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
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Purpose: The U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence publishes the **Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB)** quarterly under the provisions of **AR 25-30**. **MIPB** presents information designed to keep intelligence professionals informed of current and emerging developments within the field and provides an open forum in which ideas; concepts; tactics, techniques, and procedures; historical perspectives; problems and solutions, etc., can be exchanged and discussed for purposes of professional development.

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From The Editor

Beginning with this issue your unit may receive less than the number of issues originally requested. This is due to a mandated reduction in printing. Just a reminder, MIPB is now online at IKN on the open front page at <https://www.ikn.army.mil/apps/IKNWMS/Default.aspx?webId=2248>. You will find several of the most recent issues there as well. For earlier issues (2013 and earlier) please go to the MIPB site on IKN after you CAC in.

The following themes and suspenses are established for:

April-June 2015, *Intelligence Challenges*, deadline for article submissions is 27 February 2015.

July-September 2015, *Focus on the Reserve and National Guard*, deadline for submissions is 21 May 2015.

Articles from the field will always be very important to the success of MIPB as a professional bulletin. Please continue to submit them. *Even though the topic of your article may not coincide with an issue's theme do not hesitate to send it to me.* Most issues will contain theme articles as well as articles on other topics. Your thoughts and lessons learned (from the field) are invaluable.

Please call or email me with any questions regarding your article or upcoming issues.

Sterilla Smith

Editor

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Always Out Front

by Major General George J. Franz III
Commanding General
U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command



I want to thank MG Ashley and his Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (ICoE) team for dedicating this issue of their outstanding publication to the Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM).

Introduction

The U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) executes mission command of operational intelligence forces and conducts worldwide multidiscipline and all-source intelligence operations. Additionally the command delivers advanced skills training, linguist support, specialized quick reaction capabilities, and intelligence-related logistics, contracting, and communications in support of Army, Joint, and Coalition Commands and the National Intelligence Community (IC).

As INSCOM's Commanding General, my vision is that INSCOM continues to be the Army's "Force of Choice" for Dominant Intelligence in the Land and Cyberspace Domains.

To sustain this, we must continue to evolve as an organization in ways that support and nest with the emerging *Army Force 2025* and the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence's (G2) *Intelligence 2020 and Beyond*. We must shape the command to become a leaner, more agile organization, with enhanced interconnectedness across the enterprise and greater responsiveness to emerging conditions. We will continue to support global operations by providing trained and ready forces to commanders, effective intelligence "anchors," and enhanced intelligence support to cyberspace operations. We will strengthen intelligence Information Technology organizations and architecture (the Foundation Layer) to ensure an enduring capacity to support intelligence operations worldwide.

With an eye toward that end-state and mindful of the lessons learned from intelligence operations during the past decade plus of combat operations, we are pursuing a number of initiatives that we collectively call *INSCOM 2020*. Those initiatives include the following:

Enhanced Theater Intelligence Operations. INSCOM's MI Brigades(Theater) (MIB(T)) are structured to meet the geographic Combatant Command's (CCMD) land component intelligence requirements and serve as the intelligence "anchor" points for the Army's Regionally Aligned Forces

(RAF). Each MIB(T) is poised to provide a range of services in support of RAF to include an intelligence common operating picture, regional expertise, information technology integration and data services (Distributed Common Ground Station-Army (DCGS-A) and Knowledge Management), multidiscipline coordination, and Live Environment Training through the Foundry program. The MIB(T)s are provided general or direct support by the INSCOM functional brigades. Further, in response to U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Northern Command requirements, Army leadership directed INSCOM to establish two new MIB(T)s. The force design updates for these two multi-component units are nearly complete and they should reach operational status by 2015.

Support to the Readiness of the Echelons Corps and Below (ECB) MI Force. As the Army's operational-level intelligence organization, with presence in and interface with higher-level intelligence agencies, INSCOM serves as a bridge to link the Army's ECB MI formations to the expertise, capabilities, and intelligence that reside in the National and Defense ICs and their enterprise architectures. INSCOM also supports the Army Forces Command Readiness Enterprise to man, train, equip, and deploy MI Forces in support of worldwide operations. We do this through a variety of means, but primarily through support to certification training exercises, the Intelligence Readiness Operational Capability (IROC) concept and the Foundry Program.

Intelligence Support to Cyber Operations. The establishment of the 780th MI Brigade provided an Army unit dedicated to conducting computer network operations in support of the Army Cyber Command/U.S. Cyber Command. INSCOM is in the process of building the 780th MI Bde to its full operational capability. Beyond the capabilities resident in the 780th, INSCOM also has the responsibility for delivering robust, multi-disciplined intelligence support to Cyber planning and operations, as well as for supporting the development and integration of Cyberspace technologies. I see operations in the cyber domain becoming increasingly important in the future. INSCOM's capability to operate in, and provide effective intelligence support, in this domain will be essential.

