

INCIDENT RESPONSE – A LITTLE HUMOR





INCIDENT RESPONSE CHALLENGES



Various Teams from
Security Operations,
Incident Response,
Security Management
and third-party providers
are needed for proper
response.



Logs roll over quickly and evidence is at risk of destruction.



The stress of an incident often creates communication gaps during critical steps such as incident escalation



INCIDENT RESPONSE QUESTIONS

What kind of incident is it?

How bad?

How many systems?

Are we blocking them?



MEDEVAC 9-LINE

- High stress situations impact ability to communicate effectively
- Standard across all units
- Captures the necessary information to prepare various teams
- Trainable and repeatable process for everyone

MEDEVAC REQUEST FORM GTA 08-0		
LINE	ITEM	EVACUATION REQUEST MESSAGE
1	Location of Pickup Site.	
2	Radio Frequ., Call Sign, & Suffix.	
3	No. of Patients by Precedence.	
4	Special Equipment Required.	
5	Number of Patients by Type.	
6	Security of Pickup Site (Wartime).	
6	Number and Type of Wound, Injury, or Illness (Peacetime).	
7	Method of Marking Pickup Site.	
8	Patient Nationality and Status.	
9	NBC Contamination (Wartime).	
9	Terrain Description (Peacetime).	

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ATTN: ATIC-ITST-T, GTA Program, Fort Eustis, VA 23604-5166



INCIDENT RESPONSE 9-LINE



1. DATE AND TIME OF DETECTION



- First line is the simple one, Date and Time of the incident detection or declaration.
- Standardize the Date and Time format and zone: UTC vs. Local (UTC is preferable)



2. REPORTING PERSON



- Tie into the Incident Response Plan SOC Manager, SOC Personnel,
 Security Analyst
- Everyone should be able to execute the Nine-Line escalation
- Included contact information:
 - Mobile and/or Desk Number
 - Email
 - IM



3. INCIDENT TYPE



Incident Classification Criteria from Incident Response Plan

- □ Ransomware
- Malware Infection
- ☐ Ongoing Compromise
- ☐ Data Exfiltration
- ☐ Command and Control
- Denial of Service
- □ Other



4. INCIDENT SEVERITY



Incident Severity Criteria from Incident Response Plan

Severity Rating	Description
Emergency	An Emergency priority incident poses an imminent threat to the provision of wide-scale critical infrastructure services, national government stability, or the lives of U.S. persons.
Severe	A Severe priority incident is likely to result in a significant impact to public health or safety, national security, economic security, foreign relations, or civil liberties.
High	A High priority incident is likely to result in a demonstrable impact to public health or safety, national security, economic security, foreign relations, civil liberties, or public confidence.
Medium	A Medium priority incident may affect public health or safety, national security, economic security, foreign relations, civil liberties, or public confidence.
Low	A Low priority incident is unlikely to affect public health or safety, national security, economic security, foreign relations, civil liberties, or public confidence.



5. NUMBER OF SYSTEMS IMPACTED



- Define the number and OS of impacted systems
- Locations if geographically diverse
- Prepares Incident Responders:
 - √ Assists with identifying scope
 - ✓ Potential evidence sources
 - √ Containment



6. PATIENT ZERO IDENTIFIED



- This may not be possible during the initial reporting but in some circumstances be possible
 - Yes (Confirmed)
 - Yes (Unconfirmed)
 - No



7. TACTICS IDENTIFIED



- MITRE ATT&CK Framework
- Focus on those that are confirmed or that there is sufficient evidence
- Focus on brevity and focus on TTPs that can be acted on
- Ex.: "Adversary is using Cobalt Strike for C2 to an external system over HTTPS"



8. INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE



- What we have identified thus far
- Bias toward IOCs that can be immediately acted upon such as a Domain or URL



9. ACTIONS TAKEN




- What has the first team that touched this done? Evidence acquisition?

 Containment?
- Tie back to Incident Response Plan and Playbooks




9-LINE SAMPLES

ANALOG



DIGITAL







Gerry Johansen

CISSP, GCTI, GRID, GNFA, GCFA

Gerry.johansen@optiv.com

