NIST IR 8477-Based Set Theory Relationship Mapping (STRM)
Reference Document: Secure Controls Framework (SCF) version 2025.2
STRM Guidance: https://securecontrolsframework.com/set-theory-relationship-mapping-strm/

Focal Document: CJIS Security Policy v5.9.3
Focal Document URL: https://lee.fbl.gov/cjis-divids/nr/cjis-security-policy-resource-center
Published STRM URL: https://securecontrolsframework.com/content/strm/scf-strm-us-fed-CJIS-5-9.3.pdf

| FDE#  | FDE Name  | Focal Document Element (FDE) Description  | STRM<br>Rationale | STRM<br>Relationship | SCF Control                                       | SCF#   | Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description   | Strength of<br>Relationship<br>(optional) | Notes (optional)           |
|-------|---|---|-------------------|----------------------|---|--------|---|---|----------------------------|
| 4.1   | Criminal Justice<br>Information (CII)   | Cummah Justice information is the term used to refer to all of the PELLS provided data necessary for two enforcement and civil agenicate to perform their missions including, but not timited to biometric, identify history, biographic, property, and case/incident history data. The following categories of Cill describe the various data sets housed by the PELCIS architecture:  1. Biometric Data—data derived from one or more intrinsic physical or behavioral traits of humans typically for the purpose of uniquely identifying individuals from the propriet in the interest of public and public via a public via on public via a public records request is authorized. | Functional        | no relationahip      | N/A   | N/A    | N/A   | N/A                                       | No requirements to map to. |
| 4.1.1 | Criminal History Record<br>Information (CHRI)   | Criminal History Record Information (CHRI), sometimes informally referred to as<br>"restricted data", is a subset of CII. Due to its comparatively sensitive nature,<br>additional controls are required for the access, use and dissemination of CHRI. In<br>addition to the dissemination restrictions outlined below, Title 28, Part 20, Code of<br>Added Regulations (CFR), defines CHRI and provides the regulatory guidance for<br>dissemination of CHRI. While the CIIS Security Policy attempts to be architecturally<br>independent, the II and the NCIC are specifically identified in Title 28, Part 20, CFR,<br>and the NCIC Operating Manual, as associated with CHRI.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Statutory, Regulatory &<br>Contractual Compliance | CPL-01 | Mechanisms exist to facilitate the identification and implementation of relevant statutory, regulatory and contractual controls.  | 5   |                            |
| 4.1.1 | Criminal History Record<br>Information (CHRI)   | Criminal History Record Information (CHRI), sometimes informally referred to as<br>"restricted data", is a subset of Cil. Due to its comparatively sensitive nature,<br>additional controls are required for the access, use and dissemination of CHRI. In<br>addition to the dissemination restrictions cutline below. Title 28, Part 20, Code of<br>Addeas Regulations (CFR), defines CHRI and provides the regulatory guidance for<br>dissemination of CHRI. While the CIIS Security Policy attempts to be architecturally<br>independent, the III and the NCIC are specifically identified in Title 28, Part 20, CFR,<br>and the NCIC Ceptraling Manual, as associated with CHRI.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Data & Asset Classification                       | DCH-02 | Mechanisms exist to ensure data and assets are categorized in accordance with applicable statutory, regulatory and contractual requirements.  | 5   |                            |
| 4.2   | Access, Use and Dissemination of Criminal History Record Information (CHRI), NCIC Restricted Files Information, and NCIC Non-Restricted Files Information | This section describes the requirements for the access, use and dissemination of CHRI, NCIC restricted files information, and NCIC non-restricted files information.  | Functional        | no relationship      | N/A   | N/A    | N/A   | N/A                                       | No requirements to map to. |
| 4.2.1 | Proper Access, Use, and<br>Dissemination of CHRI  | Information obtained from the III is considered CHRI. Rules governing the access,<br>use, and dissemination of CHRI are round in Title 28, Part 20, CFR. The III shall be<br>accessed only for an authorized purpose. Further, CHRI shall only be used for an<br>sunforzing burpose consistent with the purpose for which III was accessed.<br>Dissemination to another agency is authorized If (a) the other agency is an<br>Authorized Recipient of such information and is being serviced by the accessing<br>agency. Of b) the other spency is performing personnel and appointment functions<br>for criminal sustee employment apolicents.   | Functional        | subset of            | Statutory, Regulatory & Contractual Compliance    | CPL-01 | Mechanisms exist to facilitate the identification and implementation of relevant statutory, regulatory and contractual controls.  | 10  |                            |
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| 4.2.2 | Proper Access, Use, and<br>Dissemination of NCIC<br>Restricted Files<br>Information   | The NCIC hosts restricted files and non-restricted files. NCIC restricted files are distinguished from NCIC non-restricted files by policies governing their access and use. Proper access to, use, and dissermination of data from restricted files shall be consistent with the access, use, and dissermination policies concerning the III advanced in Tiles Sp. Part 20, CFR, and the NCIC Operating Menual. The restricted files, which shall be protected as CHRI, are as follows:  1. Gang Files  2. Threat Screening Center Files  3. Supervised Release Files  4. National Sec Offender Registry Files  5. Historical Protection Order Files of the NCIC  6. Identity Thet Files  7. Protective Interest Files  8. Person With Information (WWI) data in the Missing Person Files  9. Volcent Person File  10. NICS Denied Transactions File  The remaining NCI files are considered non-restricted files.   | Functional        | subset of            | Statutory, Regulatory &<br>Contractual Compliance | CPL-01 | Mechanisms exist to facilitate the identification and implementation of relevant statutory, regulatory and contractual controls.  | 10  |                            |
| 4.2.2 | Proper Access, Use, and Dissemination of NCIC Restricted Files Information  | The NCIC hosts restricted files and non-restricted files. NCIC restricted files are distinguished from NCIC non-restricted files by the policies governing their access and use. Propar occess to use, and dissemination of data from restricted files shall be consistent with the access, use, and dissemination policies concerning the III advantage of the NCIC operating Manual. The restricted files, which shall be protected as CHRI, are as follows:  1. Gang Files  2. Threat Screening Center Files  3. Supervised Release Files  4. National Sec Offender Registry Files  5. Historical Potaction Order Files of the NCIC  6. Identity Thet Files  7. Protective Interest Files  8. Person With Information (PW) data in the Missing Person Files  10. NICS Denied Transactions File  10. NICS Denied Transactions File  10. NICS Denied Transactions File  11. Per own Might MCI files are considered non-restricted files.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Data & Asset Classification                       | DCH-02 | Mechanisms exist to ensure data and assets are categorized in accordance with applicable statutory, regulatory and contractual requirements.  | 5   |                            |
| 4.2.2 | Proper Access, Use, and<br>Dissemination of NCIC<br>Restricted Files<br>Information   | The NCIC hosts restricted files and non-restricted files. NCIC extricted files and stirtinguished from NCIC non-restricted files by the policies governing their access and use. Proper access to use, and dissemination of data from restricted files shall be consistent with the access use, and dissemination of data from restricted files shall be consistent with the access use, and dissemination policies concerning that described in Title 2R, Part 2D, CFR, and the NCIC Operating Manual. The restricted files, which shall be protected as CHRI, are as follows:  1. Gain griles  2. Threat Screening Center Files 3. Supervised Release Files 5. Supervised Release Files 5. Historical Protection Order Files of the NCIC sidentity Ther Files 5. Historical Protection Order Files of the NCIC sidentity Ther Files 7. Protective interest Files 8. Premow With Information (PWI) data in the Missing Person Files 9. Violent Person File 10. NCIS Delied Tinasactions File The remaining NCIC files are considered non-restricted files.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Personal Data (PD)<br>Retention & Disposal        | PRI-05 | Nechanisms exist to:  (1) Retain Personal Data (PD), including metadata, for an organization-defined time period to buffli the purpose(s) identified in the notice or as required by law;  (2) Bipose of, destroys, erases, and/or annymizes the Pt. pregardless of the method of storage; and  (3) Use organization-defined techniques or methods to ensure secure deletion or destruction of PD (including originals, copies and archived records). | 5   |                            |



| FDE#    | FDE Name  | Focal Document Element (FDE) Description   | STRM<br>Rationale | STRM<br>Relationship | SCF Control   | SCF#     | Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description   | Strength of<br>Relationship<br>(optional) | Notes (optional)           |
|---------|---|--|-------------------|----------------------|---|----------|---|---|----------------------------|
| 4.2.2   | Proper Access, Use, and<br>Dissemination of NCIC<br>Restricted Files<br>Information     | The MCD hasts restricted files and non-restricted files. NCIC restricted files are distinguished from NCIC non-restricted files by the policies governing their access and use. Proper access to, use, and dissermination of data from restricted files shall be consistent with the access, use, and dissermination policies concerning the III described in Title 2.5, Part 20, OFFA, and the NCIC Operating Manual. The restricted files, which shall be protected as CHRI, are as follows:  1. Gang Files 2. Threat Screening Center Files 3. Supervised Release Files 4. National Sec Offender Registry Files 5. Historical Protection Order Files of the NCIC 6. Identity Phet Files 6. Petron With Information (PWI) data in the Missing Person Files 9. Violent Person Cities are considered non-restricted files.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Internal Use of Personal<br>Data (PD) For Testing,<br>Training and Research | PRI-05.1 | Mechanisms exist to address the use of Personal Data (PD) for internal testing, training and research that:  (1) Takes measures to limit or minimize the amount of PD used for internal testing, training and research purposes, and (2) Authorizes the use of PD when such information is required for internal testing, training and research.  | 5   |                            |
| 4.2.2   | Proper Access, Use, and<br>Dissemination of NCIC<br>Restricted Files<br>Information     | The NCID chast restricted files and non-restricted files. NCIC restricted files are distinguished from NCIC non-restricted files by the policies governing their access and use. Poper access to, use, and dissemination of data from restricted files shall be consistent with the access use, and dissemination policies concerning their discretions of the dissemination policies concerning their discretions of Title 28, Part 20, CFR, and the NCIC Operating Manual. The restricted files, which shall be protected as CHRI, are as follows:  1. Gang Files 2. Threat Screening Center Files 3. Supervised Release Files 5. Supervised Release Files 5. Historical Protection Corder Files of the NCIC 6. Identity the FILE of their MCIC 6. Identity the FILE of Times for the NCIC 6. Identity the FILE of Times for the NCIC 6. Identity the FILE of Times for the NCIC 6. Identity the FILE of Times for the NCIC 6. Identity the FILE of Times for the NCIC 6. Identity the FILE framework files 6. Vicient Person File 1. NCI Scheller framework files 7. In Consideration File 1. In the Residual file of the NCIC 6. In the Residual file | Functional        | intersects with      | Usage Restrictions of<br>Personal Data (PD)                                 | PRI-05.4 | Mechanisms exist to restrict collecting, receiving, processing, storing, transmitting, updating and/or sharing Personal Data (PD) to: (1) The purpose(s) originally collected, consistent with the data privacy notice(s); (2) What is subroized by the data subject, or authorized agent; and (3) What is consistent with applicable laws, regulations and contractual obligations.  | 5   |                            |
| 4.2.3   | Proper Access, Use, and<br>Dissemination of NCIC<br>Non-Restricted Files<br>Information | N/A  | Functional        | no relationship      | N/A   | N/A      | N/A   | N/A                                       | No requirements to map to. |
| 4.2.3.1 | For Official Purposes   | NCIC non-estricted files are those not listed as restricted files in Section 4.2.2.<br>NCIC non-estricted files information may be accessed and used for any authorized<br>purpose consistent with the inquiring agency's responsibility, Information obtained<br>may be disseminated to jo other government agencies or 10 pirates entities<br>authorized by law to receive such information for any purpose consistent with their<br>responsibilities.   | Functional        | subset of            | Data Protection   | DCH-01   | Machanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of data protection controls.  | 10  |                            |
| 4.2.3.1 | For Official Purposes   | NCIC non-restricted files are those not listed as restricted files in Section 4.2.2. NCIC non-restricted files information may be accessed and used for any authorized purpose consistent with the inquiring agency is exponsibility, information obtained now the disseminated to (a) other government agencies or (i) private entities authorized by law to receive such information for any purpose consistent with their responsibilities.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Personal Data (PD)<br>Retention & Disposal                                  | PRI-05   | Mechanisms exist to:  (1) Retain Pernos Data (PD), including metadata, for an organization-defined time period to fulfill the purpose(s) identified in the notice or as required by law;  (2) lipuses of, destroye, enseas, and/or anonymizes the PD, regardless of twice  method of storage; and  (3) Use organization-defined techniques or methods to ensure secure deletion or  destruction of PD (including originals, copies and archived records). | 5   |                            |
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| 4.2.3.2 | For Other Authorized<br>Purposes  | NCIC non-restricted files may be accessed for other purposes consistent with the<br>resources of the inquiring agency however, requests for bulk data are discouraged<br>information derived from NCIC one-restricted files for other than law enforcement<br>purposes can be used by authorized criminal justice personnel only to confirm the<br>status of a person or property (i.e. wanted or stden). An inquiring agency is<br>suthorized to charge a nominal administrative fee for such service. Non-restricted<br>files information shall not be disseminated commercially.<br>A response to a NCIC person inquiry may include NCIC restricted files information<br>as well as NCIC non-restricted files information. Agencies shall not disseminate<br>restricted files information for purposes other than law enforcement.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Personal Data (PD)<br>Retention & Disposal                                  | PRI-05   | Mechanisms exist to:  (I) Retain Personal Data (PD), including metadata, for an organization-defined time period to fulfill the purpose(s) identified in the notice or as required by law;  (2) lipuses of, destroys, erases, and/or anonymizes the PD, regardless of the method of storage; and  (3) time organization-defined techniques or methods to ensure secure deletion or destruction of PD (including originals, copies and archived records).  | 5   |                            |
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| 4.2.3.3 | CSO Authority in Other<br>Circumstances   | If no federal, state or local law or policy prohibition exists, the CSO may exercise discretion to approve or deny dissemination of NCIC non-restricted file information.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Data Stewardship  | DCH-01.1 |   | 5   |                            |
| 4.2.3.3 | CSO Authority in Other<br>Circumstances   | If no federal, state or local law or policy prohibition exists, the CSO may exercise discretion to approve or deny dissemination of NCIC non-restricted file information.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Disclosure of Information   | DCH-03.1 |   | 5   |                            |
| 4.2.4   | Storage   | When CHRI is stored, agencies shall establish appropriate administrative, technical<br>and physical safeguards to ensure the security and confidentiality of the<br>information. These records shall be stored for extended periods only when they are<br>key elements for the integrity and/or utility of case files and/or criminal record files.<br>See Section. 5 of physical security controls.   | Functional        | subset of            | Sensitive / Regulated Data<br>Protection                                    | DCH-01.2 | Mechanisms exist to protect sensitive/regulated data wherever it is stored.   | 10  |                            |
| 4.2.5   | Justification and<br>Penalties  | N/A  In addition to the use of purpose codes and logging information, all users shall  | Functional        | no relationship      | N/A   | N/A      | N/A   | N/A                                       | No requirements to map to. |
| 4.2.5.1 | Justification   | provide a reason for all III inquiries whenever requested by NCIC System Managers,<br>CSAs, local agency administrators, or their representatives.   | Functional        | no relationship      | N/A   | N/A      | N/A   | N/A                                       | No requirements to map to. |
| 4.2.5.2 | Penatties   | Improper access, use or dissemination of CHRI and NCIC Non-Restricted Files<br>information is serious and may result in administrative sanctions including, but not<br>limited to, termination of services and state and federal criminal penalties.   | Functional        | no relationship      | N/A   | N/A      | N/A   | N/A                                       | No requirements to map to. |



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|---------|---|---|-------------------|----------------------|---|----------|---|---|------------------|
| 4.3     | Personally Identifiable<br>Information (Pil)      | For the purposes of this document, Pills information which can be used to distinguish or trace an individual's identity, such as name, social security number, or biometric records, alone or when combined with other personal or identifying information which is linked or linkable to a specific individual, such as date and place of birth, or mother's maiden name. Any FBI CIIS provided data maintained by a agency, including but not limited to, deucation, financial transactions, medical history, and criminal or employment history may include PIII. A criminal history record for example inherently contained. Pila soudial ca law efforcement National Data Exchange (N-DE) case file. Pill hall be extracted from CII for the purpose of official business only. Agencies shall develop policies, based on state and local privacy rules, to ensure appropriate controls are applied when handling IP extracted from CII. Due to the expansion nature of PII, this Policy does not specify auditing, logging, or personnel security resumentances associated with the life ovide of PII.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Statutory, Regulatory & Contractual Compliance                              | CPL-01   | Mechanisms exist to facilitate the identification and implementation of relevant statutory, regulatory and contractual controls.  | 5   |                  |
| 4.3     | Personally Identifiable<br>Information (PII)      | increase purposes of this occument, Pril is intornation which can be used to distinguish or trace an individual's identity, such as name, social security number, or biometric records, alone or when combined with other personal or identifying information which is linked or linkable to a specific individual, such as date and place of britth, or mother's maiden name. Any PEI CIIS provided data maintained by an agency, including but not tilmeted to, deucation, financial transactions, medical history, and criminal or employment history may include PII. A criminal history record for example inherently contains PII as would a Law Enforcement National. Data Exchange (N-DE) case file. PII shall be extracted from CI for the purpose of official business only. Agencies shall develop policies, based on state and local privacy rules, to ensure appropriate controls are applied when handling PII extracted from CII. Due to the expansive muture of PII, this Policy does not specify qualifity, logging, or personnel security   | Functional        | intersects with      | Data & Asset Classification   | DCH-02   | Mechanisms exist to ensure data and assets are categorized in accordance with applicable statutory, regulatory and contractual requirements.  | 5   |                  |
| 4.3     | Personally Identifiable<br>Information (PII)      | requirements associated with the life covie of PII.  For the purpose of this document, PIII intromation which can be used to distinguish or trace an individual's identity, such as name, social security number, or biometric records, since or when combined with other personal or identifying information which is linked or linkable to a specific individual, such as date and place of birth, or mother's maiden aman, Any FIE LIS provided data maintained by an agency, including but not limited to, education, financial transactions, medical history, and criminal or employment history may include PII. A criminal history record for example inherently contains PII as would a Law Enforcement National Data Exchange (N-DES) case file.  PII shall be extracted from CII for the purpose of official business only, Agencies shall develop policies, based on state and local privacy rule, to ensure appropriate control as a applied when handling PII extracted from CII. Due to the expansive nature of PII, his PII below the provided of the provided | Functional        | intersects with      | Personal Data (PD)<br>Retention & Disposal                                  | PRI-05   | Mechanisms exist to: (i) Retain Person Later (PD), including metadata, for an organization-defined time period to fulfill the purpose(s) identified in the notice or as required by law; (i) Dispose of, destroys, erases, and/or anonymizes the PD, regardless of the method of storage; and (i) Use organization-defined techniques or methods to ensure secure deletion or destruction of PD (including originals, copies and archived records). | 5   |                  |
| 4.3     | Personally Identifiable<br>Information (PII)      | distinguish or trace an individual's identity, such as name, social security number, or biometric records, alone or when combined with other personal or identifying information which is linked or linkable to a specific individual, such as date and place of birth, or mother's maiden name. Any FBI CIIS provided data maintained by an agency, including but not timeted to, education, financial transactions, medical history, and criminal or employment history may include PII. A criminal history record for example, inherently contains PII as avoid a La sur efforcement National Data Exchange (N-DE) case file. PII and the extracted from CII for the purpose of official business only. Agencies shall develop policies, based on state and local privacy rules, to ensure appropriate controls are applied when handling IP extracted from CII to Use to the expansion nature of PII, this Policy does not specify sudding, logging, or personnel security  | Functional        | intersects with      | Internal Use of Personal<br>Data (PD) For Testing,<br>Training and Research | PRI-05.1 | Mechanisms exist to address the use of Personal Data (PD) for internal testing,<br>training and research that:<br>(1) Takes measures to limit or minimize the amount of PD used for internal testing,<br>training and research purposes, and<br>(2) Authorizes the use of PD when such information is required for internal testing,<br>training and research.  | 5   |                  |
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| 5.1     | Policy Area 1: Information<br>Exchange Agreements | The information shared through communication mediums shall be protected with  | Functional        | intersects with      | Information Sharing   | DCH-14   | Mechanisms exist to utilize a process to assist users in making information sharing decisions to ensure data is appropriately protected.  | 5   |                  |
| 5.1     | Policy Area 1: Information<br>Exchange Agreements | The information shared through communication mediums shall be protected with  | Functional        | subset of            | Cybersecurity & Data<br>Protection Governance<br>Program                    | GOV-01   | Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of cybersecurity & data<br>protection governance controls.  | 10  |                  |
| 5.1.1   | Information Exchange                              | Before exchanging CJI, agencies shall put formal agreements in place that specify security controls. The exchange of information may take several forms including electronic mail, instant messages, whe services, faceimile, hard copy, and information systems sending, receiving and storing CJI. Information exchange agreements to regone salversel parties. Information exchange agreements to regone is sharing CJI data that is sent to and/or received from the FBI CJIS shall specify the security controls and conditions described in this document. Information exchange agreements to regone is sharing CJI data that is an extra object owners. The committing both parties to the terms of information exchange agreements in committing both parties to the terms of information exchange, agreements undivided the committed of the | Functional        | intersects with      | Information Sharing   | DCH-14   | Mechanisms exist to utilize a process to assist users in making information sharing decisions to ensure data is appropriately protected.  | 5   |                  |
| 5,1.1   | Information Exchange                              | Before exchanging CJI, agencies shall put formal agreements in place that specify security controls. The exchange of information may take several forms including electronic mail. Instant messages, whe services, faceimile, hard copy, and information systems sending, receiving and storing CJI. Information exchange agreements to regione is sharing CJI attent the roles, responsibilities, and data ownership between agencies and any external parties. Information exchange agreements for specialise sharing CJI data that is sent to and/or received from the FBI CJIS shall specify the security controls and conditions described in this document. Information exchange agreements for special specialise shall be supported by Occumentation committing both parties to the terms of information exchange. Agreements or subsequent sections, different agreements and policies apply, depending on whether the parties involved ane CJAs or NCIAs. See Appendix D for samples of information exchange Agreements.  There may be instances, on an ad-hoc basis, where CJI is authorized for further dissemination of Authorized Recipients not covered by an information exchange agreement with the releasing agency, in these instances the dissemination of CJI is considered to be secondary dissemination. Lext Enforcement and child agencies shall have a local policy to validate a requestor of CJI as an authorized recipient before desemination (CJI seemination guidance.  | Functional        | subset of            | Cybersecurity & Data<br>Protection Governance<br>Program                    | GOV-01   | Nechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of cybersecurity & data profession governance controls.   | 10  |                  |
| 5.1.1.1 | Information Handling                              | Procedures for handling and storage of information shall be established to protect that information from unauthorized disclosure, attention or misuse. Using the requirements in this Policy as a starting point, the procedures shall apply to the handling, processing, storing, and communication of CII. These procedures apply to the exchange of CI in omatter the form of exchange. The policies for information handling and protection also apply to using CJI shared with or received from PEILOIS for norminal justice purposes. In general, a noncriminal justice purpose includes the use of criminal history records for purposes authorized by floation or state law other than purpose relating to the administration of criminal justice, including—but not limited to - employment suitability, locaning determinations, immigration and naturalization matters, and national security clearances.  | Functional        | subset of            | Data Protection   | DCH-01   | Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of data protection controls.  | 10  |                  |



Secure Controls Framework (SCF) 3 of 3

| FDE#    | FDE Name                                    | Focal Document Element (FDE) Description   | STRM<br>Rationale | STRM<br>Relationship | SCF Control  | SCF#     | Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description  | Strength of<br>Relationship<br>(optional) | Notes (optional) |
|---------|---|--|-------------------|----------------------|--|----------|--|---|------------------|
| 5.1.1.1 | Information Handling                        | Procedures for handling and storage of information shall be established to protect that information from unauthorized disclosure, alteration crisiuse. Uning the requirements in this Policy as a starting point, the procedures shall apply to the requirements in this Policy as a starting point, the procedures shall apply to the exchange of CII no matter the form of exchange. The policies for information handling and protection also apply to using CII shared with or received from PB CIII 5th ronnorminal justice purposes. In general, a noncriminal justice purpose includes the use of criminal history records for purposes authorized by fearled or tast less wheth then purposes relating to the administration of criminal justice, including—but not limited to-employment suitability, Icensing determinations, in miningstion and naturalization matters, and national security clearances. | Functional        | intersects with      | Data Stewardship   | DCH-01.1 | Mechanisms exist to ensure data stewardship is assigned, documented and communicated.  | 5   |                  |
| 5.1.1.1 | Information Handling                        | that information from unauthorized disclosure, attention or misuse. Using the<br>requirements in this Policy as a starting point, the procedures shall apply to the<br>handling, processing, storing, and communication of CII. These procedures apply to<br>the exchange of CII no matter the form of exchange.<br>The policies for information handling and protection also apply to using CII shared<br>with or received from EBI CIIS for noncriminal justice purposes. In general, a<br>noncriminal justice, purches be used or minimal thatory records for<br>purposes authorized by federal or state law other than purposes relating to the<br>administration of criminal justice, including—but not limite to -employment<br>suitability, Licensing determinations, immigration and naturalization matters, and<br>national security clearances.  | Functional        | subset of            | Cybersecurity & Data<br>Protection Governance<br>Program                       | GOV-01   | Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of cybersecurity & data<br>protection governance controls.   | 10  |                  |
| 5.1.1.1 | Information Handling                        | Procedures for handling and storage of information shall be established to protect that information from unauthorized disclosure, afteration or misuse. Using the requirements in this Policy as a starting point, the procedures shall apply to the handling, processing, storing, and communication of CLI. These procedures apply to the exchange of Cli no matter the form of exchange. The policies for information handling and protection also apply to using CJI shared with or received from FBI CJIS for noncriminal justice purposes. In general, a noncriminal justice purpose in the story seconds for purposes authorized by federal or state law other than purposes relating to the administration of criminal justice, including—but not limited to -employment suitability, Leensing determinations, immigration and naturalization matters, and national security clearances.                     | Functional        | intersects with      | Sensitive / Regulated Data<br>Storage, Handling &<br>Processing                | SAT-03.3 | Mechanisms exist to ensure that every user accessing, a system processing, storing or transmitting sensitive / regulated data is formally trained in data handling requirements.                             | 5   |                  |
| 5.1.1.2 | State and Federal Agency<br>User Agreements | Each CSA head or SIB Chief shall execute a signed written user agreement with the<br>FBI CIIS Division stating their willingness to demonstrate conformity with this Policy<br>before accessing and participating in CIIS records information programs. This<br>agreement shall include the standards and sanctions governing utilization of CIIS<br>systems. As coordinated through the particular CSA or SIB Chief, each interface<br>Agency shall also allow the FBI to periodically test the ability to penetrate the FBI's<br>network through the external network connection or system. All user agreements<br>with the FBI CIIS Division shall be coordinated with the CSA head.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Information Sharing  | DCH-14   | Mechanisms exist to utilize a process to assist users in making information sharing decisions to ensure data is appropriately protected.   | 5   |                  |
| 5.1.1.2 | State and Federal Agency<br>User Agreements | Each CSA head or SIB Chief shall execute a signed written user agreement with the<br>FBI CJIS Division stating their willingness to demonstrate conformity with this Policy<br>before accessing and participating in CJIS records information programs. This<br>agreement shall include the standards and sanctions governing utilization of CJIS<br>systems. As coordinated through the particular CSA or SIG Chief, each Interface<br>Agency shall also allow the FBI to periodically test the ability to penetrate the FBI's<br>network through the external network connection or system. All user agreements<br>with the FBI CJIS bission shall be coordinated with the CSA head.   | Functional        | subset of            | Cybersecurity & Data<br>Protection Governance<br>Program                       | GOV-01   | Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of cybersecurity & data<br>protection governance controls.   | 10  |                  |
| 5.1.1.2 | State and Federal Agency<br>User Agreements | Each CSA head or SIB Chief shall execute a signed written user agreement with the<br>FBI CJIS Division stating their willingness to demonstrate conformity with this Policy<br>before accessing and participating in CJIS records information programs. This<br>agreement shall include the standards and sanctions governing utilization of CJIS<br>systems. As coordinated through the particular CSA or SIS Chief, each Interface<br>Agency shall also allow the FBI to periodically test the ability to penetrate the FBI's<br>network through the external network connection or system. All user agreements<br>with the FBI CJIS bission shall be coordinated with the CSA head.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Adequate Security for<br>Sensitive / Regulated Data<br>In Support of Contracts | IAO-03.2 | Mechanisms exist to protect sensitive / regulated data that is collected, developed, received, transmitted, used or stored in support of the performance of a contract.                                      | 5   |                  |
| 5.1.1.2 | State and Federal Agency<br>User Agreements | Each CSA head or SIB Chief shall execute a signed written user agreement with the<br>FBI CIIS Division stating their willingness to demonstrate conformity with this Policy<br>before accessing and participating for ISF secords information programs. This<br>agreement shall include the standards and sanctions governing utilization of CIIS<br>systems. As coordinated through the particular CSA or SIB Chief, each Interface<br>Agency shall also allow the FBI to periodically test the ability to penetrate the FBI's<br>network through the asternal network connection or system. All user agreements<br>with the FBI CIIS Division shall be coordinated with the CSA head.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Information Sharing With<br>Third Parties                                      | PRI-07   | Mechanisms exist to disclose Personal Data (PD) to third-parties only for the<br>purposes identified in the data privacy notice and with the implicit or explicit<br>consent of the data subject.            | 5   |                  |
| 5.1.1.2 | State and Federal Agency<br>User Agreements | Each CSA head or SIB Chief shall execute a signed written user agreement with the<br>FBI CIIS Division stating their willingness to demonstrate conformity with this Policy<br>before accessing and participating for ISF secords information programs. This<br>agreement shall include the standards and sanctions governing utilization of CIIS<br>systems. As coordinated through the particular CSA or SIS Chief, each interface<br>Agency shall also allow the FBI to periodically test the ability to penetrate the FBI's<br>network through the external network connection or system. All user agreements<br>with the FBI CIS Division shall be coordinated with the CSA head.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Data Privacy Requirements<br>for Contractors & Service<br>Providers            | PRI-07.1 | Mechanisms exist to include data privacy requirements in contracts and other acquisition-related documents that establish data privacy roles and responsibilities for contractors and service providers.     | 5   |                  |
| 5.1.1.2 | State and Federal Agency<br>User Agreements | Each CSA head or SIB Chief shall execute a signed written user agreement with the<br>FBI CIIS Division stating their willingness to demonstrate conformity with this Policy<br>before accessing and participating for ISF ecoral information programs. This<br>agreement shall include the standards and sanctions governing utilization of CIIS<br>systems. As coordinated through the particular CSA or SIS Chief, each Interface<br>Agency shall also allow the FBI to periodically test the ability to penetrate the FBI's<br>network through the external network connection or system. All user agreements<br>with the FBI CIIS Division shall be coordinated with the CSA head.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Third-Party Contract<br>Requirements   | TPM-05   | Mechanisms exist to require contractual requirements for cybersecurity & data<br>privacy requirements with third-parties, reflecting the organization's needs to<br>protect its systems, processes and data. | 5   |                  |
| 5.1.1.3 | Criminal Justice Agency<br>User Agreements  | Any CLA receiving access to CLI shall enter into a signed written agreement with the spropriate signery submitly of the CSA providing the access. The written agreement shall specify the FBI CJIS systems and services to which the agency will have access, and the FBI CJIS bivision policies to which the agency must adhere. These agreements shall include:  1. Audit. 2. Dissemination. 3. Hit confirmation. 4. Logging. 5. Quality Assurance (QA). 6. Screening (Pre-Employment). 7. Security. 8. Timeliness. 9. Training. 10. Use of the system. 11. Validation.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Information Sharing  | DCH-14   | Mechanisms exist to utilize a process to assist users in making information sharing decisions to ensure data is appropriately protected.   | 5   |                  |
| 5.1.1.3 | Criminal Justice Agency<br>User Agreements  | Any CLA receiving access to Cla shall enter into a signed written agreement with the suppropriets eliginary submity of the CSA providing the access. The written agreement shall specify the FEI CJIS systems and services to which the agency will have access, and the FEI CJIS bytision policies to which the agency must adhere. These agreements shall include:  1. Audit.  2. Dissemination.  3. Hit confirmation.  4. Logging.  6. Screening (Pre-Employment).  7. Security.  8. Timeliness.  9. Training.  10. Use of the system.  11. Validation.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Adequate Security for<br>Sensitive / Regulated Data<br>In Support of Contracts | IAO-03.2 | Mechanisms exist to protect sensitive / regulated data that is collected, developed, received, transmitted, used or stored in support of the performance of a contract.                                      | 5   |                  |



| FDE#     | FDE Name  | Focal Document Element (FDE) Description   | STRM<br>Rationale | STRM<br>Relationship | SCF Control  | SCF#     | Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description  | Strength of<br>Relationship<br>(optional) | Notes (optional) |
|----------|---|--|-------------------|----------------------|--|----------|--|---|------------------|
| 5.1.1.3  | Criminal Justice Agency<br>User Agreements                          | Any CLA receiving access to CL shall enter into a signed written agreement with the spropriate signery authority of the CAS providing the access. The written agreement shall specify the FBI CJB systems and services to which the agency will have access, and the FBI CJB Shvision policies to which the agency must adhere. These agreements shall include:  1. Audit.  2. Dissemination.  3. Hit confirmation.  4. Logging.  5. Quality Assurance (QA).  6. Screening (Pre-Employment).  7. Security.  8. Timeliness.  9. Training.  10. Use of the system.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Information Sharing With<br>Third Parties                                      | PRI-07   | Mechanisms exist to disclose Personal Data (PD) to third-parties only for the<br>purpose identified in the data privacy notice and with the implicit or explicit<br>consent of the data subject.               | 5   |                  |
| 5.1.1.3  | Criminal Justice Agency<br>User Agreements                          | 11. Validation. Any CIA receiving access to CII shall enter into a signed written agreement with the appropriate signatory authority of the CSA providing the access. The written agreement shall specify the FBI CIS systems and services to which the agency will have access, and the FBI CIS Division policies to which the agency must achere. These agreements shall include:  1. Audit. 2. Dissemination. 3. His confirmation. 4. Logging. 5. Quality Answares (QA). 5. Quality Answares (QA). 8. Timeliness. 9. Training. 10. Use of the system. 10. Use of the system. 11. Validation.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Data Privacy Requirements<br>for Contractors & Service<br>Providers            | PRI-07.1 | Mechanisms exist to include data privacy requirements in contracts and other acquisition-related documents that entablish data privacy roles and responsibilities for contractors and service providers.       | 5   |                  |
| 5.1.1.3  | Criminal Justice Agency<br>User Agreements                          | Any CLA receiving access to Cla shall enter into a signed written agreement with the sperportate signerty authority of the CAS providing the access. The written agreement shall specify the FBI CJB systems and services to which the agency will have access, and the FBI CJB bission policies to which the agency must adhere. These agreements shall include:  1. Audit. 2. Dissemination. 3. Hit confirmation. 4. Logging. 6. Screening (Pre-Employment). 7. Security, 8. Timeliness. 9. Training. 10. Use of the system. 11. Validation.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Third-Party Contract<br>Requirements   | TPM-05   | Mechanisms exist to require contractual requirements for cybersecurity & data<br>privacy requirements with third-parties, effecting the organization's needs to<br>protect its systems, processes and data.    | 5   |                  |
| 5.1.1.4  | Interagency and<br>Management Control<br>Agreements                 | A NCIA (government) designated to perform criminal justice functions for a CIA shall be eligible for access to the CI. Access shall be permitted when such designation is authorized pursuant to execute order, statute, regulation, or interagency agreement. The NCIA shall sign and execute a management control agreement (NCA) with the CIA, which stipulates a management control of the criminal justice function remains solely with the CIA. The MCA may be a separate document or included with the language of an interagency agreement. An example of an NCIA (government) as city information technology (If) department.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Information Sharing  | DCH-14   | Mechanisms exist to utilize a process to assist users in making information sharing decisions to ensure data is appropriately protected.   | 5   |                  |
| 5.1.1.4  | Interagency and<br>Management Control<br>Agreements                 | A NCIA (government) designated to perform criminal justice functions for a CIA shall be eligible for access to the CI. Access shall be permitted when such designation is authorized pursuant to execute order, statute, regulation, or interagency agreement. The NCIA shall sign and execute a management control agreement (NCA) with the CIA, which stipulates management control of the criminal justice function remains solely with the CIA. The MCA may be a separate document or included with the language of an interagency agreement. An example of an NCIA (government) is a city information technology (If) department.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Adequate Security for<br>Sensitive / Regulated Data<br>In Support of Contracts | IAO-03.2 | Mechanisms exist to protect sensitive / regulated data that is collected,<br>developed, received, transmitted, used or stored in support of the performance of<br>a contract.                                  | 5   |                  |
| 5.1.1.4  | Interagency and<br>Management Control<br>Agreements                 | A NCIA (government) designated to perform criminal justice functions for a CIA shall be eligible for access to the CI. Access shall be permitted when such designation is authorized pursuant no executive order, statute, regulation, or interagency agreement. The NCIA shall sign and execute a management control agreement (NCA) with the CIA, which stipulates a management control of the criminal justice function remains solely with the CIA. The MCA may be a separate document or included with the language of an interagency agreement. An example of an NCIA (government) is a city information technology (If) departmentopy.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Information Sharing With<br>Third Parties                                      | PRI-07   | Machanisms exist to disclose Personal Data (PD) to third-parties only for the<br>purposes identified in the data privacy notice and with the implicit or explicit<br>consent of the data subject.              | 5   |                  |
| 5.1.1.4  | Interagency and<br>Management Control<br>Agreements                 | A NCIA (government) designated to perform criminal justice functions for a CIA shall be eligible for access to the CI. Access shall be permitted when such designation is authorized pursuant no executive order, statute, regulation, or interagency agreement. The NCIA shall sign and execute a management control agreement (NCA) with the CIA, which stipulates management control of the criminal justice function remains solely with the CIA. The NCA may be a separate document or included with the language of an interagency agreement. An example of an NCIA (government) as city information technology (If) department.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Data Privacy Requirements<br>for Contractors & Service<br>Providers            | PRI-07.1 | Mechanisms exist to include data privacy requirements in contracts and other<br>acquisition-related documents that establish data privacy roles and<br>responsibilities for contractors and service providers. | 5   |                  |
| 5.1.1.4  | Interagency and<br>Management Control<br>Agreements                 | A NCIA (government) designated to perform criminal justice functions for a CIA shall be eligible for access to the CI. Access shall be permitted when such designation is suthorized pursuant to execute or control, statute, regulation, or interagency agreement. The NCIA shall sign and execute a management control agreement (MCA) with the CIA, which stipulates management control of the criminal justice function remains solely with the CIA. The MCA may be a separate document or necluded with the language of an interagency agreement. An example of an NCIA (government) is a city information technology (IT) department.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Third-Party Contract<br>Requirements   | TPM-05   | Mechanisms exist to require contractual requirements for cybersecurity & data<br>privacy requirements with third-parties, reflecting the organization's needs to<br>protect its systems, processes and data.   | 5   |                  |
| \$.1.1.5 | Private Contractor User<br>Agreements and CJIS<br>Security Addendum | The CLIS Security Addendum is a uniform addendum to an agreement between the<br>government agency and a private contractor, approved by the Attorney General of<br>the United States, which specifically authorizes access to CHRI, limits the use of the<br>information to the purposes for which is provided, ensures the security and<br>confidentiality of the information is consistent with existing regulations and the CIS<br>Security Policy, provides for sanctions, and contains such other provisions as the CIS<br>Security Policy, provides for sanctions, and contains such other provisions as the<br>Attorney General may require.<br>Physics contractors who perform criminal justice functions shall meet the same<br>training and certification criteria required by governmental agencies performing a<br>similar function, and shall be subject to the same extent of sudit review as are tocal<br>user agencies. All private contractors who perform criminal justice functions shall<br>acknowledge, via signing of the CIS Security<br>Addendum. The CIS Security Addendum is presented in Appendix H. Modifications<br>to the CIS Security Addendum shall be enacted only by the FBI.<br>1. Private contractors designated to perform criminal justice functions for a CIA<br>shall be eligible for access to CII. Access shall be permitted pursuant to an<br>agreement which specifically identifies the agency's purpose and scope of providing<br>services for the administration of criminal justice. The agreement between the CIA<br>and the private contractor shall incorporate the CIS Security<br>Addendum. 2016. The concess to CII. Access shall be permitted<br>pursuant to an agreement which specifically identifies the agency's purpose and<br>scope of providing services for the administration of criminal justice. The agreement<br>between the NCIA and the private contractor shall incorporate the CIS Security<br>Addendum. 2016. The CIS Security<br>Addendum approved by the Director of the FBI, acting for the U.S. Attorney General,<br>as referenced in Title 28 CFR 20.33 (a)?. | Functional        | intersects with      | Information Sharing  | DCH-14   | Mechanisms exist to utilize a process to assist users in making information sharing decisions to ensure data is appropriately protected.   | 5   |                  |