Aerial Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (AISR) Brigade.

The high demand for AISR in support of global CCMD requirements caused us to seek a better way to organize and manage Army medium altitude ISR operations. We are currently organizing six battalions and their associated Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination architectures into an AISR Brigade (AIB). The AIB will posture INSCOM to more agilely provide and better sustain AISR support.

Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (PED) Center of Excellence (CoE). Faced with enduring AISR requirements to support today's global missions, we modified architectures and tactics, techniques, and procedures to execute PED of forward deployed collection from CONUS by using reach capabilities. In doing so, we have leveraged a unique synergy of communications, infrastructure, and facilities that were available at Fort Gordon, Georgia, to establish a PED CoE. The PED CoE supports not only the mission in Afghanistan, but will build-out to serve as a platform for mission command and execution of PED in support of all CCMDs and to help meet global PED requirements and promote increased interoperability throughout the Intelligence Enterprise.

The Foundation Layer. We refer to the organizations and architectures that underpin intelligence operations as the Foundation Layer. Essential to successfully "fighting," the Foundation Layer is organizing and employing as an intelligence operation. This operational framework encompasses the services, processes, networks, and systems that are the tools that intelligence professionals employ to conduct their

mission. Within this construct, our primary weapons system is the DCGS-A. As we train, deploy, and employ DCGS-A in the course of our operations, we strive to organize and emplace architectures that optimally leverage DCGS-A's capabilities (e.g., cloud-enabled ubiquitous access to data, advanced analytics, and Joint/IC interoperability.)

Army Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Command (ACHC).

In order to better integrate counterintelligence (CI) and human intelligence (HUMINT) operations, INSCOM is in the process of reorganizing its CI and HUMINT groups into a single ACHC. Unifying the mission command of these groups and consolidating elements that perform similar roles and functions will improve synchronization and streamline coordination of the Army's operational-level CI and HUMINT activities to better achieve a unity of effort that maximizes the effectiveness of Army CI and HUMINT operations in support of Army, CCMD, and IC requirements.

Conclusion

Along with the Army G2 and Military Intelligence Reserve forces, we partner with the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence to continuously improve and expand intelligence in the Land and Cyber domains. With the partnership of Army G2 and ICoE, INSCOM will continue to support global operations, strengthen the Foundation Layer, and shape the command for the future. Through these strong partnerships and teamwork, INSCOM will remain the force of choice for Dominant Intelligence in the Land and Cyberspace Domains. 

The Army Publishing Directorate has authenticated and published Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 2-01, Plan Requirements and Assess Collection, dated 19 August 2014. This publication supersedes ATTP 2-01, Planning Requirements and Assessing Collection, dated 23 April 2012.

ATP 2-01 establishes doctrine for the specific tasks under planning requirements and assessing collection. It expands on the principles in FM 3-55. ATP 2-01 should be used in conjunction with FM 3-55 and with FM 2-0. Readers should be familiar with fundamental doctrine contained in ADPs 2-0, 3-0, 5-0, and 6-0 and ADRPs 2-0, 3-0, 5-0, and 6-0.

This publication's primary audience is the intelligence and operations staffs within the Army's corps, divisions, brigade combat teams, and maneuver battalions. These staffs collaborate to develop the information collection plan. Commanders also must understand the importance of developing requirements and assessing collection as part of information collection planning and the operations process. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as a joint task force or multinational headquarters should refer joint doctrine contained in JP 2-01 or appropriate multinational doctrine. ATP 2-01 forms the foundation for instruction on planning requirements and assessing collection within the Army's educational system.

Soldiers and Department of the Army civilian personnel can access this document at https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/ATP_1.html.

CSM FORUM

by Command Sergeant Major Jeffery L. Fairley
U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence

Team,

As Senior Leaders we appreciate everything that you do day in and day out for our MI Corps out in the Force. We want to capture the experience that NCOs provide to the Generating and Operating Force and we want to maximize those skills across the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

The CG and I are requesting highly skilled and motivated professionals to volunteer to be Advanced Individual Training (AIT) Platoon Sergeants, Instructors, and Drill Sergeants. We can't promise you every weekend off, but we can promise you an opportunity to mentor and develop Initial Entry Training (IET) Soldiers coming into our Corps.

How often do you talk about your AIT Platoon Sergeant, Instructors, and Drill Sergeants when out in the force? I suspect that these professionals are brought up in discussion when Soldiers look back to their IET days. Personally, as I reflect back 30 some years ago, I recall my Drill Sergeants—SFC Buffington and SSG Carter—and the great leadership they provided.

