NIST IR 8477-Based Set Theory Relationship Mapping (STRM)
Reference Document: Secure Controls Framework (SCF) version 2025.2
STRM Guidance: https://securecontrolsframework.com/set-theory-relationship-mapping-strm/

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| FDE# | FDE Name | Focal Document Element (FDE) Description | STRM Rationale | STRM Relationship | SCF Control | SCF # | Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description | Strength of Relationship | Notes (optional) |
|-------|---|---|-------------------|----------------------|---|----------|---|-----------------------------|------------------|
| 1.0 | Continuous Authentication | The ability validate network users are the ones who they claim to be throughout an entire session at every step. | Functional | equal | Continuous Authentication | IAC-13.3 | Automated mechanisms exist to enable continuous re-authentication through the lifecycle of entity interactions. | 10 | |
| 1.1 | Continuous Multifactor Authentication | The ability to conduct authentication using two or more different factors to achieve authentication. Factors include: something you know (e.g. password/FIN); something you have (e.g. cyptographic identification device, token); or something you are (e.g., biometric), something you do. Continuous means just-in-time authentication (just-in time usually refers to authorization). | Functional | intersects with | Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) | IAC-06 | Automated mechanisms exist to enforce Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for: (1) Remote network access; (2) Third-party systems, applications and/or services; and/or (3) Non-console access to critical systems or systems that store, transmit and/or process sensitive/regulated data. | 5 | |
| 1.2 | Behavioral Biometrics | Observing activities of users, information systems, and processes and measuring the activities against organizational policies and rule, baselines of | Functional | intersects with | Anomalous Behavior | MON-16 | Mechanisms exist to detect and respond to anomalous behavior that could indicate account compromise or other malicious activities. | 5 | |
| 1.2 | Behavioral Biometrics | normal activity, thresholds, and trends. Observing activities of users, information systems, and processes and measuring the activities against organizational policies and rule, baselines of | Functional | intersects with | Behavioral Baselining | THR-11 | Automated mechanisms exist to establish behavioral baselines that capture information about user and entity behavior to enable dynamic threat discovery. | 5 | |
| 2.0 | Conditional Authorization (Users, NPEs, M2M) | normal activity, thresholds, and trends. The ability to grant authorization to a resource contingent upon the continued trustworthiness of the supplicant. This trustworthiness can affect by the device hygiene, user and entity behavior, and other factors. | Functional | intersects with | Usage Conditions | | Automated mechanisms exist to enforce usage conditions for users and/or roles. | 2 | |
| 2.1 | Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) | An access control method where subject requests to perform operations on objects are granted or denied based on assigned attributes of the subject, assigned attributes of the object, environment conditions, and a set of policies that are specified in terms of those attributes and conditions. | Functional | no relationship | N/A | N/A | No applicable SCF control | N/A | |
| 2.2 | Device Hygiene | The ability to determine the compliance status of managed and unmanaged assets. | Functional | intersects with | Endpoint Security Validation | NET-14.7 | Automated mechanisms exist to validate the security posture of the endpoint devices (e.g., software versions, patch levels, etc.) prior to allowing devices to | 5 | |
| 2.2.1 | Continuous, automated, Inventory & Telemetry | The ability to locate and identify devices connected to an environment, detect their removal/addition, to accurately know the totality of assets that need to be nonlicred and protected within the enterprise, and to obtain information about them. [CIS] Also support identifying unauthorized and unmanaged assets to | Functional | intersects with | Asset Governance | AST-01 | connect to organizational technology assets. Mechanisms exist to facilitate and I Asset Management (ITAM) program to implement and manage asset management controls. | 5 | |
| 2.2.1 | Continuous, sutomated, Inventory & Telemetry | remove or remediate. The ability to local and identify devices connected to an environment, detect their removal/addition, to accurately know the totality of assets that need to be monitored and protected within the enterprise, and to obtain information about them. (CIS) Also support identifying unauthorized and unmanaged assets to remove or remediate. The ability to locate and identify devices connected to an environment, detect | Functional | intersects with | Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) Server Logging | AST-02.6 | Mechanisms exist to enable Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) server logging to improve asset inventories and assist in detecting unknown systems. Mechanisms exist to implement and manage a Configuration Management | 5 | |
