

SEVENTH
EDITION



PROPAGANDA & PERSUASION

GARTH S. JOWETT | VICTORIA O'DONNELL



Propaganda & Persuasion

Seventh Edition

*To Ada and May, who lived through two world wars and who,
in another time and place, took me to the movies, and to Carol,
who has now taken up that role.*

—Garth S. Jowett

*I continue to dedicate this book to the memory of my mother,
Helen A. O'Donnell, a very special woman, and to Chris, my son,
who left us too soon.*

—Victoria O'Donnell

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Seventh Edition

Garth S. Jowett

University of Houston

Victoria O'Donnell

Montana State University



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FOR INFORMATION:

SAGE Publications, Inc.
2455 Teller Road
Thousand Oaks, California 91320
E-mail: order@sagepub.com

SAGE Publications Ltd.
1 Oliver's Yard
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SAGE Publications India Pvt. Ltd.
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India

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BRIEF CONTENTS

| | |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| Preface | xiii |
| Acknowledgments | xv |
| Chapter 1 • What Is Propaganda, and How Does It Differ From Persuasion? | 1 |
| Chapter 2 • Propaganda Through the Ages | 47 |
| Chapter 3 • Propaganda Institutionalized | 87 |
| Chapter 4 • Propaganda and Persuasion Examined | 151 |
| Chapter 5 • Propaganda and Psychological Warfare | 195 |
| Chapter 6 • How to Analyze Propaganda | 267 |
| Chapter 7 • Propaganda in Action: Four Case Studies | 285 |
| Chapter 8 • How Propaganda Works in Modern Society | 321 |
| Appendix • Cyber Propaganda <i>Christopher Bronk</i> | 331 |
| References | 339 |
| Author Index | 375 |
| Subject Index | 383 |
| About the Authors | 399 |

DETAILED CONTENTS

| | |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| Preface | xiii |
| Acknowledgments | xv |
| | |
| Chapter 1 • What Is Propaganda, and How Does It Differ From Persuasion? | 1 |
| Propaganda Defined | 2 |
| Jowett and O'Donnell's Definition of Propaganda | 6 |
| Propaganda and the Containment of Information | 13 |
| Forms of Propaganda | 17 |
| Subpropaganda/Facilitative Communication | 26 |
| A Model of Propaganda | 28 |
| Communication Defined | 28 |
| Propaganda and Information | 29 |
| Propaganda and Persuasion | 31 |
| Persuasion Defined | 31 |
| Persuasion Is Transactional | 31 |
| Responses to Persuasion | 32 |
| Beliefs | 33 |
| Values | 33 |
| Attitudes | 34 |
| Behavior | 34 |
| Group Norms | 35 |
| Resonance | 35 |
| Persuasion Seeks Voluntary Change | 36 |
| Misleading and Manipulating an Audience | 36 |
| Rhetorical Background and the Ethics of Persuasion | 37 |
| Rhetoric and Propaganda | 40 |
| Propaganda as a Form of Communication | 41 |
| Concealed Purpose | 42 |
| Concealed Identity | 42 |
| Control of Information Flow | 42 |
| The Management of Public Opinion | 43 |
| The Manipulation of Behavior | 44 |

| | |
|----------------------------|----|
| The Demagogue/Propagandist | 45 |
| Overview of the Book | 46 |

Chapter 2 • Propaganda Through the Ages **47**

| | |
|--------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Ancient Greece and Alexander the Great | 48 |
| Alexander the Great | 50 |
| Imperial Rome | 51 |
| Propaganda and Religion | 53 |
| The Rise of Christianity | 58 |
| The Crusades | 59 |
| The Reformation and Counter-Reformation | 63 |
| The Counter-Reformation | 67 |
| The Emergence of Propaganda | 69 |
| The American Revolution | 71 |
| The French Revolution and Napoleon | 79 |
| Propaganda in the 19th Century: The American Civil War | 84 |

Chapter 3 • Propaganda Institutionalized **87**

| | |
|-------------------------------------------------|-----|
| The New Audience | 88 |
| The Emergence of Mass Society | 89 |
| The Emergence of the Propaganda Critique | 92 |
| The New Media | 95 |
| Print Media | 95 |
| Movies | 99 |
| <i>Michael Moore and Fahrenheit 9/11</i> | 113 |
| Radio | 117 |
| <i>Current International Radio Propaganda</i> | 120 |
| U.S. Government Propaganda Agencies | 125 |
| Radio and TV Marti | 128 |
| Sputnik Radio | 129 |
| Television | 130 |
| <i>The Nature of Television</i> | 130 |
| <i>Television as Propaganda</i> | 131 |
| <i>TV Marti</i> | 132 |
| <i>The Emergence of Cable News</i> | 133 |
| Advertising: The Ubiquitous Propaganda | 136 |
| Institutional Propaganda | 137 |
| Internet Advertising | 137 |
| The Science of Advertising | 138 |
| The Role of Advertising | 141 |
| Propaganda and the Internet: The Power of Rumor | 143 |

| | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|
| Chapter 4 • Propaganda and Persuasion Examined | 151 |
| The Modern Study of Propaganda and Persuasion | 151 |
| Propaganda in World War I | 151 |
| The Aftermath of World War I and the Growing Concern About Propaganda | 153 |
| The Social Sciences and the Study of Propaganda | 154 |
| Research in Propaganda and Persuasion | 155 |
| The Study of Attitudes | 155 |
| World War II and Research in Communication | 156 |
| The Yale Studies | 160 |
| Consistency Theories | 161 |
| Theory of Exposure Learning | 163 |
| Social Judgment Theory | 163 |
| Resistance to Persuasion | 163 |
| McGuire's Model of Persuasion | 164 |
| Diffusion of Innovations | 164 |
| Recent Research on Attitudes | 165 |
| Research on Persuasion and Behavior | 166 |
| The Influence of the Media | 169 |
| Violence and the Media | 169 |
| Cultivation Studies | 170 |
| Prosocial Behaviors and Television | 171 |
| The Agenda-Setting Function of the Media | 171 |
| Uses and Gratifications Theory | 174 |
| Uses and Dependency Theory | 174 |
| The Internet and Digital Innovations | 174 |
| Limitations of Effects Research | 176 |
| Cultural Studies | 177 |
| Collective Memory Studies | 180 |
| Summary | 193 |
| Generalizations About Propaganda and Persuasion Effects | 194 |
| Chapter 5 • Propaganda and Psychological Warfare | 195 |
| World War I and the Fear of Propaganda | 199 |
| British Propaganda | 200 |
| German Propaganda | 201 |
| American Propaganda | 204 |
| Atrocity Propaganda | 207 |
| Reaction to World War I Propaganda | 208 |
| The Interwar Years, 1920 to 1939 | 209 |
| The Emergence of Communist Propaganda | 209 |
| American Isolationism | 213 |

| | |
|------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| Huey Pierce Long Jr. | 213 |
| Fr. Charles Coughlin, SJ | 214 |
| The Institute for Propaganda Analysis | 217 |
| Hitler and Nazi Propaganda | 220 |
| World War II | 232 |
| Post–World War II Conflicts | 236 |
| The Korean War, 1950 to 1953 | 237 |
| <i>The Korean War and the “Brainwashing” Issue</i> | 239 |
| The Vietnam War | 241 |
| <i>The Gulf of Tonkin Incident</i> | 241 |
| <i>“Hearts and Minds”: The Propaganda Campaign</i> | 242 |
| <i>The War</i> | 245 |
| <i>The Media</i> | 245 |
| The 1991 Gulf War: Mobilization of World Public Opinion | 246 |
| Using Metaphor and Imagery in the Gulf War | 250 |
| The “Nayirah” Incident | 252 |
| The Aftermath (2005): The Invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq | 254 |
| A New World of Propaganda, 1960 to 2018 | 255 |
| International Sports Events | 256 |
| Freedom of Speech and New Technologies | 260 |
| <i>The Patriot Act</i> | 261 |
| <i>WikiLeaks</i> | 261 |
| <i>Negative Counterpropaganda</i> | 263 |
| Public Diplomacy | 264 |

Chapter 6 • How to Analyze Propaganda 267

| | |
|-----------------------------------------------------|-----|
| The Ideology and Purpose of the Propaganda Campaign | 268 |
| The Context in Which the Propaganda Occurs | 269 |
| Identification of the Propagandist | 270 |
| The Structure of the Propaganda Organization | 270 |
| The Target Audience | 272 |
| Media Utilization Techniques | 273 |
| Special Techniques to Maximize Effect | 275 |
| Predispositions of the Audience: Creating Resonance | 276 |
| Source Credibility | 276 |
| Opinion Leaders | 277 |
| Face-to-Face Contact | 277 |
| Group Norms | 277 |
| Reward and Punishment | 278 |
| Monopoly of the Communication Source | 278 |
| Visual Symbols of Power | 278 |
| Language Usage | 279 |

| | |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|
| Music as Propaganda | 281 |
| Arousal of Emotions | 281 |
| Audience Reaction to Various Techniques | 282 |
| Counterpropaganda | 282 |
| Effects and Evaluation | 283 |
| Chapter 7 • Propaganda in Action: Four Case Studies | 285 |
| Case Study 1: Women and War: Work, Housing, and Child Care | 285 |
| The Context, Ideology, and Purpose of the Propaganda Campaign | 287 |
| Identification of the Propagandist and the Structure of the Propaganda Organization | 289 |
| The Target Audience | 292 |
| Media Utilization Techniques | 292 |
| Special Techniques to Maximize Effect | 293 |
| Audience Reaction to Various Techniques | 294 |
| Effects and Evaluation | 294 |
| Case Study 2: Propaganda and Climate Change: | |
| The Heartland Institute | 294 |
| The Context, Ideology, and Purpose of the Propaganda Campaign | 295 |
| Identification of the Propagandist and Structure of the Propaganda Organization | 296 |
| The Target Audience | 298 |
| Propaganda Techniques | 299 |
| Counterpropaganda | 301 |
| Effects and Evaluation | 301 |
| Case Study 3: Big Pharma: Marketing Disease and Drugs | 303 |
| Ideology and Purpose of the Propaganda Campaign | 303 |
| The Context in Which the Propaganda Occurs: | |
| The Medicalization of Society | 304 |
| Identification of the Propagandist and Structure of the Organizations | 305 |
| The Target Audience | 306 |
| Media Utilization Techniques | 306 |
| Special Techniques to Maximize Effects | 306 |
| <i>Television Advertising</i> | 306 |
| <i>"Me-Too" Drugs</i> | 308 |
| <i>Generic Drugs</i> | 309 |
| <i>Clinical Trials</i> | 310 |
| <i>Ghostwritten Articles in Medical Journals</i> | 311 |
| <i>Sales Representatives</i> | 311 |
| <i>Opinion Leaders</i> | 312 |
| <i>Sponsorship</i> | 313 |
| <i>Lobbyists</i> | 313 |
| <i>Targeting the News Media</i> | 313 |

| | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------|------------|
| <i>Audience Reaction to Various Techniques</i> | 314 |
| <i>The Opioid Crisis</i> | 314 |
| Counterpropaganda | 315 |
| Effects and Evaluation | 316 |
| Case Study 4: Pundits for Hire: The Pentagon Propaganda Machine | 316 |
| The Propagandists | 317 |
| The Audience | 318 |
| The Various Techniques Employed | 318 |
| Counterpropaganda | 319 |
| The Consequences | 320 |
| Note | 320 |
| Chapter 8 • How Propaganda Works in Modern Society | 321 |
| A Model of the Process of Propaganda | 321 |
| Social-Historical Context | 321 |
| Cultural Rim | 323 |
| The Process of Propaganda | 324 |
| The Institution | 324 |
| Propaganda Agents | 324 |
| Media Methods | 324 |
| The Social Network | 326 |
| The Public | 326 |
| Generalizations | 327 |
| Appendix • Cyber Propaganda | 331 |
| <i>Christopher Bronk</i> | |
| Cyberspace | 331 |
| The Social Internet | 332 |
| Hackers | 332 |
| How Stolen Data Feed the Propaganda Enterprise | 333 |
| The Transparency Agenda | 334 |
| “Fake News” and Politics | 334 |
| Cyberspace: An Echo Chamber for Conspiracy | |
| Theories and Misinformation? | 335 |
| Digital Propaganda and Information Access | 336 |
| Note | 337 |
| References | 339 |
| Author Index | 375 |
| Subject Index | 383 |
| About the Authors | 399 |

PREFACE

This seventh edition of *Propaganda and Persuasion* celebrates 32 years since the first edition in 1986. Has it really been that long? The preface to the first edition noted how poorly the subject of propaganda had been treated as a part of general communication studies and that few students had been given the opportunity or encouragement to examine the subject in a systematic manner. Since the publication of the third edition, the level of interest in propaganda among scholars in many academic fields, including communication, political science, history, sociology, psychology, popular culture, and more specialized fields such as film, television, and social media studies, has increased substantially. Thanks in large part to the emergence of the vast array of “social media” as a worldwide communication phenomenon, the subject of propaganda and its very ubiquity has finally alerted scholars to examine how techniques of propaganda have been used within their own areas of specialization and are being used to shape human beliefs and behavior. This book was written to help readers understand what propaganda is, how it has shaped events throughout history, how to approach an analysis of it, and how to differentiate it from persuasion.

Over the years throughout subsequent editions, we have attempted to improve this book by making changes suggested by the many readers and teachers who have used this volume. Consequently, we have related our model of propaganda to the historical and narrative parts of this book, especially the four case studies. We also made changes to reflect how a propaganda case study can be structured to reveal the components of a campaign. This allows for a greater degree of comparison of strengths and weaknesses across different types of campaigns. This also assists students and interested readers in evaluating the relative success of propaganda strategies.

It is our clearly stated purpose in this book to provide the reader with a systematic introduction to the increasingly complex world of propaganda. We view propaganda as a form of communication and believe that an understanding of information and persuasion is necessary to comprehending what the characteristics of propaganda are and how it works as a communication process. We cannot hope to cover the full range of propaganda activities, but our principal objective is to create a framework that will give the reader a way of analyzing the many strategies employed. While our analytical matrix is by no means the only way to examine propaganda, it has been gratifying to us that every year we receive messages from scholars and interested readers who have used this model. We will continue to strive to enhance the matrix and its applicability. As usual, we encourage and welcome comments from our readers.

The Internet and the variety and significance of social media as a disseminator of propaganda cannot be ignored, and we have incorporated this wherever it is relevant throughout the book. Three case studies in Chapter 7 have been retained, and

the tobacco case study has been replaced by a new case study on climate change and propaganda.

The world of propaganda remains as fascinating as ever, and our students respond to the subject as eagerly as they have in the past. It is our hope that in a world in which communication flows so easily from such a wide variety of sources, students will use this book to help them search for a way through the morass to allow them to make intelligent decisions for themselves.

NEW TO THIS EDITION

The seventh edition reflects the remarkable changes in the world of propaganda due to increasing use of social media throughout the world and the threat of terrorism everywhere. A new section on demagoguery has been added to Chapter 1, and this edition includes an appendix by Christopher Bronk titled “Cyber Propaganda.” This book also includes updated research on persuasion and an expansion of collective memory as it appears in new memorials and monuments. New photographs and current examples of propaganda, especially the ways in which it is disseminated via the Internet, are provided throughout the book.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The preparation of this seventh edition would not have been possible without the encouragement and assistance of our companions at SAGE. Our editor, Terri Accomazzo, whose good cheer and patience was truly appreciated, was of great assistance in getting this new edition underway. Her assistant, Sarah Wilson, helped us with details in a very timely and pleasant manner. We were very lucky to have the outstanding services of our copy editor, Christina West, and project editor, Staci Wittek. We wish to thank Bennie Clark Allen, production editor, for guiding the book through its final stages, making sure that all was good. We are very grateful to her.

Garth Jowett wishes to acknowledge the contribution of his undergraduate and graduate students studying propaganda. They have, through their enthusiastic embracing of the subject, provided continuous inspiration, while at the same time applying a subtle pressure to remain current in this growing and increasingly complex field. Their “show-and-tell” examples of propaganda in our daily lives have often provided source material for this and past editions of this book. A stimulating semester spent at the University of Cape Town, South Africa, in 2010 indicated the enthusiasm for studying this subject is universal.

As always, Victoria O'Donnell had the support of the Montana State University librarians, who acquired books and articles through Interlibrary Loan for this revision.

The two authors were separated, as usual, by half a continent while preparing this seventh edition. This is no longer a factor of any consequence because modern technology has removed the barriers of separation. We worked through the combined technologies of telephone and the convenience of e-mail. As usual, we take responsibility for our individual chapters—Victoria for Chapters 1, 4, and 6, and Garth for Chapters 2, 3, and 5. Chapters 7 and 8 were joint endeavors. Of course, we also take complete responsibility for the book as a whole and willingly share the blame for any errors.

1

WHAT IS PROPAGANDA, AND HOW DOES IT DIFFER FROM PERSUASION?

Propaganda is a form of communication that attempts to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist. Persuasion is interactive and attempts to satisfy the needs of both persuader and persuadee. A model of propaganda depicts how elements of informative and persuasive communication may be incorporated into propagandistic communication, thus distinguishing propaganda as a specific class of communication. References are made to past theories of rhetoric that indicate propaganda had few systematic theoretical treatments prior to the 20th century. Public opinion and behavioral change can be affected by propaganda.

Propaganda has been studied as history, journalism, political science, sociology, and psychology, as well as from an interdisciplinary perspective. To study propaganda as history is to examine the practices of propagandists as events and the subsequent events as possible effects of propaganda. To consider propaganda as journalism is to understand how news management shapes information, emphasizing positive features and downplaying negative ones, casting institutions in a favorable light. To examine propaganda in the light of political science is to analyze the ideologies of the practitioners and the dissemination and impact of public opinion. To approach propaganda as sociology is to look at social movements and the counterpropaganda that emerges in opposition. To investigate propaganda as psychology is to determine its effects on individuals. Propaganda is also viewed by some scholars as inherent thought and practice in mass culture. Another trend that draws on most of these allied fields is cultural studies that includes the study of propaganda as a purveyor of ideology and, to this end, is largely a study of how dominant ideological meanings are constructed and interpreted by people. Ethnographic research is one way to determine whether the people on the receiving end accept or resist dominant ideological meanings. Collective memory studies include how cultural memories of the past influence beliefs and actions in the present.

This book approaches the study of propaganda as a type of communication. Persuasion, another category of communication, is also examined. The terms *propaganda* and *persuasion* have been used interchangeably in the literature on propaganda, as well as in everyday speech. Propaganda employs persuasive strategies, but it differs from persuasion in purpose. A communication approach to the study of propaganda enables us to isolate its communicative variables, to determine the relationship of message to context, to examine intentionality, to examine the responses and responsibilities of the audience, and to trace the development of propagandistic communication as a process.

We believe there is a need to evaluate propaganda in a contemporary context free from value-laden definitions. Our objectives are (a) to provide a concise examination of propaganda and persuasion, (b) to examine the role of propaganda as an aspect of communication studies, and (c) to analyze propaganda as part of cultural, social, religious, and political systems throughout history and contemporary times.