We have tasked the Office of the Chief, MI, to ensure that AIT Platoon Sergeants, Instructors, and Drill Sergeants are properly captured in DA Pam 600-25, U.S. Army Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Guide. As many of you know, DA Pam 600-25 is the only guidance that is provided to the centralized boards. Volunteering for one of these challenging opportunities will set you apart from your peers. Additionally, you will help shape the future of the MI Corps.

I strongly encourage you to consider an assignment as an AIT Platoon Sergeant, Instructor, or Drill Sergeant in TRADOC. Contact your Professional Development NCO at HRC to volunteer for these challenging leadership positions. Your MI story started here, and you now have the opportunity to help new Soldiers start their MI story. Please visit the following website for more information: <https://www.hrc.army.mil/Enlisted/Whats%20Hot%20for%20CMF35>.

Thank you for what you do every day for this great country and for the MI Corps. Please visit my website on IKN for the latest updates concerning the Force and our Corps at <https://ikn.army.mil/apps/IKNWMS/Default.aspx?webId=2360>. 

Always Out Front!

Army Strong!



The Army Publishing Directorate has authenticated and published Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 2-33.4, Intelligence Analysis, dated 18 August 2014. This publication supersedes Training Circular 2-33.4, Intelligence Analysis, dated 1 July 2009.

ATP 2-33.4 provides information on how intelligence personnel conduct intelligence analysis in support of unified land operations. It describes approaches used to conduct intelligence analysis and describes how intelligence analysis assists commanders with understanding the complex environments in which Army forces conduct operations. This manual emphasizes the act of intelligence analysis as a collaborative networked activity. This manual complements doctrinal guidance provided in ADP 2-0 and ADRP 2-0.

ATP 2-33.4 provides direction for intelligence personnel at all echelons. The principal audience for ATP 2-33.4 is Army intelligence officers, noncommissioned officers, Soldiers, and civilians. This publication provides guidelines for the conduct of intelligence analysis to commanders and staffs of Army units and is recommended for incorporation into institutional programs of instruction and unit training. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as joint task force or multinational headquarters should also refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning the range of military operations and joint or multinational forces. Trainers and educators throughout the Army will also use this manual.

Soldiers and Department of the Army civilian personnel can access this document at https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/ATP_1.html.

Technical Perspective

Chief Warrant Officer Five Joe D. Okabayashi
U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence



Greetings to all!

It is worthwhile to consider self-development as a critical part of one's leader development. The recent updated release of AR 350-1, Army Training and Leader Development, dated 19 August 2014, speaks to this issue. The regulation states that "the self-development training domain recognizes that Army service requires continuous, life-long learning and that structured training activities in Army schools and in operational units often will not meet every individual's need for content or time."

We immediately think of reading lists when we think of self-development. Every successful leader, from the Chief of Staff of the Army to inspiring Squad and Team Leaders, has a reading list. Reading is an effective method for increasing one's knowledge and understanding of topics and issues relevant to leader development. Recall the scene in the movie, *We Were Soldiers*, in which LTC Moore, late at night after he has put his children to bed, is shown reading a history book on the French-Indochina War. This scene is a great example of a leader reading about past events relevant to his unit's upcoming mission.

That we can see in a movie the importance of reading as a part of leader development demonstrates that movies and videos can be an effective part of self-development. Think of the movies you have watched that offer lessons in leadership. Inspiring, insightful videos useful for leader development can be used on any number of topics. Think of the many TED (Technology, Entertainment, and Design) Talks that provide "ideas worth spreading." TED talks are a convenient way of gaining understanding of our world in short clips; speakers are given a maximum of 18 minutes to present their ideas in the most engaging way possible.

Self-development, alongside institutional and organizational training, is the one training domain in which the individual has greatest control over content and time committed. Self-development requires self discipline as self-development is entirely owned by the individual professional. Self-development is as engaging, enlightening, and yes, as entertaining as you want it to be. I encourage you to pursue your own self-development each day. Share with your subordinates the books, articles, movies, videos, podcasts, and tunes that have inspired, motivated, and developed you as a leader!

As always, I sincerely thank all of you who are reading this column for your selfless service and commitment to our Army and to our Nation. I also extend my most heartfelt thanks to your Family members for the sacrifices they make to support you! Our Nation is truly blessed with your service!



Always Out Front!

Army Strong!