| 2.2.1 | Continuous, automated, Inventory & Telemetry | their removal/saddition, to accurately know the totality of assets that need to be monitored and protected within the enterprise, and to obtain information about them. [CIS] Also support identifying unauthorized and unmanaged assets to remove or remediate. | Functional | intersects with | Configuration Management Database (CMDB) | | Database (CMDB), or similar technology, to monitor and govern technology asset-specific information. | 5 | |
| 2.2.2 | Status Scans & Dynamic Instrumentation | The ability to poll devices for status, state, and configuration via remote management function or installation of agents/code on the device bymanagement. | Functional | intersects with | Automated Central Management & Verification | CFG-02.2 | Automated mechanisms exist to govern and report on baseline configurations of systems through Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM), or similar technologies. | 5 | |
| 2.2.2 | Status Scans & Dynamic Instrumentation | The ability to poll devices for status, state, and configuration via remote management function or installation of agents/code on the device bymanagement. | Functional | intersects with | Automated Access Enforcement / Auditing | CHG-04.1 | Mechanisms exist to perform after-the-fact reviews of configuration change logs to discover any unauthorized changes. | 5 | |
| 2.2.3 | Dynamic Device Service Updates | The ability to remotely install new configurations and services on a device in order to bring the device into conformity or compliance with existing policy. Just in Time Authorization allows a timed expiration of group membership. In | Functional | intersects with | Automated Central Management & Verification | | Automated mechanisms exist to govern and report on baseline configurations of systems through Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM), or similar technologies. Mechanisms exist to restrict and control privileged access rights for users and | 5 | |
| 2.3 | Just in Time Authorization | has in time dutinization allows a diministrative rights to be given at the time of need for as long as an action or duty needs them. As a result, access to administrative privileges becomes timited and abuse must be timed for when those privileges are given. | Functional | intersects with | Privileged Account Management (PAM) | IAC-16 | services. | 5 | |
| 2.4 | Privileged Access Management | Privileged Access Management (PAM) refers to a class of solutions that help secure, control, manage and monitor privileged access to critical assets. | Functional | equal | Privileged Account Management (PAM) | IAC-16 | Mechanisms exist to restrict and control privileged access rights for users and services. | 10 | |
| 3.0 | ZT enabling Infrastructure | Infrastructure capabilities that enable ZT | Functional | intersects with | Network Security Controls (NSC) | NET-01 | Mechanisms exist to develop, govern & update procedures to facilitate the implementation of Network Security Controls (NSC). | 5 | |
| 3.0 | ZT enabling Infrastructure | Infrastructure capabilities that enable ZT | Functional | intersects with | Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) | NET-01.1 | Mechanisms exist to treat all users and devices as potential threats and prevent access to data and resources until the users can be properly authenticated and their access authorized. | 5 | |
| 3.0 | ZT enabling Infrastructure | Infrastructure capabilities that enable ZT | Functional | intersects with | Secure Engineering Principles | SEA-01 | Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of industry-recognized cybersecurity & data privacy practices in the specification, design, development, implementation and modification of systems and services. | 5 | |
| 3.0 | ZT enabling Infrastructure | Infrastructure capabilities that enable ZT | Functional | intersects with | Alignment With Enterprise Architecture | SEA-02 | Mechanisms exist to develop an enterprise architecture, aligned with industry- recognized leading practices, with consideration for cybersecurity & data privacy principles that addresses risk to organizational operations, assets, individuals, other organizations. | 5 | |
| 3.0 | ZT enabling Infrastructure | Infrastructure capabilities that enable ZT | Functional | intersects with | Defense-In-Depth (DiD) Architecture | SEA-03 | Mechanisms exist to implement security functions as a layered structure minimizing interactions between layers of the design and avoiding any dependence by lower layers on the functionality or correctness of higher layers. | 5 | |
| 3.1 | Macro-segmentation | Similar in concept to physical network segmentation, macro-segmentation can be achieved through the application of additional hardware or VLANs. | Functional | equal | Network Segmentation (macrosegementation) | | Mechanisms exist to ensure network architecture utilizes network segmentation to isolate systems, applications and services that protections from other network resources. | 10 | |