PROPAGANDA DEFINED

Propaganda, in the most neutral sense, means to disseminate or promote particular ideas. In Latin, it means “to propagate” or “to sow.” In 1622, the Vatican established the *Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide*, meaning the sacred congregation for propagating the faith of the Roman Catholic Church. Because the propaganda of the Roman Catholic Church had as its intent spreading the faith to the New World, as well as opposing Protestantism, the word *propaganda* lost its neutrality, and subsequent usage has rendered the term pejorative. To identify a message as propaganda is to suggest something negative and dishonest. Words frequently used as synonyms for *propaganda* are *lies*, *distortion*, *deceit*, *manipulation*, *mind control*, *psychological warfare*, *brainwashing*, *palaver*, and *fake news*. Resistance to the word *propaganda* is illustrated by the following example. When the legendary film director John Ford assumed active duty as a lieutenant commander in the U.S. Navy and chief of the Field Photographic Branch of the Office of Strategic Services during World War II, he was asked by his editor, Robert Parrish, if his film *The Battle of Midway* was going to be a propaganda film. After a long pause, Ford replied, “Don’t you ever let me hear you use that word again in my presence as long as you’re under my command” (Doherty, 1993, pp. 25–26). Ford had filmed the actual battle of Midway, but he also included flashbacks of an American family at home that implied that an attack on them was an attack on every American. Ford designed the film to appeal to the American people to strengthen their resolve and belief in the war effort, but he resisted the idea of making films for political indoctrination. According to our definition, *The Battle of Midway* was a white propaganda film, for it was neither deceitful nor false, the source was known, but it shaped viewer perceptions and furthered the desired intent of the filmmaker to vilify the enemy and encourage American patriotism.

The British Library installed an exhibition of historic and contemporary propaganda in 2013. Nick Higham, reporting on the exhibit for the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), said,

Propaganda has a bad name. It is what repressive regimes use to glorify their leaders, motivate their citizens and demonise their enemies. It is about lies and distortion, manipulation and misrepresentation. But it is also, according to the British Library, about alerting people to the risks of disease, about making sure children learn how to cross the road safely and about building a perfectly legitimate sense of common purpose among the citizens of a democracy. . . . It [the exhibit] includes banknotes, postage stamps, a display of model Eiffel Towers and Nelson’s Columns and a huge photographic blow-up of Mount

Rushmore, illustrating the ways states use iconography and subliminal propaganda to brand themselves and promote a sense of belonging and common purpose among the citizenry. (Higham, 2013)

Terms implying propaganda that have gained popularity today are *spin*, *alternative facts*, and *fake news*. *Spin* is often used with reference to the manipulation of political information; therefore, press secretaries and public relations officers are referred to as “spin doctors” when they attempt to launder the news (Kurtz, 1998). *Alternative facts* became a buzz phrase when Kellyanne Conway, counselor to President Donald Trump, asserted on NBC’s *Meet the Press* that the White House’s assessment of the scope and size of the inauguration crowd was an alternative fact compared to what was reported by the news media (Fandos, 2017). Of course, there is no such thing as an alternative fact. A fact is a true and verifiable statement that has no alternative. *Fake news* is the deliberative spread of misleading and false information that contradicts the facts. It ranges from exaggerations of the truth designed for opinionated perspectives to made-up articles on social media. Common Sense Media found that less than 45% of Americans ages 10 to 18 could accurately detect fake news in their social media feeds, and nearly one-third of respondents said they had shared inaccurate news before realizing it (“Data: This Just In,” 2017). Truth has become so distorted that the *Oxford English Dictionary* named the word “post-truth” the 2016 word of the year, citing both the British Brexit and U.S. presidential elections (Oxford Dictionaries, 2016).

Besides being associated with unethical, harmful, and unfair tactics, propaganda is also commonly defined as “organized persuasion” (DeVito, 1986, p. 239). Persuasion differs from propaganda, as we will see later in this chapter, but the term is often used as a catch-all for suspicious rhetoric.

When the use of *propaganda* emphasizes purpose, the term is associated with control and is regarded as a deliberate attempt to alter or maintain a balance of power that is advantageous to the propagandist. Deliberate attempt is usually linked with a clear institutional ideology and objective. The purpose of propaganda is to convey an ideology to an audience with a related objective. Whether it is a government agency attempting to instill a massive wave of patriotism in a national audience to support a war effort, a terrorist network enlisting followers in a jihad, a military leader trying to frighten the enemy by exaggerating the strength of its army, a corporation pursuing a credible brand to maintain its legitimacy among its clientele, or a company seeking to malign a rival to deter competition for its product, a careful and predetermined plan of prefabricated symbol manipulation is used to communicate an objective to an audience. That objective endeavors to reinforce or modify the attitudes, the behavior, or both of an audience.

Many scholars have grappled with a definition of the word *propaganda*. Jacques Ellul (1965, p. xv) focused on propaganda as technique itself (notably, psychological manipulation) that, in technological societies, “has certain identical results,” whether it is used by communists or Nazis or Western democratic organizations. He regarded propaganda as sociological phenomena, not as something made or produced by people of intentions. Ellul contended that nearly all biased messages in society were propagandistic even when the biases were unconscious. He also emphasized the

potency and pervasiveness of propaganda. Because propaganda is instantaneous, he contended, it destroys one's sense of history and disallows critical reflection. Yet Ellul believed that people need propaganda because we live in mass society. Propaganda, he said, enables us to participate in important events such as elections, celebrations, and memorials. With regard to wartime, he said, "Before the war, propaganda is a substitute for physical violence; during the war, it is a supplement to it" (p. x). Ellul believed that truth does not separate propaganda from "moral forms" because propaganda uses truth, half-truth, and limited truth. A similar statement from British Labour politician Richard Crossman is that "the art of propaganda is not telling lies but rather seeing the truth you require and giving it mixed up with some truths the audience wants to hear" (Higham, 2013, p. 2). Leonard W. Doob, who defined propaganda in 1948 as "the attempt to affect the personalities and to control the behavior of individuals towards ends considered unscientific or of doubtful value in a society at a particular time" (p. 390), said in a 1989 essay that "a clear-cut definition of propaganda is neither possible nor desirable" (p. 375). Doob rejected a contemporary definition of propaganda because of the complexity of the issues related to behavior in society and differences in times and cultures.

Both Ellul and Doob have contributed seminal ideas to the study of propaganda, but we find Ellul's magnitude and Doob's resistance to definitions troublesome because we believe that to analyze propaganda, one needs to be able to identify it. A definition sets forth propaganda's characteristics and aids our recognition of it.

Psychologists Anthony Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson (2001) wrote a book about propaganda for the purpose of informing Americans about propaganda devices and psychological dynamics so that people will know "how to counteract their effectiveness" (p. xv). They regarded propaganda as the abuse of persuasion and recognized that propaganda is more than clever deception. In a series of case studies, they illustrated propaganda tactics such as withholding vital information, invoking heuristic devices, using meaningless association, and other strategies of questionable ethics. They defined propaganda as "mass 'suggestion' or influence through the manipulation of symbols and the psychology of the individual" (p. 11), thus emphasizing verbal and nonverbal communication and audience appeals.

Other scholars have emphasized the communicative qualities of propaganda. Leo Bogart (1995), in his study of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), focused on the propagandist as a sender of messages:

Propaganda is an art requiring special talent. It is not mechanical, scientific work. Influencing attitudes requires experience, area knowledge, and instinctive "judgment of what is the best argument for the audience." No manual can guide the propagandist. He must have "a good mind, genius, sensitivity, and knowledge of how that audience thinks and reacts." (pp. 195–196)

(This quotation is from the original six-volume classified study of the USIA done in 1954 that Bogart's work condenses. The study was released in abridged form in 1976, and the introduction to it was revised in 1995.)

Scholars have studied propaganda in specific institutions. Alex Carey (1997) regarded propaganda in the corporate world as “communications where the form and content is selected with the single-minded purpose of bringing some target audience to adopt attitudes and beliefs chosen in advance by the sponsors of the communications” (p. 20). Noam Chomsky (1992), in his introduction to Carey’s collection of essays, said that Carey believed that “the twentieth century has been characterized by three developments of great political importance: the growth of democracy, the growth of corporate power, and the growth of corporate propaganda as a means of protecting corporate power against democracy” (p. ix). Carey said that “commercial advertising and public relations are the forms of propaganda activity common to a democracy. . . . It is arguable that the success of business propaganda in persuading us, for so long, that we are free from propaganda is one of the most significant propaganda achievements of the twentieth century” (pp. 14, 21). The 21st century technologically advanced societies convey propaganda via marketing and fake grassroots techniques, according to Eliane Glaser. She said, “They emphasise the role of direct engagement with consumers taking part in the marketing process, and they talk of two-way communications with consumers, which sounds very egalitarian. But what it really means is that consumers are now circulating entertaining viral adverts on Facebook and companies are using ‘Astroturf’ or fake grassroots techniques to create the appearance of a broad base of support for their product or message” (Higham, 2013, p. 2).

Shawn J. Parry-Giles (2002), who studied the propaganda production of the Truman and Eisenhower Cold War operations, defined propaganda as “conceived of as strategically devised messages that are disseminated to masses of people by an institution for the purpose of generating action benefiting its source” (p. xxvi). She indicated that

Truman and Eisenhower were the first two presidents to introduce and mobilize propaganda as an official peacetime institution. In a “war of words,” propaganda acted as an integral component of the government’s foreign policy operation. To understand propaganda’s influence is to grasp the means by which America’s Cold War messages were produced and the overall impact that such strategizing had on the ideological constructions of the Cold War. (p. xvii)

Bertrand Taithe and Tim Thornton (2000) see propaganda as part of a historical tradition of pleading and convincing and therefore

as a form of political language, however, propaganda is always articulated around a system of truths and expresses a logic of exclusive representation. It is the purpose of propaganda to convince, to win over and to convert; it has therefore to be convincing, viable and truthful within its own remit. . . . The shaping of the term propaganda is also an indication of the way the political nation judges the manner in which political messages are communicated. . . . Propaganda promotes the ways of the community as well as defining them. (pp. 2–4)

Recognizing how difficult it is to define propaganda, O'Shaughnessy (2004) devoted several pages to the term's complexity. He recognized that propaganda is a "co-production in which we are willing participants, it articulates the things that are half whispered internally" (p. 4). Further, he wrote, "Propaganda generally involves the unambiguous transmission of message. . . . [I]t is a complex conveyor of simple solutions" (p. 16).