Check out the Fort Huachuca Museum website at <http://huachucamuseum.com>

INSCOM 2020: The Army's Force of Choice for Dominant Intelligence in the Land and Cyberspace Domains



by Tom Stokowski

"INSCOM 2020" is the short title for the range of actions the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) is taking that support and correspond to the Army G2's five "*Intelligence 2020 and Beyond*" focus areas:

- ◆ Ubiquitous access to data provided by Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A).
- ◆ Relevant Intelligence to the Edge (RITE) to meet the needs of forces engaged furthest forward.
- ◆ Integrated sensors and collectors—aerial, terrestrial, cyber.
- ◆ Foundry/Intelligence Readiness Operational Capability (IROC) concept.
- ◆ Enhanced Force Structure, which fully leverages the Army MI Force.

The intent of INSCOM 2020 is to posture INSCOM to fully contribute to advancing the Army's progress in these focus areas and to better shape the command to accomplish its mission of executing mission command of operational Intelligence forces and conducting multi-discipline and all-source intelligence operations.

In addition to being guided by *Intelligence 2020 and Beyond*, INSCOM 2020 has also been heavily influenced by lessons learned from over a decade of combat operations. Mindful of these lessons, INSCOM has attempted to address them as well as to anticipate future requirements. The aim is to develop INSCOM into a leaner, more agile organization—structurally, procedurally, technologically, and intellectually—that will be better prepared to respond to emerging conditions, with enhanced interconnectedness across the enterprise.

Many of the operational lessons learned that underpin the INSCOM 2020 lines of effort were identified during the 2009-2012 time frame when INSCOM was responding to the Army Campaign Plan Decision Point #142 "Strategy to Rebalance the MI Force." MI Rebalance was oriented on optimizing Army MI Force Structure for Phase IV (Stabilize) of

the Operational Planning model and maximizing the availability of MI structure for ARFORGEN rotation.

With the publication of new defense strategic guidance in 2012, "*Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century*," U.S. National strategic emphasis began shifting away from executing prolonged Phase IV operations toward a "*Prevent, Shape, Win*" framework that requires greater capacity to meet the requirements of Phase 0 (Shape) and Phase I (Deter). Given this, Army Intelligence leaders had to reconsider *MI Rebalance*, because it relied heavily on shifting structure out of theater-level MI organizations, which provide the bulk of the geographic Combatant Commands' capacity to meet Phase 0 and Phase I requirements. While the Army stopped short of enacting the proposed *MI Rebalance* force structure changes, it prompted INSCOM to thoroughly examine its functional roles and responsibilities in support of the Army, the Combatant Commands, and the wider Department of Defense (DOD) Intelligence Community.

From 2012 onward, INSCOM's leadership redirected operational and organizational assessment efforts that had previously been guided by *MI Rebalance* and oriented them on the *Intelligence 2020 and Beyond* focus areas, as well as the higher-level guidance to which *Intelligence 2020 and Beyond* responds and supports. That guidance includes the Defense Planning Guidance, Army Strategic Planning Guidance, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's description of the Future Operating Environment, and the emerging *Army Force 2025* process.

These strategy documents present a number of ideas that drive refinement of intelligence force structure and operations. Key among them is that organizing and operating to prevent conflict is as important as structuring to win a conflict. Therefore, the Army MI Community must be prepared to support an increasing number of "conflict prevention" and "shaping the environment" missions such as building partner capacity and theater security cooperation. Regional

alignment of forces enables these types of missions by enhancing readiness and strengthening relationships with partners.

In addition, as the Army shifts away from an emphasis on the conduct of prolonged Phase IV operations, the operational MI force must be sized and optimized to support Phase 0 and I operations, while sustaining sufficient capability and capacity for decisive action. Phase 0 and I intelligence operations will be critical to prevent conflict and/or provide readiness for any contingency. Future threats will be globally networked and hybrid, combining the capabilities of conventional, terrorist, criminal, proxy, and irregular organizations and forces. Engagement activities to counter these threats will require better cultural understanding to avoid deepening conflicts. MI units and Soldiers must also be prepared to fight for information in a strategic environment that is increasingly competitive and congested. Battle for access, particularly in cyberspace, may prove to be the most important and difficult future challenge. To provide that access INSCOM must leverage technology to enable national support to the lowest level.

While the future operating environment and strategic guidance are the primary drivers for INSCOM 2020, it must also account for projected budget austerity. To deal with force size and resource limitations, INSCOM 2020 embraces Joint interoperability, multi-Service collaboration, Reserve Component (RC) integration, and Special Operations Forces-conventional force integration that leverage Sister Services, Joint, and Allied Partner capabilities. Additionally, INSCOM, to remain relevant and ready, must strive to gain greater efficiencies from existing capabilities while sustaining or improving effectiveness.

