

# Memory Vulnerabilities in Memory-safe Languages

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Scope

Compilers/Interpreters

# Python

Year	# of Vulnerabilities	DoS	Code Execution	Overflow	Memory Corruption	Sql Injection	XSS	Directory Traversal	Http Response Splitting	Bypass something	Gain Information	Gain Privileges	CSRF	File Inclusion	# of exploits
<a href="#">2008</a>	1			<a href="#">1</a>											
<a href="#">2010</a>	7	<a href="#">5</a>		<a href="#">5</a>	<a href="#">1</a>										
<a href="#">2011</a>	2	<a href="#">1</a>									<a href="#">2</a>				
<a href="#">2012</a>	5	<a href="#">3</a>			<a href="#">1</a>		<a href="#">1</a>				<a href="#">1</a>				
<a href="#">2013</a>	2	<a href="#">1</a>													
<a href="#">2014</a>	6	<a href="#">2</a>	<a href="#">1</a>	<a href="#">2</a>						<a href="#">1</a>	<a href="#">1</a>				<a href="#">1</a>
<a href="#">2015</a>	1											<a href="#">1</a>			
<a href="#">2016</a>	5			<a href="#">1</a>						<a href="#">1</a>	<a href="#">1</a>				
<a href="#">2017</a>	3		<a href="#">1</a>	<a href="#">2</a>											
<a href="#">2018</a>	8	<a href="#">5</a>	<a href="#">2</a>	<a href="#">2</a>	<a href="#">1</a>										
<a href="#">2019</a>	9						<a href="#">1</a>			<a href="#">1</a>					
Total	49	<a href="#">17</a>	<a href="#">4</a>	<a href="#">13</a>	<a href="#">3</a>		<a href="#">2</a>			<a href="#">3</a>	<a href="#">5</a>	<a href="#">1</a>			<a href="#">1</a>
% Of All		34.7	8.2	26.5	6.1	0.0	4.1	0.0	0.0	6.1	10.2	2.0	0.0	0.0	

## Responding to Firefox 0-days in the wild



Philip Martin

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Aug 8, 2019 · 7 min read

## Google patches Chrome zero-day under active attacks

This is the third Chrome zero-day discovered being exploited in the wild in the past year.

### **Apple Paid Hacker \$75,000 for Uncovering Zero-Day Camera Exploits in Safari**

Friday April 3, 2020 3:58 am PDT by Tim Hardwick

Runtimes



# Scope

Bashing

Bashing

⇒ No Silver Bullets

Denial of Service (DoS)

Concurrency is getting easier to work with.

When something is easy to work with, we tend to shoot ourselves in the foot with it.

Let's talk about channels.

If a value is written to a channel and never read, what happens to it?

What happens if we wait to read and noone answers?



Always think about your processes' lifetimes.

runtime: maps do not shrink after elements removal (delete) #20135



Open

genez opened this issue on 26 Apr 2017 · 44 comments

```
func main() {  
    runtime.GC(); memUsage() // basically 0  
    m := make(map[int]int) // we start alloc'ing  
  
    for i := 0; i < 1000000; i++ { m[i] = i }  
  
    runtime.GC() // nothing deleted, of course  
  
    for i := 0; i < 1000000; i++ { delete(m, i) }  
  
    runtime.GC() // still nothing deleted!  
  
    fmt.Println(m) // just to make sure GC is not too clever  
}
```

Listing 1: Go sitting on your memory.

So?

- ▶ Memory bugs don't need to corrupt memory.


# So?

- ▶ Memory bugs don't need to corrupt memory.
- ▶ Runtimes hide a lot from you (good and bad).


Haskell is lazy.

```
let (x, y) = (1 + 2, error "boom!") in x -- => 3
```

Listing 2: Thunks in action.







New vocabulary: space leaks.

“Pinpointing space leaks is a skill that takes practice and perseverance. Better tools could significantly simplify the process.”  
— Mitchell, Neil: Leaking Space. Eliminating memory hogs.