| FDE#    | FDE Name  | Focal Document Element (FDE) Description   | STRM<br>Rationale | STRM<br>Relationship | SCF Control  | SCF#     | Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description  | Strength of<br>Relationship | Notes (optional) |
|---------|---|--|-------------------|----------------------|--|----------|--|-----------------------------|------------------|
| 5.1.1.5 | Private Contractor User<br>Agreements and CJIS<br>Security Addendum | The CJIS Security Addendum is a uniform addendum to an agreement between the government agency and so private contractor, approved by the Attornicy General of the United States, which is perivate contractor, approved by the Attornicy General of the United States, which specifically authorizes access to CHRI, limits the use of the information to the purposes for which it is provided, ensures the security and confidentially of the information is consistent with existing regulations and the CJIS Security Policy, provides for sanctions, and contains such other provisions as the Attorney General may require.  Private contractors who perform criminal justice functions shall meet the same training and certification criteria required by governmental agencies performing a similar function, and shall be subject to the same extent of audit review as are local user agencies. All private contractors who perform criminal justice functions all acknowledge, via signing of the CJIS Security Addendum. The CJIS Security Addendum carried trained and provided to the CJIS Security Addendum. The CJIS Security Addendum is presented in Appendix H. Modification to the CJIS Security Addendum size of the extensive private contractors designated to perform criminal justice functions for a CJIA and the private contractors designated to perform criminal justice functions for a CJIA and the private contractors designated to perform criminal justice. The agreement between the CJIA and the private contractors and lincorporate the CJIS Security Addendum approved by the Divector of the FIB, acting for the LS. Attorney General, as referenced in Title 2 CFR 20.3 3 (a)(7).  2. Private contractors designated to perform criminal justice. The agreement between the CJIA and the private contractors shall incorporate the CJIA and the private contractors and approved by the Divector of the SJB, acting for the LS. Attorney General, as referenced in Title 2 CFR 20.3 3 (a)(7).   | Functional        | intersects with      | Adequate Security for<br>Sensitive / Regulated Data<br>In Support of Contracts | IAO-03.2 | Mechanisms exist to protect sensitive / regulated data that is collected, developed, received, transmitted, used or stored in support of the performance of a contract.                                  | 5                           |                  |
| 5.1.1.5 | Private Contractor User<br>Agreements and CJIS<br>Security Addendum | The CIJS Security Addendum is a uniform addendum to an agreement between the government agency and a private contractor, approved by the Attorny General of the United States, which specifically authorizes access to CHRI, limits the use of the information to the purposes for which it is provided, ensures the security and confidentially of the information is consistent with existing regulations and the CIJS Security Policy, provides for sanctions, and contains such other provisions as the Attorney General of any require.  Private contractors who perform criminal justice functions shall meet the same training and certification criteria required by governmental agencies performing a similar function, and shall be subject to the same extent of audit review as are local user agencies. All private contractors who perform criminal justice functions all acknowledge, via signing of the CIJS Security Addendum. The CIJS Security Addendum services and the CIJS Security Addendum. The CIJS Security Addendum is presented in Appendix H. Modification to the CIJS Security Addendum is presented in the CIJS Security Addendum that of the contractors designated to perform criminal justice functions for a CIJA and the private contractors designated to perform criminal justice functions for a CIJA and the private contractors designated to perform criminal justice functions for a CIJA and the private contractors designated to perform criminal justice. The agreement between the CIJA and the private contractors designated to perform criminal justice. The agreement between the CIJA and the private contractors designated to perform criminal justice. The agreement between the CIJA and the private contractors designated to perform criminal justice. The agreement between the CIJA and the private contractors designated to perform criminal justice. The agreement between the CIJA and the private contractors of the CIJA Security Addendum approved by the Divector of the Agdendum approved to the CIJA Security Addendum approved to the CIJA Security A | Functional        | intersects with      | Information Sharing With<br>Third Parties                                      | PRI-07   | Mechanisms exist to disclose Personal Data (PD) to third-parties only for the purposes identified in the data privacy notice and with the implicit or explicit consent of the data subject.              | 5                           |                  |
| 5.1.1.5 | Private Contractor User<br>Agreements and CJIS<br>Security Addendum | The CJIS Security Addendum is a uniform addendum to an agreement between the government agency and a private contractor, approved by the Attemy General of the United States, which specifically admicrates access to CHR, limits the use of the information to the purposes for which it is provided, ensures the security and confidentially of the information is consistent with existing regulations and the CJIS Security Policy, provides for sanctions, and contains such other provisions as the Attemney General on my require.  Private contractors who perform criminal justice functions shall meet the same training and certification criteria required by governmental agencies performing a similar function, and shall be subject to the same extent of audit review as are local user agencies. All private contractors who perform criminal justice functions shall acknowledge, via signing of the CJIS Security Addendum. The CJIS Security Addendum and the cJIS Security Addendum. The CJIS Security Addendum is presented in Appendix H. Modifications to the CJIS Security Addendum and the contractors designated to perform criminal justice functions or a CJI and the private contractors designated to perform criminal justice functions or a CJI and the private contractors designated to perform criminal justice functions on the CJIS Security by the Director of the EJIS Security Addendum approved by the Director of the EJIS Security Addendum approved by the Director of the EJIS Security Addendum approved by the Director of the EJIS Security Addendum approved by the Director of the EJIS Security Addendum approved providing services for the administration of criminal justice. The agreement between the CJIA and the private contractors designated to perform criminal justice functions on behalf of a NCJIA (government) shall be eligible for access to CJI. Access shall be permitted providing services for the administration of criminal justice. The general to the CJIS Security Addendum approved to the EJIS Security Addendum approved by the Director of | Functional        | intersects with      | Data Privacy Requirements<br>for Contractors & Service<br>Providers            | PRI-07.1 | Mechanisms exist to include data privacy requirements in contracts and other acquilation-related documents that entablish data privacy roles and responsibilities for contractors and service providers. | 5                           |                  |
| 5.1.1.5 | Private Contractor User<br>Agreements and CIIS<br>Security Addendum | The CLIS Security Addendum is a uniform addendum to an agreement between the government agency and a private contractor, approved by the Attorney General of the United States, which specifically authorizes access to CHR, limits the use of the information to the purposes for which it is provided, ensures the security and confidentially of the information to consistent with existing regulations and the CLIS Security Delicy, provides for senctions, and contains such other provisions as the Attorney General of the CLIS Security and contractors who present in a security and contractors who present in a security and contractors who present a security and contractors who present a security and contractors who present a security and a small are function, and shall be subject to the same settent of such review as are tool user agencies. All private contractors who perform criminal justice functions shall administration. The CLIS Security Addendum and the CLIS Security Addendum, the CLIS Security Addendum, and the CLIS Security Addendum, and the CLIS Security Addendum, and the CLIS Security Addendum approved by the Director of the FIB, acting for the U.S. Attorney General, as referenced in Title 25 CRI 20.33 (a)(7).  2. Private contractors and all incorporate the CLIS Security Addendum approved by the Director of the FIB, acting for the U.S. Attorney General, as referenced in Title 25 CRI 20.33 (a)(7).  2. Private contractors and all presents and the CLIS Security Addendum approved by the Director of the | Functional        | intersects with      | Third-Party Contract<br>Requirements   |          | Mechanisms exist to require contractual requirements for cybersecurity & data privacy requirement with third-paint, effecting the organization's needs to protect its systems, processes and data.       | 5                           |                  |



| FDE#    | FDE Name                                | Focal Document Element (FDE) Description   | STRM<br>Rationale | STRM<br>Relationship | SCF Control  | SCF#     | Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description  | Strength of<br>Relationship<br>(optional) | Notes (optional) |
|---------|---|--|-------------------|----------------------|--|----------|--|---|------------------|
| 5.1.1.6 | Agency User Agreements                  | ANCIA (public) designated to request civil fingerprint-based background checks, with the full consent of the individual to whom a background ecke it staining place, for noncriminal justice functions, shall be eligible for access to C.II. Access shall be permitted when such designation is authorized pursuant to federal law or state statute approved by the U.S. Attorney General. ANCIA (public) receiving access to C.II. shall enter into a signed written agreement with the appropriate signatory authority of the CSA/SIB providing the access. An example of a NCIA (public) is a county school board.  A NCIA (private) designated to request civil finger print-based background checks, which is the control of the control of the county school board.  A NCIA (private) designation is unbitorized pursuant or federal law or state statute approved by the U.S. Attorney General. A NCIA (private) receiving access to C.II. shall enter into a signed written agreement with the approviate signatory authority of the CSA, SIB, or authorized pursuant for federal law or state statute approved by the U.S. Attorney General. A NCIA (private) receiving access to C.II. shall enter into a signed written agreement with the appropriate signatory authority of the CSA, SIB, or authorized agency providing the access. An example of a NCIA (private) is a local bank.  All NCIAs accessing C.II shall the subject to all pertinent areas or the C.II Security Policy (see Appendix I/or supplemental againance). Each NCIA that directly accesses FBI C.II shall also allow the FBI to periodically text the ability to penetrate the FBI's network through the acternal network connection or system.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Information Sharing  | DCH-14   | Mechanisms exist to utilize a process to assist users in making information sharing decisions to ensure data is appropriately protected.   | 5   |                  |
| 5.1.1.6 | Agency User Agreements                  | A NCIA (public) designated to request civil fingerprint-based background checks, with the full consent of the individual to whom a background check is taking place, with the full consent of the individual to whom a background check is taking place for nonciminal justice functions, shall be eligible for access to CIA. Access shall be permitted when such designation is authorized pursuant to federal law or state statute approved by the LS. Attorney General. A NCIA (public) receiving access to CIA. CIA. CONTRACT of the CIA. CIA. CONTRACT of the CIA. CIA. CIA. CIA. CONTRACT of the CIA. CIA. CIA. CIA. CIA. CIA. CIA. CIA.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Adequate Security for<br>Sensitive Regulated Data<br>In Support of Contracts   | IAO-03.2 | Mechanisms exist to protect sensitive: /regulated data that is collected, developed, received, transmitted, used or stored in support of the performance of a contract.                                      | 5   |                  |
| 5.1.1.6 | Agency User Agreements                  | A NCIA (public) designated to request civil fingerprint-based background checks, with the bull consent of the individual to whom a background check is taking place, which was the consent of the individual to whom a background check is taking place. The office of the consent of the individual to whom a background check is taking place. Of the consent | Functional        | intersects with      | Information Sharing With<br>Third Parties                                      | PRI-07   | Mechanisms exist to disclose Personal Data (PC) to third-parties only for the purposes identified in the data privacy notice and with the implicit or explicit consent of the data subject.                  | 5   |                  |
| 5.1.1.6 | Agency User Agreements                  | A NCJA (public) designated to request civil fingerprint-based background checks, with the full connect of the individual to whom a background check is taking place, for noncriminal justice functions, shall be eligible for access to C.I. Access shall be permitted when such designation is authorized pursuant for federal law or state statute approved by the U.S. Attorney General. A NCJA (public) receiving access to C.I. shall enter into a gined written appearment with the appropriate signatory suthority of the CSA/SIB providing the access. An example of a NCJA (public) is a county school board.  A NCJA (private) designated to request clief fingerprint-based background checks, with the full connect of the individual to whom a background check is taking indice, for noncriminal justice functions, shall be eligible for access to C.I. Access shall be permitted when such designation is authorized pursuant for federal law or state statute approved by the U.S. Attorney General. A NCJA (private) receiving access to C.I. shall enter into a signed written apprement with the appropriate signatory suthority of the CSA, SIB, or authorized agency providing the access. An example of a NCJA (private) is a local bank.  All NCJAs accessing C.II shall the subject to all perinent areas of the C.II Security Policy (see Appendant) for supplementagildiance, Each NCJA that difficetly accesses FBI C.II shall alter into through the external redwork connection or system.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Data Privacy Requirements<br>for Contractors & Service<br>Providers            | PRI-07.1 | Mechanisms exist to include data privacy requirements in contracts and other acquilition-related documents that exhabits nata privacy roles and responsibilities for contractors and service providers.      | 5   |                  |
| 5.1.1.6 | Agency User Agreements                  | A NCIA (public) designated to request civil fingerprint-based background checks, with the bull consent of the individual to whom a background check is taking place, with the bull consent of the individual to whom a background check is taking place for noncriminal public functions, shall be eligible for access to CIA. Access shall be premitted when such designation is authorized pursuant to federal law or state statute approved by the U.S. Attorney Germela. A NCIA (public) receiving access to CII shall enter into a signed written agreement with the appropriate signatory authority of the CSA/BB providing the access. An example of a NCIA (public) is a county school board.  A NCIA (private) designated to request civil fingerprint-based background checks attaking place for noncriminal justice functions, and be eligible for access to CIA. Access shall be permitted when such designation is authorized gunraunt to federal law or state statute approved by the U.S. Attorney Germela. A NCIA (privately needing access to CII abrael and enter into a signed written agreement with the appropriate signatory authority of the CSA, SIB, or suthorized agreency providing the access. An example of a NCIA (privately is a local bank.  All NCIAs accessing CII shall be subject to all pertinent areas of the CIIS Security Policy (see Appendant) for supplemental guidance). Each NCIA that directly accesses FBI CII shall alise allow the FBI to periodically text the ability to penetrate the FBI's network through the external network connection or system.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Third-Party Contract<br>Requirements   | TPM-05   | Mechanisms exist to require contractual requirements for cybersecurity & data<br>privacy requirements with third-parties, reflecting the organization's needs to<br>protect its systems, processes and data. | 5   |                  |
| 5.1.1.7 | Outsourcing Standards<br>for Channelers | Channelers designated to request chil fingerprint-based background checks or noncriminal justices ancillarly functions on behalf of a NCIA (public) or NCIA (private) for noncriminal plusices ancillarly functions and the eligible for access to CIA. Access shall be permitted when such designation is authorized pursuant to federal law or state statute approved by the U.S. Attorney General. All Channelers accessing CII shall be subject to the terms and conditions described in the Compact Council Security and Management Control Outsouring Standard. Each Channeler that directly accesses CII shall also allow the FBI to conduct periodic penetration testing. Channelers leveraging CJI to perform civil functions on behalf of an Authorized Recipient shall meet the same training and certification criteria required by governmental agencies performing a similar function, and shall be subject to the same extent of audit review as are local user agencies.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Information Sharing  | DCH-14   | Mechanisms exist to utilize a process to assist users in making information sharing decisions to ensure data is appropriately protected.   | 5   |                  |
| 5.1.1.7 | Outsourcing Standards for Channelers    | Channelers designated to request civil fingerprint-based background checks or noncriminal justices ancillary functions on behalf of a NCIA (public) or NCIA (private) for noncriminal justices ancillary functions and the eligible for access to CIA. Access shall be parmitted when such designation is authorized pursuant to federal law or state statute approved by the U.S. Attroney General. All Channelers accessing CI3 shall be subject to the terms and conditions described in the Compact Council Security acress Management Control Outsouring Stander. Each Channeler Intel directly access CI3 shall also allow the FB to conduct periodic penetration testing. CI also perform out further control treating. CR and perform outflunctions on behalf of an Authorized Recipient shall meet the same training and certification criteria required by governmental genices performing a similar function, and shall be subject to the same extent of audit review as are local user agencies.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Adequate Security for<br>Sensitive / Regulated Data<br>In Support of Contracts |          | Mechaniams exist to protect sensitive / regulated data that is collected, developed, received, transmitted, used or stored in support of the performance of a contract.                                      | 5   |                  |



| FDE#    | FDE Name  | Focal Document Element (FDE) Description   | STRM<br>Rationale | STRM<br>Relationship | SCF Control  | SCF#     | Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description   | Strength of<br>Relationship<br>(optional) | Notes (optional) |
|---------|---|--|-------------------|----------------------|--|----------|---|---|------------------|
| 5.1.1.7 | Outsourcing Standards<br>for Channelers         | Channelers designated to request civil fingerprint-based background checks or<br>noncriminal justice ancillary functions on behalf of a NCIA (public) or NCIA (private)<br>for noncriminal justice ancillary functions also eligible for access to CII. Access shill be premitted when such designation is authorized pursuant to federal favor state<br>statutae approved by the U.S. Atturney General. All Channelers accessing CII shall be<br>subject to the terms and conditions described in the Compact Council Security and<br>Management Control Outsouring Standard. Each Channeler that directly accesses<br>CII shall also allow the FBI to conduct periodic penetration testing.<br>Channelers leveraging CII to perform out functions on behalf of an Authorized<br>Recipient shall meet the same training and certification criteriar required by<br>governmental geneils performing a similar function, and shall be subject to the<br>arme extent of audit review as are local user agencies.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Information Sharing With<br>Third Parties                                      | PRI-07   | Mechanisms exist to disclose Personal Data (PD) to third-parties only for the<br>purposes identified in the data privacy notice and with the implicit or explicit<br>consent of the data subject.   | (optional)                                |                  |
| 5.1.1.7 | Outsourcing Standards<br>for Channelers         | Channelers designated to request civil fingeprint-based background checks or<br>noncriminal justice ancillary functions on behalf of a NCIA (public) or NCIA (private)<br>for noncriminal justice functions shall be eligible for access to CII. Access shall be<br>permitted when such designation is authorized pursuant to federal law or state<br>statute approved by the U.S. Attornoy General. All Channelres accessing CII shall be<br>subject to the terms and conditions described in the Compact Council Security and<br>Management Control Outsouring Standard. Each Channelre that directly accesses<br>CII shall also allow the FBI to conduct periodic penetration testing.<br>Channelers leveraging CII to perform out functions on behalf of an Authorized<br>Recipient shall meet the same training and certification criteria required by<br>governmental geneins performing a similar function, and shall be subject to the<br>same extent of audit review as are local user agencies.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Data Privacy Requirements<br>for Contractors & Service<br>Providers            | PRI-07.1 | Mechanisms exist to include data privacy requirements in contracts and other<br>acquisition-related documents that establish data privacy roles and<br>responsibilities for contractors and service providers.  | 5   |                  |
| 5.1.1.7 | Outsourcing Standards<br>for Channelers         | Channelirar designated to request civil fingerprint-based background checks or<br>noncriminal justice ancillarly functions on behalf of a NCIA (public) or NCIA privately<br>for noncriminal justice ancillarly functions and be eligible for access to CII. Access shall be<br>permitted when such designation is authorized pursuant to federal law or state<br>statute approved by the U.S. Attorney General. All Channeliras accessing CII shall be<br>subject to the terms and conditions described in the Compact Council Security and<br>Management Control Outsouring Standard. Each Channeler that directly accesses<br>CII shall also allow the FBI to conduct periodic penetration testing.<br>Channelers leveraging CII to perform out flunctions on behalf of an Authorized<br>Recipient shall meet the same training and certification criteria required by<br>governmental agencies performing a similar function, and shall be subject to the<br>same extent of audit reviews as an local user agencies.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Third-Party Contract<br>Requirements   | TPM-05   | Mechanisms exist to require contractual requirements for cybersecurity & data<br>privacy requirements with third-parties, effecting the organization's needs to<br>protect its systems, processes and data.   | 5   |                  |
| 5.1.1.8 | Outsourcing Standards<br>for Non-Channelers     | Contractors designated to perform noncriminal justice ancillary functions on behalf<br>of a NLAI (public) or NLAI (private) for noncriminal justice functions shall be eligible<br>for access to C.H. Access shall be permitted when such designation is authorized<br>pursuant to federal law or state statute approved by the U.S. Attomey General. All<br>contractors accessing C.H shall be subject to the terms and conditions described<br>the Compact Council Cultouring Standard for Non-Channelers. Contractors<br>leveraging. C.H to perform civit functions on behalf of an Authorized Recipient shall<br>meet the same training and certification, crieful required by governmental agencies<br>performing a similar function, and shall be subject to the same extent of sudit review<br>as are local user acrenies.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Information Sharing  | DCH-14   | Mechanisms exist to utilize a process to assist users in making information sharing decisions to ensure data is appropriately protected.  | 5   |                  |
| 5.1.1.8 | Outsourcing Standards<br>for Non-Channelers     | Contractors designated to perform noncriminal justice ancillary functions on behalf<br>or a NAI/Q hobit loy NAI/Q (invise) to noncriminal justice functions shall be eligible<br>for access to CII. Access shall be permitted when such designation is authorized<br>pursuant to federal law or state statute approved by the IQ. Attomey General. All<br>contractors accessing CII shall be subject to the terms and conditions described<br>in the Compact Council Cuttouring Standard for Non-Channelers. Contractors<br>leveraging CII to perform civit functions on behalf of an Authorized Recipient shall<br>meet the asent straining and certification, criteria required by governmental agencies<br>performing a similar function, and shall be subject to the same extent of sudit review<br>as and not less examples.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Adequate Security for<br>Sensitive / Regulated Data<br>In Support of Contracts | IAO-03.2 | Mechanisms exist to protect sensitive / regulated data that is collected,<br>developed, received, transmitted, used or stored in support of the performance of<br>a contract.   | 5   |                  |
| 5.1.1.8 | Outsourcing Standards<br>for Non-Channelers     | Contractors designated to perform noncriminal justice ancillary functions on behalf of a NLA (public) or NUA (private) for noncriminal justice functions shall be algorithm of a NLA (public) or NUA (private) for noncriminal justice functions shall be algorithm or noncriminal justice functions and surforized pursuant to federal law or state statute approved by the U.S. Attomey General. All contractors accessing CII shall be subject to the terms and conditions described in the Compact Council Cultivarium (shandard for Non-Channelers. Contractors leveraging CII to perform civit functions on behalf of an Authorized Recipient shall meet the same straining and certification crietar equired by governmental agencies performing a similar function, and shall be subject to the same extent of audit review as are local user agencies.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Information Sharing With<br>Third Parties                                      | PRI-07   | Mechanisms exist to disclose Personal Data (PD) to third-parties only for the<br>purposes identified in the data privacy notice and with the implicit or explicit<br>consent of the data subject.   | 5   |                  |
| 5.1.1.8 | Outsourcing Standards<br>for Non-Channelers     | Contractors designated to perform noncriminal justice ancillary functions on behalf<br>of a NCIA (public) or NCIA (private) for noncriminal justice functions shall be eligible<br>for access to Cil. Access shall be permitted when such designation is authorized<br>pursuant to federal law or state statute approved by the LS, Attomey General. All<br>contractors accessing Cil shall be subject to the terms and conditions described in<br>the Compact Council Outsourcing Standard for Non-Channelers. Contractors<br>leveraging Cil to perform civil functions on behalf of an Authorized Recipient shall<br>meet the same training and certification criteria required by governmental agencies<br>performing a similar function, and shall be subject to the same extent of sould treview  | Functional        | intersects with      | Data Privacy Requirements<br>for Contractors & Service<br>Providers            | PRI-07.1 | Mechanisms exist to include data privacy requirements in contracts and other acquisition-related documents that eatablish data privacy roles and responsibilities for contractors and service providers.  | 5   |                  |
| 5.1.1.8 | Outsourcing Standards<br>for Non-Channelers     | as are local user asencies.  Contractors designated to perform noncriminal justice ancillarly functions on behalf of a NCIA (public) or NCIA (private) for noncriminal justice functions shall be eligible for access to ICI. Access shall be permitted when such designation is authorized pursuant to federal law or state statute approved by the U.S. Attorney General. All contractors accessing CII shall be subject to the terms and conditions described in the Compact Council Cutsourcing Standard for Non-Channeters. Contractors ieveraging CII to perform civil functions on behalf of an Authorized Recipient shall meet the asame training and certification criefare required by governmental agencies performing a similar function, and shall be subject to the same extent of sudit review as are local user agencies.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Third-Party Contract<br>Requirements   | TPM-05   | Mechanisms exist to require contractual requirements for cybersecurity & data<br>privacy requirements with third-parties, reflecting the organization's needs to<br>protect its systems, processes and data.  | 5   |                  |
| 5.1.2   | Monitoring, Review, and<br>Delivery of Services | As specified in the interagency agreements, MCAs, and contractual agreements with private contractors, the services, reports and records provided by the service provider shall be regularly monitored and reviewed. The CIA, authorized agency, or fill shall maintain sufficient coveral control and visibility into all security sepects to include, but not limited to, identification of vulnerabilities and information security includes the provider properties provides used to the control of the provider shall conform to the incident reporting/response. The incident propting/response process used by the service provider shall conform to the incident reporting/response process.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Service Delivery<br>(Business Process Support)                                 | OPS-03   | Mechanisms exist to define supporting business processes and implement<br>supporpriate governance and service management to ensure appropriate planning,<br>delivery and support of the organization's technology capabilities supporting<br>business functions, workforce, and/or customers based on industry-recognized<br>standards to achieve the specific goals of the process area. | 5   |                  |
| 5.1.2.1 | Managing Changes to<br>Service Providers        | Any changes to services provided by a service provider shall be managed by the CIA,<br>authorized agency, or FBI. This includes provision of services, changes to existing<br>services, and new services. Evaluation of the risks to the agency shall be<br>undertaken based on the criticality of the data, system, and the impact of the   | Functional        | intersects with      | Service Delivery<br>(Business Process Support)                                 | OPS-03   | Mechanisms exist to define supporting business processes and implement<br>appropriate governance and service management to ensure appropriate planning,<br>delivery and support of the organization's technology capabilities supporting<br>business functions, workforce, and/or customers based on industry-recognized  | 5   |                  |
| 5.1.3   | Secondary Dissemination                         | change.  If CHRI is released to another authorized agency, and that agency was not part of the releasing agency's primary information exchange agreement(s), the releasing agency shall log such dissemination.  | Functional        | subset of            | Disclosure of Information  | DCH-03.1 |   | 10  |                  |
| 5.1.4   | Secondary Dissemination<br>of Non-CHRI CJI      | If III does not contain CHRI and is not part of an information exchange agreement them II does not need to be logged. Dissemination shall conform to this local policy validating the requestor of the CLI as an employee ended contractor of a law endocement agency or club, agency requiring the CLI to perform their mission or a member of the public necessing CLI val exhortsed dissemination.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Disclosure of Information  | DCH-03.1 | Mechanisms exist to restrict the disclosure of sensitive / regulated data to<br>authorized parties with a need to know.   | 5   |                  |
| 5.1.4   | Secondary Dissemination<br>of Non-CHRI CJI      | ICLI does not contain CHRI and is not part of an information exchange agreement<br>them it does not need to be logged. Dissemination shall conform to the local policy<br>validating the requestor of the CLI as an employee and/or contractor of a law<br>enforcement agency or clike agency requiring the CLI to perform their mission or a<br>member of the public receiving CLI val exchoized dissemination.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Information Sharing  | DCH-14   | Mechanisms exist to utilize a process to assist users in making information sharing decisions to ensure data is appropriately protected.  | 5   |                  |
| 5.1.4   | Secondary Dissemination<br>of Non-CHRI CJI      | It CII does not contain CHRI and is not part of an information exchange agreement;<br>then it does not need to be legged. Dissemination shall conform to the local participation of the local participation of the local participation of the local participation and of the local participation of t | Functional        | intersects with      | Information Sharing With<br>Third Parties                                      | PRI-07   | Mechanisms exist to disclose Personal Data (PD) to third-parties only for the<br>purposes identified in the data privacy notice and with the implicit or explicit<br>consent of the data subject.   | 5   |                  |
| 5.1.4   | Secondary Dissemination<br>of Non-CHRI CJI      | If Cli does not contain CHRI and is not part of an information exchange agreement<br>then it does not need to be logged. Dissemination shall conform to the local policy<br>validating the requestor of the Cli as an employee and for contractor of a law<br>enforcement agency or clik agency requiring the Cli to perform their mission or a<br>member of the public necessing Cli via authorized dissemination.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Data Privacy Requirements<br>for Contractors & Service<br>Providers            | PRI-07.1 | Mechanisms exist to include data privacy requirements in contracts and other<br>acquisition-related documents that establish data privacy roles and<br>responsibilities for contractors and service providers.  | 5   |                  |
| 5.1.4   | Secondary Dissemination of Non-CHRI CJI         | It CJI does not contain CHRI and is not part of an information exchange agreement<br>then it does not need to be logged. Dissemination shall conform to the local policy<br>validating the requestor of the CII as an employee and/or contactor of a law<br>enforcement agency or civil agency requiring the CJI to perform their mission or a<br>member of the public receiving CJI via authorized dissemination.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Third-Party Contract<br>Requirements   | TPM-05   | Mechanisms exist to require contractual requirements for cybersecurity & data<br>privacy requirements with third-parties, reflecting the organization's needs to<br>protect its systems, processes and data.  | 5   |                  |



| FDE# | FDE Name                                      | Focal Document Element (FDE) Description  | STRM<br>Rationale | STRM<br>Relationship | SCF Control   | SCF#          | Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description  | Strength of<br>Relationship<br>(optional) | Notes (optional) |
|------|---|---|-------------------|----------------------|---|---------------|--|---|------------------|
| 5.2  | AWARENESS AND<br>TRAINING (AT)                | Security training is key to the human element of information security. All users with<br>authorized access to CII should be made aware of their individual responsibilities<br>and expected behavior when accessing CII and the systems which process CII.<br>LNSor require enhanced training on the specific duties and responsibilities of those<br>positions and the impact those positions have on the overall security of information<br>systems.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Publishing Cybersecurity &<br>Data Protection<br>Documentation            | GOV-02        | Mechanisms exist to establish, maintain and disseminate cybersecurity & data<br>protection policies, standards and procedures.   | 5   |                  |
| 5.2  | AWARENESS AND<br>TRAINING (AT)                | Security training is key to the human element of information security. All users with<br>unthorized access to CII should be made aware of their individual responsibilities<br>and expected behavior when accessing CII and the systems which process CII.<br>LASOs require enhanced training on the specific duties and responsibilities of those<br>positions and the impact those positions have on the overall security of information<br>systems.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Periodic Review & Update of<br>Cybersecurity & Data<br>Protection Program | GOV-03        | Mechanisms exist to review the cybersecurity & data protection program, including<br>policies, standards and procedure, or planned intensity or slignificant changes<br>occur to ensure their continuing suitability, adequacy and effectiveness.    | 5   |                  |
| 5.2  | AWARENESS AND<br>TRAINING (AT)                | Security training is key to the human element of information security. All users with<br>untroited access to CII should be made aware of their individual responsibilities<br>and expected behavior when accessing CII and the systems which process CII.<br>LASO require enhanced training on the specific duties and responsibilities of those<br>positions and the impact those positions have on the overall security of information<br>systems.  | Functional        | subset of            | Cybersecurity & Data<br>Privacy-Minded Workforce                          | SAT-01        | Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of security workforce development and awareness controls.  | 10  |                  |
| 5.3  | INCIDENT RESPONSE (IR)                        | N/A   | Functional        | intersects with      | Publishing Cybersecurity &<br>Data Protection<br>Documentation            | GOV-02        | Mechanisms exist to establish, maintain and disseminate cybersecurity & data protection policies, standards and procedures.  | 5   |                  |
| 5.3  | INCIDENT RESPONSE (IR)                        | N/A   | Functional        | intersects with      | Periodic Review & Update of<br>Cybersecurity & Data<br>Protection Program | GOV-03        | Mechanisms exist to review the cybersecurity & data protection program, including<br>policies, standards and procedures, at planned intervals or if significant changes<br>occur to ensure their continuing suitability, adequacy and effectiveness. | 5   |                  |
| 5.4  | Policy Area 4: Auditing and Accountability    | Agencies shall implement audit and accountability controls to increase the<br>probability of authorized users conforming to a prescribed pattern of behavior.<br>Agencies shall carefully assess the inventory of components that compose their<br>information systems to determine which security controls are applicable to the<br>various components.<br>Auditing controls are typically applied to the components of an information system<br>that provide auditing capability (servers, etc.) and would not necessarily be applied<br>to every user-level workstation within the agency. As technology advances, more<br>powerful and diverse functionality can be found in such device as a personal digital<br>assistants and cellular telephones, which may require the application of security<br>controls in accordance with an agency assessment of risk.<br>Refer to Section 5.13.6 for additional audit requirements related to mobile devices<br>used to access.                | Functional        | intersects with      | Publishing Cybersecurity & Data Protection Documentation                  | GOV-02        | Mechanisms exist to establish, maintain and disseminate cybersecurity & data protection policies, standards and procedures.  | 5   |                  |
| 5.4  | Policy Area 4: Auditing and Accountability    | Agencies shall implement audit and accountability controls to increase the<br>probability of authorized users conforming to a prescribed pattern of behavior.<br>Agencies shall carefully assess the inventory of components that compose their<br>information systems to determine which security controls are applicable to the<br>various components.<br>Auditing controls are typically applied to the components of an information system<br>that provide auditing appability (server, etc.) and would not necessarily be applied<br>to every user-level workstation within the agency. As technology advances, more<br>powerful and diverse functionality can be found in such device as a personal digital<br>assistants and cellular telephones, which may require the application of security<br>controls in accordance with an agency assessment of risk.<br>Rafer to Section 5.13.6 for additional audit requirements related to mobile devices<br>used to access Careful.         | Functional        | intersects with      | Periodic Review & Update of<br>Cybersecurity & Data<br>Protection Program | GOV-03        | Mechanisms exist to review the cybersecurity & data protection program, including<br>policies, standards and procedures, at planned intervals or if significant changes<br>occur to ensure their continuing suitability, adequacy and effectiveness. | 5   |                  |
| 5.4  | Policy Area 4: Auditing and Accountability    | Agencies shall implement audit and accountability controls to increase the<br>probability of authorized users conforming to a prescribed pattern of behavior.<br>Agencies shall carefully assess the inventory of components that compose their<br>information systems to determine which security controls are applicable to the<br>various components.<br>Auditing controls are bpically applied to the components of an information system<br>that provide auditing capability (person, etc.) and would not not necessarily be applied<br>to every user-level workstation within the agency. As technology advances, more<br>powerful and diverse functionality can be build in such devices as personal digital<br>assistants and cellular telephones, which may require the application of security<br>controls in accordance with an agency assessment of trail.<br>Refer to Section 5.13.8 for additional audit requirements related to mobile devices<br>used to access CII.          | Functional        | subset of            | Continuous Monitoring   | MON-01        | Machanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of enterprise-wide monitoring controls.  | 10  |                  |
| 5.4  | Policy Area 4: Auditing and Accountability    | Agencies shall implement audit and accountability controls to increase the<br>probability of authorized users conforming to a prescribed pattern of behavior.<br>Agencies shall carefully assess the inventory of components that compose their<br>information systems to determine which security controls are applicable to the<br>various components. Additing controls are typically applied to the components of an information system<br>that provide auditing appability (servers, etc.) and would not no accessarily be applied<br>to every user-level workstation within the agency. As technology advances, more<br>powerful and diverse functionality can be found in such device as a personal digital<br>assistants and cellular telephones, which may require the application of security<br>controls in accordance with an agency assessment of risk.<br>Refer to Section 5.13.6 for additional audit requirements related to mobile devices<br>used to access CII.            | Functional        | intersects with      | Alert Threshold Tuning  | MON-<br>01.13 | Mechanisms exist to "une" event monitoring technologies through analyzing communications ratific/event patterns and developing profiles representing common traffic patterns and/or events.  | 5   |                  |
| 5.4  | Policy Area 4: Auditing and Accountability    | Agencies shall implement audit and accountability controls to increase the<br>probability of authorized users conforming to a prescribed pattern of behavior.<br>Agencies shall carefully assess the inventory of components that compose their<br>information systems to determine which security controls are applicable to the<br>various components produced by a positive produced and a produced and the<br>hat provide auditing apability (servers, etc.) and would not no ceassarily be applied<br>to every user-level workstation within the agency. As technology advances, more<br>powerful and diverse functionality can be found in such devices as personal digital<br>assistants and cellular telephones, which may require the application of security<br>controls in accordance with an agency assessment of fairs.<br>Refer to Section 5.13.6 for additional audit requirements related to mobile devices<br>used to access.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Analyze and Prioritize<br>Monitoring Requirements                         | MON-<br>01.16 | Mechanisms exist to assess the organization's needs for monitoring and prioritize the monitoring of assets, based on asset criticality and the sensitivity of the data it stores, transmits and processes.   | 5   |                  |
| 5.4  | Policy Area 4: Auditing<br>and Accountability | Agencies shall implement audit and accountability controls to increase the<br>probability of authorized users conforming to a prescribed pattern of behavior.<br>Agencies shall certuly assess the intentory of components that compose their<br>information systems to determine which security controls are applicable to the<br>various components.<br>Auditing controls are typically applied to the components of an information system<br>that provide auditing capability (servers, etc.) and would not no cessarily be applied<br>to every user-level workstation within the agency. As technology advances, more<br>powerful and develer functionality can be found in such devices as personal digital<br>assistants and cellular telephones, which may require the application of security<br>controls in accordance with an agency assessment of Tais.<br>Refer to Section 5.13.5 for additional audit requirements related to mobile devices<br>used to access 2.                | Functional        | intersects with      | Centralized Collection of<br>Security Event Logs                          | MON-02        | Mechanisms exist to utilize a Socurity incident Event Manager (SIEM) or similar automated tool, to support the centralized collection of security-related event logs.  | 5   |                  |
| 5.4  | Policy Area 4: Auditing and Accountability    | Agencies shall implement audit and accountability controls to increase the<br>probability of authorized users conforming to a prescribed pattern to helawor.<br>Agencies shall careful yassess the inventory of components that compose their<br>information systems to determine which security controls are applicable to the<br>various components.<br>Auditing controls are typically applied to the components of an information system<br>that provide audition graphibity (servers, etc.) and would not necessarily be applied<br>to every user-level workstation within the agency. As technology advances, more<br>powerful and deverse functionally can be bound in such devices as personal digital<br>assistants and cellular talephones, which may require the application of security<br>controls as accordance with an agency assessment of fax.<br>Refer to Section 5.13.6 for additional audit requirements related to mobile devices<br>used to access Critical securities. | Functional        | intersects with      | Correlate Monitoring<br>Information                                       | MON-02.1      | Automated mechanisms exist to correlate both technical and non-technical information from across the enterprise by a Security Incident Event Manager (SEM) or similar automated tool, to enhance organization-wide altuational awareness.            | 5   |                  |



| FDE#    | FDE Name   | Focal Document Element (FDE) Description  | STRM<br>Rationale | STRM<br>Relationship | SCF Control                                       | SCF#          | Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description  | Strength of<br>Relationship<br>(optional) | Notes (optional) |
|---------|--|---|-------------------|----------------------|---|---------------|--|---|------------------|
| 5.4.1   | Auditable Events and<br>Content (Information<br>Systems) | The agency's information system shall generate audit records for defined events. These defined events include identifying significant events which need to be audited as relevant to the security of the information system. The agency shall specify which information system components carry out auditing activities. Auditing activity can artect information system performance and this issue must be considered as a separate factor during the acquisition of information systems. The agency's information systems into produce, at the application and/or operating system level, audit records containing sufficient information to establish what events occurred, the sources of the events, and the outcomes of the events. The agency shall periodically review and update the last of agency-defined auditable events. In the events containing autition to use an automated system, manual recording of activities shall still take place.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Alert Threshold Tuning                            | MON-<br>01.13 | Mechanisms exist to "tune" event monitoring technologies through analyzing communications stratific/event paterns and developing profiles representing common traffic patterns and/or events.  | 5   |                  |
| 5.4.1   | Auditable Events and<br>Content (Information<br>Systems) | The agency's information system shall generate audit records for defined events.<br>These defined events include identifying significant events which need to be audited<br>as relevant to the security of the information system. The agency shall specify which<br>information system components carry out auditing activities. Auditing activity can<br>affect information system performance and this issue must be considered as a<br>separate factor during the acquisition of information systems.<br>The agency's information systems shall produce, at the application and/or operating<br>system level, audit records containing sufficient information to eatablish what<br>events occurred, the sources of the events, and the outcomes of the events. The<br>agency shall periodically review and update the list of agency-defined auditable<br>events. In the event an agency does not use an automated system, manual<br>recording of activities shall still task place.            | Functional        | intersects with      | Analyze and Prioritize<br>Monitoring Requirements | MON-<br>01.16 | Mechanisms exist to assess the organization's needs for monitoring and prioritize the monitoring of assets, based on asset criticality and the sensitivity of the data it stores, transmits and processes.   | 5   |                  |
| 5.4.1   | Auditable Events and<br>Content (Information<br>Systems) | The a gency's information system shall generate audit records for defined events.<br>These defined events include identifying gainfland events which need to be audited as relevant to the security of the information system. The agency shall specify which information system components carry out audifing activities. Auditing activity can affect information system performance and this issue must be considered as a separate factor during the acquaistion or information system. Seed and or information system shall produce, at the application and/or operating system level, audit records containing sufficient information to establish what events accurred, the sources of the events, and the outcomes of the events. The agency shall proficially review and update the list of agency-defined auditable events. In the event an agency does not use an automated system, manual recording of activities shall still lated place.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Automated Tools for Real-<br>Time Analysis        | MON-01.2      | Mechanisms exist to utilize a Security incident Event Manager (SIEM), or similar<br>automated tool, to support near real-time analysis and incident escalation.  | 5   |                  |
| 5.4.1   | Auditable Events and<br>Content (Information<br>Systems) | The agency's information system shall generate audit records for defined events.<br>These defined events include identifying aignificant events which need to be audited as relevant to the accurity of the information system. The agency shall specify high information system performance and this issue must be considered as a separate factor during the acquisition of information systems or the system performance and this issue must be considered as a separate factor during the acquisition of information systems. The agency is information systems have performed in the application and/or operating system level, audit records containing sufficient information to establish what events occurred, the sources of the events, and the outcomes of the events. The agency shall periodically review and update the list of agency-defined auditable events. In the event an agency of ose not use an automated system, manual recording of accitivities shall still task place. | Functional        | intersects with      | Inbound & Outbound<br>Communications Traffic      | MON-01.3      | Mechanisms exist to continuously monitor inbound and outbound communications traffic for unusual or unauthorized activities or conditions.   | 5   |                  |
| 5.4.1   | Auditable Events and<br>Content (Information<br>Systems) | The agency's information system shall generate audit records for defined events.<br>These defined events include identifying eignificant events which need to be audited as relevant to the audited as relevant to the accurity of the information system. The agency shall specify high information system components carry out auditing activities. Auditing activity can affect information system performance and this issue must be considered as a separate factor during the acquisition of information systems. The agency and according to the acquisition of information systems level, audit records containing sufficient information to establish what events occurred to sources of the events. The agency shall periodically review and update the last of agency-defined auditable events. In the event an agency does not use an automated system, manual recording of activities shall still take place.  | Functional        | intersects with      | System Generated Alerts                           | MON-01.4      |  | 5   |                  |
| 5.4.1   | Auditable Events and<br>Content (Information<br>Systems) | The agency is information system shall generate audit records for defined events.<br>These defined events include identifying guilforand events which need to be audited as relevant to the security of the information system. The agency shall specify which information system components carry out auditing activities. Auditing activity as affect information system performance and this issue must be considered as a separate factor during the acquisition or information system issue. Audit spectives are application and/or operating system level, audit records containing sufficient information to establish what events occurred, the sources of the events, and the outcomes of the events. The agency shall periodically review and update the list of agency-defined auditable events. In the event an agency does not use an automated system, manual recording of activities shall still task place.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Centralized Collection of<br>Security Event Logs  | MON-02        | Mechanisms exist to utilize a Security Incident Event Manager (SIEM) or similar<br>automated tool, to support the centralized collection of security-related event<br>logs.  | 5   |                  |
| 5.4.1   | Auditable Events and<br>Content (Information<br>Systems) | The agency's information system shall generate audit records for defined events.<br>These defined events include identifying significant events which need to be audited<br>as relevant to the security of the information system. The agency shall specify which<br>information system components carry out auditing activities. Auditing activity can<br>affect information system performance and this issue must be considered as a<br>separate factor during the acquisition of information systems.<br>The agency is information systems hall produce, at the application and/or operating<br>system level, audit records containing sufficient information to establish what<br>events occurred, the sources of the events, and the outcomes of the events. The<br>agency shall periodically review and rupdate the list of agency-defined auditable<br>events in the event an agency does not use an automated system, manual<br>recording of activities shall still task place.            | Functional        | intersects with      | Correlate Monitoring<br>Information               | MON-02.1      | Automated mechanisms exist to correlate both technical and non-technical information from across the enterprise by a Security incident Event Manager (SIEM) or similar automated tool, to enhance organization-wide situational awareness.   | 5   |                  |
| 5.4.1   | Auditable Events and<br>Content (Information<br>Systems) | The agency's information system shall generate audit records for defined events.<br>These defined events include identifying significant events which need to be audited as relevant to the security of the information system. The agency shall specify which information system components carry out auditing activities. Auditing activity can affect information system performance and this issue must be considered as a separate factor during the acquisition of information systems. The agency's information systems have produce, at the application and/or operating system level, audit records containing sufficient information to establish what events occurred, the sources of the events, and the outcomes of the events. The agency shall periodically review and update the list of agency-defined auditable events. In the event an agency does not use an automated system, manual recording of activities shall still take place.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Content of Event Logs                             | MON-03        | Mechanisms exist to configure systems to produce event logs that contain sufficient information to, at a minimum: (1) Establish what type of event occurred; (2) Wherle (date and time) the event occurred; (3) Where the event occurred; (4) The source of the event; (6) The outcome guesses of railure) of the event; and (6) The outcome guesses of railure) of the event; and (6) The identity of any user/subject associated with the event. | 5   |                  |
| 5.4.1.1 | Events   | The following events shall be logged:  1. Successful and unsuccessful system log-on attempts.  2. Successful and unsuccessful system log-on attempts.  2. Successful and unsuccessful system log-on attempts.  2. Successful and unsuccessful system log-on attempts.  b. create permission on a user account, file, directory or other system resource;  b. create permission on a user account, file, directory or other system resource;  d. delete permission on a user account, file, directory or other system resource;  d. delete permission on a user account, file, directory or other system resource;  3. Successful and unsuccessful attempts to change account passwords.  4. Successful and unsuccessful attempts to thange accounts (i.e., not), Oracle,  DBA, darm., etc.).  5. Successful and unsuccessful attempts for users to:  a. access the audit log file;  b. modify the audit log file;  c. destroy the audit log file.   | Functional        | intersects with      | System Generated Alerts                           | MON-01.4      | Mechanisms exist to generate, monitor, correlate and respond to alerts from<br>physical, observeruity, data privacy and supply chain activities to achieve<br>integrated situational awareness.  | 5   |                  |
| 5.4.1.1 | Content  | The following content shall be included with every audited event:  1. Date and time of the event.  2. The component of the information system (e.g., software component, hardware component) where the event occurred.  3. Type of event.  4. User/subject identity.  5. Outcome (success or failure) of the event.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Content of Event Logs                             | MON-03        | Mechanisms exist to configure systems to produce event logs that contain sufficient information, to, at an inimizum.  (1) Establish what type of event occurred;  (2) When (late and time) the event occurred;  (3) Where the event occurred;  (4) The source of the event;  (5) The outcome guoceas or failure) of the event; and  (6) The identity of any user/aublect associated with the event.  | 5   |                  |



