



# ¿Por qué estudiar y contrarrestar a la desigualdad?

Dr. Héctor Nájera

0/2/2026

En unos minutos comenzamos...

475+  
UNIVERSIDAD  
NACIONAL  
AUTÓNOMA  
DE MÉXICO  
"UNAM, rumbo al medio milenio."

# Dos razones

La desigualdad  
como objeto  
científico

La desigualdad  
como un problema  
económico, social  
y político

# La primera


- verificarse empíricamente
- cuantificarse
- realizar comparaciones entre poblaciones y períodos
- su distribución (estadística) puede existir independientemente de los observadores
- Tiene explicaciones sobre su variabilidad sistemática

La segunda

World  
Inequality  
Report  
2026

# Tendencias de la desigualdad global


The squeezed global wealth middle class, 1980–2050



Source: WID.world (2017). See [wir2018.wid.world](#) for data series and notes.


In 2016, in a world represented by China, Europe and the US, the global wealth share of the Top 1% was 33%. Under "Business as usual", the Top 1% global wealth share would reach 39% by 2050, while the Top 0.1% wealth owners would own nearly as much wealth (26%) as the middle class (27%). The evolution of global wealth groups from 1987 to 2017 is represented by China, Europe and the US. Values are net of inflation.

## Figure 1.3. Income and wealth shares are distributed very unequally




**Interpretation.** The global bottom 50% captures 8% of total income and owns 2% of global wealth (2025 PPP). The top 10% capture 53% of income and own 75% of wealth, while the P90–99 capture 33% of income and own 38% of wealth. Moreover, the Top 1% capture 20% of income and hold 37% of wealth. Income is measured after pensions and unemployment benefits are received by individuals and before taxes and transfers. **Sources and series:** Arias–Osorio et al. (2025) and [wir2026.wid.world/methodology](http://wir2026.wid.world/methodology).

## Figure 1.7. Wealth grows faster among the very wealthy



**Interpretation.** Growth rates in net personal wealth varied sharply across the global distribution between 1995 and 2025. While the bottom 50% experienced positive growth of around 2–4% per year, their low initial wealth meant that they captured only 1.1% of total global wealth growth. In contrast, the top 1% experienced significantly higher growth rates, ranging from 2 to 9% annually, and captured 36.7% of global wealth growth during the same period. The very top of the distribution, including the wealthiest 50 individuals, had the steepest increases. Net personal wealth is defined as the sum of financial (e.g. equity, bonds) and non-financial assets (e.g. housing, land) owned by individuals, net of their debts. **Notes.** The curve is smoothed using a centered moving average. **Sources and series:** Arias–Osorio et al. (2025), Chancel et al. (2022) and [wir2026.wid.world/methodology](http://wir2026.wid.world/methodology).


**Figure 2.6. Extreme concentration of income at the very top is a defining feature of the global economy**



**Interpretation.** In Latin America, the top 1% captures 20% of national income, and the next 9% an additional 37%. Together, the top 10% earns 57%, compared to 36% in Europe. Income is measured after pension and unemployment benefits are received by individuals, but before income taxes and other transfers. **Sources and series:** [wir2026.wid.world/methodology](#), Andreeșcu and Sodano (2024), Bharti and Mo (2024), El Hariri (2024), Flores and Zúñiga-Cordero (2024), Forward and Fisher-Post (2024), and Loubes and Robilliard (2024).


# ¿Qué ha pasado en AL? 2

**Figure 2. Inequality in the developing world around 2020: Gini coefficients of the distribution of household consumption per capita by region**




Source: Update of Alvaredo and Gasparini (2015), Gasparini et al. (2018) and Bracco et al. (2021) based on PovcalNet/PIP.

**Figure 9. Top 10% income share 2000-2020: household surveys and the effects of adjustments with administrative data and national accounts**



Source: Series from De Rosa, Flores, and Morgan (2022)

## Mexico




## Cuadro 7

Coeficientes de Gini y Palma. Distribución de la subdeclaración proporcional al cuadrado del ingreso. México 2008-2014.

