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**Comparing Post-Quantum
Instantiations of the TLS 1.3
Handshake**

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Abstract

With the continuous development of quantum computers and their approaching cryptographic relevance a severe threat is posed to public-key cryptography. Specifically, the TLS 1.3 Handshake, which is the backbone of modern internet communication, is highly vulnerable to quantum threats such as Shor's algorithm and, consequently, *collect now, decrypt later* attacks. Mitigating this threat requires a fast transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC). However, PQC schemes generate drastically larger cryptographic objects, raising concerns about their impact on network traffic.

To address this concern, we propose a calculator to quickly compare different instantiations of the TLS 1.3 Handshake, offering insights into the size of transmitted cryptographic objects and their impact on the size of different handshake messages. The calculator offers classical, post-quantum and hybrid key-exchange and signature schemes as well as security-enhancing extensions such as OCSP-Stapling, Certificate Transparency and Encrypted Client Hello to create different instantiations of the TLS 1.3 Handshake.

The calculator shows that migrating to PQC schemes comes with a drastic increase in the size of transmitted cryptographic objects. This increase quickly exceeds standard TCP packet sizes, inevitably leading to fragmentation, thus increasing latency and increasing the attack surface to the handshake. Ultimately, this thesis highlights the trade-off between maintaining forward secrecy and network performance during the transition to quantum-proof TLS 1.3.

Contents

| | |
|--|-----------|
| Abstract | iv |
| 1 Introduction | 1 |
| 2 Related Works | 3 |
| 3 Preliminaries | 4 |
| 3.1 TLS 1.3 Handshake | 4 |
| 3.1.1 Key-Exchange | 7 |
| 3.1.2 Signatures | 10 |
| 3.1.3 Extensions | 11 |
| 3.2 Post-Quantum Cryptography | 13 |
| 3.2.1 Shor's Algorithm | 14 |
| 3.3 Security Strength Categories | 14 |
| 3.4 Illustrated Components | 15 |
| 4 Method | 17 |
| 4.1 Calculator | 19 |
| 4.1.1 Underlying Equation | 19 |
| 4.1.2 User Interface | 20 |
| 5 Results | 23 |
| 5.1 Benchmarking | 23 |
| 5.2 Implications for Traffic | 24 |
| 5.3 Use Cases | 25 |
| 6 Conclusion | 26 |
| 6.1 Relevance | 26 |
| 6.2 Future Work | 26 |
| Bibliography | 28 |

1 Introduction

With the continuous progress in the development of quantum computers, new challenges arise alongside of their many benefits. One, if not the biggest challenge for the field of cryptography, is the threat posed to widely used public key cryptography. These public key cryptography schemes help to ensure the integrity, confidentiality and authenticity of modern-day communications. They rely on complex mathematical problems like the factorization of large integers or the discrete logarithm problem, which, without the right information or keys, are assumed to be impossible to solve efficiently with today's most powerful computers. However, quantum algorithms such as Shor's algorithm are able to efficiently solve these problems in polynomial time. An adversary capable of running Shor's quantum algorithm on a realistic problem of relevant size would be able to derive shared secrets used in public key cryptography. Using the shared secret, an attacker can easily decrypt any data encrypted using this secret, which leads to the loss of confidentiality and forward security. Especially in the face of *collect now, decrypt later* attack schemes, where adversaries store encrypted data in advance with the intention to receive sensible data by breaking the used encryption once they gain the ability to do so, are quantum attackers already a threat.

Additionally, attackers gain the ability to fake signatures, leading to the loss of authenticity as well.

These risks underline the urgency of a fast transition to post-quantum public key cryptography to ensure the confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of transmitted data in the future.

One of the affected protocols is Transport Layer Security (TLS), which is used for a wide range of applications from simply surfing the internet or using instant messaging to voice over IP. Especially the handshake, which relies on asymmetric cryptography, is susceptible to quantum attacks. However, the symmetric encryptions used in the following data transfer are not resistant either.

Even the most recent TLS 1.3 standard itself is not inherently post-quantum secure. One promising approach for the transition to post-quantum cryptography is the use of so-called *hybrid* solutions, which combine traditional encryptions with post-quantum schemes like ML-KEM. Some of these approaches are already included in current versions of web browsers.

As with all increases in security, the transition to post-quantum cryptography comes at a cost, as post-quantum encryptions tend to require more computational

power and produce larger cryptographic objects. Thus, an overall decrease in the performance of relying protocols is expected. Benchmarks for these hybrid solutions already exist, however, it is still hard to compare different cryptographic TLS configurations against each other.

To address this issue and further support the post-quantum transition of TLS 1.3, this thesis will introduce a calculator to view, create and compare different TLS configurations, including traditional, hybrid and post-quantum schemes. This will give a better overview of the current state of research and understanding of the implications on performance of the transition to post-quantum TLS 1.3, thus giving easier approaches for further research.