Terence H. Qualter (1962) emphasized the necessity of audience adaptation: "Propaganda, to be effective, must be seen, remembered, understood, and acted upon . . . [and] adapted to particular needs of the situation and the audience to which it is aimed" (p. xii). Influencing attitudes, anticipating audience reaction, adapting to the situation and audience, and being seen, remembered, understood, and acted on are important elements of the communicative process.

Pratkanis and Turner (1996) defined the function of propaganda as "attempts to move a recipient to a predetermined point of view by using simple images and slogans that truncate thought by playing on prejudices and emotions" (p. 190). They separated propaganda from persuasion according to the type of deliberation used to design messages. Persuasion, they said, is based on "debate, discussion, and careful consideration of options" to discover "better solutions for complex problems," whereas "propaganda results in the manipulation of the mob by the elite" (p. 191). These definitions vary from the general to the specific, sometimes including value judgments, sometimes folding propaganda into persuasion, but nearly always recognizing propaganda as a form of communication.

JOWETT AND O'DONNELL'S DEFINITION OF PROPAGANDA

The Internet and social media have significantly increased the dissemination of propaganda, thus it is especially important to understand what propaganda is and what its capabilities are. We seek to understand and analyze propaganda by identifying its characteristics and to place it within communication studies to examine the qualities of context, sender, intent, message, channel, audience, and response. Furthermore, we want to clarify, as much as possible, the distinction between propaganda and persuasion by examining propaganda as a subcategory of persuasion, as well as information. Our definition of propaganda focuses on the communication process—most specifically, on the purpose of the process: *Propaganda is the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist.* Let's examine the words of the definition to see what is precisely meant.

Deliberate. *Deliberate* is a strong word meaning "willful, intentional, and premeditated." It implies a sense of careful consideration of all possibilities. We use it because propaganda is carefully thought out ahead of time to select what will be the most effective strategy to promote an ideology and maintain an advantageous position.

Systematic. *Systematic* complements *deliberate* because it means "precise and methodical, carrying out something with organized regularity." Governments and

corporations establish departments or agencies specifically to create systematic propaganda. Although the general public is more aware of propaganda agencies during wartime, such agencies exist all the time, for they are essential. For example, as you will see in the case study “Big Pharma: Marketing Disease and Drugs” in Chapter 7, pharmaceutical companies wage massive advertising campaigns and engage in questionable practices. Advertising campaigns, as discussed in Chapter 3, are forms of systematic propaganda. Political advertising campaigns, often very negative, are systematic before elections. They are expensive to produce for television; consequently, digital technologies have been used creatively. The jihadist movement feeds the Internet with its ideology, recruitment tactics, fund-raising, and training material via videos, e-mail, and various websites to systematically “obtain support from the Muslim community and to intimidate Western public opinion” (Torres, Jordan, & Horsburgh, 2006).

Attempt. The goal of propaganda is to “attempt,” or try, to create a certain state in a certain audience; thus, propaganda is an attempt at directive communication with an objective that has been established a priori. The desired state may be perceptual, cognitive, behavioral, or all three. Each one of these is described with examples as follows.

Shaping Perceptions. *Shaping perceptions* is usually attempted through language and images, which is why slogans, posters, symbols, and even architectural structures are developed during resistance movements and wartime. How we perceive is based on “complex psychological, philosophical, and practical habitual thought patterns that we carry over from past experiences” (Hayward, 1997, p. 73). *Perception* is the process of extracting information from the world outside us, as well as from within ourselves. Each individual has a perceptual field that is unique to that person and formed by the influences of values, roles, group norms, and self-image. Each of these factors colors the ways a person perceives (O'Donnell & Kable, 1982, p. 171). George Johnson, in his book *In the Palaces of Memory* (1991), offered a colorful description of perception and recognition according to the activity of neural networks in the brain:

Looking out the window at the ocean, we might notice a bright light in the night sky hovering on the horizon. Deep inside the brain one neural network responds to this vector, dismissing it as just another star. But its intense brightness causes another network to guess that it is Venus. Then the light starts getting bigger, brighter, creating a different vector, a different set of firing patterns. Another network associates this configuration with approaching headlights on a freeway. Then two more lights appear, green and red. Networks that interpret these colors feed into other networks; the pattern for stop light weakly responds. All over the brain, networks are talking to networks, entertaining competing hypotheses. Then comes the roar, and suddenly we know what it is. The noise vector, the growing-white-light vector, the red-and-green vector all converge on the network—or network of networks—that says airplane. (p. 165)

Johnson (1991) continued, “How a perception was ultimately categorized would depend on the architecture of the system, that which a person was born with and that which was developed through experience. Some people’s brains would tell them they had seen a UFO or an angel instead of a plane” (p. 165). Because members of a culture share similar values and norms as well as the same laws and general practices, it is quite possible to have group perceptions or, at least, very similar perceptions within a cultural group.

Our language is based on a vast web of associations that enables us to interpret, judge, and conceptualize our perceptions. Propagandists understand that our constructed meanings are related to both our past understanding of language and images and the culture and context in which they appear. Perception is dependent on our attitudes toward issues and our feelings about them. For example, legislation designed to increase timber thinning in national forests was labeled a “Healthy Forests Initiative.” Environmental groups protested the legislation on the grounds that it was unhealthy to cut down healthy trees and harm wildlife. Michael Garrity, executive director of the Alliance for the Wild Rockies, revealed that the U.S. Forest Service will make about \$312,000 by cutting 4.5 million board feet of timber in southern Montana’s Gallatin National Forest alone (“Gallatin National Forest Thinning Plan Moves Ahead,” 2005). What is “healthy” depends on our associations.

An Associated Press (2006) article titled “Doublespeak: Lingo in Nation’s Capital as Important as Issues” offered several examples of language that evades “responsibility and accountability”—a government report on hunger in America referred to “food insecurity” rather than hunger; descriptions of suicide by war captives labeled them as “self-injurious behavior incidents,” and interrogations as “debriefings” (p. A1). When the sky became dark and dirty with smog during the first few days of the Beijing Olympics in August 2008, in a *Los Angeles Times* article it was officially called “haze” (Plaschke, 2008, p. S4).

The Montana Senate in 2013 reviewed a bill titled “The Wildlife Recovery Act,” which would have allowed individuals to obtain unlimited numbers of licenses to hunt with hounds and to kill black bears, mountain lions, and wolves. The intent of the bill, which was struck down in committee, was the exact opposite of “wildlife recovery” (Lundquist, 2013, p. C2).

President George W. Bush began to use the phrase “the war on terror” shortly after the attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, and continuing through his reelection campaign in 2004. Gilles Kepel, in *The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West* (2004), said, “The phrase was engineered to heighten fear while simultaneously tapping the righteous indignation of citizens in ‘civilized nations’ against barbaric murderers who would perpetrate despicable atrocities on innocent victims” (p. 112).

The U.S. military has created perception-shaping phrases that sanitize the reality of war, for example, “collateral damage” standing for civilians killed or injured; “friendly fire” for soldiers killed or injured by troops from their side; “turkey run” for randomly killing a massive number of people; and “sorties” for bombing missions. Military acronyms such as WMD and IED have become so common in news reporting that they have become public jargon.

President Bush made a serious gaffe when, in impromptu remarks, he described America's goal to annihilate Al Qaeda's Taliban hosts in Afghanistan as a "crusade." In the Muslim world, "crusade" represented medieval European Christianity's Crusades against Islam. There was an uproar over the religious connotations of the word, which suggested that Bush wanted to conquer Islam. Bush retracted the term immediately and promptly visited a mosque in Washington, D.C., in an attempt to nullify the impression that American mobilization against Al Qaeda was aimed at Muslims or at Islam in general (Kepel, 2004, p. 117). Osama bin Laden, however, quickly picked up the term and used it in his Al Qaeda propaganda messages denouncing American crusaders.

Perceptions are also shaped by visual symbols. During the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, symbolic yellow ribbons have been put on trees, fences, buildings, automobiles, and jewelry to indicate support of the U.S. military. The ritual of tying yellow ribbons can be traced back to the American Civil War, when women wore yellow ribbons for their loved ones who were away at war. The 1949 John Wayne film *She Wore a Yellow Ribbon* reflects the theme of remembering someone who is away. To signify identification and status as commander in chief of the Armed Forces, President Bush wore combat clothing when he visited troops on the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln on Thanksgiving Day 2003, and President Obama wore a bomber jacket when he spoke to the troops at Bagram Air Base in Kabul on March 28, 2010. Posters have become very common in the Middle East and Latin American protest meetings. In Syria, both the Assad government and the opposition supporters have used multiple posters, which can be seen on various websites.

As we have seen, digital technology enables images to be sent to television, newspapers, and the Internet instantly. Photographs are easily doctored, making it difficult to tell what is real and what is not. A video of a man and his 12-year-old son, Mohammed al-Dura, cowered behind a concrete structure in the Gaza strip while Israeli soldiers and Palestinian fighters engaged in gun battle, was widely circulated in September 2000. The boy appeared to be killed and the father wounded in the crossfire. A clip of the boy's death was widely circulated on television worldwide, and stills appeared on the front pages of newspapers. This visual became a symbol of continuing atrocities for the Palestinian intifada, causing riots to break out in the West Bank and violent outbreaks against Jews not only in Israel but also elsewhere around the world. According to an article in *Reader's Digest* ("Seeing Isn't Believing," 2004), there were many indications that the video was staged.

There have been numerous accounts of incorrect images in Western media of the ongoing (2012–2017) Syrian conflict. The BBC used a 9-year-old photograph of hundreds of dead Iraqi children who were said to have been killed in a 2012 government massacre in Houla, Syria (Watson, 2012). In another instance, the *New York Times*, relying on a video released from Tremseh, Syria, reported that hundreds of people had been killed by the Assad government troops. After United Nations investigators went to Tremseh, they found that the death toll was much smaller, perhaps 40–100, and that most of the dead were opposition rebels who had fought against the Syrian Army. It turned out that it was a propaganda video from the rebel fighters (Gopal, 2012). The Syrian sectarian conflict has witnessed gruesome atrocities on both sides, and the

graphic images have been shown on YouTube and other Internet sites for propaganda purposes (Baker, 2013).