Escenarios (%)		2008		2010		2012		2014	
Sub <sup>a/</sup>	Tru <sup>a/</sup>	Palma	Gini	Palma	Gini	Palma	Gini	Palma	Gini
100	0	9.9	0.698	8.9	0.674	9.1	0.675	11.7	0.723
95	5	10.1	0.701	9.1	0.679	9.3	0.681	11.9	0.728
90	10	10.3	0.704	9.3	0.684	9.6	0.686	12.1	0.732
85	15	10.4	0.706	9.5	0.689	9.8	0.692	12.4	0.737
80	20	10.5	0.709	9.7	0.694	10.1	0.698	12.6	0.741
75	25	10.6	0.712	9.9	0.699	10.3	0.703	12.9	0.746
70	30	10.7	0.714	10.1	0.703	10.6	0.709	13.1	0.75
65	35	10.8	0.717	10.3	0.708	10.8	0.715	13.4	0.755
60	40	11.0	0.720	10.5	0.713	11.1	0.721	13.7	0.760
55	45	11.1	0.722	10.7	0.718	11.4	0.726	14.0	0.764
50	50	11.2	0.725	11.0	0.723	11.7	0.732	14.3	0.769
45	55	11.3	0.728	11.2	0.728	12.0	0.738	14.6	0.774
40	60	11.5	0.731	11.5	0.733	12.4	0.744	14.9	0.778
35	65	11.6	0.733	11.7	0.738	12.7	0.75	15.2	0.783
30	70	11.7	0.736	12.0	0.743	13.0	0.756	15.6	0.788
25	75	11.9	0.739	12.3	0.748	13.4	0.762	15.9	0.793
20	80	12.0	0.742	12.5	0.753	13.8	0.768	16.3	0.797
15	85	12.2	0.745	12.8	0.759	14.2	0.774	16.7	0.802
10	90	12.3	0.748	13.2	0.764	14.7	0.78	17.1	0.807
5	95	12.5	0.751	13.5	0.769	15.1	0.786	17.6	0.812
0	100	12.7	0.754	13.9	0.775	15.6	0.793	18.1	0.818

a/Sub= subdeclaración, Tru=truncamiento. Fuente: estimaciones propias con base en la ENIGH 2008-2014. Nueva construcción.


Figure 3. Gini coefficients in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1948-2021 (continued)



Note: The figure shows all the Gini coefficients from WIID, from De Rosa, Flores, and Morgan (2022), and from additional historical series and studies collected by the authors. The plots for the remaining countries in Latin America and the Caribbean can be found in Appendix Figure A1.

# ¿Por qué estudiar desigualdad?

1. Algunos referentes macro-históricos sobre la desigualdad
2. Evolución reciente de la desigualdad
  
1. Promesas incumplidas y consecuencias de la desigualdad
2. ¿Es justa la desigualdad?
3. Preguntas hacia adelante



¿Es la desigualdad un problema?

# Desigualdad en el largo plazo

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8 | SPECIAL ISSUE REVIEW



## Inequality in the long run

THOMAS PIKETTY AND EMMANUEL SAEZ [Authors Info & Affiliations](#)

SCIENCE • 23 May 2014 • Vol 344, Issue 6186 • pp. 838-843 • DOI: 10.1126/science.1251936

14,138 731




CHECK ACCESS

### Abstract

This Review presents basic facts regarding the long-run evolution of income and wealth inequality in Europe and the United States. Income and wealth inequality was very high a century ago, particularly in Europe, but dropped dramatically in the first half of the 20th century. Income inequality has surged back in the United States since the 1970s so that the United States is much more unequal than Europe today. We discuss possible interpretations and lessons for the future.



**Figure 6.1. Triple climate inequality: the poorest lose the most, contribute the least, and lack the means to act**



**Interpretation.** The figure illustrates three dimensions of global climate inequality. Projected relative income losses from climate change in 2025 are taken from Bothe et al. (2025) and represent percentage reductions in income compared with a business-as-usual scenario. The distribution of emissions is based on Bruckner et al. (2022). The distribution of wealth shares comes from WID (2025). Groups are defined by income for losses, by emitters for emissions, and by wealth for the wealth distribution, but all three distributions are highly correlated. For another paper on emissions inequalities by income groups, see Kartha et al. (2020), who find similar concentration levels.  
**Sources and series:** Bothe et al. (2025), Bruckner et al. (2022), and WID (2025).

# Algunos referentes macro-históricos sobre la desigualdad

**Me in history class**



# La conjetura de Kuznets (1955)






Figure 1.3 The Kuznets Curve: mostly the twentieth-century downswing.  
Source: Lindert and Williamson (1985, Figure 2, p. 345)



Kuznets S. (1955), Economic Growth and Income Inequality,  
The American Economic Review.

# Esto no proponía Kuznets



# Rostow (1960)

## Las etapas del crecimiento económico



Rostow W. W. (1960), *The Stages of Economic Growth. A Non-Communist Manifest*, Cambridge University Press.