2 Related Works

Post-quantum TLS has been studied throughout various works regarding its different implementation approaches, their individual performance and security implications. The currently used RSA- or ECDSA-based signatures and the ECDH based key exchange lose their security properties facing cryptographically relevant quantum computers, thus threatening the confidentiality and authenticity of network traffic. As shown by Alnahawi et al. in [AMOW24], offering a quantum-safe key exchange is more challenging than simply replacing the Diffie-Hellman key exchange, as the only standardized and widely-used approach is deploying a different cryptographic concept, namely KEM algorithms.

Garcia et al. found in [RRT⁺24] that using purely post-quantum-based TLS improves handshake performance by approximately 9% over classical configurations. However, using the proposed full hybrid approach of quantum key distribution paired with post-quantum algorithms increases handshake latency by 117%.

By benchmarking post-quantum algorithms in TLS under realistic network conditions, Paquin et al. found in [PST20] that the size of generated cryptographic objects, and thus the bandwidth requirements, will increase. Packet loss and fragmentation had a significant impact on the performance, emphasizing the need for size-optimized primitives.

KEM algorithms generally perform better in their post-quantum versions. The overall performance is still worse than classical predecessors but already surpasses the hybrid approaches.

Current research efforts often focus on the key exchange rather than authentication, which in the face of *collect now, decrypt later* attacks still leaves vulnerabilities unaddressed. To mitigate this issue, ML-KEM can be introduced to the key exchange and ML-DSA or SLH-DSA to the authentication of the handshake [MRLC26].

3 Preliminaries

In the following we will discuss the TLS 1.3 handshake and its messages and components to give a solid understanding of mechanisms and schemes included in the proposed comparison and the calculator using it.

3.1 TLS 1.3 Handshake

The TLS 1.3 Handshake, as described in [Res18], is the backbone of today's communication via the internet, as it enables peers to communicate privately without having to agree on any secret in advance. It is the successor of TLS 1.2, offering improved security and performance, only allowing robust encryption schemes and reducing the minimum amount of messages exchanged until the connection is secured. The handshake protocol is used to negotiate the security parameters of a connection. Handshake messages are supplied to the TLS record layer, where they are encapsulated within one or more `TLSPACKET` or `TLSCiphertext` structures which are processed and transmitted as specified by the current active connection state. Figure 3.1 shows a simplified overview of the handshake, reduced to messages which contain cryptographic objects used in the proposed calculator:




Figure 3.1: TLS 1.3 Handshake, reduced to transmitted cryptoobjects

These four messages sent, **Client Hello**, **Server Hello**, **Server Certificate** and **Server Certificate Verify** contain all the information needed to agree on a shared secret without ever revealing it to any possible third party as well as verifying the server's identity. This shared secret is used to symmetrically encrypt any further messages sent. In real-world situations these messages contain a lot of additional information, but for the proposed use case the transmitted cryptographic objects as shown in the figure are fully sufficient. With the TLS handshake three security properties are to be achieved:

Confidentiality "Preserving authorized restrictions on information access and disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information." [Nisa]

Integrity "Guarding against improper information modification or destruction, and includes ensuring information non-repudiation and authenticity." [Nisb]

Authenticity "The property that data originated from its purported source." [Nisc]

Client Hello The client hello message contains information about the client's supported protocols, ciphersuites and protocols as well as an initial keyshare, which consists of the required data for multiple different key exchange schemes. The latter is new to the TLS 1.3 Handshake, as TLS 1.2 did not include a keyshare in the **Client Hello**, but instead waited for the server's supported ciphersuites. If the server accepts one of the shared keys one additional roundtrip is saved. The client hello includes the following four components [Dri18]:

- Client Random Data - this is used for several hashes within the handshake to ensure the **integrity** of shared data
- The client's supported cipher suites
- A list of data for different key-exchange schemes the server might see eligible for key exchange
- Protocol versions which are supported by the client

Within the **Client Hello**, the base for the key exchange and further handshake is set, as the client shares every information needed to continue the handshake.

Server Hello Within the **Server Hello** the server agrees on a proposed protocol and ciphersuite based on the client's offer. The public key or ciphertext needed for the chosen ciphersuite is also included within this message. The server hello message includes the following four components [Dri18]:

- Server Random Data
- The selected cipher suite
- A public key for key exchange
- The negotiated protocol version

Server and client now have the information to calculate the shared secret, which is used to symmetrically encrypt the rest of the handshake. With completion of this step **confidentiality** of any further messages against third parties is ensured.

Server Certificate The **Server Certificate** message conveys the server's certificate, which contains the signature for the server's public keys, to the client. Sending a certificate is mandatory for any server if a secured connection is to be established. The contained signature is proof of the server's identity. Proof of ownership is made in an additional message, **Server Certificate Verify**. The client on the other hand only must send a certificate if the server requested client authentication via **CertificateRequest** [Res18]. The **Server Certificate** message contains the server's certificate or certificate chain and ensures the authenticity of the established connection.

