



**BERGISCHE  
UNIVERSITÄT  
WUPPERTAL**

BACHELOR THESIS

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# Comparing Post-Quantum Instantiations of the TLS1.3 Handshake

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**Jonas Dinspel**

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Chair for IT Security and Cryptography  
University of Wuppertal

First Examiner:           **Prof. Dr.-Ing. Tibor Jager**  
Second Examiner:       **Jun.-Prof. Dr.-Ing Malte Mues**

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By submitting this thesis, I declare that I have carefully read and followed the university's guidelines and the instructions of the ITSC research group on the use of AI.



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Whoever falsely makes a declaration in lieu of an oath before an authority which is competent to administer such declarations or falsely testifies whilst referring to such a declaration incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or a fine.

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(1) Wenn eine der in den §§ 154 bis 156 bezeichneten Handlungen aus Fahrlässigkeit begangen worden ist, so tritt Freiheitsstrafe bis zu einem Jahr oder Geldstrafe ein.

(2) Strafflosigkeit tritt ein, wenn der Täter die falsche Angabe rechtzeitig berichtigt. Die Vorschriften des § 158 Abs. 2 und 3 gelten entsprechend.

#### § 161 StGB (German Criminal Code): Negligent false oath; negligent false declaration in lieu of oath

(1) Whoever commits one of the offences referred to in sections 154 to 156 by negligence incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or a fine.

(2) No penalty is incurred if the offender corrects the false statement in time. The provisions of section 158 (2) and (3) apply accordingly.

# Abstract

**Some Advice.** Think of the abstract as a short version of your thesis. Motivate the topic of your thesis, and give a brief summary of its contents. Keep in mind that the abstract (and the remainder of your thesis) should be comprehensible for fellow students of yours. It is often expected that abstracts do not exceed one page.

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# 1 Introduction

**Writing an Introduction.** Introductions are often regarded as the “hardest part” when it comes to writing a thesis. You can use the following questions as a golden thread:

- Why is the topic of your thesis of particular interest? Why is it interesting to investigate this topic today?
- What are interesting problems and why are they interesting?
- Are there simple or naïve approaches to solve those problems? Why do they fail in practice?
- What are the goals of your thesis?
- What is the current state of the art?
- Did you contribute to the state of the art? How?
- Is there any related work not covered by the previous questions? Which? Why are those works not applicable to your thesis?
- How is your thesis structured?

Do not be afraid of writing too much. In my opinion, a good introduction is at least 3–4 pages long, sometimes even longer. For example, the introduction of my PhD thesis is 13 pages long, including a broad research motivation, several conceptual approaches to my research, the formulation of research questions, the state of the art, how my thesis advanced the state of the art, and related work. Of course, we do not expect a 13 page introduction in a bachelor or master thesis but we encourage you to invest some time when writing it. By the way, a well-written introduction is a great outline for a talk about your thesis.

## 2 Fundamentals

**TLS1.3** how does the handshake work, where are the components used that are relevant for the formula - not too technical, just nice for understanding

**PQC** Overview NIST-finalists, differences between them - key size/general runtime

**NIST-Levels** Difference between levels - what do they imply

### 2.1 Illustrated components

#### 2.1.1 Key-Exchange

public key schemes

#### 2.1.2 key encapsulation mechanisms

#### 2.1.3 Signing

#### 2.1.4 Extensions

Encrypted Public Key

OCSP-stapeling

certificate transparency

## 3 Method

I create an UI based calculator to configure and compare the size of transmitted cryptographic objects of up to 2 different instantiations of the TLS 1.3 handshake. These instantiations consist of key-exchange and used signing-algorithm as well as different TLS extensions. Aviable extensions are OCSP-stapeling, certificate transparency with variable log length and encrypted public key. The underlying datasets for key-exchange and signing include different pre- and post-quantum schemes with different parametersets aviable for each scheme.

classic	post-quantum
DHE	HQC
ECDHE	KYBER

Table 3.1: Aviable key-exchange schemes

For signing algorithms, there is a broad spectrum of different post-quantum schemes with different NIST status, including on-ramp and not fully proven as secure applications. As this calculator focuses on post-quantum instantiations of the TLS1.3 handshake, all included schemes from classic cryptography are those which are included in [rfc8446], where the TLS1.3 handshake is formally defined. Legacy algorithms, even those annotated in [rfc8446], are not included.

