NIST IR 8477-Based Set Theory Relationship Mapping (STRM)
Reference Document: Secure Controls Framework (SCF) version 2025.1
STRM Guidance: https://securecontrolsframework.com/set-theory-relationship-mapping-strm/

Focal Document: NIST SP 800-218 Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF) Versi
Focal Document URL: https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/218/final https://securecontrolsframework.com/content/strm/scf-strm-general-nist-800-218.pdf

FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship (optional)	Notes (optional)
PO.1	Define Security Requirements for Software Development	Ensure that security requirements for software development are known at all times so that they can be taken into account throughout the SDLC and duplication of effort can be minimized because the requirements information can be collected once and shared. This includes requirements from internal sources (e.g., the organization's policies, business objectives, and risk management strategy) and external sources (e.g., applicable laws and regulations).	Functional	Intersects With	Statutory, Regulatory & Contractual Compliance	CPL-01	Mechanisms exist to facilitate the identification and implementation of relevant statutory, regulatory and contractual controls.	8	Example 1: Define policies for securing software development infrastructures and their components, including development endpoints, throughout the SDLC and maintaining that security. Example 2: Define policies for securing software development processes throughout the SDLC and maintaining that security, including for open-source and other third-party software components utilized by software being developed. Example 3: Review and update security requirements at least annually, or sooner if there are new requirements from internal or external sources, or a major security incident targeting software development infrastructure has occurred. Example 4: Educate affected individuals on impending chapters to requirements
PO.1	Define Security Requirements for Software Development	Ensure that security requirements for software development are known at all times so that they can be taken into account throughout the SDLC and duplication of effort can be minimized because the requirements information can be collected once and shared. This includes requirements from internal sources (e.g., the organization's policies, business objectives, and risk management strategy) and external sources (e.g., applicable laws and regulations).	Functional	Intersects With	Compliance Scope	CPL-01.2	Mechanisms exist to document and validate the scope of cybersecurity & data privacy controls that are determined to meet statutory, regulatory and/or contractual compliance obligations.	5	Channess to requirements
PO.1	Define Security Requirements for Software Development	Ensure that security requirements for software development are known at all times so that they can be taken into account throughout the SDLC and duplication of effort can be minimized because the requirements information can be collected once and shared. This includes requirements from internal sources (e.g., the organization's policies, business objectives, and risk management strategy) and external sources (e.g., applicable laws and regulations).	Functional	Intersects With	Data Privacy Requirements for Contractors & Service Providers	PRI-07.1	establish data privacy roles and responsibilities for contractors and service providers.	5	
PO.1	Define Security Requirements for Software Development	Ensure that security requirements for software development are known at all times so that they can be taken into account throughout the SDLC and duplication of effort can be minimized because the requirements information can be collected once and shared. This includes requirements from internal sources (e.g., the organization's policies, business objectives, and risk management strategy) and external sources (e.g., applicable laws and regulations).	Functional	Intersects With	Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Requirements Definition	PRM-05	at pre-defined decision points in the Secure Development Life Cycle (SDLC).	5	
PO.1	Define Security Requirements for Software Development	Ensure that security requirements for software development are known at all times so that they can be taken into account throughout the SDLC and duplication of effort can be minimized because the requirements information can be collected once and shared. This includes requirements from internal sources (e.g., the organization's policies, business objectives, and risk management strategy) and external sources (e.g., applicable laws and regulations).	Functional	Intersects With	Secure Development Life Cycle (SDLC) Management	PRM-07	Mechanisms exist to ensure changes to systems within the Secure Development Life Cycle (SDLC) are controlled through formal change control procedures.	5	
PO.1	Define Security Requirements for Software Development	Ensure that security requirements for software development are known at all times so that they can be taken into account throughout the SDLC and duplication of effort can be minimized because the requirements information can be collected once and shared. This includes requirements from internal sources (e.g., the organization's policies, business objectives, and risk management strategy) and external sources (e.g., applicable laws and regulations).	Functional	Intersects With	Minimum Viable Product (MVP) Security Requirements	TDA-02	Mechanisms exist to design, develop and produce products and/or services in such a way that risk-based technical and functional specifications ensure Minimum Viable Product (MVP) criteria establish an appropriate level of security and resiliency based on applicable risks and threats.	5	
PO.1	Define Security Requirements for Software Development	Ensure that security requirements for software development are known at all times so that they can be taken into account throughout the SDLC and duplication of effort can be minimized because the requirements information can be collected once and shared. This includes requirements from internal sources (e.g., the organization's policies, business objectives, and risk management strategy) and external sources (e.g., applicable laws and regulations).	Functional	Intersects With	Development Methods, Techniques & Processes	TDA-02.3	programming, engineering methods, quality control processes and validation techniques to minimize flawed and/or malformed software.	5	
PO.1	Define Security Requirements for Software Development	Ensure that security requirements for software development are known at all times so that they can be taken into account throughout the SDLC and duplication of effort can be minimized because the requirements information can be collected once and shared. This includes requirements from internal sources (e.g., the organization's policies, business objectives, and risk management strategy) and external sources (e.g., applicable laws and regulations).	Functional	Intersects With	Secure Software Development Practices (SSDP)	TDA-06	Mechanisms exist to develop applications based on Secure Software Development Practices (SSDP).	5	
PO.1	Define Security Requirements for Software Development	Ensure that security requirements for software development are known at all times so that they can be taken into account throughout the SDLC and duplication of effort can be minimized because the requirements information can be collected once and shared. This includes requirements from internal sources (e.g., the organization's policies, business objectives, and risk management strategy) and external sources (e.g., applicable laws and requisitations).	Functional	Subset Of	Technology Development & Acquisition	TDA-01	Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of tailored development and acquisition strategies, contract tools and procurement methods to meet unique business needs.	10	
PO.1	Define Security Requirements for Software Development	Ensure that security requirements for software development are known at all times so that they can be taken into account throughout the SDLC and duplication of effort can be minimized because the requirements information can be collected once and shared. This includes requirements from internal sources (e.g., the organization's policies, business objectives, and risk management strategy) and external sources (e.g., applicable laws and regulations).	Functional	Intersects With	Product Management	TDA-01.1	Mechanisms exist to design and implement product management processes to proactively govern the design, development and production of products and/or services across the System Development Life Cycle (SDLC) to: (1) Improve functionality. (2) Enhance sourity and resiliency capabilities; (3) Correct security deficiencies; and (4) Conform with applicable statutory, regulatory and for contractual obligations.	5	
PO.1	Define Security Requirements for Software Development	Ensure that security requirements for software development are known at all times so that they can be taken into account throughout the SDLC and duplication of effort can be minimized because the requirements information can be collected once and shared. This includes requirements from internal sources (e.g., the organization's policies, business objectives, and risk management strategy) and external sources (e.g., applicable laws and regulations).	Functional	Intersects With	Third-Party Contract Requirements	TPM-05	Mechanisms exist to require contractual requirements for cybersecurity & data privacy requirements with third-parties, reflecting the organization's needs to protect its systems, processes and data.	5	
PO.1.1	N/A	Identify and document all security requirements for the organization's software development infrastructures and processes, and maintain the requirements over time.	Functional	Intersects With	Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Requirements Definition	PRM-05	Mechanisms exist to identify critical systems components and functions by performing a critically analysis for critical systems, system components or services at pre-defined decision points in the Secure Development Life Cycle (SDLC).	5	Example 1: Define policies that specify risk-based software architecture and design requirements, such as making code modular to facilitate oder result and updates; lacidating security components from other components during sexecution; working undocumented commands and settings; and providing fleatures that will aid software acquirers with secure deployment, operation, and maintenance of the software; captures, and service provides the secure deployment, operation, and maintenance of the software; captures with secure deployment, operation, and winforcements for the organization's software, and verify requirements for the organization's software, and verify compliance at key points in the SDL (e.g., classes of software flaws verified by gates, responses to vulnerabilities discovered in released software). Example 3: Analyse the risk of applicable technology stacks (e.g., languages, environments, deployment models), and recommend or require the use of stacks that will reduce risk compared to others. Example 4: Define policies that specify what needs to be archived for each software relaced based on the SDLC model, software end-of-life, and other factors. Example 5: Desire with applicate soon when entire software subsort and the date of software end-of-life. Example 5: Review all security requirements at least annually, or soon of there are now requirements from internal or external sources, a major vulnerability in discovered in released software, or a major security incident targeting organization-developed software lass.



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FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship (optional)	Notes (optional)
PO.1.1	N/A	Identify and document all security requirements for the organization's software development infrastructures and processes, and maintain the requirements over time.	Functional	Intersects With	Minimum Viable Product (MVP) Security Requirements	TDA-02	Mechanisms exist to design, develop and produce products and/or services in such a way that risk-based technical and functional specifications ensure Minimum Viable Product (MVP) criteria establish an appropriate level of security and resiliency based on applicable risks and threats.	5	
PO.1.1	N/A	Identify and document all security requirements for the organization's software development infrastructures and processes, and maintain the requirements over time.	Functional	Intersects With	Product Management	TDA-01.1	Mechanisms exist to design and implement product management processes to proactively govern the design, development and production of products and/or services across the System Development Life Cycle (SDLC) to: (1) Improve functionality; 2) Enhance servicing and resiliency capabilities; (3) Correct security deficiencies; and (4) Conform with applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual obligations.	5	
PO.1.2	N/A	Identify and document all security requirements for organization-developed software to meet, and maintain the requirements over time.	Functional	Subset Of	Statutory, Regulatory & Contractual Compliance	CPL-01	Mechanisms exist to facilitate the identification and implamentation of relevant status, regulatory and confirectual controls.	10	Example 1: Define a core set of security requirements for software components, and include it in acquisition documents, software contracts, and other agreements with third parties. Example 2: Define security-related criteria for selecting software, the criteria can include the third party's universability disclosure program and product security incident response capabilities or the third party's adherence to organization defined practices. Example 3: Require third parties to attest that their software complies with the organization's security requirements. Example 4: Require third parties to rovide provenance data and integrity verification mechanisms for all components of their software. Example 5: Establish and follow processes to address risk when there are security requirements that third-party software components to the acquired do not meet; this should include periodic reviews of all approved exceptions to requirements.
