

some notes of mine

hejohns' notes

hejohns

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Papers

2012 – Soare, *Formalism and intuition in computability*

Tags: [computability](#), [history](#)

Date: 2022-12-17

up to p.9

f

1981 – Kleene, *Origins of recursive function theory*

Tags: [logic](#), [computability](#), [history](#)

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need to read last 10 pages

nice review by Steward Shapiro, 1990

λ -defineable = Church, recursive = Gödel, Herbrand, computable = Turing,

(although until 193?, recursive \mapsto primitive recursive, for Gödel, now recursive \mapsto Herbrand-Gödel general recursive)

Book Reviews

1995 - Makiko Nakano, *Makiko's Diary*

Tags:

Date: December 19, 2022

Translated by Kazuko Smith

sticky rice (desserts) = $\frac{1}{2}$ sticky rice + $\frac{1}{2}$ normal

Presentations/Lectures

2007 - Bryan Cantrill, *Dtrace*

Tags:

Date: December 19, 2022

Link: [recording](#)

A

Dictionary

Craig's Trick

Tags: logic, computability

Date: 2022-12-18

Theorem (Craig's Trick)

From Mathew (MATH 684): S is a set of sentences $\implies \exists S^*. S^*$ is computable \wedge they have the same theory.

(my terminology) a theory is computable \iff it is c.e.¹

ie a theory is computably axiomatized \iff it is computably enumerably axiomatized

Proof. MATH 684: S is c.e., so you only have a listing of the sentences. We can make it strictly monotonic by relisting, but by adding a bunch of tautological noise or padding to each sentence (say, by conjuncting tautologies, assuming eg Gödel's prime factorization encoding) st the Gödel number is much larger. (Each sentence is relisted logically equivalently.) \square

See: Theory

So c.e. theories are just as effective as computable ones, which is good news for axiom schemas. A priori, it's not clear that theories w/ axiom schemas are as effective as finitely axiomatizable ones, but intuitively, axiom schemas are of the same character, are "easily checkable". Craig's trick formally grounds this.

eg PA is as effective as PA^- . (although PA^- has nice utility for the Entscheidungsproblem.)

r: ...sentences up to logical equivalence

Wikipedia has a similar sketch.

Somehow the proof itself doesn't feel intuitive, but the "intended use" of the theorem is.

Enumeration Operator

Tags: logic, computability

Date: 2022-12-18

Definition (Enumeration Operator)

Each enumeration reduction witness z and B determine the A , so each z determines an enumeration operator $\Phi_z : 2^\omega \rightarrow 2^\omega$.

ie $\Phi_z(B) = A \iff A \leq_e X$ witnessed by z .

$$A \equiv_e B \iff A \leq_e B \wedge B \leq_e A$$

Theorem

- enumeration operators compose, by inspection
- $A \subseteq B \implies \Phi(A) \subseteq \Phi(B)$ (monotonicity)
- $x \in \Phi(B) \implies \exists C. C \text{ finite} \wedge C \subseteq B \wedge x \in \Phi(C)$ (continuity)²

See: Dana Scott's graph model of λ -calculus

From Rogers' 1967 *Theory of Recursive Functions*.

An archetypical example: In Gödel's incompleteness theorems, each computable enumeration of a theory (my sense) gives rise to an enumeration of the theory (the deductive closure). In Miller's terms, there is the "deducibility operator" D that gives for each axiom set B , $D(B)$, the set of consequences.

I'm thinking of the deducibility operator the whole time.

z : which I'd call compactness

Enumeration Reducibility

Tags: [logic](#), [computability](#)

Date: 2022-12-18

Definition (Enumeration Reduc(tion/ible))

$$A \leq_e B \iff \exists z. \forall x. x \in A \leftrightarrow \exists u. \langle x, y \rangle \in W_z \wedge D_u \subseteq B$$

where z is the Gödel code of the reduction witness, and D_u is the finite set associated with u as a canonical index (ie a tuple).³

Rogers' (really simple) examples:

- ▶ $\{2n \mid n \in \omega\} \leq_e \omega$
- ▶ $A \leq_e B \implies \forall B. A \leq_e B$

See: Enumeration Operator

Dana Scott's Graph Model

Tags: [logic](#), [λ-calculus](#)

Date: 2022-12-18

Definition

$$\llbracket \lambda x. \rrbracket := \quad (0.1)$$

$$\llbracket e_1 e_2 \rrbracket := \quad (0.2)$$

See: Enumeration Operator

Herbrand's Theorem

Tags: [logic](#)

Date: 2022-12-17

TODO: convert notes from Prof. Blass' November seminar [Herbrand's Theorem](#)

From Rogers' 1967 *Theory of Recursive Functions*.

This definition is not as nice as (many-)one or Turing reduction, but the idea is that we want to “effectively list A using any listing (computable or not) of B ”. Note that enumeration reductions “only use positive information about B , and produce only positive information about A ; whereas Turing reductions use and produce both positive and negative information.” (paraphrased from the introduction to Russell Miller's *Non-coding Enumeration Operators*.)

³: The idea w/ u is that to list A while watching elements enter B , you should only need (to see) a finite amount of B to list a particular element $x \in A$.

Knaster-Tarski

Tags: logic

Date: 2022-12-19

Theorem (Knaster-Tarski Fixpoint Theorem)

Every monotone function on a complete lattice has a complete lattice of fixpoints.

Proof. Widely available. \square

Example

- The deducibility operator is a monotone function on sets of sentences.⁴ The bottom (least) fixpoint is the (deductively closed) empty theory. The top (greatest) fixpoint is the inconsistent theory, ie the set of all sentences. Consistency of the empty theory (by Gentzen's original cut elimination, or by existence of a model) says this complete lattice is nontrivial. Any consistent, computably axiomatizable (deductively closed) theory that proves more than the empty theory is an intermediate fixpoint— eg PA. Incompleteness says there is no intermediate fixpoint above PA that is complete, but there are at least 2^{\aleph_0} intermediate fixpoints above PA where we keep adding $Con(T)$ or $\neg Con(T)$.⁵

This theorem has many statements, and this is the easiest for me to remember. The complete lattice is often a powerset lattice.

4: For simplicity, assume everything is about—and still true about— a fixed language of arithmetic.

5: Are there complete intermediate fixpoints?

See: Enumeration Operator, Dana Scott's Graph Model

Locus Solum

Tags:

Date: December 19, 2022

This is my version of Girard's dictionary.

Also afaik the most Girard paper there is

PA

Tags:


Date: December 19, 2022

Peano Arithmetic w/ induction. $PA^- := PA \setminus \text{induction}$

Realizability

Tags:

Date: December 19, 2022

This is how we can attach beamer presentations 

Theory

Tags: [logic](#)

Date: 2022-12-18

An unfortunately ambiguous term, but you can usually figure it out from context, if it really matters.

I tend to use “Theory” to just mean a set of sentences, as in the Γ in the sequent $\Gamma \vdash$. So I see a finite set for “the theory of groups”, and a finite set unioned w/ a schema for “Peano Arithmetic”. (and the empty set for the Entscheidungsproblem.) Sometimes, people mean a deductively closed set of sentences.

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