As the dangerous eating disorder anorexia nervosa reaches epidemic proportions among young girls and women, hundreds of pro-anorexia websites keep appearing on the Internet. These websites, which appear to be put up by young anorexic females and friends, offer advice on dieting tips for drastic weight loss, strategies to trick parents into believing that their daughters are eating, and praise on behalf of extreme thinness. Visual propaganda on these *Pro-Ana* (anorexia is personified as “My friend Ana”) websites features photographs of famous models and movie stars that have been altered to make them appear even thinner than they actually are. Photographs of extremely obese women are also shown to trigger extreme fasting.

There is nothing new about propagandists exploiting the media to get their visual messages across, for historical propagandists did so as well to shape perceptions. In 1914, Mary Richardson went into the National Gallery in London and slashed a painting, *The Rokeby Venus*, a 1650 masterpiece by Diego Velasquez. At her trial, she said her motive had been to draw attention to the treatment of the suffragette leader Emmeline Pankhurst, who was on a hunger strike in prison. Toby Clark (1997) said,

The attack on the painting would have been partly understood as an extension of the suffragettes’ tactic of smashing department store windows, which assaulted feminized spaces of consumerism like a parodic inversion of shopping. By moving the battle to the nation’s foremost art museum, Richardson brought the values of the state’s guardians of culture into the line of fire, and by choosing a famous picture of a nude woman, she targeted the point of intersection between institutional power and the representation of femininity. . . . Richardson had not destroyed the picture, but altered it, making a new image—the slashed Venus—which was widely reproduced in photographs in the national press, as Richardson had surely anticipated. Though the newspapers’ response was hostile, demonizing “Slasher Mary” as a monstrous hysteric, Richardson had succeeded in using the mass media to disseminate “her” picture of a wounded heroine, in effect a metaphorical portrait of the martyred Pankhurst and of the suffering of women in general. (pp. 28–29)

As perceptions are shaped, *cognitions may be manipulated*. One way that cognitions or beliefs are formed is through a person’s trust in his or her own senses (Bem, 1970). Certainly, an attitude is a cognitive or affective reaction to an idea or object, based on one’s perceptions. Of course, once a belief or an attitude is formed, a person’s perceptions are influenced by it. This does not happen in a vacuum. The formation of cognitions and attitudes is a complex process related to cultural and personal values and emotions.

Manipulation means to manage, control, and handle to one’s own advantage. Although the word suggests something negative, manipulation can have positive results. For example, a parent may manipulate a teenager by cutting off an allowance or use of the family car if the child does not get good grades in school. The Voice of

America (VOA) during World War II had a stated directive to manipulate the cognitions of both the enemy and America's allies. It was to "spread the contagion of fear among our enemies but also to spread the contagion of hope, confidence and determination among our friends" (Shulman, 1997, p. 97).

There were many heroes among the troops fighting in the second Iraq war, but the story of Private Jessica Lynch received nonstop coverage in the media. One story in the *Washington Post* (Baker, 2003), whose headlines claimed, "She Was Fighting to the Death," manipulated a public cognition that the 19-year-old supply clerk had fought fiercely against her Iraqi attackers but was riddled with bullet and knife wounds. As a prisoner of war, the papers said she was abused and finally rescued in a daring night raid. A revised story (Priest, Booth, & Schmidt, 2003), with the headline "A Broken Body, a Broken Story, Pieced Together," disclosed that Lynch had not been shot or stabbed but that a Humvee accident shattered her bones. Her rifle jammed, thus she never fired, and her captors were gone before she was rescued. As Ellen Goodman wrote in her column titled "Jessica Lynch a Human, Not Symbolic, Hero" (2003), "By making Jessica into a cartoon hero, we may have missed the bravery of the young soldier. . . . Jessica Lynch has now become a redefining story of the war, with skeptics asking whether the Pentagon spun the media or the media hyped the story" (p. B4). Whether it was the Pentagon or media hype, the public's cognitions were manipulated.

After a devastating cyclone that killed 60,000 people in Myanmar (formerly Burma) on May 3, 2008, 1.5 million people faced disease and starvation. When the United Nations World Food Program delivered airplanes full of aid, relief workers were barred entry into the country. Instead, members of the military, including Senior General Than Shwe, handed out the donated food and medicine from boxes that had the generals' names written on them. A referendum to solidify the ruling junta's power was held as scheduled. Because the people believed that the aid had come from the generals, they were inclined to have positive attitudes toward them (Associated Press, 2008). Beliefs and attitudes are discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

Often, the *direction of a specific behavior* is the intent of a propaganda effort. During war, one desired behavior is defection of enemy troops. In the 1991 Gulf War, the U.S. Fourth Psychological Operations Group dropped 29 million leaflets on Iraqi forces to attract defectors. A U.S. radio program, *Voice of the Gulf*, featured testimonials from happy Iraqi prisoners of war, along with prayers from the Koran and the location of the bomb targets for the next day. Seventy-five percent of Iraqi defectors said they were influenced by the leaflets and the radio broadcasts ("A Psy-Ops Bonanza," 1991). The same tactic was used in the 2003 Iraq war when leaflets that said, "Do Not Risk Your Life and the Lives of Your Comrades. Leave Now and Go Home. Watch Your Children Learn, Grow and Prosper" were dropped on Iraqi military forces. At the beginning of the 2001 war on the Taliban, U.S. military radio broadcasts into Afghanistan by Air Force EC-130E Commando Solo aircraft warned the Taliban in two of the local Afghan languages that they would be destroyed not only by U.S. bombs and missiles but also by American helicopters and ground troops:

Our helicopters will rain fire down upon your camps before you detect them on radar. . . . Our bombs are so accurate we can drop them right through your

windows. Our infantry is trained for any climate and terrain on earth. United States soldiers fire with superior marksmanship and are armed with superior weapons.

This tactic to frighten the enemy was successful in directing a specific behavior, for Rear Admiral John Stufflebeem, deputy director of operations for the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, said, “I have not seen any reports that they are returning fire on our aircraft” (Associated Press, 2001).

Al Qaeda websites not only attempt to recruit people to the jihad, but they also provide behavioral instructions for making bombs and how to use them. A month before the Boston Marathon attack in 2013, “the Al Qaeda branch in Yemen posted on the Web the ‘Lone Mujahid Pocketbook,’ a compilation of all the do-it-yourself articles with jaunty English text, high-quality graphics and teen-friendly shorthand, . . . [stating], ‘There’s no need to travel abroad, because the frontline has come to you.’” The Boston attack seems to have followed the tips. “The pressurized cooker should be placed in crowded areas and left to blow up,” the manual says. “More than one of these could be planted to explode at the same time” (Shane, 2013, p. 2). Dzhokhar Tsarnaev told FBI investigators that he and his brother Tamerlan followed the script to make the bombs that killed three people and injured scores of others at the finish line of the Boston Marathon. Tamerlan downloaded the summer 2010 issue of *Inspire*, an online magazine published by Al Qaeda, that gave detailed instructions on how to make bombs from pressure cookers, explosive powder, and shrapnel. He also downloaded extremist Muslim literature that advocates “violence designed to terrorize the perceived enemies of Islam” (Associated Press, 2013b, p. A3). It appeared that the Tsarnaev brothers were “radicalized and instructed in explosives not at a training camp but at home on the Internet” (Shane, 2013, p. 2). Thus a specific behavior was the result of a propaganda effort. The desired response furthered the intent of Al Qaeda because of the spectacular media impact that followed.

Beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors are desirable end states for propagandistic purposes and determine the formation of a propaganda message, campaign, or both. Because so many factors determine the formation of beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors, the propagandist has to gather a great deal of information about the intended audience.

Achieve a Response. To continue with the definition, propaganda seeks to *achieve a response*, a specific reaction or action from an audience *that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist*. These last words are the key to the definition of propaganda, for the one who benefits from the audience’s response, if the response is the desired one, is the propagandist and not necessarily the members of the audience. People in the audience may think the propagandist has their interests at heart, but in fact, the propagandist’s motives are selfish ones. Selfish motives are not necessarily negative, and judgment depends on which ideology one supports. For example, people who listened to the VOA broadcasts behind the Iron Curtain during the Cold War found satisfaction for their hunger for information, and thus it appeared that VOA had altruistic motives. The information they received from VOA, however, was ideologically injected to shape positive perceptions about the United States and its allies and

to manipulate attitudes toward democracy, capitalism, and freedom. Most Americans would not regard these practices as negative, but the Communist government officials did. Today the VOA reaches 236.6 million international listeners with news and information in 47 languages, which is the highest number ever recorded to date (Bennet, 2017, p. 62). Later in this chapter, in the section on subpropaganda, we give examples of seemingly altruistic communication that was deliberately designed to facilitate acceptance of an ideology.

Propaganda and the Containment of Information

When conflict exists and security is required, it is not unusual for propagandists to try to contain information and responses to it in a specific area. Recipients of propaganda messages are discouraged from asking about anything outside the contained area. During wartime, members of the press complain about restrictions placed on them in reporting the events of the war. Newspaper reporters covering the Civil War complained in the 1860s, as journalists did during the Gulf War in 1991. Tom Wicker (1991), of the *New York Times*, wrote, “The Bush administration and the military were so successful in controlling information about the war that they were able to tell the public just about what they wanted the public to know. Perhaps worse, press and public largely acquiesced in this disclosure of only selected information” (p. 96). Complaints regarding information control during wartime are not unusual. Consider the saying “The first casualty during war is truth.” Two journalists in Nigeria were detained after publishing a story about an attempt by the nation’s president to disrupt opposition parties. “Journalists have been threatened, killed, beaten by thugs or succumbed to the enticement of bribes to color the stories they write” (“Paper: Police Detain Reporters Over Story,” 2013).