PO.1.2	N/A	Identify and document all security requirements for organization-developed software to meet, and maintain the requirements over time.	Functional	Intersects With	Minimum Viable Product (MVP) Security Requirements	TDA-02	Mechanisms exist to design, develop and produce products and/or services in such a way that risk-based technical and functional specifications ensure Minimum Viable Product (MVP) criteria establish an appropriate level of security and resiliency based on applicable risks and threats.	5	
PO.1.2	N/A	identify and document all security requirements for organization-developed software to meet, and maintain the requirements over time.	Functional	Intersects With	Product Management	TDA-01.1	Mechanisms exist to design and implement product management processes to proactively govern the design, development and production of products and/or services across the System Development Life Cycle (SDLC) to: (1) Improve functionality; (2) Enhance security and resiliency capabilities; (3) Correct security deficiencies; and (4) Conform with applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual obligations.	5	
PO.2	Implement Roles and Responsibilities	Ensure that everyone inside and outside of the organization involved in the SDLC is prepared to perform their SDLC-related roles and responsibilities throughout the SDLC.	Functional	Intersects With	Defined Roles & Responsibilities	HRS-03	Mechanisms exist to define cybersecurity roles & responsibilities for all personnel.	5	
PO.2	Implement Roles and Responsibilities	Ensure that everyone inside and outside of the organization involved in the SDLC is prepared to perform their SDLC-related roles and responsibilities throughout the SDLC.	Functional	Intersects With	Competency Requirements for Security-Related Positions	HRS-03.2	Mechanisms exist to ensure that all security-related positions are staffed by qualified individuals who have the necessary skill set.	5	
PO.2.1	N/A	Create new roles and after responsibilities for existing roles as needed to encompass all parts of the SDLC. Periodically review and maintain the defined roles and responsibilities, updating them as needed.	Functional	Subset Of	Human Resources Security Management	HRS-01	Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of personnel security controls.	10	Eample 1: Define SDLC-related roles and responsibilities for all members of the software development team. Eample 2: Integrate the security roles into the software development team. Eample 3: Define roles and responsibilities for ophersecurity staff, security champions, project managers and leads, senior management, software developers, software testers, software assurance leads and staff, product owners, operations and platform engineers, and others involved in the SDLC. Eample 4: Conduct an annual review of all roles and responsibilities. Eample 5: Educate affected individuals on impending changes to roles and responsibilities, and confirm that the individuals understand the changes and agree to follow them. Eample 6: Implement and use tools and processes to promote communication and engagement among individuals with SDLC-related roles and responsibilities, such as creating messaging changes for team discussions. Eample 7: Designate a group of individuals or a team as the code owner for each project.
PO.2.1	N/A	Create new roles and alter responsibilities for existing roles as needed to encompass all parts of the SDLC. Periodically review and maintain the defined roles and responsibilities, updating them as needed.	Functional	Intersects With	Defined Roles & Responsibilities	HRS-03	Mechanisms exist to define cybersecurity roles & responsibilities for all personnel.	5	
PO.2.2	N/A	Provider forle-based training for all personnel with responsibilities that contribute to secure development. Periodically review personnel proficiency and role-based training, and update the training as needed.	Functional	Equal	Role-Based Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Training	SAT-03	Mechanisms exist to provide role-based cybersecurity & data privacy-related training: (1) Before authorizing access to the system or performing assigned duties; (2) When required by system changes; and (3) Annually thereafter.	10	Example 1: Document the desired outcomes of training for sach role. Example 2: Define the type of training or curriculum required to achieve the desired outcome for each role. Example 3: Create a training plan for each role. Example 4: Acquire or create training for each role; acquired training may need to be customized for the organization. Example 5: Measure outcome performance to identify areas where changes to training may be beneficial.
PO.2.2	N/A	Provide role-based training for all personnel with responsibilities that contribute to secure development. Periodically review personnel proficiency and role-based training, and update the training as needed.	Functional	Intersects With	Sensitive / Regulated Data Storage, Handling & Processing	SAT-03.3	Mechanisms exist to ensure that every user accessing a system processing, storing or transmitting sensitive / regulated data is formally trained in data handling requirements.	5	
PO.2.2	N/A	Provide role-based training for all personnel with responsibilities that contribute to secure development. Periodically review personnel proficiency and role-based training, and update the training as needed.	Functional	Intersects With	Privileged Users	SAT-03.5	roles and responsibilities	5	
PO.2.2	N/A	Provider Orle-based training for all personnel with responsibilities that contribute to secure development. Periodically eview personnel proficiency and role-based training, and update the training as needed.	Functional	Intersects With	Cyber Threat Environment	SAT-03.6	Mechanisms exist to provide role-based cybersecurity & data privacy awareness training that is current and relevant to the cyber threats that users might encounter in day-to-day business operations.	5	



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PO.2.3	N/A	Obtain upper management or authorizing official commitment to secure development, and convey that commitment to all with development-related roles and responsibilities.	Functional	Intersects With	Assigned Cybersecurity & Data Protection Responsibilities	GOV-04	Mechanisms exist to assign one or more qualified individuals with the mission and resources to entithy-manage, coordinate, develop, implement and maintain an enterprise-wide cybersecurity & data protection program.	5	Example 1: Appoint a single leader or leadership team to be responsible for the entire secure software development process, including being accountable for releasing software to production and delegating responsibilities as appropriate. Example 2: Increase authorizing officials' ewareness of the risks of developing software without integrating security throughout the development tide cycle and the risk mitigation provided by secure development practices. Example 3: Assist upper management in incorporating secure development support into their communications with personnel with development-related roles and responsibilities. Example 4: Educate all personnel with development-related roles and responsibilities on upper management's commitment to secure development and the importance of secure development to the organization.
PO.2.3	N/A	Obtain upper management or authorizing official commitment to secure development, and convey that commitment to all with development-related roles and responsibilities.	Functional	Intersects With	Stakeholder Accountability Structure	GOV-04.1	Mechanisms exist to enforce an accountability structure so that appropriate teams and individuals are empowered, responsible and trained for mapping, measuring and managing data and technology-related risks.	5	
PO.3	Implement Supporting Toolchains	Use automation to reduce human effort and improve the accuracy, reproducibility, usability, and comprehensiveness of security practices throughout the SDLC, as well as provide a way to document and demonstrate the use of these practices. Toolchains and tools may be used at different levels of the organization, such as organization-wide or project-specific, and may address a particular part of the SDLC, like a build pipeline.	Functional	Subset Of	Technology Development & Acquisition	TDA-01	Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of tailored development and acquisition strategies, contract tools and procurement methods to meet unique business needs.	10	
PO.3	Implement Supporting Toolchains	Use automation to reduce human effort and improve the accuracy, reproducibility, usability, and comprehensiveness of security practices throughout the SDLC, as well as provide a way to document and demonstrate the use of these practices. Toolchains and tools may be used at different levels of the organization, such as organization-wide or project-specific, and may address a particular part of the SDLC, like a build pipeline.	Functional	Intersects With	Development Methods, Techniques & Processes	TDA-02.3	Mechanisms exist to require software developers to ensure that their software development processes employ industry-recognized secure practices for secure programming, engineering methods, quality control processes and validation techniques to minimize flawed and/or malformed software.	5	
PO.3	Implement Supporting Toolchains	Use automation to reduce human effort and improve the accuracy, reproducibility, usability, and comprehensiveness of security practices throughout the SDLC, as well as provide a way to document and demonstrate the use of these practices. Toolchains and tools may be used at different levels of the organization, such as organization-wide or project-specific, and may address a particular part of the SDLC, like a blid pipeline.	Functional	Equal	Supporting Toolchain	TDA-06.4	Automated mechanisms exist to improve the accuracy, consistency and comprehensiveness of secure practices throughout the asset's lifecycle.	10	
PO.3.1	N/A	Specify which tools or tool types must or should be included in each toolchain to mitigate identified risks, as well as how the toolchain components are to be integrated with each other.	Functional	Intersects With	Development Methods, Techniques & Processes	TDA-02.3	Mechanisms exist to require software development processes amplipy industry-recognized secure practices for semipley industry-recognized secure programming, engineering methods, quality control processes and validation techniques to minimize flawed and/or malformed software.	5	Example 1: Define categories of toolchains, and specify the mandatory tools or tool types to be used for each category. Example 2: Identify security tools to integrate into the developer toolchain. Example 3: Define what the tools into the passed between tools and what data formats are to be used. Example 4: Evaluate tools' signing capabilities to create immutable records logs for auditability within the toolchain. Example 5: Use automated technology for toolchain management and orchestration.
PO.3.1	N/A	Specify which tools or tool types must or should be included in each toolchain to mitigate identified risks, as well as how the toolchain components are to be integrated with each other.	Functional	Intersects With	Supporting Toolchain	TDA-06.4	Automated mechanisms exist to improve the accuracy, consistency and comprehensiveness of secure practices throughout the asset's lifecycle.	5	
PO.3.2	N/A	Follow recommended security practices to deploy, operate, and maintain tools and toolchains.	Functional	Subset Of	Technology Development & Acquisition	TDA-01	Mechanisms axist to facilitate the implementation of tailored development and acquisition strategies, contract tools and procurement methods to meet unique business needs.	10	Example 1: Evaluate, select, and acquire tools, and assess the security of each tool. Example 2: Integrate tools with other tools and existing software development processes and workflows. Example 3: Use code-based configuration for toolchains (e.g., pipelines-acode), toolchains-acode). Example 4: Implement the technologies and processes needed for reproducible builds. Example 5: Update, upgrade, or replace tools as needed sto address tool vulnerabilities or add mer tool capabilities. Example 6: Continuously monitor tools and tool logs for potential operational and security issues, including policy violations and anomalous behavior. Example 7: Regularly verify the integrity and check the provenance of each tool to identify potential problems. Example 8: See PW 8: regarding compiler, interpreter, and build tools. Example 9: See PO.5 regarding implementing and maintraining secure environments.
PO.3.2	N/A	Follow recommended security practices to deplay, operate, and maintain tools and toolchains.	Functional	Intersects With	Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP)	OPS-01.1	Mechanisms exist to identify and document Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP), or similar documentation, to enable the proper execution of day-to-day / assigned tasks.	5	
PO.3.2	N/A	Follow recommended security practices to deploy, operate, and maintain tools and toolchains.	Functional	Intersects With	Service Delivery (Business Process Support)	OPS-03	Nechanisms exist to define supporting business processes and implement appropriate governance and service management to ensure appropriate planning, delivery and support of the organization's technology capabilities supporting business functions, workforce, and/or customers based on industry-recognized standards to achieve the specific goals of the process area.	5	
PO.3.2	N/A	Follow recommended security practices to deploy, operate, and maintain tools and toolchains.	Functional	Intersects With	Development Methods, Techniques & Processes	TDA-02.3	Mechanisms exist to require software development to ensure that their software development processes employ industry- recognized secure practices for secure programming, engineering methods, quality control processes and validation techniques to minimize flawed and/or malformed software.	5	
PO.3.2	N/A	Follow recommended security practices to deploy, operate, and maintain tools and toolchains.	Functional	Intersects With	Supporting Toolchain	TDA-06.4	Automated mechanisms exist to improve the accuracy, consistency and comprehensiveness of secure practices throughout the asset's lifecycle.	5	
PO.3.3	N/A	Configure tools to generate artifacts of their support of secure software development practices as defined by the organization.	Functional	Intersects With	Development Methods, Techniques & Processes	TDA-02.3	Mechanisms exist to require software developers to ansure that their software developers to ansure that their software development processes employ industry-recognized secure practices for secure programming, engineering methods, quality control processes and validation techniques to minimize flawed and/or matformed software.	5	Example 1: Use existing tooling (e.g., workflow tracking, issue tracking, you see ame ampling) to create an audit trail of the secure development-related actions that are performed for continuous improvement purposes. Example 2: Determine how often the collected information should be audited, and implement the necessary processes. Example 3: Establish and enforce security and retention policies for artifact data. Example 4: Assign responsibility for creating any needed artifacts that broke anonat senareta.
