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# Overview Project Audit Status:

Severity Level	Total Number of Issues
Informative	4
Discussion	1
Minor	2
Medium	3
Major	0
Critical	0

## Open Issues:

Pending	Resolved
0	10

# Audit Request:

Topic	Comments
Repo Link	https://github.com/agiledev624/synclub-contracts
Commit Id	https://github.com/agiledev624/synclub- contracts/commit/ab8e36ff7760caa635cc0197b6ebf1bcfd574b57
PRD Document	Not Shared
Last Audit	NA
Request Date	07/06/2023
Owner	Tom

### Important Notes:

#### Notes

- snBNB is not pausable.
- Undelegate is only with reserve but delegate is with and without reserve.

## Deployment Verification:

Deployment is verified

Verification Checks	Status	
Repo code maps with Deployed code	Verified	
Ownership Account	Multisig	
Ownership Verified	Verified	
Secondary Accounts	EOA and Multisig	
Secondary Accounts Verified	Verified	

### **Audit Result**

### SnBNB.sol:

This is the token contract for Synclub project.

SS#01	SS#01	
StakeManage	StakeManager can be added as a role too	
Severity:	Informative	
Line:	#10	
Description:	Stake Manager can be added as a role too similar to DEFAULT_ADMIN role.  // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0 pragma solidity ^0.8.0;  import "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/token/ERC20/ERC20Upgradeable.sol";  import "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/access/AccessControlUpgradeable.sol";  mport "./interfaces/ISnBnb.sol";  contract SnBnb is ISnBnb, ERC20Upgradeable, AccessControlUpgradeable {  address private stakeManager;  /// @custom:oz-upgrades-unsafe-allow constructor constructor() {    disableInitializers(); }  function initialize(address _admin) external override initializer {    AccessControl_init();    ERC20_init("Synclub BNB", "SnBNB");  require(_admin != address(0), "zero address provided");	
Suggestion:	Add in stake manager as a role	
Status:	Confirmed	
Team Comments:	We will keep this logic	

# SnStakeManager.sol:

This is the staking contract for Synclub project.

SS#02	SS#02	
SafeMath is r	SafeMath is not required as the compiler is being used above 0.8.0	
Severity:	Informative	
Line:	#10	
Description:	SafeMath is not required as the compiler is being used above 0.8.0  //SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0  pragma solidity ^0.8.0;  import "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/proxy/utils/Initializable.sol";  import "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/security/PausableUpgradeable.sol";  import "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/token/ERC20/IERC20Upgradeable.sol";  import "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/token/ERC20/Upgradeable.sol";  import "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/token/ERC20/Upgradeable.sol";  import "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/token/ERC20/Upgradeable.sol";  import "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/token/ERC20/Upgradeable.sol";  import "@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/SafeMath.sol";  import (IStakeManager) from "./interfaces/IStakeManager.sol";  import {IStakeManager} from "./interfaces/INativeStaking.sol";  /**  * @dev Handles Staking of BNB on BSC  */  contract SnStakeManager is  IStakeManager,  Initializable,	
Suggestion:	Remove SafeMath as it is not required	
Status:	Resolved	
	https://github.com/agiledev624/synclub- contracts/commit/622e1e44fb2e9f3adcbdad158e50e0203653b169	

SS#03	
Additional event is not required.	
Severity:	Informative
Function:	Initialize

Line:	#107
Line:  Description:	When setupRole is called it already emits an event for "RoleGranted" setupRole(BUI, _DOL);  99  100
	#/ function deposit() external payable override whenNotPaused {     uint256 amount = msg.value;     require(amount > 0, "Invalid Amount");     wint256 and Table = convertPahlassapah/amount).
Suggestion:	No requirement for an additional event. This can be removed.
Status:	Resolved
	https://github.com/agiledev624/synclub- contracts/commit/622e1e44fb2e9f3adcbdad158e50e0203653b169

SS#04	
No event emitted on deposit	
Severity:	Informative
Function:	Deposit
Line:	#116
Description:	No event is emitted on call to deposit

```
emit SetBotRole(_bot);
                 108
                             emit SetBCValidator(bcValidator);
                 109
                             emit SetRevenuePool(revenuePool);
                             emit SetSynFee(_synFee);
                111
                112
                113
                114
                           * @dev Allows user to deposit Bnb at BSC and mints SnBnb for the user
                115
                function deposit() external payable override whenNotPaused {
                117
                              uint256 amount = msg.value;
                             require(amount > 0, "Invalid Amount");
                118
                119
                120
                            uint256 snBnbToMint = convertBnbToSnBnb(amount);
                121
                 122
                              amountToDelegate += amount;
                123
                124
                              ISnBnb(snBnb).mint(msg.sender, snBnbToMint);
                 125
                         }
                 126
                127
                128
                           st @dev Allows bot to delegate users' funds to native staking contract without reserved BNB
Suggestion:
                 Do make sure that important events are emitted on deposit
Status:
                 Resolved
                 https://github.com/agiledev624/synclub-
                 contracts/commit/622e1e44fb2e9f3adcbdad158e50e0203653b169
```