Although contemporary technology is capable of instantaneous transmission of messages around the world via the Internet and because of the tremendous expansion of exposure to all the mass media throughout the world, it is difficult for a country to isolate its citizens from ideas and information that are commonly known in the rest of the world. Despite the availability of the Internet, smartphones, computers, tablets, and other digital devices, China has attempted to prevent people from receiving information. Chinese censorship, known as “The Great Firewall,” a “vast digital barricade that prevented Chinese users from seeing newspaper stories critical of China’s leaders or reports from human rights groups” (Osnos, 2014, p. 30), reveals how the communist government in Beijing has intensified its efforts to control what its citizens can read and discuss online. Popular Internet cafes are forced to use only official software, Red Flag Linux, which eliminates the English language on websites. Furthermore, computer users at Internet cafes are required by the China State Council Information Office, which supervises the Internet in China, to register with their actual names and numbers as they appear on their identification cards. In regions where there is antigovernment unrest, censors have cut off Internet service to places like the Xinjiang region after there were deadly clashes between ethnic Uighurs and Han in 2009 (Ansfield, 2009; Radio Free Asia, 2008). As of February 2018, VPN services used to bypass state-imposed censorship will be blocked (*Time*, 2017, July 24, p. 12). President Xi declared

that China's media "must work for the party's will . . . and protect the party's authority and unity" (Wong, 2016, p. 2). He also ruled that foreign media companies must be prevented from publishing and distributing content online in China. Control over television broadcasts and online content are also censored. Subjects that are prohibited are depictions of gay relationships, underage romance, extramarital affairs, smoking, witchcraft, and reincarnation (Qin, 2016, p. 1).

The vast search engine Google had been a presence in China, abiding by government censorship policies until March 22, 2010, thus revealing to the world that China had demanded that Google censor Web content such as the pro-democracy movement, persecution, the 1989 crackdown on students in Tiananmen Square, the banned spiritual sect Falun Gong, and Tibetan independence. In negotiations, Google executives asked to operate as an uncensored search engine in China, and they were rejected. Google moved its operations to Hong Kong, where its mainland users were blocked by the government when searches involved forbidden subjects. Hong Kong users could still see uncensored results (Nakashima, Kang, & Pomfret, 2010; Pomfret, 2010). In 2014, access to Gmail was blocked (Associated Press, 2014).

A shocking form of Chinese suppression of information occurred when Liu Xiaobo, a Chinese advocate for democracy who was imprisoned for subversion in 2008, was awarded the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize. Nothing about it appeared in Chinese-language state media or on the country's Internet portals. CNN broadcasts, which reach only luxury compounds and hotels in China, were blacked out. Mobile phone users could not transmit text messages containing his name (Jacobs & Ansfield, 2010). In June 2017, it was revealed that Liu, then 61 years old, had cancer. He was transferred under custody to a state hospital where he died a month later, still captive under guard.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has a vast system of propaganda. The agenda for the CCP's Central Propaganda Department (CPD) includes the following: "theoretical work; the news media; political thought work; managing literary and art circles; establishing moral standards; and the construction of a 'spiritual civilization'—a euphemism for the new era's soft propaganda and soft social control" (Brady & Wang, 2009, p. 773). The CPD controls 2,000 newspapers, 8,000 magazines, every film and television program, and every textbook. Publishing companies must have licenses, thus they can be controlled by the General Administration of Press and Publishing, which has the power to determine how many books each publisher can sell every year. Permission must be granted by the CPD for cultural activities to be organized, causing entertainment, such as the Chinese New Year celebrations, to be a key vehicle for propaganda. The CPD oversees museums, amusement parks, libraries, theaters, exhibits, video games, hobby societies, art groups, and, of course, the Internet. The CPD has veto power over scholarly research and can silence professors (Osnos, 2014, pp. 117–119). Propaganda is so pervasive that there is a propaganda officer for every 100 Chinese citizens. Television has become the main tool for communicating party messages to the masses and the Internet for communicating with youth (Brady & Wang, 2009, pp. 776–784).

Television transmission has crossed political boundaries to halt containment of information. As communist governments toppled in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany, and Romania in 1989, the world saw dramatic evidence that

propaganda cannot be contained for long where television exists. People living under the austere regime of East Germany received television from West Germany and saw consumer goods that were easily had and a lifestyle that was abundant rather than austere. Also, the technology of the portable video camera enabled amateurs to capture and display footage of the Czech police on the rampage, the massacre of Georgian demonstrators in Tbilisi, and the bloodbath in Tiananmen Square. When a communist government controlled Czechoslovakia, rebellious protesters produced the “Video Journal” on home video cameras and sent it into Czech homes via rented satellite dishes. In Poland, Lech Walesa said that the underground Solidarity movement could not have succeeded without video. In Romania, while the crowds protested against Nicolae Ceausescu, the television showed fear and doubt in his eyes and encouraged people to continue to fight against his regime despite his army’s violence. Ironically, the center of the intense fighting between the army and Ceausescu’s loyalists was the Bucharest television station. For a time, the new government was in residence there, making the television station the epicenter of the revolution and the seat of the provisional government.

Propaganda itself, as a form of communication, is influenced by the technological devices for sending messages that are available in a given time. As technology advances, propagandists have more sophisticated tools at their service. ABC’s *Nightline* reported in December 1991 the first recorded use of a fax machine for propaganda purposes. Leaflets describing how to prepare for a chemical warfare assault, presumably sent by the Hussein propagandists, came through thousands of Kuwaiti fax machines. The Global Jihadist Movement has given propaganda communication through the Internet a central role in its attempts to realize its goals. Manuel Torres, Javier Jordan, and Nicola Horsburgh (2006) analyzed the thematic content, both narrative and visual, on jihadist websites where material targeted both Muslims and non-Muslims, mixing objectives to intimidate some and mobilize others: “threat of new attacks; blackmail on the taking of hostages; commentary on current affairs; religious-political discourse; assassination of hostages; mobilization of new mujahedin; denial of responsibility for attacks; and re-vindication of an attack” (p. 404). In addition to recruiting new members and raising funds, the websites also offer sympathizers of the Islamic State (ISIS or ISIL) a form of “surrogate activism,” enabling them to defend terrorism and engage in cyberterrorism (Soriano, 2012, p. 782).

Cyberterrorism generally means “unlawful attacks and threats of attack against computers, networks, and the information stored therein when done to intimidate or coerce a government or its people in furtherance of political or social objectives” (Ogun, 2012, p. 209). Cyberterrorism is a form of propaganda because it operates within a specific ideological agenda supported by organized funding. Individual hackers may be paid to carry out attacks on behalf of the terrorist organization. Cyberterrorists use the term “hacktivism” to describe defacing the site of an enemy for a political cause (Warren, 2008, p. 43). Cyberterrorism, according to Warren (2008), “offers the opportunity of making an ideological point to a wider population while ensuring that no immediate long-term damage is caused which would cloud the issue” (p. 48). For example, a return to services that existed prior to the cyberattack would happen if demands were met.

Unlawful attacks on the Internet have become known as Cyber War. The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence has created the *Tallinn Manual*, which applies the practice of international law to the world of electronic warfare to show how hospitals, civilians, and neutral nations can be protected from cyberterrorism. The manual takes existing rules of battlefield behavior, such as the 1949 Geneva Convention, to the Internet and includes humanitarian rules (Associated Press, 2013a). This, however, has not prevented extensive hacking of medical records.

Another use of the Internet for propaganda purposes is steganography (“covered writing”), which is “the process of hiding information that can be used to embed propaganda messages in digital files” (Warkentin, Schmidt, & Bekkering, 2008, p. 50). This is a way to disguise communications between or among others, resulting in facilitated communications among terrorists. It is theorized that ISIS “uses porn sites to hide their messages because porn sites are so prevalent and because they are among the last places Muslims would be expected to visit” (Warkentin et al., 2008, p. 52). Encryption technology is used by surveillance agencies in governments to uncover hidden messages, but it is resource intensive, if not impossible because of the very nature of the Internet. By some estimates, there will be trillions of files transmitted each year over the Internet (Warkentin et al., 2008, p. 52).

New technologies have also been a boon to protesters, resulting in cyber duels between autocratic governments and dissidents. According to Navtej Dhillon, an analyst with the Brookings Institution, “The Internet has certainly broken 30 years of state control over what is seen and is unseen, what is visible versus invisible” (Stelter & Stone, 2009, p. 1).

Young people have increasingly used the Internet to mobilize politically. Text messaging was used to rally supporters in a popular political uprising in Ukraine in 2004; protesters in Moldova used text messaging, Facebook, and Twitter to rally supporters to protest against the communist leadership in 2009; protesters in the Arab Spring countries in 2010–2013 used smartphone messages to rally and recruit supporters. Text messages threatened activists in Belarus in 2006. When Myanmar sought to silence demonstrators in 2007, it switched off the country’s Internet for six weeks. China’s government has tried hard over the years to obliterate the memory of the huge student-led protest in Tiananmen Square that captivated the world on June 4, 1989. China blocked sites like YouTube to coincide with the 20th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre. Chen Guang, who was 17 in 1989, had been a soldier who was told to fire on the students. Twenty years later, he made a painting of the event. When Chinese galleries refused to exhibit his painting, he posted it on the Internet, but it was removed within hours (E. Barry, 2009; Stelter & Stone, 2009).

As in pre-Internet conflicts, the communication media serve both supporters and the enemy. Although the technology has changed, propaganda strategies tend to be similar in many ways. The study of contemporary propaganda in both oppressed and free societies is a complex endeavor. We acknowledge that one’s perception of a form of communication determines what is self-evident and what is controversial. One person’s propaganda may be another person’s education. In our definition, the elements of deliberate intent and manipulation, along with a systematic plan to achieve a purpose that is advantageous to the propagandist, however, distinguish propaganda from a free and open exchange of ideas.