### 3.0.1 Limitations

The formula which is used by the calculator only includes the size of cryptographic objects during the handshake, stopping at and already excluding the shared private key. Everything adide the cryptographic objects in each payload is not taken into consideration. This includes package information, additional extensions and even headers, even these used in ocsf or certificate transparency. The computational effort for used schemes is not taken into consideration either, as results heavily vary outside of benchmarks. By excluding these factors I ensure the compareability and consitancy of generated results, regardless of connected host or comuting machine in real life cenarios.

scheme	status	scheme	status
EdDSA	classic	CROSS	On-ramp
RSA	classic	Feast	On-ramp
DHE	classic	Falcon	t.b.s
UOV	On-ramp	Hawk	On-ramp
SQIsign	On-ramp	Less	On-ramp
SNOVA	On-ramp	MAYO	On-ramp
SLH-DSA	FIPS	ML-DSA	FIPS
SDitH	On-ramp	MQOM	On-ramp
RYDE	On-ramp	Mirath	On-ramp
QR-UOV	On-ramp	PERK	On-ramp

Table 3.2: Aviable signature schemes

### 3.0.2 Capabilities

This calculator can be used to quickly compare the size of transmitted cryptographic objects during client and server hello as well as the total size, without setting up and reconfiguring a dedicated server. These objects are included:

- The used public key, which can also be encrypted if the extension encrypted public key [] is enabled
- Transmitted cyphertext, which will be used if the key exchange is handled by KEM[]
- Signatures
- The signature part of OCSP-responses, if ocsf-stapeling is enabled
- the signature part of scts, if certificate transparency is enabled

### 3.0.3 data source

The data used for calculating the size of the key-exchange is sourced from their individual NIST-publications[1][2][3]. Each signature dataset is sourced from the repository of the "PQ Signatures Zoo" open source project [4]. By using consistent sources for each dataset I further ensure the compareability of generated results.

## 3.1 calculation

### 3.1.1 Underlying Equation

The total size is calculated using the following equation:

$$y_1 * a_1 * x_1 + y_2 * x_2 + y_3 * x_3 + y_4 * x_4 + y_5 * x_5 + y_6 * a_6 * x_6 \quad (3.1)$$

$$\text{s.t.} \quad x_i \in \mathbb{N}, \forall i \in \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6\} \quad (3.2)$$

$$y_i \in \{0, 1\}, \forall i \in \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6\} \quad (3.3)$$

$$a \in \{1, 2\} \quad (3.4)$$

$$b \in \mathbb{N} \quad (3.5)$$

$$y_1 + y_3 \geq 1 \quad (3.6)$$

$$y_5 + y_6 \leq 1 \quad (3.7)$$

The formula and subjected restrictions are to be understood as follows:

(3.1) calculate total size, considering all aspects of the represented instantiation

(3.2) represents the size of corresponding cryptographic object in bytes. Needs to be a positiv whole number

- 1 Client Public Key
- 2 Server Public Key
- 3 Server Ciphertextunderline
- 4 Signature
- 5 OCSP-response signature
- 6 Certificate transparency signature

(3.3) represents if component is selected or not. Mapping is the same as (3.2)

(3.4) Factor for Client public key. If public key encryption is enabled public key size is doubled

(3.5) Factor for Certificate transparency, represents log length.

(3.6) at least key-exchange or signature need to be included

(3.7) only ocsf-stapeling OR certificate transparency is enabled

### 3.1.2 UI

This formula is embedded in a browser based user interface, enabling users to configure different instantiations within the subjected restrictions proposed earlier. The UI shifts selection options based on made inputs, so instantiations outside of the given constraints can not be created. Each created instantiation consists of up to five entries, which consist of informations about selected schemes and enabled elements of the formula.

- key-exchange: name of scheme, selected parameterset and corresponding NIST Level. The name is a hyperlink pointing to the schemes homepage or publication, depending on availability.
- signature - name of scheme, selected parameterset and corresponding NIST Level. The name is a hyperlink pointing to the schemes publication or homepage, depending on availability
- Client Hello - Public key size for selected key-exchange, displayed in bytes. If public-key encryption is enabled this value is doubled
- Server Hello - Public key or ciphertext size in bytes, depending on selected key exchange. Selected Signature size in bytes. Size of attached ocsp-response size OR scts
- total size - sum of all used crypto objects

## 4 Results

**some benchmarking** average key exchange/sign size per nist level

**implications for traffic** when is size for one tcp package exceeded? what does that imply?

**usage** optimizing bandwidth influence of addons on package size

## 5 Conclusion