SS#05	
Bot can pass bigger value for msg.value	
Severity:	Minor
Function:	Delegate, DelegateWithReserve, Redelgate
Line:	#132, #161, #181
Description:	What is the need to pass the whole msg.value to the the function call?

```
function delegate()
                        payable
                        override
                        whenNotPaused
                        onlyRole(BOT)
                        returns (uint256 _amount)
                        uint256 relayFee = IStaking(NATIVE_STAKING).getRelayerFee();
                        uint256 relayFeeReceived = msg.value;
                        _amount = amountToDelegate - (amountToDelegate % TEN_DECIMALS);
                        require(relayFeeReceived >= relayFee, "Insufficient RelayFee");
                        require(_amount >= IStaking(NATIVE_STAKING).getMinDelegation(), "Insufficient Deposit Amount");
                        amountToDelegate = amountToDelegate - _amount;
                        totalDelegated += _amount;
                         // delegate through native staking contract
                  IStaking(NATIVE_STAKING).delegate{value: _amount + msg.value}(bcValidator, _amount);
                        emit Delegate(_amount);
Suggestion:
                  Do make sure that only the relay fee is passed across and rest is returned to
                 the caller
                 Resolved
Status:
                 https://github.com/agiledev624/synclub-
                 contracts/commit/0644fcf89a0680507d4ee2bc43af40867d883fcd
```

SS#06	
Usability - how would the user remember on if the last is moved to the claimed one, Is it maintained on FE?	
Severity:	Discussion
Function:	claimWithdraw
Line:	#281
Description :	https://github.com/agiledev624/synclub- contracts/blob/master/contracts/SnStakeManager.sol#L281  Is the list maintained on FE?

```
function claimWithdraw(uint256 _idx) external override whenNotPaused {
                       address user = msg.sender;
                        WithdrawalRequest[] storage userRequests = userWithdrawalRequests[user];
                        require(_idx < userRequests.length, "Invalid index");</pre>
                        WithdrawalRequest storage withdrawRequest = userRequests[_idx];
                        uint256 uuid = withdrawRequest.uuid;
                        uint256 amountInSnBnb = withdrawRequest.amountInSnBnb;
                        {\tt BotUndelegateRequest}
                            storage botUndelegateRequest = uuidToBotUndelegateRequestMap[uuid];
                        require(botUndelegateRequest.endTime != 0, "Not able to claim yet");
                        userRequests[_idx] = userRequests[userRequests.length - 1];
                        userRequests.pop();
                        uint256 totalBnbToWithdraw_ = botUndelegateRequest.amount;
                        uint256 totalSnBnbToBurn_ = botUndelegateRequest.amountInSnBnb;
                        uint256 amount = (totalBnbToWithdraw_ * amountInSnBnb) /
                           totalSnBnbToBurn_;
                        AddressUpgradeable.sendValue(payable(user), amount);
                        emit ClaimWithdrawal(user, _idx, amount);
                    }
Suggestion
               Do check on the logic
               Confirmed
Status:
Team
               It's maintained on FE
Comments:
```

SS#07	
claimFailedDelegation perform the same operation as claimUndelegated without the state updates	
Severity:	Minor
Function:	claimFailedDelegation
Line:	
Description:	When setupRole is called it already emits an event for "RoleGranted"
Suggestion:	Instead of putting this function under bot, it can be put under manager. Also for additional security, it is recommended that in case of failedDelegation the contract is paused and only then this is called to map the states back.

Status:	Confirmed
Team Comments:	This is monitored at our end.