| Part      | FDE#      | FDE Name                | Focal Document Element (FDE) Description  | STRM<br>Rationale | STRM<br>Relationship | SCF Control              | SCF#     | Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description   | Strength of<br>Relationship<br>(optional) | Notes (optional)           |
|--|-----------|-------------------------|---|-------------------|----------------------|--------------------------|----------|---|---|----------------------------|
| Table  |           |                         | The following content shall be included with every audited event:  1. Date and time of the event. |                   |                      |                          |          |   |   |                            |
| Part      | 5.4.1.1.1 | Content                 | component) where the event occurred. 3. Type of event.  | Functional        | intersects with      | System Generated Alerts  | MON-01.4 |   | 5   |                            |
| Part      |           |                         |   |                   |                      |                          |          | Mechanisms exist to configure systems to produce event logs that contain  |   |                            |
|  |           |                         | Date and time of the event.   |                   |                      |                          |          |   |   |                            |
| A  | 5.4.1.1.1 | Content                 | component) where the event occurred.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Content of Event Logs    | MON-03   |   | 5   |                            |
| April  |           |                         | 4. User/subject identity.   |                   |                      |                          |          |   |   |                            |
| Manual Part  |           |                         | The agency's information system shall provide alerts to appropriate agency officials              |                   |                      |                          |          | (6) The identity of any user/subject associated with the event.  Mechanisms exist to alert appropriate personnel in the event of a log processing |   |                            |
| Auto-Part   Auto   | 5.4.2     |                         |   | Functional        | equal                |                          | MON-05   | failure and take actions to remedy the disruption.  | 10  |                            |
| Authorities      |           |                         | The responsible management official shall designate an individual or position to                  |                   |                      |                          |          | Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of enterprise-wide monitoring   |   |                            |
| August   Company   Compa   |           |                         | unusual activity, investigate suspicious activity or suspected violations, to report              |                   |                      |                          |          | controls.   |   |                            |
|  |           | Audit Monitoring        | review/analysis shall be conducted at a minimum once a week. The frequency of                     |                   |                      |                          |          |   |   |                            |
|  | 5.4.3     |                         | indicates an elevated need for audit review. The agency shall increase the level of               | Functional        | subset of            | Continuous Monitoring    | MON-01   |   | 10  |                            |
| April   Control Cont   |           |                         | is an indication of increased risk to agency operations, agency assets, or individuals            |                   |                      |                          |          |   |   |                            |
| And Transport And Andrew Communication and And |           |                         | sources of information.   |                   |                      |                          |          |   |   |                            |
| Mark      |           |                         | review/analyze information system audit records for indications of inappropriate or               |                   |                      |                          |          | communications traffic/event patterns and developing profiles representing  |   |                            |
| March   Marc   |           |                         | findings to appropriate officials, and to take necessary actions. Audit                           |                   |                      |                          |          | common traffic patterns and/or events.  |   |                            |
| Part      | 5.4.3     |                         | review/analysis should be increased when the volume of an agency's processing                     | Functional        | intersects with      | Alert Threshold Tuning   |          |   | 5   |                            |
| Company   Comp   |           | .,                      | audit monitoring and analysis activity within the information system whenever there               |                   |                      |                          |          |   |   |                            |
| April   Part     |           |                         | based on law enforcement information, intelligence information, or other credible                 |                   |                      |                          |          |   |   |                            |
| March   Part     |           |                         | The responsible management official shall designate an individual or position to                  |                   |                      |                          |          |   |   |                            |
| Section of the control of the contro |           |                         | unusual activity, investigate suspicious activity or suspected violations, to report              |                   |                      |                          |          |   |   |                            |
| March   Marc   |           | Audit Monitoring,       | review/analysis shall be conducted at a minimum once a week. The frequency of                     |                   |                      | Analyze and Prioritize   | MON-     |   |   |                            |
| Language of the common of the special position of the common of the comm | 5.4.3     | Analysis, and Reporting | indicates an elevated need for audit review. The agency shall increase the level of               | Functional        | intersects with      |                          | 01.16    |   | 5   |                            |
| Secretary of the control of the cont |           |                         | is an indication of increased risk to agency operations, agency assets, or individuals            |                   |                      |                          |          |   |   |                            |
| Leading to the control of the contro |           |                         | sources of information.   |                   |                      |                          |          |   |   |                            |
| August National Processor Comment of the Comment of |           |                         | review/analyze information system audit records for indications of inappropriate or               |                   |                      |                          |          | automated tool, to support the centralized collection of security-related event   |   |                            |
| Section of the control of the contro |           |                         | findings to appropriate officials, and to take necessary actions. Audit                           |                   |                      |                          |          | logs.   |   |                            |
| and microscopical analysis and supervisions for the plane of the plane | 5.4.3     |                         | review/analysis should be increased when the volume of an agency's processing                     | Functional        | intersects with      |                          | MON-02   |   | 5   |                            |
| Second Continues of the Continues of Conti   |           |                         | audit monitoring and analysis activity within the information system whenever there               |                   |                      |                          |          |   |   |                            |
| Experience of the company of the com |           |                         | based on law enforcement information, intelligence information, or other credible                 |                   |                      |                          |          |   |   |                            |
| And The Control of Section 2015 and the Control of Section 201 |           |                         | The responsible management official shall designate an individual or position to                  |                   |                      |                          |          |   |   |                            |
| Augin following was constructed in minimum and was also his between the perior which to increase his need of control and the control of the c |           |                         | unusual activity, investigate suspicious activity or suspected violations, to report              |                   |                      |                          |          |   |   |                            |
| Advantage and approach and control for court town. The appropriate for court for the approach and control from the approach and the approach a | 5.4.3     |                         | review/analysis shall be conducted at a minimum once a week. The frequency of                     | Functional        | intersects with      |                          | MON-02 1 |   | 5   |                            |
| so in reference of the contraction of the specific personal residence of the contraction  |           | Analysis, and Reporting | indicates an elevated need for audit review. The agency shall increase the level of               |                   |                      | Information              |          |   | _   |                            |
| Section 2 designations of the control of the contro |           |                         | is an indication of increased risk to agency operations, agency assets, or individuals            |                   |                      |                          |          |   |   |                            |
| The Barry   Execution   Exec   |           |                         | sources of information.   |                   |                      |                          |          | Mechanisms exist to configure systems to use an authoritative time source to  |   |                            |
| Information years decided on a sound about 1946   Potention of Aud 1940   Potention of Aud 1940   Potention of Aud 1940   Potention of Security   Po   | 5.4.4     | Time Stamps             | generation. The time stamps shall include the date and time values generated by the               | Functional        | equal                | Time Stamps              | MON-07   | generate time stamps for event logs.  | 10  |                            |
| Aut Record Remote  Ligging NCC and Bit Transactions  ACCES CONTROL(A)  ACCES CONTROL | 5.45      | Protection of Audit     | information system clocks on an annual basis.   | Frankland         |                      | Postantina of Franklant  | MONIOS   | Mechanisms exist to protect event logs and audit tools from unauthorized access,  | 40  |                            |
| 4.4 Audit Record Reteating by an out long are related for administration, legal, words, or control and communication of the control relative in Production of Ministration, supplements, su | 0.4.0     | Information             | The agency shall retain audit records for at least one (1) year. Once the minimum                 | runctionat        | equat                | Protection of Event Logs | 11014-08 |   | 10  |                            |
| Section (Control of the Control of Control o | 5.4.6     | Audit Record Retention  | until it is determined they are no longer needed for administrative, legal, audit, or             | Functional        | enual                | Event Log Retention      | MON-10   | security incidents and to meet statutory, regulatory and contractual retention  | 10  |                            |
| A fig shalls be maintained for a minimum of one (1) year or an in ACC and II manaciscins. The large form of the log shall close clearly sheetly identify on the log shall close clearly sheetly identify on the log shall close clearly sheetly identify on the log shall close clearly sheetly in the log shall safe clearly sheetly in the log shall safe clearly sheetly in the log shall shall be clearly sheetly in the log shall safe clearly sheetly in the log shall shall be clearly sheetly sh |           |                         | audit records relative to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, subpoena, and               |                   |                      |                          |          | requirements.   |   |                            |
| Lagging VCCL and III submits receiving agency. III gas shall also clearly identify the requester and the subbest of Transactions shower that the firm and unique to the individual requester and to the secondary requirement and to the secondary requirement and the secondary requirement to the individual requester and to the secondary requirement on the secondary requirement to the individual requester and to the secondary requirement on the secondary requirement to the individual requester and to the secondary requirement on the secondary requirement in the secondary requirement on the secondary requirement on the secondary requirement on the secondary requirement related to mobile and the secondary requirement related to mobile and the secondary requirements of the secondary requirements.  So DETIFICATION AND AND AITEMETICATION (A)  IDENTIFICATION AND AITEMETICATION (A)  AITEMETICATION (A |           |                         | A log shall be maintained for a minimum of one (1) year on all NCIC and III                       |                   |                      |                          |          | Mechanisms exist to retain event logs for a time period consistent with records   |   |                            |
| Transactions secondary recipient. The destinification on the log shall stake the from of a unique secondary recipient. The destinification of microscopies of the planning and implementation of microscopies of the planning and implementation of CIS information and the microscopies and transmission of CIS information and the microscopies of the planning and implementation of microscopies of the planning and implementation of CIS information and the microscopies of the planning and implementation of CIS information and the deciding variety processing, and transmission of CIS information and the microscopies the planning and implementation of microscopies and implementation of microscopies and imp | 5.4.7     |                         | authorized receiving agency. III logs shall also clearly identify the requester and the           | Functional        | subset of            | Event Log Retention      | MON-10   | security incidents and to meet statutory, regulatory and contractual retention  | 10  |                            |
| Access control provides the planning and implementation or the chankmins to restrict reading, writing, processing, and transmission of CIII information and the intersects with possible for control and  |           | rransactions            | identifier that shall remain unique to the individual requester and to the secondary              |                   |                      |                          |          | requirements.   |   |                            |
| ACCESS CONTROL (AD Interface is a policial configuration and access control requirements related to mobile dender and related access control requirements related to mobile dender access and communication of the mobile denders access control requirements related to mobile denders access control requirements related to mobile denders and access control requirements related to mobile denders and access and communication of the mobile denders and access and communication of the mobile denders and access to the formation system access to information system access to information system access to information system access to information syst |           |                         | Access control provides the planning and implementation of mechanisms to restrict                 |                   |                      |                          |          |   |   |                            |
| Documentation  Docume | 5.5       | ACCESS CONTROL (AC)     | modification of information systems, applications, services, and communication                    | Functional        | intersects with      | Data Protection          | GOV-02   |   | 5   |                            |
| Access control provides the planning and implementation of mechanisms to restrict reading, writing, processing, and transmission of Clip information and the modification of information systems, applications, services, and communication configurations allowing access to CSI information of Methods used to access (CIII) and the modification of information systems, applications, services, and communication configurations allowing access to CSI information of Methods used to access (CIII) and information systems usually in the form of a simple character string for each information system usually in the form of a simple character string for each information system usually in the form of a simple character string for each information system usually in the form of a simple character string for each information system usually in the form of a simple character string for each information system usually in the form of a simple character string for each information system usually in the form of a simple character string for each information system usually in the form of a simple character string for each information system usually in the form of a simple character string for each information system usually in the form of a simple character string for each information system usually in the form of a simple character string for each information system usually in the form of a simple character string for each information system usually in the form of a simple character string for each information system usually in the form of a simple character string for each information system usually in the form of a simple character string for each information system usually in the form of a simple character string for each information system usually in the form of a simple character string for each information system usually in the form of a simple character string for each information system usually in the form of a simple character string for each information system usually in the form of a simple character string for each information  |           |                         | Refer to Section 5.13.6 for additional access control requirements related to mobile              |                   |                      | Documentation            |          |   |   |                            |
| ACCESS CONTROL (AC) Configuration allowing access to DCIS Informations, services, and communication configurations allowing access to CIS Informations. Refer to Section 5.13.6 for additional access control requirements related to mobile devices survivous event on access (CIS). The Configuration allowing access to CIS Information. Refer to Section 5.13.6 for additional access control requirements related to mobile devices survivous event on access (CIS). The Configuration of the Information survivous usual transfer to the Configuration of the Information survivous usual transfer to the Configuration of the Information survivous usual transfer to the Configuration of the Information survivous usual transfer to the Configuration of the Information survivous usual transfer to the Configuration of the Information survivous usual transfer to the Configuration of the Information survivous usual transfer to the Configuration of the Information survivous usual transfer to the Configuration of the Information survivous usual transfer to the Configuration of the Information survivous usual transfer to the Configuration of the Information survivous usual transfer to the Configuration of the Information survivous usual transfer to the Information survivous usual transfer transfer transfer to the Information survivous usual transfer tr |           |                         | Access control provides the planning and implementation of mechanisms to restrict                 |                   |                      |                          |          |   |   |                            |
| Refer to Section 1.1.5.6 for additional access control requirements related to mobile devices used to access to set to access CII.  1DENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (A) AUTHENTICATION | 5.5       | ACCESS CONTROL (AC)     | modification of information systems, applications, services, and communication                    | Functional        | intersects with      | Cybersecurity & Data     | GOV-03   |   | 5   |                            |
| Identification is a unique, auditable representation of an identify within an information system susually in the form of a simple character string for each information system susually in the form of a simple character string for each office to mechanism or processor to any other origin, Authentication feet to mechanism or processor to any other with publishing Cybersecurity & Data Protection policies, standards and procedures.    Solid DENTIFICATION (A)   Identification is a unique, auditable representation of an identity within an original processor of evide, as a principalistic to allowing access to a system's resources.    Solid DENTIFICATION (A)   Identification is a unique, auditable representation of an identity within an original processor. In the standard of an approach of the intersects with a protection program, including policies, standards and procedures.    Solid DENTIFICATION (A)   Identification is a unique, auditable representation of an identity within an original processor. In the standard is an approach of the intersects with a protection program, including policies, standards and procedures.    Solid DENTIFICATION (A)   Identification is a unique, auditable representation of an identity within an original processor. In the processor of the information system and procedures.    Solid DENTIFICATION (A)   Identification is a unique, auditable representation of an identify of suser, process, or device, as a principal processor. In the processor with the intersects with a processor with a processor with the intersects with a processor with a processor with the intersects with a processor within a processor with   |           |                         | Refer to Section 5.13.6 for additional access control requirements related to mobile              |                   |                      | Protection Program       |          |   |   |                            |
| IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (A)  |           |                         | Identification is a unique, auditable representation of an identity within an                     |                   |                      | Postleria (*)            |          |   |   |                            |
| refers to mechanisms or processes to verify the identity of a user, process, or device, as a precipitation to a system's resources.  IDENTIFICATION AND IDENTIFICATION (A)  IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (A)  AUTHENTICATION (A)  Policy Area 7:  Configuration Management  Access Restrictions for Changes  Access Restrictions for Changes  Access Restrictions for Changes  Access Restrictions for Changes  S.7.1.1  Least Functionally on the requirement for continuing upgrades, and modifications, Section 5.5, Access Control, describes agency requirements for control of refringes and restrictions agency and metalticions, section 5.5, Access Control, describes agency requirements for control of refringes and metalticions are provided in the process of the proposed | 5.6       |                         | individual user, machine, software component, or any other entity. Authentication                 | Functional        | intersects with      | Data Protection          | GOV-02   |   | 5   |                            |
| IDENTIFICATION AND AITHENTICATION (A) AITHENTICAT   |           |                         |   |                   |                      | Documentation            |          |   |   |                            |
| IDENTIFICATION AID   |           |                         |   |                   |                      | Pariadia Perient         |          |   |   |                            |
| Policy Area 7:  5.7 Policy Area 7: Configuration Management  Access Restrictions for Changes  Access Restrictions for Changes  5.7.1 Least Functionally on search and an experiments for purposes of initiating changes, and modifications. Section 5.5, Access Control, describes accompression information system components of the information system to provide access to information system on provide on the management of the information system on have algnificant effects on the overall accompliance on the information system on the provide of the section of the information system on the provide of the section of the information system on provide of the section of the information system on the provide of the information system on provide on the provide of the section of the information system on provide on the provide of the section of the information system on provide on the provide on t | 5.6       |                         | individual user, machine, software component, or any other entity. Authentication                 | Functional        | intersects with      | Cybersecurity & Data     | GOV-03   |   | 5   |                            |
| 5.7 Configuration Management  Funned of unplanned changes to the hardware, software, and/or firmware components to The information system can have significant affects on the overall security of the system. The goal is to allow only qualified and authorized individuals access information system can have significant affects on the overall security of the system. The goal is to allow only qualified and authorized individuals access information system components for purposes of initiating changes, including uggrades, and modifications. Section 5.5, Access Control, describes assent requirements for control of orfivilleas and restrictions.  The agency shall configure the application, service, or information system to provide only essential capabilities and shall specifically prohibit and/or restrict the use of the provision of the information system to provide only essential capabilities of the provision of the information system to provide only essential capabilities to the system of provide only essential capabilities to the provision of the provision of the information system to provide only essential capabilities to the provision of the provision of the information system to provide only essential capabilities to the provision of the information system to provide only essential capabilities to the provision of th |           |                         |   |                   |                      | Protection Program       |          |   |   |                            |
| Fanned or unplaned changes to the hardware, software, so | 5.7       | Configuration           | N/A   | Functional        | no relationship      | N/A                      | N/A      | N/A   | N/A                                       | No requirements to map to. |
| 5.7.1 Access Restrictions for Changes cocasts information systems, The goal is to allow only qualified and authorized individuals of Changes and modifications. Section 5.5, Access Control, describes access to information systems components for purposes of initiating changes, including uggrades, and modifications. Section 5.5, Access Control, describes access control, describes access control, describes access control, describes access control of infiliages and modifications, section 5.5, Access Control, describes access access access control, describes access access access access access access access access described for Change Chicago Change C |           | Management              |   |                   |                      |                          |          |   |   |                            |
| Changes access to information system components for purposes of initiating changes, including upgrades, and modifications. Section 5, Access Control, describles agency requirements for control of orlylinees and restrictions.  The agency shall configure the application, service, or information system to provide only essential capabilities by sesential capabilities and shall specifically prohibit and/or restrict the use of restricting the use of ports, protocols, and/or services.   | 5.7.1     |                         | security of the system. The goal is to allow only qualified and authorized individuals            | Functional        | equal                |                          | CHG-04   | ายเหนุง 01 นระหรั to conduct unauthorized changes.  | 10  |                            |
| The agency shall configure the application, service, or information system to provide only essential capabilities by 5.7.1.1 Least Functionality only essential capabilities and shall specifically prohibit and/or restrict the use of provide only essential capabilities by Equal Least Functionality CFG-03 specifically prohibiting or restricting the use of ports, protocols, and/or services.  |           | Changes                 | including upgrades, and modifications. Section 5.5, Access Control, describes                     |                   |                      | Change                   |          |   |   |                            |
|  | 5714      | Legat Function 16-      | The agency shall configure the application, service, or information system to provide             | Eupotion -1       | ogua!                | Laget Europtic tile -    | CEC or   |   | 10  |                            |
|  | 5.7.1.1   | Least Functionality     |   | runcuonal         | equal                | Least Functionality      | UFG-03   | opecanically promoting or restricting the use of ports, protocols, and/or services.   | 10  |                            |



| FDE#    | FDE Name   | Focal Document Element (FDE) Description   | STRM<br>Rationale | STRM<br>Relationship | SCF Control   | SCF#     | Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description  | Strength of<br>Relationship<br>(optional) | Notes (optional) |
|---------|--|--|-------------------|----------------------|---|----------|--|---|------------------|
| 5.7.1.2 | Network Diagram                                      | The agency shall ensure that a complete oppological drawing depicting the interconnectivity of the agency network, to criminal justice information, systems and services is maintained in a current status. See Appendix C for sample network diagrams. The network topological drawing shall include the following:  1. All communications paths, circuits, and other components used for the interconnection, beginning with the agency-owned system(s) and traversing through all interconnected systems to the agency-owned system(s) and traversing through all interconnected systems to the agency-owned system (s), notice is, servers, encryption devices, and computer workstations), individual workstations (clients) do not have to be shown; the number of clients is sufficient.  2. "For Official Use Only" (FOUO) markings.  4. The agency name and date (day, month, and year) drawing was created or updated.   | Functional        | subset of            | Network Diagrams & Data<br>Flow Diagrams (DFDs)                           | AST-04   | Mechanisms exist to maintain network architecture diagrams that: (i) Contain sufficient detail to assess the security of the network's architecture; (2) Reflect the current architecture of the network environment; and (3) Document all sensitive/regulated data flows.   | 10  |                  |
| 5.7.2   | Security of Configuration<br>Documentation           | The system configuration documentation often contains sensitive details (e.g.,<br>descriptions of applications, processes, procedures, data structures, authorization<br>processes, data flow, etc.) Agencies shall protect the system documentation from<br>unauthorized access consistent with the provisions described in Section 5.5 Access<br>Control.  | Functional        | subset of            | Data Protection   | DCH-01   | Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of data protection controls.   | 10  |                  |
| 5.7.2   | Security of Configuration<br>Documentation           | The system configuration documentation often contains sensitive details (e.g., descriptions of applications, processes, procedures, data structures, authorization processes, data flow, etc.) Agencies shall protect the system documentation from unauthorized access consistent with the provisions described in Section 5.5 Access Control.  | Functional        | intersects with      | System Security & Privacy<br>Plan (SSPP)                                  | IAO-03   | Mechanisms exist to generate System Security & Privacy Plans (SSPPs), or similar<br>document repositories, to identify and maintain key architectural information on<br>each critical system, application or service, as well as influence injuryle, entities,<br>systems, applications and processes, providing a historical record of the data and<br>its origins. | 5   |                  |
| 5.8     | MEDIA PROTECTION (MP)                                | Documented and implemented media protection policies and procedures ensure<br>that access to digital and non-digital media in all forms is restricted to authorized<br>individuals using authorized methods and processes.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Publishing Cybersecurity &<br>Data Protection<br>Documentation            | GOV-02   | Mechanisms exist to establish, maintain and disseminate cybersecurity & data protection policies, standards and procedures.  | 5   |                  |
| 5.8     | MEDIA PROTECTION (MP)                                | Documented and implemented media protection policies and procedures ensure   | Functional        | intersects with      | Periodic Review & Update of<br>Cybersecurity & Data<br>Protection Program | GOV-03   | Mechanisms exist to review the cybersecurity & data protection program, including<br>policies, standards and procedures, at planned intervals or if significant changes<br>occur to ensure their continuing suitability, adequacy  | 5   |                  |
| 5.9     | Policy Area 9: Physical<br>Protection                | Physical protection policy and procedures shall be documented and implemented to ensure CJI and information system hardware, software, and media are physically protected through access control measures.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Publishing Cybersecurity &<br>Data Protection<br>Documentation            | GOV-02   | Mechanisms exist to establish, maintain and disseminate cybersecurity & data<br>protection policies, standards and procedures.  Mechanisms exist to review the cybersecurity & data protection program, including  | 5   |                  |
| 5.9     | Policy Area 9: Physical<br>Protection                | Physical protection policy and procedures shall be documented and implemented<br>to ensure CII and information system hardware, software, and media are physically<br>protected through access control measures.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Periodic Review & Update of<br>Cybersecurity & Data<br>Protection Program | GOV-03   | policies, standards and procedures, at planned intervals or if significant changes occur to ensure their continuing suitability, adequacy and effectiveness.   | 5   |                  |
| 5.9     | Policy Area 9: Physical<br>Protection                | Physical protection policy and procedures shall be documented and implemented<br>to ensure CJI and information system hardware, software, and media are physically<br>protected through access control measures.   | Functional        | subset of            | Physical & Environmental<br>Protections                                   | PES-01   | Mechanisms exist to facilitate the operation of physical and environmental<br>protection controls.   | 10  |                  |
| 5.9.1   | Physically Secure<br>Location                        | A physically secure location is a facility, a criminal justice conveyance, or an area, a room, or a group of rooms within a facility with both the physical and personnel security controls sufficient to protect [2] and associated information systems. The physically secure location is subject to criminal justice agency management controls [38] control. PBI CLIS Security addendum; or a combination thereof.  Sections 5.9.1.1 – 5.9.1.8 describe the physical controls required in order to be considered an physically secure location, while Sections 5.2 and 5.12, respectively, describe the minimum security awareness training and personnel security controls required for unsecorted access to a physically secure location. Sections 5.5, 5.2.2.1, and 5.10 describe the requirements for technical security controls required to access Cli from within the perimeter of a physically secure location without AA.                                       | Functional        | subset of            | Physical & Environmental<br>Protections                                   | PES-01   | Mechanisms exist to facilitate the operation of physical and environmental protection controls.  | 10  |                  |
| 5.9.1.1 | Security Perimeter                                   | The perimeter of a physically secure location shall be prominently posted and separated from non-secure locations by physical controls. Security perimeters shall be defined, controlled and secured in a manner acceptable to the CSA or SIB.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Controlled Ingress & Egress<br>Points                                     | PES-03.1 | Physical access control mechanisms exist to limit and monitor physical access through controlled ingress and egress points.  | 5   |                  |
| 5.9.1.2 | Physical Access<br>Authorizations                    | The agency shall develop and keep current a list of personnel with authorized<br>access to the physically secure location (except for those areas within the<br>permanent facility officially designated as publicly accessible) or shall issue<br>credentials to authorized personnel.  | Functional        | equal                | Physical Access<br>Authorizations   | PES-02   | Physical access control mechanisms exist to maintain a current list of personnel with authorized access to organizational facilities (except for those areas within the facility officially designated as publicly accessible).  | 10  |                  |
| 5.9.1.3 | Physical Access Control                              | The agency shall control all physical access points (except for those areas within   | Functional        | intersects with      | Role-Based Physical<br>Access   | PES-02.1 | Physical access control mechanisms exist to authorize physical access to facilities based on the position or role of the individual.   | 5   |                  |
| 5.9.1.3 | Physical Access Control                              | The agency shall control all physical access points (except for those areas within<br>the facility officially designated as publicly accessible) and shall verify individual<br>access authorizations before granting access.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Physical Access Control   | PES-03   | Physical access control mechanisms exist to enforce physical access<br>authorizations for all physical access points (including designated entry/exit<br>points) to facilities (excluding those areas within the facility officially designated as<br>publicly accessible).  | 5   |                  |
| 5.9.1.4 | Access Control for<br>Transmission Medium            | The agency shall control physical access to information system distribution and transmission lines within the physically secure location.  | Functional        | equal                | Transmission Medium<br>Security   | PES-12.1 | Physical security mechanisms exist to protect power and telecommunications<br>cabling carrying data or supporting information services from interception,<br>interference or damage.   | 10  |                  |
| 5.9.1.5 | Access Control for<br>Display Medium                 | The agency shall control physical access to information system devices that display<br>CJI and shall position information system devices in such a way as to prevent<br>unauthorized individuals from accessing and viewing CJI.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Physical Security of Offices,<br>Rooms & Facilities                       | PES-04   | Mechanisms exist to identify systems, equipment and respective operating<br>environments that require limited physical access so that appropriate physical<br>access controls are designed and implemented for offices, rooms and facilities.  | 5   |                  |
| 5.9.1.5 | Access Control for<br>Display Medium                 | The agency shall control physical access to information system devices that display<br>CJI and shall position information system devices in such a way as to prevent<br>unauthorized individuals from accessing and viewing CJI.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Working in Secure Areas   | PES-04.1 | Physical security mechanisms exist to allow only authorized personnel access to secure areas.  | 5   |                  |
| 5.9.1.5 | Access Control for<br>Display Medium                 | The agency shall control physical access to information system devices that display<br>CJI and shall position information system devices in such a way as to prevent<br>unauthorized individuals from accessing and viewing CJI.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Access Control for Output<br>Devices                                      | PES-12.2 | Physical security mechanisms exist to restrict access to printers and other system output devices to prevent unauthorized individuals from obtaining the output.   | 5   |                  |
| 5.9.1.6 | Monitoring Physical<br>Access                        | The agency shall monitor physical access to the information system to detect and respond to physical security incidents.  The agency shall control physical access by authenticating visitors before   | Functional        | equal                | Monitoring Physical Access  | PES-05   | Physical access control mechanisms exist to monitor for, detect and respond to physical security incidents.  Physical access control mechanisms exist to identify, authorize and monitor   | 10  |                  |
| 5.9.1.7 | Visitor Control                                      | authorizing escorted access to the physically secure location (except for those areas designated as publicly accessible). The agency shall escort visitors at all times and monitor visitor activity.  | Functional        | equal                | Visitor Control   | PES-06   | visitors before allowing access to the facility (other than areas designated as publicly accessible).  Physical security mechanisms exist to isolate information processing facilities   | 10  |                  |
| 5.9.1.8 | Delivery and Removal                                 | The agency shall authorize and control information system-related items entering and exiting the physically secure location.  If an agency cannot meet all of the controls required for establishing a physically  | Functional        | equal                | Delivery & Removal  | PES-10   | Physical security mechanisms exist to isolate information processing facilities from points such as delivery and loading areas and other points to avoid unauthorized access.  Mechanisms exist to identify systems, equipment and respective operating  | 10  |                  |
| 5.9.2   | Controlled Area                                      | If an agency cannot meet as or the controls required for establishing a physically associate founds to the sain operational meet to access or stor CUI, the agency shall designate an area, a room, or a storage container, as a controlled area for the purpose of day-fox CUI access or storage. The agency shall, at a minimum:  1. Limit access to the controlled area during CII processing times to only those personnel authorized by the agency to access or view CII.  2. Lock the area, room, or storage container when unattended.  3. Position information system devices and documents containing CII in such a way as to prevent unauthorized individuals from access and view.  4. Follow the encryption requirements found in Section 5.10.1.2 for electronic storage (i.e., data "at rest") of CII.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Physical Security of Offices,<br>Rooms & Facilities                       | PES-04   | environments that require limited physical access so that appropriate physical access controls are designed and implemented for offices, rooms and facilities.   | 5   |                  |
| 5.9.2   | Controlled Area                                      | It an agency cannot meet all of the controls required for establishing a physically accure location, but has an operational need to access or store CII, the agency shall designate an area, a room, or a storage container, as a controlled area for the purpose of day-to-day CII access or storage. The agency shall, at a minimum:  1. Limit access to the controlled area during CII processing times to only those personnel authorized by the agency to access or view CII.  2. Lock the area, room, or storage container when unattended.  3. Position information system devices and documents containing CII in such away as to prevent unaturbrized individuals from access and view.  4. Follow the encryption requirements found in Section 5.10.1.2 for electronic storage (i.e., data "artest") of CII.  Examples of systems and communications safeguards range from boundary and transmission protection to securing a agency's virtualized environment. In | Functional        | intersects with      | Working in Secure Areas   | PES-04.1 | Physical security mechanisms exist to allow only authorized personnel access to secure areas.  Mechanisms exist to develop, govern & update procedures to facilitate the implementation of Network Security Controls (NSC).  | 5   |                  |
| 5.10    | Policy Area 10: System and Communications Protection | addition, applications, services, or information systems must have the capability to<br>ensure system integrity through the detection and protection against unauthorized<br>changes to software and information. This section details the policy for protecting<br>systems and communications infrastructures.<br>Meter to Section 5.13.4 for additional system integrity requirements related to<br>mobile devices used to access CII.   | Functional        | subset of            | Network Security Controls<br>(NSC)  | NET-01   |  | 10  |                  |



| FDE#       | FDE Name                         | Focal Document Element (FDE) Description  | STRM<br>Rationale | STRM<br>Relationship | SCF Control  | SCF#     | Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description  | Strength of<br>Relationship | Notes (optional) |
|------------|----------------------------------|---|-------------------|----------------------|--|----------|--|-----------------------------|------------------|
| 5.10.1     | Information Flow<br>Enforcement  | The network infrastructure shall control the flow of information between interconnected systems. Information flow control regulates where information is allowed to ravel within a information system and between information systems (as opposed to who is allowed to access the information) and without explicit regard to subsequent accesses to that information, in other works, controlling how data moves from one place to the next in a secure manner. Examples of controls that are better expressed as flow control than access control (see Section 5.5) are: 1. Prevent Clif from being transmitted unencrypted across the public network. 2. Block outside fartific that claims to be from within the agency. 3. Do not pass any web requests to the public network that are not from the internal web proxy. Specific examples of flow control enforcement can be found in boundary protection devices (e.g., process, areoxypted turnels, frevalls, and routers) that employ rule sets or establish configuration settings that restrict information system services or provide a packet fifting capability.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Layered Network Defenses   | NET-02   | Mechanisms exist to implement security functions as a layered structure that minimizes interactions between layers of the design and avoids any dependence by lower layers on the functionality or correctness of higher layers. | 5                           |                  |
| 5.10.1     | Information Flow<br>Enforcement  | The network infrastructure shall control the flow of information between interconnected systems. Information flow control regulates where information is allowed to rave within an information system and between information systems (as opposed to who is allowed to access the information) and without explicit regard to subsequent accesses to that information. In other words, controlling how date moves from one place to the next in a secure manner. Examples of controls that are better expressed as flow control than access control (see Section 5.5) sec. 1. Prevent CII from being transmitted unencrypted across the public network.  2. Book coustaid entify that claims to be from within the agency.  3. Do not pass any web requests to the public network that are not from the internal web proxy.  Specific examples of flow control enforcement can be found in boundary protection devices (e.g., proxies, gateways, guards, encrypted turnels, frevalls, and routers) that employ rule sets or establish configuration settings that restrict information system services or provide a packet filtering capability.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Data Flow Enforcement –<br>Access Control Lists (ACLs)           | NET-04   | Mechanisms exist to design, implement and review firewall and router configurations to restrict connections between untrusted networks and internal systems.   | 5                           |                  |
| 5.10.1.1   | Boundary Protection              | The agency shall:  1. Control access to networks processing CII.  2. Monitor and control communications at the external boundary of the information system and at key internal boundaries within the system.  3. Ensure any connection to the Internet, other external networks, or information systems occur through controlled interfaces (e.g., proxies, gateways, routers, firewalls, e.mcrypted tunnels). See Section 5.13.4. 3 for guidance on personal frewalls.  4. Employ tools and techniques to monitor network events, detect attacks, and provide identification of unauthorized use.  5. Ensure the operational failure of the boundary protection mechanisms do not result in any unauthorized release of information system boundary (i.e., the device "fails closed" vs. "fails open").  6. Allocate publicly accessible information system components (e.g., public Web sarvers) to separate sub networks with separate, network interfaces. Publicly accessible information systems components (e.g., public Web sarvers) to separate sub networks with separate, network interfaces.  | Functional        | equal                | Boundary Protection  | NET-03   | Mechanisms exist to monitor and control communications at the external network boundary and at key internal boundaries within the network.   | 10                          |                  |
| 5.10.1.2   | Encryption                       | In Section 5.10.3.2 to achieve as eneration.<br>Encryption is a found cryptology that applies a cryptographic operation to provide<br>confidentiality of jeansitive) information. Decryption is the reversing of the<br>cryptographic logoration to convert the information back into a plaintext (readable)<br>format. There are two main types of encryption: symmetric encryption and<br>asymmetric encryption (also known as public key encryption). Hybrid encryption<br>solutions do exist and use both asymmetric encryption for client/server certificate<br>exchange – session integrity and symmetric encryption for bulk data encryption—  | Functional        | subset of            | Use of Cryptographic<br>Controls                                 | CRY-01   | Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of cryptographic protections<br>controls using known public standards and trusted cryptographic technologies.  | 10                          |                  |
| 5.10.1.2   | Encryption                       | Encryption is a form of encryptology that applies a cryptographic operation to provide<br>confidentiality for encryptology that applies a cryptographic operation to provide<br>confidentiality for encryption (and the revening of the<br>cryptographic operation to convert the information back into a plaintext (readable)<br>format. There are two mainty pass of encryption: symmetric encryption for<br>asymmetric encryption (also known as public key encryption). Hybrid encryption<br>solutions do exist and use both asymmetric encryption for client/server certificate<br>exchange — session integrity and symmetric encryption for bulk data encryption—   | Functional        | intersects with      | Transmission<br>Confidentiality                                  | CRY-03   | Crystographic mechanisms exist to protect the confidentiality of data being transmitted.   | 5                           |                  |
| 5.10.1.2   | Encryption                       | Encryption is a form of cryptology that applies a cryptographic operation to provide<br>confidentiality of (ensaithe) information. Decryption is the reversing of the<br>cryptographic operation to convert the information back into a plaintext (readable)<br>format. There are two main types of encryption: symmetric encryption and<br>asymmetric encryption (also known as public key encryption). Hybrid encryption<br>solutions do exist and use both asymmetric encryption for client/server certificate<br>exchange – session integrity and symmetric encryption for bulk data encryption –<br>data confidentiality.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Encrypting Data At Rest  | CRY-05   | Cryptographic mechanisms exist to prevent unauthorized disclosure of data at rest.   | 5                           |                  |
| 5.10.1.2   | Encryption                       | Encyption is a form of cryptology that applies a cryptographic operation to provide<br>confidentiality of feasitive) information. Deception is the reversing of the<br>cryptographic operation to convert the information back into a plaintext (readable)<br>format. There are two mainty pass of encryption: symmetric encryption and<br>asymmetric encryption (also known as public key encryption). Hybrid encryption<br>solutions do exist and use both asymmetric encryption for client/server certificate<br>exchange — session integrity and symmetric encryption for bulk data encryption—<br>data confidentiality.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Protection of<br>Confidentiality / Integrity<br>Using Encryption | NET-14.2 | Cryptographic mechanisms exist to protect the confidentiality and integrity of<br>remote access sessions (e.g., VPN).  | 5                           |                  |
| 5.10.1.2   | Encryption                       | Encryption is a form of cryptology that applies a cryptographic operation to provide<br>confidentiality of (ensanthie) eliformation. Decryption is the reversing of the<br>cryptographic operation to convert the information back into a plaintext (readable)<br>format. There are two main types of encryption: symmetric encryption and<br>asymmetric encryption (also known as public key encryption). Hybrid encryption<br>solutions do exist and use both asymmetric encryption for client/server certificate<br>exchange—session integrity and symmetric encryption for bulk date encryption—<br>date confidentiality.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Authentication &<br>Encryption                                   | NET-15.1 | Mechanisms exist to secure Wi-Fite.g., IEEE 802.11) and prevent unauthorized access by: (1) Authenticating devices trying to connect; and (2) Encrypting transmitted data.   | 5                           |                  |
| 5.10.1.2.1 | Encryption for CJI in<br>Transit | When CI is transmitted outside the boundary of the physically secure location, the data shall be immediately protected via encyption is employed, the cryptographic module used shall be FIRS 140-2 certified and use a symmetric cipher key strengly for at least 128 bit strength to protect CI). NOTE: Subsequent versions of approved cryptographic modules that are under current review for FIPS 140-2 compliancy can be used in the interim until certification is complete. EXCEPTIONS:  1. See Sections 5.13.1.2.2 and 5.10.2.  2. Encryption shall not be required if the transmission medium meets all of the following requirements:  a. The agency owns, operates, manages, or protects the medium.  b. Medium terminates within physically secure locations at both ends with no interconnections between.  c. Physical access to the medium is controlled by the agency using the requirements is sections 5.1 and 5.12.  d. Protection includes asfeguards (e.g., acoustic, electric, electromagnetic, and physically and fresulte countermessures (e.g., alarms, notifications) to permit its use for the transmission of unencrypted information through an area of lesser classification or control.  a. With prior approval of the CSD.  Examples:  *A Campus is completely owned and controlled by a criminal justice agency (CIA)—filtino-faight between buildings exists where a cable is buried, encryption is not required.  *A mutil-story building is completely owned and controlled by a CIAI—If floors are physically secure or able runs through non-accure areas are protected, encryption is not required. | Functional        | subset of            | Use of Cryptographic<br>Controls                                 | CRY-01   | Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of cryptographic protections controls using known public standards and trusted cryptographic technologies.   | 10                          |                  |