| 3.2 | Micro-segmentation | Micro-segmentation is the practice of dividing (solaring) the network into small logical segments by exhabiling granular access control, whereby users, applications, workloads and devices are segmented based on logical, not physical, attributes. This also provides an advantage over traditional perimeter security, as the smaller segments present a reduced attack surface (for malicious actors), in a 71 Architecture, security settings can be applied to different types of traffic, creating policies that timin network and application flows between voluntable to the set that explicitly permitted. | Functional | equal | Microsegmentation | NET-06.6 | Automated mechanisms exist to enable microsegmentation, either physically or virtually, to divide the network according to application and data worlflows communications needs. | 10 | |
| 3.2.1 | Workload Definition | The ability to define the objectives, compute requirements, and communication pathways required for a specific application workload. | Functional | intersects with | Business Process Definition | PRM-06 | Mechanisms exist to define business processes with consideration for cybenecurity & data privacy that determines: (1) The resulting risk to organizational operations, assets, individuals and other organizations; and (2) Information protection needs arising from the defined business processes and revises the processes as necessary, until an achievable set of protection mades to obtained. | 2 | |
| 3.2.2 | Workload Isolation | The ability to segment out an application workload so as to only allow the required connections be made between processes, network traffic, and api calls. As a subset of micro-segmentation the capability is limiting east west traffic preventing lateral movement. | Functional | no relationship | N/A | N/A | No applicable SCF control | N/A | |
| 3.3 | Software-defined perimeter (SDP) | The ability to control access to resources based on identity and a need-to-know model in which device state and identity are verified before access to application infrastructure is granted. | Functional | no relationship | N/A | N/A | No applicable SCF control | N/A | |
| 4.0 | Securing Application & Workload | The ability to secure and manage the application layer as well as compute containers and virtual machines. The ability to identify and control the technology stack to facilitate more granular and accurate access decisions. | Functional | no relationship | N/A | N/A | No applicable SCF control | N/A | |
| 4.1 | API and Process Micro Segmentation | The ability to allow or block communication of API calls and process to process communication on both remote and local systems. The ability to prevent or arrest software supply chain attacks, which occur | Functional | no relationship | N/A | N/A | No applicable SCF control Mechanisms exist to track the origin, development, ownership, location and | N/A | |
| 4.2 | Securing Software Supply Chain | "when a cyber threat actor infiltrates a software vendor's network and employs malicious code to compromise the software before the vendor sends it to their customers." | Functional | intersects with | Provenance | AST-03.2 | changes to systems, system components and associated data. | 5 | |
| 4.2 | Securing Software Supply Chain | The ability to prevent or arrest software supply chain attacks, which occur "when a cyber threat actor infiltrates a software vendor's network and employs malicious code to compromise the software before the vendor sends it to their customers." | Functional | intersects with | Roots of Trust Protection | AST-18 | Mechanisms exist to provision and protect the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of product supplier keys and data that can be used as a "roots of trust" basis for integrity verification. Machanisms exist to devalon a plan for Sunniv Chain Blak Management ISCRM. | 5 | |
| 4.2 | Securing Software Supply Chain | The ability to prevent or arrest software supply chain attacks, which occur "when a cyber threat cort infiltrates a software vendor's network and employs malicious code to compromise the software before the vendor sends it to their customers." | Functional | intersects with | Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) Plan | RSK-09 | Mechanisms exist to develop a plan for Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) associated with the development, acquisition, maintenance and disposal of systems, system components and services, including documenting selected mitigating actions and monitoring performance against those plans. | 5 | |
| 4.2 | Securing Software Supply Chain | The sbillity to prevent or arrest software supply chain attacks, which occur "when a cyber threat actor infiltrates a software vendor's network and employs malicious code to compromise the software before the vendor sends it to their customers." | Functional | intersects with | Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) | TDA-04.2 | Mechanisms exist to generate, or obtain, a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) for systems, applications and services that lists software packages in use, including versions and applicable licenses. | 5 | |