Server Certificate Verify The **Server Certificate Verify** message contains, if agreed on, a **Online Certificate Status Protocol Response** (OCSP) used for **OCSP-Stapling** and a list of **Signed Certificate Timestamps** (SCT) used by **Certificate Transparency**. The latter being mandatory in most modern web-browsers since [wann wurde google nochmal impersonated?]. With this message **authenticity** and **integrity** are further improved.

3.1.1 Key-Exchange

The key-exchange is based on asymmetric cryptography, in which two peers agree on a secret without having to exchange any secret in advance. There are three different available approaches to agree on a shared secret. Public-key encryption used for key-exchange such as RSA or ECDHE, referred to as PKE, and Key-Encapsulation Mechanisms, referred to as KEM. The third method available are hybrid approaches, which combine KEMs and PKI.

A message m encrypted using the public key pk of a pair (pk, sk) can only be decrypted using the private key sk . The way encryption and decryption work and how pk and sk are generated depend on the used scheme. The key-exchange is mandatory to achieve confidentiality.

Public-Key Encryption

A public-key encryption scheme is a tuple of probabilistic, polynomial-time algorithms $(\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ that satisfy the following as described in [KL20]:

1. The key-generation algorithm Gen takes as input a security parameter 1^n and outputs a pair of keys (pk, sk) . We refer to the first of these as the public key and the second as the private key.
2. The encryption algorithm Enc takes as input a public key pk and a message m from some underlying plaintext space. It outputs a ciphertext c , and we write this as $c \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{pk}(m)$.
3. The decryption algorithm Dec takes as input a private key sk and a ciphertext c , and outputs a message m or a special symbol \perp denoting failure. We assume without loss of generality that Dec is deterministic, and write this as $m := \text{Dec}_{sk}(c)$.

We require for correctness, that for every n , every (pk, sk) output by $\text{Gen}(1^n)$, and every message in the appropriate underlying plaintext space, it holds that

$$\text{Dec}_{sk}(\text{Enc}_{pk}(m)) = m.$$

Exchanging an encrypted message via PKE is described in Figure 3.2:




Figure 3.2: Using PKE to encrypt and decrypt a message using a pair of public and private keys

Within the TLS handshake PKE is used for key-exchange rather than encrypting messages as shown in Figure 3.2. Figure 3.3 describes, strongly simplified, how two parties can agree on a shared secret using a PKE scheme. We emphasize that Figure 3.3 depicts the idea behind using PKE schemes for key-exchange and not the actual execution of these schemes:




Figure 3.3: Using PKE to agree on a shared secret

Using PKE, client and server agree on a shared secret by exchanging their public

keys derived from a shared number, from which the shared secret can be calculated. During the handshake both parties will exchange their public keys. The authenticity of the server's public key is backed by the server's certificate, which will be discussed in the following.

Key Encapsulation Mechanisms

Similar to PKEs KEMs can be used to agree on a shared secret over an unsecured channel. A KEM Π consists of four components as proposed in [GAN25]:

1. $\Pi_{ParamSets}$: A collection of parametersets.
2. Π_{KeyGen} : The key-generation algorithm. An efficient probabilistic algorithm that accepts a parameter set $p \in \Pi_{ParamSets}$ as input and produces an encapsulation key ek and a decapsulation key dk as output.
3. Π_{Encaps} : The encapsulation algorithm. An efficient probabilistic algorithm that accepts a parameter set $p \in \Pi_{ParamSets}$ and an encapsulation key ek as input and produces a shared secret key K and a ciphertext c as output.
4. Π_{Decaps} : The decapsulation algorithm. An efficient deterministic algorithm that accepts a parameter set $p \in \Pi_{ParamSets}$, a decapsulation key dk , and a ciphertext c as input and produces a shared secret key K' as output.

The key-encapsulation correctness experiment for a KEM Π and parameter set $p \in \Pi_{ParamSets}$ consists of the following three steps:

1. $(ek, dk) \leftarrow \Pi_{KeyGen}(p)$
2. $(K, c) \leftarrow \Pi_{Encaps}(p, ek)$
3. $K' \leftarrow \Pi_{Decaps}(p, dk, c)$

The KEM is correct if, for all $p \in \Pi_{ParamSets}$, the correctness experiment for p results in $K = K'$ with all but negligible probability. A key-exchange using a KEM is executed as shown in Figure 3.4




Figure 3.4: Using KEMs to agree on a shared secret

Within the handshake's key-exchange, (ek, dk) will be generated by Π_{KeyGen} on the clients side, and the ek will be sent with the **Client Hello**. The server will use the received ek to run Π_{Encaps} to receive its copy of the shared secret K and generate the ciphertext c which will be sent in the **Server Hello**. Using c the client can run Π_{Decaps} to receive its own copy of the shared secret, K' .

Hybrid Key Exchange

Hybrid key exchanges utilize a combination of PKE and KEM, where each handshake message contains a concatenation of public key pk and encapsulation key ek or ciphertext ct as described in [SFG25]. Thus the **Client Hello** will include the public key of the used PKE scheme and the encapsulation key of the used KEM scheme. The **Server Hello** will include the public key of the used PKE scheme and the ciphertext containing the encapsulated public key of the used KEM scheme. With both messages containing two cryptographic objects, these messages average size is larger than using a single approach. The advantage of hybrid approaches is increased forward security, as the newer KEMs are additionally secured by long tested PKE, which can be expected to be mathematically safe, as flaws within different KEMs math might still be discovered.