Within this context, INSCOM 2020 has progressed over the course of three INSCOM Commanders, who each adapted and adjusted its lines of effort in response to developments in strategic guidance, directives, and emerging conditions. However from the outset, several underlying tenets emerged and have remained relatively constant:

- ◆ INSCOM must provide trained and ready forces to Combatant Commands and Combat Support Agencies (includes enabling Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF)).
- ◆ A resilient INSCOM Enterprise relies on the establishment of solid geographical and functional anchor points that are positioned to provide responsive support to intelligence operations at all echelons.
- ◆ The high demand for aerial Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (A-ISR) requires increased A-ISR capability along with the commensurate processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) to support it.

- ◆ Optimizing Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and Counterintelligence (CI) operations will require better coordination to synchronize between the two disciplines.
- ◆ INSCOM must build cyber operational capability and provide multi-disciplined and all-source intelligence support to cyberspace operations.
- ◆ INSCOM serves as a bridge to link the Army's Echelon-Corps-and-Below (ECB) MI formations with higher-level intelligence agencies and supports the U.S. Army Forces Command Readiness Enterprise to enable ECB operations, improve interoperability, and promote readiness.
- ◆ INSCOM must strengthen the Intelligence Enterprise's Foundation Layer (organizations, operations, and architectures), to improve both its effectiveness and efficiency.

INSCOM's current Commander continues to pursue INSCOM 2020 lines of effort that build upon the initiatives started by his predecessors and track with strategic guidance and the tenets described above. The vision that the INSCOM Commander has established for the command is "INSCOM is the Army's Force of Choice for Dominant Intelligence in the Land and Cyberspace Domains." Successfully realizing this vision depends in large measure on the major INSCOM 2020 lines of effort that are identified and outlined as follows.

Enhance Theater Intelligence Operations

- ◆ Operationalize the existing Theater Intelligence Brigades (now known as MI Brigades(Theater) (MIB(T)) as the anchor points for Intelligence Enterprise support to Land and Cyberspace operations in their respective geographic Combatant Commands—66th MI Bde (EUCOM), 470th MI Bde (SOUTHCOM), 500th MI Bde (PACOM), 501st MI Bde (PACOM/USFK), 513th MI Bde (CENTCOM).
- ◆ Establish new MIB(T)s for AFRICOM (207th MI Bde) and NORTHCOM (505th MI Bde).
- ◆ Leverage support provided by RC MI units to the maximum extent feasible, especially the U.S. Army Reserve Theater Support Battalions and U.S. Army National Guard 300th MI Bde units.

Transform Army A-ISR

- ◆ Consolidate Army A-ISR assets in an Aerial ISR Brigade.
- ◆ Modernize both manned and unmanned aircraft (Gray Eagle UAS, EMARSS, ARL-E, Guardrail RC12X).
- ◆ Station like-aircraft in the same battalion and location to the maximum extent feasible for safer, more efficient and effective operations and maintenance.

- ◆ Manage the entire A-ISR fleet as Army Serviced-retained and globally available for allocation through Global Force Management Process.

Improve Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (PED) Capabilities

- ◆ Establish the PED Center of Excellence (CoE) at Fort Gordon, Georgia to improve both mission command and capacity (Reach and Expeditionary) for PED and multi-INT synergy.
- ◆ Promote collaboration and inter-operability across Services to optimize distribution of PED capacity in response to global Joint requirements.
- ◆ Leverage relationships with DOD Combat Support Agencies (National Security Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency) to support PED for all echelons.
- ◆ Manage PED across all echelons and components to reinforce downward or upward and improve MI training and readiness across the Total Force.

Evolve the CI/HUMINT Enterprise by Establishing an Army CI/HUMINT Command

- ◆ Plan and execute synchronized operations.
- ◆ Coordinate collection strategies and integrate targeting.
- ◆ Orchestrate analysis and campaign activities.
- ◆ Coordinate support activities and increase engagement with supported units/agencies.
- ◆ Serve as a single point of contact for all CI/HUMINT issues.

Provide Intelligence Support to Cyber Operations

- ◆ Build the 780th MI Brigade (OPCON to CYBERCOM/ARCYBER) to full operational capability.
- ◆ Deliver robust, multi-disciplined intelligence support to cyber planning and operations.
- ◆ Support the development and integration of cyberspace technologies.

Support the Readiness of the ECB MI Force

- ◆ Serve as the bridge to link Army ECB MI formations to the expertise, capabilities, and intelligence resident in the National and Defense Intelligence Communities and Enterprise architectures.

- ◆ Provide training support through the Foundry program and in accordance with IROC.
- ◆ Support certification training exercises.

