

Helena Pedrotti

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EDUCATION

2019-present	Ph.D. Candidate in Economics	New York University
2023	M.A. in Economics	New York University
2017-2019	Predoctoral Fellow	Stanford GSB
2013-2017	B.A. in Mathematics and Economics	Reed College

RESEARCH INTERESTS

<i>Primary</i>	Industrial Organization, Public Economics
<i>Secondary</i>	Urban Economics, Real Estate

REFERENCES

Prof. Daniel Waldinger, NYU (Chair)
19 West 4th St
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+1 (212) 998-8900 (office)
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Prof. Guillaume Frechette, NYU
19 West 4th St
5th Floor, Office 507
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Prof. Martin Rotemberg, NYU
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WORKING PAPERS

Local Discretion in Low Income Housing Policy: Evidence from France

[Job Market Paper]

Governments seek to promote affordable housing in mixed-income neighborhoods while preserving local municipal discretion over land use. Municipalities who retain local discretion better cater to local preferences, but only internalize preferences of incumbent residents and underprovide affordable housing. I quantify the trade-off in allowing municipal discretion over affordable housing provision when residents dislike low-income neighbors. I leverage a discontinuity in a French policy which allows municipalities to build more social housing or pay a fine. Limiting local discretion increases social housing by 31% and induces a compositional shift in private housing: high-income households move out and low-income households move in. I then estimate a structural location choice model to quantify the welfare effects of local discretion over social housing. Using the policy to identify preferences for low-income neighbors, I find that all households dislike low-income peers, especially high-income households who are willing-to-pay €538 per month to avoid a 20 p.p. increase in the share of low-income residents. Prohibiting local discretion by distributing social housing uniformly across municipalities increases the median municipal share of low-income households from 24% to 26%, although it would be twice larger without subsequent migration. While entirely removing local discretion reduces socioeconomic segregation, private residents bear large welfare cost which are unlikely to be offset by the welfare gains to social housing recipients moving to wealthier neighborhoods.

WORK IN PROGRESS

Zoning Against Neighborhood Change

Since its inception, zoning laws have expanded their scope to control the exact maximum allowable height, the number of units available per building across the city, and the total floor area allowed in each building. Stronger zoning laws result in less neighborhood change and such ossification is valuable to risk averse homeowners. By controlling the environment around one's property, zoning prevents rapid unforeseen neighborhood transformations, and the resulting negative externalities. Zoning thus provides a prospective homeowner with insurance against such transformations through a more accurate forecast of future neighborhood amenities. This paper quantifies this motive contributing value of zoning, and its effect on homeowners location choices. I leverage the implementation of a California zoning amendment that allows homeowners to construct a secondary unit on their property. Price differences in response to the law change between two neighborhoods with similar amenities but different zoning levels would thus reflect the value of zoning laws for homeowners.

Right to Rent: The Impact of Energy Efficiency Efforts on Housing and Rental Markets

Tiered Water Pricing: Drought Control or Redistribution Tool?

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

(G = graduate, U = undergraduate)

Fall 2022	Graduate TA Econometrics (G) for Profs. Chris Conlon and Paul Scott	NYU
Fall 2021	TA Introduction to Econometrics (U) for Prof. Sharon Traiberman	NYU

RESEARCH ASSISTANCE

Winter 2021	RA for Prof. Paul Scott	NYU
2020-2021	RA for Prof. Daniel Waldinger	NYU
2017-2019	RA for Profs. B. Bronnenberg, S. Jha, P. Koudjis, R. Lester, P. Somaini	Stanford GSB
Summer 2016	REU Economics Researcher with Prof. Chris Ferguson	NSF
Summer 2015	RA for Prof. Jeffrey Parker	Reed College

FELLOWSHIPS & AWARDS

June 2025	AEA Summer Dissertation Fellowship (\$15,000)	Philadelphia Federal Reserve
May 2024	Horowitz Fellowship for Social Policy (\$10,000)	Horowitz Foundation
May 2024	Irving Louis Award (\$5,000)	Horowitz Foundation
March 2023	C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics data grant (\$8,500)	NYU
2023, 2024	Global Research Initiative Fellowship for mobility (awarded ×2)	NYU
June 2022	Urban summer school travel grant	Urban Economics Association
August 2019	Graduate Research Fellowship (3-year fully funded)	National Science Foundation
August 2019	MacCracken doctoral fellowship (5-year fully funded)	NYU
May 2017	Gerald M. Meier Award for best undergraduate thesis in economics	Reed College
May 2017	Phi Beta Kappa Award for academic excellence	Reed College

SEMINARS

2025	Philadelphia Fed, NYU Microeconomics Seminar, NYU Stern IO Internal Seminar
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MISCELLANEOUS

Languages	English (native), French (intermediate)
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Citizenship	USA
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