3.1.2 Signatures

A signature scheme is, as defined in [KL20], a tuple of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms Gen, Sign and Vrfy satisfying the following:

1. The **key-generation algorithm** Gen takes as input a security parameter 1^n and outputs a pair of keys pk and sk . These are called public key and private key respectively.
2. The **signing algorithm** Sign takes as input a private key sk and a message m from some underlying message space. It outputs a signature σ , and we write this as $\sigma \leftarrow \text{Sign}_{sk}(m)$
3. The deterministic **verification algorithm** Vrfy takes as input a public key pk , a message m , and a signature σ . It outputs a bit b with $b = 1$ meaning *VALID* and $b = 0$ meaning *INVALID*. We write this as $b := \text{Vrfy}_{pk}(m, \sigma)$

We require for correctness that for every n , every (sk, pk) output by $\text{Gen}(1^n)$ and every message m in the appropriate underlying plaintext space, it holds that

$$\text{Vrfy}_{pk}(m, \text{Sign}_{sk}(m)) = 1.$$

We say σ is a valid signature on a message m if $\text{Vrfy}_{pk}(m, \sigma) = 1$.

In context of the TLS 1.3 Handshake signature schemes are used within the certificates, as these are signed by the Certificate Authority (CA), and in the **Server Certificate Verify** message, where the server sends a signed hash of the handshake. The latter ensures that the message were exchanged between the same peers and were not tampered with. This guarantees **integrity** and **authenticity**.

Authenticity is ensured by the **Server Certificate** message, which contains the server's certificate signed by the CA. Integrity is ensured in the **Server Certificate Verify** message where a hash of the handshake is signed by the server which is already authenticated at this point. If messages or certificates were manipulated or signed by potential attackers the Vrfy algorithm would return *INVALID*, as $\text{Vrfy}_{pk}(m, \text{Sign}_{sk}(m)) = 1$ would no longer hold.

3.1.3 Extensions

Aside from the regular handshake messages we investigate three TLS extensions which impact the security of the handshake and transmit some sort of cryptographic object, and are available for instantiations.

Encrypted Client Hello

Encrypted client hello (ECH) encrypts, as proposed in [AvdMM23], the client hello message, adding an additional layer of security and privacy to the key-exchange. ECH hides the Server Name Indication (SNI) within the **Client Hello** from any

possible attackers, the internet service provider (ISP) or other observer's. Only the target IP address stays visible. With ECH, the ClientHello message part is split into two separate messages: an inner part and an outer part. The outer part contains the non-sensitive information such as which ciphers to use and the TLS version. It also includes an outer SNI. The inner part is encrypted and contains an inner SNI.

The outer SNI is a common name that represents that a user is trying to visit a website on the chosen DNS provider. Because the DNS provider controls that domain we have the appropriate certificates to be able to negotiate a TLS handshake for that server name.

The inner SNI contains the actual server name that the user is trying to visit. This is encrypted using a public key and can only be read by the DNS provider. Once the handshake completes the web page is loaded as normal, just like any other website loaded over TLS. This further increases **confidentiality** of sent data. With ECH enabled, two public keys are used within the **Client Hello**, thus the public key size doubles.

OCSP-Stapling

Online Certificate Status Protocol stapling, short OCSP-stapling is a standard for checking the revocation status of digital certificates, ensuring that revoked certificates are not used to impersonate peers and thereby increasing trust in the authenticity of connections. As described in [3rd11] OCSP-stapling additionally avoids transmission of Certificate Revocation List and therefore reduces bandwidth. In order to indicate their desire to receive certificate status information, clients may include an extension of type **statusRequest** in the **Client Hello**. Server's that receive a client hello containing the statusRequest extension may return a suitable certificate status response to the client along with their certificate. This OCSP-response is sent within the **Server Certificate Status** message right after the **Server Certificate** message. The OCSP-response is defined in [GAM⁺99] as follows, but reduced to the response's portion containing relevant sizes for the proposed calculator. A definitive OCSP-response message is composed of:

- Version of the response syntax
- Name of the responder
- Responses for each of the certificates in a request
- Optional extensions
- Signature algorithm OID

- Signature computed across hash of the response

Within the calculator, only the signature computed across the hash of the response is taken into consideration. The main goal of OCSP-Stapling is to increase hand-shake efficency, as neither a CRL is needed nor does the client need to check the certificates status with the corresponding CA. Nonetheless, OCSP-Stapling adds to the **authenticity** of the established connection.