PO.3.3	N/A	Configure tools to generate artifacts of their support of secure software development practices as defined by the organization.	Functional	Intersects With	Identification & Justification of Ports, Protocols & Services	TDA-02.5	Mechanisms exist to require process owners to identify, document and justify the business nead for the ports, protocols and other services necessary to operate their technology solutions.	3	



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FDE#	PDE Name	Configure tools to generate artifacts of their support of secure software development	Rationale	Relationship	SCFControl	SCF#	Control Description Mechanisms exist to obtain, protect and	(optional)	Notes (opuonar)
PO.3.3	N/A	practices as defined by the organization.	Functional	Intersects With	Documentation Requirements	TDA-04	distribute administrator documentation for systems that describe: (1) Secure configuration, installation and operation of the system; (2) Effective use and maintenance of security features/functions; and (3) Known vulnerabilities regarding configuration and use of administrative fea. s. privileged functions.	5	
PO.3.3	N/A	Configure tools to generate artifacts of their support of secure software development practices as defined by the organization.	Functional	Intersects With	Functional Properties	TDA-04.1	Mechanisms exist to require software developers to provide information describing the functional properties of the security controls to be utilized within systems, system components or services in sufficient detail to permit analysis and testing of the controls.	3	
PO.4	Define and Use Criteria for Software Security Checks	Help ensure that the software resulting from the SDLC meets the organization's expectations by defining and using criteria for checking the software's security during development. Help ensure that the software resulting from the SDLC meets the organization's	Functional	Intersects With	Software Design Review	TDA-06.5	Mechanisms exist to have an independent review of the software design to confirm	5	
PO.4	Define and Use Criteria for Software Security Checks	respectations by defining and using criteria for checking the software's security during development.	Functional	Intersects With	Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Testing Throughout Development	TDA-09	vectorismisms assu to vector systems of the developers/integrators consult with toplersecurity & data privacy personnel to (I) Create and implement a Security Testing and Evaluation (ST&E) plan, or similar capability. (2) Implement a verifiable flaw remediation process to correct weaknesses and deficiencies identified during the security testing and evaluation process; and (3) Document the results of the security testing/evaluation and flaw remediation processes.	5	
PO.4	Define and Use Criteria for Software Security Checks	Help ensure that the software resulting from the SDLC meets the organization's expectations by defining and using criteria for checking the software's security during development.	Functional	Intersects With	Static Code Analysis	TDA-09.2	remediate common flaws and document the results of the analysis.	3	
PO.4	Define and Use Criteria for Software Security Checks	Help ensure that the software resulting from the SDLC meets the organization's expectations by defining and using criteria for checking the software's security during development.	Functional	Intersects With	Dynamic Code Analysis	TDA-09.3	Mechanisms exist to require the developers of systems, system components or services to employ dynamic code analysis tools to identify and remediate common flaws and document the results of the analysis.	3	
PO.4.1	N/A	Define criteria for software security checks and track throughout the SDLC.	Functional	Intersects With	Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Testing Throughout Development	TDA-09	Mechanisms axist to require system developers/infegrators consult with opbersecurity & data privacy personnel to: (1) Create and implement a Security Testing and Feulation (ST&E) plan, or similar capability; (2) Implement a verifiable flaw remediation process to correct weaknesses and deficiancies identified during the security testing and evaluation process; and (3) Document the results of the security testing/evaluation and flaw remediation processes.	5	Example 1: Ensure that the criteria adequately indicate how effectively security risk is being managed. Example 2: Define key performance indicators (KPls), key risk indicators (KRls), vulnerability severity scores, and other measures for ordivers escurity. Example 3: Add software security criteria to existing checks (e.g., the Definition of Done in agiles DLC methodologies). Example 4: Review the artifacts generated as part of the software development workflow system to determine if they meet the criteria. Example 5: Record security check approveds, rejections, and exception requests as part of the workflow and tracking system. Example 6: Analyze collected data in the context of the security successes and failures of each development project, and use the results to improve the SDLC.
PO.4.2	N/A	Implement processes, mechanisms, etc. to gather and safeguard the necessary information in support of the criteria.	Functional	Intersects With	Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP)	OPS-01.1	Mechanisms exist to identify and document Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP), or similar documentation, to enable the proper execution of day-to-day / assigned tasks.	5	Example 1: Use the toolchain to automatically gather information that informs security decision-making. Example 2: Policy additional tools if needed to support the generation and collection of information supporting the criteria. Example 3: Automate decision-making processes utilizing the criteria, and periodically review these processes. Example 4: Only allow authorized personnel to access the gathered information, and prevent any alteration or deletion of the information.
PO.4.2	N/A	Implement processes, mechanisms, etc. to gather and safeguard the necessary information in support of the criteria.	Functional	Intersects With	Product Management	TDA-01.1	Mechanisms exist to design and implement product management processes to proactively govern the design, development and production of product and/or services across the System Development Life Cycle SDLO to: (1) Improve functionality; (2) Enhance security and resiliency capabilities; (3) Cornect security deficiencies; and (4) Conform with applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual obligations.	5	
PO.4.2	N/A	Implement processes, mechanisms, etc. to gather and safeguard the necessary information in support of the criteria.	Functional	Intersects With	Development Methods, Techniques & Processes	TDA-02.3	Mechanisms exist to require software developers to ensure that their software development processes employ industry-recognized secure practices for secure programming, engineering methods, quality control processes and validation tachniques to minimize flawed and/or malformed software.	5	
PO.5	Implement and Maintain Secure Environments for Software Development	Ensure that all components of the environments for software development are strongly protected from internal and external threats to prevent compromises of the environments or the software being developed or maintained within them. Examples of environments for software development include development, build, test, and distribution environments.	Functional	Intersects With	Development & Test Environment Configurations	CFG-02.4	Mechanisms exist to manage baseline configurations for development and test	5	
PO.5	Implement and Maintain Secure Environments for Software Development	the software being developed or maintained within them. Examples of environments for software development include development, build, test, and distribution environments.	Functional	Subset Of	Secure Development Environments	TDA-07	Mechanisms exist to maintain a segmented development network to ensure a secure development environment.		
PO.5	Implement and Maintain Secure Environments for Software Development	Ensure that all components of the environments for software development are strongly protected from internal and external threats to prevent compromises of the environment for software being developed or maintained within them. Examples of environments for software development include development, build, test, and distribution environments. Ensure that all components of the environments for software development are strongly	Functional	Intersects With	Separation of Development, Testing and Operational Environments	TDA-08	Mechanisms exist to manage separate development, testing and operational environments to reduce the risks of unauthorized access or changes to the operational environment and to ensure no impact to production systems.	5	
PO.5	Implement and Maintain Secure Environments for Software Development	Ensure that all components of the environments for software development are strongly protected from internal and external threats to prevent compromises of the environments or the software being developed or maintained within them. Examples of environments for software development include development, build, test, and distribution environments.	Functional	Intersects With	Secure Migration Practices	TDA-08.1	Mechanisms exist to ensure secure migration practices purge systems, applications and services of test/development/staging data and accounts before it is migrated into a production environment.	5	



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FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship (optional)	Notes (optional)
PO.5.1	N/A	Separate and protect each environment involved in software development.	Functional	Subset Of	Secure Development Environments	TDA-07	Mechanisms exist to maintain a segmented development network to ensure a secure development environment.		Example 1: Use multi-factor, risk-based authentication and conditional access for each environment. Example 2: Use network segmentation and access controls to separate the environments from each other and from production environments, and to separate components from each other within each non-production environment, in order to reduce tatack surfaces and tatackers' lateral movement and privilege/access secalation. Example 3: Enforce authentication and tightly restrict connections entering and exiting each software development environment, including minimizing access to the internet to only what is necessary. Example 3: Himiting direct human access to toolchain systems, such as build services. Continuously monitor and audit all access attempts and all use of privileged access. Example 5: Minimize the use of production environments. Example 6: Regularly log, monitor, and audit trust relationships for suthorization and access between the environment. Example 7: Continuously log and monitor operations and alerts across all components of the development environment and between the components within each environment. Example 8: Continuously log and monitor operations and alerts across all components of the development environment of the development and access and the production environments. Example 9: Continuously nontrols and other tools involved in separating and protecting the environments to separate artifacts for their activities.
PO.5.1	N/A	Separate and protect each environment involved in software development.	Functional	Intersects With	Separation of Development, Testing and Operational Environments	TDA-08	Mechanisms exist to manage separate development, testing and operational environments to reduce the risks of unauthorized access or changes to the operational environment and to ensure no impact to oroduction systems.	5	secul etwionment for new vuolerautues, and respond to
PO.5.2	N/A	Secure and harden development endpoints (i.e., endpoints for software designers, developers, testers, builders, etc.) to perform development-related tasks using a risk-based approach.	Functional	Subset Of	System Hardening Through Baseline Configurations	CFG-02	Mechanisms exist to develop, document and maintain secure baseline and maintain secure baseline configurations for technology platforms that are consistent with industry-accepted system hardening standards.		Eample 1: Configure each development endopoint based on approved hardening guides, checklists, etc.; for example, enable FIPS-compliant encryption of all sensitive data at rest and in transit. Example 2: Configure each development endpoint and the development resources to provide the least functionality needed by users and services and to enforce the principle of least privilege. Example 3: Configure seculity point of the security posture of all development endpoints, including monitoring and auditing all use of privilege access. Example 4: Configure security controls and other tools involved in securing and hardening development endpoints to generate artifacts for their activities. Example 5: Require multi-factor suthertication for all access to development endpoints and other configures exceptions and development endpoints on production networks for performing all development related tasks. Provide separate endpoints on production networks for performing all development endpoints on production their tasks.
PO.5.2	N/A	Secure and harden development endpoints (i.e., endpoints for software designers, development, testers, builders, etc.) to perform development-related tasks using a risk-based approach.	Functional	Intersects With	Development & Test Environment Configurations	CFG-02.4	Mechanisms exist to manage baseline configurations for development and test environments separately from operational baseline configurations to minimize the risk of unintentional changes.	5	
PO.5.2	N/A	Secure and harden development endpoints (i.e., endpoints for software designers, developers, testers, builders, etc.) to perform development-related tasks using a risk-based approach.	Functional	Intersects With	Configure Systems, Components or Services for High-Risk Areas	CFG-02.5	Mechanisms exist to configure systems utilized in high-risk areas with more restrictive baseline configurations.	5	
PS.1		Help prevent unauthorized changes to code, both inadvertent and intentional, which could circumvent or negate the intended security characteristics of the software. For code that is not intended to be publicly accessible, this helps prevent theft of the software and may make it more difficult or time-consuming for attackers to find vulnerabilities in the software.	Functional	Intersects With	Access Restriction For Change	CHG-04	Mechanisms exist to enforce configuration restrictions in an effort to restrict the ability of users to conduct unauthorized changes.	5	
PS.1	Protect All Forms of Code from Unauthorized Access and Tampering	Help prevent unauthorized changes to code, both inadvertent and intentional, which could circumvent or negate the intended security characteristics of the software. For code that is not intended to be publicly accessible, this helps prevent thefr of the software and may make it more difficult or time-consuming for attackers to find vulnerabilities in the software.	Functional	Intersects With	Library Privileges	CHG-04.5	Mechanisms exist to restrict software library privileges to those individuals with a pertinent business need for access.	5	
PS.1.1	N/A	Store all forms of code – including source code, executable code, and configuration-as- code – based on the principle of least privilege so that only authorized personnel, tools, services, etc. have access.	Functional	Equal	Access to Program Source Code	TDA-20	Mechanisms exist to limit privileges to change software resident within software libraries.	10	
PS.2	Provide a Mechanism for Verifying Software Release Integrity	Help software acquirers ensure that the software they acquire is legitimate and has not been tampered with.	Functional	Equal	Software Release Integrity Verification	TDA-20.1	Mechanisms exist to publish integrity verification information for software releases.	10	
PS.2.1	N/A	Make software integrity verification information available to software acquirers.	Functional	Equal	Software Release Integrity Verification	TDA-20.1	Mechanisms exist to publish integrity verification information for software releases.	10	Example 1: Post cryptographic hashes for release files on a well-secured website. Example 2: Use an established certificate authority for code signing so that consumers' operating systems or other tools and services can confirm the validity of signatures before use. Example 3: Periolically review the code signing processes, including certificate renewal, rotation, revocation, and protection.