Strengthen the Foundation Layer

- ◆ Organize and employ the Foundation Layer organizations and architectures as an intelligence operation.
- ◆ Treat DCGS-A as our Intelligence Warfighting Function “weapons system.”
- ◆ Train, deploy, and employ DCGS-A in a way that maximizes its capabilities (e.g., ubiquitous access to data, advanced analytics, and Joint/IC interoperability).

These brief outlines of the main INSCOM 2020 lines of effort are only overviews of complex, multi-tiered actions that are at different stages of planning and execution. This INSCOM-focused edition of the MI Professional Bulletin features articles that provide more detail on the MIB(T)s as an anchor concept, the Aerial Intelligence Brigade and PED CoE, the Army CI/HUMINT Command, INSCOM’s support to the DOD cyber mission, and Foundry 2.0 in support of ECB MI training.

It is important to note that INSCOM 2020 is only meant as an umbrella term that describes a range of actions. As higher level guidance and direction changes, the INSCOM Commander will necessarily revise and adapt INSCOM 2020 to meet emerging requirements and conditions. As the Army moves its force development time horizon forward, as it is currently doing with the recently issued *Army Force 2025 and Beyond* strategy, INSCOM may update the term INSCOM 2020 to something that better corresponds to the emerging lexicon.

But even as terminology changes, the underlying INSCOM 2020 tenets are likely to endure for the foreseeable future. They are the product of lessons learned from 13 years of combat operations and of detailed assessment over the course of several changes in INSCOM leadership. Further, the resulting actions spurred by these tenets have been vetted through Army force development and program processes and approved by the Army’s senior leaders. INSCOM 2020 truly postures INSCOM to be the Army’s Force of Choice for Dominant Intelligence in the Land and Cyberspace Domains.



Mr. Stokowski is currently the Acting Division Chief, Headquarters, INSCOM, G3 Plans.



The MI Brigade(T) as an Anchor Point

by Colonel Patrick J. Wempe and Major Mason D. Thompson

500th MI Bde Contributors: Lynmarie Christy, Jesse Mohrlant and Mark Sheahan

Introduction

The Army is transitioning from the Army Forces Generation model and processes to Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF), which will require careful balancing of the demands of the Decisive Action Training Environment with the geographic combatant commands' (CCMDs) priorities for Phase 0/1 activities. Maneuver units and their intelligence enablers will have greater latitude to focus mission and training requirements in a specific geographic theater. However, increased complexity in threat environments, evolving friendly and adversary capabilities and doctrine, and emerging regional partnerships will present new challenges to leaders and their Soldiers, including within the Intelligence Warfighting Function (IWfF). The Army's and the Military Intelligence Corps' critical roles and missions will increase in complexity and sensitivity.

Units, whether CONUS-based and regionally-aligned, those forward stationed, or those responding to contingencies, will require ready access to, and seamless interaction, with the theater's intelligence enterprise. They'll require theater situational awareness in order to tailor mission planning and training, connectivity and architecture to support intelligence operations, and access to in-theater intelligence relationships to effectively leverage the theater enterprise. The U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command's (INSCOM) "*MI Brigade (Theater) as the Anchor Point*" concept provides the framework for addressing these requirements.

What is an MI Brigade(T)?

INSCOM MIB(T)s are Echelons above Corps brigades, assigned to the combatant command (CCMD) and typically OPCON to the Theater Army Service Component Command (ASCC). Incorporated within the Geographic CCMD theater intelligence structure, the MIB(T)s are the Army's access points into the theater intelligence infrastructure and training platforms in each CCMD area of responsibility (AOR). The MIB(T) serves as the ASCC G2's operational intelligence force provider, the repository of theater intelligence on Army systems, the resident theater collection and analytical capability, and primary connector to the INSCOM Enterprise and the Intelligence Community (IC).

Simply stated, the MIB(T)s provide an operational level ground intelligence capability to the theater and provide unique access to theater intelligence, both resident and through Reach. As theater intelligence "problem solvers," the MIB(T)s also facilitate INSCOM's support to regional Treaty Partners and Allies, reinforcing CCMD Phase 0/1 priorities while enhancing the Global Response Force's (GRF) ability to respond to any global crisis.

The ASCC G2 is the center of gravity for Theater Army Intelligence. The MIB(T), on behalf of the ASCC G2/3, manages ground intelligence collection, production, knowledge management, and other activities. With robust organic capabilities in all intelligence disciplines, the MIB(T) is a hub for connectivity, intelligence fusion, and integration of ASCC G2 requirements for forces operating in the assigned theaters. The MIB(T)s synchronize with ASCC G2s to ensure optimal intelligence force and resource management as it assists in shaping future intelligence requirements for a range of military operations. By facilitating Army intelligence integration into theater, the MIB(T) Anchor Point facilitates readiness throughout all layers of the intelligence community (IC), tactical to national. It reinforces the "No MI Solider at Rest" principle and prevents cold starts by providing theater and ASCC commanders with intelligence capabilities fully prepared to support their mission.