FORMS OF PROPAGANDA

Although propaganda takes many forms, it is almost always in some form of activated ideology. Sometimes propaganda is *agitative*, attempting to rouse an audience to certain ends and usually resulting in significant change; sometimes it is *integrative*, attempting to render an audience passive, accepting, and nonchallenging (Szanto, 1978, p. 10). Propaganda is also described as white, gray, or black, in relationship to an acknowledgment of its source and its accuracy of information. This distinction comes from the Psychological Warfare Division (PWD) of the Allied Forces in 1944 (Sproule, 1997, p. 192).

White propaganda comes from a source that is identified correctly, and the information in the message tends to be accurate. This is what one hears on Radio Moscow and VOA during peacetime. Although what listeners hear is reasonably close to the truth, it is presented in a manner that attempts to convince the audience that the sender is the “good guy” with the best ideas and political ideology. White propaganda attempts to build credibility with the audience, for this could have usefulness at some point in the future.

National celebrations, with their overt patriotism and regional chauvinism, can usually be classified as white propaganda. International sports competitions also inspire white propaganda from journalists. The 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing, China, had over 200 nations represented, but in addition to the events themselves, American television networks primarily focused on biographical profiles of American athletes, especially champion swimmer Michael Phelps. The same thing happened during the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver, British Columbia, but only this time the cameras focused on skiers Lindsey Vonn and Bode Miller and speed skater Apolo Ohno. In its pro-American coverage, with its prepackaged biographies, the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) anchors kept referring to “Team USA.” Even though they were instructed not to use pronouns like “we” and “our,” with reference to American athletes, in their enthusiasm, they did so. In Russia, after figure skater Yevgeny Plushenko lost the gold medal to American Evan Lysacek, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said, with disdain, that Plushenko was still the champion. One has to ask whether television viewers watch the Olympics out of national pride or interest in international athletics. Sports anchors continued with “Team USA” in the 2012 Olympics in London and dubbed Michael Phelps the “King of the Games” when he won four more gold medals and two silver medals. Much was made of the United States having the most medals (104) with China second (87). China had been first in medals in 2008. Overt nationalism continued in 2016 at the Rio de Janeiro Olympics. When Michael Phelps lost the 100-meter butterfly swim to Joseph Schooling of Singapore, NBC interviewed Phelps afterward but not Schooling. Simone Manuel of the United States and Penny Oleksiak of Canada tied for the gold medal in the 100-meter freestyle swim, but the follow-up interview was with Manuel, who was the first African American woman to win an individual swimming event. NBC did not interview Oleksiak. Greg Hughes, spokesperson for NBC Sports said, “The American audience wants to hear from U.S. athletes” (Sandomir, 2016, p. 2). This was all white propaganda because it was correct, but it emphasized American Olympic superiority.

Andrew Billings (2008) examined six Olympic telecasts from 1996 to 2006 and found that “sportscasters treat US athletes in a particular way that is significantly different from the treatment of non-US athletes” (p. 102). Overall, he found that 41% to 44% of NBC’s coverage was on American athletes. He drew the conclusion that excessive nationalism is driven by television ratings and advertising rates. This kind of white propaganda is also common in Olympic telecasts in other nations as well.

The NBC broadcast of the 2018 Olympics in PyeongChang, South Korea, emphasized American athletes not only with many biographical sketches but also with advertisements featuring athletes like Lindsey Vonn and Shaun White. However, the commentators emphasized the dazzling performances of Russian figure skater Alina Zagitova and Japanese figure skater Yuzuru Hanyu. They also marveled at Alpine skier and snowboarder Ester Ledecká from the Czech Republic. This was not only good television journalism, but it was also a shared recognition of their performances.

Black propaganda is when the source is concealed or credited to a false authority and spreads lies, fabrications, and deceptions. Black propaganda is the “big lie,” including all types of creative deceit. Joseph Goebbels, Adolf Hitler’s propaganda minister, claimed that outrageous charges evoke more belief than milder statements that merely twist the truth slightly (Bogart, 1995, p. xii). Written by Czar Nicholas II’s secret police in 1903, *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* portrayed Jews as demonic schemers. The 24 chapters or protocols claimed to be the real minutes of a secret council of Jews discussing its plot for world domination. First serialized in part in a Russian newspaper, the *Protocols* were released publicly in 1905 at a time when, as part of a propaganda campaign, Russia sought to incite anti-Semitism. They were also used in Russia during the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 to encourage widespread slaughter of Jews and were circulated widely by conspiracy theorists even after they were exposed as a forgery in 1921. Hitler cited the *Protocols* in *Mein Kampf*, and they permeated Nazi propaganda. In recent times, they were printed in Pakistan, put on the Web in Palestine, shown on Arab TV as a miniseries in Egypt in 2002 and Lebanon in 2003, and cited by neo-Nazis in the United States and Europe.

During World War II, prior to Hitler’s planned invasion of Britain, a radio station known as “The New English Broadcasting Station,” supposedly run by discontented British subjects, ran half-hour programs throughout the day, opening with “Loch Lomond” and closing with “God Save the King.” The station’s programming consisted of “war news.” This was actually a German undercover operation determined to reduce the morale of the British people throughout the Battle of Britain. The same technique was used on the French soldiers serving on the Maginot Line from the autumn of 1939 until the spring of 1940. Radio broadcasts originating from Stuttgart and hosted by Paul Ferdonnet, a turncoat Frenchman who pretended to be a patriot, warned the French soldiers to save France before the Nazis took it over. The French soldiers heard Ferdonnet sympathize with their discomfort in crowded and damp conditions in barrack tunnels, and they enjoyed the latest gossip about Paris. He then went on to tell them that French officers had dined at a famous restaurant in Paris, where they ate delicious six-course lunches (Roetter, 1974, p. 3). He also described British soldiers in French towns. Because they earned higher pay than their French counterparts, he said they spent a lot of money and made love to French women. He also said the French

soldiers were dupes to fight England's war and urged them to support a "new" government for France. The French soldiers were already miserable because of the conditions on the Maginot Line, and they resented the differences in pay between themselves and the British soldiers. Ferdonnet's broadcasts, though designed to weaken the French soldiers' morale, provided entertainment but not thoughts of defection. Perhaps the French soldiers were not deceived because they also received obvious Nazi propaganda in the form of pornographic cartoons showing British soldiers fondling naked French women. Huge billboards were set up within their view that said, "SOLDIERS OF THE NORTHERN PROVINCES, LICENTIOUS BRITISH SOLDIERY ARE SLEEPING WITH YOUR WIVES AND RAPING YOUR DAUGHTERS." The French soldiers put up their own sign that said, "WE DON'T GIVE A BUGGER, WE'RE FROM THE SOUTH" (Costello, 1985, pp. 242–243). The French soldiers listened to Ferdonnet because they knew he would be more entertaining than their own official radio broadcasts (O'Donnell & Jowett, 1989, p. 51).

One of the most dramatic examples of black propaganda was known as "The Ghost Army," a field deception unit devised in 1944 to deceive the Germans in World War II into believing that the Allied Forces were in various places in Europe from Normandy to the Rhine. Eleven hundred American men, many of them artists, craftsmen, and designers, landed in France with truckloads of inflatable rubber tanks, rubber airplanes, and artillery guns, sound effect records, and radio interception devices. They made phony tank tracks and placed rubber artillery shells on the ground for German reconnaissance planes to see. They used sound trucks to make it sound like much equipment and a tank battalion were coming in to certain areas. Germans opened fire on rubber tanks and were fooled into planning attacks where there were no armed forces. The Ghost Army staged more than 20 deception operations in France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Germany, each one requiring that they impersonate a different U.S. unit, often using different multimedia and fake equipment. This elaborate deception saved many Allied lives because they tricked the Germans into going to false battle sites. General Dwight D. Eisenhower said that deception is a potent weapon because of surprise and duplicity. The Ghost Army was kept a secret for nearly 50 years because during the Cold War the U.S. thought there would be a war with the Soviet Union and did not want them to know how their deception had worked ("The Ghost Army," 2013).

Even allies target friendly nations with black propaganda. British intelligence operations attempted to manipulate the United States to go to war in the two years before Pearl Harbor was attacked by the Japanese. British Security Coordination (BSC) established itself in New York City's Rockefeller Center for covert action techniques. They wrote stories that were fed to the *New York Herald Tribune* about Nazi spies in America and infiltrated WRUL, a radio station in New York. BSC subsidized the radio station and furnished it with material for news bulletins and specially prepared scripts for talks and commentaries. One example was a propaganda campaign by the British to deter Spain from entering the war on Germany's side. Because the radio station had an ethics standard and a rule against broadcasting material that had not appeared in the American press, the BSC inserted its own material into friendly newspapers and then quoted it for radio broadcasts. BSC also conducted a campaign

against German-controlled corporations in the United States by placing articles in newspapers and magazines, organizing protest meetings, and bringing picket lines to certain properties belonging to I. G. Farben Corporation. The British activities were discovered after the bombing of Pearl Harbor when the U.S. State Department pronounced that “British intelligence operations in America were out of control and demanded that offensive covert operations end” (Ignatius, 1989, pp. 9–11).

Black propaganda includes all types of creative deceit, and this type of propaganda gets the most attention when it is revealed. The exhibit “Fake? The Art of Deception” was featured in the British Museum in 1990 and included among the art forgeries several examples of propaganda. One type of forgery was the postage stamp (see Figures 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3). Both British and German versions were displayed, and the exhibition catalogue reported that 160 different stamps were produced by both sides during the two World Wars (M. Jones, 1990, p. 75).

The success or failure of black propaganda depends on the receiver’s willingness to accept the credibility of the source and the content of the message. Care has to be taken to place the sources and messages within a social, cultural, and political framework of the target audience. If the sender misunderstands the audience and therefore designs a message that does not fit, black propaganda may appear suspicious and tends to fail.

FIGURE 1.1 ■ A German “black” parody of a British stamp, c. 1944. Note how the traditional crown has been replaced with a Star of David at the very top of the stamp.