PS.3	Archive and Protect Each Software Release	Preserve software releases in order to help identify, analyze, and eliminate vulnerabilities discovered in the software after release.	Functional	Equal	Archiving Software Releases	TDA-20.2	Mechanisms exist to archive software releases and all of their components (e.g., code, package files, third-party libraries, documentation) to maintain integrity verification information.	10	
PS.3.1	N/A	Securely archive the necessary files and supporting data (e.g., integrity verification information, provenance data) to be retained for each software release.	Functional	Equal	Archiving Software Releases	TDA-20.2	Mechanisme exist to archive software releases and all of their components (e.g., code, package files, third-party libraries, documentation) to maintain integrity verification information.	10	Example 1: Store the release files, associated images, etc. in repositories following the organization's established policy. Allow read-only access to them by necessary personnel and no access by anyone else. Example 2: Store and protect release integrity verification information and provenance data, such as by keeping it in a separate location from the release files or by signing the data.
PS.3.1	N/A	Securely archive the necessary files and supporting data (e.g., integrity verification information, provenance data) to be retained for each software release.	Functional	Intersects With	Software Escrow	TDA-20.3	Mechanisms exist to escrow source code and supporting documentation to ensure software availability in the event the software provider goes out of business or is unable to provide support.	5	
PS.3.2	N/A	Collect, safeguard, maintain, and share provenance data for all components of each software release (e.g., in a software bill of materials [SBOM]).	Functional	Intersects With	Documentation Requirements	TDA-04	Mechanisms exist to obtain, protect and distribute administrator documentation for systems that describe: (1) Secure configuration, installation and operation of the system; (2) Effective use and maintenance of security features/functions; and (3) Known vulnerabilities regarding configuration and use of administrative (e.g., privileged) functions.	5	



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FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship (optional)	Notes (optional)
PS.3.2	N/A	Collect, safeguard, maintain, and share provenance data for all components of each software release (e.g., in a software bill of materials [SBOM]).	Functional	Intersects With	Software Bill of Materials (SBOM)	TDA-04.2	Mechanisms exist to generate, or obtain, a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) for systems, applications and services that lists software packages in use, including versions and applicable licenses.	5	
PW.1		Identify and evaluate the security requirements for the software; determine what security risks the software is likely to free during operation and how the software's design and architecture should mitigate those risks; and justify any cases where risk-based analysis indicates that security requirements should be relaxed or wiewlet. Addressing security requirements and risks during software design (secure by design) is key for improving software security and also helps improve development efficiency.	Functional	Intersects With	Secure Software Development Practices (SSDP)	TDA-06	Mechanisms exist to develop applications based on Secure Software Development Practices (SSDP).	5	
PW.1	Design Software to Meet Security Requirements and Mitigate Security Risks	Identify and evaluate the security requirements for the software; determine what security risks the software is likely to face during operation and how the software's design and architecture should mitigate those risks; and justify any cases where risk-based analysis indicates that security requirements should be relaxed or waived. Addressing security requirements and risks during software design (secure by design) is key for improving software security and also helps improve development efficiency.	Functional	Intersects With	Criticality Analysis	TDA-06.1	Mechanisms exist to require the developer of the system, system component or service to perform a criticality analysis at organization-defined decision points in the Secure Development Life Cycle (SDLC).	5	
PW.1	Design Software to Meet Security Requirements and Mitigate Security Risks	Identify and evaluate the security requirements for the software; determine what security risks the software is likely to face during operation and how the software's design and architecture should mitigate those risks; and justify any cases where risk-based analysis indicates that security requirements should be relaxed or waived. Addressing security requirements and risks during software design (secure by design) is key for improving software security and also helps improve development efficiency.	Functional	Intersects With	Threat Modeling	TDA-06.2	accounted for.	5	
PW.1	Design Software to Meet Security Requirements and Mitigate Security Risks	Identify and evaluate the security requirements for the software; determine what security risks the software is likely to face during operation and how the software's design and architecture should mitigate those risks; and justify any cases where risk-based analysis indicates that security requirements should be relaxed or waived. Addressing security requirements and risks during software design (secure by design) is key for improving software security and also helps improve development efficiency.	Functional	Intersects With	Software Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM)	TDA-06.3	the development of systems, applications and services.	5	
PW.1.1	N/A	Use forms of risk modeling – such as threat modeling, attack modeling, or attack surface mapping – to help assess the security risk for the software.	Functional	Intersects With	Threat Modeling	TDA-06.2	Mechanisms exist to perform threat modelling and other secure design techniques, to ensure that threats to software and solutions are identified and accounted for.	5	Example 1: Train the development team (security champions, in particular) or collaborate with a risk modeling expert to create models and analyze how to use a risk-based approach to communicate the risks and determine how to address them, including implementing mitigations. Example 2: Perform more rigorous assessments for high-risk areas, such as protecting sensitive data and sarefigurating identification, authentication, and access control, including credential management. Example 3: Review ulnerability reports and statistics for previous software to inform the security risk assessment. Example 4: We teat classification methods to identify and characterize each type of data that the software will
PW.1.2	N/A	Track and maintain the software's security requirements, risks, and design decisions.	Functional	Subset Of	Product Management	TDA-01.1	Mechanisms oxist to design and implement product management processes to practively govern the design, development and production of products and reverse survives across the System Development Life Cycle (SDLC) to: (1) Improve functionality; (2) Enhance security and resiliency capabilities; (3) Corroct security deficiencies; and (4) Conform with applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual obligations.		Interact. with. Example 1: Record the response to each risk, including how mitigations are to be achieved and what the rationales are for any approved exceptions to the security requirements. Add any mitigations to the software's security requirements. Add any mitigations to the software's security requirements. Example 2: Maintain records of design decisions, risk responses, and approved exceptions that can be used for auditing and maintenance purposes throughout the rest of the software life cyclie. Example 3: Periodically re-valuate all approved exceptions to the security requirements, and implement changes as needed.
PW.1.2	N/A	Track and maintain the software's security requirements, risks, and design decisions.	Functional	Intersects With	Minimum Viable Product (MVP) Security Requirements	TDA-02	Mechanisms exist to design, develop and produce products and/or services in such a way that risk-based technical and functional specifications ensure Minimum Viable Product (MVP) criteria establish an appropriate level of security and resiliency based on applicable risks and threats.	5	
PW.1.3	N/A	Where appropriate, build in support for using standardized security features and services (e.g., enabling software to integrate with existing log management, identity management, access control, and vulnerability management systems instead of creating proprietary implementations of security features and services. [Formerly PW.4.3]	Functional	Intersects With	Minimum Viable Product (MVP) Security Requirements	TDA-02	Mechanisms exist to design, develop and produce products and/or services in such a way that risk-based technical and functional specifications ensure Minimum Vishel Product (MPV) criteria establish an appropriate level of security and resiliency biased on applicable risks and threats.	5	Example 1: Maintain one or more software repositories of modules for supporting standardized security features and services. Example 2: Determine secure configurations for modules for supporting standardized security features and services, and make these configurations available (e.g., as configuration-as-code) so developers can readily use them. Example 3: Define criteria for which security features and services must be supported by software to be developed.
PW.1.3	N/A	Where appropriate, build in support for using standardized security features and services (e.g., enabling software to integrate with existing log management, identity management, access control, and vulnerability management systems) instead of creating proprietary implementations of security features and services. [Formerty PW.4.3]	Functional	Intersects With	Secure Settings By Default	TDA-09.6	Mechanisms exist to implement secure configuration settings by default to reduce the likelihood of software being deployed with weak security settings that would put the asset at a greater risk of compromise.	5	
PW.1.3	N/A	Where appropriate, build in support for using standardized security features and services (e.g., enabling software to integrate with existing log management, identity management, access control, and vulnerability management systems) instead of creating proprietary implementations of security features and services. [Formerly P.W.4.3]	Functional	Intersects With	Secure Software Development Practices (SSDP)	TDA-06	Mechanisms exist to develop applications based on Secure Software Development Practices (SSDP).	5	
PW.2	Review the Software Design to Verify Compliance with Security Requirements and Risk Information	Help ensure that the software will meet the security requirements and satisfactorily address the identified risk information.	Functional	Intersects With	Minimum Viable Product (MVP) Security Requirements	TDA-02	Mechanisms exist to design, develop and produce products and/or services in such a way that risk-based technical and functional specifications ensure Minimum Viable Product (MVP) criteria establish an appropriate level of security and resiliency based on applicable risks and threats.	5	
PW.2	Review the Software Design to Verify Compliance with Security Requirements and Risk Information	Help ensures that the software will meet the security requirements and satisfactorily address the identified risk information.	Functional	Intersects With	Development Methods, Techniques & Processes	TDA-02.3	programming, engineering methods, quality control processes and validation techniques to minimize flawed and/or	5	
PW.2	Review the Software Design to Verify Compliance with Security Requirements and Risk Information	Help ensure that the software will meet the security requirements and satisfactorily address the identified risk information.	Functional	Intersects With	Insecure Ports, Protocols & Services	TDA-02.6	malformed software. Mechanisms exist to mitigate the risk associated with the use of insecure ports, protocols and services necessary to operate technology solutions.	5	
PW.2	Review the Software Design to Verify Compliance with Security Requirements and Risk Information	Help ensure that the software will meet the security requirements and satisfactorily address the identified risk information.	Functional	Intersects With	Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Representatives For Product Changes	TDA-02.7	Mechanisms exist to include appropriate cybersecurity & data privacy representatives in the product feature and/or functionality change control review process.	5	
PW.2	Review the Software Design to Verify Compliance with Security Requirements and Risk Information	Help ensure that the software will meet the security requirements and satisfactorily address the identified risk information.	Functional	Intersects With	Software Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM)	TDA-06.3	Mechanisms exist to utilize a Software Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM) to govern a secure development lifecycle for the development of systems, applications and services.	5	
PW.2	Review the Software Design to Verify Compliance with Security Requirements and Risk Information	Help ensure that the software will meet the security requirements and satisfactorily address the identified risk information.	Functional	Intersects With	Software Design Review	TDA-06.5	Mechanisms exist to have an independent review of the software design to confirm that all cybersecurity & data privacy requirements are met and that any identified risks are satisfactorily addressed.	5	



FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship (optional)	Notes (optional)
PW.2.1	N/A	Have 1) a qualified person (or people) who were not involved with the design and/or 2) automated processes instantiated in the toolchain review the software design to confirm and enforce that it meets all of the security requirements and satisfactorily addresses the identified risk information.	Functional	Equal	Software Design Review	TDA-06.5	Mechanisms exist to have an independent review of the software design to confirm that all cybersecurity & data privacy requirements are met and that any identified risks are satisfactorily addressed.	10	Example 1: Review the software design to confirm that it addresses applicable security requirements. Example 2: Review the risk models created during software design to determine if they appear to adequately identify the risks. Example 3: Review the software design to confirm that it assistatectority addresses the risks identified by the risk models. Example 4: Have the software design or correct failures to meet the requirements. Example 4: Have the software's designer correct failures to meet the requirements. Example 5: Change the design and/or the risk response strategy if the security requirements cannot be met. Example 6: Record the findings of design reviews to serve as artifacts (e.g., in the software specification, in the issue tracking swares in the threat model.