# Actividad 1

# Explicaciones de todo tipo y etapa

- Lindert (1986): Caída del ingreso generado mediante la agricultura induce un aumento en la desigualdad
- Williamson (1985): El cambio tecnológico aumenta los salarios más rápido que el capital.
- Aghion and Bolton (1997): La acumulación de los ricos baja la tasa de interés para que los pobres puedan invertir y aproximarse a los ricos.
- Acemoglu y Robinson: Las políticas tienden a favorecer a los ricos, pero la desestabilización y la inconformidad transforma las instituciones y fortalece la democracia
- Derramamiento de la riqueza: Supone que los dueños del capital son el motor de la economía y que los retornos de la inversión tienen un efecto multiplicador hacia abajo. Todos se benefician eventualmente. Externalidades positivas de bajos impuestos.


# Fuera del patrón de Kuznets y Rostow

Acemoglu and Robinson (2001):

- Desastre autocrático: Alta desigualdad se acompaña de una sociedad pobre, mal organizada y con instituciones muy débiles. Al no haber democratización, no hay redistribución. Se desacelera la acumulación y lleva a un estancamiento de corto plazo.
- Milagro: La baja desigualdad inicial es clave. Cuando la economía crece, las ganancias se redistribuyen más rápidamente, la presión social no emerge tan rápido y la reforma política se atrasa.

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Actividad 2:

Condiciones necesarias  
del capitalismo liberal


# Callinicos: Promesas del capitalismo liberal

- ¿Le ha seguido una caída de la desigualdad a periodos de crecimiento económico?
- ¿Existe mayor movilidad mediante la participación en el mercado laboral?
- ¿Se benefician los de “abajo” de empleos seguros?
- ¿La pobreza afecta a una minoría?

# Derramamiento (trickle-down effect)

Profesor Cortés (2022):


- *En efecto, si todos los países transitan por las diferentes etapas del crecimiento económico señaladas por Rostow, entonces sus ingresos per cápita progresan sostenidamente, y, en consecuencia, según la conjetura de Kuznets la desigualdad se reduciría*
- *Se debe notar que la combinación de mayor equidad con ingresos más elevados conduce, necesariamente, a la reducción de la pobreza*
- *Se planteaba que la concentración del ingreso en manos de las clases más adineradas se transformaría en volúmenes crecientes de ahorros que permitirían financiar la inversión y por esa vía alentarían el crecimiento económico futuro, al igual que lo había hecho, en su época, la industriosamente frugal burguesía protestante en los países hoy desarrollados.*
- *El discurso se sintetizaba en la frase “la desigualdad es buena para el crecimiento económico”.*



# The Trickle-Down Myth: Vertical Distribution

Money is injected at the top. Watch how wealth accumulates with the wealthy while only drops reach the workers below.

● Wealthy (Top 20%)   ● Workers (Bottom 80%)   ● Money Flow



Start Animation

Reset

Period: 0 / 5

# Evidencia sobre la hipótesis del derramamiento

2016 CHAPTERS (LAYOUT FEATURES)

## Inequality and Economic Growth

Stiglitz, Joseph E.

This chapter argues in favour of alternative explanations of inequality, with particular reference to the theory of rent-seeking and to the influence of institutional and political factors, which have shaped labour markets and patterns of remuneration. And it shows that, far from being either necessary or good for economic growth, excessive inequality tends to lead to weaker economic performance. In light of this, it argues for a range of policies that would increase both equity and economic well-being.

### Subjects

Economics   Income distribution   Economic development   Equality

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## Development Policy Review



ORIGINAL ARTICLE

### Inequality and economic growth: Trickle-down effect revisited

Merter Akinci

First published: 20 January 2017 | <https://doi.org/10.1111/dpr.12214> |

[Read the full text >](#)


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### Abstract

The purpose of this study is to investigate the validity of trickle-down effect by using unbalanced panel data analysis for 65 countries in the period of 1995–2011. The estimation results point out that an increase in the incomes of the rich raises the incomes of the poor and vice versa. Nevertheless, it can clearly be seen that the contribution of the income transfer of the poor to the rich is more dominant than vice versa. Therefore, the invalidity of trickle-down effect can be stated for 65 countries.


# Tendencias recientes de la desigualdad del ingreso a nivel mundial

**Figure 2.10** The elephant curve of global inequality, 1980-2020





**Interpretation:** The bottom 50% incomes of the world saw substantial growth between 1980 and 2020 (between +50% and +200%). The top 1% incomes also benefited from high growth (between +100% and +200%). Intermediate categories grew less. In sum, inequality decreased between the bottom and the middle of the global income distribution, and increased between the middle and the top. In effect, the top 1% captured 23% of total world growth between 1980 and 2020, vs. 9% for the bottom 50%. Income is measured per capita after pension and unemployment insurance transfers and before income and wealth taxes. **Sources and series:** [wir2022.wid.world/methodology](http://wir2022.wid.world/methodology) and Chancel and Piketty (2021).

