# [2023 JBUCTF] crypto

# same\_nonce\_2

Write-Up

## 문제 개요

제공 파일 : same\_nonce\_2.py

```
from Crypto.Cipher import AES
from Crypto.Random import get_random_bytes
from random import randint
from base64 import b64encode, b64decode
 flag = open('/flag', 'rb').read()
 secret = get_random_bytes(randint(33, 48))
key, nonce = get_random_bytes(16), get_random_bytes(12)
crypto = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_GCM, nonce=nonce)
enc_secret, secret_tag = crypto.encrypt_and_digest(secret)
enc_secret = b64encode(enc_secret).decode()
 p1, p2 = get_random_bytes(randint(17, 32)), get_random_bytes(randint(17, 32))
ciphers = []
for p in [p1, p2]:
    crypto = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_GCM, nonce=nonce)
    c, t = crypto.encrypt_and_digest(p)
    c = b64encode(c+t).decode()
 for i in range(10):
        print('[1] show_ciphers')
print('[2] show_secret')
print('[3] verify')
print('[4] exit')
                n = int(input('>> '))
if n < 1 or n > 4:
               print('Retry')
               print(f'c1 : {ciphers[0]}')
print(f'c2 : {ciphers[1]}')
               print(f'enc_secret : {enc_secret}')
         if n == 3:
                       edata = input('edata : ')
edata = b64decode(edata)
                        coata = bodectobe(coata)
cipher = edata[:-16]
tag = edata[-16:]
crypto = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_GCM, nonce=nonce)
result = crypto.decrypt_and_verify(cipher, tag)
                     print(f'flag : {flag.decode()}')
         if n == 4:
exit()
```

33 ~ 48 byte 크기의 secret과, 16byte key, 12byte nonce 생성

secret을 AES-GCM으로 암호화해서 암호화 값인 enc\_secret과 인증 값인 secret\_tag를 생성 enc\_secret 값은 base64 인코딩하여 저장한다.

17 ~ 32 byte 크기의 p1, p2를 생성한 후, p1과 p2를 AES-GCM으로 암호화해서 암호화 값과 인증 값을 합치고, base64인코딩을 한 값을 ciphers 리스트에 저장한다.

1번 입력

위에서 p1, p2를 암호화 한 값과 인증 값을 합친 값을 base64인코딩해서 저장하고 있는 ciphers 리스트의 값들을 출력한다.

2번 입력

enc\_secret의 값을 출력한다.

3번 입력

Base64 인코딩 된 값을 입력 받아 디코딩한 후, 그 값의 마지막 16byte를 인증 값으로, 나머지는 암호문으로 해서 복호화를 한다. 이때 인증 값이 암호문에 맞는 값이 아니면 예외가 발생해서 Failed를 출력하며, 맞는 값이면 그 암호문의 복호화 값이 secret 값인지 확인 후 flag를 출력한다.

4번 입력

exit() 함수를 호출해서 프로그램을 종료한다.

## 문제 풀이

GCM 상세 참고 자료

Galois/Counter Mode: <a href="https://url.kr/hs62co">https://url.kr/hs62co</a>

NIST SP 800-38D,: https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/38/d/final 꼭 보세요~

GHASH 함수 구조




Figure 1: GHASH<sub>H</sub>  $(X_1 || X_2 || ... || X_m) = Y_m$ .

#### GCTR 함수 구조





Figure 2:  $GCTR_K(ICB, X_1 \parallel X_2 \parallel ... \parallel X_n^*) = Y_1 \parallel Y_2 \parallel ... \parallel Y_n^*$ 

#### GCM 인증 값 생성 구조



 $P\,:\,\,{\sf The\ plaintext}.$ 

C: The ciphertext.

T: The authentication tag.

A: The additional authenticated data

 $H: \mathsf{The} \mathsf{\ hash\ subkey}.$ 

t: The bit length of the authentication tag.  $0^s$ : The bit string that consists of s '0' bits. len(X): The bit length of the bit string X.

 $[x]_s$ : The binary representation of the non — negative integer x as a string of s bits, where  $x < 2^s$ .

 $\lceil x \rceil$ : The least integer that is not less than the real number x.

 $X \mid\mid Y$  : The concatenation of two bit strings X and Y.

 $X \oplus Y$ : The bitwise exclusive — OR of two bit strings X and Y of the same length.

 $X \bullet Y$ : The product of two blocks, X and Y, regarded as elements of a certain binary Galois field.  $(GF(2^{128}))$ 

ICB: Initial Counter Block

 $MSB_s(X)$  : The bit string consisting of the s left — most bits of the bit string X.