PW.4	Reuse Existing, Well- Secured Software When Feasible Instead of Duplicating Functionality	Lower the costs of software development, expedite software development, and decrease the likelihood of introducing additional security vulnerabilities into the software by resuing software modules and services that have already had their security posture checked. This is particularly important for software that implements security functionality, such as cryptographic modules and protocols.	Functional	Intersects With	Product Management	TDA-01.1	Mechanisms exist to design and implement product management processes to proactively govern the design, development and production of products and/or services across the System Development Life Cycle (SDLC) to: (1) Improve functionality; (2) Enhance security and resiliency capabilities; (3) Correct security deficiencies; and (4) Conform with applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual obligations.	5	
PW.4	Reuse Existing, Well- Secured Software When Feasible Instead of Duplicating Functionality	cryptographic modules and protocols.	Functional	Intersects With	Pre-Established Secure Configurations	TDA-02.4	(2) Use the pre-established, secure configuration as the default for any subsequent system, component, or service reinstallation or upgrade.	5	
PW.4	Secured Software When Feasible Instead of Duplicating	Lower the costs of software development, expedite software development, and decrease the likelihood of introducing additional security vulnerabilities into the software by reusing software modules and services that have already had their security posture checked. This is particularly important for software that implements security functionality, such as	Functional	Intersects With	Commercial Off-The- Shelf (COTS) Security Solutions	TDA-03	Mechanisms exist to utilize only Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) security products.	5	
PW-4.1	Functionality N/A	cnytographic modules and protocols. Acquire and maintain well-secured software components (e.g., software libraries, modules, middleware, frameworks) from commercial, open-source, and other third-party developers for use by the organization's software.	Functional	Intersects With	Commercial Off-The- Shelf (COTS) Security Solutions	TDA-03	Mechanisms exist to utilize only Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) security products.	5	Eample 1: Review and evaluate third-party software components in the contaxt of their expected use. If a component is to be used in a substantially different way in the future, perform the review and evaluation again with the future, perform the review and evaluation again with that new contact in mind. Eample 2: Determine secure configurations for software components, and make these available (e.g., as configuration-as-code) so developers can readily use the configuration-as-code) so developers can readily use the configuration and provenance information (e.g., SBOM, Eample 3: Obtain provenance information (e.g., SBOM, source composition analysis) for each software component, and analyze that information to better assess the risk that the component may introduce. Example 3: Establish one or more software repositories to host sanctioned and vetted open-source components. Example 5: Maintain ailst of organization-approved commercial software components and component various along with their provenance data. Example 6: Designate which components must be included in software to be developed. Example 5: Designate which components must be included in software components until all transitions from those versions is developed commercial software component until all transitions from those versions have been completed successfully. Example 8: The provides of the provides
PW.4.2	N/A	Create and maintain well-secured software components in-house following SDLC processes to meet common internal software development needs that cannot be better met by third-party software components.	Functional	Intersects With	Product Management	TDA-01.1	Mechanisms exist to design and implement product management processes to proactively govern the design, development and products of products and/or services across the System Development Life Cycle (SDLC) to: (1) Improve functionality; (2) Enhance security and resiliency capabilities; (3) Correct security deficiencies; and (4) Conform with applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual obligations.	5	Example 1: Follow organization-established security practices for secure software development when creating and maintaining the components. Example 2: Determine secure configurations for software components, and make these available (a.g., as configuration-as-code) so developers can readily use the configurations. Example 3: Haintain one or more software repositories for these components. Example 4: Designate which components must be included in software to be developed. Example 5: Implement processes to update deployed software components to newer versions, and maintain older versions of software components to newer versions, and maintain older versions of software components to meave versions, and maintain older versions of software components until at transitions from those versions have been completed successfully.
PW.4.2	N/A	Create and maintain well-secured software components in-house following SDLC processes to meet common internal software development needs that cannot be better met by third-party software components.	Functional	Intersects With	Developer Architecture & Design	TDA-05	Mechanisms exist to require the developers of systems, system components or services to produce a design specification and security architecture that or services to produce of design specification and supportive of the organization's security architecture which is established within and is an integrated part of the organization's enterprise architecture; (2) Accurately and completely describes the required security functionality and the allocation of security controls among physical and logical components; and (3) Expresses how individual security functions, mechanisms and services work together to provide required security capabilities and a unified approach to protection.	5	
PW.4.2	N/A	Create and maintain well-secured software components in-house following SDLC processes to meet common internal software development needs that cannot be better met by third-party software components. Create and maintain well-secured software components in-house following SDLC.	Functional	Intersects With	Secure Software Development Practices (SSDP)	TDA-06	Mechanisms exist to develop applications based on Secure Software Development Practices (SSDP). Mechanisms exist to utilize a Software	5	
PW.4.2	N/A	Create and maintain well-secured software components in-house following SDLC processes to meet common internal software development needs that cannot be better met by third-party software components.	Functional	Intersects With	Software Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM)	TDA-06.3	Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM) to	5	



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FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship (optional)	Notes (optional)
PW.4.4	N/A	Verify that acquired commercial, open-source, and all other third-party software components comply with the requirements, as defined by the organization, throughout their life cycles.	Functional	Intersects With	Minimum Viable Product (MVP) Security Requirements	TDA-02	Mechanisms exist to design, develop and produce products and/or services in such a way that risk-based tachnical chased tachnical and functional specifications ensure Minimum Visible Product (WPV) criteria establish an appropriate level of security and resiliency based on applicable risks and threats.	5	Example 1: Regularly check whether there are publicly known vulnerabilities in the software modules and services that vendors here not yet fixed. Example 2: Build into the toolchain automatic detection of known vulnerabilities in software components. Example 3: Use a visiting results from commercial services for verting the software modules and services. Example 4: Ensure that each software component is still actively maintained and has not reached end off life; this should include new vulnerabilities found in the software being remediated and has not reached end off life. Example 5: Determine a plan of action for each software component that is no longer being maintained or will not be available in the near future. Example 5: Determine a plan of action for each software components that is no longer being maintained or will not be available in the near future. Example 6: Confirm the integrity of software components through digital signatures or other mechanisms. Example 7: Review, analyze, and/or test code. See PW.7 and PW.8.
PW.4.4	N/A	Varify that acquired commercial, open-source, and all other third-party software components comply with the requirements, as defined by the organization, throughout their life cycles.	Functional	Intersects With	Ports, Protocols & Services In Use	TDA-02.1	Mechanisms exist to require the developers of systems, system components or services to identify early in the Secure Development Life Cycle (SDLC), the functions, ports, protocols and services intended for use.	5	
PW.4.4	N/A	Varify that acquired commercial, open-source, and all other third-party software components comply with the requirements, as defined by the organization, throughout their life cycles.	Functional	Intersects With	Identification & Justification of Ports, Protocols & Services	TDA-02.5	Mechanisms exist to require process owners to identify, document and justify the business need for the ports, protocols and other services necessary to operate their technology solutions.	5	
PW.4.4	N/A	Verify that acquired commercial, open-source, and all other third-party software components comply with the requirements, as defined by the organization, throughout their life cycles. Verify that acquired commercial, open-source, and all other third-party software	Functional	Intersects With	Insecure Ports, Protocols & Services	TDA-02.6	Mechanisms exist to mitigate the risk associated with the use of insecure ports, protocols and services necessary to operate technology solutions. Mechanisms exist to generate a Software	5	
PW.4.4	N/A	components comply with the requirements, as defined by the organization, throughout their life cycles. Decrease the number of security vulnerabilities in the software, and reduce costs by	Functional	Intersects With	Software Bill of Materials (SBOM)	TDA-04.2	Bill of Materials (SBOM) for systems, applications and services that lists software packages in use, including versions and applicable licenses. Mechanisms exist to design and	5	
PW.5	Create Source Code by Adhering to Secure Coding Practices	minimizing vulnerabilities introduced during source code creation that meet or exceed organization-defined vulnerability severity criteria.	Functional	Intersects With	Product Management	TDA-01.1	implement product management processes to proactively govern the design, development and production of products and/or services across the System Development Life Cycle (SDLC) to: (1) Improve functionality; (2) Enhance security and resiliency capabilities; (3) Correct security deficiencies; and (4) Conform with applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual obligations.	5	
		Decrease the number of security vulnerabilities in the software, and reduce costs by minimizing vulnerabilities introduced during source code creation that meet or exceed					Mechanisms exist to require software developers to ensure that their software		
PW.5	Create Source Code by Adhering to Secure Coding Practices	organization-defined vulnerability severity criteria.	Functional	Intersects With	Development Methods, Techniques & Processes	TDA-02.3	programming, engineering methods, quality control processes and validation techniques to minimize flawed and/or malformed software.	5	
PW.5.1	Create Source Code by Adhering to Secure Coding Practices	Decrease the number of security vulnerabilities in the software, and reduce costs by minimizing vulnerabilities introduced during source occle reation that meet or exceed organization-defined vulnerability seventy criteria. Follow all secure coding practices that are appropriate to the development languages and environment to meet the organization's requirements.	Functional Functional	Intersects With	Sacure Software Development Practices (SSDP) Product Management	TDA-06	Mechanisms exist to develop applications based on Secure Software Development Practices (SSDP). Mechanisms exist to design and implement product management processes to proactively govern the design, development and production of products and/or services across the System Development Life Cycle (SDLC) to: (1) Improve functionality; (2) Enhance security and resiliency capabilities; (3) Correct security deficiencies; and (4) Conform with applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual obligations.	5	Example 1: Validate all inputs, and validate and properly encode all outputs. Example 2: Avoid using unsafe functions and calls. Example 3: Detect errors, and handle them gracefully. Example 4: Provide logging and tracing capabilities. Example 5: Use development environments with automated features that encourage or require the use of secure coding practices with just-in-time training-in-place. Example 5: Follow procedures for manually ensuring compliance with secure coding practices when automated methods are insufficient or unavailable. Example 7: Use tools (e.g., linters, formatters) to standardize the style and formatting of the source code. Example 8: Ose for other vulnerabilities that are common to the development languages and environment. Example 9: Hew the developer review their own human- readable code to complement (not replace) code review performed by other people or tools. See PW.7.