**Figure 2.4** Global income inequality: Between-country vs Within-country inequality (ratio T10/B50), 1820-2020





**Interpretation:** Between-country inequality, as measured by the ratio T10/B50 between the average incomes of the top 10% and the bottom 50% (assuming everybody within a country has the same income), rose between 1820 and 1980 and has since strongly declined. Within-country inequality, as measured also by the ratio T10/B50 between the average incomes of the top 10% and the bottom 50% (assuming all countries have the same average income), rose slightly between 1820 and 1910, declined between 1910 and 1980, and rose since 1980. Income is measured per capita after pensions and unemployment insurance transfers and before income and wealth taxes. **Sources and series:** [wir2022.wid.world/methodology](#) and Chancel and Piketty (2021).



# Evolución de la desigualdad países desarrollados y en desarrollo



# Crecimiento del ingreso por decil




# Desigualdad y derramamiento hacia abajo



# Desigualdad y distribución


Figure 4.4 Top 1% versus bottom 50% wealth shares in Western Europe and the US, 1910-2020



¿Por qué?

**Interpretation:** The graph presents decennial averages of top 1% personal wealth shares in Western Europe and the US. Between 1910 and 1919 the top 1% was 55% on average in Europe and 43% in the US. A century later, the US is almost back to its early 20th century level. Net household wealth is equal to the sum of financial assets (e.g. equity or bonds) and non-financial assets (e.g. housing or land) owned by individuals, net of their debts. **Sources and series:** [wir2022.wid.world/methodology](http://wir2022.wid.world/methodology), Bauluz et al. (2021) and updates.

**Figure 11a. Top 10% income share: Russia vs USA and France**



Distribution of pretax national income (before taxes and transfers, except pensions and unempl. insurance) among equal-split adults  
(income of married couples divided by two). Sources for USA and France: WID.world.

# ¿Por qué Francia se comporta diferente?




FIG. 6.—Effective average income tax rates in France, 1915–98. Source: Author's computations based on income tax returns and income tax laws (see Piketty 2001a, app. B, table B-20, pp. 636–37).







FIG. 1.—The top decile income share in France, 1900–1998. Source: Author's computations based on income tax returns (see App. table A1, col. P90–100, and Piketty [2001a, app. B, table B14, pp. 620–21]).

# ¿Por qué Estados Unidos se comporta diferente?



Source: Forbes Annual Compensation surveys of CEOs in top 800 companies; Average wages of full-time employees are from National Income Accounts.


**Figure 8.1. Working class representation has always been low and has further deteriorated in recent decades**



**Interpretation.** The long-run decline in the share of working-class members of parliament (MPs): evidence from France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The figure plots the evolution of the share of working-class MPs—measured as the number of MPs whose former occupation just before the elections was a “manual” occupation (United Kingdom), a “blue-collar” occupation (United States), or an occupation as “employés et ouvriers” (France)—over the total number of MPs in each country. The share of working-class occupations in the total labor force is usually around 50%–60% or more. **Sources and series:** Cagé (2024).

**Figure 8.5. The fragmentation of political cleavage structures in Western democracies**

**Comparing education and income divides in Western democracies, 1960–2025**



Este es el tema clásico  
de la participación del  
estado en la economía




Redistribution  
of wealth  
through taxation



Redistribution of wealth  
through free market  
assassination of hedge funds

## Perfil del grupo de acuerdo a sus perspectivas sociales y económicas



## Perfil del grupo de acuerdo a sus perspectivas sociales y económicas

Autoritarismo

Más estado

Más mercado

Indicador social

Política social:  
Sistema de salud  
británico

10

5

0

-5

-10

Tony Blair

Sistema tributario  
David Cameron


Indicador económico

Libertarianismo

5


10

**Figure 2.15** Global income inequality: pre-tax vs post-tax T10/B50 income ratio, 1820-2020



**Interpretation:** Global inequality, as measured by the post-tax ratio T10/B50 between the average income of the top 10% and the average income of the bottom 50%, more than doubled between 1820 and 1910, from less than 20 to about 40, and stabilized around 35 between 1910 and 2020. It is too early to say whether the decline in global inequality observed since 2008 will continue. Pre-tax Income is measured per capita after pension and unemployment insurance transfers and before income and wealth taxes. Post-tax income is income per capita after income tax and all transfers. **Sources and series:** [wir2022.wid.world/methodology](http://wir2022.wid.world/methodology) and Chancel and Piketty (2021).