| 4.2 | Securing Software Supply Chain | The ability to prevent or arrest software supply chain attacks, which occur "when a cyber threat actor inflitrates a software vendor's network and employs malicious code to compromise the software before the vendor sends it to their customers." | Functional | intersects with | Software Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM) | TDA-06.3 | Mechanisms exist to utilize a Software Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM) to govern a secure development lifecycle for the development of systems, applications and services. | 5 | |
| 4.2.1 | DevSecOps | A process capability that improves the lead time and frequency of delivery outcomes through enhanced engineering practices; promoting a more cohesive collaboration between Development, Security, and Operations teams as they work towards continuous integration and delivery. | Functional | no relationship | N/A | N/A | No applicable SCF control | N/A | |
| 4.2.2 | API Standardization | The ability to reach agreement and publish, locally, the applicatoin programming interface for a commonly used service. Enforecement of compliance in the use of commonly agreed API's. | Functional | no relationship | N/A | N/A | No applicable SCF control | N/A | |



Secure Controls Framework (SCF) 1 of 2

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|-------|---|---|-------------------|----------------------|---|----------|--|-----------------------------|------------------|
| 4.3 | Application Proxies | An application proxy or application proxy server receives requests intended for another server and acts as the proxy of the client to obtain the requested | Functional | no relationship | N/A | N/A | No applicable SCF control | N/A | |
| 4.4 | Risk-adaptive Application Access | In Risk-daptive Application Access, access privileges are granted based on a combination of a user's identity, mission need, and the level of security risk that exists between the system being accessed and a user. AAGO. will use security metrics, such as the strength of the authentication method, the level of assurance of the session connection between the system and a user, and the physical location of a user, to make its risk determination. | Functional | no relationship | N/A | N/A | No applicable SCF control | N/A | |
| 5.0 | Securing Data | Processes and technical controls to identify, classify, securely handle, retain, and dispose of data. | Functional | intersects with | Data Protection | DCH-01 | Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of data protection controls. | 5 | |
| 5.0 | Securing Data | Processes and technical controls to identify, classify, securely handle, retain, and dispose of data. | Functional | intersects with | Sensitive / Regulated Data Protection | DCH-01.2 | Mechanisms exist to protect sensitive/regulated data wherever it is stored. | 5 | |
| 5.0 | Securing Data | Processes and technical controls to identify, classify, securely handle, retain, and dispose of data. | Functional | intersects with | Defining Access Authorizations for Sensitive/Regulated Data | DCH-01.4 | Mechanisms exist to explicitly define authorizations for specific individuals and/or roles for logical and/or physical access to sensitive/regulated data. | 5 | |
| 5.0 | Securing Data | Processes and technical controls to identify, classify, securely handle, retain, and dispose of data. | Functional | intersects with | Data & Asset Classification | DCH-02 | Mechanisms exist to ensure data and assets are categorized in accordance with applicable statutory, regulatory and contractual requirements. | 5 | |
| 5.1 | Encryption | A procedure used in cryptography to convert plaintext into ciphertext to prevent anyone but the intended recipient from reading that data. | Functional | subset of | Use of Cryptographic Controls | CRY-01 | Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of cryptographic protections controls using known public standards and trusted cryptographic technologies. | 10 | |
| 5.1.1 | Encryption In Transit | The ability to protect data if communications are intercepted while data moves between sites or services. This protection is achieved by encrypting the data before transmission; authenticating the endpoints; and decrypting and verifying the data on arrival. | Functional | equal | Transmission Confidentiality | CRY-03 | Cryptographic mechanisms exist to protect the confidentiality of data being transmitted. | 10 | |
| 5.1.2 | Encryption At Rest | The ability to protect data from a system compromise or data exfiltration by encrypting data while stored. | Functional | equal | Encrypting Data At Rest | CRY-05 | Cryptographic mechanisms exist to prevent unauthorized disclosure of data at rest. | 10 | |
