

# Helena Pedrotti

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## EDUCATION

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2019-present	Ph.D. Candidate in Economics	New York University
2023	M.A. in Economics	New York University
2017-2019	Predoctoral Fellow	Stanford GSB
2013-2017	B.A. in Mathematics and Economics	Reed College

## RESEARCH INTERESTS

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Primary	Industrial Organization, Public Economics
Secondary	Urban Economics, Real Estate

## REFERENCES

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**Prof. Daniel Waldinger, NYU (Chair)**  
19 West 4th St  
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New York, NY 10012  
+1 (212) 998-8900 (office)  
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**Prof. Guillaume Frechette, NYU**  
19 West 4th St  
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19 West 4th St  
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## WORKING PAPERS

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### Local Discretion in Low Income Housing Policy: Evidence from France

[Job Market Paper]

Governments seek to promote affordable housing in mixed-income neighborhoods while preserving local municipal discretion over land use. Municipalities who retain local discretion better cater to local preferences, but only internalize preferences of incumbent residents and underprovide affordable housing. I quantify the trade-off in allowing municipal discretion over affordable housing provision when residents dislike low-income neighbors. I leverage a discontinuity in a French policy which allows municipalities to build more social housing or pay a fine. Limiting local discretion increases social housing by 31% and induces a compositional shift in private housing: high-income households move out and low-income households move in. I then estimate a structural location choice model to quantify the welfare effects of local discretion over social housing. Using the policy to identify preferences for low-income neighbors, I find that all households dislike low-income peers, especially high-income households who are willing-to-pay €538 per month to avoid a 20 p.p. increase in the share of low-income residents. Prohibiting local discretion by distributing social housing uniformly across municipalities increases the median municipal share of low-income households from 24% to 26%, although it would be twice larger without subsequent migration. While entirely removing local discretion reduces socioeconomic segregation, private residents bear large welfare cost which are unlikely to be offset by the welfare gains to social housing recipients moving to wealthier neighborhoods.

## Zoning Against Neighborhood Change

Since its inception, zoning laws have expanded their scope to control the exact maximum allowable height, the number of units available per building across the city, and the total floor area allowed in each building. Stronger zoning laws result in less neighborhood change and such ossification is valuable to risk averse homeowners. By controlling the environment around one's property, zoning prevents rapid unforeseen neighborhood transformations, and the resulting negative externalities. Zoning thus provides a prospective homeowner with insurance against such transformations through a more accurate forecast of future neighborhood amenities. This paper quantifies this motive contributing value of zoning, and its effect on homeowners location choices. I leverage the implementation of a California zoning amendment that allows homeowners to construct a secondary unit on their property. Price differences in response to the law change between two neighborhoods with similar amenities but different zoning levels would thus reflect the value of zoning laws for homeowners.

## Right to Rent: The Impact of Energy Efficiency Efforts on Housing and Rental Markets

## Tiered Water Pricing: Drought Control or Redistribution Tool?

### TEACHING EXPERIENCE

(G = graduate, U = undergraduate)

<i>Fall 2022</i>	Graduate TA Econometrics (G) for Profs. Chris Conlon and Paul Scott	<b>NYU</b>
<i>Fall 2021</i>	TA Introduction to Econometrics (U) for Prof. Sharon Traiberman	<b>NYU</b>

### RESEARCH ASSISTANCE

<i>Winter 2021</i>	RA for Prof. Paul Scott	<b>NYU</b>
<i>2020-2021</i>	RA for Prof. Daniel Waldinger	<b>NYU</b>
<i>2017-2019</i>	RA for Profs. B. Bronnenberg, S. Jha, P. Koudjis, R. Lester, P. Somaini	<b>Stanford GSB</b>
<i>Summer 2016</i>	REU Economics Researcher with Prof. Chris Ferguson	<b>NSF</b>
<i>Summer 2015</i>	RA for Prof. Jeffrey Parker	<b>Reed College</b>

### FELLOWSHIPS & AWARDS

<i>June 2025</i>	AEA Summer Dissertation Fellowship (\$15,000)	<b>Philadelphia Federal Reserve</b>
<i>May 2024</i>	Horowitz Fellowship for Social Policy (\$10,000)	<b>Horowitz Foundation</b>
<i>May 2024</i>	Irving Louis Award (\$5,000)	<b>Horowitz Foundation</b>
<i>March 2023</i>	C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics data grant (\$8,500)	<b>NYU</b>
<i>2023, 2024</i>	Global Research Initiative Fellowship for mobility (awarded $\times 2$ )	<b>NYU</b>
<i>June 2022</i>	Urban summer school travel grant	<b>Urban Economics Association</b>
<i>August 2019</i>	Graduate Research Fellowship (3-year fully funded)	<b>National Science Foundation</b>
<i>August 2019</i>	MacCracken doctoral fellowship (5-year fully funded)	<b>NYU</b>
<i>May 2017</i>	Gerald M. Meier Award for best undergraduate thesis in economics	<b>Reed College</b>
<i>May 2017</i>	Phi Beta Kappa Award for academic excellence	<b>Reed College</b>

### SEMINARS

<i>2025</i>	Philadelphia Fed, NYU Microeconomics Seminar, NYU Stern IO Internal Seminar
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### MISCELLANEOUS

<i>Languages</i>	English (native), French (intermediate)
<i>Citizenship</i>	USA

*Last updated: November 2025*