**Figure 1.10** Inequality before and after taxes 2018-2021: Top 10/Bottom 50 income gap




**Interpretation:** Before taxes, the bottom 50% in South Africa earns 63 times less than the top 10%, whereas after taxes, the bottom 50% earns 24 times less than the top 10%. Income is measured after pension and unemployment payments and benefits received by individuals but before other taxes they pay and transfers they receive. Data for 2018-2021. **Sources and series:** [wir2022.wid.world/methodology](http://wir2022.wid.world/methodology)

# Evolución de los impuestos en USA

Top marginal income tax rate, 1900 to 2017

Top marginal tax rate of the income tax (i.e. the maximum rate of taxation applied to the highest part of income)


Our World  
in Data




Source: World Inequality Report (2018)

OurWorldInData.org/taxation/ • CC BY

Curva de Laffer



**Figure 4.6 Projections of the top 0.1%, middle 40% and bottom 50% wealth shares, 2000-2100**



**Interpretation:** The graph shows the evolution of the global top 0.1% and middle 40% wealth shares if each group continued to grow at the same speed as they have since 1995, all else being equal. Net household wealth is equal to the sum of financial assets (e.g. equity or bonds) and non-financial assets (e.g. housing or land) owned by individuals, net of their debts. Sources and series: [wir2022.wid.world/methodology](#), Bauluz et al. (2021) and updates. **Sources and series:** [wir2022.wid.world/methodology](#), Bauluz et al. (2021) and updates.

# Desigualdad y crecimiento

# Actividad 3

# Desigualdad v crecimiento: Dos momentos

Inequality and Growth in a Panel of Countries

ROBERT J. BARRO

Littauer Center, Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138

“La curva de Kuznets, mediante la cual la desigualdad primero incrementa y después se reduce, emerge como una clara regularidad empírica”

Inequality and growth: evidence from panel cointegration

Dierk Herzer & Sebastian Vollmer [✉](#)

*The Journal of Economic Inequality* 10, 489–503 (2012) | [Cite this article](#)

“Encontramos que la desigualdad de ingreso tiene un efecto negativo de largo plazo sobre el crecimiento”

JOURNAL ARTICLE

Inequality and Growth Reconsidered: Lessons from East Asia [Get access >](#)

Nancy Birdsall, David Ross, Richard Sabot

*The World Bank Economic Review*, Volume 9, Issue 3, September 1995, Pages 477–508,

“Es más, bajos niveles de desigualdad de ingreso parecen haber estimulado el crecimiento económico”

## Inicios del siglo XXI



A Meta-Analytic Reassessment of the Effects of Inequality on Growth


Pedro Cunha Neves <sup>a</sup>, Óscar Afonso <sup>b</sup>, Sandra Tavares Silva <sup>c</sup>

“La desigualdad ejerce un efecto negativo fuerte en el crecimiento de países en desarrollo.”  
“La desigualdad en capital es más nociva que la de ingreso para el crecimiento”

# Desigualdad y crecimiento

Si la desigualdad no hubiera aumentado, el crecimiento acumulado de la OCDE hubiera sido de 33%


Income inequality and growth in OECD regions, 2008-12




# Regresando a Callinicos y las promesas del capitalismo liberal

- ¿Existe mayor movilidad mediante la participación en el mercado laboral?
- ¿Se benefician los de “abajo” de empleos seguros?
- ¿La pobreza afecta a una minoría?

# Desigualdad y movilidad social



**Gráfico 4** América Latina (14 países)<sup>a</sup>: tasa de conclusión de la educación primaria, la educación secundaria baja y la educación secundaria alta<sup>b</sup>, por quintiles de ingreso extremos, 2000, 2010, 2015, 2019 y 2022  
(En porcentajes)



Fuente: Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), sobre la base del Banco de Datos de Encuestas de Hogares (BADEHOG).

<sup>a</sup> Promedio ponderado de los siguientes países: Argentina, Bolivia (Estado Plurinacional de), Brasil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, México, Panamá, Paraguay, Perú, República Dominicana y Uruguay.


<sup>b</sup> Se analizó la finalización de la educación primaria entre los jóvenes de 15 a 19 años, y de la educación secundaria baja y alta entre los jóvenes de 20 a 24 años.

