div>
14 </body>
15 </html>
16
17 <br><br><br><br><br><br>
18 <div align="center"><h2>Cipher:
19 \x65\x66\x0e\x7f\x44\x60\x09\x5f\x10\x78\x7f\x5d\x1e\x10\x15\x15\x63\x50\x7f\x7d\x53\x4d\x51\x61\x5e\x54\x02\x4d\x6f
20 \x59\x00\x45\x1d\x71\x78\x1b\x02\x73\x49\x63\x48\x40\x0f\x10\x69\x71\x6d\x53\x57\x73\x12\x7a\x79\x74\x03\x4d\x15\x41
21 <!-- Flag: }YA+dVW$5XR {=c5Zz'VLv}kmqsXPx++MT@u  ^^djnNMQEci45 {1}-
22 1B1D`k0Ro?J#Yg  c1%cXP! ?/7l-c4kU9wP `sU' *-->

```

加密的方法是 $K \text{ xor } M_{\text{input}} = C_{\text{input}}$ ， $K \text{ xor } \text{Flag} = \text{Flag_enc}$ 。

而我们现在知道了 M_{input} ， C_{input} ， Flag_enc 。

所以 $\text{Flag} = K \text{ xor } \text{Flag_enc} = (M_{\text{input}} \text{ xor } C_{\text{input}}) \text{ xor } \text{Flag_enc}$ 。

先写个python脚本获取Flag_enc(此处吐槽一下为什么Flag_enc不base64或hex显示)：

从而得到了C_input和Flag_enc，python解密之:

得到flag: `hctf{Rive5t_C1pher_4_1s_ez}`