| FDE#       | FDE Name                                      | Focal Document Element (FDE) Description   | STRM<br>Rationale | STRM<br>Relationship | SCF Control  | SCF#     | Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description   | Strength of<br>Relationship<br>(optional) | Notes (optional) |
|------------|---|--|-------------------|----------------------|--|----------|---|---|------------------|
| 5.10.1.2.1 | Encryption for CII in<br>Transit              | When CII is transmitted outside the boundary of the physically secure location, the data shall be immediately protected via encryption. Nea encyption is employed, that e cytographic module used shall be FIPS 140-2 centrified and use a symmetric clopher key strangly of at least 128 bit strength to protect CII.  NOTE: Subsequent versions of approved cryptographic modules that are under current review for RPS 140-2 compliancy can be used in the interim until certification is complete.  EXCEPTIONES:  1. See Sections 5.13.1.2 and 5.10.2.  2. Encryptions shall not be required if the transmission medium meets all of the following requirements:  a. The agency own, operates, manages, or protects the medium.  b. Medium terminates within physically secure locations at both ends with no interconnections between.  c. Physical access to the medium is controlled by the agency using the requirements is Detomore.  c. Provincial access to the medium is controlled by the agency using the requirements in Sections 5.3 at and 5.2.  d. Protection includes safeguards (e.g., acoustic, electric, electromagnetic, and physically and if Resulbe countermeasures (e.g., almans, notifications) to permit its use for the transmission of unencrypted information through an area of lesser classification or control.  - With prior approval of the CSO.  - A mutit-stoy building is completely owned and controlled by a CIA—if floors are physically accure or called runs through annoculation of CIAs and non-CIAs—if floors are hydrolized and controlled by a mile of CIAs and non-CIAs—if floors are   | Functional        | intersects with      | Transmission<br>Confidentiality                                      | CRY-03   | Cryptographic mechanisms exist to protect the confidentiality of data being transmitted.  | 5   |                  |
| 5.10.1.2.2 | Encryption for CJI at Rest                    | 6. Be changed when previously suthorized personnel no longer require access. 2. Autitipe filter aminitaried in the seam unencypted folder shall have separate and distinct passphrases. A single passphrase may be used to encoyst an entire folder of dak containing muttiple files. All suit live frequirements found in Section 5.4.1 Auditable Events and Content (information Systems) shall be applied. NOTE: Commonly available encryption tools often use sky to unlock the clipher to allow data access; this key is called a passphrase. While similar to a password, a mapsphrase into used for user authentication. Additionally, the passphrase contains stringent character requirements making it more secure and thus providing a higher level of confidence that the passphrase will not compromised.   | Functional        | equal                | Encrypting Data At Rest  | CRY-05   | Cryptographic mechanisms exist to prevent unauthorized disclosure of data at rest.  | 10  |                  |
| 5.10.1.2.3 | Public Key Infrastructure<br>(PKI) Technology | For agencies using public key infrastructure (PKI) technology, the agency shall develop and implement a certificate policy and certification practice statement for the issuance of public key certificates used in the information system. Registration to receive a public key certificate shall.  1. Include authorization by a supervisor or a responsible official.  2. Be accomplished by a secure process that verifies the identity of the certificate holder.  3. Ensure the certificate is issued to the intended party.   | Functional        | subset of            | Public Key Infrastructure<br>(PKI)                                   | CRY-08   | Mechanisms exist to securely implement an internal Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)<br>infrastructure or obtain PKI services from a reputable PKI service provider.  | 10  |                  |
| 5.10.1.3   | Voice over internet<br>Protocol               | Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) has been embraced by organizations globally as an addition to, or replacement for, public switched stelephone network (PSTN) and private branch schange (PSN) relations by extens. The immediate benefits are lower costs than traditional telephone services and VoIP can be installed in-time with an organization is esting internet Protocol (IP) services. Almong VoIP's risks that have to be considered carefully are: myriad security concerns, cost is assess associated with new networking hardware requirements, and overarching quality or service (QSO) factors. And organization is an advantage of the protocologistic pro | Functional        | intersects with      | Host Intrusion Detection<br>and Prevention Systems<br>(HIDS/HIPS)    | END-07   | Mechanisms exist to utilize Host-based intrusion Detection / Prevention Systems (HIDS / HIPS), or Immilar technologies, to monitor for an orrect against anomalous host activity, including lateral movement across the network | 5   |                  |
| 5.10.1.3   | Voice over internet<br>Protocol               | Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) has been embraced by organizations globally as an addition to, or replacement for, public awthorted telephone network (PSTN) and provise branch extange (PSN) telephone systems. The immediate benefits are lower costs than traditional telephone services and VoIP can be installed in-line with an organization's existing internet Protocol (IP) services. Among YoIP's risks that have to be considered carefully are: myriad security cornerse, cost is sues associated with new networking hardware requirements, and overarching quality of service (QSI) Stacks.  In addition to the security controls described in this document, the following additional controls shall be implemented when an agency deploys VoIP within a network that contains unencrypted CII:  1. Establish usage restrictions and implementation guidance for VoIP technologies.  2. Change the default administrative password on the IP phones and VoIP witchen Juliza Virtual Coat Area Network, VAJN technology to segment VoIP traffic from data traffic.  Appendix G. 2 outlines threats, vulnerabilities, mitigations, and NIST best practices for VoIP.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Intrusion Detection &<br>Prevention Systems (IDS &<br>IPS)           | MON-01.1 | Mechanisms exist to implement intrusion Detection / Prevention Systems (IDS / IPS) technologies on critical systems, key network segments and network choke points.   | 5   |                  |
| 5.10.1.3   | Voice over internet<br>Protocol               | Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) has been embraced by organizations globally as an addition to, or replacement for, public switched stelephone network (PSTN) and private branch extange (PSN) telephone systems. The immediate benefits are lower costs than traditional telephone services and VoIP can be installed in-line with norganization's existing internet Protocol (IP) services. Among VoIP's risks that have to be considered carefully are: myriad security concerns, cost is susses associated with me wetworking hardware requirements, and overarching quality of service (QSS) factors.  In addition at the security control described in this document, the following additional controls shall be implemented when an agency deploys VoIP within a network that contains unencrypted Clit.  1. Stabalish usage servictions and implementation guidance for VoIP technologies.  2. Change the defeatul administrative password on the IP phones and VoIP volt evidence of the production of the p | Functional        | intersects with      | Network Intrusion<br>Detection / Prevention<br>Systems (NIDS / NIPS) | NET-08   | Mechanisms exist to employ Network Intrusion Detection / Prevention Systems (NIDS/NIPS) to detect and/or prevent intrusions into the network.   | 5   |                  |



| FDE#     | FDE Name                           | Focal Document Element (FDE) Description   | STRM<br>Rationale | STRM<br>Relationship | SCF Control   | SCF#     | Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description   | Strength of<br>Relationship<br>(optional) | Notes (optional) |
|----------|------------------------------------|--|-------------------|----------------------|---|----------|---|---|------------------|
| 5.10.1.3 | Voice over internet<br>Protocol    | Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) has been embraced by organizations globally as an addition to, or replacement for, public awitched telephone network (PSTN) and an addition to, or replacement for, public awitched telephone network (PSTN) and lower costs than traditional telephone services and VoIP can be installed in-line with an organization is existing internet Protocol (P) services. Among VoIP's risks that have to be considered carefully are: myriad security concerns, cost issues associated with me wetvorhigh publicave requirements, and overarching quality of service (QSS) factors.  In addition to the security controls described in this document, the following additional controls shall be implemented when an agency deploys VoIP within a network that footination usenercypted CII:  1. Establish usage restrictions and implementation guidance for VoIP technologies.  2. Unlike Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN) technology to segment VoIP traffic from VoIP.  Appendix G. Joulines threats, vulnerabilities, mitigations, and NIST best practices for VoIP.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Wireless Intrusion<br>Detection / Prevention<br>Systems (WIDS / WIFS) | NET-08.2 | Machanisms exist to monitor wireless network segments to implement Wireless<br>intrusion Detection / Prevention Systems (WIDS/WIPS) technologies.   | 5   |                  |
| 5.10.1.4 | Cloud Computing                    | Organizations transitioning to a cloud environment are presented unique opportunities and helilenges (e.g., upproted cost as wings and increased efficiencies ventus a loss of control over the datal, Reviewing the cloud computing efficiencies ventus a loss of control over the datal, Reviewing the cloud computing white paper (Appendix G.3), the cloud assessment located within the security policy resource center on FBLgov, NRIST Special Publications (800-144, 800-145, and 800-146), as well as the cloud provider so policies and capabilities will enable organizations to make informed decisions on whether or not the cloud provider so offer service that maintains compliance with the requirements of the CIS Security Policy. The storage of CII, regardless of encryption status, shall only be permitted in cloud environments (e.g., government or third-party/commercial datacenters, etc.) which reside within the physical boundaries of APP-member county (i.e., U.S. – Ideat/statten/erritor), Indian Trilbs, or the Royal Canadian Mounter (e.g., U.S. – Tedeat/statten/erritor), Indian Trilbs, or the Royal Canadian Mounter (e.g., U.S. – Tedeat/statten/erritor), Indian Trilbs, or the Royal Canadian Mounter (e.g., U.S. – Tedeat/statten/erritor), Indian Trilbs, or the Royal Canadian Mounter (e.g., U.S. – Tedeat/statten/erritor), Indian Trilbs, or the Royal Canadian Mounter (e.g., U.S. – Tedeat/statten/erritor), Unidea Trilbs, or the Royal Canadian Mounter (e.g., U.S. – Tedeat/statten/erritor), Unidea Trilbs, or the Royal Canadian Mounter (e.g., U.S. – Tedeat/statten/erritor), Unidea Trilbs, or the Royal Canadian Mounter (e.g., U.S. – Tedeat/statten/erritor), Unidea Trilbs, or the Royal Canadian Mounter (e.g., U.S. – Tedeat/statten/erritor), Unidea Trilbs, or the Royal Canadian Mounter (e.g., U.S. – Tedeat/statten/erritor), Unidea Trilbs, or the Royal Canadian Mounter (e.g., U.S. – Tedeat/statten/erritor), Unidea Trilbs, or the Royal Canadian Mounter (e.g., U.S. – Tedeat/statten/erritor), Unidea Trilbs, or the Royal Canadian Mounter (e | Functional        | intersects with      | Use of Communications<br>Technology                                   | HRS-05.3 | Mechanisms exist to establish usage restrictions and implementation guidance for communications technologies based on the potential to cause damage to systems, if used maliciously.                                  | 5   |                  |
| 5.10.1.4 | Cloud Computing                    | Upganizations transitioning to a cloud environment are presented unique opportunities and challenges (e.g., purported cost savings and increased efficiencies versus a loss of control over the data). Reviewing the cloud computing white apper (Appendix G.3), the cloud assessment located within the security policy resource center on Filgo. yn NET Speal Publications (601-48, 601-445, and 800-146), as well as the cloud provider's policies and capabilities will enable of 1860-146, 601-445, and 800-146), as well as the cloud provider's policies and capabilities will enable organizations to make informed declaries on whether or not the cloud provider can ofter service that maintains compliance with the requirements of the CISS Security Policy.  The storage of CII, regardless of encryption status, shall only be permitted in cloud environments (e.g., government or third-party/commercial datacenters, etc.) which reside within the physical boundaries of APB-member country (i.e., U.S., U.S. textractices, incline in Tibes, and Canada) and legal authority of an APB-member agency (i.e., U.S Tederal/status-farricry, Indian Tribe, or the Royal Canadian Mounted Policie (ROMP).  Note: This restriction does not apply to exchanges of CII with foreign government agencies under international exchange agreements (i.e., the Preventing and Combating Serious Crime (PCSC) agreements, fugitive extracts, and exchanges made for humanistarian and criminal investigatory purposes in particular accumstances).  Hat define the control of the same manner as CII and shall not be used for any advertising or other commercial purposes by any cloud service provider or other associated entity.  The agency may permit limited use of metadata derived from unencrypted CII when service agreements. Such authorized uses of metadata only include, but are not under the control of the company of the control of the     | Functional        | subset of            | Cloud Services  | CLD-01   | Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of cloud management controls to ensure cloud instances are secure and in-line with industry practices.  | 10  |                  |
| 5.10.2   | Facsimile Transmission of CJI      | Cil transmitted via a single or multi-function device over a standard telephone line is<br>exempt from encryption requirements. Cil transmitted external to a physically<br>secure location using a facsimile server, application or service which implements<br>email-like technology, shall meet the encryption requirements for Cil in transit as   | Functional        | intersects with      | Use of Communications<br>Technology                                   |          | Mechanisms exist to establish usage restrictions and implementation guidance for<br>communications technologies based on the potential to cause damage to<br>systems, if used maliciously.                            | 5   |                  |
| 5.10.3   | Partitioning and<br>Virtualization | defined in Section 5.10.  As resources grow scarce, agencies are increasing the centralization of applications, services, and system administration. Advanced software now provides the ability to create virtual machines that allows agencies to reduce the amount of hardware needed. Although the concepts of partitioning and virtualization have assted for a while, the need for securing the partitions and virtualized machines has evolved due to the increasing amount of distributed processing and federated information sources now available across the Internet.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Virtual Machine Images  | CLD-05   | Mechanisms exist to ensure the integrity of virtual machine images at all times.  | 5   |                  |
| 5.10.3   | Partitioning and<br>Virtualization | As resources grow scarce, agencies are increasing the centralization of<br>applications, services, and system administration. Advanced software now provides<br>the ability to create virtual machines that allows agencies to reduce the amount of<br>hardware needed. Although the concepts of partitioning and virtualization have<br>seatest for a white. The need for security the partitions and virtualization achieves<br>evolved due to the increasing amount of distributed processing and federated<br>information sources now available sects the Internet.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Standardized Virtualization<br>Formats                                | CLD-08   | Mechanisms exist to ensure interoperability by requiring cloud providers to use<br>industry-recognized formats and provide documentation of custom changes for<br>review.   | 5   |                  |
| 5.10.3   | Partitioning and<br>Virtualization | As resources grow scarce, agencies are increasing the centralization of<br>applications, services, and system administration. Advanced software now provide<br>the ability to create virtual machines that allows agencies to reduce the amount of<br>hardware needed. Although the concepts of partitioning and virtualization have<br>satisfat for a while, the need for security the partitions and virtualization have<br>sevolved due to the increasing amount of distributed processing and federated<br>information sources now available across the internet.<br>The application, service, or information system shall separate user functionality   | Functional        | intersects with      | Virtualization Techniques   | SEA-13.1 | Mechanisms exist to utilize virtualization techniques to support the employment of<br>a diversity of operating systems and applications.  Mechanisms exist to partition systems so that partitions reside in separate | 5   |                  |
| 5.10.3.1 | Partitioning                       | (including user interface services) from information system management functionality. The application, service, or information system shall physically or logically separate user interface services (e.g., public weep bages) from information storage and management services (e.g., database management). Separation may be accomplished through the user of one or more of the following:  1. Different commanders of the operation of the properties of the operation of the | Functional        | intersects with      | System Partitioning   | SEA-03.1 | physical domains or environments.   | 5   |                  |
| 5.10.3.1 | Partitioning                       | The application, service, or information system shall separate user functionality (including user interface services) from information system management functionality. The application, service, or information system shall physically or togically separate user interface services (e.g., public web pages) from information storage and management services (e.g., database management, Separation may be accomplished through the use of one or more of the following:  1. Different computers.  2. Different computers.  3. Different instances of the operating system.  4. Different network addresses.  5. Other methods secreved by the FBI CJS ISO.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Application Partitioning  | SEA-03.2 | Mechanisms exist to separate user functionality from system management functionality.   | 5   |                  |



| FDE#     | FDE Name   | Focal Document Element (FDE) Description   | STRM<br>Rationale | STRM<br>Relationship | SCF Control                      | SCF#     | Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description   | Strength of<br>Relationship<br>(optional) | Notes (optional)           |
|----------|--|--|-------------------|----------------------|----------------------------------|----------|---|---|----------------------------|
| 5.10.3.2 | Virtualization   | Virtualization refers to a methodology of dividing the resources of a computer (kindward and software) into mutiple osecution environments. Virtualization environments are authorized for criminal justice and noncriminal justice activities and the control of the | Functional        | subset of            | Secure Engineering<br>Principles | SEA-01   | Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of industry-recognized cybersecurity & data privacy practices in the specification, design, development, implementation and modification of systems and services. | 10  |                            |
| 5.10.3.2 | Virtualization   | Whatlackinch refers to a methodology of dividing the resources of a computer fluoridance and reviewed into multiple execution environments. Unraulized environments are authorized for criminal justice and noncriminal justice activities. In addition to the security control described in this Policy, the following additional controls shall be implemented in a virtual environment.  I. soldate the host from the virtual menhine in other words, virtual machine users cannot access host files, firmware, etc.  J. Minatina audit logs for all virtual machines and hosts and store the logs outside the hosts' virtual environment.  J. Winatina handling for for all virtual machines and hosts and store the logs outside the hosts' virtual environment.  J. Virtual Machines that are linternet facing (web servers, portal servers, etc.) shall be physically separate for on Virtual Machines (Wh9) that process CII internally or be separated by a virtual ferwall.  4. Drivers that serve critical functions shall be stored within the hypervisor, or host operating system, for sharing. Each VMI is to be treated as an independent system – secured as independently as possible.  The following additional technical security controls shall be applied in virtual environments. Where CII is comingied with non-CII:  1. Encrypt network traffic within the virtual environment. Here CII is comingied with non-CII or seggester and store unencypted CII within its own secure VM.  2. Encrypt network traffic within the virtual environment.  The following and and/or PM monitoring within the virtual environment.  2. Virtually or physically freward each VM within the virtual environment.  2. Virtually or physically freward each VM within the virtual environment.  3. Gegegate the administrative duties for the host.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Virtualization Techniques        | SEA-13.1 | Mechaniams exist to utilize virtualization techniques to support the employment of<br>a diversity of operating systems and applications.  | 5   |                            |
| 5.11     | Policy Area 11: Formal   | hidratalization  Formal audits are conducted to ensure compliance with applicable statutes, regulations and policies.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Independent Assessors            | CPL-03.1 | Mechanisms exist to utilize independent assessors to evaluate cybersecurity & data protection controls at planned intervals or when the system, service or  | 5   |                            |
| 5.11.1   | Audits Audits by the FBI CJIS                                  | N/A  | Functional        | no relationship      | N/A                              | N/A      | project undergoes significant changes.  N/A   | N/A                                       | No requirements to map to. |
| 5.11.1.1 | Division  Triennial Compliance Audits by the FBI CJIS Division | The FBI CIIS Division is authorized to conduct audits, once every three (3) years as a<br>minimum, to assess agency compliance with applicable statutes, regulations and<br>policies. The CISA Audit thu (RCIA) alload to conduct a triennial audit of each CSA in<br>order to verify compliance with applicable statutes, regulations and policies. This<br>audit shall include a sample of CISA and, in coordination with the SIB, the NCIAA.<br>Audits may be conducted on a more frequent basis if the audit reveals that an<br>agency has not complied with applicable statutes, regulations and policies. The FBI<br>CISD Oxidion shall also have the authority to conduct unannounced security<br>inspections and acheduled audits of Contractor facilities.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Independent Assessors            | CPL-03.1 | Mechanisms exist to utilize independent assessors to evaluate cybersecurity & data protection controls at planned intensis or when the system, service or project undergoes significant changes.                    | 5   |                            |
| 5.11.1.2 | Triennial Security Audits by the FBI CJIS Division             | The FBI CIIS Division is authorized to conduct security audits of the CSA and SIB networks and systems, once every three (3) years as a minimum, to assess agency compliance with the CIIS Security Policy. This audit shall include a sample of CIAs and KCIAs. Audits may be conducted on a more frequent basis if the audit reveals that an agency has not compliate with the CIIS Security Policy.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Independent Assessors            | CPL-03.1 | Mechanisms exist to utilize independent assessors to evaluate cybersecurity &<br>data protection controls at planned intervals or when the system, service or<br>project undergoes significant changes.             | 5   |                            |
| 5.11.2   | Audits by the CSA  | Each CSA shalt:  1. At a minimum, triennially audit all CIAs and NCIAs which have direct access to the state system in order to ensure compliance with applicable statutes, regulations and policies.  2.1 nocordination with the SIB, establish a process to periodically audit all NCIAs, with access to CII, in order to ensure compliance with applicable statutes, regulations and policies.  3. Have the authority to conduct unannounced security inspections and scheduled audits of Contractor facilities.  4. Have the authority, on behalf of another CSA, to conduct a CSP compliance audit or contractor facilities and provide the results to the requesting CSA. If a subsequent CSA requests an audit of the same contractor facility, the CSA may provide the results of the previous audit unless otherwise notified by the requesting CSA and an evaluate of the previous audit unless otherwise notified by the requesting CSA that a new audit be performed.  Note: This authority does not apply to the audit requirement outlined in the Security and Management Control Outsourcing Standard for Non-Channeler and Channelers related to outsourcing noncrimmal justice administrative functions.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Independent Assessors            |          | Mechanisms exist to utilize independent assessors to evaluate cybersecurity & data protection controls at planned intensis or when the system, service or project undergoes significant changes.                    | 5   |                            |
| 5.11.3   | Special Security Inquiries<br>and Audits                       | appropriate inquiry and audit of any alleged security violations. The inspection team shall be appointed by the APB and shall include at least one representative of the   | Functional        | intersects with      | Independent Assessors            | CPL-03.1 | data protection controls at planned intervals or when the system, service or<br>project undergoes significant changes.  | 5   |                            |
| 5.11.4   | Compliance<br>Subcommittees                                    | CIS Division. All results of the inquiry and sudit shall be reported to the APB with seprogrative recommendations.  The Criminal Justice Information Services (CIIS) Advisory Policy Board (APB) established the Compliance Evaluation Subcommittee (CES) to evaluate the results of audits conducted by the CIIS Audit Unit (CAU). The CES makes specific recommendations to the APB concenting compliance with septicable policies and regulations. The most current information regarding the CAU audits that are within the puriew of the CES and detailed CES anactions proceed procedures are available at CIIS, gov (Law Enforcement Enterprise Portal) CIIS Special Interest Groups CES Section and CIIS Section of FISI gov.  The National Crime Prevention and Privacy Compact (Compact) Council at Article V statishished the Compact Council Clouncil. The Compact Council Council statishished the Compact Council Clouncil, The Compact Council Clouds, standards, and procedures established by the Compact Council. As such, the Sanctions Committee reviews the results of audits conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of participants in the FBI's Criminal Justice Services (CIS) Division programs. The Sanctions Committee reviews the seasor to the Compact Council Council as and the participants' response to determine a course of action necessary to bring the participants' in Compact Council Services to the Compact Council of seasons and the participants' compact council of seasons to the Compact Council of seasons and seasons and seasons to the Compact Council of seasons and seasons and seasons and seasons to the Compact Council of seasons and se | Functional        | no relationship      | N/A                              | N/A      | N/A   | N/A                                       | No requirements to map to. |
| 5.12     | Policy Area 12: Personnel<br>Security                          | Having proper security measures against the insider threat is a critical component for the CRS Security Policy. This section's security terms and requirements apply to all personnel who have unescorted access to unencrypted CLR legardises or a hybrid model – unescorted access to unencrypted access to any information system seasting in the ability, right, or privilege to view, modify, or make use of unencrypted C.II.  | Functional        | no relationship      | N/A                              | N/A      | N/A   | N/A                                       | No requirements to map to. |



| FDE#       | FDE Name  | Focal Document Element (FDE) Description   | STRM<br>Rationale | STRM<br>Relationship | SCF Control                                 | SCF#   | Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description   | Strength of<br>Relationship<br>(optional) | Notes (optional) |
|------------|---|--|-------------------|----------------------|---|--------|---|---|------------------|
| 5.12.1     | Personnel Screening<br>Requirements for<br>Individuals Requiring<br>Unescorted Access to<br>Unencrypted CJI | 1. To verily identification, state of residency and national fringerprint-based record hencks shall be conducted prior to granting access to Lift or all personnel who have unescorded access to unencrypted CII or unescorted access to physically secure locations or controlled areas (during times of CII processing). However, the parson resides in a different state than that of the assigned agency, the agency shall conduct state of the agency and national fingerprint-based record checks and essecute a NLFIS CHRIQP(AQ) query using purpose code C, E, or J depending on the circumstances. When appropriate, the screening shall be consistent with: a. S.CFR.371.106; and/or b. D.Office of Personnel Management policy, regulations, and guidance. and/or c. agency policy, regulations, and guidance. Supplemental Guidance: a. Federal entities bypassing state repositories in compliance with federal law may not be required to conduct a state fingerprint-based record check. b. See Appendix I for applicable guidance regarding noncriminal justice agencies performing adjudication of tokil fingerprint abunisations. c. Fingerprint-based record checks may not be required for all cloud provider personand depending upon the type of service offering and access to encryption keys. d. See Appendix I for applicable in the made as specified by the CSO. The CSO, or their designes, is authorized to approve access to CII shall not be granted until the CSO or harder designes, is authorized to simple visited exists, she interface Agency shall deray access to CII shall not be granted until the CSO or harder designes, the control of the co | Functional        | equal                | Personnel Screening                         | HRS-04 | Mechanisms exist to manage personnel security risk by screening individuals prior to authorizing access.  | 10  |                  |
| 5.12.2     | Personnel Termination   | Upon termination of personnel by an interface agency, the agency shall immediately<br>terminate access to local agency systems with access to CII. Furthermore, the<br>interface agency shall provide notification or other action to ensure access to state<br>and other agency systems is terminated. If the employee is an employee of a NO.<br>or a Contractor, the employer shall notify all interface Agencies that may be affected<br>by the personnel change.  | Functional        | equal                | Personnel Termination                       | HRS-09 | Mechanisms exist to govern the termination of individual employment.  | 10  |                  |
| 5.12.3     | Personnel Transfer  | The agency shall review CII access authorizations when personnel are reassigned or<br>transferred to other positions within the agency and initiate appropriate actions<br>such as closing and establishing accounts and changing system access<br>authorizations.   | Functional        | equal                | Personnel Transfer                          | HRS-08 | Mechanisms exist to adjust logical and physical access authorizations to systems<br>and facilities upon personnel reassignment or transfer, in a timely manner. | 10  |                  |
| 5.12.4     | Personnel Sanctions   | The agency shall employ a formal sanctions process for personnel failing to comply with established information security policies and procedures.  | Functional        | equal                | Personnel Sanctions                         | HRS-07 | Mechanisms exist to sanction personnel failing to comply with established security policies, standards and procedures.  | 10  |                  |
| 5.13       | Policy Area 13: Mobile<br>Devices   | This policy area describes considerations and requirements for mobile devices including ameriphones and tablets. Mobile devices are not limited to a single form factor or communications medium. The requirements in this section sugment those in other areas of the Policy to address the gaps introduced by using mobile devices. In device, a consideration of the properties of the section and implementation guidance for mobile devices, and (ii) authorize, monitor, control vireless access to the information system. Wireless technologies, in the simplest sense, enable one or more devices to communicate without physical connections—without requiring network or peripheral cabling.  Appendix O provides reference material and additional information on mobile devices.  | Functional        | subset of            | Centralized Management<br>Of Mobile Devices | MDM-01 | Mechanisms exist to implement and govern Mobile Device Management (MDM) controls.   | 10  |                  |
| 5.13.1     | Wireless<br>Communications<br>Technologies  | Examples of wireless communication technologies include, but are not limited to:<br>802.11, cellular, Bluetooth, satellite, microwave, and land mobile radio (LMR).<br>Wireless technologies require at least her minimum security applied to wireld<br>technology and, based upon the specific technology or implementation, wireless<br>technologies may require additional security controls as described below.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Centralized Management<br>Of Mobile Devices | MDM-01 | Mechanisms exist to implement and govern Mobile Device Management (MDM) controls.   | 5   |                  |
| 5.13.1     | Wireless<br>Communications<br>Technologies  | Examples of wireless communication technologies include, but are not limited to:<br>802.11, cellular, Bluetooth, satellite, microwave, and land mobile radio (LMR).<br>Wireless technologies require at least her minimum security applied to wireless<br>technology and, based upon the specific technology or implementation, wireless<br>technologies may require additional security control as described below.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Wireless Networking                         | NET-15 | Mechanisms exist to control authorized wireless usage and monitor for<br>unauthorized wireless access.  | 5   |                  |
| 5.13.1.1   | 802.11 Wireless<br>Protocols  | Wind Equivalent Primary (WEP) and Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) cryptographic algorithms, used by alpre-802-11 protocols, do not meet the requirements for FIPS 140-2 and shall not be used.  140-2 and shall not shall n | Functional        | subset of            | Wireless Networking                         | NET-15 | Mechanisms exist to control authorized wireless usage and monitor for<br>unauthorized wireless access.  | 10  |                  |
| 5.13.1.2   | Cettular Davices  | Cellular telephones, smartphones (La, Blackbern, Phones, etc.), tablets, personal digital assistants (PDA), and "aircards" are examples or cellular handheld devices or devices that are expathed of employing cellular technology. Admitionally, cellular handheld devices to price the cellular technology admitionally, cellular handheld devices spically include Bluestoch, infraed, and other viewises protocols acquited joining intrastructure networks or creating dynamic ad hoc networks. Thesets to cellular handheld devices stem manely from their size, portability, and available writers in structure.  1 Loss, the continuous control of the control of the cellular handheld devices include: 1 Loss, the control of the control of the cellular handheld devices. A span. 2 Unauthorized access. 3 Helwisses. 4 Span. 5 Electronic leavesdropping. 6 Electronic tracking (threat to security of data and safety of the criminal justice professional). 7 Coloning not as prevalent with later generation cellular technologies).   | Functional        | subset of            | Centralized Management<br>Of Mobile Devices | MDM-01 | Mechanisms exist to implement and govern Mobile Device Management (MDM) controls.   | 10  |                  |
| 5.13.1.2.1 | Cellular Service Abroad   | Cartain internal functions on cellular devices may be modified or compromised by that cellular careful during international use as the device as intended to have cartain parameters configured by the cellular provider which is considered a "tausted" entity by the device.  When devices are authorized to access Cli outside the U.S., agencies shall perform an inspection to ensure that all control are in place and functioning properly in accordance with the agency's policies prior to and after deployment outside of the U.S.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Physical Tampering<br>Detection             | AST-08 | Mechanisms exist to periodically inspect systems and system components for<br>indicators of Compromise (IoC).   | 5   |                  |
| 5.13.1.2.1 | Cellular Service Abroad   | Cartain internal functions on cellular devices may be modified or compromised by the cellular carrier during international use as the devices are intended to have certain parameters configured by the cellular provider which is considered a "trusted" entity by the device. The cellular provider which is considered a "trusted" entity by the device. When devices are authorized to access CII outside the U.S., agencies shall perform an inspection to ensure that all controls are in place and functioning properly in accordance with the agency's policies prior to and after deployment outside of the U.S.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Centralized Management<br>Of Mobile Devices | MDM-01 | Mechanisms exist to implement and govern Mobile Device Management (MDM) controls.   | 5   |                  |



| FDE#       | FDE Name                                     | Focal Document Element (FDE) Description   | STRM<br>Rationale | STRM<br>Relationship | SCF Control   | SCF#     | Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description   | Strength of<br>Relationship | Notes (optional) |
|------------|--|--|-------------------|----------------------|---|----------|---|-----------------------------|------------------|
| 5.13.1.2.1 | Cellular Service Abroad                      | Certain internal functions on cellular devices may be modified or compromised by<br>the cellular carrier during international use as the devices are intended to have<br>cartain parameter configured by the cellular provider which is considered a<br>"trusted" entity by the device.<br>When devices are authorized to access CII outside the U.S., agencies shall perform<br>an inspection to ensure that all controls are in place and functioning properly in<br>accordance with the agency's policies prior to and after deployment outside of the<br>U.S.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Mobile Device Tampering                             | MDM-04   | Mechanisms exist to protect mobile devices from tampering through inspecting devices returning from locations that the organization deems to be of significant risk, prior to the device being connected to the organization's network. | (optional)                  |                  |
| 5.13.1.2.2 | Voice Transmissions<br>Over Cellular Devices | Any cellular device used to transmit CJI via voice is exempt from the encryption and authentication requirements.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Use of Communications<br>Technology                 | HRS-05.3 | systems, if used maliciously.   | 5                           |                  |
| 5.13.1.2.2 | Voice Transmissions<br>Over Cellular Devices | Any cellular device used to transmit CJI via voice is exempt from the encryption and authentication requirements.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Centralized Management<br>Of Mobile Devices         | MDM-01   | Mechanisms exist to implement and govern Mobile Device Management (MDM) controls.   | 5                           |                  |
| 5.13.1.3   | Bluetooth                                    | Bluetooth is an open standard for short-range radio frequency (RF) communication.<br>Bluetooth is used primarly to establish wireless personal area networks (RFAN).<br>Bluetooth technology has been integrated into many types of business and<br>consumer devices, including cell phones, laptops, automobiles, medical devices<br>printers, keyboards, mice, hadedest, and biometric capture devices.<br>Bluetooth technology and associated devices are susceptible to general wireless<br>metworking threats (e.g., denial of service (IDOS) attacks, exwedropping, man-in-the-<br>middle (PHTM) attacks, message modification, and resource misappropriation) as<br>well as specific Bluetooth-related attacks that targets known vulnerabilities in<br>Bluetooth implementations and specifications. Organizational security policy shall<br>be used to dictate the use of Bluetooth and its associated devices based on the<br>agency's operational and business processes.   | Functional        | intersects with      | System Hardening Through<br>Baseline Configurations | CFG-02   | Mechanisms exist to develop, document and maintain secure baseline configurations for technology platforms that are consistent with industry-accepted system hardening standards.   | 5                           |                  |
| 5.13.1.3   | Bluetooth                                    | Bluetooth is an open standard for short-range radio frequency (RF) communication.<br>Bluetooth is used primarily to establish wireless personal area networks (WPAN).<br>Bluetooth technology has been integrated into many types of business and consumer devices, including cell phones, laptops, sutomobiles, medical devices, printers, keyboards, mice, haedsets, and biometric capture devices.<br>Bluetooth technology and associated devices are susceptible to general wireless and extractional control of the co | Functional        | intersects with      | Centralized Management<br>Of Mobile Devices         | MDM-01   | Mechanisms exist to implement and govern Mobile Device Management (MDM) controls.   | 5                           |                  |
| 5.13.1.4   | Mobile Hotspots                              | Many mobile devices include the capability to function as a Wi-Fi hotspot that allows other devices to connect through the device to the internet over the devices collular network.  When an agency allows mobile devices that are approved to access or store CII to function as Wi-Fi hotspot connecting to the internet, they shall be configured.  I. finable encryption on the hotspot  2. Change the hotspot devices that see approved to access or store CII to connect the hotspot SIG loses not identify the device make/model or agency  a. Ensure the hotspot SIG loses not identify the device make/model or agency  2. Create a wideries network password (pre-shared key)  4. Enable the hotspot's port filtering/flocking features if present.  5. Only allow connections from agency-controlled devices  Note: Refer to the requirements in Section 5.10.1.2 Ecoryption for item #1. Refer to the requirements a Section 5.20.1.2 Ecoryption for lose #1. Pafeir to the requirements of section 5.10.1.2 Ecoryption for item #3. Only password attributes #1, #2 and #3 are required.  OR  1. Have a NDM solution to provide the same security as identified in items 1 – 5 above.  | Functional        | intersects with      | System Hardening Through<br>Baseline Configurations | CFG-02   | Mechanisms exist to develop, document and maintain secure baseline configurations for technology platforms that are consistent with industry-accepted system hardening standards.   | 5                           |                  |
| 5.13.1.4   | Mobile Hotspots                              | Many mobile devices include the capability to function as a Wi-Fi hotspot that allows other devices to connect through the device to the internet over the devices collular network.  When an agency allows mobile devices that are approved to access or store CII to function as a Wi-Fi hotspot connecting to the Internet, they shall be configured:  1. Enable encryption on the hotspot  2. Change the hotspot Safetuil SSD  a. Ensure the hotspot SSID does not identify the device make/model or agency connecting  3. Create a wireless network password (pre-shared key)  4. Enable the hotspot Spot filtering/blocking features if present  5. Only allow connections from agency-controlled devices  Note: Refer to the requirements in Section 5.0.1.2 Encryption for item #1. Refer to the requirements in Section 5.0.1.2 Encryption for item #5. Only password attributes #1, #2 and #3 are required.  OR  1. Have a MDM solution to provide the same security as identified in items 1 - 5 above.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Centralized Management<br>Of Mobile Devices         | MDM-01   | Mechanisms exist to implement and govern Mobile Device Management (MDM) controls.   | 5                           |                  |
| 5.13.2     | Mobile Device<br>Management (MDM)            | Hobita Device Nanagement (MDM) facilitates the implementation of sound security controls for mobile devices and allows for centralized oversight of configuration control, application usage, and device protection and recovery, if so desired by the agency.  Due to the potential for inconsistent network access or monitoring capability or mobile devices, methods used to monitor and manage the configuration of full-featured operating systems may not function properly on devices with limited-feature operating systems. MDH systems and applications coupled with device specific technical policy can provide a robust method for device configuration management if properly implemented.  Devices that have had any unauthorized changes made to them (including but not limited to being robot of jailbroken) and the second controls when directly accessing 101 from devices unning a limited-feature operating systems.  I. Ensure that CI is only transferred between CI authorized applications and storage areas of the device.  2. MDM with centralized administration configured and implemented to perform at least the following controls:  a. Remote booking of device  c. Setting and locking device configuration  d. Detection of rootod* and rigilations/ devices  e. Enforcement of folder or disk level encryption  1. Application or fundatory policy settings on the device  g. Detection of unauthorized configurations  1. Alterior of configurations  1. Alterior of configurations of the configuration of the configuration of the configurations of the c       | Functional        | subset of            | Centralized Management<br>Of Mobile Devices         | MDM-01   | Mechanisms exist to implement and govern Mobile Device Management (MDM) controls.   | 10                          |                  |