Certificate Transparency

Certificate transparency, as described in [LLK13], aims to mitigate the problem of misissued certificates by providing publicly auditable, append-only, untrusted logs of all issued certificates. The logs are publicly auditable so that it is possible for anyone to verify the correctness of each log and to monitor when new certificates are added to it. The logs do not themselves prevent misissue, but they ensure that interested parties can detect such misissuance. Each log consists of certificate chains, which can be submitted by anyone. In order to avoid logs being spammed into uselessness, it is required that each chain is rooted in a known CA certificate. When a chain is submitted to a log, a signed certificate timestamp (SCT) is returned, which can later be used to provide evidence to clients that the chain has been submitted. These SCTs will be appended to the **Server Certificate Status** message within the **SignedCertificateTimestampList**. This list contains the last n STCs, but must at least contain 2 SCTs. Certificate Transparency gives those who are responsible for given domains the ability to check whether unexpected certificates have been issued to their domain. Similar to OCSP-stapling, it adds to the authenticity of a connection. Certificate Transparency is mandatory since in [wann war das mit google nochmal?] attackers managed to issue a certificate on googles domain and intercept usernames and passwords of users connecting to google through their counterfeit certificate. By using Certificate Transparency, the **integrity** and **authenticity** of the established connection is increased.

3.2 Post-Quantum Cryptography

In this section we discuss threats imposed on the TLS 1.3 Handshake by cryptographically relevant quantum computers and schemes which are able to mitigate posed threats. Schemes which are vulnerable to these threats will be referred to as **classic cryptography**.

3.2.1 Shor's Algorithm

Shor's algorithm [Sho94] is the major threat which the TLS 1.3 Handshake is faced with. Using Shor's algorithm, potential attackers gain the ability to factor large numbers in polynomial time. This especially poses a threat to the widely used RSA algorithm, as its security is solely based on the assumption that large integers cannot be factorized within any feasible timespan. In addition to integer factorization, Shor's algorithm is also capable of efficiently solving the discrete logarithm problem, compromising the security of Diffie-Hellman key exchanges and Elliptic Curve Cryptography.

However, executing Shor's algorithm at a scale required to break modern cryptographic keys is not yet possible. It would require a Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer (CRQC), equipped with millions of stable, error-corrected qubits. An adversary in possession of a CRQC could effortlessly compute the shared secret of a connection, removing any confidentiality and forward secrecy.

Todays Quantum Computers are still in the *Noisy Intermediate-Scale Quantum* (NISQ) era, consisting of only up to a few hundred qubits with high error rates [Ive]. While quantum computers today still are far away from cryptographic relevance, in the face of *collect now, decrypt later* attacks, the immediate transition to quantum-resistant alternatives is indispensable.

3.3 Security Strength Categories

Any instantiaton of a post-quantum scheme standardized by NIST is classified in security strength categories as described in [nis17]. These categories can be referrd to as NIST-Levels, ranging from 1 to 5. With the uncertainties of yet to be discovered quantum attacks and the limited ability to predict performance metrics for future quantum computers, these categories are defined by reference primitives rather than bits of security. These will serve as the base of a wide variety of metrics relevant in practical security. Each level is defined as follows:

1. Any attack that breaks the relevant security definition must require computational resources comparable to or greater than those required for key search on a block cipher with a 128-bit key (e.g. AES128)
2. Any attack that breaks the relevant security definition must require computational resources comparable to or greater than those required for collision search on a 256-bit hash function (e.g. SHA256/ SHA3-256)
3. Any attack that breaks the relevant security definition must require computational resources comparable to or greater than those required for key search on a block cipher with a 192-bit key (e.g. AES192)

4. Any attack that breaks the relevant security definition must require computational resources comparable to or greater than those required for collision search on a 384-bit hash function (e.g. SHA384/ SHA3-384)
5. Any attack that breaks the relevant security definition must require computational resources comparable to or greater than those required for key search on a block cipher with a 256-bit key (e.g. AES 256)

These categories can also be applied to schemes not standardized by NIST, such as FrodoKEM [GLN⁺25].

3.4 Illustrated Components

Next we discuss how the proposed components will be illustrated and used with the formula which calculates the size of the handshake's cryptographic objects. The selection of at least one key-exchange scheme or signature scheme is mandatory. Usage of available extensions is optional.

Key-Exchange

Depending on the selected key-exchange method a combination of public key pk and ciphertext ct is used in the calculation, according to the following table:

| | Client Hello | Server Hello |
|--------|-----------------------|--------------|
| PKI | pk | pk |
| KEM | pk | ct |
| hybrid | $pk_{PKI} + pk_{KEM}$ | $pk + ct$ |

Table 3.1: Cryptographic objects used from key-exchange

Signatures

For the selected signature scheme the size of the resulting signature σ which is part of the `Server Certificate` message is used in the calculation.