 $GHASH_{H}(X)$  : The output of the GHASH function under the hash subkey H applied to the bit string X

 $GCTR_K(ICB,X) \ : \ \mathsf{The} \ \mathsf{output} \ \mathsf{of} \ \mathsf{the} \ GCTR \ \mathsf{function} \ \mathsf{for} \ \mathsf{a} \ \mathsf{given} \ \mathsf{block} \ \mathsf{cipher} \ \mathsf{with} \ \mathsf{key} \ K \ \mathsf{applied} \ \mathsf{to} \ \mathsf{the} \ \mathsf{bit} \ \mathsf{string} \ X \ \mathsf{with} \ \mathsf{an} \ \mathsf{initial} \ \mathsf{counter} \ \mathsf{block} \ ICB.$ 

 $CIPH_K(X)$  : The output of the forward cipher function of the block cipher under the key K applied to the block X

아래의 수식에서 C1, C2는 문제 코드에서 p1, p2의 암호화 값이고, T1 T2는 C1, C2의 인증 값이다. C3는 enc\_secret이고, T3는 enc\_secret의 인증 값을 나타낸다.

136 
$$<= len(C_1), len(C_2) <= 256$$
 $264 <= len(C_3) <= 384$ 
 $C_n' = C_n \mid 0^{128^n len(C_n)/128^n - len(C_n)}$ 
 $C_n' = C_{n,1} \mid C_{n,2} \mid C_{n,3} \mid \dots \mid C_{n,m}$ 
 $len(C_{n,m}) = 128$ 
 $C_1' = C_{1,1} \mid C_{1,2}$ 
 $C_2' = C_{2,1} \mid C_{2,2}$ 
 $C_3' = C_{3,1} \mid C_{3,2} \mid C_{3,3}$ 
 $len(T_1) = len(T_2) = len(T_3) = 128$ 
 $A = 0$ 
 $len(A) = 0$ 
 $J_0 = nonce \mid \mid [1]_{32}$ 
 $H = CIPH_K(0^{128})$ 
 $L_n = ([len(A)]_{64} \mid [len(C_n)]_{64})$ 
 $T_1 = MSB_t(GCTR_K(GHASH_H(A \mid\mid C_{1,1} \mid\mid C_{1,2} \mid\mid L_1)))$ 
 $A \succeq 0$  이므로,

 $T_1 = MSB_t(GCTR_K(GHASH_H(C_{1,1} \mid\mid C_{1,2} \mid\mid L_1)))$ 
 $t = len(T_1) = 128$  이므로,

 $T_1 = GHASH(C_{1,1} \mid\mid C_{1,2} \mid\mid L_1) \oplus CIPH_k(J_0)$ 
 $T_1 = (L_1 \oplus (C_{1,2} \oplus (C_{1,1} \bullet H)) \bullet H) \bullet H \oplus CIPH_k(J_0)$ 
 $T_1 = (L_1, \bullet H^3 \oplus C_{1,2} \bullet H^2 \oplus L_1 \bullet H \oplus CIPH_k(J_0))$  이다.

 $H \cong 2^n \succeq 3^n \Leftrightarrow 3^n$ 

```
T_{3} = MSB_{t}(GCTR_{K}(GHASH_{H}(C_{3,1} || C_{3,2} || C_{3,3} || L_{3})))
T_{3} = GCTR_{K}(GHASH_{H}(C_{3,1} || C_{3,2} || C_{3,3} || L_{3}))
T_{3} = GHASH_{H}(C_{3,1} || C_{3,2} || C_{3,3} || L_{3}) \oplus CIPH_{k}(J_{0})
T_{3} = (L_{3} \oplus (C_{3,3} \oplus (C_{3,2} \oplus (C_{3,1} \bullet H)) \bullet H) \bullet H) \bullet H) \oplus CIPH_{k}(J_{0})
T_{3} = C_{3,1} \bullet H^{4} \oplus C_{3,2} \bullet H^{3} \oplus C_{3,3} \bullet H^{2} \oplus L_{3} \bullet H \oplus CIPH_{k}(J_{0})
```

위 수식들을 통하여 p1, p2의 암호문 C1, C2의 인증 값인 T1, T2를 이용해서 enc\_secret의 인증 값인 T3를 구할 수 있다는 것을 알 수 있다.

이제 이 수식을 파이썬과 sagemath를 이용해서 구현하겠다.