| FDE#   | FDE Name                            | Focal Document Element (FDE) Description   | STRM<br>Rationale | STRM<br>Relationship | SCF Control                                  | SCF#   | Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description   | Strength of<br>Relationship | Notes (optional) |
|--------|-------------------------------------|--|-------------------|----------------------|--|--------|---|-----------------------------|------------------|
|        |                                     | Mobile Device Management (MDM) facilitates the implementation of sound security controls for mobile devices and allows for centralized oversight of configuration  |                   |                      |  |        | Mechanisms exist to enforce access control requirements for the connection of mobile devices to organizational systems.   | (optional)                  |                  |
| 5.13.2 | Mobile Device<br>Management (MDM)   | control, application usage, and device protection and recovery, if so desired by the agency.  Due to the potential for inconsistent network access or monitoring capability on mobile devices, methods used to monitor and manage the configuration of full-featured operating systems may not function properly on devices with limited-feature operating systems. MDH systems and applications coupled with device specific technical policy can provide a robust method for device configuration management if properly implemented.  Devices that have had any unauthorized changes made to them (including but not limited to being robust or justification) and in the used to process, store, or transmit Cli data at any time. User agencies shall implement the following controls when directly accessing Cliff form devices unning a limited-feature operating system:  1. Ensure that Cli is only transferred between Cli authorized applications and storage areas of the device.  2. MDM with centralized administration configured and implemented to perform at least the following controls:  a. Remote booking of device  b. Remote viping of device  c. Setting and looking device configuration  d. Detection of rootor's and "jailblooken" devices  e. Enforcement of folder or disk level encryption  1. Application or fundatory policy settings on the device  g. Detection of unauthorized software or applications  l. Ability to determine the location of agency-controlled devices  L. Porvention of the provided device is a provided that the provided devices is a provided to the provided device of the provided device is a provided to the provided device of the provided device o | Functional        | intersects with      | Access Control For Mobile<br>Devices         | MDM-02 |   | 5                           |                  |
|        |                                     | EXCEPTION: An MDM is not required when receiving CII from an indirect access.<br>Mobile Device Management (MDM) facilitates the implementation of sound security<br>controls for mobile devices and allows for centralized oversight of configuration  |                   |                      |  |        | Cryptographic mechanisms exist to protect the confidentiality and integrity of information on mobile devices through full-device or container encryption.                         |                             |                  |
| 5.13.2 | Mobile Device<br>Management (MDM)   | control, application usage, and device protection and recovery, if so desired by the agency.  Due to the potential for inconsistent network access or monitoring capability on mobile devices, methods used to monitor and manage the configuration of full-featured operating systems may not function properly on devices with limited-feature operating systems. MOH systems and applications coupled with device specific technical policy can provide a robust method for device configuration management filt properly implemented.  Devices that have had any unauthorized changes made to them (including but not limited to being robet of yalibroken) aball not be used to process, store, or transmit Cli data at any time. User agencies shall implement the following controls when directly accessing CI for med evices running a limited-feature operating system:  1. Ensure that CI is only transferred between CI authorized applications and storage areas of the device.  2. MOM with centralized administration configured and implemented to perform at least the following controls:  a. Remote bocking of device  b. Remote whigh got device  c. Setting and locking device configuration  f. Application of mandatory policy settings on the device  g. Detection of runauthorized software or applications  l. Ability to determine the location of agency-controlled devices  l. Ability to determine the location of agency-controlled devices  l. Ability to determine the location of agency-controlled devices  l. Albity to determine the location of agency-controlled devices  l. Albity to determine the location of agency-controlled devices  l. Albity to determine the location of agency-controlled devices  l. Albity to determine the location of agency-controlled devices  l. Albity to determine the location of agency-controlled devices  l. Albity to determine the location of agency-controlled devices  l. Albity to determine the location of agency-controlled devices  l. Albity to determine the location of agency-controlled devices  l. Albity to determine the loca | Functional        | intersects with      | Full Device & Container-<br>Based Encryption | MDM-03 |   | 5                           |                  |
| 5.13.2 | Mobile Device<br>Management (MDM)   | Mobile Device Management (MDM) facilitates the implementation of sound security controls for mobile devices and allows for centralizad oversight of configuration control, application usage, and device protection and recovery, if so desired by the agency.  Due to the potential for inconsistent network access or monitoring capability on mobile devices, methods used to monitor and manage the configuration of full-featured operating systems may not function properly on devices with limited-feature operating systems. MDM systems and applications coupled with device specific technical policy can provide a robust method for device onfiguration of management if properly implemented.  Devices that have had any unauthorized changes made to them (including but not limited to being robet of jailbroken) and not be used to process, store, or transnitt Cli data at any time. User agencies shall implement the following controls when directly accessing 101 from devices running a limited-festive operating system:  1. Finauer that Cli is only transterred between Cli authorized applications and storage areas of the device.  2. MDM with centralized administration configured and implemented to perform at teast the following controls:  3. Exercise the clinical device configuration  4. Deficial controls of the device.  5. Setting and folding device configuration  6. Deficial on of "noted" and "jailbroken" devices  6. Enforcement of folder or dals kelled encryption  6. Application of mandatory policy settings on the devices  6. Devices for insulative devices of the proper of the pr   | Functional        | intersects with      | Remote Purging                               | MDM-05 | Mechanisms exist to remotely purge selected information from mobile devices.  | 5                           |                  |
| 5.13.3 | Wireless Device Risk<br>Mitigations | EXCEPTION. An MDM is not required when receiving CII from an indirect access Organizations shill, at a minimum, menure that wireless devices:  1. Apply available critical patches and supgrades to the operating system as soon as they become available for the device and fare necessary stesting as described in Section 5.10.4.1.  2. Are configured for local device authentication (see Section 5.13.7.1).  3. Use advanced authentication or CSO approved compensating controls as per Section 5.13.7.2 and authentication or CSO approved compensating controls as per Section 5.13.7.2 and authentication or CSO approved compensating controls as per Section 5.6.2.1 in application.  4. Encrypt all CII resident on the device.  5. Erase cached information, to include authenticators (see Section 5.6.2.1) in applications, when session is terminated.  6. Employ personal frewalts on III. Extraured operating system devices or run a Mobile Device Management (MDM) system that facilitates the ability to provide frewalts and rules from the agency level.  7. Employ malicious code protection on full-featured operating system devices or run an MDM system that facilitates the ability to provide anti-mailware services from the agency level.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Endpoint Protection<br>Measures              | END-02 | Mechanisms exist to protect the confidentiality, integrity, availability and safety of endpoint devices.  Mechanisms exist to implement and govern Mobile Device Management (MDM) | 5                           |                  |
| 5.13.3 | Wireless Device Risk<br>Mitigations | 1. Apply available critical patches and upgrades to the operating system as soon as they become available for the device and after necessary testing as described in Saction 5.10.4.1.  2. Are configured for local device authentication (see Section 5.13.7.1).  3. Use advanced authentication or CSO approved compensating controls as per Section 5.13.7.2.  4. Encrypt all CJI resident on the device.  5. Erase cached information, to include authenticators (see Section 5.5.2.1) in applications, when session is terminated.  6. Employ personal freewals on bit il-featured operating system devices or run a Mobile Device Management (IMOI) system that facilitates the ability to provide freewall services from the agency level.  7. Employ malicious code protection on full-featured operating system devices or run a MOM system that facilitates the ability to provide anti-malware services from the agency level.  Managing system integrify on limited function bille operating systems may require machine all services from the agency level.  Managing system integrify on limited function bill operating systems may require methods and technologies significantly different from traditional full-featured   | Functional        | intersects with      | Centralized Management<br>Of Mobile Devices  | MDM-01 | controls.  Mechanisms exist to protect the confidentiality, integrity, availability and safety of and point devices.  | 5                           |                  |
| 5.13.4 | System Integrity                    | operating systems. In many cases, the requirements of Section 5.10 of the CJIS<br>Security Policy cannot be met with a mobile device without the installation of a third-<br>party MDM, application, or supporting service infrastructure.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Endpoint Protection<br>Measures              | END-02 |   | 5                           |                  |
| 5.13.4 | System Integrity                    | Managing system integrity on imitted function mobile operating systems may require methods and technologies significantly different from traditional full-featured operating systems. In many cases, the requirements of Section 5.10 of the CIIS Security Policy cannot be met with a mobile device without the installation of a third-party MDM, application, or supporting service infrastructure.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Centralized Management<br>Of Mobile Devices  | MDM-01 | Mechanisms exist to implement and govern Mobile Device Management (MDM) controls.   | 5                           |                  |



| FDE#       | FDE Name  | Focal Document Element (FDE) Description   | STRM<br>Rationale | STRM<br>Relationship | SCF Control                                 | SCF#   | Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description   | Strength of<br>Relationship<br>(optional) | Notes (optional)           |
|------------|---|--|-------------------|----------------------|---|--------|---|---|----------------------------|
| 5.13.4.1   | Patching/Updates                                      | Based on the varying connection methods for mobile devices, an always on<br>connection cannot be guaranteed for pactaching and updating. Devices without<br>slways-on cellular connections may not be reachable for extended periods of time<br>by the MDM or solution either to report status or initiate patching.<br>Agencies shall monitor mobile devices to ensure their patch and update state is<br>current.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Centralized Management<br>Of Mobile Devices | MDM-01 | Mechanisms exist to implement and govern Mobile Device Management (MDM) controls.   | 5   |                            |
| 5.13.4.2   | Maticious Code<br>Protection                          | Appropriately configured MDM software is capable of checking the installed application on the device and reporting the software invertory to a central management console in a manner analogous to traditional virus scan detection of unauthorized software and can provide a high degree of confidence that only known software or applications are installed on the device.  Agencies that allow smartphones and tablets to access CJI shall have a process to approve the use of specific software or applications on the devices. Any device natively capable of performing these functions without a MDM solution is acceptable under this section.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Centralized Management<br>Of Mobile Devices | MDM-01 | Mechanisms exist to implement and govern Mobile Device Management (MDM) controls.   | 5   |                            |
| 5.13.4.3   | Personal Firewall                                     | For the purpose of this policy, a personal frewall is an application that controls instruct further condition and the major device, permitting or dening communications based on policy. A personal frewall shall be employed on all mobile devices that have a full-fleature operating system(), a leptops or tables with Windows or LinuxUhix operating system(). At a minimum, the personal frewall shall perform the following activities:  1. Manage program access to the Internet. 2. Block unsolicited requests to connect to the user device.  3. Filter incoming traffic by IP address or protocol.  4. Filter incoming traffic by address or protocol.  5. Maintain an IP traffic log.  Mobile device swith limited-fleature operating systems (i.e., tablets, smartphones) may not support a personal frewall. However, these operating systems have a limited number of system services installed, carefully controlled network access, and to a certain extent, perform functions similar to a personal freewall on a device with a full-feature operating system a proportion of the device.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Centralized Management<br>Of Mobile Devices | MDM-01 | Mechanisms exist to implement and govern Mobile Device Management (MDM) controls.   | 5   |                            |
| 5.13.5     | Incident Response                                     | In addition to the requirements in Section 5.3 Incident Response, agencies shall develop additions or enhanced incident reporting and handling procedures to address mobile device operating scenarios. Repid response to mobile device related incidents can significantly miligrate the risks associated with Illicid data access either on the device Itself or within online data resources associated with the device through an application or specialized interface.  Special reporting procedures for mobile devices shall apply in any of the following situations:  1. Loss of device control. For example:  1. Device known to be Locked, minimal duration of loss  1. Device known to be Locked, minimal duration of loss  6. Device known to be Locked, minimal duration of loss  6. Device known to be unlocked, more than momentary duration of loss  6. Device control recommended duration of loss  8. Device compromise of the commentary duration of loss  1. Device compromise of the commentary duration of loss  1. Device compromise of the commentary duration of loss  1. Device compromise of the commentary duration of loss  1. Device compromise of the commentary duration of loss  1. Device compromise of the commentary duration of loss  1. Device compromise of the linear States   | Functional        | subset of            | Incident Response<br>Operations             | IRO-01 | Mechanisms exist to implement and govern processes and documentation to<br>tracilitate an organization-wide response capability for cybersecurity & data privacy-<br>related incidents. | 10  |                            |
| 5.13.6     | Access Control  | Multiple user accounts are not generally supported on limited-feature mobile operating systems. Access control (Section 5.5 Access Control) shall be accomplished by the application that accesses CJI.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Access Control For Mobile<br>Devices        | MDM-02 | Mechanisms exist to enforce access control requirements for the connection of mobile devices to organizational systems.   | 5   |                            |
| 5.13.7     | Identification and<br>Authentication                  | Due to the technical methods used for identification and authentication on many<br>limited-feature mobile operating systems, achieving compliance may require many   | Functional        | intersects with      | Centralized Management<br>Of Mobile Devices | MDM-01 | Mechanisms exist to implement and govern Mobile Device Management (MDM) controls.   | 5   |                            |
| 5.13.7     | Identification and<br>Authentication                  | different components.  Due to the technical methods used for identification and authentication on many limited-feature mobile operating systems, achieving compliance may require many   | Functional        | intersects with      | Access Control For Mobile<br>Devices        | MDM-02 | Mechanisms exist to enforce access control requirements for the connection of mobile devices to organizational systems.   | 5   |                            |
| 5.13.7.1   | Local Device<br>Authentication                        | different components.  When mobile devices are authorized for use in accessing CJI, local device authentication shall be used to unlock the device for use. The authenticator used   | Functional        | intersects with      | Centralized Management<br>Of Mobile Devices | MDM-01 | Mechanisms exist to implement and govern Mobile Device Management (MDM) controls.   | 5   |                            |
| 5.13.7.1   | Local Device<br>Authentication                        | shall meet the requirements in section 5.6.2.1 Standard Authenticators.  When mobile devices are authorized for use in accessing CJI, local device authentication shall be used to unlock the device for use. The authenticator used shall meet the requirements in section 5.6.2.1 Standard Authenticators.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Access Control For Mobile<br>Devices        | MDM-02 | Mechanisms exist to enforce access control requirements for the connection of mobile devices to organizational systems.   | 5   |                            |
| 5.13.7.2   | Advanced Authentication                               | when accessing CJI from an authorized mobile device, advanced authentication<br>shall be used by the authorized user unless the access to CJI is indirect as described<br>in Section 5.6.2.2.1. If access is indirect, then AA is not required.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Centralized Management<br>Of Mobile Devices | MDM-01 | Mechanisms exist to implement and govern Mobile Device Management (MDM) controls.   | 5   |                            |
| 5.13.7.2   |   | When accessing CJI from an authorized mobile device, advanced authentication<br>shall be used by the authorized user unless the access to CJI is indirect as described<br>in Section 5.6.2.2.1. If access is indirect, then AA is not required.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Access Control For Mobile<br>Devices        | MDM-02 | Mechanisms exist to enforce access control requirements for the connection of mobile devices to organizational systems.   | 5   |                            |
| 5.13.7.2.1 | Compensating Controls                                 | CSO approved compensating controls to meet the AA requirement on agency- assued amartphones and tabels with imited-calure operating systems are permitted. Compensating controls are temporary control measures that are implemented in leu of the required AA control measures that are appropriated (CSOs consider approval of compensating controls, Mobile Device Management (MDM) shall be implemented or Section 5.13.2. The compensating controls shall: 1. Need the intent of the CISS Security Policy AA requirement 2. Provide a similar level of protection or security as the original AA requirement 3. Not rely upon the estimate requirements for AA as compensating controls in 3. Not rely upon the estimate requirements for AA as compensating controls 3. Not rely upon the estimate requirements for AA as compensating controls 3. Not rely upon the estimate requirements for AA as compensating controls 4. Expire upon the CSO approved date or when a compliant AA solution is implemented. Additionally, compensating controls may rely upon other, non-AA, existing requirements as compensating controls and/or be combination of controls providing the compensating controls. The compensating controls is made-ceptable assurance only the authorized user is authenticating and not an impersonator or (in the case of agency-is-sued device used by multiple users) controls that reduce the risk of exposure in information is accessed by an unauthorized parry.  The tolowing minimum controls shall be implemented as part of the CSO approved compensating controls.  Possession and registration of an agency issued amartphone or tablet as an indication in its the authorized user of the compensation of the case of the compensation controls.  Level of evice centricate per Section 5.13.7.3 Device Centricates  - Implemented CIS Security Policy complaint standard authenticator protection on the secure location where CI is stored. | Functional        | intersects with      | Centralized Management<br>Of Mobile Devices | MDM-01 | Mechanisms exist to implement and govern Mobile Device Management (MDM) controls.   | 5   |                            |
| 5.13.7.3   | Device Certificates                                   | Device certificates are often used to uniquely identify mobile devices using part of a<br>public key pair on the device in the form of a public key certificate. While there is<br>visuate to ensuring the device start on authenticate to a system supplying CII, and<br>may provide a critical sayer of device identification or authentication in a larger<br>scheme, a device certificate alone pleade on the device hall not be considered<br>valid proof that the device is being operated by an authorized user.<br>When certificates or cryptographic keys used to authenticate a mobile device are<br>used in lieu of compensating controls for advanced authentication, they shall be:<br>1. Protected against being extracted from the device<br>2. Configured for remote wipe on demand or self-deletion based on a number of<br>unsuccessful login or access attempts<br>3. Configured to use a secure authenticator (i.e., password, PIN) to unlock the key<br>for use.  | Functional        | subset of            | Centralized Management<br>Of Mobile Devices | MDM-01 | Mechanisms exist to implement and govern Mobile Device Management (MDM) controls.   | 10  |                            |
| 5.14       | SYSTEM AND SERVICES<br>ACQUISITION (SA)<br>SYSTEM AND | N/A  | Functional        | no relationship      | N/A   | N/A    | N/A   | N/A                                       | No requirements to map to. |
| 5.15       | INFORMATION INTEGRITY (SI)                            | N/A  | Functional        | no relationship      | N/A   | N/A    | N/A   | N/A                                       | No requirements to map to. |
| 5.16       | MAINTENANCE   | N/A  | Functional        | no relationship      | N/A   | N/A    | N/A   | N/A                                       | No requirements to map to. |



| FDE# | FDE Name                 | Focal Document Element (FDE) Description   | STRM       | STRM            | SCF Control                             | SCF#     | Secure Controls Framework (SCF)  | Strength of<br>Relationship | Notes (optional) |
|------|--------------------------|--|------------|-----------------|---|----------|--|-----------------------------|------------------|
| PDE# | PDE Name                 |  | Rationale  | Relationship    | 3CF Control                             |          | Control Description  | (optional)                  | reces (optional) |
| AC-1 | POLICY AND<br>PROCEDURES | a. Develop, document, and disseminate to: organizational personnel with access control responsibilities  1. Agency-lavel access control policy that is a control process. The control responsibilities is nanagement commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and (b) is consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and quidelines; and  2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the access control policy and the associated access controls in individual with security responsibilities to manage the development, documentation, and dissemination of the access control policy and procedures; and  c. Review and update the current access control:  1. Policy annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to CII or systems used to process, store, or transmit CIL and  2. Procedures annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to CII or systems used to process, store, or transmit CIL and  2. Procedures annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to CII or systems used to process, store, or transmit CIL and  2. Procedures an annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to CII or systems used to process, store, or transmit CIL and  2. Procedures and acceleration specification and specification provides and specification and applications and accelerations and as pecifications and applications.   | Functional | subset of       | Identity & Access<br>Management (IAM)   | IAC-01   | Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of identification and access management controls.  | 10                          |                  |
| AC-2 | ACCOUNT<br>MANAGEMENT    | a. Define and document the types of accounts allowed and specifically prohibited for use within the system; b. Assign account managers; c. Require conditions for group and role membership; d. Specity; d. Specity; l. Authorized users of the system; 2. Group and role membership; and 3. Access subrorizations (i.e., privileges) and attributes listed for each account; Attribute Name Email Address Text Employer Name Federation Id Given Name Identity Provider Id Given Name Identity Provider Id Sur Name Identity Provider Id Sur Name Identity Provider Id Counter Terrorism Data Self Search Home Privilege Indicator Commail Hatlory Data Self Search Home Privilege Indicator Commail Intelligence Data Self Search Home Privilege Indicator Commail Intelligence Data Self Search Home Privilege Indicator Commail Text Data Self Search Home Privilege Indicator Commander Data  | Functional | intersects with | Termination of Employment               | IAC-07.2 | Mechaniams exist to revoke user access rights in a timely manner, upon termination of employment or contract.  | 5                           |                  |
| AC-2 | ACCOUNT<br>MANAGEMENT    | a. Define and document the types of accounts allowed and specifically prohibited for use within the system; b. Assign account managers; c. Require conditions for group and role membership; d. Specify; d. Specif | Functional | intersects with | Account Management                      | IAC-15   | Mechaniams exist to proactively govern account management of individual, group, system, service, application, guest and temporary accounts.                                  | 5                           |                  |
| AC-2 | ACCOUNT<br>MANAGEMENT    | Access and occurrent the types of accounts allowed and specifically prohibited for use within the system;  b. Assign account managers; c. Require conditions for group and role membership; d. Specify; 1. Authorized users of the system; 2. Group and role membership; and 3. Access authorizations (i.e., privileges) and attributes listed for each account; Attribute Name Email Address Text Employer Name federation id Given Name Identity Provider id Sur Name Identity Provider id Unique Subject of Common Surface of Common Hostop Common Intelligence Data Self Search Home Privilege Indicator Criminal Intelligence Data Self Search Home Privi | Functional | intersects with | Safeguarding Data Over<br>Open Networks |          | Cryptographic mechanisms exist to implement strong cryptography and security protocols to safeguard sensitive/regulated data during transmission over open, public networks. | 5                           |                  |



| FDE#                                    | FDE Name   | Focal Document Element (FDE) Description   | STRM<br>Rationale  | STRM<br>Relationship  | SCF Control   | SCF#   | Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description  | Strength of<br>Relationship<br>(optional) | Notes (optional) |
|---|--|--|--|---|---|--|--|---|------------------|
| AC-2                                    | ACCOUNT<br>MANAGEMENT  | a. Define and document the types of accounts allowed and specifically prohibited for use within the system; b. Assign account managers; c. Require conditions for group and role membership; d. Specify; d. Specify; l. Authorized users of the system; 2. Group and role membership; and 3. Access suthorized store, see a supplied of the system; 2. Group and role membership; and 3. Access suthorized store, see a supplied system of the syste | Functional   | intersects with   | Input Data Validation   | TDA-18   | Mechanisms exist to check the validity of information inputs.  | 5   |                  |
| AC-2(1)                                 | ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT   AUTOMATED SYSTEM ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT   | Support the management of system accounts using automated mechanisms including email, phone, and text notifications.   | Functional   | equal   | Automated System<br>Account Management<br>(Directory Services)  | IAC-15.1   | Automated mechanisms exist to support the management of system accounts (e.g., directory services).  Automated mechanisms exist to disable or remove temporary and emergency   | 10  |                  |
| AC-2(2)                                 | MANAGEMENT   AUTOMATED TEMPORARY AND EMERGENCY ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT  | Automatically remove temporary and emergency accounts within 72 hours.   | Functional   | equal   | Removal of Temporary /<br>Emergency Accounts  | IAC-15.2   | Automated mechanisms ossit of aisable or remove temporary and emergency accounts after an organization-defined time period for each type of account.   | 10  |                  |
| AC-2(3)                                 | ACCOUNT<br>MANAGEMENT   DISABLE<br>ACCOUNTS  | Disable accounts within one (1) week when the accounts: (a) Have expired; (b) Are no longer associated with a user or individual; (c) Are in violation of organizational policy; or (d) Have been insective for 90 calendar drays.   | Functional   | equal   | Disable Inactive Accounts   | IAC-15.3   | Automated mechanisms exist to disable inactive accounts after an organization-<br>defined time period.   | 10  |                  |
| AC-2(4)                                 | ACCOUNT<br>MANAGEMENT  <br>AUTOMATED AUDIT<br>ACTIONS  | Automatically audit account creation, modification, enabling, disabling, and removal actions.  | Functional   | equal   | Automated Audit Actions   | IAC-15.4   | Automated mechanisms exist to audit account creation, modification, enabling, disabling and removal actions and notify organization-defined personnel or roles.  | 10  |                  |
| AC-2(5)                                 | ACCOUNT<br>MANAGEMENT  <br>INACTIVITY LOGOUT   | Require that users log out when a work period has been completed.  | Functional   | equal   | Session Lock  | IAC-24   | Mechanisms exist to initiate a session lock after an organization-defined time<br>period of inactivity, or upon receiving a request from a user and retain the session<br>lock until the user reestablishes access using established identification and<br>authentication methods.   | 10  |                  |
| AC-2(13)                                | ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT   DISABLE ACCOUNTS FOR HIGH- RISK INDIVIDUALS   | Disable accounts of individuals within 30 minutes of discovery of direct threats to the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of CJI.  | Functional   | intersects with   | High-Risk Terminations  | HRS-09.2   |  | 5   |                  |
| AC-2(13)                                | ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT   DISABLE ACCOUNTS FOR HIGH- RISK INDIVIDUALS   | Disable accounts of individuals within 3D minutes of discovery of direct threats to the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of CJI.  | Functional   | intersects with   | Account Disabling for High<br>Risk Individuals  | IAC-15.6   | Mechanisms exist to disable accounts immediately upon notification for users<br>posing a significant risk to the organization.   | 5   |                  |
| AC-3                                    | ACCESS ENFORCEMENT   | Enforce approved authorizations for logical access to information and system resources in accordance with applicable access control policies.  | Functional   | intersects with   | Access Enforcement  | IAC-20   | Mechanisms exist to enforce Logical Access Control (LAC) permissions that conform to the principle of "least privilege."   | 5   |                  |
| AC-3                                    | ACCESS ENFORCEMENT  ACCESS ENFORCEMENT   | Enforce approved authorizations for logical access to information and system resources in accordance with applicable access control policies.  Enforce approved authorizations for logical access to information and system  | Functional   | intersects with   | Safeguarding Data Over<br>Open Networks   | NET-12<br>TDA-18                                 | Cryptographic mechanisms exist to implement strong cryptography and security protocols to safeguard sensitive/regulated data during transmission over open, public networks.  Mechanisms exist to check the validity of information inputs.  | 5   |                  |
| AC-3(14)                                | ACCESS ENFORCEMENT   | resources in accordance with applicable access control policies.  Provide automated or manual processes to enable individuals to have access to elements of their personally identifiable information.   | Functional   | equal   | Data Subject  | PRI-06   | Mechanisms exist to provide authenticated data subjects the ability to:  (1) Access their Personal Data (PD) that is being processed, stored and shared,  except where the bruther, nik or expanse of providing access would be  disproportionate to the benefit offered to the data subject through granting  access;  (2) Obtain enswers on the specifics of how their PD is collected, received,  processed, stored, transmitted, shared, updated and disposed;  (3) Obtain the acceptions of their PD being collected, received, processed, stored  (4) Obtain the acceptions of their PD being collected, received, processed, stored   | 10  |                  |
|   |  |  |  |   | Empowerment   |  | and shared; (5) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies; (6) Request erasure of their PD; and (7) Restrict the further collecting, receiving, processing, storing, transmitting,  |   |                  |
| AC-4                                    | INFORMATION FLOW<br>ENFORCEMENT  | Enforce approved authorizations for controlling the flow of information within the system and between connected systems by preventing CII from being transmitted unencrypted across the public network, blocking outside traffic that claims to be from within the agency, and not passing any web requests to the public network that are not from the agency-controlled or internal boundary protection devices (e.g., provise, stateways, firewalls, or router).  | Functional   | equal   | Data Flow Enforcement –<br>Access Control Lists (ACLs)  | NET-04   | and shared; (S) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies; (6) Request erasure of their PD; and (7) Restrict the further collecting, receiving, processing, storing, transmitting, understate administration and training that the configuration of the RD Mechanisms exist to design, implement and review firewall and router configurations to restrict connections between untrusted networks and internal systems.   | 10  |                  |
| AC-4<br>AC-5                            |  | system and between connected systems by preventing CII from being transmitted<br>unencrypted across the public network, blocking outside traffic that claims to be<br>from within the agency, and not passing any web requests to the public network that<br>are not from the agency-controlled or internal boundary protection devices (e.g.,<br>orosies, actives, inferentles, or public, and the controlled or internal boundary protection devices (e.g.,<br>orosies, actives, inferentles, or public, or the controlled or internal to<br>ori information systems, as necessary, to mitigate risk to CII; and   | Functional   | equal intersects with   | Data Flow Enforcement –   |  | and shared; (5) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies; (6) Request erasure of their PD; and (7) Restrict the further collecting, receiving, processing, storing, transmitting, undestate adout a version of their PD. Machanisms exist to design, implement and review firewall and router configurations to restrict connections between untrusted networks and internal   | 10  |                  |
|   | ENFORCEMENT  | system and between connected systems by preventing CII from being transmitted unencypted across the public network, blocking outside traffic that claims to be from within the agency, and not passing any web requests to the public network that are not from the agency-controlled or internal boundary protection devices (e.g., orosies, sateways, freevalls, or router).  a. Identify and document separation of duties based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to mitigate risk to CII; and b. Define system access authorizations to support separation of duties. a Identify and document separation of duties based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to mitigate risk to CII; and b. Define system access authorization to support separation of duties. Determine the control of the contr |  |   | Data Flow Enforcement –<br>Access Control Lists (ACLs)  |  | and shared; (5) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies; (6) Request errasure of their PD; and (7) Restrict the further collecting, receiving, processing, storing, transmitting, undasted active sharing of their PD. Mechanisms exist to design, implement and review firewail and router configurations to restrict connections between untrusted networks and internal systems.  Mechanisms exist to enforce a two-person rule for implementing changes to critical assets.  Mechanisms exist to implement and maintain Separation of Duties (SoD) to prevent potential inappropriate activity without collusion.   |   |                  |
| AC-5                                    | ENFORCEMENT SEPARATION OF DUTIES   | system and between connected systems by preventing CII from being transmitted unencygrided across the public network, blocking outside fraffer that claims to be trom within the agency, and not passing any web requests to the public network that are not from the agency-controlled or internal boundary protection devices (e.g., socies, actievers, firevellis, or routers).  I clientify and document separation or disuries based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to mitigate risk to CII; and b. Define system access authorization to support separation of duties, a leantly and document separation of duties based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to mitigate risk to CII; and b. Define system access authorizations to support separation of duties.  I clientify and document separation of duties based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to mitigate risk to CII; and b. Define system access authorizations to support separation of duties.  I clientify and document separation of duties based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to mitigate risk to CII; and b. Define system access authorizations to support separation of duties.   | Functional   | intersects with   | Data Flow Enforcement –<br>Access Control Lists (ACLs)  Dual Authorization for Change   | CHG-04.3   | and shared; (5) Request correction to their PD due to Inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD and (7) Restrict the Inter collecting, receiving, processing, storing, transmitting, undested anotic sharins of their PD Mechanisms exist to design, implement and review frewall and router configurations to restrict connections between untrusted networks and internal systems.  Mechanisms exist to enforce a two-person rule for implementing changes to critical assets.  Mechanisms exist to implement and maintain Separation of Duties (SoD) to prevent potential inappropriate activity without collusion.  Cryptographic mechanisms exist to implement strong cryptography and security protocols to safeguard sensitive/regulated data during transmission over open,   | 5   |                  |
| AC-5                                    | ENFORCEMENT  SEPARATION OF DUTIES  SEPARATION OF DUTIES  | system and between connected systems by preventing CII from being transmitted unencypted across the public network, bloosing outside traffic that claims to be from within the agency, and not passing any web requests to the public network that are not from the agency-controlled or internal boundary protection devices (e.g., ordiness, dateware).  a. Identify and document separation of duties based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to mitigate risk to CII; and b. Define system access authorizations to support separation of duties. Joerations, or information systems, as necessary, to mitigate risk to CII; and b. Define system access authorization to support separation of duties. a Identify and document separation of duties based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to mitigate risk to CII; and b. Define system access authorizations to support separation of duties. b. Define system access authorizations to support separation of duties. b. Define systems cases authorizations to support separation of duties. b. Define systems access authorizations to support separation of duties. Identify and document separation of duties based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to mitigate risk to CII; and b. Define systems operations, or information systems, as necessary, to mitigate risk to CII; and b. Define systems are separations, or information systems, as necessary, to mitigate risk to CII; and b. Define systems are separation of duties based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to mitigate risk to CII; and b. Define systems are separation of duties are separation of duties are separation of duties and the system are separations.   | Functional Functional  | intersects with   | Data Flow Enforcement – Access Control Lists (ACLs)  Dual Authorization for Change  Separation of Duties (SoD)  Safeguarding Data Over  | CHG-04.3<br>HRS-11                               | and shared; (5) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies; (6) Request ensure of their PD, and (7) Restrict the further collecting, receiving, processing, storing, transmitting, undexted and/or sharinar of make IPD. Mechanisms exist to design, implement and review firewall and router configurations to restrict connections between untrusted networks and internal systems.  Mechanisms exist to enforce a two-person rule for implementing changes to critical assets.  Mechanisms exist to implement and maintain Separation of Duties (SoD) to prevent potential inappropriate activity without collusion.  Cryptographic mechanisms exist to implement strong cryptography and security protocols to adequard sensitive/regulated data during transmission over open, public networks.  Mechanisms exist to check the validity of information inputs.  | 5   |                  |
| AC-5<br>AC-5<br>AC-5                    | ENFORCEMENT  SEPARATION OF DUTIES  SEPARATION OF DUTIES  SEPARATION OF DUTIES  | system and between connected systems by preventing CII from being transmitted unencypted across the public network, blocking outside fraft that claims to be trom within the agency, and not passing any web requests to the public network that are not from the agency-controlled or internal boundary protection devices (e.g., pooles, activewes, firewalls, or routers).  I clientify and document separation or disules based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to militigate risk to CII; and b. Define system access authorization to support separation of duties, a Identify and document separation of duties based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to militigate risk to CII; and b. Define system access authorizations to support separation of duties, a Identify and document separation of duties based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to militigate risk to CII; and b. Define system access authorizations to support separation of duties, a Identify and document separation of duties based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to militigate risk to CII; and b. Define system access authorizations to support separation of duties, a Identify and document separation of duties based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to militigate risk to CII; and b. Define system access authorizations to support separation of duties.  In the system access authorization to support separation of duties, perations, or information systems, as necessary, to militigate risk to CII; and b. Define system access authorizations to support separation of duties, fram the system access authorizations to support separation of duties, and the system access authorizations to support separation of duties, fram the paratic duties, and the system access authorizations to support separation of duties, and the system access authorizations to support separation of duties, perations, or information syste | Functional Functional  | intersects with intersects with intersects with   | Data Flow Enforcement – Access Control Lists (ACLs)  Dual Authorization for Change  Separation of Duties (SoD)  Safeguarding Data Over Open Networks  | CHG-04.3<br>HRS-11<br>NET-12                     | and shared; (5) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD and (7) Restrict the Inter collecting, receiving, processing, storing, transmitting, undested anotic sharing of their PD Mechanisms exist to design, implement and review firewall and router configurations to restrict connections between untrusted networks and internal systems.  Mechanisms exist to enforce a two-person rule for implementing changes to critical assets.  Mechanisms exist to implement and maintain Separation of Duties (SoD) to prevent potential inappropriate activity without collusion.  Cryptographic mechanisms exist to implement strong cryptography and security protocols to safeguard sensitive/regulated data during transmission over open, public networks.  Mechanisms exist to check the validity of information inputs.  Mechanisms exist to check the validity of information inputs.   | 5 5 5                                     |                  |
| AC-5 AC-5 AC-5                          | SEPARATION OF DUTIES  SEPARATION OF DUTIES  SEPARATION OF DUTIES   | system and between connected systems by preventing CII from being transmitted unencypted across the public network, blocking outside fraft that claims to be trom within the agency, and not passing any web requests to the public network that are not from the agency-controlled or internal boundary protection devices (e.g., provises, activewes, firewalls, or routers).  I identify and document separation of duties based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to mitigate risk to CII; and b. Define system access suthinization to support separation of duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to mitigate risk to CII; and b. Define system excess suthorizations to support separation of duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to mitigate risk to CII; and b. Define system access suthorizations to support separation of duties. I alientify and document separation of duties based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to mitigate risk to CII; and b. Define system access authorizations to support separation of duties. Secure on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary to mitigate risk to CII; and b. Define system access authorization to support separation of duties. Secure on specific duties, operations, a letterity and document separation of duties based on specific duties, operations. In Jedinal system access subtractional to support separation of duties. Secure on specific duties, operations, a befine system access subtractional to susport separation of duties. Secure of the principle of least privilege, allowing only authorized accesses for users (or processes acting on behalf of users) that are necessary to accomplish assigned organizational tasks.  | Functional Functional Functional   | intersects with intersects with intersects with intersects with intersects with                                       | Data Flow Enforcement – Access Control Lists (ACLs)  Dusl Authorization for Change  Separation of Duties (SoD)  Safeguarding Data Over Open Networks  Input Data Validation   | CHG-04.3  HRS-11  NET-12  TDA-18                 | and shared; (5) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies; (6) Request errasure of their PD and (7) Restrict the further collecting, receiving, processing, storing, transmitting, undested another sharing of their PD due to their PD due t | 5<br>5<br>5                               |                  |
| AC-S AC-S AC-S AC-S AC-S                | ENFORCEMENT  SEPARATION OF DUTIES  SEPARATION OF DUTIES  SEPARATION OF DUTIES  SEPARATION OF DUTIES  LEAST PRIVILEGE  LEAST PRIVILEGE  LEAST PRIVILEGE    AUTHORIZE ACCESS TO  SECURITY FUNCTIONS  | system and between connected systems by preventing CII from being transmitted unencypted across the public network, blocking outside fraft that claims to be trom within the agency, and not passing any web requests to the public network that are not from the agency-controlled or internal boundary protection devices (e.g., pooles, activews, firevalls, or routers).  I clientify and document separation or distribe based on a specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to militigate risk to CII; and b. Define system access authorization to support separation of duties, a Identify and document separation of duties based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to militigate risk to CII; and b. Define system access authorizations to support separation of duties, a Identify and document separation of duties based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to militigate risk to CII; and b. Define system access authorizations to support separation of duties, a Identify and document separation of duties based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to militigate risk to CII; and b. Define system access authorizations to support separation of duties, a Identify and document separation of duties based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to militigate risk to CII; and b. Define system access authorizations to support separation of duties.  Employ the principle of least privilege, allowing only sutriorized accesses for users (or processes acting on behalf of users) that are necessary to accomplish a seigned representations of the assigned or processes acting on behalf or users that are necessary to accomplish a seigned or processes acting on behalf or users that are necessary to accomplish a seigned or processes acting on behalf or users that are necessary to accomplish a seigned   | Functional  Functional  Functional  Functional                                     | intersects with intersects with intersects with intersects with   | Data Flow Enforcement – Access Control Lists (ACLs)  Dual Authorization for Change  Separation of Duties (SoD)  Safeguarding Data Over Open Networks  Input Data Validation  Access Enforcement   | CHG-04.3  HRS-11  NET-12  TDA-18  IAC-20         | and shared; (5) Request correction to their PD due to Inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD due to Inaccuracies; (6) Request errasure of their PD and (7) Restrict the Inthe collecting, receiving, processing, storing, transmitting, undested anotic sharins of thair PD. Mechanisms exist to design, implement and review firewall and router configurations to restrict connections between untrusted networks and internal systems.  Mechanisms exist to enforce a two-person rule for implementing changes to critical assetts.  Mechanisms exist to implement and maintain Separation of Duties (SoD) to prevent potential inappropriate activity without collusion.  Cryptographic mechanisms exist to implement strong cryptography and security protocols to safeguard sensitivity-regulated data during transmission over open, public networks.  Mechanisms exist to enforce Logical Access Control (LAC) permissions that conform to the principle of "least privilege."  Mechanisms exist to enforce Logical Access Control (LAC) permissions that conform to the principle of "least privilege."  Mechanisms exist to utilize the concept of least privilege, allowing only authorized access to processes necessary to accomplish assigned tasks in accordance with organizational business functions.  Mechanisms exist to utilize the concept of least privilege, allowing only authorized privileged users.  | 5<br>5<br>5<br>5                          |                  |
| AC-S AC-S AC-S AC-S AC-S AC-S AC-S      | ENFORCEMENT  SEPARATION OF DUTIES  SEPARATION OF DUTIES  SEPARATION OF DUTIES  SEPARATION OF DUTIES  LEAST PRIVILEGE  LEAST PRIVILEGE  LEAST PRIVILEGE    AUTHORIZE ACCESS TO  | system and between connected systems by preventing CII from being transmitted unencypted across the public network, blocking outside fraft that claims to be from within the agency, and not passing any web requests to the public network that are not from the agency-controlled or internal boundary protection devices (e.g., sozies, activews, firewalls, or routers).  I clientify and document separation or distries based on a specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to niligate risk to CII; and b. Define system access authorizations to support separation of duties.  I clientify and document separation of duties based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to niligate risk to CII; and b. Define system access authorizations to support separation of duties.  I clientify and document separation of duties based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to niligate risk to CII; and b. Define system access authorizations to support separation of duties.  I clientify and document separation of duties based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to niligate risk to CII; and b. Define system access authorizations to support separation of duties.  I clientify and document separation of duties based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to niligate risk to CII; and b. Define system access authorizations to support separation of duties.  I consider the system access authorizations to support separation of duties.  Employ the principle of less thrivilege, allowing only authorized accesses for users (or processes acting on behalf of users) that are necessary to accomplish assigned organizational tasks.  Employ the principle of less thrivilege, allowing only authorized accesses for users (or processes acting on behalf of users) that are necessary to accomplish assigned organizational tasks.  Employ the principle of less thrivilege, allowing only authorized accesses for users (or process | Functional  Functional  Functional  Functional  Functional  Functional             | intersects with intersects with intersects with intersects with intersects with intersects with                       | Data Flow Enforcement – Access Control Lists (ACLs)  Dual Authorization for Change  Separation of Duties (SoD)  Safeguarding Data Over Open Networks  Input Data Validation  Access Enforcement  Least Privilege  | CHG-04.3  HRS-11  NET-12  TDA-18  IAC-20  IAC-21 | and shared; (5) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD and (7) Restrict the further collecting, receiving, processing, storing, transmitting, undested anotic sharina of their PD. Mcchanisms exist to design, implement and review firewall and router configurations to restrict connections between untrusted networks and internal systems.  Mechanisms exist to enforce a two-person rule for implementing changes to critical assetts.  Mechanisms exist to implement and maintain Separation of Duties (SoD) to prevent potential inappropriate activity without collusion.  Cryptographic mechanisms exist to implement storing cryptography and security protocols to safeguard sensitive/regulated data during transmission over open, public networks.  Mechanisms exist to enforce a logical Access Control (LAC) permissions that conform to the principle of "least privilege," Mechanisms exist to enforce Logical Access Control (LAC) permissions that conform to the principle of "least privilege," Mechanisms exist to utilize the concept of least privilege, allowing only authorized scoss to processes necessary to accomplish assigned tasks in accordance with organizational business functions.  Mechanisms exist to limit access to security functions to explicitly-authorized privileged users.   | 5 5 5 5 5 5                               |                  |
| AC-S AC-S AC-S AC-S AC-S AC-6 AC-6 AC-6 | ENFORCEMENT  SEPARATION OF DUTIES  SEPARATION OF DUTIES  SEPARATION OF DUTIES  SEPARATION OF DUTIES  LEAST PRIVILEGE  LEAST PRIVILEGE  LEAST PRIVILEGE    AUTHORIZE ACCESS TO SECURITY FUNCTIONS  LEAST PRIVILEGE   NON-PRIVILEGE   NON-PRIVIL | system and between connected systems by preventing CII from being transmitted unencypted across the public network, blocking outside fraft that claims to be trom within the agency, and not passing any web requests to the public network that are not from the agency-controlled or internal boundary protection devices (e.g., proxies, activews, firewalls, or routers).  I cliently and document separation of duties based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to mitigate risk to CII; and b. Define system access authorization to support separation of duties. Proxies a leading of the control  | Functional Functional Functional Functional Functional Functional                  | intersects with intersects with intersects with intersects with intersects with intersects with equal                 | Data Flow Enforcement – Access Control Lists (ACLs)  Dual Authorization for Change  Separation of Duties (SoD)  Safeguarding Data Over Open Networks  Input Data Validation  Access Enforcement  Least Privilege  Authorize Access to Security Functions  | CHG-04.3 HRS-11 NET-12 TDA-18 IAC-20 IAC-21.1    | and shared; (5) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies; (6) Request errasure of their PD and (7) Restrict the further collecting, receiving, processing, storing, transmitting, undated, activate collecting, receiving, processing, storing, transmitting, undated, activate collecting, receiving, processing, storing, transmitting, undated, activate configurations to restrict connections between untrusted networks and internal systems.  Mechanisms exist to enforce a two-person rule for implementing changes to critical assets.  Mechanisms exist to implement and maintain Separation of Duties (SoD) to prevent potential inappropriate activity without collusion.  Cryptographic mechanisms exist to implement strong cryptography and security protocols to safeguard sensitive/regulard data during transmission over open, public networks.  Mechanisms exist to continue the validity of information inputs.  Mechanisms exist to enforce Logical Access Control ((AC) permissions that conform to the principle of Teast privilege.  Mechanisms exist to utilize the concept of least privilege, allowing only authorized access to processes necessary to accomplish assigned tasks in accordance with organizational pursuas bunctions.  Mechanisms exist to tribite the concept of least privilege, allowing only authorized access to processes necessary to accomplish assigned tasks in accordance with organizational pursuas bunctions.  Mechanisms exist to prohibit privileged users from using privileged accounts,  | 5 5 5 5 5 10                              |                  |
| AC-5 AC-5 AC-6 AC-6 AC-6 AC-6(1)        | ENFORCEMENT  SEPARATION OF DUTIES  SEPARATION OF DUTIES  SEPARATION OF DUTIES  SEPARATION OF DUTIES  LEAST PRIVILEGE  LEAST PRIVILEGE  LEAST PRIVILEGE   AUTHORIZE ACCESS TO SECURITY FUNCTIONS  LEAST PRIVILEGE   NON-PRIVILEGE   NON-PRIVILEGE ACCESS TO NONSECURITY FUNCTIONS   | system and between connected systems by preventing Cli from being transmitted unencypted across the public network, blocking outside fraft that claims to be from within the agency, and not passing any web requests to the public network that see not from the agency-controlled or internal boundary protection devices (e.g., oxcises, stateways, firewalls, or routers).  I dentify and document separation or duties based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to mitigate risk to Cli; and b. Define system access authorizations to support separation of duties. as identify and document separation of duties based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to mitigate risk to Cli; and b. Define system access authorizations to support separation of duties. as identify and document separation of duties based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to mitigate risk to Cli; and b. Define system access authorizations to support separation of duties. I dentify and document separation of duties based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to mitigate risk to Cli; and b. Define system access authorizations to support separation of duties. a identify and document separation of duties based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to mitigate risk to Cli; and b. Define system access authorization to support separation of duties. Define system access authorization to support separation of duties. Define system access authorization to support separation of duties. Define system access acting to the duties accessed on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to mitigate risk to Cli; and b. Define system access authorization to support separation of duties. Employ the principle of less thrivings, allowing only authorized accesses for users for processes acting on behaff of users linking allowing only authorized accesses for users for processes acting on behaff of us | Functional  Functional  Functional  Functional  Functional  Functional  Functional | intersects with equal | Data Flow Enforcement – Access Control Lists (ACLs)  Dual Authorization for Change Separation of Duties (SoD) Safeguarding Data Over Open Networks Input Data Validation Access Enforcement Least Privilege  Authorize Access to Security Functions  Non-Privileged Access for Non-Security Functions | CHG-04.3 HRS-11 NET-12 TDA-18 IAC-20 IAC-21.1    | and shared; (5) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies; (6) Request correction to their PD due to inaccuracies; (6) Request errasure of their PD and (7) Restrict the further collecting, receiving, processing, storing, transmitting, undexted and/or sharing of make PD Mechanisms exist to design, implement and review firewall and router configurations to restrict connections between untrusted networks and internal systems.  Mechanisms exist to enforce a two-person rule for implementing changes to critical assets.  Mechanisms exist to implement and maintain Separation of Duties (SoD) to prevent potential inappropriate activity without collusion.  Cryptographic mechanisms exist to implement strong cryptography and security protocols to adequard sensitive/regulated data during transmission over open, public networks.  Mechanisms exist to implement exist of implement strong cryptography and security protocols to adequard sensitive/regulated data during transmission over open, public networks.  Mechanisms exist to concept of least privilege, allowing only authorized access to processes necessary to accomplish assigned tasks in accordance with organizational business functions.  Mechanisms exist to limit access to security functions to explicitly-authorized privileged users.  Mechanisms exist to prohibit privileged users from using privileged accounts, while performing non-security functions.   | 5 5 5 5 5 5 10 10                         |                  |