Extensions

Depending on the extension different elements are taken into the calculation:

ECH - the additional public key is taken into the calculation by doubling the size of the public key from the selected key exchange scheme

OCSP-Stapling - the signature part of the attached OCSP-response σ_{OCSP} is used in the calculation, the rest of the response is not used

Certificate transparency - the attached list with given length l of SCTs σ_{SCT} is used in the calculation

4 Method

We propose a calculator, including a UI, to configure and compare the size of transmitted cryptographic objects of different instantiations of the TLS 1.3 Handshake. These instantiations consist of key-exchange and used signature schemes as well as different TLS extensions. Available extensions are **OCSP-Stapling**, **Certificate Transparency** and **Encrypted Client Hello**. The underlying datasets for key-exchange and signing include different pre- and post-quantum schemes with different parameter sets available for each scheme.

| classic | post-quantum |
|----------|--------------|
| DHE | HQC |
| ECDHE | ML-KEM |
| FFDHE | FrodoKEM |
| RSA | X-Wing |
| RSA-OAEP | |

Table 4.1: Available key-exchange schemes

For signature schemes, there is a broad spectrum of different post-quantum schemes with different NIST-Status, including on-ramp and not fully proven as secure applications. As this calculator focuses on post-quantum instantiations of the TLS 1.3 Handshake, all included schemes from classic cryptography are those which are included in [rfc8446], where the TLS 1.3 handshake is formally defined.

| scheme | status | scheme | status |
|---------|-------------|--------|-------------|
| EdDSA | Pre-quantum | CROSS | On-ramp |
| RSA | Pre-quantum | Feast | On-ramp |
| DHE | Pre-quantum | Falcon | t.b.s |
| UOV | On-ramp | Hawk | On-ramp |
| SQIsign | On-ramp | Less | On-ramp |
| SNOVA | On-ramp | MAYO | On-ramp |
| SLH-DSA | FIPS | ML-DSA | FIPS |
| SDitH | On-ramp | MQOM | On-ramp |
| RYDE | On-ramp | Mirath | On-ramp |
| QR-UOV | On-ramp | PERK | On-ramp |
| RSA-PSS | Pre-quantum | ECDSA | Pre-quantum |
| ED | Pre-quantum | | |

Table 4.2: Available signature schemes

Limitations The formula which is used by the calculator only includes the size of cryptographic objects during the handshake, stopping at and already excluding the shared secret K . Everything aside from the cryptographic objects in each payload is not taken into consideration. This includes package information, additional extensions and headers, even those used in OCSP or Certificate Transparency. The computational effort of used schemes is not taken into consideration either. By excluding these factors we ensure the compareability and consistency of generated results, regardless of connected host or computing machine.

Capabilities This calculator can be used to quickly compare the size of transmitted cryptographic objects during `Client Hello`, `Server Hello`, `Server Certificate` and `Server Certificate Verify` as well as the total size, without setting up and reconfiguring a dedicated server. The following objects are included:

- The used public key pk , which is doubled if the extension `Encrypted Client Hello` is enabled
- Transmitted ciphertext ct , which will be used if the key exchange is handled by a KEM
- Signatures σ
- The signature of OCSP-responses σ_{OCSP} , if OCSP-Stapling is enabled
- The signature of SCTs σ_{SCT} , if Certificate Transparency is enabled

Data Source The data used for calculating the size of the key-exchange is sourced from its individual NIST-publications [Nisd] [Nise] or comparable works[RSA][RSA-OAEP][Frodo][X-Wing][ECDHE][FFDHE]. Each signature dataset is sourced from the repository of the "PQ Signatures Zoo" open source project [PQz]. By using sources that are consistent as possible for each dataset we further ensure the comparability of generated results.

To ensure fast access without the need for a backend, the collected data is directly embedded into the application. As Vanilla JavaScript is not able to access local files, all data is stored within .js files as constant variables `const`, which is structured like a .csv file and parsed accordingly by the main script.

4.1 Calculator

The calculator offers the ability to compare the size of cryptographic objects exchanged within the TLS 1.3 handshake. This includes the key exchange, signatures and OCSP-stapling, Encrypted Client Hello, and Certificate Transparency. The key exchange offers a wide variety of schemes from classical and post-quantum cryptography, as well as hybrid key exchange, which can be freely configured from offered PKI and KEM schemes.

Technical Implementation The proposed calculator is designed as a lightweight, browser-based web application. It is implemented using strictly standard web technologies, specifically HTML and Vanilla JavaScript, avoiding frontend frameworks and backend dependencies. All calculations, DOM manipulations, constraint validations, and data storage are executed entirely on client-side. This ensures fast visual feedback without network latency. Furthermore, a solely client-sided approach inherently preserves user privacy, as no data is ever transmitted to an external server.

4.1.1 Underlying Equation

The total size is calculated using the following equation:

$$y_1*a*pk_{client1} + y_2*a*pk_{client2} + y_3*pk_{server} + y_4*ct + y_5*\sigma + y_6*\sigma_{ocsp} + y_7*b*\sigma_{ct} \quad (4.1)$$

$$\text{s.t.} \quad pk_{client1}, pk_{client2}, pk_{server}, ct, \sigma, \sigma_{ocsp}, \sigma_{ct} \in \mathbb{N} \quad (4.2)$$

$$y_i \in \{0, 1\}, \forall i \in \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7\} \quad (4.3)$$

$$a \in \{1, 2\} \quad (4.4)$$

$$b \in \mathbb{N} \quad (4.5)$$

$$y_1 + y_4 \geq 1 \quad (4.6)$$

The formula and subjected restrictions are to be understood as follows:

- (4.1) Calculate total size, considering all aspects of the represented instantiation
- (4.2) Represents the size of corresponding cryptographic object in bytes. Needs to be a positive whole number

$pk_{client1}$ - Client Public Key

$pk_{client2}$ - Second Client Public Key - for hybrid key-exchange

pk_{server} - Server Public Key

ct - Server Ciphertext

σ - Signature

σ_{ocsp} - OCSP-response signature

σ_{ct} - Certificate Transparency signature

- (4.3) Represents if component is selected or not.

