1 General McCall Search Model

• Offer arriving rate: λ

• Separation rate: α

• Discount rate: β

• Wage offers: $\{w_1, w_2, \dots, w_n\}$ with probability $\{p_1, p_2, \dots, p_n\}$

ullet Unemployment benefit: c

• Life time utility

$$\mathbb{E}\sum_{t=0}^{\infty}\beta^{t}u(y_{t})$$

The value functions are

$$V_s = u(w_s) + \beta \left[(1 - \alpha)V_s + \alpha U \right]$$
$$U = u(c) + \beta (1 - \lambda)U + \beta \lambda \sum_s p_s \max \{U, V_s\}$$

2 A Simple Example

We will make the following assumptions to make it easy to solve: the wage offers are $\{w_1, w_2\}$ with probability $\{p_1, p_2\}$, the period utility function $u(y_t) = y_t$, and the unemployment benefit c = 0. We also assume that $w_2 > w_1 > 0$.

With these assumption, the value functions become

$$V_1 = w_1 + \beta \left[(1 - \alpha)V_1 + \alpha U \right] \tag{2.1}$$

$$V_2 = w_2 + \beta \left[(1 - \alpha)V_2 + \alpha U \right] \tag{2.2}$$

$$U = \beta(1 - \lambda)U + \beta\lambda p_1 \max\{U, V_1\} + \beta\lambda p_2 \max\{U, V_2\}$$
(2.3)

There are two possible scenarios: first, $U > V_1$; second, $U < V_1$. Let us guess that the first is true, and we will verify whether this guess is valid or not.

With the first guess, we have

$$V_1 = w_1 + \beta \left[(1 - \alpha)V_1 + \alpha U \right]$$
 (2.4)

$$V_2 = w_2 + \beta \left[(1 - \alpha)V_2 + \alpha U \right]$$
 (2.5)

$$U = \beta(1 - \lambda)U + \beta\lambda p_1 U + \beta\lambda p_2 V_2 \tag{2.6}$$

It is easy to see the following is true

$$V_1 = V_2 - \frac{w_2 - w_1}{1 - \beta(1 - \alpha)} \tag{2.7}$$

and

$$U = \frac{\beta \lambda p_2}{1 - \beta (1 - \lambda) - \beta \lambda p_1} V_2 < V_2$$
(2.8)

Then we have

$$V_2 = w_2 + \beta(1 - \alpha)V_2 + \alpha\beta \frac{\beta\lambda p_2}{1 - \beta(1 - \lambda) - \beta\lambda p_1}V_2$$
(2.9)

which leads to

$$V_{2} = \frac{1}{1 - \beta(1 - \alpha) - \frac{\alpha\beta^{2}\lambda p_{2}}{1 - \beta(1 - \lambda) - \beta\lambda p_{1}}} w_{2} = \frac{1 - \beta(1 - \lambda) - \beta\lambda p_{1}}{(1 - \beta(1 - \lambda p_{2}) + \alpha\beta)(1 - \beta)} w_{2} \equiv Aw_{2}$$
 (2.10)

Then it follows

$$V_1 = V_2 - \frac{w_2 - w_1}{1 - \beta(1 - \alpha)} = \left(A - \frac{1}{1 - \beta(1 - \alpha)}\right) w_2 + \frac{1}{1 - \beta(1 - \alpha)} w_1 \tag{2.11}$$

$$U = \frac{\beta \lambda p_2}{1 - \beta (1 - \lambda) - \beta \lambda p_1} A w_2 \tag{2.12}$$

To verify our initial guess, the following has to be true

$$U > V_1 \tag{2.13}$$

which is equivalent to

$$\frac{\beta \lambda p_2}{1 - \beta(1 - \lambda) - \beta \lambda p_1} A w_2 > \left(A - \frac{1}{1 - \beta(1 - \alpha)}\right) w_2 + \frac{1}{1 - \beta(1 - \alpha)} w_1 \tag{2.14}$$

which can be simplified to

$$\frac{1}{1 - \beta(1 - \alpha)}(w_2 - w_1) > \frac{1 - \beta}{1 - \beta(1 - \lambda) - \beta\lambda p_1} Aw_2$$
 (2.15)

After some algebra, the equation above simplifies to

$$\frac{1}{1 - \beta + \alpha \beta} (w_2 - w_1) > \frac{1}{1 - \beta (1 - \lambda p_2) + \alpha \beta} w_2 \tag{2.16}$$

$$\beta \lambda p_2 w_2 > [1 - \beta (1 - \lambda p_2) + \alpha \beta] w_1 \tag{2.17}$$

The following intuitions should apply

- If w_1 is small enough, $U > V_1$
- If β is large, it is more likely to have $U > V_1$
- If p_2 is large, it is more likely to have $U > V_1$
- If λ is large, it is more likely to have $U > V_1$
- If α is smaller, it is more likely to have $U > V_1$