| FDE#     | FDE Name  | Focal Document Element (FDE) Description  | STRM<br>Rationale | STRM<br>Relationship | SCF Control                                     | SCF#     | Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description  | Strength of<br>Relationship | Notes (optional) |
|----------|---|---|-------------------|----------------------|---|----------|--|-----------------------------|------------------|
|          | LEAST PRIVILEGE  <br>PROHIBIT NON-                                |   |                   |                      | Prohibit Non-Privileged                         |          | Mechanisms exist to prevent non-privileged users from executing privileged functions to include disabling, circumventing or altering implemented security  | (optional)                  |                  |
| AC-6(10) | PRIVILEGED USERS<br>FROM EXECUTING                                | Prevent non-privileged users from executing privileged functions.   | Functional        | equal                | Users from Executing<br>Privileged Functions    | IAC-21.5 | safeguards / countermeasures.  | 10                          |                  |
|          | PRIVILEGED FUNCTIONS  | a. Enforce a limit of five (5) consecutive invalid logon attempts by a user during a 15-  |                   |                      |   |          | Mechanisms exist to enforce a limit for consecutive invalid login attempts by a  |                             |                  |
| AC-7     | UNSUCCESSFUL LOGON<br>ATTEMPTS                                    | minute time period; and3 b. Automatically lock the account or node until released by an administrator when the maximum number of unsuccessful attempts is exceeded.   | Functional        | equal                | Account Lockout                                 | IAC-22   | user during an organization-defined time period and automatically locks the account when the maximum number of unsuccessful attempts is exceeded.  | 10                          |                  |
|          |   | a. Display a system use notification message to users before granting access to the<br>system that provides privacy and security notices consistent with applicable laws,   |                   |                      |   |          | Mechanisms exist to utilize system use notification / logon banners that display an approved system use notification message or banner before granting access to the   |                             |                  |
|          |   | executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines and state that:  1. Users are accessing a restricted information system;   |                   |                      |   |          | system that provides cybersecurity & data privacy notices.   |                             |                  |
|          |   | 2. System usage may be monitored, recorded, and subject to audit; 3. Unauthorized use of the system is prohibited and subject to criminal and civil   |                   |                      |   |          |  |                             |                  |
|          |   | penalties; and 4. Use of the system indicates consent to monitoring and recording; b. Retain the notification message or banner on the screen until users acknowledge   |                   |                      |   |          |  |                             |                  |
| AC-8     | SYSTEM USE<br>NOTIFICATION  | <ul> <li>b. Netain the notification message or banner on the screen until users acknowledge<br/>the usage conditions and take explicit actions to log on to or further access the<br/>system; and</li> </ul>  | Functional        | equal                | System Use Notification<br>(Logon Banner)       | SEA-18   |  | 10                          |                  |
|          |   | c. For publicly accessible systems:  1. Display system use information consistent with applicable laws, executive   |                   |                      |   |          |  |                             |                  |
|          |   | orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines, before granting further access to the publicly accessible system;  2. Display references, if any, to monitoring, recording, or auditing that are consistent                               |                   |                      |   |          |  |                             |                  |
|          |   | with privacy accommodations for such systems that generally prohibit those activities; and  |                   |                      |   |          |  |                             |                  |
|          |   | 3. Include a description of the authorized uses of the system  a. Prevent further access to the system by initiating a device lock after a maximum of 30 minutes of inactivity and requiring the user to initiate a device lock before leaving                  |                   |                      |   |          | Mechanisms exist to initiate a session lock after an organization-defined time<br>period of inactivity, or upon receiving a request from a user and retain the session   |                             |                  |
|          |   | the system unattended.  NOTE: In the interest of safety, devices that are: (1) part of a criminal justice   |                   |                      |   |          | lock until the user reestablishes access using established identification and authentication methods.  |                             |                  |
| AC-11    | DEVICE LOCK   | conveyance; or<br>(2) used to perform dispatch functions and located within a physically secure<br>location: or   | Functional        | equal                | Session Lock                                    | IAC-24   |  | 10                          |                  |
| AC-11    | DEVICE LOCK   | (3) terminals designated solely for the purpose of receiving alert notifications (i.e., receive only terminals or ROT) used within physically secure location facilities that   | Functional        | equat                | Session Lock                                    | IAC-24   |  | 10                          |                  |
|          |   | remain staffed when in operation, are exempt from this requirement. b. Retain the device lock until the user reestablishes access using established   |                   |                      |   |          |  |                             |                  |
|          |   | identification and authentication procedures.   |                   |                      |   |          | Mechanisms exist to implement pattern-hiding displays to conceal information   |                             |                  |
| AC-11(1) | DEVICE LOCK   PATTERN-<br>HIDING DISPLAYS                         | Conceal, via the device lock, information previously visible on the display with a publicly viewable image.   | Functional        | equal                | Pattern-Hiding Displays                         | IAC-24.1 |  | 10                          |                  |
| AC-12    | SESSION TERMINATION   | Automatically terminate a user session after a user has been logged out.  | Functional        | equal                | Session Termination                             | IAC-25   | Automated mechanisms exist to log out users, both locally on the network and for<br>remote sessions, at the end of the session or after an organization-defined period<br>of inactivity.   | 10                          |                  |
|          | PERMITTED ACTIONS<br>WITHOUT                                      | Identify any specific user actions that can be performed on the system without identification or authentication consistent with organizational mission and business   |                   |                      | Permitted Actions Without                       |          | Mechanisms exist to identify and document the supporting rationale for specific<br>user actions that can be performed on a system without identification or  |                             |                  |
| AC-14    | IDENTIFICATION OR<br>AUTHENTICATION                               | functions; and  b. Document and provide supporting rationale in the security plan for the system, user actions not requiring identification or authentication.  | Functional        | equal                | Identification or<br>Authorization              | IAC-26   | authentication.  | 10                          |                  |
|          |   | Establish and document usage restrictions, configuration/connection requirements, and implementation guidance for each type of remote access  |                   |                      |   |          | Mechanisms exist to define, control and review organization-approved, secure remote access methods.  |                             |                  |
| AC-17    | REMOTE ACCESS   | allowed; and b. Authorize each type of remote access to the system prior to allowing such connections.  | Functional        | equal                | Remote Access                                   | NET-14   |  | 10                          |                  |
| AC-17(1) | REMOTE ACCESS  <br>MONITORING AND<br>CONTROL                      | Employ automated mechanisms to monitor and control remote access methods.   | Functional        | equal                | Automated Monitoring &<br>Control               | NET-14.1 | Automated mechanisms exist to monitor and control remote access sessions.  | 10                          |                  |
|          | REMOTE ACCESS  <br>PROTECTION OF                                  | Implement cryptographic mechanisms to protect the confidentiality and integrity of  |                   |                      | Protection of                                   |          | Cryptographic mechanisms exist to protect the confidentiality and integrity of remote access sessions (e.g., VPN).   |                             |                  |
| AC-17(2) | CONFIDENTIALITY AND<br>INTEGRITY USING<br>ENCRYPTION              | remote access sessions.   | Functional        | equal                | Confidentiality / Integrity<br>Using Encryption | NET-14.2 |  | 10                          |                  |
| AC-17(3) | MANAGED ACCESS<br>CONTROL POINTS                                  | Route remote accesses through authorized and managed network access control points.   | Functional        | equal                | Managed Access Control<br>Points                | NET-14.3 | Mechanisms exist to route all remote accesses through managed network access control points (e.g., VPN concentrator).  | 10                          |                  |
|          | REMOTE ACCESS   | a. Authorize the execution of privileged commands and access to security-relevant information via remote access only in a format that provides assessable evidence  |                   |                      | Remote Privileged                               |          | Mechanisms exist to restrict the execution of privileged commands and access to<br>security-relevant information via remote access only for compelling operational<br>needs.   |                             |                  |
| AC-17(4) | PRIVILEGED COMMANDS<br>AND ACCESS                                 | and for the following needs: compelling operational needs; and<br>b. Document the rationale for remote access in the security plan for the system.  | Functional        | equal                | Commands & Sensitive<br>Data Access             | NET-14.4 |  | 10                          |                  |
|          | WIRELESS ACCESS   | a. Establish configuration requirements, connection requirements, and implementation guidance for each type of wireless access; and   |                   |                      | Wireless Access                                 |          | Mechanisms exist to protect the confidentiality and integrity of wireless networking technologies by implementing authentication and strong encryption.  |                             |                  |
| AC-18    | WIRELESS ACCESS   | b. Authorize each type of wireless access to the system prior to allowing such connections.     a. Establish configuration requirements, connection requirements, and   | Functional        | intersects with      | Authentication &<br>Encryption                  | CRY-07   | Mechanisms exist to control authorized wireless usage and monitor for  | 5                           |                  |
| AC-18    | WIRELESS ACCESS   | a. Establish Comiguration requirements, commention requirements, and implementation guidance for each type of wireless access; and b. Authorize each type of wireless access to the system prior to allowing such   | Functional        | intersects with      | Wireless Networking                             | NET-15   | unauthorized wireless access.  | 5                           |                  |
|          | WIRELESS ACCESS   | connections.  Protect wireless access to the system using authentication of authorized users and  |                   |                      | Authentication &                                |          | Mechanisms exist to secure Wi-Fi (e.g., IEEE 802.11) and prevent unauthorized access by:   |                             |                  |
| AC-18(1) | AUTHENTICATION AND<br>ENCRYPTION                                  | agency-controlled devices, and encryption.  | Functional        | equal                | Encryption                                      | NET-15.1 | (1) Authenticating devices trying to connect; and (2) Encrypting transmitted data.   | 10                          |                  |
| AC-18(3) | WIRELESS ACCESS  <br>DISABLE WIRELESS<br>NETWORKING               | Disable, when not intended for use, wireless networking capabilities embedded within system components prior to issuance and deployment.  | Functional        | equal                | Disable Wireless<br>Networking                  | NET-15.2 | Mechanisms exist to disable unnecessary wireless networking capabilities that are<br>internally embedded within system components prior to issuance to end users.  | 10                          |                  |
| AC-19    | ACCESS CONTROL FOR<br>MOBILE DEVICES                              | Establish configuration requirements, connection requirements, and implementation guidance for organization-controlled mobile devices, to include when such devices are outside of controlled areas; and  | Functional        | equal                | Access Control For Mobile<br>Devices            | MDM-02   | Mechanisms exist to enforce access control requirements for the connection of mobile devices to organizational systems.  | 10                          |                  |
|          | ACCESS CONTROL FOR  | b. Authorize the connection of mobile devices to organizational systems.  Employ full-device encryption to protect the confidentiality and integrity of   |                   |                      |   |          | Cryptographic mechanisms exist to protect the confidentiality and integrity of   |                             |                  |
| AC-19(5) | MOBILE DEVICES   FULL<br>DEVICE OR CONTAINER-<br>BASED ENCRYPTION | information on full- and limited-feature operating system mobile devices authorized to process, store, or transmit CJI.   | Functional        | equal                | Full Device & Container-<br>Based Encryption    | MDM-03   | information on mobile devices through full-device or container encryption.   | 10                          |                  |
|          |   | Establish agency-level policies governing the use of external systems consistent with the trust relationships established with other organizations owning, operating.   |                   |                      |   |          | Mechanisms exist to govern how external parties, systems and services are used to securely store, process and transmit data.   |                             |                  |
| AC-20    | USE OF EXTERNAL   | and/or maintaining external systems, allowing authorized individuals to:  1. Access the system from external systems; and  2. Process, store, or transmit organization-controlled information using external  | Functional        | equal                | Use of External Information                     | DCH-13   |  | 10                          |                  |
| NO-20    | SYSTEMS   | systems; or<br>b. Prohibit the use of personally-owned information systems including mobile   | , anouonat        | equal                | Systems   | 501113   |  | 10                          |                  |
|          |   | devices (i.e., bring your own device [BYOD]) and publicly accessible systems for accessing, processing, storing, or transmitting CJI.   |                   |                      |   |          |  |                             |                  |
|          | USE OF EXTERNAL   | Permit authorized individuals to use an external system to access the system or to process, store, or transmit organization-controlled information only after:  |                   |                      |   |          | Mechanisms exist to prohibit external parties, systems and services from storing,<br>processing and transmitting data unless authorized individuals first:<br>(1) Verifying the implementation of required security controls; or |                             |                  |
| AC-20(1) | SYSTEMS   LIMITS ON<br>AUTHORIZED USE                             | a. Verification of the implementation of controls on the external system as specified<br>in the organization's security and privacy policies and security and privacy plans; or<br>b. Retention of approved system connection or processing agreements with the | Functional        | equal                | Limits of Authorized Use                        | DCH-13.1 | (1) Vernying the implementation of required security controls; or<br>(2) Retaining a processing agreement with the entity hosting the external systems<br>or service.  | 10                          |                  |
|          | USE OF EXTERNAL   | organizational entity hosting the external system.  |                   |                      |   |          | Mechanisms exist to restrict or prohibit the use of portable storage devices by  |                             |                  |
| AC-20(2) | SYSTEMS   PORTABLE<br>STORAGE DEVICES —<br>RESTRICTED USE         | Restrict the use of organization-controlled portable storage devices by authorized individuals on external systems.   | Functional        | equal                | Portable Storage Devices                        | DCH-13.2 | users on external systems.   | 10                          |                  |
| 40       |   | Enable authorized users to determine whether access authorizations assigned to a sharing partner match the information's access and use restrictions as defined in  | Francis           | laterary in the      | Indoorani (ii)                                  | 0000     | Mechanisms exist to utilize a process to assist users in making information sharing decisions to ensure data is appropriately protected.   | _                           |                  |
| AC-21    | INFORMATION SHARING   | an executed information exchange agreement; and<br>b. Employ attribute-based access control (see AC-2(d)(3)) or manual processes as<br>defined in information exchange ag   | Functional        | intersects with      | Information Sharing                             | DCH-14   |  | 5                           |                  |
| AC-21    | INFORMATION SHARING   | <ul> <li>a. Enable authorized users to determine whether access authorizations assigned to<br/>a sharing partner match the information's access and use restrictions as defined in</li> </ul>   | Functional        | intersects with      | Information Sharing With                        | PRI-07   | Mechanisms exist to disclose Personal Data (PD) to third-parties only for the<br>purposes identified in the data privacy notice and with the implicit or explicit<br>concept of the data quicket.                                | 5                           |                  |
| AG-21    | INFURMATION SHAKING   | an executed information exchange agreement; and<br>b. Employ attribute-based access control (see AC-2(d)(3)) or manual processes as<br>defined in information exchange ag   | runctional        | intersects with      | Third Parties                                   | PRI-0/   | consent of the data subject.   | _ 。                         |                  |
|          |   |   | -                 |                      |   |          |  |                             |                  |



| Manual Content   | FDE#    | FDE Name                    | Focal Document Element (FDE) Description  | STRM<br>Rationale | STRM<br>Relationship | SCF Control                 | SCF#     | Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description  | Strength of<br>Relationship<br>(ontional) | Notes (optional) |
|--|---------|-----------------------------|---|-------------------|----------------------|-----------------------------|----------|--|---|------------------|
| ### PART   |         |                             |   |                   |                      |                             |          |  | (optional)                                |                  |
| 1,000   1,00   | AC-22   |                             | not contain nonpublic information;  | Functional        | eguel                |                             | DCH-15   |  | 10  |                  |
| ## 1997 1997 1997 1997 1997 1997 1997 19   | A0 22   | CONTENT                     | accessible system to ensure that nonpublic information is not included; and   | Tanotional        | cquu                 | Content                     | 501110   |  |   |                  |
| Part   |         |                             | quarterly and remove such information, if discovered  |                   |                      |                             |          | Machanisms axist to facilitate the implementation of security workforce  |   |                  |
| ## 1962   Process of the control of  |         |                             | logical or physical access to any information system results in the ability, right, or  |                   |                      |                             |          |  |   |                  |
| ## 15 April 19 April  |         |                             | Organization-level awareness and training policy that:  |                   |                      |                             |          |  |   |                  |
| March  |         |                             | coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and   |                   |                      |                             |          |  |   |                  |
| ## 1   |         |                             | policies, standards, and guidelines; and  |                   |                      |                             |          |  |   |                  |
| Part   | AT-1    |                             | and the associated awareness and training controls;   | Functional        | subset of            |                             | SAT-01   |  | 10  |                  |
| Add  |         |                             | training responsibilities to manage the development, documentation, and   |                   |                      |                             |          |  |   |                  |
| ## Company of the Com |         |                             | c. Review and update the current awareness and training:  |                   |                      |                             |          |  |   |                  |
| The content of the    |         |                             | environment, when security incidents occur, or when changes to the CJIS Security  |                   |                      |                             |          |  |   |                  |
| 1/2  |         |                             | 2. Procedures annually and following changes in the information system operating  |                   |                      |                             |          |  |   |                  |
| ## 14 AUGUST CONTROL OF CONTROL O |         |                             | Policy are made<br>a. Provide security and privacy literacy training to system users (including managers,   |                   |                      |                             |          |  |   |                  |
| 1  |         |                             | As part of initial training for new users prior to accessing CJI and annually   |                   |                      |                             |          | awareness education and training that is relevant for their job function.  |   |                  |
| 1-12   |         |                             | 2. When required by system changes or within 30 days of any security event for  |                   |                      |                             |          |  |   |                  |
| March   Marc   |         |                             | b. Employ one or more of the following techniques to increase the security and  |                   |                      |                             |          |  |   |                  |
| ## PASS - MARKET STATE - CONTINUES AND ADDRESS OF THE PASS OF THE PASS - CONTINUES AND ADDRESS OF THE PASS OF THE  | AT-2    |                             | 1. Displaying posters   | Functional        | equal                |                             | SAT-02   |  | 10  |                  |
| Control   Cont   |         | AWARENESS                   | 3. Displaying logon screen messages   |                   |                      | Privacy Awareness Training  |          |  |   |                  |
| Manual Content of the Content of t   |         |                             | 5. Conducting awareness events  |                   |                      |                             |          |  |   |                  |
| 1.   |         |                             | the information system operating environment, when security incidents occur, or   |                   |                      |                             |          |  |   |                  |
| International Content  |         |                             | d. Incorporate lessons learned from internal or external security incidents or  |                   |                      |                             |          |  |   |                  |
| ## Section of the control of the con | AT-2(2) | AWARENESS   INSIDER         | Provide literacy training on recognizing and reporting potential indicators of insider  | Functional        | equal                | Insider Threat Awareness    | THR-05   | Mechanisms exist to utilize security awareness training on recognizing and reporting potential indicators of insider threat. | 10  |                  |
| Manual Control |         | LITERACY TRAINING AND       |   |                   |                      |                             |          | Mechanisms exist to include awareness training on recognizing and reporting  |   |                  |
| ## And Control Transport Control State Contr | AT-2(3) | ENGINEERING AND             | Provide literacy training on recognizing and reporting potential and actual instances of social engineering and social mining.                                      | Functional        | equal                | Social Engineering & Mining | SAT-02.2 | potential and actual instances of social engineering and social mining.  | 10  |                  |
| Forest Land Ass S, for no construction of the  |         |                             | roles and responsibilities:   |                   |                      |                             |          |  |   |                  |
| A SECONDO CONTRACTOR C |         |                             | General User: A user, but not a process, who is authorized to use an information  |                   |                      |                             |          | (2) When required by system changes; and   |   |                  |
| ACCURATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE PROPERTY  |         |                             | Privileged User: A user that is authorized (and, therefore, trusted) to perform   |                   |                      |                             |          | (3) Annually thereafter.   |   |                  |
| A 2 STATE OF CONTRACTION OF CONTRACT |         |                             | Organizational Personnel with Security Responsibilities: Personnel with the   |                   |                      |                             |          |  |   |                  |
| Mode and control processing and pr   |         |                             | implementation of technology in a manner compliant with the CJISSECPOL.   |                   |                      |                             |          |  |   |                  |
| AC 2-00 Control Contro |         |                             | duties, and annually thereafter; and  |                   |                      |                             |          |  |   |                  |
| Control Contro |         |                             | b. Update role-based training content annually and following audits of the CSA and  |                   |                      |                             |          |  |   |                  |
| Leading the control and control and control and private group cross become present to the control and private group cross become contro | AT-3    | ROLE-BASED TRAINING         | incidents; or when changes are made to the CJIS Security Policy;  | Functional        | equal                |                             | SAT-03   |  | 10  |                  |
| A CASON CAN AND CONTROLLED AND CONTR |         |                             | breaches into role-based training;  |                   |                      |                             |          |  |   |                  |
| And Comment of the Co |         |                             | content:  |                   |                      |                             |          |  |   |                  |
| Rootles 1. Decorption (Security Security Securit |         |                             | a. Access, Use and Dissemination of Criminal History Record Information (CHRI),   |                   |                      |                             |          |  |   |                  |
| E. Cooker Repose Theory B. Project Access Authorization (P. Project Access Cortical Control of Project Access Control of Project Acce |         |                             | Penalties   |                   |                      |                             |          |  |   |                  |
| ## Procedure of the control of the c |         |                             | c. Incident Response Training   |                   |                      |                             |          |  |   |                  |
| Fig. 64.005 (Amount of a personnel where the consideration of control of the cont |         |                             | e. Physical Access Authorizations   |                   |                      |                             |          |  |   |                  |
| A TO SECONDATION S |         | DOLE BASED TRAINING I       | g. Monitoring Physical Access   |                   |                      |                             |          | Manhaniama axist to angure that auguruper apparaing a sustem proposing   |   |                  |
| INCHERNATE  AT 4. MINON RECORDS  AT 50 APT SEARCH AND CONTROL STORY AND CONTROL STOR | AT-3(5) | PROCESSING                  | information system results in the ability, right, or privilege to view, modify, or make   | Functional        | egual                |                             | SAT-03.3 | storing or transmitting sensitive / regulated data is formally trained in data handling                                      | 10  |                  |
| MARKO RECORD  Could record purply any purply requirements training and specific registering for the same and specific registering records and a minimal purply records and a minimal purply record for |         | IDENTIFIABLE<br>INFORMATION | controls.   |                   |                      |                             |          |  |   |                  |
| A Pleas and individual transvers genoty of term (Fig. Statut bits or off) (Statut bits used in each transcellar on CER) systems in order to dentify the sending agency and to ensure transcellar on CER systems in control to dentify the sending agency and to ensure transcellar on CER systems in control to dentify the sending agency and to ensure transcellar on CER systems in control to dentify an access device necessary desertifiers, such as used destination or personal identifier, an access device necessary desertifiers, such as used destination or personal identifier, an access device necessary desertifiers, such as used destination or personal identifier, an access device necessary desertifiers, such as used destination or personal identifier, an access device necessary destination of the control of the c | AT-4    | TRAINING RECORDS            | including security and privacy awareness training and specific role-based security  | Functional        | equal                |                             | SAT-04   | including basic cybersecurity & data privacy awareness training, ongoing   | 10  |                  |
| Internation on CIES systems in order to identify the sending agency and to crosses the popular level of cases for each transaction. The original clearful between the inquisiting agency and the CLAS-SCO-than-level entails be in 100, and other agency memorities. The internations of the internation o |         |                             | b. Retain individual training records for a minimum of three years.   |                   |                      |                             |          |  |   |                  |
| IN DECIDION TO DECIDIO TO DE |         |                             | transaction on CJIS systems in order to identify the sending agency and to ensure   |                   |                      |                             |          |  |   |                  |
| IA-0   |         |                             | requesting agency and the CSA/SIB/Channeler shall be the ORI, and other agency identifiers, such as user identification or personal identifier, an access device    |                   |                      |                             |          |  |   |                  |
| USE OF ORIGINATING ADNOTYDETHES IN ORIE Service generics may sit our behalf of another agency may do so using the requesting agency's ADNOTYDE ADNO |         |                             | mnemonic, or the Internet Protocol (IP) address.  Agencies may act as a servicing agency and perform transactions on behalf of                                      |                   |                      |                             |          |  |   |                  |
| IA-0  INDICATION AND INTERNAL TONS AND INTERNAL  |         |                             | transactions on behalf of another agency may do so using the requesting agency's  |                   |                      |                             |          |  |   |                  |
| INFORMATION EXCHANGES EXCH | IA-0    | TRANSACTIONS AND            | on behalf of a requesting agency if the means and procedures are in place to provide  | Functional        | no relationship      | N/A                         | N/A      | N/A  | N/A                                       |                  |
| requesting the transaction, and track, div audit tail, to the specific agency which is endurance time. And the specific agency which is requesting the transaction. Addit transaction and transaction are the tracked, via audit tail, to the specific agency if there is a reason to insquere into the details surrounding why an agency ran an inquiry on a subject. Agencies assigned a time document and authentication and authentication and authentication policy that:  a. Develop, document, and disseminate to authorized personnel:  1. Agency stript identification and authentication policy that:  (a) Addresses purpose, scope, rotes, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance, and (b) is consistent with applicable laws, seachtive orders, directives, registions, policies, straindral, and guidelines; and (b) is consistent with applicable laws, seachtive orders, directives, registions, policies, straindral, and guidelines; and (c) is consistent with applicable laws, seachtive orders, directives, registions of the compliance, and (b) is consistent with applicable laws, seachtive orders, directives, registions of the compliance and (b) is consistent with applicable laws, seachtive orders, directives, registions of the compliance and (b) is consistent with applicable laws, seachtive orders, directives, registions of the compliance and (b) is consistent with applicable laws, seachtive orders, directives, registions, policies, straindral, and guidelines; and (c) is consistent with applicable laws, seachtive orders, directives, registions and consistent strains and the compliance and (b) is consistent with applicable laws, seachtives orders, directives, registions orders, directives, registions or directives, registions or an application order orders, and the compliance and consistent orders and consistent orders and consistent orders and consistent orders are consistent orders.  IA-2  IDENTIFICATION AND (a) AUTHENTICATION (a) (DA AUTHENTICATION (a) and procedures and (a) and |         |                             | an audit trail for the current specified retention period. Because the agency<br>performing the transaction may not necessarily be the same as the agency           |                   |                      |                             |          |  |   |                  |
| Audit traits can be used to identify the requesting agency if there is a reason to nequire into the details surrounding why an agency man in inquiry on a subject. Agencies assigned alimited access CRI shall not use the full access ORI of another agency to conduct an inquiry transaction.  NOTE: This control will be included in AC-3 Access Enforcement when modernized.  a. Develop, document, and disseminate to authorized personnel:  1. Agency/Entity identification and authentication policy that:  (a) Addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational authentication policy that:  (b) Is consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and pick adversariation and subtentication and authentication and authentication and authentication and authentication policy and procedures; and  c. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the identification and authentication and authentication and authentication and authentication and authentication and authentication policy and and procedures; and  c. Review and update the current identification and authentication:  1. Policy annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to Cli or systems used to process, store, or transmit Cl; and  2. Procedures annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to Cli or systems used to process, store, or transmit Cl; and  2. Procedures annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to Cli or systems used to process, store, or transmit Cl; and  3. Procedures annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to Cli or systems used to process, store, or transmit Cl; and  4. Authentication for Committed Uniquely identify and centrally Authenticate, Authorize and Audit (AAA) organizational users and processes acting on behalf of those users.  4. Authentication for Committed Uniquely identify and authenticate, authorize and industre |         |                             | requesting the transaction, the CSA/SIB/Channeler shall ensure that the ORI for<br>each transaction can be traced, via audit trail, to the specific agency which is |                   |                      |                             |          |  |   |                  |
| Agencies assigned a limited access ORI shall not use the full access ORI of another agency to conduct an inquiry transaction.  NOTE: This control will be included in AC-3 Access Enforcement when modernized.  a. Develop, document, and disseminate to authorized personnel: 1. Agency/Entity identification and authentication policy that: (a) Addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and (b) is consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines; and (b) is consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines; and 2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the identification and authentication policy and the associated themselves to manage the development, documentation, and dissemination of the identification and authentication policy and procedures, and c. Review and update the current identification and authentication: 1. Policy annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to CI or systems used to process, store, or transmit CII and 2. Procedures annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to CI or systems used to process, store, or transmit CII and 2. Procedures annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to CII or systems used to process, store, or transmit CII and 3. Authentication for Complex and processes acting on behalf of those users.  IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION AND (INGRAIZHONAL) |         |                             | Audit trails can be used to identify the requesting agency if there is a reason to  |                   |                      |                             |          |  |   |                  |
| A. Develop, document, and disseminate to authorized personnet: 1. Agency/Entity identification and authentication policy that: (a) Addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational antities, and compliance; and (b) is consistent with applicable laws, security endirections, policies, standards, and guidelines; and 2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the identification and authentication policy and the associated identification and authentication policy and the associated identification and authentication policy and procedures; and c. Review and update the current identification and authentication: 1. Policy annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to Cli or systems used to process, store, or transmit Cli.  IDENTIFICATION AND (ORGANIZIONAL) (IOGANIZIONAL) (IOGA |         |                             | Agencies assigned a limited access ORI shall not use the full access ORI of another   |                   |                      |                             |          |  |   |                  |
| 1. Agency/Ently identification and suthentication policy that: (a) Addresse surpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, (coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and (b) is consistent with applicable leave, securities of the implementation of the identification and authentication policy and the associated identification and authentication policy and the associated identification and authentication policy and procedures to facilities the implementation of the identification and authentication policy and procedures and authentication policy and procedures and complex in the implementation of the identification and authentication policy and procedures, and commentation, and dissemination of the identification and authentication policy and procedures, and commentation, and dissemination of the identification and authentication policy and procedures; and conceived and conceived and conceived and conceived access to Cli or systems used to process, store, or transmit Cli; and conceived access to Cli or systems used to process, store, or transmit Cli; and conceived access to Cli or systems used to process, store, or transmit Cli; and conceived access to Cli or systems used to process, store, or transmit Cli; and conceived access to Cli or systems used to process, store, or transmit Cli; and conceived access to Cli or systems used to process, store, or transmit Cli; and conceived access to Cli or systems used to process, store, or transmit Cli; and conceived access to Cli or systems used to process, store, or transmit Cli; and conceived access to Cli or systems used to process, store, or transmit Cli; and conceived the conce |         |                             |   |                   |                      |                             |          |  |   |                  |
| IA-1 POLICY AND POCEDURES  |         |                             |   |                   |                      |                             |          |  |   |                  |
| (b) is consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, regulations, policies, standards, an equipalienes; and 2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the identification and surface interaction policy and the associated indentification and surface interaction policy and procedures; and c. Review and update the current identification and surface interaction policy and procedures; and c. Review and update the current identification and surface interaction policy and |         |                             | (a) Addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment,   |                   |                      |                             |          |  |   |                  |
| 2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the identification and undertication policy and the associated identification and the associated identification and surface interaction controls: b. Designate an individual with security responsibilities to manage the development, documentation, and dissemination of the identification and authentication policy and procedures; and c. Review and update the current identification and authentication: 1. Policy annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to CI or systems used to process, store, or transmit CII. 2. Procedures annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to CII or systems used to process, store, or transmit CII.  IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION AND (ORGANIZATIONAL) (Incidentification with processes acting on behalf of those users.  IDENTIFICATION AND (ORGANIZATIONAL) (Incidentification with processes acting on behalf of those users.  IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION AND AUTHENTICATION AND (ORGANIZATIONAL) (Incidentification with processes acting on behalf of those users.  IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION AND AU |         |                             | (b) Is consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations,  |                   |                      |                             |          |  |   |                  |
| IA-1 PROCEDURES  D. Designate an individual with security responsibilities to manage the development, documentation, and dissemination of the identification and authentication policy and procedures; and c. Review and update the current identification and authentication: 1. Policy annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to CII or systems used to process, store, or transmit CII; and 2. Procedures annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to CII or systems used to process, store, or transmit CII; and access to CII or systems used to process, store, or transmit CII; and access to CII or systems used to process, store, or transmit CII; and access to CII or systems used to process, store, or transmit CII; and access to CII or systems used to process, store, or transmit CII; and access to CII or systems used to process, store, or transmit CII; and access to CII or systems used to process, store, or transmit CII; and access to CII or systems used to process, store, or transmit CII; and access to CII or systems used to process, store, or transmit CII; and access to CII or systems used to process, store, or transmit CII; and access to CII or systems used to process, store, or transmit CII; and access to CII or systems used to process, store, or transmit CII; and access to CII or systems used to process, store, or transmit CII; and access to CII or systems used to process, store, or transmit CII; and access to CII or systems used to process, store, or transmit CII; and access to CII or systems used to process, store, or transmit CII; and access to CII or systems used to process, store, or transmit CII; and access to CII or systems used to process access to CII or systems  |         | POLICY AND                  | 2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the identification and  | Por 1             |                      | Identity & Access           | 1/2      |  |   |                  |
| and procedures; and c. Review and update the current identification and authentication: 1. Policy annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to Cli or systems used to process, since, or transmit Cli. and 2. Procedures annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to Cli or systems used to process, since, or transmit Cli.  IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION AND AUTHENTICATION AND (INGRAIZATIONAL) Identify and authenticate organizational users and associate that unique (INGRAIZATIONAL) Identification with processes acting on behalf of those users.  IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION AND AUTHEN | IA-1    |                             | <ul> <li>Designate an individual with security responsibilities to manage the development,</li> </ul>   | runctional        | subset of            |                             | IAC-01   |  | 10  |                  |
| 1. Policy annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to Coll or systems used to process, store, or transmit CII, and 2. Procedures annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to CII or systems used to process year or transmit CII.  IDENTIFICATION AND  AUTHENTICATION AND  AUTHENTICATION AND  (ORGANIZATIONAL Identification with processes acting on behalf of those users.  IDENTIFICATION AND  AUTHENTICATION AND  AUTHENTIC |         |                             | c. Review and update the current identification and authentication:   |                   |                      |                             |          |  |   |                  |
| access to Cil or systems used to process, store, or transmit Cil.  IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (IORGANIZATIONAL Identification with processes acting on behalf of those users.  Identification & Authentication for Comparizational users and associate that unique in the processes acting on behalf of those users.  Identification & Authentication for Comparizational users and processes acting on behalf of those users.  Identification & Authentication for Comparizational users and processes acting on behalf of those users.  Identification & Authentication for Comparizational users and processes acting on behalf of those users.  Identification & Authentication for Comparizational users and processes acting on behalf of those users.  |         |                             | Policy annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to CJI or systems used to process, store, or transmit CJI; and                   |                   |                      |                             |          |  |   |                  |
| IA-2 AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL dentification with processes acting on behalf of those users.    Authentication of Long (AMA) organizational users and processes acting on behalf of organizational users.  |         | IDENTIFICATION              |   |                   |                      |                             |          |  |   |                  |
|  | IA-2    | AUTHENTICATION              |   | Functional        | equal                | Authentication for          | IAC-02   | Audit (AAA) organizational users and processes acting on behalf of organizational  | 10  |                  |
|  |         |                             | Composition of mode users.  |                   |                      | Organizational Users        | <u> </u> |  |   |                  |



| FDE#     | FDE Name  | Focal Document Element (FDE) Description   | STRM<br>Rationale | STRM<br>Relationship | SCF Control                                    | SCF#     | Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description  | Strength of<br>Relationship<br>(optional) | Notes (optional) |
|----------|---|--|-------------------|----------------------|--|----------|--|---|------------------|
| IA-2(1)  | IDENTIFICATION AND<br>AUTHENTICATION<br>(ORGANIZATIONAL<br>USERS)   MULTI-FACTOR<br>AUTHENTICATION TO<br>PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS        | Implement multi-factor authentication for access to privileged accounts.                                   | Functional        | intersects with      | Multi-Factor Authentication<br>(MFA)           | IAC-06   | Automated mechanisms exist to enforce MutII-Factor Authentication (MFA) for: (1) Rendre network access; (2) Third-party systems, applications and/or services; and/or (3) Non-console access to critical systems or systems that store, transmit and/or process sensitive/regulated data.  | 5   |                  |
| IA-2(1)  | IDENTIFICATION AND<br>AUTHENTICATION<br>(ORGANIZATIONAL<br>USERS)   MULTI-FACTOR<br>AUTHENTICATION TO<br>PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS        | Implement multi-factor authentication for access to privileged accounts.                                   | Functional        | intersects with      | Network Access to<br>Privileged Accounts       | IAC-06.1 | Machanisms exist to utilize Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) to authenticate<br>network access for privileged accounts.   | 5   |                  |
| IA-2(1)  | IDENTIFICATION AND<br>AUTHENTICATION<br>(ORGANIZATIONAL<br>USERS)   MULTI-FACTOR<br>AUTHENTICATION TO<br>PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS        | Implement multi-factor authentication for access to privileged accounts.                                   | Functional        | intersects with      | Network Access to Non-<br>Privileged Accounts  | IAC-06.2 | Machanisms exist to utilize Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) to authenticate<br>network access for non-privileged accounts.   | 5   |                  |
| IA-2(1)  | IDENTIFICATION AND<br>AUTHENTICATION<br>(ORGANIZATIONAL<br>USERS)   MULTI-FACTOR<br>AUTHENTICATION TO<br>PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS        | Implement multi-factor authentication for access to privileged accounts.                                   | Functional        | intersects with      | Local Access to Privileged<br>Accounts         | IAC-06.3 | Mechanisms exist to utilize Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) to authenticate local access for privileged accounts.  | 5   |                  |
| IA-2(1)  | IDENTIFICATION AND<br>AUTHENTICATION<br>(ORGANIZATIONAL<br>USERS)   MULTI-FACTOR<br>AUTHENTICATION TO<br>PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS        | Implement multi-factor authentication for access to privileged accounts.                                   | Functional        | intersects with      | Out-of-Band Multi-Factor<br>Authentication     | IAC-06.4 | Mechanisms exist to implement Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for access to<br>privileged and non-privileged accounts such that one of the factors is<br>independently provided by a device separate from the system being accessed.   | 5   |                  |
| IA-2(1)  | IDENTIFICATION AND<br>AUTHENTICATION<br>(ORGANIZATIONAL<br>USERS)   MULTI-FACTOR<br>AUTHENTICATION TO<br>PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS        | Implement multi-factor authentication for access to privileged accounts.                                   | Functional        | intersects with      | Hardware Token-Based<br>Authentication         | IAC-10.7 | Automated mechanisms exist to ensure organization-defined token quality<br>requirements are satisfied for hardware token-based authentication.   | 5   |                  |
| IA-2(1)  | IDENTIFICATION AND<br>AUTHENTICATION<br>(ORGANIZATIONAL<br>USERS)   MULTI-FACTOR<br>AUTHENTICATION TO<br>PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS        | Implement multi-factor authentication for access to privileged accounts.                                   | Functional        | intersects with      | Information Assurance<br>Enabled Products      | TDA-02.2 | Mechanisms exist to limit the use of commercially-provided Information<br>Assurance (I) and I-enabled IT products to those poducts that have been<br>successfully evaluated against a National Information Assurance partnership<br>(NAR)-approved.  | 5   |                  |
| IA-2(2)  | IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS)   MULTI-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION TO NON-PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS                   | Implement multi-factor authentication for access to non-privileged accounts.                               | Functional        | intersects with      | Multi-Factor Authentication<br>(MFA)           | IAC-06   | Automated mechanisms exist to enforce MutII-Factor Authentication (MFA) for: (1) Rendre network access;<br>(2) Third-party systems, applications and/or services; and/or (3) Non-console access to critical systems or systems that store, transmit and/or process sensitive/regulated data.   | 5   |                  |
| IA-2(2)  | IDENTIFICATION AND<br>AUTHENTICATION<br>(ORGANIZATIONAL<br>USERS)   MULTI-FACTOR<br>AUTHENTICATION TO<br>NON-PRIVILEGED<br>ACCOUNTS | Implement multi-factor authentication for access to non-privileged accounts.                               | Functional        | intersects with      | Network Access to<br>Privileged Accounts       | IAC-06.1 | Machanisms exist to utilize Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) to authenticate<br>network access for privileged accounts.   | 5   |                  |
| IA-2(2)  | IDENTIFICATION AND<br>AUTHENTICATION<br>(ORGANIZATIONAL<br>USERS)   MULTI-FACTOR<br>AUTHENTICATION TO<br>NON-PRIVILEGED<br>ACCOUNTS | Implement multi-factor authentication for access to non-privileged accounts.                               | Functional        | intersects with      | Network Access to Non-<br>Privileged Accounts  | IAC-06.2 | Machaniams exist to utilize Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) to authenticate<br>network access for non-privileged accounts.   | 5   |                  |
| IA-2(2)  | IDENTIFICATION AND<br>AUTHENTICATION<br>(ORGANIZATIONAL<br>USERS)   MULTI-FACTOR<br>AUTHENTICATION TO<br>NON-PRIVILEGED<br>ACCOUNTS | Implement multi-factor authentication for access to non-privileged accounts.                               | Functional        | intersects with      | Local Access to Privileged<br>Accounts         | IAC-06.3 | Mechanisms exist to utilize Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) to authenticate local access for privileged accounts.  | 5   |                  |
| IA-2(2)  | IDENTIFICATION AND<br>AUTHENTICATION<br>(ORGANIZATIONAL<br>USERS)   MULTI-FACTOR<br>AUTHENTICATION TO<br>NON-PRIVILEGED<br>ACCOUNTS | Implement multi-factor authentication for access to non-privileged accounts.                               | Functional        | intersects with      | Out-of-Band Multi-Factor<br>Authentication     | IAC-06.4 | Mechanisms exist to implement Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for access to<br>privileged and non-privileged accounts such that one of the factors is<br>independently provided by a device separate from the system being accessed.   | 5   |                  |
| IA-2(2)  | IDENTIFICATION AND<br>AUTHENTICATION<br>(ORGANIZATIONAL<br>USERS)   MULTI-FACTOR<br>AUTHENTICATION TO<br>NON-PRIVILEGED<br>ACCOUNTS | Implement multi-factor authentication for access to non-privileged accounts.                               | Functional        | intersects with      | Hardware Token-Based<br>Authentication         | IAC-10.7 | Automated mechanisma exist to ensure organization-defined token quality<br>requirements are satisfied for hardware token-based authentication.   | 5   |                  |
| IA-2(2)  | IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS)   MULTI-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION TO NON-PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS                   | Implement multi-factor authentication for access to non-privileged accounts.                               | Functional        | intersects with      | Information Assurance<br>Enabled Products      | TDA-02.2 | Mechanisms exist to limit the use of commercially provided information<br>Assurance (I/a) and I-enabled IT products to those products that have been<br>successfully evaluated against a National Information Assurance partnership<br>(NAP)-approved Protection Profile or the cryptographic module is FIPS-validated<br>or NSA-approved. | 5   |                  |
| IA-2(8)  | IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS)   ACCESS TO ACCOUNTS — REPLAY RESISTANT IDENTIFICATION AND                 | Implement replay-resistant authentication mechanisms for access to privileged and non-privileged accounts. | Functional        | equal                | Replay-Resistant<br>Authentication             | IAC-02.2 | Automated mechanisms exist to employ replay-resistant authentication.  Mechanisms exist to accept and electronically verify organizational Personal  | 10  |                  |
| IA-2(12) | AUTHENTICATION AND (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS)   ACCEPTANCE OF PIV CREDENTIALS   | Accept and electronically verify Personal Identity Verification-compliant credentials.                     | Functional        | equal                | Acceptance of PIV<br>Credentials               | IAC-02.3 | Identity Verification (PIV) credentials.   | 10  |                  |
| IA-3     | DEVICE IDENTIFICATION<br>AND AUTHENTICATION   |  | Functional        | equal                | Identification &<br>Authentication for Devices | IAC-04   | Mechanisms exist to uniquely identify and centrally Authenticate, Authorize and<br>Audit (AAA) devices before establishing a connection using bidirectional<br>authentication that is cryptographically-based and replay resistant.  | 10  |                  |