# Movilidad social

## Movin' on up

Actual and perceived social mobility of children, 2016

Probability of remaining in the bottom quintile of earnings, %




Source: "Intergenerational Mobility and Preferences for Redistribution" by A. Alesina, St. Stantcheva and E. Teso

Economist.com

Actual Perceived\*

Probability of moving from bottom to top quintile of earnings, %




\*Surveyed Feb-Oct 2016

## As mobile as before

Probability\* of reaching top income quintile at age 26 by year of birth and parental income, %

### Parental income quintile



Source: Equality of Opportunity Project

\*Earlier figures were compiled using a different statistical method

# Economic Mobility by Gender

Men      Women

INICIO  
(Punto igual)

Top 20%

2nd Quintile

3rd Quintile

4th Quintile


Bottom 20%

Start Animation

Reset

Period: 5 / 5

**Black** and **white** girls raised in poor families,  
as measured by individual income



# Explicaciones de la baja movilidad






Figure 4


Higher Returns to Schooling are Associated with Lower Intergenerational Earnings Mobility





# Desigualdades en educación y movilidad



# Expectativa: Desigualdad y pobreza







# Estados Unidos. Desigualdad y pobreza




# Reino Unido. Desigualdad y pobreza

UK Child Poverty trends




# ¿Es la pobreza un fenómeno de minorías?

## Child Poverty Rate



Source: <http://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/rc12-eng-web.pdf>

Material deprivation rate, 2018 (%)



Note: the material deprivation rate refers to the share of the population unable to pay for at least three out of nine items that are deemed to be desirable or even necessary to lead an adequate life; the severe material deprivation rate refers to the share of the population unable to pay for at least four out of the same nine items.

(\*) Estimates.

(?) 2016.

(?) 2017.

Source: Eurostat (online data code: ilc\_sip8)

En fin, el derrumbe de “la doctrina”:

- (i) que el crecimiento económico está garantizado y que se logra a través de transitar por una serie de etapas claramente identificadas, y
- (ii) que en la medida que los países crezcan la desigualdad en los ingresos familiares decaerá, porque los ingresos fluirán de la parte alta a la baja en la estratificación social; no se explica únicamente por el rechazo teórico y empírico de la “teoría” sino también por razones político-ideológicas (advenimiento de la democracia) y metodológicas

Supongamos que estas promesas aún pueden cumplirse

- Mayor movilidad mediante la participación en el mercado laboral
- Se benefician los de “abajo” de empleos seguros
- La pobreza afecta a una minoría

¿Importa la desigualdad?

Consecuencias

# Income Inequality and Social Dysfunction

**Annual Review of Sociology**

Vol. 35:493-511 (Volume publication date 11 August 2009)

First published online as a Review in Advance on April 6, 2009

<https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-soc-070308-115926>

Wilkinson, R. G., & Pickett, K. E. (2009). Income inequality and social dysfunction. *Annual review of sociology*, 35, 493-511.

# Desigualdades


- First, income inequality serves as a measure that allows us to compare the scale or importance of social stratification in different societies.
- Second, because it is problems with social gradients that are related to inequality, this is probably a reflection of their sensitivity, on the one hand, to the existing status differentiation and, on the other, to the size and importance of the status differences as they vary from one society to another.
- Third, the forms of social dysfunction associated with greater inequality are not confined to the poor but extend to almost all sections of society.
- Fourth, the most plausible explanation of the effects of income inequality is that material inequality serves as a determinant and measure of the scale of social status differentiation in society



Wilkinson, R. G., & Pickett, K. E. (2009). Income inequality and social dysfunction. *Annual review of sociology*, 35, 493-511.

# Matriz de desigualdades

**Diagrama 1** América Latina y el Caribe: matriz de la desigualdad social



Fuente: Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), sobre la base de CEPAL, *La matriz de la desigualdad social en América Latina* (LC/G.2690(MDS.1/2)), Santiago, 2016.