PW.5.1	N/A	Follow all secure coding practices that are appropriate to the development languages and environment to meet the organization's requirements.	Functional	Intersects With	Minimum Viable Product (MVP) Security Requirements	TDA-02	Mechanisms exist to design, develop and produce products and/or services in such a way that risk-based technical and functional specifications ensure Minimum Viable Product (MVP) criterie establish an appropriate level of security and resiliency based on applicable risks and threats.	5	
PW.5.1	N/A	Follow all secure coding practices that are appropriate to the development languages and environment to meet the organization's requirements. Follow all secure coding practices that are appropriate to the development languages and	Functional	Intersects With	Pre-Established Secure Configurations Secure Software	TDA-02.4	Mechanisms exist to ensure vendors / manufacturers: (1) Delive the system, component, or service with a pre-established, secure configuration implemented; and (2) Use the pre-established, secure configuration as the default for any subsequent system, component, or service reinstallation or updrade. Mechanisms exist to develop applications	5	
PW.5.1	N/A	environment to meet the organization's requirements.	Functional	Intersects With	Development Practices (SSDP)	TDA-06	based on Secure Software Development Practices (SSDP).	5	
PW.5.1	N/A	Follow all secure coding practices that are appropriate to the development languages and environment to meet the organization's requirements.	Functional	Intersects With	Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Testing Throughout Development	TDA-09	Mechanisms exist to require system developers/integrators consult with cybersecurity 8 data privacy personnel to: (1) Create and implement a Security Testing and Evaluation (135E) plan, or similar capability. (2) implement a verifiable flaw remediation process to correct weaknesses and deficiencies identified during the security testing and evaluation process; and (3) Document the results of the security testing/evaluation and flaw remediation processes.	5	
PW.5.1	N/A	Follow all secure coding practices that are appropriate to the development languages and environment to meet the organization's requirements.	Functional	Intersects With	Secure Settings By Default	TDA-09.6	Mechanisms exist to implement secure configuration settings by default to reduce the likelihood of software being deployed with weak security settings that would put the asset at a greater risk of compromise.	5	



FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship (optional)	Notes (optional)
PW.6	Configure the Compilation, Interpreter, and Build Processes to Improve Executable Security	Decrease the number of security vulnerabilities in the software and reduce costs by eliminating vulnerabilities before testing occurs.	Functional	Intersects With	Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Testing Throughout Development	TDA-09	Mechanisms exist to require system developers/infegrators consult with cybersecurity & data privacy personnel to: (1) Create and implement a Security Testing and Feulation (ST&E) plan, or similar capability; (2) Implement a verifiable flaw remediation process to correct weaknesses and deficiencies identified during the security testing and evaluation process; and (3) Document the results of the security testing/evaluation and flaw remediation processes.	5	
PW.6	Configure the Compilation, Interpreter, and Build Processes to Improve Executable Security	Decrease the number of security vulnerabilities in the software and reduce costs by eliminating vulnerabilities before testing occurs.	Functional	Intersects With	Secure Settings By Default	TDA-09.6	Mechanisms exist to implement secure configuration settings by default to reduce the likelihood of software being deployed with weak security settings that would put the asset at a greater risk of compromise.	5	
PW.6.1	N/A	Use compiler, interpreter, and build tools that offer features to improve executable security.	Functional	Intersects With	Development Methods, Techniques & Processes	TDA-02.3	Mechanisms exist to require software developers to ensure that their software development processes employ industry- recognized secure practices for secure programming, engineering methods, quality control processes and validation tachniques to minimize flawed and/or malformed software.	5	Example 1: Use up-to-date versions of compiler, interpreter, and build tools. Example 2: Follow change management processes when deploying or updaining compiler, interpreter, and build tools, and audit all unexpected changes to tools. Example 3: Regularly validate the authenticity and integrity of compiler, interpreter, and build tools. See PO.3.
PW.6.1	N/A	Use compiler, interpreter, and build tools that offer features to improve executable security.	Functional	Intersects With	Secure Software Development Practices (SSDP)	TDA-06	Mechanisms exist to develop applications based on Secure Software Development Practices (SSDP).	5	Example 1: Use up-to-date versions of compiler, interpreter, and build tools. Example 2: Follow change management processes when deploying or updating compiler, interpreter, and build tools, and audit all unexpected changes to tools. Example 3: Regularly validate the authenticity and integrity of compiler, interpreter, and build tools. See PO.3.
PW.6.1	N/A	Use compiler, interpreter, and build tools that offer features to improve executable security.	Functional	Intersects With	Supporting Toolchain	TDA-06.4	Automated mechanisms exist to improve the accuracy, consistency and comprehensiveness of secure practices	5	
PW.6.2	N/A	Determine which compiler, interpreter, and build tool features should be used and how each should be configured, then implement and use the approved configurations.	Functional	Intersects With	Product Management	TDA-01.1	throughout the asset's lifecycle. Mechanisms exist to design and implement product management processes to proactively govern the design, development and production of products and/or services across the System Development Life Cycle (EDLC) to: (1) Improve functionality. 2) Enhance security and resiliency capabilities: (3) Correct security deficiencies; and (4) Conform with applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual obligations.	5	Example 1: Enable compiler features that produce warnings for poorly secured code during the compilation process. Example 2: Implement the "clean build" concept, where all compiler warnings are treated as errors and eliminated except those determined to be false positives or irrelevant. Example 3: Perform all builds in a dedicated, highly controlled build environment. Example 4: Enable compiler features that randomize or obtainacte execution characteristics, such as memory location usage, that would otherwise be predictable and thus potentially exploitable. Example 5: Test to ensure that the features are working as expected and are not inadvertently causing any operational issues or other problems. Example 6: Continuously verify that the approved configuration are being used. Example 7: Make the approved tool configurations are being used. Example 7: Make the approved tool configurations are sound to the configuration are sound to the confi
PW.6.2	N/A	Determine which compiler, interpreter, and build tool features should be used and how each should be configured, then implement and use the approved configurations.	Functional	Intersects With	Secure Software Development Practices (SSDP)	TDA-06	Mechanisms exist to develop applications based on Secure Software Development Practices (SSDP).	5	
PW.6.2	N/A Review and/or Analyze Human-Readable Code to Identify Vulnerabilities and Verify Compliance with Security Requirements	Determine which compiler, interpreter, and build tool features should be used and how each should be configured, then implement and use the approved configurations. Help identify vulnerabilities so that they can be corrected before the software is released to prevent exploitation. Using automated methods lowers the effort and resources needed to detect vulnerabilities. Human-readable code includes source code, scripts, and any other form of code that an organization deems human-readable.	Functional Functional	Intersects With	Supporting Toolchain Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Testing Throughout Development	TDA-06.4	comprehensiveness of secure practices throughout the sase's l'idercycle. Mechanisms exist to require system developers'infegators consult with optersecurity & data privacy personnet to: (1) Create and implement a Security Testing and Evaluation (ST&E) plan, or similar capability. (2) Implement a verifiable flaw remediation process to correct weaknesses and declicancies identified during the security testing and evaluation process; and (3) Document the results of the security testing/evaluation and flaw remediation processes.	5	
PW.7	Human-Readable Code to Identify Vulnerabilities and Verify Compliance with Security Requirements	Help identify vulnerabilities so that they can be corrected before the software is released to prevent exploitation. Using automated methods lowers the effort and resources needed to detect vulnerabilities. Human-readable code includes source code, scripts, and any other form of code that an organization deems human-readable. Help identify vulnerabilities so that they can be corrected before the software is released to prevent exploitation. Using automated methods lowers the effort and resources needed to detect vulnerabilities. Human-readable code includes source code, scripts, and any other form of code that an organization deems human-readable.	Functional	Intersects With	Static Code Analysis Dynamic Code Analysis	TDA-09.2	code analysis tools to identify and remediate common flaws and document the results of the analysis. Mechanisms exist to require the developers of systems, system components or services to employ dynamic code analysis tools to identify	5	
PW.7	Security Requirements	Help identify vulnerabilities so that they can be corrected before the software is released to prevent exploitation. Using automated methods lowers the effort and resources needed to detect vulnerabilities. Human-readable code includes source code, scripts, and any other form of code that an organization deems human-readable.	Functional	Intersects With	Malformed Input Testing	TDA-09.4	and remediate common flaws and document the results of the analysis. Mechanisms exist to utilize testing methods to ensure systems, services and products continue to operate as intended when subject to invalid or unexpected inputs on its interfaces.	5	
PW.7	Review and/or Analyze Human-Readable Code to Identify Vulnerabilities and Verify Compliance with Security Requirements	Help identify vulnerabilities so that they can be corrected before the software is released to prevent exploitation. Using automated methods lowers the effort and resources needed to detect vulnerabilities. Human-readable code includes source code, scripts, and any other form of code that an organization deems human-readable.	Functional	Intersects With	Application Penetration Testing	TDA-09.5	Mechanisms exist to perform application- level penetration testing of custom-made applications and services.	5	
PW.7.1	N/A	Determine whether code review (a person looks directly at the code to find issues) and/or code analysis (tools are used to find issues in code, either in a fully automated way or in conjunction with a person) should be used, as defined by the organization.	Functional	Subset Of	Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Testing Throughout Development	TDA-09	Mechanisms exist to require system developers/integrators consult with opensesurity at data privacy personnel to: (I) Create and implement a Security Testing and Evaluation (ST&E) plan, or similar capability. (2) Implement a verifiable flaw remediation process to correct weaknesses and deficiencies identified during the security testing and evaluation process, and (3) Document the results of the security testing/evaluation and flaw remediation processes.		Example 1: Follow the organization's policies or guidelines for when code review should be performed and how it should be conducted. This may include third-party code and reusable code modules written in-house. Example 2: Follow the organization's policies or guidelines for when code analysis should be performed and how it should be conducted. Example 3: Othoose code review and/or analysis methods based on the stage of the software.



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FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship (optional)	Notes (optional)
PW.7.2	N/A	Perform the code review and/or code analysis based on the organization's secure coding standards, and record and triage all discovered issues and recommended remediations in the development team's workflow or issue tracking system.	Functional	Intersects With	Static Code Analysis	TDA-09.2	Mechanisms exist to require the developers of systems, system components or services to employ static code analysis tools to identify and remeditate common flaws and document the results of the analysis.	5	Example 1: Perform pear review of code, and review any existing code review, nailysis, or testing results as part of the peer review. Example 2: Use expert reviewers to check code for backdoors and other malicious content. Example 3: Use peer reviewing tools that facilitate the peer reviewey process, and document all discussions and other feedback. Example 4: Use a static analysis tool to automatically check code for vulnerabilities and compliance with the organization's secure coding standards with a human reviewing the issues reported by the tool and remediating them as necessary. Example 5: Use review checklists to verify that the code complies with the requirements. Example 6: Use automated tools to identify and remediate documented and verified unsefs software practices on a continuous basis as human-readable code is checked into the code repository. Example 7: Identify and document the root causes of discovered issues. Example 8: Document lessons learned from code review and analysis in a wild that developers can access and search.