| FDE#    | FDE Name   | Focal Document Element (FDE) Description   | STRM<br>Rationale | STRM<br>Relationship | SCF Control   | SCF#     | Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description   | Strength of<br>Relationship<br>(optional) | Notes (optional) |
|---------|--|--|-------------------|----------------------|---|----------|---|---|------------------|
| IA-4    | IDENTIFIER<br>MANAGEMENT                           | Manage system identifiers by:  a. Receiving authorization from organizational personnel with identifier management responsibilities to assign an individual, group, role, service, or device identifier;  b. Selecting an identifier that identifies an individual, group, role, service, or device; c. Assigning the identifier to the intended individual, group, role, service, or device; and d. Preventing reuse of identifiers for one (1) year.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Authenticate, Authorize<br>and Audit (AAA)          | IAC-01.2 | Mechanisms exist to strictly govern the use of Authenticate, Authorize and Audit<br>(AAA) solutions, both on-premises and those hosted by an External Service<br>Provider (ESP).              | 5   |                  |
| IA-4    | IDENTIFIER<br>MANAGEMENT                           | Manage system identifiers by: a. Receiving authorization from organizational personnel with identifier management responsibilities to assign an individual, group, role, service, or device identifier; b. Selecting an identifier that identifiers an individual, group, role, service, or device; c. Assigning the identifier to the intended individual, group, role, service, or device; and d. Preventing reuse of identifiers for one (1) year.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Identifier Management<br>(User Names)               | IAC-09   | Mechanisms exist to govern naming standards for usernames and systems.  | 5   |                  |
| IA-4(4) | IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT   IDENTIFY USER STATUS       | Manage individual identifiers by uniquely identifying each individual as agency or nonagency.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Authenticate, Authorize<br>and Audit (AAA)          | IAC-01.2 | Mechanisms exist to strictly govern the use of Authenticate, Authorize and Audit (AAA) solutions, both on-premises and those hosted by an External Service Provider (ESP).                    | 5   |                  |
| IA-4(4) | IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT   IDENTIFY USER STATUS       | Manage individual identifiers by uniquely identifying each individual as agency or nonagency.  | Functional        | intersects with      | User Identity (ID)<br>Management                    | IAC-09.1 | Mechanisms exist to ensure proper user identification management for non-<br>consumer users and administrators.   | 5   |                  |
| IA-4(4) | IDENTIFIER<br>MANAGEMENT   IDENTIFY<br>USER STATUS | Manage individual identifiers by uniquely identifying each individual as agency or nonagency.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Identity User Status                                | IAC-09.2 | Mechanisms exist to identify contractors and other third-party users through unique username characteristics.  Mechanisms exist to develop, document and maintain secure baseline             | 5   |                  |
| IA-S    | AUTHENTICATOR<br>MANAGEMENT                        | Manage system authenticators by: a. Verifying, as port the initial authenticator distribution, the identity of the individual, group, role, service, or device receiving the authenticator; 3 b. Establishing initial authenticator content for any authenticators issued by the organization; c. Ensuring that authenticators have sufficient strength of mechanism for their intended use; d. Establishing and implementing administrative procedures for initial authenticators distribution, for lost or compromised or damaged authenticators, and for revoking authenticators; e. Changing default authenticators prior to first use; f. Changing or refeabing authenticators annually or when there is evidence of authenticator content from unauthorized disclosure and modification; f. Protecting authenticator content from unauthorized disclosure and modification; for received authenticator annually of evices implement, specific controls to protect authenticators; and and having devices implement, specific controls to protect authenticators or group or role accounts when membership to those accounts changes. 3 i. ALZ Specific Requirements  | Functional        | intersects with      | System Hardening Through<br>Baseline Configurations | CFG-02   | redcriments easi, to everely, occurrent and maintain secure designation for configurations for exchanology platforms that are consistent with industry-accepted system hardening standards.   | 5   |                  |
| IA-S    | AUTHENTICATOR<br>MANAGEMENT                        | Manage system authenticators by:  a Verifying, as part of the initial authenticator distribution, the identity of the individual, group, role, service, or device receiving the authenticator.3  b. Establishing initial authenticator content for any authenticators.3  c. Ensuring that authenticators have sufficient strength of mechanisms for their intended uses.3  d. Establishing and implementing administrative procedures for initial authenticator individual content of the strength of the stre | Functional        | intersects with      | Authenticator Management                            | IAC-10   | Mechanisms exist to: (1) Securely manage authenticators for users and devices; and (2) Ensure the strength of authentication is appropriate to the classification of the data being accessed. | 5   |                  |
| IA-S    | AUTHENTICATOR<br>MANAGEMENT                        | Manage system authenticators by:  a. Verifying, as part of the intitial authenticator distribution, the identity of the individual, group, rote, service, or device receiving the authenticators.  b. Establishing initial authenticator content for any authenticators issued by the organization;  c. Ensuring that authenticators have sufficient strength of mechanism for their intended users?  d. Establishing and implementing administrative procedures for initial subenticator distribution, for loss or compromise or damaged authenticators, and for revoking authenticators;  e. Changing or refreshing authenticators prior to first user;  f. Changing or refreshing authenticators annually or when there is evidence of authenticator devices are understituded to the content from unauthorized disclosure and modification;  h. Protecting authenticator content from unauthorized disclosure and modification; and content authenticator content from unauthorized disclosure and modification;  c. Changing authenticator or dark and having devices implement, specific controls to protect authenticators; and s. C. Changing suthenticators for group or role accounts when membership to those accounts changes. 3  j. AVIZ Specific Requirements  | Functional        | intersects with      | Password-Based<br>Authentication                    | IAC-10.1 | Mechanisms exist to enforce complexity, length and lifespan considerations to ensure strong criteria for password-based authentication.   | 5   |                  |
| IA-S    | AUTHENTICATOR<br>MANAGEMENT                        | Manage system authenticators by:  a. Verifying, as part of the initial authenticator distribution, the identity of the individual, group, rote, service, or device receiving the authenticator.3  b. Establishing initial authenticator content for any authenticators asseed by the organization.  c. Ginder of the content of the content for any authenticators have sufficient strength of mechanism for their c. Ginder of the content of the conten | Functional        | intersects with      | Protection of<br>Authenticators                     | IAC-10.5 | Mechanisms exist to protect authenticators commensurate with the sensitivity of the information to which use of the authenticator permits access.   | 5   |                  |
| IA:S    | AUTHENTICATOR<br>MANAGEMENT                        | Manage system authenticators by:  a. Verifying, as port of the initial authenticator distribution, the identity of the individual, group, role, service, or device receiving the authenticators is better the individual, group, role, service, or device receiving the authenticators is used by the organization;  c. Ensuring that authenticators have sufficient strength of mechanism for their intended use;  d. Establishing and implementing administrative procedures for initial authenticators distribution, for lost or compromised or damaged authenticators, and for revoking suthenticators;  e. Changing default authenticators prior to first use;  f. Changing of entershing authenticators an unally or when there is evidence of suthenticator compromises;  p. Protecting authenticator content from unauthorized disclosure and modification;  h. Requiring individuals to take, and having devices implement, specific controls to protect authenticator; and 3.  L. Changing guithenticators and 3.  L. Changing guithenticators and 3.  J. A. AL 2 Specific Requirements  | Functional        | intersects with      | Default Authenticators                              | IAC-10.8 | Mechanisms exist to ensure default authenticators are changed as part of account creation or system installation.   | 5   |                  |



| FDE#    | FDE Name  | Focal Document Element (FDE) Description   | STRM<br>Rationale | STRM<br>Relationship | SCF Control                                | SCF#     | Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description   | Strength of<br>Relationship | Notes (optional) |
|---------|---|--|-------------------|----------------------|--|----------|---|-----------------------------|------------------|
| IA-5(1) | AUTHENTICATOR<br>MANAGEMENT <br>AUTHENTICATOR TYPES                 | (a) Hemorized Secret Authenticators and Verifiers:  1. Mentaina list of commonly-used, expected, or compromised passwords and update the list quarterly and when organizational passwords are supsected to have been compromised directly or indirectly:  2. Require immediate selection of an enw password upon account recovery.3  3. Allow user selection of long passwords and passphrases, including spaces and all printable characters;  4. Employ sutomated tools to assist the user in selecting strong password authenticators;  5. Enforce the following composition and complexity rules when agencies elect to follow basic password standards:  (a) Not be a proper anne.  (b) Not be the same as the Userid.  C) Expire within a maximum of 90 celendar days.  (d) Not be identical to the previous ten (10) passwords.  (d) Not be displayed when entered.  6. If chosen by the subscriber, memorized secrets SHALL be at least 8 characters in levent.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Authenticator Management                   |          | Mechanisms exist to:  (1) Securely manage authenticators for users and devices; and  (2) Ensure the strength of authentication is appropriate to the classification of the  data being accessed.                                    | 5                           |                  |
| IA-5(1) | AUTHENTICATOR<br>MANAGEMENT  <br>AUTHENTICATOR TYPES                | (a) Meanorized Secret Authenticators and Verifiers:  I. Melatian lail sit of commonly-used, expected, or compromised passwords and update the list quarterly and when organizational passwords are suspected to have been compromised directly or indirectly:  2. Require immediate selection of a new password upon account recovery.3  3. Allow user selection of non passwords and passphrases, including spaces and all printable characters;  4. Employ automated tools to assist the user in selecting strong password authenticators;  5. Enforce the following composition and complexity rules when agencies elect to follow basic password standards:  (a) Not be a proper name.  (b) Not be the same as the Userid.  (c) Expre within a maximum of 90 celendar days.  (d) Not be displayed to the previous ten (10) passwords.  (e) Not be displayed when entered.  6. If chosen by the subscriber, memorized secrets SHALL be at least 8 characters in   | Functional        | intersects with      | Out-of-Band Authentication<br>(GOBA)       | IAC-02.4 | Mechanisms exist to implement Out-of-Band Authentication (OOBA) under specific conditions.  | 5                           |                  |
| IA-S(1) | AUTHENTICATOR<br>MANAGEMENT  <br>AUTHENTICATOR TYPES                | Jonates  John Memorized Secret Authenticators and Verifiers:  1. Maintain a list of commonly-used, expected, of compromised passwords and update the list quarterly and when organizational passwords are suspected to have been compromised disectly or indirectly.  2. Require immediate selection of one password upon account recovery,3  3. Allow user selection or long passwords and passphrases, including spaces and all 6. Pipuloch phasmosters.  4. Employed phasmosters.  4. Employed phasmosters.  5. Enforce the tolking composition and complexity rules when agencies elect to follow less password sandards:  (a) Not be a proper name.  (b) Not be the same as the Userid.  (c) Expire within a maintainum of 50 celendar days.  (d) Not be identicat to the previous ten (10) passwords.  (d) Not be districted to the previous ten (10) passwords.  (d) Not be identicat to the previous ten (10) passwords.  (d) Not be disployed when entered.  6. If chosen the users the users the contraction of the contraction | Functional        | intersects with      | Authenticator Management                   | IAC-10   | Mechanisms exist to: (1) Securely manage authenticators for users and devices; and (2) Ensure the stepping of authentication is appropriate to the classification of the data being accessed.                                       | 5                           |                  |
| IA-S(1) | AUTHENTICATOR<br>MANAGEMENT  <br>AUTHENTICATOR TYPES                | (a) Memorized Secret Authenticators and Verifiers:  1. Mantaina list of commonly-used, expected, or compromised passwords and update the list quarterly and when organizational passwords are suspected to have been compromised directly or indirectly;  2. Require immediate selection of an enw password upon account recovery.3  3. Allow user selection of long passwords and passphrases, including spaces and all printable characters;  4. Employ automated tools to assist the user in selecting strong password authenticators;  5. Enforce the following composition and complexity rules when agencies elect to follow basic password standards.  (a) Not be of the same as the Userid.  (c) Explex within a maximum of 80 celendar days.  (d) Not be displayed to the previous tent (10) passwords.  (e) Not be displayed when entered.  (e) Not be displayed when entered.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Password-Based<br>Authentication           | IAC-10.1 | Mechanisms exist to enforce complexity, length and lifespan considerations to ensure strong criteria for password-based authentication.   | 5                           |                  |
| IA-5(1) | AUTHENTICATOR<br>MANAGEMENT  <br>AUTHENTICATOR TYPES                | (a) Meanorized Secret Authenticators and Verifiers:  1. Melatian is list of commonly-used, expected, or compromised passwords and update the list quarterly and when organizational passwords are suspected to have been compromised directly or indirectly:  2. Require immediate selection of a new password upon account recovery,3  3. Allow user selection of long passwords and passphrases, including spaces and all printable characters;3  4. Employ automated tools to assist the user in selecting strong password authenticators;3  5. Enforce the following composition and complexity rutes when agencies elect to follow basic password standards:  (a) Not be a proper name.  (b) Not be the same as the Userid.  (c) Expire within a maximum of 90 celendar days.  (d) Not be displayed when entered.  6. In those by the subscrible, memorized secrets SHALL be at least 8 characters in   | Functional        | intersects with      | Automated Support For<br>Password Strength | IAC-10.4 | Automated mechanisms exist to determine if password authentications are sufficiently strong enough to satisfy organization-defined password length and complexity requirements.   | 5                           |                  |
| IA-S(1) |   | Journal (James Common)—Land (James Common)—Lan | Functional        | intersects with      | Protection of<br>Authenticators            | IAC-10.5 | Mechanisms exist to protect authenticators commensurate with the sensitivity of the information to which use of the authenticator permits access.   | 5                           |                  |
| IA-5(2) | AUTHENTICATOR<br>MANAGEMENT   PUBLIC<br>KEY BASED<br>AUTHENTICATION | 1. Enforce authorized access to the corresponding private key; and (b) When public key infrastructure (PKI) is used:  (1) When public key infrastructure (PKI) is used:  (1) Validate certificates by constructing and verifying a certification path to an accepted trust anonon, including checking certificate status information; and 2. Implement a local cache of revocation data to support path discovery and validation.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Dynamic Management                         | IAC-09.3 | Mechanisms exist to dynamically manage usernames and system identifiers.  | 5                           |                  |
| IA-5(2) | AUTHENTICATOR<br>MANAGEMENT   PUBLIC<br>KEY BASED<br>AUTHENTICATION | (a) For public key-based authentication:  I. Enforce authorized access to the corresponding private key; and  2. Map the authenticated identity to the account of the individual or group; and  (b) When public key-infrastructure (Fig. 1s used:  1. Validate certificates by constructing and verifying a certification path to an  accepted rust andon, including checking certificate statins information; and  2. Implement a local cache of revocation data to support path discovery and  validation.   | Functional        | intersects with      | PKI-Based Authentication                   | IAC-10.2 | Automated mechanisms exist to validate certificates by constructing and verifying a certification pair to an accepted trust annor including checking certificate status information for PKI-based authentication.                   | 5                           |                  |
| IA-5(6) | AUTHENTICATORS  | Protect authenticators commensurate with the security category of the information to which use of the authenticator permits access.  Obscure feedback of authentication information during the authentication process  | Functional        | equal                | Protection of<br>Authenticators            | IAC-10.5 | Mechanisms exist to protect authenticators commensurate with the sensitivity of<br>the information to which use of the authenticator permits access.  Mechanisms exist to obscure the feedback of authentication information during | 10                          |                  |
| IA-6    | AUTHENTICATION<br>FEEDBACK  | to protect the information from possible exploitation and use by unauthorized individuals.   | Functional        | equal                | Authenticator Feedback                     | IAC-11   | the authentication process to protect the information from possible exploitation/use by unauthorized individuals.   | 10                          |                  |
| IA-7    | CRYPTOGRAPHIC<br>MODULE<br>AUTHENTICATION                           | Implement mechanisms for authentication to a cryptographic module that meet the requirements of applicable laws, executive orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidelines for such authentication.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Cryptographic Module<br>Authentication     | CRY-02   | Automated mechanisms exist to enable systems to authenticate to a<br>cryptographic module.  | 5                           |                  |



| FDE#            | FDE Name   | Focal Document Element (FDE) Description   | STRM<br>Rationale     | STRM<br>Relationship | SCF Control   | SCF#     | Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description   | Strength of<br>Relationship | Notes (optional) |
|-----------------|--|--|-----------------------|----------------------|---|----------|---|-----------------------------|------------------|
| IA-7            | CRYPTOGRAPHIC<br>MODULE<br>AUTHENTICATION  | Implement mechanisms for authentication to a cryptographic module that meet the requirements of applicable laws, executive orders, directives, policies, regulations,  | Functional            | intersects with      | Cryptographic Module<br>Authentication                              | IAC-12   | Mechanisms exist to ensure cryptographic modules adhere to applicable statutory, regulatory and contractual requirements for security strength.   | (optional)<br>5             |                  |
| IA-8            | AUTHENTICATION  IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (NON- ORGANIZATIONAL USERS)  | standards, and guidelines for such authentication.  Uniquely identify and authenticate non-organizational users or processes acting on behalf of non-organizational users.   | Functional            | equal                | Identification &<br>Authentication for Non-<br>Organizational Users | IAC-03   | Mechanisms exist to uniquely identify and centrally Authenticate, Authorize and<br>Audit (AAA) third-party users and processes that provide services to the<br>organization.  | 10                          |                  |
| IA-8(1)         | IDENTIFICATION AND<br>AUTHENTICATION (NON-<br>ORGANIZATIONAL<br>USERS)   ACCEPTANCE<br>OF PIV CREDENTIALS<br>FROM OTHER AGENCIES | Accept and electronically verify Personal Identity Verification-compilant credentials from other federal, state, local, tribal, or territorial (SLTI) agencies.  | Functional            | equal                | Acceptance of PIV<br>Credentials from Other<br>Organizations        | IAC-03.1 | Mechanisms exist to accept and electronically verify Personal Identity Verification (PIV) credentials from third-parties.   | 10                          |                  |
| IA-8(2)         | IDENTIFICATION AND<br>AUTHENTICATION (NON-<br>ORGANIZATIONAL<br>USERS)   ACCEPTANCE<br>OF EXTERNAL<br>AUTHENTICATORS             | (a) Accept only external authenticators that are NIST-compliant; and (b) Document and maintain a list of accepted external authenticators.   | Functional            | equal                | Acceptance of Third-Party<br>Credentials                            | IAC-03.2 | Automated mechanisms exist to accept Federal Identity, Credential and Access<br>Management (FICAM)-approved third-party credentials.  | 10                          |                  |
| IA-8(4)         | IDENTIFICATION AND<br>AUTHENTICATION (NON-<br>ORGANIZATIONAL<br>USERS)   USE OF<br>DEFINED PROFILES                              | Conform to the following profiles for identity management: Security Assertion<br>Markup Language (SAML) or OpenID Connect.   | Functional            | equal                | Use of FICAM-Issued<br>Profiles                                     | IAC-03.3 | Mechanisms exist to conform systems to Federal Identity, Credential and Access<br>Management (FICAM)-Issued profiles.   | 10                          |                  |
| IA-11           | RE-AUTHENTICATION  | Require users to re-authenticate when: roles, authenticators, or credentials change,<br>security categories of systems change, the execution of privileged functions occur,<br>or every 12 hours.  | Functional            | equal                | Re-Authentication   | IAC-14   | Mechanisms exist to force users and devices to re-authenticate according to<br>organization-defined circumstances that necessitate re-authentication.   | 10                          |                  |
| IA-12           | IDENTITY PROOFING  | Lidentity proof uners that require accounts for logical access to systems based on<br>appropriate identity assurance level requirements as specified in applicable<br>standards and guidelines:<br>N. Receive user identities to a unique individual; and<br>c. Collect, unidiate, and verify identity evidence.<br>I dentity proof users that require accounts for logical access to systems based on   | Functional            | intersects with      | Identity Proofing (Identity<br>Verification)                        | IAC-28   | Mechanisms exist to verify the identity of a user before issuing authenticators or modifying access permissions.  Mechanisms exist to conduct in-person or trusted third-party identity verification  | 5                           |                  |
| IA-12           | IDENTITY PROOFING  | appropriate identity assurance level requirements as specified in applicable standards and guidelines;  b. Resolve user identities to a unique individual; and c. Collect, validate, and verify identity evidence.   | Functional            | intersects with      | In-Person or Trusted Third-<br>Party Registration                   | IAC-10.3 | Mechanisms exist to conduct in-person or trusted third-party identity verification<br>before user accounts for third-parties are created.   | 5                           |                  |
| IA-12(2)        | IDENTITY PROOFING  <br>IDENTITY EVIDENCE   | Require evidence of individual identification be presented to the registration<br>authority.  a. Require that the presented identity evidence be validated and verified through  | Functional            | equal                | Identity Evidence   | IAC-28.2 | Mechanisms exist to require evidence of individual identification to be presented to the registration authority.  Mechanisms exist to require that the presented identity evidence be validated and   | 10                          |                  |
| IA-12(3)        | IDENTITY PROOFING  <br>IDENTITY EVIDENCE<br>VALIDATION AND<br>VERIFICATION   | Is nequire that the presented between yearhead evaluates all on well and again garged referred resolution, validation, and verification methods. It is described by a service of the services of benefits, and the services of benefits, and it is a service of the services. C. 1. Collection of PIISHALL be limited to the minimum necessary to validate the valuation of PIISHALL be limited to the minimum necessary to validate the existence of the claimed identity and associate the claimed identity with the applicant providing identity evidence for appropriate identity resolution, validation, and verification.  | Functional            | equal                | Identity Evidence Validation<br>& Verification                      | IAC-28.3 | Mechanisms exist to require that the presented isentity evidence be validated and<br>verified through organizational-defined methods of validation and verification.  | 10                          |                  |
| IA-12(5)        | IDENTITY PROOFING   ADDRESS CONFIRMATION   | and verification a. Require that a registration code or notice of proofing be delivered through an out- of-band channel to verify the users address (physical or digital) of record. b. The CSP SHALL confirm address of record  | Functional            | equal                | Address Confirmation  | IAC-28.5 | Mechanisms exist to require that a notice of proofing be delivered through an out-<br>of-band channel to verify the user's address (physical or digital).   | 10                          |                  |
| IR-1            | POLICY AND<br>PROCEDURES   | a. Develop, document, and disseminate to all personnel when their unescorted logical or physical access to any information system results in the ability, right, or privilege to view, modify, or make use of unencrypted CII:  1,8 agency-level indicent responses policy that:  (a) Addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and (b) Is consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines; and compliance; and (c). Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the incident response policy and 2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the incident response policy and course individual with security responsibilities to manage the development, documentation, and dissemination of the incident response policy and procedures; and  1. Policy annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized ascess to CII or systems used to process, struce, or transmit CII and  2. Procedures annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized sceepes to CII or sections used to proceed a view of the content in some content in the | Functional            | subset of            | Incident Response<br>Operations                                     | IRO-01   | Mechanisms exist to implement and govern processes and documentation to<br>tracilitate an organization-wide response capability for cybersecurity & data privacy<br>related incidents.  | 10                          |                  |
| IR-1            | POLICY AND<br>PROCEDURES   | secest to CI for extrems used to process, atone, or transmit CII.  a. Develop, document, and disseminant to all personnel when their unescorted logical or physical access to any information system results in the ability, right, or privilege to view, modify, or make use of unencrypted CII.  1. Agency-level incident reaponse policy that:  (i) Addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and (i) is consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines; and  2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the incident response policy and the associated incident response controls;  D. benignate an individual with security responsibilities to manage the development, documentation, and dissemination of the incident response policy and procedures; and  c. Review and update the current incident responses: 3  1. Policy annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized secess to CII or systems used to process, store, or transmit CII; and  2. Procedures a naturally and following any sequenty incidents involving unauthorized secess to CII or systems used to process, store, or transmit CIII; and  2. Prevedures annually and following any sequenty incidents involving unauthorized access to CII or systems used to process, store, or transmit CIII.  3. Develop, document, and disseminates to all personnel when their unescorted   | Functional            | intersects with      | IRP Update  | IRO-04.2 | Mechanisms exist to regularly review and modify incident response practices to incorporate lesson learned, business process changes and industry developments, as necessary.  | 5                           |                  |
| IR-1            | POLICY AND PROCEDURES  | a. Levelop, occument, and asseminate to all personnel when their unescoreal logical or physical access to any information system results in the ability, right, or privilege to view, modify, or make use of unencrypted CII:  1, Agency-level incident response policy that littles, and compliance; and (a) Addresses purpose, scope, rotes, response bilities, amangement commitment, (a) Addresses purpose, scope, rotes, response bilities, and angulance; and (b) is consistent with applicable lewer, executive orders, directives, regulations, poticies, standards, and guidelines, ordered, and guidelines, describes, and guidelines, and guidelines, and guidelines, the associated includent response policy and procedures; on the associated includent response policy and procedures; and concentration, and desemination of the incident response policy and procedures; and concentration, and desemination of the incident response policy and procedures; and procedures are consistent and procedures and update the current incident responses or consistent and update the current incident responses. 3  1, Policy annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to CII or systems used to process, atom, or transmit CII and provide incident response and consistent with assigned roles. Access to CII or systems used to process, atom, or transmit CII.   | Functional            | intersects with      | Root Cause Analysis (RCA)<br>& Lessons Learned                      | IRO-13   | Mechanisms exist to incorporate lessons learned from analyzing and resolving cybersecurity & data privacy incidents to reduce the likelihood or impact of future incidents.  Mechanisms exist to train personnel in their incident response roles and | 5                           |                  |
| IR-2            | INCIDENT RESPONSE TRAINING INCIDENT RESPONSE   | and responsibilities tailing to system uses consistent win assigned loss and responsibility or acquiring an incident response role or responsibility or acquiring system access;  2. When required by system changes; and  3. Annually thereafter; and  b. Review and update incident response training content annually and following any security incidents involving unasthorized access to CLI or systems used to process, store, or transmit CII.  Provide incident response training on how to identify and respond to a breach,   | Functional            | equal                | Incident Response Training  | IRO-05   | Mechanisms exist to train personnel in their incident response roles and responsibilities.  Mechanisms exist to train personnel in their incident response roles and  | 10                          |                  |
| IR-2(3)         | TRAINING   BREACH  | including the organization's process for reporting a breach. Test the effectiveness of the incident response capability for the system annually  | Functional            | equal                | Incident Response Training  | IRO-05   | responsibilities.  Mechanisms exist to formally test incident response capabilities through realistic   | 10                          |                  |
| IR-3<br>IR-3(2) | TESTING  INCIDENT RESPONSE  TESTING    COORDINATION WITH   | using the following tests: tabletop or walk-through exercises; simulations; or other<br>agency-appropriate tests.  Coordinate incident response testing with organizational elements responsible for<br>related name.  | Functional Functional | equal<br>equal       | Incident Response Testing  Coordination with Related Plans          | IRO-06   | exercises to determine the operational effectiveness of those capabilities.  Mechanisms exist to coordinate incident response testing with organizational elements responsible for related plans.   | 10                          |                  |
|                 | RELATED PLANS  | related plans.   |                       |                      | Plans   |          |   | L                           |                  |



| FDE#    | FDE Name                                    | Focal Document Element (FDE) Description  | STRM<br>Rationale | STRM<br>Relationship | SCF Control  | SCF#     | Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description  | Strength of<br>Relationship | Notes (optional) |
|---------|---|---|-------------------|----------------------|--|----------|--|-----------------------------|------------------|
|         |   | Implement an incident handling capability for incidents that is consistent with the incident response plan and includes preparation, detection and analysis,  |                   |                      |  |          | Mechanisms exist to cover: (1) Preparation:  | (optional)                  |                  |
|         |   | incident response pian and includes preparation, detection and analysis,<br>containment, eradication, and recovery;<br>b. Coordinate incident handling activities with contingency planning activities;   |                   |                      |  |          | (1) Preparation; (2) Automated event detection or manual incident report intake; (3) Analysis:   |                             |                  |
| IR-4    | INCIDENT HANDLING                           | Coordinate inclorer handling activities with contingency planning activities;     Incorporate lessons learned from ongoing incident handling activities into incident response procedures, training, and testing, and implement the resulting   | Functional        | equal                | Incident Handling                                      | IRO-02   | (4) Containment;   | 10                          |                  |
|         |   | changes accordingly; and  |                   |                      |  |          | (5) Eradication; and<br>(6) Recovery.  |                             |                  |
|         | INCIDENT HANDLING                           | d. Ensure the rigor, intensity, scope, and results of incident handling activities are<br>comparable and predictable across the organization. Support the incident handling process using automated mechanisms (e.g., online  |                   |                      |  |          | Automated mechanisms exist to support the incident handling process.   |                             |                  |
| IR-4(1) | AUTOMATED INCIDENT                          | incident management systems and tools that support the collection of live   | Functional        | equal                | Automated Incident<br>Handling Processes               | IRO-02.1 | Automated mechanisms exist to support the incident handling process.   | 10                          |                  |
| IR-5    | HANDLING PROCESSES INCIDENT MONITORING      | response data, full network packet capture, and forensic analysis.  Track and document incidents.   | Functional        |                      | Situational Awareness For                              | IRO-09   | Mechanisms exist to document, monitor and report the status of cybersecurity &   | 10                          |                  |
| IN-5    | INCIDENT MONITORING                         | Irack and document incidents.   | runctional        | equal                | Incidents  | INO-09   | data privacy incidents to internal stakeholders all the way through the resolution of<br>the incident.   | 10                          |                  |
|         |   | <ul> <li>a. Require personnel to report suspected incidents to the organizational incident<br/>response capability immediately but not to exceed one (1) hour after discovery; and</li> </ul>   |                   |                      |  |          | Mechanisms exist to identify and document appropriate contacts with relevant law enforcement and regulatory bodies.  |                             |                  |
| IR-6    | INCIDENT REPORTING                          | <ul> <li>Report incident information to organizational personnel with incident handling<br/>responsibilities, and if confirmed, notify the CSO, SIB Chief, or Interface Agency</li> </ul>   | Functional        | intersects with      | Contacts With Authorities                              | GOV-06   |  | 5                           |                  |
|         |   | Official.   |                   |                      |  |          | Mechanisms exist to timely-report incidents to applicable:   |                             |                  |
|         |   | <ul> <li>Require personnel to report suspected incidents to the organizational incident<br/>response capability immediately but not to exceed one (1) hour after discovery; and</li> </ul>  |                   |                      | Incident Stakeholder                                   |          | (1) Internal stakeholders; (2) Affected clients & third-parties; and   |                             |                  |
| IR-6    | INCIDENT REPORTING                          | <ul> <li>Report incident information to organizational personnel with incident handling<br/>responsibilities, and if confirmed, notify the CSO, SIB Chief, or Interface Agency</li> </ul>   | Functional        | intersects with      | Reporting  | IRO-10   | (3) Regulatory authorities.  | 5                           |                  |
|         |   | Official.   |                   |                      |  |          | Mechanisms exist to maintain incident response contacts with applicable  |                             |                  |
|         |   | <ul> <li>Require personnel to report suspected incidents to the organizational incident<br/>response capability immediately but not to exceed one (1) hour after discovery; and</li> </ul>  |                   |                      | Regulatory & Law                                       |          | regulatory and law enforcement agencies.   |                             |                  |
| IR-6    | INCIDENT REPORTING                          | <ul> <li>Report incident information to organizational personnel with incident handling<br/>responsibilities, and if confirmed, notify the CSO, SIB Chief, or Interface Agency</li> </ul>   | Functional        | intersects with      | Enforcement Contacts                                   | IRO-14   |  | 5                           |                  |
|         |   | Official.   |                   |                      |  |          | Automated mechanisms exist to assist in the reporting of cybersecurity & data  |                             |                  |
| IR-6(1) | INCIDENT REPORTING  <br>AUTOMATED REPORTING | Report incidents using automated mechanisms.  | Functional        | equal                | Automated Reporting                                    | IRO-10.1 | privacy incidents.   | 10                          |                  |
| IR-6(3) | INCIDENT REPORTING  <br>SUPPLY CHAIN        | Provide incident information to the provider of the product or service and other<br>organizations involved in the supply chain or supply chain governance for systems   | Functional        | equal                | Supply Chain Coordination                              | IRO-10.4 | Mechanisms exist to provide cybersecurity & data privacy incident information to<br>the provider of the product or service and other organizations involved in the   | 10                          |                  |
|         | COORDINATION<br>INCIDENT RESPONSE           | or system components related to the incident.  Provide an incident response support resource, integral to the organizational  |                   |                      | Incident Reporting                                     |          | supply chain for systems or system components related to the incident.  Mechanisms exist to provide incident response advice and assistance to users of              |                             |                  |
| IR-7    | ASSISTANCE                                  | incident response capability, that offers advice and assistance to users of the<br>system for the handling and reporting of incidents.  | Functional        | equal                | Incident Reporting<br>Assistance                       | IRO-11   | systems for the handling and reporting of actual and potential cybersecurity & data privacy incidents.   | 10                          |                  |
|         | INCIDENT RESPONSE                           |   |                   |                      |  |          | Automated mechanisms exist to increase the availability of incident response-<br>related information and support.  |                             |                  |
| IR-7(1) | ASSISTANCE  <br>AUTOMATION SUPPORT          | Increase the availability of incident response information and support using  | Functional        | equal                | Automation Support of<br>Availability of Information / | IRO-11.1 |  | 10                          |                  |
| . ,     | FOR AVAILABILITY OF<br>INFORMATION AND      | automated mechanisms described in the discussion.   |                   |                      | Support  |          |  |                             |                  |
|         | SUPPORT                                     | a. Develop an incident response plan that:  |                   |                      |  |          | Mechanisms exist to maintain and make available a current and viable Incident  |                             |                  |
|         |   | Provides the organization with a roadmap for implementing its incident response capability;   |                   |                      |  |          | Response Plan (IRP) to all stakeholders.   |                             |                  |
|         |   | capaintry,  2. Describes the structure and organization of the incident response capability;  3. Provides a high-level approach for how the incident response capability fits into  |                   |                      |  |          |  |                             |                  |
|         |   | the overall organization;   |                   |                      |  |          |  |                             |                  |
|         |   | Meets the unique requirements of the organization, which relate to mission, size, structure, and functions;     Office and the leaders of the organization and the org |                   |                      |  |          |  |                             |                  |
|         |   | Defines reportable incidents;     Provides metrics for measuring the incident response capability within the  |                   |                      |  |          |  |                             |                  |
|         |   | organization; 7. Defines the resources and management support needed to effectively maintain  |                   |                      |  |          |  |                             |                  |
| IR-8    | INCIDENT RESPONSE<br>PLAN                   | and mature an incident response capability;  8. Addresses the sharing of incident information;  | Functional        | equal                | Incident Response Plan<br>(IRP)                        | IRO-04   |  | 10                          |                  |
|         |   | Is reviewed and approved by the organization's/agency's executive leadership annualty; and  |                   |                      |  |          |  |                             |                  |
|         |   | <ol> <li>Explicitly designates responsibility for incident response to organizational<br/>personnel with incident reporting responsibilities and CSO or CJIS WAN Official.</li> </ol>   |                   |                      |  |          |  |                             |                  |
|         |   | b. Distribute copies of the incident response plan to organizational personnel with incident handling responsibilities;   |                   |                      |  |          |  |                             |                  |
|         |   | c. Update the incident response plan to address system and organizational changes or problems encountered during plan implementation, execution, or testing;  |                   |                      |  |          |  |                             |                  |
|         |   | d. Communicate incident response plan changes to organizational personnel with<br>incident handling responsibilities; and<br>e. Protect the incident response plan from unauthorized disclosure and   |                   |                      |  |          |  |                             |                  |
|         |   | e. Protect the incident response plan from unautionized disclosure and modification.  Include the following in the Incident Response Plan for breaches involving  |                   |                      |  |          |  |                             |                  |
|         |   | personally identifiable information:  |                   |                      |  |          | Mechanisms exist to address data breaches, or other incidents involving the<br>unauthorized disclosure of sensitive or regulated data, according to applicable       |                             |                  |
| IR-8(1) | INCIDENT RESPONSE                           | A process to determine if notice to individuals or other organizations, including oversight organizations, is needed;   | Functional        | subset of            | Data Breach  | IRO-04.1 | laws, regulations and contractual obligations.   | 10                          |                  |
|         | PLAN   BREACHES                             | An assessment process to determine the extent of the harm, embarrassment, inconvenience, or unfairness to affected individuals and any mechanisms to  |                   |                      |  |          |  |                             |                  |
|         |   | mitigate such harms; and c. Identification of applicable privacy requirements.  |                   |                      |  |          | Mechanisms exist to establish, maintain and disseminate cybersecurity & data   |                             |                  |
|         |   | Develop, document, and disseminate to organizational personnel with system maintenance responsibilities:  |                   |                      |  |          | protection policies, standards and procedures.   |                             |                  |
|         |   | Agency-level maintenance policy that:     (a) Addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment,   |                   |                      |  |          |  |                             |                  |
|         |   | coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and (b) Is consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations,  |                   |                      |  |          |  |                             |                  |
| MA-1    | POLICY AND                                  | policies, standards, and guidelines; and  2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the maintenance policy and the  | Functional        | intersects with      | Publishing Cybersecurity &<br>Data Protection          | GOV-02   |  | 5                           |                  |
|         | PROCEDURES                                  | associated maintenance controls; b. Designate an individual with security responsibilities to manage the development,   |                   |                      | Documentation  |          |  |                             |                  |
|         |   | documentation, and dissemination of the maintenance policy and procedures; and c. Review and update the current maintenance:  |                   |                      |  |          |  |                             |                  |
|         |   | Policy annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to CJI or systems used to process, store, or transmit CJI; and   |                   |                      |  |          |  |                             |                  |
|         |   | Procedures annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to CJI or systems used to process, store, or transmit CJI.   |                   |                      |  |          |  |                             |                  |
|         |   | a. Develop, document, and disseminate to organizational personnel with system maintenance responsibilities:   | -                 |                      |  |          | Mechanisms exist to review the cybersecurity & data protection program, including policies, standards and procedures, at planned intervals or if significant changes |                             |                  |
|         |   | maintenance responsibilities:  1. Agency-level maintenance policy that:  (a) Addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment,  |                   |                      |  |          | occur to ensure their continuing suitability, adequacy and effectiveness.  |                             |                  |
|         |   | (a) Addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management communent, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and (b) is consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations,   |                   |                      |  |          |  |                             |                  |
|         | POLICY AND                                  | to) is consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines; and  2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the maintenance policy and the   |                   |                      | Periodic Review & Update of                            |          |  |                             |                  |
| MA-1    | PROCEDURES                                  | Designate an individual with security responsibilities to manage the development,   | Functional        | intersects with      | Cybersecurity & Data<br>Protection Program             | GOV-03   |  | 5                           |                  |
|         |   | documentation, and dissemination of the maintenance policy and procedures; and c. Review and update the current maintenance:  |                   |                      |  |          |  |                             |                  |
|         |   | L. Neview and update are Curint maintenance.  1. Policy annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to CJI or systems used to process, store, or transmit CJI; and  |                   |                      |  |          |  |                             |                  |
|         |   | 2. Procedures annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to CJI or systems used to process, store, or transmit CJI.  |                   |                      |  |          |  |                             |                  |
|         |   | a. Develop, document, and disseminate to organizational personnel with system   |                   |                      |  |          | Mechanisms exist to develop, disseminate, review & update procedures to  |                             |                  |
|         |   | maintenance responsibilities:  1. Agency-level maintenance policy that:   |                   |                      |  |          | facilitate the implementation of maintenance controls across the enterprise.   |                             |                  |
|         |   | (a) Addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and   |                   |                      |  |          |  |                             |                  |
|         |   | (b) Is consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines; and   |                   |                      |  |          |  |                             |                  |
| MA-1    | POLICY AND<br>PROCEDURES                    | Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the maintenance policy and the associated maintenance controls;  | Functional        | subset of            | Maintenance Operations                                 | MNT-01   |  | 10                          |                  |
|         |   | b. Designate an individual with security responsibilities to manage the development, documentation, and dissemination of the maintenance policy and procedures; and   |                   |                      |  |          |  |                             |                  |
|         |   | Review and update the current maintenance:  1. Policy annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized  |                   |                      |  |          |  |                             |                  |
|         |   | access to CJI or systems used to process, store, or transmit CJI; and  2. Procedures annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized   |                   |                      |  |          |  |                             |                  |
|         |   | access to CJI or systems used to process, store, or transmit CJI.   |                   |                      |  |          |  |                             |                  |



