'modal logic'

hejohns

October 28, 2022

Math. Struct. in Comp. Science (2001), vol. 11, pp. 511–540. Printed in the United Kingdom © 2001 Cambridge University Press

A judgmental reconstruction of modal logic

FRANK PFENNING† and ROWAN DAVIES

Department of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh PA 15213-3891, USA

Received 3 December 1999; revised 3 May 2000

1/10

Outline

- Pre paper
 - Pre Pre 1960
 - Pre 1960
 - Kripke Semantics
- Pfenning, Davies
 - Judgment, in passing

prior

hilbert proofs

Definition

$$\mathcal{M} = \langle \mathcal{W} : Set, R : \mathcal{W} \times \mathcal{W} \rightarrow 2, V : \omega \rightarrow \mathcal{W} \rightarrow 2 \rangle$$

Definition

$$\begin{array}{l}
\vDash^{\mathcal{M}}_{\alpha \in \mathcal{W}} P_n \iff V(n)(\alpha) \\
\vDash^{\mathcal{M}}_{\alpha \in \mathcal{W}} \bot \iff false \\
\vDash^{\mathcal{M}}_{\alpha \in \mathcal{W}} A \land B \iff \vDash^{\mathcal{M}}_{\alpha} A \text{ and } \vDash^{\mathcal{M}}_{\alpha} B \\
\vDash^{\mathcal{M}}_{\alpha \in \mathcal{W}} A \lor B \iff \vDash^{\mathcal{M}}_{\alpha} A \text{ or } \vDash^{\mathcal{M}}_{\alpha} B \\
\vDash^{\mathcal{M}}_{\alpha \in \mathcal{W}} A \to B \iff \vDash^{\mathcal{M}}_{\alpha} A \implies \vDash^{\mathcal{M}}_{\alpha} B \\
\vDash^{\mathcal{M}}_{\alpha \in \mathcal{W}} \Box A \iff \forall \beta \in \mathcal{W}.\alpha R\beta \implies \vDash^{\mathcal{W}}_{\beta} A \\
\vDash^{\mathcal{M}}_{\alpha \in \mathcal{W}} \lozenge A \iff \exists \beta \in \mathcal{W}.\alpha R\beta \land \vDash^{\mathcal{W}}_{\beta} A
\end{array}$$

Definition

$$\mathcal{M} = \langle \mathcal{W} : Set, \leq, V : \omega \to \mathcal{W} \to 2 \rangle$$

$$\alpha \leq \beta \Longrightarrow \models_{\alpha}^{\mathcal{M}} P_n \Longrightarrow \models_{\beta}^{\mathcal{M}} P_n$$

Definition

$$\models_{\alpha}^{\mathcal{M}} A \to B \Longleftrightarrow \forall \beta.\alpha \leq \beta \Longrightarrow \models_{\beta}^{\mathcal{M}} A \Longrightarrow \models_{\beta}^{\mathcal{M}} B$$

Judgment

• "Of course, there would be needed here an analysis of what is understood by an expression, but that is a comparatively trivial matter, as compared with explaining the notion of proposition and judgement. An expression in the most general sense of the word is nothing but a form, that is, something that we can passively recognize as the same in its manifold occurrences and actively reproduce in many copies. But I think that I shall have to rely here upon an agreement that we have such a general notion of expression, which is formal in character, so that the rule can now count as a formal rule "

Local Soundness/Completeness

hejohns Judgmental Reconstruction

References I

[1] TODO: ask me