- (4.4) Factor for Client public key. If Encrypted Client Hello is enabled public key size is doubled. Impacts both public keys if hybrid key-exchange is enabled

- (4.5) Factor for Certificate Transparency, represents log length.

- (4.6) At least key-exchange or signature need to be included

4.1.2 User Interface

This formula is embedded in browser-based user interface shown in Figure 4.1, enabling users to configure different instantiations within the subjected restrictions proposed earlier. The UI shifts selection options based on made inputs, so instantiations outside of the given constraints can not be created.




Figure 4.1: UI of the calculator

Creating Instantiations

1. Select how the key-exchange is handled. All available schemes are within the upper dropdown. Once a scheme is selected, the desired parameters can be selected from the second dropdown. If hybrid key exchange is enabled, there will be two sets of dropdowns instead. The upper set defines the used KEM, the lower set defines the used PKI.
2. Select the signature scheme. The upper dropdown again includes a list of available schemes, the lower one the possible parameters.
3. Additional extensions can be toggled on and off. If Certificate Transparency is enabled, the length of its backlog can be set
4. By clicking on “Add to Comparison”, the created instantiations will be added to the list of comparable instantiations.

Viewing Configurations

Each created instantiation will be added to the list on the right hand side of the UI. It is identified by the schemes used for key-exchange and creating the signature. The total size of transmitted crypto objects will also be visible[5.]. Instantiations can be expanded by clicking on them, revealing details of the selected components. These include:

6. The selected key-exchange scheme(s) name, which is a link to some external site with additional information about each scheme, the selected parameters and the corresponding NIST-Level
7. The selected signature scheme's name, which is a link to some external website with additional information about each scheme, the selected parameters and the corresponding NIST-Level
8. Client Hello with the size and type of each transmitted crypto object as well as the total size of all crypto objects within the client hello message.
9. Server Hello with the size and type of each transmitted crypto object as well as the total size of all crypto objects within the server hello message.
10. The combined size of all transmitted crypto objects during the handshake

The **Server Certificate** and **Server Certificate Verify** messages are displayed within the **Server Hello** to offer a clearer visualisation.

5 Results

5.1 Benchmarking

The following tables show the schemes with the largest and smallest resulting cryptographic objects for each NIST Level. As only levels 1, 3, and 5 occur within the source data, no entries for Levels 2 and 4 were made. The size for key-exchange schemes represents either the sum of the public key and ciphertext or twice the public key, as the sum represents the transmitted size within the handshake.

| nist level | ke scheme | params | size | sig scheme | params | size |
|-------------|------------|-------------|-------|------------|--------------|--------|
| pre-quantum | ECDHE, RSA | (ffdhe)4096 | 1024 | RSA | 2048 | 256 |
| 1 | FrodoKEM | Frodo-640 | 10360 | CROSS | R-SDP 1 fast | 18,432 |
| 3 | FrodoKEM | Frodo-976 | 16720 | CROSS | R-SDP 3 fast | 41,406 |
| 5 | FrodoKEM | Frodo-1244 | 22876 | CROSS | R-SDP 5 fast | 74,590 |

Table 5.1: Schemes with largest cryptographic objects per level

| NIST level | ke scheme | params | size | sig scheme | params | size |
|-------------|-----------|------------|------|------------|-----------|------|
| pre-quantum | ECDHE | X25519 | 64 | EdDSA | Ed25519 | 64 |
| 1 | ML-KEM | 512(-90s) | 1568 | UOV | ls-pkc | 96 |
| 3 | ML-KEM | 768(-90s) | 2272 | SNOVA | (56 25 2) | 168 |
| 5 | ML-KEM | 1024(-90s) | 3136 | UOV | V-pkc | 260 |

Table 5.2: Schemes with smallest cryptographic objects per level

As for the smallest signatures, all represented schemes have some kind of known vulnerability depending on the used parameters and their status is still on-ramp, meaning they are not yet standardized.

While the previous tables highlight the absolute extremes, it is crucial to examine realistic, everyday configurations as shown in Table 5.3:

| NIST level | ke scheme | params | size | sig scheme | params | size |
|-------------|-----------|--------|------|------------|--------|------|
| pre-quantum | ECDHE | X25519 | 64 | RSA | 2048 | 256 |
| 3 | ML-KEM | 768 | 2272 | ML-DSA | 65 | 3309 |

Table 5.3: Common classic and post-quantum combinations

A commonly used pre-quantum approach based on ECDHE as key exchange scheme and RSA as signature scheme results in highly compact cryptographic objects, only requiring an expected 320 bytes in total.