| FDE#    | FDE Name  | Focal Document Element (FDE) Description   | STRM<br>Rationale | STRM<br>Relationship | SCF Control                         | SCF#     | Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description   | Strength of<br>Relationship<br>(optional) | Notes (optional) |
|---------|---|--|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------------|----------|---|---|------------------|
| MA-1    | POLICY AND<br>PROCEDURES                                  | a. Develop, document, and disseminate to organizational personnel with system maintanance responsibilities:  1. Agency-level maintenance policy that:  1. Agency-level maintenance compliance;  1. Agency-level maintenance;  1. Agency-level maintenance;  1. Agency-level maintenance;  2. Procedures a foreint and experient for the maintenance policy and the associated maintenance controls;  1. Designate an individual with security responsibilities to manage the development, documentation, and dissemination of the maintenance policy and procedures; and   c. Review and update the current maintenance;  1. Policy annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to CII or systems used to process, store, or transmit CII; and  2. Procedures annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to CII or systems used to process, store, or transmit CII.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Auditing Remote<br>Maintenance      | MNT-05.1 | Mechanisms exist to audit remote, non-local maintenance and diagnostic sessions, as well as review the maintenance action performed during remote maintenance sessions.   | 5   |                  |
| MA-1    | POLICY AND<br>PROCEDURES                                  | a. Develop, document, and disseminate to organizational personnel with system ministrance responsibilities: <ol> <li>1. Agency-level maintenance policy that:</li> <li>1. Agency-level maintenance opticy that:</li> <li>1. Agency-level maintenance commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and</li> <li>1. In consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, indicatives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines; and</li> <li>2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the maintenance policy and procedures; and committed maintenance controls;</li> <li>1. Designates an individual with security responsibilities to manage the development, documentation, and dissemination of the maintenance policy and procedures; and</li> <li>1. Policy sonusally and following any security indication involving unauthorized access to CII or systems used to process, atons, or transmit CII.</li> </ol>   | Functional        | intersects with      | Remote Maintenance<br>Notifications | MNT-05.2 | stakeholders when remote, non-local maintenance is planned (e.g., date/time).   | 5   |                  |
| MA-2    | CONTROLLED<br>MAINTENANCE                                 | a. Schedule, document, and review records of maintenance, repair, and replacement on system components in accordance with manufacture or vendor replacement on system components in accordance with manufacture or vendor specifications and/or regularizational requirements; b. Approve and monitor all maintenance accidines, whether performed on site or removed to another the system or system components are serviced on site or removed to another location; c. Require that organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities explicitly approve the removal of the system or system components from organizational facilities for first maintenance, repair, replacement; d. Sanitize equipment to remove information from associated media prior to removal from organizational facilities for off-site maintenance, repair, replacement, or destruction; e. Check all potentially impacted controls to verify that the controls are still functioning properly following maintenance, repair, por placement actions; and f. Include the following information in organizational maintenance records: 1. Component name 3. Data-film of maintenance 4. Maintenance performed 5. Name(s) of entity performing maintenance including escort if required. | Functional        | equal                | Controlled Maintenance              | MNT-02   | Mechanisms exist to conduct controlled maintenance activities throughout the lifecycle of the system, application or service.   | 10  |                  |
| MA-3    | MAINTENANCE TOOLS   | Approve, control, and monitor the use of system maintenance tools; and     B. Review previously approved system maintenance tools prior to each use.     Inspect the maintenance tools used by maintenance personnel for improper or   | Functional        | equal                | Maintenance Tools                   | MNT-04   | Mechanisms exist to control and monitor the use of system maintenance tools.  Mechanisms exist to inspect maintenance tools carried into a facility by  | 10  |                  |
| MA-3(1) | INSPECT TOOLS  MAINTENANCE TOOLS                          | inspect the maintenance tools used by maintenance personner or improper or<br>unauthorized modifications.  Check media containing diagnostic and test programs for malicious code before the   | Functional        | equal                | Inspect Tools                       | MNT-04.1 | meintenance personnel for improper or unauthorized modifications.  Mechanisms exist to check media containing diagnostic and test programs for  | 10  |                  |
| MA-3(2) | INSPECT MEDIA   | Check media containing diagnostic and test programs for malicious code before the media are used in the system.  | Functional        | equal                | Inspect Media                       | MNT-04.2 | Mechanisms exist to check media containing diagnostic and test programs for<br>malicious code before the media are used.<br>Mechanisms exist to prevent or control the removal of equipment undergoing  | 10  |                  |
| MA-3(3) | MAINTENANCE TOOLS  <br>PREVENT<br>UNAUTHORIZED<br>REMOVAL | Prevent the removal of maintenance equipment containing organizational<br>information by: a. Verifying that there is no organizational information contained on the equipment; b. Satistizing or destroying the equipment; c. Retaining the equipment within the facility, or d. Ottaining an exemption from organizational personnel with system maintenance responsibilities explicitly authorizing removal of the equipment from the facility.  | Functional        | equal                | Prevent Unauthorized<br>Removal     | MNT-04.3 | maintenance that containing organizational information.   | 10  |                  |
| MA-4    | NONLOCAL<br>MAINTENANCE                                   | a. Approve and monitor nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic activities; b. Allow the use of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic tools only as consistent with organizational policy and documented in the security pain for the system; c. Employ strong authentication in the establishment of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic sessions; d. Maintain records for nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic activities; and e. Terminate session and network connections when nonlocal maintenance is completed.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Remote Maintenance                  | MNT-05   | Mechanisms exist to authorize, monitor and control remote, non-local maintenance and diagnostic activities.   | 5   |                  |
| MA-4    | NONLOCAL<br>MAINTENANCE                                   | a. Approve and monitor nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic activities; b. Allow the use of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic tools only as consistent with organizational policy and documented in the security pain for the system; c. Employ strong authentication in the establishment of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic sessions; d. Maintain records for nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic activities; and a. Terminate session and network connections when nonlocal maintenance is completed.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Remote Maintenance<br>Notifications | MNT-05.2 | Mechanisms exist to require maintenance personnel to notify affected<br>stakeholders when remote, non-local maintenance is planned (e.g., date/time).   | 5   |                  |
| MA-5    | MAINTENANCE<br>PERSONNEL                                  | a. Establish a process for maintenance personnel authorization and maintain a list<br>of authorized maintenance organizations or personnel;<br>b. Verify that non-escorted personnel performing maintenance on the system<br>possess the required access authorizations; and<br>c. Designate organizational personnel with required access authorizations and<br>technical competence to supervise the maintenance activities of personnel who do<br>not possess the required access authorizations.   | Functional        | equal                | Authorized Maintenance<br>Personnel | MNT-06   | Mechanisms exist to maintain a current list of authorized maintenance<br>organizations or personnel.  | 10  |                  |
| MA-6    | TIMELY MAINTENANCE  | a. Develop, document, and disseminate to authorized individuals:   | Functional        | equal                | Timely Maintenance                  | MNT-03   | Mechanisms exist to obtain maintenance support and/or spare parts for systems<br>within a defined Recovery Time Objective (RTO).  Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of data protection controls.  | 10  |                  |
| MP-1    | POLICY AND<br>PROCEDURES                                  | 1. Agency-level media protection policy that: (a) Addresses purpose, scope, rotes, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among agency entities, and compliance; and (b) is consistent with applicable laws, esecutive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines; and applications or a consistent with applicable laws, esecutive orders, directives, regulations, 2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the media protection policy and the associated media protection controls; b. Designate an individual with security responsibilities to manage the development, documentation, and dissemination of the media protection policy and procedures; and c. Review and update the current media protection: 2 1. Policy at least annually and following any security incidents involving digital and/or non-digital media; and 2. Procedures at least annually and following any security incidents involving digital and/or non-digital media.  | Functional        | subset of            | Data Protection                     | DCH-01   |   | 10  |                  |
| MP-2    | MEDIA ACCESS  | Restrict access to digital and non-digital media to authorized individuals.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Media Access                        | DCH-03   | Mechanisms exist to control and restrict access to digital and non-digital media to<br>authorized individuals.  Mechanisms exist to feelilists the implementation of enderint country controls.   | 5   |                  |
| MP-2    | MEDIA ACCESS  | Restrict access to digital and non-digital media to authorized individuals.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Endpoint Security                   | END-01   | Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of endpoint security controls.  | 5   |                  |
| MP-4    | MEDIA STORAGE   | a. Physically control and securely store digital and non-digital media within<br>physically secure locations or controlled areas and encypt CI on digital media<br>when physical and personnel restrictions are not feasible; and<br>b. Protect system media types defined in MP-4a until the media are destroyed or<br>santized using approved equipment, techniques, and procedures.   | Functional        | equal                | Media Storage                       | DCH-06   | Mechanisms exist to:<br>(I) Physically control and securely store digital and non-digital media within<br>controlled areas using organization-defined security measures; and<br>(2) Protect system media until the media are destroyed or sanitized using<br>approved equipment, techniques and procedures. | 10  |                  |
| MP-5    | MEDIA TRANSPORT   | a. Protect and control digital and non-digital media to help prevent compromise of the data during trapport outside of the physically scote occurions or controlled sense using encryption, as defined in Section 5. 10.1.2 of this Policy. Physical media will be protected in 4th seam level as the information vould be protected in electronic form. Restrict the activities associated with transport of electronic and physical media to subtrioled personned is unity transport outside of the physical media to subtrioled personned is unity transport outside of the physically sense to ecosion or controlled areas; c. Document activities associated with the transport of system media, and d. Restrict the activities associated with the transport of system media to subtrioled outsonned.  | Functional        | equal                | Media Transportation                | DCH-07   | Mechanisms exist to protect and control digital and non-digital media during<br>transport outside of controlled areas using appropriate security measures.  | 10  |                  |



| FDE#    | FDE Name   | Focal Document Element (FDE) Description   | STRM<br>Rationale | STRM<br>Relationship | SCF Control   | SCF#     | Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description  | Strength of<br>Relationship<br>(optional) | Notes (optional) |
|---------|--|--|-------------------|----------------------|---|----------|--|---|------------------|
| MP-6    | MEDIA SANITIZATION   | a. Sanitize or destroy digital and non-digital media prior to disposat, release out of<br>sagency control. or release for resus using overwite technicipy at least three times<br>or degauss digital media prior to disposat or release for reuse by unauthorized<br>individuals. Inoperable digital media with be destroyed (cut up, shredded, etc.).<br>Physical media with be accurally disposed of when no longer needed for irrestigative<br>or security purposes, whichever is later. Physical media with be destroyed by<br>crossout shredding or incineation; and in the strength and integrity commensurate<br>with the security retector or classification of the information.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Physical Media Disposal                               | DCH-08   | Mechanisms exist to securely dispose of media when it is no longer required, using formal procedures.  | 5   |                  |
| MP-6    | MEDIA SANITIZATION   | a. Sanitac or destroy digital and non-digital media prior to disposal, release out of<br>spacey control, or release for trave using overwite technicogy at least three times<br>or deguas digital media prior to disposal or release for reuse by unauthorized<br>individuals. Inoperable digital media with de destroyed (cut up, shredded, et c.).<br>Physical media with be accurely disposed of when no longer needed for investigative<br>or accurity purposes, whichever is later. Physical media with be destroyed by<br>crossout shredding or incineation; and in the strength and integrity commensurate<br>with the security restopy or classification of the information.   | Functional        | intersects with      | System Media Sanitization                             | DCH-09   | Mechanisms exist to sanitize system media with the strength and integrity commensurate with the classification or sensitivy of the information prior to disposal, release out of organizational control or release for reuse.  | 5   |                  |
| MP-6    | MEDIA SANITIZATION   | a. Sanitize or destroy digital and non-digital media prior to disposal, release out of sagency control, or release for trave using overwite technicogy at least three times or deguas digital media prior to disposal or release for reuse by unauthorized includuals. Inopenbale digital media with the destroyed cut up, shredded, etc.). Physical media with the securely disposed of when no longer needed for investigative or security purposes, whichever is later. Physical media will be destroyed by crossout shredding or incineration, and to consout shredding or incineration, and to the strength and integrity commensurate with the security extension of the information.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Sanitization of Personal<br>Data (PD)                 | DCH-09.3 | Mechanisms exist to facilitate the sanitization of Personal Data (PD).   | 5   |                  |
| MP-7    | MEDIA USE  | a. Restrict the use of digital and non-digital media on agency owned systems that have been approved for use in the storage, processing or transmission of criminal justice information by using technical, physical, or administrative controls (examples below); and b. Prohibit the use of personally owned digital media devices on all agency owned or controlled systems that store, process, or transmit criminal justice information, and c. Prohibit the use of digital media devices on all agency owned or controlled systems that store, process, or transmit criminal justice information when such devices have no fostifiable owner.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Media Use   | DCH-10   | Mechanisms exist to restrict the use of types of digital media on systems or system components.  | 5   |                  |
| MP-7    | MEDIA USE  | a. Restrict the use of digital and non-digital media on agency owned systems that have been approved for use in the storage, processing, or transmission of criminal justice information by using stechnical, hypical, or administrative controls (examples below); and D. Prohibit the use of personally owned digital media devices on all agency owned or controlled systems that store, process, or transmit criminal justice information; and C. Prohibit the use of digital media devices on all agency owned or controlled systems that store, process, or transmit criminal justice information when such devices have no foliatinal devices on transmit criminal justice information when such devices have no foliatinal devices have not destruction of the devices have not destruct the devices have not device the devices have not device the devices have not device the device have not device the devi | Functional        | intersects with      | Prohibit Use Without Owner                            | DCH-10.2 | Mechanisms exist to prohibit the use of portable storage devices in organizational information systems when such devices have no identifiable owner.   | 5   |                  |
| MP-7    | MEDIA USE  | a. Restrict the use of digital and non-digital media on agency owned systems that<br>have been approved for use in the storage, processing, or transmission of criminal<br>justice information by using stechnical, hypical, or administrative controls<br>(examples below); and<br>b. Prohibit the use of personally owned digital media devices on all agency owned or<br>controlled systems that store, process, or transmit criminal justice information; and<br>c. Prohibit the use of digital media devices on all agency owned or controlled<br>systems that store, process, or transmit criminal justice information when such<br>devices have no fostifibale owner.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Media & Data Retention                                | DCH-18   | Mechanisms exist to retain media and data in accordance with applicable statutory, regulatory and contractual obligations.   | 5   |                  |
| SA-22   | UNSUPPORTED SYSTEM COMPONENTS                              | a. Replace system components when support for the components is no longer available from the developer, vendor, or manufacturer; or b. Provide the following options for alternative sources for continued support for unsupported components: original manufacturer support, or original contracted vendor support.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Unsupported Systems                                   | TDA-17   | Mechanisms exist to prevent unsupported systems by:  (1) Replacing systems when support for the components is no longer available from the developer, vendor or manufacturer; and  (2) Requiring justification and documented approval for the continued use of unsupported system components required to satisfy mission/flusiness needs. | 5   |                  |
| SA-22   | UNSUPPORTED SYSTEM COMPONENTS                              | a. Replace system components when support for the components is no longer susuable from the developer, wendor, or manufacturer or or b. Provide the following options for alternative sources for continued support for unsupported components: original manufacturer support, or original contracted windor support.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Alternate Sources for<br>Continued Support            | TDA-17.1 | Mechanisms exist to provide in-house support or contract external providers for<br>support with unsupported system components.   | 5   |                  |
| SI-1    | POLICY AND<br>PROCEDURES                                   | a. Develop, document, and disseminate to all organizational personnel with system and information integrity responsibilities and information system owners:  1. Agency-level system and information integrity policy that integrity and integrity policy and the associated system and information integrity controls;  b. Designate organizational personnel with system and information integrity controls;  c. Review and update the current system and information, and dissemination of the system and information integrity controls;  1. Policy annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to Cli or systems used to process, store, or transmit Cli and  2. Procedures annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to Cli or systems used to process, store, or transmit Cli and  2. Procedures annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to Cli or systems used to process, store, or transmit Cli and   | Functional        | subset of            | Secure Engineering<br>Principles                      | SEA-01   | Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of industry-recognized cybersecurity & data privacy practices in the specification, design, development, implementation and modification of systems and services.  | 10  |                  |
| SI-2    | FLAW REMEDIATION   | a. Identify, report, and correct system flaws; b. Test software and firmware updates related to flaw remediation for effectiveness and potential side effects before installation; 2 c. Install security-relevant software and firmware updates within the number of days instead after the release of the updates; 5 c-Ortical - 15 days - Medium - 60 days - Medium - 60 days - Medium - 60 days, and - di. Incorporate haw remediation into the organizational configuration management.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Automatic Antimalware<br>Signature Updates            | END-04.1 | Mechanisms exist to automatically update antimalware technologies, including agnature definitions.   | 5   |                  |
| SI-2    | FLAW REMEDIATION   | oncess. A lidentify, report, and correct system flaws; b. Test software and firmware updates related to flaw remediation for effectiveness and potential side effects before installation; 2 c. Install security-relevant software and firmware updates within the number of days listed after the release of the updates; 5 + Cinical - 15 days + Hadium - 60 days - Hadium - 60 days - I kinw - 90 days; and d. Incorporate flaw remediation into the organizational configuration management process.   | Functional        | subset of            | Vulnerability & Patch<br>Management Program<br>(VPMP) | VPM-01   | Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation and monitoring of vulnerability management controls.   | 10  |                  |
| SI-2    | FLAW REMEDIATION   | a. Identify, report, and correct system flaws; b. Test software and firmware updates related to flaw remediation for effectiveness and potential side effects before installation; 2. c. Install security-relevant software and firmware updates within the number of days listed after the release of the updates;5 c. Cincia. 15 days c. Macillania. 80 days c. Medium. 80 days c. Medium. 80 days d. Incorporate flaw remediation into the organizational configuration management process.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Software & Firmware<br>Patching                       | VPM-05   | Mechanisms exist to conduct software patching for all deployed operating systems, applications and firmware.   | 5   |                  |
| SI-2(2) | FLAW REMEDIATION  <br>AUTOMATED FLAW<br>REMEDIATION STATUS | Determine if system components have applicable security-relevant software and<br>firmware updates installed using vulnerability scenning tools as least quarterly or<br>following any security incidents involving CII or systems used to process, store, or<br>transmit CII.  | Functional        | equal                | Automated Remediation<br>Status                       | VPM-05.2 | Automated mechanisms exist to determine the state of system components with<br>regard to flaw remediation.   | 10  |                  |



| FDE# | FDE Name                     | Focal Document Element (FDE) Description   | STRM<br>Rationale | STRM<br>Relationship | SCF Control   | SCF#     | Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description   | Strength of<br>Relationship<br>(optional) | Notes (optional) |
|------|------------------------------|--|-------------------|----------------------|---|----------|---|---|------------------|
| SI-3 | MALICIOUS CODE<br>PROTECTION | a. Implement signature-based malicious code protection mechanisms at system entry and extr points to detect and endicate malicious code; 2  Automatically update malicious code protection mechanisms as new releases are evaluable in accordance with organizational configuration management policy and extra configuration of the | Functional        | intersects with      | Automatic Antimalware<br>Signature Updates            | END-04.1 | Mechaniams exist to automatically update antimalware technologies, including signature definitions.   | 5   |                  |
| SH3  | MALICIOUS CODE<br>PROTECTION | a. Implement signature-based malicious code protection mechanisms at system entry and exit points to detect and sradicate malicious code; 2 b. Automatically update malicious code protection mechanisms as new releases are available in accordance with organizational configuration management policy and procedures; c. Configure malicious code protection mechanisms to: 1. Perform periodic scans of the system at least daily and real-time scans of files from external sources at network entry and exit points and on all severs and anapoint devices as the files are downloade, opened, or executed in accordance with organizational policy, and 2. Block or quarantine malicious code, take mitigating action(s), and when necessary, implement incident response procedures; and send alert to system/network administrators and/or organizational personnel with information security responsibilities in response to malicious code detection; and 5 d. Address the receipt of files positives during malicious code detection and aradication and the resulting potential impact on the availability of the system.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Heuristic / Nonsignature-<br>Based Detection          | END-04.4 | Mechanisms exist to utilize heuristic / nonsignature-based antimativare detection capabilities.   | 5   |                  |
| SI-3 | MALICIOUS CODE<br>PROTECTION | a Implement signature-based malicious code protection mechanisms at system entry and exit points to detect and eradicate malicious code; 2. b. Automatically update malicious code protection mechanisms as new releases are available in accordance with organizational configuration management policy and procedures; c. Configure malicious code protection mechanisms to: 1. Perform periodic scans of the system at least daily and real-time scans of files from external sources at network entry and exit points and on all severs and endpoint device as the files are downloaded, opened, or executed in accordance with organizational policy, and 2. Block or quarantine malicious code, take mitigating action(s), and when necessary, implement incident response procedures; and send after to system/network administrators and/or organizational personnel with information security responsibilities in response to malicious code detection, and 6. Address he receipt of false possibles during malicious code detection and excitacion and the resulting potential impact on the evaluability of the system.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Safeguarding Data Over<br>Open Networka               | NET-12   | Cyptographic mechanisms exist to implement strong cryptography and security protocols to safeguard sensitive/regulated data during transmission over open, public networks. | 5   |                  |
| SI-3 | MALICIOUS CODE<br>PROTECTION | a. Implement signature-based malicious code protection mechanisms at system entry and exit priorits to detect and exidaten salicious code; 2  b. Automatically update malicious code protection mechanisms as nev releases are wellable in accordance with organizational configuration menagement policy and procedures; c. Configure malicious code protection mechanisms to:  1. Perform periodic scans of the system at least daily and real-time scans of files from external sources at network entry and exit points and on all servers and endpoint devices as the files are downloaded, opened, or executed in accordance with organizational policy; and  2. Block or quarantine malicious code, take mitigating action(s), and when necessary, implement incident response procedures; and send alert to system/network administrators and/or organizational personnel with information security responsibilities in response to malicious code detection; and d. Address the receipt of files positives during malicious code detection and endiciation and the resulting potential impact on the availability of the system.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Input Data Validation                                 | TDA-18   | Mechaniams exist to check the validity of information inputs.   | 5   |                  |
| SH3  | MALICIOUS CODE<br>PROTECTION | Implement signature-based malicious code protection mechanisms at system setty and out priority to defect and esticiation anticious code; 2:  Automatically update malicious code protection mechanisms as new releases are evaluable in accordance with organizational configuration management policy and procedures;  Configure malicious code protection mechanisms to:  1. Perform periodic scans of the system at least daily and real-time scans of files from external sources an texture for any and ext points and on all severs and endpoint devices as the files are downloaded, opened, or executed in accordance with organizational policy, and  2. Block or quarantine malicious code, take mitigating action(s), and when necessary, implement incident response procedures; and send select to system/network administrators and/or organizational personnel with information security responsibilities in response to malicious code detection; and 5. d. Address the receipt of files positives during malicious code detection and endication and the resulting potential impact on the evaluability of the system.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Vulnerability & Patch<br>Management Program<br>(VPMP) | VPM-01   | Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation and monitoring of vulnerability management controls.  | 5   |                  |
| Sk3  | MALICIOUS CODE<br>PROTECTION | a. Implement signature-based malicious code protection mechanisms at system entry and ext points to detect and eradicate malicious code; 2 b. Automatically judient malicious code protection mechanisms as new releases are available in accordance with organizational configuration management policy and procedures; c. Configure malicious code protection mechanisms to: 1. Perform periodic scans of the system at least daily and real-time scans of files from external sources at network entry and exit points and on all severs and andpoint device as the files are downloaded, opened, or executed in accordance with organizational policy, and 2. Block or quantine malicious code, take mitigating action(s), and when necessary, implement incident response procedures; and send alert to system intervevok administrators and/or organizational personnel with information security segonabilities in response to malicious code detection; and d. Address the receipt of files positive studing and not one detection and aradication and the resulting potential impact on the evaluability of the system.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Software & Firmware<br>Patching                       | VPM-05   | Mechanisms exist to conduct software patching for all deployed operating systems, applications and firmware.  | 5   |                  |
| Si-4 | SYSTEM MONITORING            | A. Monitor the system to detacts:  1. Attacks an indicators or potential stacks in accordance with the following monitoring objectives:  a. Intrusion detection and prevention  b. Malicious code protection  b. Malicious code protection  d. Audit record monitoring  d. Audit record monitoring  d. Audit record monitoring  1. Firewall monitoring  2. Linear/brotized local, network, and remote connections;  b. Identify unsultorized use of the system through the following techniques and methods: event logging (ref. 5. Audit and Accountability);  c. Invoke internal monitoring capabilities or deploy monitoring devices:  1. Strategically within the system to collect organization-determined essential internation, and internation to the system of  | Functional        | subset of            | Continuous Monitoring                                 | MON-01   | Mechaniams exist to facilitate the implementation of enterprise-veide monitoring controls.  | 10  |                  |



| FDE#    | FDE Name  | Focal Document Element (FDE) Description  a. Monitor the system to detect:   | STRM<br>Rationale | STRM<br>Relationship | SCF Control                                      | SCF#     | Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description  | Strength of<br>Relationship<br>(optional) | Notes (optional) |
|---------|---|--|-------------------|----------------------|--|----------|--|---|------------------|
| SI-4    | SYSTEM MONITORING   | 1. Horizon the system to expend to expend the following monitoring objectives:  1. Hattacks and indicators of potential attacks in accordance with the following monitoring objectives:  1. Hattacks and indicators of potential or the system of the system   | Functional        | intersects with      | Centralized Collection of<br>Security Event Logs | MON-02   | Mechanisms exist to utilize a Security Incident Event Manager (SIEN) or similar automated tool, to support the centralized collection of security-related event logs.  | 5   |                  |
| SI-4    | SYSTEM MONITORING   | g. Provide intrusion detection and prevention systems, malicious code protection sortware, scanning tools, audit record monitoring software, network monitoring, and feveral monitoring software logs to organizational personnel with information sequents are socialists, assessible.  1. Attacks and indicators of potential attacks in accordance with the following monitoring objects: a. Intrusion detection and prevention b. Malicious code protection c. Vulnerability scanning d. Audit record monitoring s. Network monitoring to the provide social provides of the system through the following techniques and the standard provides of the system through the following techniques and methods: event logging (ref. 5.4 Audit and Accountability). c. Invoke internal monitoring capabilities or deploy monitoring devices: 1. Strategically within the system to collect organization characterism desential information; and 2. And no to closations within the system to collect organization detection sof interest to the organizations of monitoring activity when there is a change in risk to organization soft intrusion to the system monitoring activities; and g. Provide intrusion detection and prevention systems, malicious code protection software, scanning tools, audit record monitoring inclination; and feveral monitoring software, scanning note, network monitoring and feveral monitoring software, network monitoring software, inclinations and server incomplications of software, scanning tools, audit record monitoring software, network monitoring and feveral monitoring software logs to organizational personnel with information and server in the Monitoring software in careful and control monitoring software in a detection and server in the monitoring software in a detection and server in the monitoring software in a detection and server in the monitoring software in a detection and server in the monitoring software in a detection and server in the monitorin | Functional        | intersects with      | Safeguarding Data Over<br>Open Networks          | NET-12   | Cryptographic mechanisms exist to implement strong cryptography and security protocols to safeguard sensitive/regulated data during transmission over open, public networks.   | 5   |                  |
| SI-4    | SYSTEM MONITORING   | 1. Attacks and indicators of potential attacks in accordance with the following monitoring objectives: 3. Intrusion detection and prevention 5. Midlicious code protection 6. Vulnerability scanning 6. Audit record monitoring 7. Firewalt monitoring 8. Network monitoring 8. Network monitoring 8. Network monitoring 9. Network monitoring 9. Network monitoring 1. Firewalt monitoring 9. Network monitoring 1. Firewalt monitoring 1. See the proving of the system through the following techniques and methods: event longing (ref. 6. A Audit and Accountability) 6. Invoke internal monitoring capabilities or deploy monitoring devices: 1. Strategically within the system to collect organization-determined essential information; and 2. Ad and not locations within the system to tack specific types of transactions of interest to the organization; and analysis detected events and anomalies; 8. Adjust the level of system monitoring activity when there is a change in risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation; 8. Obtain legal opinion regarding system monitoring activities; and 9. Provide intrusion detection and prevention systems, malicious code protection software, scanning tools, audit record monitoring software, network monitoring, software network monitoring and frewall monitoring software previous personnel with information and frewall monitoring software personnel with information and frewall monitoring software personnel with information.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Input Data Validation                            | TDA-18   |  | 5   |                  |
| SI-4(2) | SYSTEM MONITORING  <br>AUTOMATED TOOLS AND<br>MECHANISMS FOR REAL-<br>TIME ANALYSIS | Employ automated tools and mechanisms to support near real-time analysis of events.  | Functional        | equal                | Automated Tools for Real-<br>Time Analysis       | MON-01.2 | Mechanisms exist to utilize a Security incident Event Manager (SIEM), or similar<br>automated tool, to support near real-time analysis and incident escalation.  | 10  |                  |
| SI-4(4) |   | a. Determine criteria for unusual or unauthorized activities or conditions for inbound and outbound communications traffic.  b. Monitor inbound and outbound communications traffic continuously for unusual or unauthorized activities or conditions such as: the presence of indicious code or unauthorized use of legistimate code or credentials within organizational systems or propagating among system components, signaling to external systems, and the unauthorized use organized or indicious code or unauthorized expering of informations.   | Functional        | equal                | Inbound & Outbound<br>Communications Traffic     | MON-01.3 | Mechanisms exist to continuously monitor inbound and outbound<br>communications traffic for unusual or unauthorized activities or conditions.  | 10  |                  |
| SI-4(5) |   | Alert organizational personnel with system monitoring responsibilities when the following system-generated indications of compromise or potential compromise occur: inappropriate or unusual activities with security or privacy implications.   | Functional        | equal                | System Generated Alerts                          | MON-01.4 | integrated situational awareness.  | 10  |                  |
| SI-5    | SECURITY ALERTS,<br>ADVISORIES, AND<br>DIRECTIVES                                   | a. Receive system security alerts, advisories, and directives from external source(s) (e.g., CISA, Muth-State Information Sharing & Analysis Center (MS-ISAC), U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness 1 Family (DSCRT), Indrawd-roftware providers, tederar/lastae advisories, etc.) on an ongoing basis; b. Centerate interials sourity alerts, advisories, and directives as deemed necessary. C. Disseminate sourity alerts, advisories, and directive to: organizational personnel implementing, operating, maintaining, and using the system; and d. Implement security directives in accordance with established time frames, or notify the issuing organization of the degree of noncompliance.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Safeguarding Data Over<br>Open Networks          | NET-12   | Cryptographic mechanisms exist to implement strong cryptography and security protocols to safeguard sensitive/regulated data during transmission over open, public networks.   | 5   |                  |
| SI-5    | SECURITY ALERTS,<br>ADVISORIES, AND<br>DIRECTIVES                                   | a. Receive system security alerts, advisories, and directives from external source(s) (e.g., CISA, Multi-State Information Sharing & Analysis Center (MS-ISAC), U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness 1 Fear (USCERT), hardware-fortware providers, federal/state advisories, etc.) on an ongoing basis; b. Generate Informal security alerts, advisories, and directives as deemed necessary. C. Disseminate security alerts, advisories, and directives to organizational personnel implementing, operating, maintaining, and using the system; and d. Implement security directives in accordance with established time frames, or notify the issuing operatization of the degree of nancompliance.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Input Data Validation                            | TDA-18   | Mechanisms exist to check the validity of information inputs.  | 5   |                  |
| SI-5    |   | a. Receive system security alerts, advisories, and directives from external source(s) (e.g., CISA, Multi-State Information Sharing & Analysis Center (MS-ISAC), U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (USCERT), hardware-fortware providers, tederar/lasts advisories, etc.) on an ongoing basis;  b. Generate Internal socurity alerts, advisories, and directives as deemed necessary.  c. Disseminate security alerts, advisories, and directives to organizational personnel implementing, operating, maintaining, and using the system; and d. Implement security directives in accordance with established time frames, or notify the issuing organization of the degree of noncompliance.  | Functional        | intersects with      | Threat Intelligence Feeds<br>Feeds               | THR-03   | Mechanisms exist to maintain situational awareness of vulnerabilities and evolving threats by leveraging the knowledge of attacker tactics, techniques and procedures to facilitate the implementation of preventiative and compensating controls. | 5   |                  |
| SI-7    | SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE,<br>AND INFORMATION<br>INTEGRITY                                 | a. Employ integrity verification tools to detect unauthorized changes to software, firmware, and information systems that contain or process CII; and b. Take the following actions when unauthorized changes to the software, firmware, and information are detected: notify organizational personnel responsible for software, firmware, and/or information integrity and implement incident response procedures as appropriate.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Endpoint File Integrity<br>Monitoring (FIM)      | END-06   | Mechanisms exist to utilize File Integrity Monitor (FIM), or similar technologies, to detect and report on unauthorized changes to selected files and configuration settings.  | 5   |                  |



| FDE#     | FDE Name   | Focal Document Element (FDE) Description  | STRM<br>Rationale | STRM<br>Relationship | SCF Control  | SCF#     | Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description   | Strength of<br>Relationship<br>(optional) | Notes (optional) |
|----------|--|---|-------------------|----------------------|--|----------|---|---|------------------|
| SI-7     | SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE,<br>AND INFORMATION<br>INTEGRITY  | a. Employ integrity verification tools to detect unauthorized changes to achieve, firmware, and information systems that contain or process Clit, and b. Take the following actions when unauthorized changes to the software, firmware, and information are detected: notify operatization pleanonie responsible for software, firmware, and/or information integrity and implement incident response procedure as a sprangiate. | Functional        | intersects with      | Safeguarding Data Over<br>Open Networks                                | NET-12   | Cyptographic mechanisms exist to implement strong cyptography and security protocols to sateguard sensitive/regulated data during transmission over open, public networks.  | 5   |                  |
| SI-7     | SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE,<br>AND INFORMATION<br>INTEGRITY  | a. Employ integrity verification tools to detect unauthorized changes to softwere, firmware, and information systems that contain or process EU; and b. Take the following actions when unauthorized changes to the software, firmware, and information and electredic notify organization personnel responsible for software, firmware, and/or information integrity and implement incident response procedure as a appropriate. | Functional        | intersects with      | Input Data Validation  | TDA-18   | Mechanisms exist to check the validity of information inputs.   | 5   |                  |
| SI-7(1)  | SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE,<br>AND INFORMATION<br>INTEGRITY   INTEGRITY<br>CHECKS  | Perform an integrity check of software, firmware, and information systems that contain or process CJI at agency-defined transitional states or security relevant events at least weekly or in an automated fashion.   | Functional        | equal                | Integrity Checks   | END-06.1 | Mechanisms exist to validate configurations through integrity checking of software and firmware.  | 10  |                  |
| SI-7(7)  | SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE,<br>AND INFORMATION<br>INTEGRITY  <br>INTEGRATION OF<br>DETECTION AND<br>RESPONSE                   | Incorporate the detection of the following unauthorized changes into the<br>organizational incident response capability: unauthorized changes to established<br>configuration setting or the unauthorized elevation of system privileges.   | Functional        | equal                | Automated Central<br>Management & Verification                         | CFG-02.2 | Automated mechanisms exist to govern and report on baseline configurations of<br>systems through Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM), or similar<br>technologies.   | 10  |                  |
| SI-8     | SPAM PROTECTION  | Employ spam protection mechanisms at system entry and exit points to detect<br>and act on unsolicited messages; and     Update spam protection mechanisms when new releases are available in<br>accordance with organizational configuration management policy and procedures.  | Functional        | equal                | Phishing & Spam Protection   | END-08   | Mechanisms exist to utilize anti-phishing and spam protection technologies to<br>detect and take action on unsolicited messages transported by electronic mail.   | 10  |                  |
| SI-8(2)  | SPAM PROTECTION  <br>AUTOMATIC UPDATES   | Automatically update spam protection mechanisms at least daily.   | Functional        | equal                | Automatic Spam and<br>Phishing Protection<br>Updates                   | END-08.2 | Mechanisms exist to automatically update anti-phishing and spam protection<br>technologies when new releases are available in accordance with configuration<br>and change management practices.   | 10  |                  |
| SI-10    | INFORMATION INPUT<br>VALIDATION  | Check the validity of the following information inputs: all inputs to web/application servers, database servers, and any system or application input that might receive or process CII.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Safeguarding Data Over<br>Open Networks                                | NET-12   | Cryptographic mechanisms exist to implement strong cryptography and security<br>protocols to safeguard sensitive/regulated data during transmission over open,<br>public networks.  | 5   |                  |
| SI-10    | INFORMATION INPUT<br>VALIDATION  | Check the validity of the following information inputs: all inputs to web/application servers, database servers, and any system or application input that might receive or process CII.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Input Data Validation  | TDA-18   | Mechanisms exist to check the validity of information inputs.   | 5   |                  |
| SI-11    | ERROR HANDLING   | a. Generate error messages that provide information necessary for corrective actions without revealing information that could be exploited; and b. Reveal error messages only to organizational personnel with information security responsibilities.   | Functional        | equal                | Error Handling   | TDA-19   | Mechanisms exist to handle error conditions by:<br>(1) identifying potentially security-relevant error conditions;<br>(2) Generating error messages that provide information necessary for corrective<br>actions without revealing sensitive or potentially harmful information in error logs<br>and administrative messages that could be exploited; and<br>(3) Revealing error messages only to authorized personnel.                               | 10  |                  |
| SI-12    | INFORMATION<br>MANAGEMENT AND<br>RETENTION   | Manage and retain information within the system and information output from the system in accordance with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, guidelines and operational requirements.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Media & Data Retention   | DCH-18   | Mechanisms exist to retain media and data in accordance with applicable statutory, regulatory and contractual obligations.  | 5   |                  |
| SI-12    | INFORMATION<br>MANAGEMENT AND<br>RETENTION   | Manage and retain information within the system and information output from the<br>system in accordance with applicable laws, executive orders, directives,<br>regulations, policies, standards, guidelines and operational requirements.   | Functional        | intersects with      | Personal Data (PD)<br>Retention & Disposal                             | PRI-05   | Mechanisms exist to:  (1) Retain Personal Data (PD), including metadata, for an organization-defined time period to Multi the purpose(s) identified in the notice or as required by law;  (2) Dispose of, destroys, erases, and/or anonymizes the PD, regardless of the method of storage; and  (3) Use organization-defined techniques or methods to ensure secure deletion or destruction of PD (including originals, copies and archived records). | 5   |                  |
| SI-12(1) | INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND RETENTION   LIMIT PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION ELEMENTS                              | Limit personally identifiable information being processed in the information life cycle to the minimum PII necessary to achieve the purpose for which it is collected (see Section 4.3).  | Functional        | equal                | Minimize Sensitive /<br>Regulated Data                                 | DCH-18.1 | Mechanisms exist to minimize sensitive/regulated data that is collected, received,<br>processed, stored and/or transmitted throughout the information lifecycle to only<br>those elements necessary to support necessary business processes.  | 10  |                  |
| SI-12(2) | INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND RETENTION   MINIMIZE PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION IN TESTING, TRAINING, AND RESEARCH | Use the following techniques to minimize the use of personally identifiable information for research, testing, or training; data obfuscation, randomization, arronymization, or use of synthetic data.  | Functional        | equal                | Limit Sensitive / Regulated<br>Data In Testing, Training &<br>Research | DCH-18.2 | Mechanisms exist to minimize the use of sensitive/regulated data for research, testing, or training, in accordance with authorized, legitimate business practices.  | 10  |                  |
| SI-12(3) | INFORMATION<br>MANAGEMENT AND<br>RETENTION  <br>INFORMATION DISPOSAL   | Use the following techniques to dispose of, destroy, or erase information following the retention period: as defined in MP-6.   | Functional        | equal                | Information Disposal   | DCH-21   | Mechanisms exist to securely dispose of, destroy or erase information.  | 10  |                  |
| SI-16    | MEMORY PROTECTION  | Implement the following controls to protect the system memory from unauthorized code execution: data execution prevention and address space layout randomization.   | Functional        | equal                | Memory Protection  | SEA-10   | Mechanisms exist to implement security safeguards to protect system memory from unauthorized code execution.  | 10  |                  |