The MIB(T) in Action—the 500th MI Brigade

As an MIB(T), the 500th MIB operates across an extraordinarily diverse, dispersed, and complex theater. In addition to the Brigade's ADCON and OPCON relationships with INSCOM and U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) respectively, the Brigade and its subordinate elements have multilayered mission command, installation, and support relationships with Eighth Army, U.S. Army Japan, U.S. Army Hawaii, U.S. Army Alaska, the 8th Theater Support Command, III Corps, I Corps, the Army Reserve's Military Intelligence Readiness Command, INSCOM's Aerial Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (A-ISR) Brigade, NSA-Hawaii, Special Operations Command Pacific's Joint Special Operations Task Force—Philippines, and others (see Figure 1).




Figure 1. 500th MI Bde Organization.

Additionally, the Brigade's forward-based Force Protection Detachments and Resident Offices maintain close relationships with Country Teams, Host Nation Liaison elements, Joint partners, and military and interagency partners throughout the AOR. In total, the Brigade and its five subordinate battalions have a persistent presence across six states, eight countries, and eleven time zones, illustrating the broad reach and complexity of all of the INSCOM MIB(T)s which support similarly demanding theaters.

INSCOM's articulation of the "MIB(T) as an Anchor" concept is depicted in Figure 2. Described as "Resident and Reach Intelligence Capabilities to the Theater," the concept encompasses the multifaceted roles, capabilities, and activities of the MIB(T)s. The concept also describes some of the Anchor Point Services inherent in MIB(T) requirements to support units, and reflects the demand for seamless integration of IC, INSCOM, Theater, and unit intelligence efforts across all disciplines to effectively support Regionally Aligned, Global Response, and Theater Committed forces.

Functional Support to the MIB(T)


Vital to the MIB(T)s' operations are the capabilities and support provided by INSCOM's Functional Brigades, which provide reinforcing operational and training capabilities to the MIB(T)s, other Army and DoD elements, and the IC. The functional brigades have missions and capabilities focused on a single discipline or operational function. Examples of this type of command are the 902^d MI Group (Counterintelligence (CI)), the Army Operations Group (Human Intelligence) operating in direct support of Army requirements, and the 704th MI Brigade and 706th MI Group providing Signals Intelligence functional capabilities in direct support of Director of National Intelligence mandated missions.

"Resident and Reach Intelligence Capabilities to the Theater"

Anchor Point Services

- Intelligence Assessments
- Foundry 2.0
- Live Environment Training
- Data (DCGS/KM) Services
 - Access to Theater Specific DBs
 - Data Ingest services for RAF IFS
- IT Integration
- SMEs Across all Disciplines
- Intelligence COP
- Persistent Intelligence Overwatch
- Federated Intelligence Production
- Coordination
 - All-Source
 - GEOINT
 - CI
 - HUMINT
 - SIGINT

Offers FORSCOM Units the "IN" into Army Theater Intelligence



KEY

AFSC-Army Field Support Center
 AIB-aerial intelligence brigade
 AOG-Army Operations Group
 CI-Counterintelligence
 COP-common operating picture
 C2-Command and control
 DBs-databases
 DCGS-Distributed Common Ground Station
 DIA-Defense Intelligence Agency

GEOINT-Geospatial Intelligence
 GISA-Ground Intelligence Support Agency
 HUMINT-Human Intelligence
 IFS-imagery file server
 IIS-Intelligence Information Services
 IT-Information Technology
 JSTARS-Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
 NGA-National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
 NGIC-National Ground Intelligence Center

NSA-National Security Agency
 ODIN-E-Observe, Detect, Identify, Neutralize-Enhanced
 RAF-regionally aligned forces
 SIGINT-Signals Intelligence
 SMEs-subject matter experts
 TCF-theater committed forces
 USAF-U.S. Air Force
 USN-U.S. Navy

Figure 2. The MIB(T) as an Anchor.

INSCOM's Functional Brigades, while not regionally aligned, work in coordination with the MIB(T)s to create a seamlessly integrated tactical to national intelligence enterprise. Without them, the MIB(T)s would have insufficient capabilities and capacities to support CCMD, ASCC, and unit intelligence requirements.