“Using the benchmark I observed a space leak. But the program is huge, and manual code inspection usually needs a 10 line code fragment to have a change. So I started modifying the program to do less, and continued until the program did as little as it could, but still leaked space. After I fixed a space leak, I zoomed out and saw if the space leak persisted, and then had another go.”

— Mitchell, Neil: Fixing Space Leaks in Ghcide

So?

- ▶ Again: Runtimes hide a lot from you (good and bad).

# So?

- ▶ Again: Runtimes hide a lot from you (good and bad).
- ▶ If your runtime is complex, it can feel like an adversary.

# Memory Bugs

```
fn main() {  
    unsafe fn dangerous<'a>() -> *const String {  
        let tmp:String = "boom goes the dynamite!".to_string();  
        &tmp  
    }  
  
    println!("{:?}", unsafe { dangerous().as_ref() })  
}
```

Listing 3: unsafe considered... unsafe?



```
#![ forbid(unsafe_code) ]
```

## Auditing popular Rust crates: how a one-line unsafe has nearly ruined everything



Sergey "Shnatsel" Davidoff

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Jul 19, 2018 · 10 min read

“If you want to write DoS-critical code in Rust and use some existing libraries, you’re out of luck. Nobody cares about denial of service attacks. You can poke popular crates with a uzzar and get lots of those. When you report them, they do not get fixed.”

— Davidoff, Sergey (Shnatsel): How Rust’s standard library was vulnerable for years and nobody noticed

## **Memory-Safety Challenge Considered Solved? An In-Depth Experience Report with All Rust CVEs**

Hui Xu

School of Computer Science  
Fudan University

Mingshen Sun

Baidu Security

Zhuangbin Chen

Dept. of Computer Science and Engineering  
The Chinese University of Hong Kong

Yangfan Zhou

School of Computer Science  
Fudan University

“Most importantly, we find while Rust successfully limits memory-safety risks to the realm of unsafe code, it also brings some side effects that cause new patterns of dangling-pointer issues. In particular, most of the use-after-free and double-free bugs are related to the automatic destruction mechanism associated with the ownership-based memory management scheme.”

— Xu, Hui et al.: Memory-Safety Challenge Considered Solved? An In-Depth Experience Report with All Rust CVEs

So?

- ▶ Don't use your language's escape hatches.

# So?

- ▶ Don't use your language's escape hatches.
- ▶ Seriously.

# So?

- ▶ Don't use your language's escape hatches.
- ▶ Seriously.
- ▶ Please.



# So?

- ▶ Don't use your language's escape hatches.
- ▶ Seriously.
- ▶ Please.
- ▶ Or write proofs, but I know you won't, so don't.

Conclusions (and better vibes)

Everything sucks in its own way, and that's alright.

Nothing will be perfectly secure. Make a better threat model.

## References

- ▶ These slides: <https://github.com/hellerve/talks>
- ▶ Go bug 20135:  
<https://github.com/golang/go/issues/20135>
- ▶ Breaking Erlang Maps:  
<https://medium.com/@jlouis666/breaking-erlang->
- ▶ RustBelt: <https://plv.mpi-sws.org/rustbelt>
- ▶ Space leak: A Haskell Sore Spot:  
<https://fremissant.net/leaky>
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<https://medium.com/@shnatsel/auditing-popular->
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<https://neilmitchell.blogspot.com/2020/05/fixi>

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<https://www.macrumors.com/2020/04/03/apple-paid-hacker-75000-zero-day-camera-exploits-safari/>
- ▶ Google patches Chrome zero-day under active attacks  
<https://www.zdnet.com/article/google-patches-chrome-zero-day-under-active-attacks/>
- ▶ Responding to Firefox 0-days in the wild  
<https://blog.coinbase.com/responding-to-firefox-0-days-in-the-wild>
- ▶ Xu, Hui et al.: Memory-Safety Challenge Considered Solved? An In-Depth Experience Report with All Rust CVEs
- ▶ Kulal, Sumith et al.: Space leaks exploration in Haskell
- ▶ Mitchell, Neil: Leaking Space—Eliminating memory hogs

Thank you!

Questions?

Slides at <https://github.com/hellerve/talks>