| 5.2 | Dynamic Policy enforcement | The ability to adapt policy and configurations, and enforce that change, in near real time based on environmental circumstances and indications of user and network behavior. DRM is a set of access control technologies and policies that proactively detect | Functional | no relationship | N/A | N/A | No applicable SCF control | N/A | |
| 5.3 | Data Rights Management (DRM) | Down is a set of access control technologies and policies that proactively detect and protect access to data and proprietary hardware and prevent unauthorized modification or redistribution of protected data. | Functional | equal | Data Rights Management (DRM) | DCH-27 | Automated mechanisms exist to protect Intellectual Property (IP) rights by preventing the unauthorized distribution and/or modification of sensitive IP. | 10 | |
| 5.4 | Data Loss Prevention (DLP) | The ability to detect and prevent the unauthorized use and transmission of information. | Functional | intersects with | Data Loss Prevention (DLP) | NET-17 | Automated mechanisms exist to implement Data Loss Prevention (DLP) to protect sensitive information as it is stored, transmitted and processed. | 5 | |
| 5.5 | Dynamic Data Masking | The ability to provide a column-level security feature that uses masking policies to selectively mask tables and columns at query time. | Functional | no relationship | N/A | N/A | No applicable SCF control | N/A | |
| 5.6 | Data Discovery & Classification | The ability to discover, classify, label, and report upon the sensitive data in your databases. | Functional | subset of | Data & Asset Classification | DCH-02 | Mechanisms exist to ensure data and assets are categorized in accordance with applicable statutory, regulatory and contractual requirements. | 10 | |
| 5.6.1 | Data Tagging | The ability to associate a data object with characterizing metadata for a defined purpose. | Functional | intersects with | Automated Marking | DCH-04.1 | Automated mechanisms exist to mark physical media and digital files to indicate the distribution limitations, handling requirements and applicable security markings (if any) of the information to aid Data Loss Prevention (DLP) technologies. | 5 | |
| 6.0 | Analytics | The ability to systematically apply statistical and /or logical techniques to describe and illustrate, condense, and recap, and evaluate data. | Functional | no relationship | N/A | N/A | No applicable SCF control | N/A | |
| 6.1 | Data Visualization | The ability to represent information graphically, highlighting patterns and trends in data and helping the reader to achieve quick insights. | Functional | no relationship | N/A | N/A | No applicable SCF control | N/A | |
| 6.2 | Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) | The ability to centrally collect event and incident alerts across disparate sources, analyze them, and provide reports, situational awareness, and notifications. It is frequently used in support of incidence response, compliance, and reporting. | Functional | equal | Automated Tools for Real- Time Analysis | MON-01.2 | Mechanisms exist to utilize a Security Incident Event Manager (SIEM), or similar automated tool, to support near real-time analysis and incident escalation. | 10 | |
| 6.3 | Big Data | The ability to enable enhanced insight, decision making, and process automation by consuming high-volume, high-velocity and/or high-variety information assets. | Functional | no relationship | N/A | N/A | No applicable SCF control | N/A | |
| 6.4 | Sensors & Telemetry | The ability to collect status, state, and configuration of a service or device via the use of active or passive probes or other analytic activities on the device. | Functional | no relationship | N/A | N/A | No applicable SCF control | N/A | |
| 6.5 | Continuous Monitoring | The ability to determine if the complete set of planned, required, and deployed security controls within an information system or inherited by the system continue to be effective over time in light of the inevitable changes that occur. | Functional | subset of | Continuous Monitoring | MON-01 | Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of enterprise-wide monitoring controls. | 10 | |
| 6.6 | Machine Learning | The ability to apply machine learning algorithms composed of many technologies (such as deep learning, neural networks and natural language processing), in unsupervised and supervised learning, that operate guided by lessons from existing information. | Functional | no relationship | N/A | N/A | No applicable SCF control | N/A | |
| 6.7 | Entity and Activity Auditing | events. The analysis seeks to find patterns amongst data generated by user activity. | Functional | intersects with | Anomalous Behavior | MON-16 | Mechanisms exist to detect and respond to anomalous behavior that could indicate account compromise or other malicious activities. | 5 | |
| 7.0 | ZT Governance | A set of processes that ensures that ZT assets are formally managed throughout the enterprise. A ZT governance model establishes authority and management and decision making parameters related to ZT policies produced or managed by the enterprise. | Functional | no relationship | N/A | N/A | No applicable SCF control | N/A | |