In contrast, a NIST-recommended configuration consisting of post-quantum schemes only, namely ML-KEM for key-exchange and ML-DSA as signature scheme, drastically increases in size, standing at an expected 5581 bytes. A hybrid approach combining these schemes to maintain backwards compatibility and mathematically proven security, adds the sizes of both algorithms together. While this increases the handshake's security during the transition period, it creates the largest handshakes.

Extensions Overhead The proposed calculator also highlights the impact of privacy- and security-enhancing TLS extensions. For instance, ECH requires the client to transmit an additional public key. In a pre-quantum setting using ECDHE with X25519, this adds 32 bytes totaling 64 bytes. However, if a client utilizes a scheme like ML-KEM with 768 as in Table 5.3, ECH adds an additional 1088 bytes, totaling 2176 bytes to the `Client Hello` alone.

Extensions like OCSP-Stapling and Certificate Transparency (CT) attach additional signatures to the handshake. If the associated CAs migrate to post-quantum signature schemes, the `Server Certificate Verify` message will grow proportionally. As both signature schemes in Table 5.3 differ in size by an approximate factor of 13, their impact on the handshake's size will drastically increase.

5.2 Implications for Traffic

With the drastic increase in key- and signature size, some impact on network traffic is to be expected. On the one hand, TLS records have a size limit of 2^{14} or 16384 bytes as described in [Tho18]. Including padding and overhead, `TLSCiphertext` can be slightly larger with $2^{14} + 256$ bytes. IP/TCP traffic, on the other hand has a regular maximum transmission unit (MTU) size of around 1500 bytes. TCP technically supports up to 65535 bytes [cfM], but this value is more theoretical than practical. The largest signature size within our source data even exceeds this theoretical limit with 74,509 bytes. Considering that we only inspect cryptographic objects, the transmitted records will be even larger.

Under these circumstances, fragmentation is to be expected, at least to a certain degree. This especially impacts the performance of the TLS 1.3 Handshake, but also increases the possible attack surface.

5.3 Use Cases

The calculator offers fast comparison of different instantiations with insights on security and size of created crypto-objects, as well as offering easily accessible deeper insights for used schemes and extensions by linking their respective paper or publication. By toggling extensions, even those mandatory in real-life scenarios, on and off, their impact on the TLS 1.3 Handshake size can be easily visualized. Nonetheless, this calculator does not (yet) replace testing within fully configured server setups as it only represents a small scope of the whole TLS 1.3 Handshake, but gives a quick comparison of viable configurations.

6 Conclusion

6.1 Relevance

Given the current uncertainty when the first cryptographically relevant quantum computer will be fully developed, it is necessary to prepare the backbones of our means of private communication such as TLS for the impending risks. Thus it is important to be able to compare different instantiations of the TLS 1.3 Handshake, both quantum-proof and those at risk, to develop efficient approaches which will withstand the threats posed by future quantum computers.

6.2 Summary

This thesis addressed the impending threat posed by CRQCs to the TLS 1.3 Handshake and the urgency of the transition to quantum-proof key-exchange and signature algorithms within the handshake. To support this transition, we proposed a calculator, which enables researchers to quickly configure and compare different instantiations of the TLS 1.3 Handshake as well as the size of transmitted cryptographic objects.

We clearly demonstrate that post-quantum schemes, such as ML-KEM and ML-DSA, drastically increase the size of their corresponding cryptographic objects and thus the handshake's overall size.

6.3 Future Work

Even with the proposed calculator already functional, there still is potential for improvements regarding functional enhancements as well as supporting broader research applications.

Functional Enhancements

- Quality of life upgrades such as exporting and importing the created list of instantiations

- Giving users the ability to add custom schemes for key-exchange and signatures
- Generating a visual comparison as charts or comparable depictions
- Visualizing how the messages are fragmented, if record size is exceeded

Research

- Adding a second measuring unit for used schemes, such as their runtime, measuring elapsed CPU cycles for different CPU architectures
- Adding KEMTLS as a supported handshake, where authenticity is granted by using a KEM instead of a signature
- Giving the possibility to inspect the full size of sent records, including headers, metadata, etc.
- In addition to the expected size and CPU cycles, a backend could run a real-time benchmark of a created instantiation and deliver test results and complete generated records for further inspection

Especially with these features implemented the calculator can be used to create instantiations offering useful comparisons for a wide range of use cases, including optimizing bandwidth or computing power in relation to the given level of security. With backend simulation implemented, at least the initial need for test environments would be obsolete as well.

6.4 Conclusion

Ultimately, the transition to quantum-safe TLS 1.3 will be complex and time-consuming. In the meantime, it will be a trade-off between forward secrecy against *collect now, decrypt later* attacks and maintaining network performance. Tools like the proposed calculator are highly relevant in this transition, as they provide accessible insights into the architectural consequences of quantum-proof approaches before deploying them in live environments.

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