### exploit.py

```
from base64 import b64encode, b64decode
 p = remote('172.17.0.2', 10003)
p.sendafter(b'>> ', b'1\n')
 c1 = b64decode(p.recvline()[5:-1])
c2 = b64decode(p.recvline()[5:-1])
 p.sendafter(b'>> ', b'2\n')
c3 = b64decode(p.recvline()[13:-1])
 t1 = c1[-16:]
 t2 = c2[-16:]
 c1 = c1[:-16]
 c2 = c2[:-16]
print(f'c1 = \'{c1.hex()}\'')
print(f't1 = \'{t1.hex()}\'')
print(f'c2 = \'{c2.hex()}\'')
print(f't2 = \'{t2.hex()}\'')
 print(f'c3 = \'{c3.hex()}\'')
 tags = input('tags : ')
 tags = list(tags.split(' '))
 for tag in tags:
    tag = bytes.fromhex(tag.zfill(16*2))
     edata = b64encode(c3 + tag)
     p.sendafter(b'>> ', b'3\n')
p.sendafter(b'edata : ', edata + b'\n')
      result = p.recvline()[:-1]
      if result != b'Failed'
           print(result.decode())
           exit()
```

먼저 알아낼 수 있는 값인 C1, C2, T1, T2, C3의 값을 알아낸다.

그리고 이 값들을 이용해서 T3 값을 계산하기 위해서는 GF(2^128)에서의 연산과 3차 방정식의 해를 구해야 하므로 sagemath라는 툴을 사용하겠다.

### calc\_tag.sage

```
# Installation Guide : https://doc.sagemath.org/html/en/installation/index.html
  def pad(x):
return x + '00' * ((16-(len(x)//2)%16)%16)
def hex2poly(hexx, x):
            r nezposy(nexx, x);
poly = 0
binary = bin(int(hexx, 16))[2:].rfill(128)
for i in range(len(binary));
poly + int(binary[i]) * x*i
return poly
F, a - GF(2^128, name-"a", modulus-x^128 + x^7 + x^2 + x + 1).objgen() H - PolynomialRing(F, name-"H").gen()
  - 'ad163689d664241d4b33e82a060f38347117004c3ddb9f3adc6a27ec'
t1 = '407fae2ac3b9cc87f77ee29393622097'
  12 - 407/acust.sort.com//ocuss/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com/sort.com
A - ''s and
11- length(A, c1)
sl1: [len(A)]_64 || [len(C1)]_64
12- length(A, c2)
sl2: [len(A)]_64 || [len(C2)]_64
13- length(A, c3)
sl3: [len(A)]_64 || [len(C3)]_64
  11 = hex2poly(11, a)
12 = hex2poly(12, a)
13 = hex2poly(13, a)
 c1 = pad(c1)
c2 = pad(c2)
c3 = pad(c3)
c1 = [hex2poly(c1[i], a) for i in range(0, len(c1))]
c2 = [hex2poly(c2[i], a) for i in range(0, len(c2))]
c3 = [hex2poly(c3[i], a) for i in range(0, len(c3))]
 \begin{aligned} & \text{ciph\_j} &= (\text{cl}[\theta]^*\text{H}^3) + (\text{cl}[1]^*\text{H}^2) + (\text{11}^*\text{H}) + \text{t1} & \text{# CIPH(j}\theta) \\ & \text{p} &= (\text{cl}[\theta] + \text{c2}[\theta])^*\text{H}^3 + (\text{c1}[1] + \text{c2}[1])^*\text{H}^2 + (\text{11} + \text{12})^*\text{H} + (\text{t1} + \text{t2}) \\ & \text{t3} &= (\text{c3}[\theta]^*\text{H}^4) + (\text{c3}[1]^*\text{H}^3) + (\text{c3}[2]^*\text{H}^2) + (\text{13}^*\text{H}) + \text{ciph\_j} \end{aligned} 
tag_list = []
for H, m in p.roots():
   tag = t3(H)
   tag = tsr(int(bin(tag.to_integer())[2:].zfill(128)[::-1], 2).to_bytes(16, byteorder="big").hex())
   tag_list.append(tag)
  for tag in tag_list:
    print(f'{tag}', end=' ') # exploit.py input
```

exploit.py를 실행 후, 출력 결과를 exploit.sage 코드에 넣어서 실행하면 3차 방정식이므로 최대 3 개의 enc\_secret의 인증 값 후보들이 나온다. 이 인증 값들을 입력을 기다리고 있는 exploit.py에 입력해서 flag를 얻을 수 있다.

#### **FLAG**

scpCTF{635835b528cdcc44c8eb000321368e83f66c2f3d9feb}