FIGURE 1.2 ■ In this “black” parody, c. 1944, the Germans used the image of the Russian leader Stalin in place of the traditional image of Queen Elizabeth. Other political symbols visible on this stamp include the Star of David and the Hammer and Sickle. The function of such parody stamps was more to create a symbolic awareness of the political association between the USSR and Britain than to undermine the economy of the postal system.



Source: Produced by German Government as Propaganda Counterfeit, 1944 (Photograph of originals).

FIGURE 1.3 ■ The “battle of the stamps” continued with this British “black” parody of a German stamp. The meaning of the iconography is obvious. Here again, this stamp was probably more effective as anti-Nazi propaganda in Britain than in Germany itself.



Source: Produced by US Government as a Propaganda Counterfeit in Second World War, circa 1942.

Gray propaganda is somewhere between white and black propaganda. The source may or may not be correctly identified, and the accuracy of the information is uncertain. In 1961, when the Bay of Pigs invasion took place in Cuba, the VOA moved over into the gray area when it denied any U.S. involvement in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)-backed activities. In 1966–1967, Radio Free Europe was organized, financed, and controlled by the CIA, which publicly denied any connection. A fund appeal on American television, radio, and mail indicated that Radio Free Europe was dependent on voluntary contributions, known as “truth dollars.” The actual purpose of the appeal was to fortify the deception and dispel rumors about a CIA relationship (Barnouw, 1978, p. 143). Gray propaganda is also used to embarrass an enemy or competitor. Radio Moscow took advantage of the assassinations of Martin Luther King Jr. and John F. Kennedy to derogate the United States. VOA did not miss the opportunity to offer similar commentaries about Russia’s arrests of Jewish dissidents. In June 2013, after Edward Snowden, a former National Security Agency contractor, leaked details of a U.S. government secret surveillance program, China’s state-run media reveled in the opportunity to embarrass the United States by hailing Snowden as a hero (Greene, 2013).

It has long been a practice to plant favorable stories about the United States in foreign newspapers. The practice has been sanctioned by the U.S. Department of Defense. This was confirmed by an unclassified summary of the policy released by the Associated Press: “Psychological operations are a central part of information operations and contribute to achieving . . . the commander’s objectives. They are aimed at conveying selected, truthful information to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, reasoning, and ultimately, the behavior of governments and other entities” (“Pentagon Propaganda Program Within the Law,” 2006).

Planting stories is not only practiced by governments, for private organizations do it as well. There is a growing use of video news releases (VNRs) inserted in television news programs. The practice began in the 1980s, when promotional videos were sent to selected television stations for possible inclusion in the evening news. This is gray propaganda because the true source is hidden and legitimized by the news station as the source. Today, VNRs have become a slick public relations tool as sophisticated, high-quality video content formatted to the needs of local newsrooms. VNRs can be downloaded online, and studies reveal that they are widely used in selected segments or in their entirety. Major networks tend to identify them as “This Is a Video News Release.” Federal Communications Commission regulations require news stations to reveal the source of a VNR only when it is about a political or controversial issue or when a station is paid to use it. VNRs also appear as a form of marketing communication for viewing on cell phones and other devices (Pavlik, 2006). Not only do corporate sponsors, whose identity is usually concealed, insert news releases, they also can censor news reports that may discredit them or their products (Collison, 2004).

Parry-Giles (1996), by reviewing internal documents of the Truman and Eisenhower presidencies, revealed how the U.S. government used the domestic news media to propagandize the American public during the Cold War by giving journalists the texts to be published in the newspapers in the 1940s and 1950s. By controlling the content and favoring journalists who cooperated, the government covertly

disseminated propaganda to a domestic audience. This example of gray propaganda expands the definition to include, according to Parry-Giles, the attribution of the source to a nonhostile source (p. 53). An example of gray propaganda coming from a nonhostile source is as follows: Letters describing the successes of rebuilding Iraq, presumably written by American soldiers in Iraq in 2003, appeared in newspapers across the United States. A Gannett News Service (GNS) search found identical letters in 11 newspapers, and thus they appeared to be form letters. Six soldiers, whose names appeared on the letters, were questioned by GNS, and they denied having written them. A seventh soldier did not know about the letter bearing his name until his father congratulated him for getting it published in his hometown newspaper. All of the interviewed soldiers said they agreed with the information in the letters even though they did not write them. The actual source has not been uncovered. This is clearly gray propaganda with acceptable information attributed to a nonhostile source that was not the actual source.

Gray propaganda is widespread. Companies that distort statistics on annual reports, advertising that suggests a product will achieve results that it cannot, films that are made solely for product placement, and prominent charities that raise money for research but use it for administrative costs all tend to fall in the gray propaganda category.

Another term used to describe propaganda is *disinformation*. Disinformation is usually considered black propaganda because it is covert and uses false information. In fact, the word *disinformation* is a cognate for the Russian *dezinformatsia*, taken from the name of a division of the KGB devoted to black propaganda.

Disinformation means “false, incomplete, or misleading information that is passed, fed, or confirmed to a targeted individual, group, or country” (Shultz & Godson, 1984, p. 41). It is not misinformation that is merely misguided or erroneous information. Disinformation is made up of news stories deliberately designed to weaken adversaries and planted in newspapers by journalists who are actually secret agents of a foreign country. The stories are passed off as real and from credible sources.

Ladislav Bittmann, former deputy chief of the Disinformation Department of the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service, in testimony before the House Committee on Intelligence of the U.S. Congress in February 1980, said,

If somebody had at this moment the magic key that would open the Soviet bloc intelligence safes and looked into the files of secret agents operating in Western countries, he would be surprised. A relatively high percentage of secret agents are journalists. . . . There are newspapers around the world penetrated by the Communist Intelligence services. (Brownfield, 1984, p. 6)

John Stockton, a CIA officer, wrote of disinformation used by his agency,

Propaganda experts in the CIA station in Kinshasa busily planted articles in the Kinshasa newspapers, Elimo and Salongo. These were recopied into agency cables and sent on to European, Asian, and South American stations, where they were secretly passed to recruited journalists representing news services who saw to it that many were replayed in the world press. Similarly,

the Lisaka station placed a steady flow of stories in Zambian newspapers and then relayed them to major European newspapers. (West, 2016)


Among the more sensational Soviet disinformation campaigns was one that charged the United States with developing the virus responsible for AIDS for biological warfare. The story first appeared in the October 1985 issue of the Soviet weekly *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, and it quoted the *Patriot*, a pro-Soviet newspaper in India. Although it was a Soviet tactic to place a story in a foreign newspaper to give it credibility, this time no such story had appeared in India. Despite denials by the U.S. Department of State, the story appeared in the news media of more than 60 countries, including Zimbabwe, while the nonaligned countries were having a conference there and in the October 26, 1986, issue of London's *Sunday Express* after *Express* reporters interviewed two people from East Berlin who repeated the story. Subtle variations continued to appear in the world press, including an East German broadcast of the story into Turkey that suggested it might be wise to get rid of U.S. bases because of servicemen infected with AIDS. On March 30, 1987, Dan Rather read the following news item on *CBS Evening News*:

A Soviet military publication claims the virus that causes AIDS leaked from a U.S. Army laboratory conducting experiments in biological warfare. The article offers no hard evidence but claims to be reporting the conclusions of unnamed scientists in the United States, Britain, and East Germany. Last October, a Soviet newspaper alleged that the AIDS virus may have been the result of Pentagon or CIA experiments. ("CBS Spreads Disinformation," 1987, p. 7)


Increasing evidence indicates that disinformation is widely practiced by most major world powers, and this reflects the reality of international politics. For a long time, the United States denied using disinformation, yet disinformation stories planted by the United States during the Cold War were about carcinogenic Soviet spy dust, Soviet sponsorship of international terrorism, and attempts by Bulgarians to assassinate the pope (Alexandre, 1988, pp. 114–115). According to Ahmed Rashid (2004), the Pakistan, Afghanistan, and central Asia correspondent for the *Far Eastern Economic Review* and the *Daily Telegraph*, "The CIA has a long record of manipulating the press and television and putting out its own interpretation of events" (p. 19).

Websites used for identity theft and software "Trojan horses" that conceal malicious functions within are Internet examples of disinformation (Rowe & Custy, 2008). Fake news stories such as one that appeared on the Internet shortly before Election Day in 2016 indicating that Hillary Clinton and her aides ran a pedophile ring in the basement of a pizza parlor are also disinformation.

As a communication process, disinformation is described according to two models we have developed (see Figures 1.4 and 1.5). In Figure 1.4, the propagandist (P) creates a *deflective source* (P_1), which becomes the apparent source of the message (M). The receiver (R) perceives the information as coming directly from P_1 and does not associate it with the original propagandist (P). In Figure 1.5, the propagandist

FIGURE 1.4 ■ Deflective source model.

Source: Reprinted by permission of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc., Westport, CT, from Victoria O'Donnell and Garth Jowett, "Propaganda as a Form of Communication," in *Propaganda: A Pluralistic Perspective* by T. J. Smith III. Copyright by T. J. Smith III and published in 1989 by Praeger Publishers.

FIGURE 1.5 ■ Legitimizing source model.

Source: Reprinted by permission of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc., Westport, CT, from Victoria O'Donnell and Garth Jowett, "Propaganda as a Form of Communication," in *Propaganda: A Pluralistic Perspective* by T. J. Smith III. Copyright by T. J. Smith III and published in 1989 by Praeger Publishers.

secretly places the original message (M_1) in a *legitimizing source* (P_2). This message (now M_2), as interpreted by P_2 , is then picked up by the propagandist (P) and communicated to the receiver (R) in the form M_3 , as having come from P_2 . This legitimates the message and at the same time dissociates the propagandist (P) from its origination. One can see in both models that the propagandist's intent is to obscure the identity of the message originator, thus creating a high degree of credibility for both message and apparent source.

A story that was widely circulated appeared first in Canada's *National Post*. Written by Iranian-American Amir Taheri, it said that Iran had passed legislation requiring Jews and other religious minorities to wear distinctive colored badges. It was then