# Desigualdades




Table 1 Associations of social problems with income inequality<sup>a</sup>


Outcome	International comparison	U.S. state comparison	Key sources
Homicide—adults	+	+	Hsich & Pugh 1993, Kaplan et al. 1996, Kennedy et al. 1996
Homicide—juvenile	n.a.	+	Pickett et al. 2005b
Violent crime	+	+	Hsich & Pugh 1993, Kaplan et al. 1996, Krohn 1976
Property crime	~	~	Krohn 1976, Kelly 2000
Conflict—children	+	n.a.	Pickett et al. 2005b
Obesity—adults	+	+	Pickett et al. 2005a, Wilkinson & Pickett 2009
Overweight—children	+	+	Pickett & Wilkinson 2007
Math and reading scores	+	+	Kaplan et al. 1996, Pickett & Wilkinson 2007
School drop-out rate	n.a.	+	Kaplan et al. 1996, Pickett & Wilkinson 2007
Racism	n.a.	+	Kennedy et al. 1997
Smoking	~	~	Diez-Roux et al. 2000, Pampel 2002
Suicide	~	~	Lester 1987, Andres 2005, Kowalski et al. 1987
Teenage births	+	+	Gold et al. 2001, Pickett et al. 2005b
Child well-being	+	n.a.	Pickett & Wilkinson 2007
Drug abuse	+	n.a.	Wilkinson & Pickett 2009
Drug overdose deaths	n.a.	+	Wilkinson & Pickett 2007
Alcohol abuse	~	~	Henderson et al. 2004, Elgar et al. 2005
Mental illness—adults	+	~	Wilkinson & Pickett 2007, 2009
Mental illness—children	n.a.	+	Pickett et al. 2005b
Imprisonment rate	+	+	Kaplan et al. 1996, Wilkinson & Pickett 2007
Social capital	n.a.	+	Kawachi et al. 1997
Social mobility	+	n.a.	Wilkinson & Pickett 2007
Status of women	+	+	Kawachi et al. 1999, Wilkinson & Pickett 2009
Trust	+	+	Kawachi et al. 1997, Uslaner 2002

<sup>a</sup>Abbreviations: +, worse outcomes significantly associated with greater inequality; -, better outcomes significantly associated with greater inequality; ~, no statistically significant association; n.a., data not available.

Crecimiento del ingreso ≠ desarrollo

# Desigualdad y crimen


Figure 2: Income Distribution and Robbery Rates, 1970-1994  
(5-year-averages)



# Desigualdad v seguridad

## Keeping up with the Joneses

Income inequality (Gini coefficient\*) and crime, 2017




Sources: Gallup; World Bank; *The Economist*

Economist.com


\*Latest available, 0=perfect equality and 100=perfect inequality

# Desigualdad y bienestar infantil


Child wellbeing is better in more equal rich countries



# Desigualdad y desigualdades en salud




**Mental illness is more common in more unequal societies**




Wilkinson & Pickett, *The Spirit Level*

[www.equalitytrust.org.uk](http://www.equalitytrust.org.uk)



# Desigualdad y desigualdades en salud




# Desigualdad y pobreza infantil


League Table 1 Inequality in income


Rank	Country	Relative income gap	Child poverty rate (50% of the median)
1	Norway	37.00	4.5
2	Iceland	37.76	6.4
3	Finland	38.34	3.7
4	Denmark	39.54	4.8
5	Czech Republic	39.62	6.3
6	Switzerland	39.64	7
7	United Kingdom	39.94	9.3
8	Netherlands	40.64	5.7
9	Luxembourg	41.21	13
10	Ireland	41.49	6.9
11	Austria	41.87	9.6
12	Germany	43.11	7.2
13	France	43.95	9
14	Australia	44.75	9.3
15	Republic of Korea	45.74	8
16	Sweden	46.23	9.1
17	New Zealand	46.52	11
18	Cyprus	47.19	9.1
19	Slovenia	47.29	8.3
20	Malta	48.21	14.5
21	Hungary	48.34	15
22	Belgium	48.41	10.1
23	Poland	51.76	14.5
24	Canada	53.19	16.9
25	Slovakia	54.21	13.7
26	Croatia	54.59	14.8
27	Lithuania	54.81	17.8
28	Estonia	55.55	12.4
29	Turkey	57.07	22.8
30	United States	58.85	20
31	Chile	59.03	26.3
32	Latvia	59.66	16.3
33	Portugal	60.17	17.4
34	Japan	60.21	15.8
35	Italy	60.64	17.7
36	Spain	62.62	20.2
37	Israel	64.58	27.5
38	Greece	64.69	22.3
39	Mexico	65.00	24.6
40	Bulgaria	67.01	23.1
41	Romania	67.08	24.3

# Desigualdad y desigualdades en salud infantil




# Desigualdad y desigualdad en salud infantil





**Figure 8**


Infant mortality by occupational class of father in Sweden compared with England and Wales. Sweden had lower infant mortality in all classes and a shallower social gradient than England and Wales. Redrawn from Leon et al. 1992.



**Figure 9**

Mortality of working-age men by occupational class in Sweden compared with England and Wales. Note that as well as having smaller income differences, Sweden has lower mortality in all classes and that the social gradient is less steep than in England and Wales. Redrawn from Vagero & Lundberg 1989.