PW.7.2	N/A	Perform the code review and/or code analysis based on the organization's secure coding standards, and record and triage all discovered issues and recommended remediations in the development team's workflow or issue tracking system.	Functional	Intersects With	Dynamic Code Analysis	TDA-09.3	Mechanisms exist to require the developers of systems, system components or services to employ dynamic code analysis tools to identify and remediate common flaws and document the results of the analysis.	5	
PW.8	Test Executable Code to Identify Vulnerabilities and Verify Compliance with Security Requirements	Help identify vulnerabilities so that they can be corrected before the software is released in order to prevent exploitation. Using automated methods lowers the effort and resources needed to detect vulnerabilities and improves traceability and repeatability. Executable code includes binaries, directly executed bytecode and source code, and any other form of code that an ortaination deems executable.	Functional	Intersects With	Malformed Input Testing	TDA-09.4	Mechanisms exist to utilize testing methods to ensure systems, services and products continue to operate as intended when subject to invalid or unexpected inputs on its interfaces.	5	
PW.8	Test Executable Code to Identify Vulnerabilities and Verify Compliance with Security Requirements	Help identify vulnerabilities so that they can be corrected before the software is released in order to prevent exploitation. Using automated methods lowers the effort and resources needed to detect vulnerabilities and improves traceability and repeatability. Executable code includes binaries, directly executed bytecode and source code, and any other form of code that an organization deems executable.	Functional	Intersects With	Application Penetration Testing	TDA-09.5	Mechanisms exist to perform application- level penetration testing of custom-made applications and services.	5	
PW.8.1	N/A	Determine whether executable code testing should be performed to find vulnerabilities not identified by previous reviews, analysis, or testing and, if so, which types of testing should be used.	Functional	Intersects With	Product Management	TDA-01.1	Mechanisms exist to design and implement product management processes to proactively govern the design, development and production of products and/or services across the System Development Life Cycle (SDLC) to: (1) Improve functionality. 2] Enhance security and resiliency capabilities; (3) Correct security and resiliency and (4) Conform with applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual obligations.	5	Example 1: Follow the organization's policies or guideline for when code testing should be performed and how it should be conducted (e.g., within a sandboxed environment). This may include third-party executable code and reusable executable code modules written in-house. Example 2: Choose testing methods based on the stage of the software.
PW.8.1	N/A	Determine whether executable code testing should be performed to find vulnerabilities not identified by previous reviews, analysis, or testing and, if so, which types of testing should be used.	Functional	Intersects With	Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Testing Throughout Development	TDA-09	Mechanisms exist to require system developers/integrators consult with cybersecurity & data privacy personnel to: (1) Create and implement a Security Testing and Evaluation (ST&E) plan, or similar capability. (2) Implement a verifiable flaw remediation process to correct weaknesses and deficiencies identified during the security testing and evaluation process; and (3) Document the results of the security testing/evaluation and flaw remediation processes.	5	
PW.8.2	N/A	Scope the testing, design the tests, perform the testing, and document the results, including recording and triaging all discovered issues and recommended remediations in the development team's workflow or issue tracking system.	Functional	Subset Of	Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Testing Throughout Development	TDA-09	Mechanisms exist to require system developers/integrators consult with operations of the consult with operations of the consult with operations of the consultation of		Example 1: Perform robust functional testing of security features. Example 2: Integrate dynamic vulnerability testing into the project's automated test suite. Example 3: Integrate dynamic vulnerability testing into the project's automated test suite. Example 4: Take into the project's test suite to ensure that errors are not reintroduced. Example 4: Take into consideration the infrastructures and technology stacts that the software will be used with in production when developing test plans. Example 5: Use fuzz testing tools to find issues with input handling. Example 5: Use fuzz testing tools to find issues with input handling. Example 7: Identify and record the root causes of discovered issues. Example 8: Document lessons learned from code testing in a with that developers can access and search. Example 8: Document lessons learned from code testing in a with that developers can access and search. Example 9: Use source code, design records, and other resources when destending that challed in the substance and search.
PW.9	Configure Software to Have Secure Settings by Default	Help improve the security of the software at the time of installation to reduce the likelihood of the software being deployed with weak security settings, putting it at greater risk of compromise.	Functional	Equal	Secure Settings By Default	TDA-09.6	Mechanisms exist to implement secure configuration settings by default to reduce the likelihood of software being deployed with weak security settings that would put the asset at a greater risk of compromise.	10	
PW.9.1	N/A	Define a secure baseline by determining howto configure each setting that has an effect on security or a security-related setting so that the default settings are secure and do not weaken the security functions provided by the platform, network infrastructure, or services.	Functional	Equal	System Hardening Through Baseline Configurations	CFG-02	Mechanisms exist to develop, document and maintain secure baseline configurations for technology platforms that are consistent with industry- accepted system hardening standards.	10	Example 1: Conduct testing to ensure that the settings, including the default settings, are working as expected and are not inadvertently causing any security weaknesses, operational issues, or other problems.
PW.9.1	N/A	Define a secure baseline by determining how to configure each setting that has an effect on security or as early-related setting so that the default settings are secure and do not weaken the security functions provided by the platform, network infrastructure, or services.	Functional	Intersects With	Minimum Viable Product (MVP) Security Requirements	TDA-02	Mechanisms exist to design, develop and produce products and/or services in such a way that risk-based technical and functional specifications ensure Minimum Viable Product (MVP) criteria establish an appropriate level of security and resiliency based on applicable risks and threats.	5	
PW.9.1	N/A	Define a secure baseline by determining how to configure each setting that has an effect on security or a security-related setting so that the default settings are secure and do not weaken the security functions provided by the platform, network infrastructure, or services.	Functional	Intersects With	Pre-Established Secure Configurations	TDA-02.4	(2) Use the pre-established, secure configuration as the default for any subsequent system, component, or service reinstallation or upgrade.	5	
PW.9.1	N/A	Define a secure baseline by determining howto configure each setting that has an effect on security or a security-related setting so that the default settings are secure and do not weaken the security functions provided by the platform, network infrastructure, or services.	Functional	Intersects With	Secure Settings By Default	TDA-09.6	Mechanisms exist to implement secure configuration settings by default to reduce the likelihood of software being deployed with weak security settings that would put the asset at a greater risk of compromise.	5	



FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship (optional)	Notes (optional)
PW.9.2	N/A	Implement the default settings (or groups of default settings, if applicable), and document each setting for software administrators. Implement the default settings (or groups of default settings, if applicable), and document	Functional	Intersects With	Minimum Viable Product (MVP) Security Requirements	TDA-02	Mechanisma exist to design, develop and produce products and/or services in such a way that risk-based technical and functional specifications ensure Minimum Viable Product (MVP) criteria establish an appropriate levol of ascurity and resiliency based on applicable risks and threats.	5	Example 1: Verify that the approved configuration is in place for the software. Example 2: Document each sating's purpose, options, default value, security relevance, potential operational impact, and relationships with other settings. Example 3: Use authoritative programmatic technical mechanisms to record how each setting can be implemented and assessed by software administrators. Example 4: Store the default configuration in a usable format and follow change control practices for modifying it is, c. confluentation-sis-code).
PW.9.2	N/A	each setting for software administrators.	Functional	Intersects With	Pre-Established Secure Configurations	TDA-02.4	manufacturers: (1) Deliver the system, component, or service with a pre-established, secure configuration implemented; and (2) Use the pre-established, secure configuration as the default for any subsequent system, component, or service eninstitation or updated.	5	
PW.9.2	N/A	Implement the default settings (or groups of default settings, if applicable), and document each setting for software administrators.	Functional	Intersects With	Secure Settings By Default	TDA-09.6	Mechanisms exist to implement secure configuration settings by default to reduce the likelihood of software being deployed with weak security settings that would put the asset at a greater risk of compromise.	5	
RV.1	Identify and Confirm Vulnerabilities on an Ongoing Basis	Help ensure that vulnerabilities are identified more quickly so that they can be remediated more quickly in accordance with risk, reducing the window of opportunity for attackers.	Functional	Intersects With	Development Methods, Techniques & Processes	TDA-02.3	Mechanisms exist to require software developers to ensure that their software development processes employ industry-recognized secure practices for secure programming, engineering methods, quality control processes and validation techniques to minimize flawed and/or malformed software.	5	
RV.1	Identify and Confirm Vulnerabilities on an Ongoing Basis	Help ensure that vulnerabilities are identified more quickly so that they can be remediated more quickly in accordance with risk, reducing the window of opportunity for attackers. Help ensure that vulnerabilities are identified more quickly so that they can be remediated	Functional	Intersects With	Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Representatives For Product Changes	TDA-02.7	Mechanisms exist to include appropriate cybersecurity & data privacy representatives in the product feature and/or functionality change control review process. Mechanisms exist to have an independent	5	
RV.1	Identify and Confirm Vulnerabilities on an Ongoing Basis	more quickly in accordance with risk, reducing the window of opportunity for attackers.	Functional	Intersects With	Software Design Review	TDA-06.5	identified risks are satisfactorily addressed.	5	
RV.1	Identify and Confirm Vulnerabilities on an Ongoing Basis	Help ensure that vulnerabilities are identified more quickly so that they can be remediated more quickly in accordance with risk, reducing the window of opportunity for attackers.	Functional	Subset Of	Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Testing Throughout Development	TDA-09	Mechanisms exist to require system developers/integrators consult with cybersecurity & data privacy personnel to: (1) Create and implement a Security Testing and Evaluation (ST&E) plan, or similar capability; (2) implement a verifiable flaw remediation process to correct weaknesses and deficiencies identified during the security testing and evaluation process: and (3) Document the results of the security testing/evaluation and flaw remediation processes.		
RV.1	Identify and Confirm Vulnerabilities on an Ongoing Basis	Help ensure that vulnerabilities are identified more quickly so that they can be remediated more quickly in accordance with risk, reducing the window of opportunity for attackers.	Functional	Intersects With	Continuous Monitoring Plan	TDA-09.1	Mechanisms exist to require the developers of systems, system components or services to produce a plan for the continuous monitoring of cybersecurity & data privacy control effectiveness.	5	
RV.1.1	N/A	Gather information from software acquirers, users, and public sources on potential vulnerabilities in the software and third-party components that the software uses, and investigate all credible reports.	Functional	Intersects With	Documentation Requirements	TDA-04	Mechanisme exist to obtain, protect and distribute administrator documentation for systems that describe: (1) Secure configuration, installation and operation of the system; (2) Effective use and maintenance of security features/functions; and (3) Known vulnerabilities regarding configuration and use of administrative	5	Example 1: Monitor vulnerability databases , security maining lists, and other sources of vulnerability reports through manuel or automated means. Example 2: Use threat intelligence sources to better understand how vulnerabilities in general are being exploited. Example 2: Use threat intelligence sources to better understand how vulnerabilities in general are being exploited. Example 3: Automatically review provenance and software composition data for all software components to identify any new vulnerabilities they have.