SS#08		
Circumventing the admin for the role		
Severity:	Medium	
Function:	setBotRole	
Line:	#413	
Description:	setupRole is used under the function to set the role. "setupRole" bypass the admin check for the role which was set in constructor.	
	);	
	<pre>manager = proposedManager; proposedManager = address(0);</pre>	
	<pre>emit SetManager(manager); }</pre>	
	<pre>function setBotRole(address _address) external override onlyManager {     require(_address != address(0), "zero address provided");</pre>	
	_setupRole(BOT, _address);	
	<pre>emit SetBotRole(_address); }</pre>	
	<pre>function revokeBotRole(address _address) external override onlyManager {     require(_address != address(0), "zero address provided");</pre>	
	_revokeRole(BOT, _address);	
	<pre>emit RevokeBotRole(_address); }</pre>	
	<pre>/// @param _address - Beck32 decoding of Address of Validator Wallet on Beacon Chain wit function setBCValidator(address _address)</pre>	
Suggestion:	Either make the manager as admin for role "BOT" or use Default Admin to call setBotRole and under the function, call for "grantRole" instead of "setupRole" to check for role admin.	
	Do check the documentation for proper implementation of access control: https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts- upgradeable/blob/release- v4.0/contracts/access/AccessControlUpgradeable.sol	

	Apart from that event is already emitted with access control, there won't be a need to emit an extra event for this.
Status:	Resolved
	https://github.com/agiledev624/synclub- contracts/commit/f6f98728e6ae93a100859741ec98dbf2d93d265e

SS#09		
Circumventing the admin for the role		
Severity:	Medium	
Function:	revokeBotRole	
Line:	#413	
Description:	<pre>_revokeRole is used under the function to revoke the role. "revokeRole" bypass the admin check for the role which was set in constructor.  );  manager = proposedManager; proposedManager = address(0);  emit SetManager(manager); }  function setBotRole(address _address) external override onlyManager {     require(_address != address(0), "zero address provided");     _setupRole(BOT, _address); }  function revokeBotRole(address _address) external override onlyManager {     require(_address != address(0), "zero address provided");     _revokeRole(BOT, _address);     emit RevokeBotRole(_address); }</pre>	
	<pre>/// @param _address - Beck32 decoding of Address of Validator Wallet on Beacon Chain wit function setBCValidator(address _address)</pre>	
Suggestion:	Either make the manager as admin for role "BOT" or use Default Admin to call setBotRole and under the function, call for "revokeRole" instead of "_revokeRole" to check for role admin.	
	Do check the documentation for proper implementation of access control:	

	https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts- upgradeable/blob/release- v4.0/contracts/access/AccessControlUpgradeable.sol  Apart from that event is already emitted with access control, there won't be a need to emit an extra event for this.
Status:	Resolved
	https://github.com/agiledev624/synclub- contracts/commit/f6f98728e6ae93a100859741ec98dbf2d93d265e

SS#10					
availableRes	availableReserveAmount is not updated on "delegateWithReserve" and "undelegate"				
Severity:	Medium				
Function:	delegateWithReserve, undelegate				
Line:					
Description:	If availableReservedAmount is higher then reserveAmount, this function will never fail. For example if availableReservedAmount is set to 2 BNB and reserveAmount to 1 BNB, then on each call reserveAmount will be less than availableReservedAmount, so even if availableReservedAmount is set 2 BNB, delegateWithReserve can run indefinitely with it.				
	<pre>function delegateWithReserve()     external     payable  override  whenNotPaused  onlyRole(BOT)     returns (uint256 _amount)  {     uint256 relayFee = IStaking(NATIVE_STAKING).getRelayerFee();     uint256 relayFeeReceived = msg.value;     _amount = amountToDelegate - (amountToDelegate % TEN_DECIMALS);  require(relayFeeReceived &gt;= relayFee, "[nsufficient RelayFee");     require(awailableReserveAmount &gt;= reserveAmount, "Insufficient Reserve Amount");     require(_amount + reserveAmount &gt;= IStaking(NATIVE_STAKING).getMinDelegation(), "Ins  amountToDelegate = amountToDelegateamount;  totalDelegated += _amount;  // delegate through native staking contract  IStaking(NATIVE_STAKING).delegate{value: _amount + msg.value + reserveAmount}(bcVali)  emit Delegate(_amount);     emit Delegate(_amount);  emit Delegate(address srcValidator, address dstValidator, uint256 amount)</pre>				

Sı	uggestion:	Consider adding in (availableReserveAmount = availableReserveAmount – reserveAmount)
		To make sure that only up-to the availableReserveAmount, the function is able to delegate
St	atus:	Confirmed
	eam omments:	The controls for this is added on the Bot end and not at contract end.  In addition to that the deposit and withdrawl amount has to be same, so it won't affect the users. The checks external to the contract code and it's recommended to audit the same.