Wilkinson, R. G., & Pickett, K. E. (2009). Income inequality and social dysfunction. *Annual review of sociology*, 35, 493-511.



**Figure 10**

Morbidity rates (diabetes, hypertension, cancer, lung disease, and heart disease) by tertiles of education comparing whites aged 55–64 in the United States and England. Note that morbidity rates are lower in England even in the top educational tertile for all morbidities except lung disease. Data source: Banks et al. 2006.


Wilkinson, R. G., & Pickett, K. E. (2009). Income inequality and social dysfunction. *Annual review of sociology*, 35, 493-511.

# Mecanismos

- Noten que prácticamente todos los resultados son estáticos y no los estamos interpretando formalmente desde el punto de vista causal
- Tenemos que explicar por qué un rango amplio de problemas sociales y en salud tienden a ser más comunes en sociedades desiguales.
  - Acá la teoría económica se acaba rápido. ¿Diferencias en productividad?
  - Necesitamos recurrir a otros cuerpos teóricos para explicar los mecanismos



# Mecanismos: Desigualdad social y estratificación



## Social Stratification



¿Debemos preocuparnos por modificar  
la magnitud de la desigualdad?

Justicia distributiva

# Desigualdad y justicia social (distributiva)



# Hipótesis de la desigualdad, crecimiento y desarrollo

Existe un creciente acuerdo de que las **tendencias y los niveles** de desigualdad importan porque las siguientes hipótesis no se sostienen:

- la desigualdad es buena para el crecimiento la desigualdad (con crecimiento) eventualmente se reduciría por cambios en los patrones de movilidad social la desigualdad (con crecimiento) se traduciría en muy bajas tasas de pobreza se acompaña de resultados insatisfactorios
- la desigualdad (con crecimiento) se traduciría en desarrollo generalizado

Ello sumado al creciente acuerdo de que:

- El crecimiento económico se beneficia de niveles bajos de desigualdad
- Las sociedades más igualitarias parecen tener mejores resultados en términos de marcadores de desarrollo

# ¿Cuáles son las preguntas relevantes?

Callinicos: Quizá no nos hemos hecho las preguntas relevantes ¿Cuáles serían?

¿Es justa la desigualdad? Justicia y el papel del Estado

Nozick: La desigualdad no importa... siempre y cuando sea resultado de las elecciones libres de los individuos. Podrá ser mala/desafortunada pero no **injusta**.

Cohen: Las desigualdades son tolerables en tanto las **oportunidades vitales** de las personas progresan de forma continua

- La desigualdad en las oportunidades es una forma de injusticia

Titmuss: La única igualdad justa es aquella en la que todas las personas que integran la sociedad se benefician igualmente de un conjunto mínimo de bienes públicos

hmhm...



# ¿Cuáles son las preguntas relevantes?

Callinicos: Quizá no nos hemos hecho las preguntas relevantes ¿Cuáles serían?

Justicia y el papel del Estado

Nozick: La desigualdad no importa siempre y cuando sea resultado de las elecciones libres de los individuos. Podrá ser mala/desafortunada la desigualdad pero no injusta.

Cohen: Las desigualdades son tolerables en tanto las oportunidades vitales de las personas progresan de forma continua

- La desigualdad en las oportunidades son una forma de injusticia

Titmuss: La única igualdad justa es aquella en la que todas las personas que integran la sociedad se benefician igualmente de un conjunto mínimo de bienes públicos

# ¿Cuáles son las preguntas relevantes?


Callinicos: Quizá no nos hemos hecho las preguntas relevantes ¿Cuáles serían?

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# Conclusiones

En el trasfondo operan juicios respecto sobre la justificación que tiene cada persona para beneficiarse sus acciones y de la sociedad en la que vive

Preocuparnos por el modo en el que las instituciones funcionan para privilegiar a unos y relegar a otros

¿Qué nivel de desigualdad es justo?

¿Qué tipo de igualdad es justo? (¿O igualdad de qué?)

¿Qué tipo de características tendría una sociedad deseable?

¿Por qué la política social está atada a las perspectivas de



# Próxima clase

- Callinicos Capítulo 3. La igualdad y los filósofos.
- Hayek, F (1978) New studies in Philosophy, politics, economics and history of Ideas. Capítulo 16 Adam Smith's Message in Today´s Language. 267-270.
- Plant, Raymond. 2009. "Chapter 4 Social Justice: A Mirage?" In *The Neo-liberal State*. Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199281756.003.0005>.

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