RV.1.1	N/A	Gather information from software acquirers, users, and public sources on potential vulnerabilities in the software and third-party components that the software uses, and investigate all credible reports.	Functional	Intersects With	Functional Properties	TDA-04.1	In st. privileged functions. Mechanisms exist to require software developers to provide information describing the functional properties of the security controls to be utilized within systems, system components or services in sufficient detail to permit analysis and testine of the controls.	5	
RV.1.1	N/A	Gather information from software acquirers, users, and public sources on potential vulnerabilities in the software and third-party components that the software uses, and investigate all credible reports.	Functional	Intersects With	Software Bill of Materials (SBOM)	TDA-04.2	Mechanisms exist to generate a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) for systems,	5	
RV.1.1	N/A	Gather information from software acquirers, users, and public sources on potential vulnerabilities in the software and third-party components that the software uses, and investigate all credible reports.	Functional	Intersects With	Developer Architecture & Design	TDA-05	Mechanisms exist to require the developers of systems, system components or services to produce a design specification and security architecture that: (1) is consistent with and supportive of the organization's security architecture which is established within and is an integrated part of the organization's enterprise architecture; (2) Accurately and completely describes the required security functionality and the allocation of security functionality and the physical and logical components; and (3) Expresses how individual security functions, mechanisms and services work together to provide required security capabilities and a unified approach to protection.	5	
RV.1.2	N/A	Review, analyze, and/or test the software's code to identify or confirm the presence of previously undetected vulnerabilities.	Functional	Subset Of	Software Design Review	TDA-06.5	Mechanisms exist to have an independent review of the software design to confirm that all cybersecurity & data privacy requirements are met and that any identified risks are satisfactorily addressed.		Example 1: Configure the toolchain to perform automated code analysis and testing on a regular or continuous basis for all supported releases. Example 2: See PW.7 and PW.8.
RV.1.3	N/A	Have a policy that addresses vulnerability disclosure and remediation, and implement the roles, responsibilities, and processes needed to support that policy.	Functional	Equal	Vulnerability Disclosure Program (VDP)	THR-06	Mechanisms exist to establish a Vulnerability Disclosure Program (VDP) to assist with the secure development and maintenance of products and services that receives unsolicited input from the public about vulnerabilities in organizational systems, services and processes.	10	Exemple 1: Establish a vulnerability disclosure program, and make it easy for security researchers to learn about your program and report possible vulnerabilities. Example 2: Have a Product Security incident Response Team (PSRT) and processes in place to handle the responses to vulnerability reports and incidents, including communications plans for all stakeholders. Example 3: Have a security response playbook to handle a generic reported vulnerability, a report of zero-days, a vulnerability being exploited in the wild, and a major ongoing incident involving multiple parties and open-sources software components. Example 4: Periodically conduct exercises of the product security incident response processes.



FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship (optional)	Notes (optional)
RV.2	Assess, Prioritize, and Remediate Vulnerabilities	Help ensure that vulnerabilities are remediated in accordance with risk to reduce the window of opportunity for attackers.	Functional	Intersects With	Development Methods, Techniques & Processes	TDA-02.3	Mechanisms exist to require software developers to ensure that their software development processes employ industry- recognized secure practices for secure programming, engineering methods, quality control processes and validation techniques to minimize flawed and/or malformed software.	5	
RV.2	Assess, Prioritize, and Remediate Vulnerabilities	Help ensure that vulnerabilities are remediated in accordance with risk to reduce the window of opportunity for attackers.	Functional	Subset Of	Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Testing Throughout Development	TDA-09	Mechanisms exist to require system developers/infeptors consult with optersecurity & data privacy personnel to: (I) Create and implement a Security Testing and Evaluation (ST&E) plan, or similar capability; (2) Implement a verifiable flaw remediation process to correct weaknesses and declicancies identified during the security testing and evaluation process; and (3) Document the results of the security testing/evaluation and flaw remediation processes.		
RV.2.1	N/A	Analyze each vulnerability to gather sufficient information about risk to plan its remediation or other risk response.	Functional	Subset Of	Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Testing Throughout Development	TDA-09	Mechanisms exist to require system developers/integrators consult with opersecunity & data privacy personnel to: (1) Create and implement a Security Testing and Evaluation (ST&E) plan, or similar capability; (2) Implement a verifiable flaw remediation process to correct wakenesses and deficiencies identified during the security testing and evaluation process; and (3) Document the results of the security testing/evaluation and flaw remediation processes.		Example 1: Use existing issue tracking software to record sack vulnerability. Example 2: Perform risk calculations for each vulnerability based on estimates of its exploitability, the potential impact if exploited, and any other relevant characteristics.
RV.2.2	N/A	Plan and implement risk responses for vulnerabilities.	Functional	Intersects With	Product Management	TDA-01.1	Mechanisms exist to design and implement product management processes to proactively govern the design, development and production of products and/or services across the System Development Life Cycle (DLC) to: (1) Improve functionality, (2) Enhance security and resiliency capabilities; (3) Correct security deficiencies; and (4) Conform with applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual obligations.	5	Example 1: Make a risk-based decision as to whether each winerability will be remediated or if the risk will be addressed through their means (e.g., risk acceptance, risk transference), and prioritize any actions to be taken. Example 2: It a permanent mitigation for a vulnerability is not yet available, determine how the vulnerability can be temporarily mitigated until the permanent solution is available, and add that temporary remediation to the plan. Example 3: Develop and release security advisories that provide the necessary information to software acquirers, including descriptions of what the vulnerabilities are, how to find instances of the vulnerable software, and how to address them (e.g., where to get patches and what the patches change in the software; what configuration settings may need to be changed; how temporary workarcunds could be implemented). Example 4: Deliver remediations to acquirers via an automated and trusted delivery mechanism. A single remediation could address multiple vulnerabilities. Example 5: Update records of design decisions, risk responses, and approved exceptions as needed. See PM1.1.2.
RV.2.2	N/A	Plan and implement risk responses for vulnerabilities.	Functional	Intersects With	Threat Modeling	TDA-06.2	Mechanisms exist to perform threat modelling and other secure design techniques, to ensure that threats to software and solutions are identified and accounted for.	5	
RV.2.2	N/A	Plan and implement risk responses for vulnerabilities.	Functional	Subset Of	Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Testing Throughout Development	TDA-09	Mechanisms exist to require system developers/integrators consulf with cyclesceurly data privacy personnel to: (1) Create and implement a Security Teating and Feulation (ST&E) plan, or similar capability; (2) Implement a verifiable flaw remediation process to correct washesses and deficiencies identified during the security testing and evaluation process; and (3) Document the results of the security testing and evaluation process; and (3) Document the results of the security testing/evaluation and flaw remediation processes.		
RV.2.2	N/A	Plan and implement risk responses for vulnerabilities.	Functional	Intersects With	Vulnerability Remediation Process	VPM-02	Mechanisms exist to ensure that vulnerabilities are properly identified, tracked and remediated.	5	
RV.3	Analyze Vulnerabilities to Identify Their Root Cause	Help reduce the frequency of vulnerabilities in the future.	Functional	Subset Of	Product Management	TDA-01.1	Mechanisms exist to design and implement product management processes to proactively govern the design, development and production of products and/or services servors the System Development Life Cycle (SDLC) to: (1) Improve functionally; (2) Enhance security and resiliency capabilities; (3) Correct security deficiencies; and (4) Conform with applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual obligations.		
RV.3	Analyze Vulnerabilities to Identify Their Root Cause	Help reduce the frequency of vulnerabilities in the future.	Functional	Intersects With	Root Cause Analysis (RCA) & Lessons Learned	IRO-13	Mechanisms exist to incorporate lessons learned from analyzing and resolving cybersecurity & data privacy incidents to reduce the likelihood or impact of future incidents.	5	
RV.3.1	N/A	Analyze identified vulnerabilities to datermine their root causes.	Functional	Subset Of	Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Testing Throughout Development	TDA-09	Mechanisms exist to require system developers/integrators consult with ophersecunity & data privacy personnel to: (1) Create and implement a Security Testing and Evaluation (ST&E) plan, or similar capability; (2) Implement a verifiable flaw remediation process to correct weaknesses and declicancies identified during the security testing and evaluation process; and (3) Document the results of the security testing/evuluation and flaw remediation processes.		Example 1: Record the root cause of discovered issues. Example 2: Record classons learned through root cause analysis in a wiki that developers can access and search.



FDE#	FDE Name	Focal Document Element (FDE) Description	STRM Rationale	STRM Relationship	SCF Control	SCF#	Secure Controls Framework (SCF) Control Description	Strength of Relationship (optional)	Notes (optional)
RV.3.2	N/A	Analyze the root causes over time to identify patterns, such as a particular secure coding practice not being followed consistently.	Functional	Subset Of	Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Testing Throughout Development	TDA-09	Mechanisms exist to require system developers/finggrators consult with cybersecurity & data privacy personnel to: (1) Create and implement a Security Testing and Evaluation (ST&E) plan, or similar capability. (2) implement a verifiable flaw remediation process to correct weaknesses and deficiencies identified during the security testing and evaluation process; and (3) Document the results of the security testing/evaluation and flaw remediation processes.		Example 1: Record lessons learned through rout cause analysis in a with that developers can access and search. Example 2: Add mechanisms to the toolchain to automatically detect future instances of the root cause. Example 3: Update manual processes to detect future instances of the root cause.
RV.3.3	N/A	Review the software for similar vulnerabilities to eradicate a class of vulnerabilities, and proactively fix them rather than waiting for external reports.	Functional	Subset Of	Product Management	TDA-01.1	Mechanisms exist to design and implement product management processes to proactively govern the design, development and production of products and/or services across the System Development Life Cycle (SDLC) to: (1) improve functionality: (2) Enhance security and resiliency capabilities; (3) Correct security deficiencies; and (4) Conform with applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual obligations.		Example 1: See PW.7 and PW.8.
RV.3.3	N/A	Review the software for similar vulnerabilities to eradicate a class of vulnerabilities, and proactively fix them rather than waiting for external reports.	Functional	Intersects With	Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Testing Throughout Development	TDA-09	Mechanisms exist to require system developers/integrators consult with cybersecurity 8 data privacy personnel to: (1) Create and implement a Security Testing and Evaluation (ST&E) plan, or similar capability. (2) implement a verifiable flaw remediation process to correct weaknesses and deficiencies identified during the security testing and evaluation process; and (3) Document the results of the security testing/evaluation and flaw remediation processes.	5	
RV.3.4	N/A	Review the SDLC process, and update it if appropriate to prevent (or reduce the likelihood of) the root cause recurring in updates to the software or in new software that is created.	Functional	Subset Of	Technology Development & Acquisition	TDA-01	Mechanisms exist to facilitate the implementation of tailored development and acquisition strategies, contract tools and procurement methods to meet unique business needs.	10	Example 1: Record lessons learned through root cause analysis in a wiki that developers can access and search. Example 2: Plan and implement changes to the appropriate SDLC practices.
RV.3.4	N/A	Review the SDLC process, and update it if appropriate to prevent (or reduce the likelihood of) the root cause recurring in updates to the software or in new software that is created.	Functional	Intersects With	Product Management	TDA-01.1	Mechanisms exist to design and implement product management processes to proactively govern the design, development and production of products and/or services across the System Development Life Opcle (SDLC) to: (1) improve functionality; 2) Enhance security and resiliency capabilities; (3) Correct security deficiencies; and (4) Conform with applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual obligations.	5	
RV.3.4	N/A	Review the SDLC process, and update it if appropriate to prevent (or reduce the likelihood of) the root cause recurring in updates to the software or in new software that is created.	Functional	Intersects With	Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Representatives For Product Changes Secure Software	TDA-02.7	Mechanisms exist to include appropriate cybersecurity & data privacy representatives in the product feature and/or functionality change control review process. Mechanisms exist to develop applications	5	
RV.3.4	N/A	Review the SDLC process, and update it if appropriate to prevent (or reduce the likelihood of) the root cause recurring in updates to the software or in new software that is created.	Functional	Intersects With	Development Practices (SSDP)	TDA-06	based on Secure Software Development Practices (SSDP).	5	