| 8.0 | ZT Orchestration | The ability to coordinate and automate disparate Zero Trust services, systems, and activities as part of of Cybersecurity Domain Orchestrator. | Functional | no relationship | N/A | N/A | No applicable SCF control | N/A | |
| 8.1 | Automation | The ability to create and apply application technology to monitor and control the production and delivery of otherwise manual services. | Functional | no relationship | N/A | N/A | No applicable SCF control | N/A | |
| 8.1.1 | Artificial Intelligence | The capability of computer processes to perform functions that are normally associated with human intelligence such as reasoning, learning, and self- improvement. | Functional | no relationship | N/A | N/A | No applicable SCF control | N/A | |
| 8.1.2 | Robotic Process Automation | The ability to use software tools that partially or fully automate human activities that are manual, rule-based, and repetitive. | Functional | no relationship | N/A | N/A | No applicable SCF control | N/A | |
| 8.1.3 | Policy Administrator | A component with the ability to establish and/or shut down the communication path between a subject and a resource (via commands to relevant Policy Enforcement Points). The ability to direct Policy Enforcement Polins to grant or deny access to resources based on policies created by the policy engine. | Functional | no relationship | N/A | N/A | No applicable SCF control | N/A | |
| 8.2 | ZT Policy Engine | The ability for a component responsible for the ultimate decision to grant access to a resource for a given subject. | Functional | no relationship | N/A | N/A | No applicable SCF control | N/A | |
| 8.3 | ZT Policy Administration | The ability to coordinate and enforce policy created by the ZT policy engine by translating it to settings and configurations at designated policy enforcementpoints (PEPs). | Functional | no relationship | N/A | N/A | No applicable SCF control | N/A | |
| 8.4 | Software-Defined Enterprise | The ability to create a virtualized layer over physical infrastructure, and centrally manage it in an automated manner, utilizing a policy-based access control to dynamically create, configure, provision, and decommission virtualized network functions, system functions, security functions, and | Functional | no relationship | N/A | N/A | No applicable SCF control | N/A | |
| 8.4.1 | Domain Orchestration | workflows. The ability to coordinate services and operations, for a specific domain, across multiple types of devices and systems. | Functional | no relationship | N/A | N/A | No applicable SCF control | N/A | |
| 8.4.2 | Domain Control | The ability direct or command elements and associated systems to perform specific actions within a specified domain. | Functional | no relationship | N/A | N/A | No applicable SCF control | N/A | |
| 8.4.3 | Software Defined Networking | The ability to separate the control and data planes and centrally manage and control the elements in the data plane. | Functional | no relationship | N/A | N/A | No applicable SCF control | N/A | |
| 8.4.5 | Software-defined Wide- area Network | The ability to virtualizethe enterprise connection of local networks into a wide- area network through the use of central routing, management, control & configuration of virtualized, distributed network and security services. | Functional | no relationship | N/A | N/A | No applicable SCF control | N/A | |
| 8.4.6 | Network Function Virtualization / Virtual Security Function | The ability to decouple network functions (VNF) and security functions (VSF) from hardware appliances anddeliver those functions as software in virtual machines. | Functional | no relationship | N/A | N/A | No applicable SCF control | N/A | |
| 8.5 | Data Governance | A set of processes that ensures that data assets are formally managed throughout the enterprise. A data governance model establishes authority and management and decision making parameters related to the data produced or managed by theenterprise. | Functional | equal | Data Governance | GOV-10 | Mechanisms exist to facilitate data governance to oversee the organization's policies, standards and procedures so that sensitive/regulated data is effectively managed and maintained in accordance with applicable statutory, regulatory and contractual obligations. | 10 | |
| 8.6 | Risk Management Framework | Provides a comprehensive, flexible, repeatable, and measurable process that any organization can use to manage information security and privacy risk for organizations and systems and links to a suite of NST standards and guidelines to support implementation of risk management programs tomeet the requirements of the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA). | Functional | subset of | Risk Management Program | RSK-01 | Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of strategic, operational and tactical risk management controls. | 10 | |
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