MIB(T) Intelligence Support

The services that the MIB(T)s provide as an intelligence Anchor Point for Army units are an extension of their ongoing operational support to the ASCC and CCMD. All MIB(T)s offer the following basic services:

- ◆ Intelligence
 - ◆ Intelligence collection.
 - ◆ Intelligence assessments.
 - ◆ Common operation/Intelligence picture (COP/CIP).
 - ◆ Persistent intelligence overwatch (cultural, language, subject matter expertise).
 - ◆ Federated intelligence production and coordination on behalf of the ASCC G2.

- ◆ Integration
 - ◆ Information Technology (IT) Integration.
 - ◆ Data Services (COP/CIP, data sharing, access to theater Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A) Integration Backbone (DIB), and knowledge management).
 - ◆ Data Ingest services (Data push/pull, data formatting, and DCGS-A to Army Battle Command Systems (ABCS) population).
 - ◆ Architecture Management Services (SECRET, SCI, and Coalition communications networks, RAF DCGS-A connectivity, and data routing services provided/coordinate by Ground Intelligence Support Activity (GISA) IT Operations).
 - ◆ Training
 - ◆ Live Environment Training (LET) and Foundry.
 - ◆ Mobile Training Teams (MTTs).
 - ◆ Subject Matter Expertise.

Each MIB(T) is organized and structured in accordance with the operational support needs of the CCMD. The regional alignment with the CCMDs allows an AOR-specific focus, enabling the MIB(T)'s processes and systems to be agile and adaptable to support the Intelligence needs and orientation of the force. The 500th MI Brigade demonstrates the Anchor Point concept on an ongoing basis in its support to the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) and USARPAC (see Figure 3).




Figure 3. 500th MI Bde - Anchor Point for the Pacific.

Anchor Point Services. With GISA-West's capabilities and the MIB(T)'s enduring task of maintaining the DCGS-A "Brain" Foundational Layer for the PACOM AOR, connectivity, architecture, and data ingest and management are critical requirements for the 500th. The Brigade maintains the theater-specific database that aggregates the DCGS-A populated data. As the custodian for the regional DIB and the CCMD's DCGS-A architecture, the MIB(T) maintains the ability to control access and structure the data for effective dissemination.

The Theater's DIB is a cohesive set of modular, community-governed, standards-based data services focused on enterprise information sharing. Each Theater DIB provides a common framework to enable the construction of cloud services for data exposure and transformation, and for enabling applications and users to discover and access information from a wide range of distributed sources. Each intelligence collector/discipline within the MIB(T) has a unique input system that feeds data directly into the DCGS-A capability.

At the operational level, the MIB(T) has the responsibility to ingest the tactically collected data and format it to meet the predetermined criteria. This system indexes the data, which enables future queries to access the information. Currently, the MIB(T) ensures access to this data through establishing SCI Communications and DCGS-A connectivity throughout its AOR. Although the MIB(T) only provides a small fraction of the networking equipment, its key service is routing the DIB's information onto the GISA IT/NETCOM/Trojan network, as required. This service facilitates DCGS-A data sharing between the ASCC, RAF, and GRF operating in the ASCC's AOR. GISA IT Operations design will provide data access for the data centers to the MIB(T)s in order to solicit analyzed intelligence across the ASCC's ABCS. MIB(T)s publish this same access to the theater architecture to ensure interoperability with other joint intelligence networks

Access. Operational access across the PACOM AOR is currently available through the 500th's forward-based CI Offices/CI Agents, with permanent presence in mainland Japan, Okinawa, Kwajalein, Guam, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Australia and rotational presence in numerous other Pacific Theater countries. The 441st MI BN, headquartered at Camp Zama, Japan, includes the Pacific Liaison Detachment and the Asian Studies Detachment, which have a nearly seventy year history of providing strategic and national liaison and foreign Open Source Intelligence respectively. The Brigade's access also encompasses growing relationships with USARPAC's Regional Partnership Program designated foreign partners and Pacific Pathways exercise series partners. The 500th is leading intelligence partnership efforts with Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Philippines, and India, and overall supports 154 Theater Security Cooperation Program activities in 26 countries across the PACOM AOR. All of these efforts and activities represent a level of access to allies that can be leveraged by other units to support their planning, training, and operational requirements.

Intelligence Synchronization/Collaboration/Fusion. A primary role for the MIB(T) is to synchronize intelligence requirements and processes with ASCC and CCMD plans and operations, to include nesting of their organic assets within theater ISR assets, force protection and CI missions, and other activities. Other units can leverage the expertise and depth in Brigade, INSCOM, and IC analytic and collection resources and can effectively exploit available information and intelligence resources. Currently the USARPAC Analysis and Control Element (ACE) provides overwatch to the supported commander (and ASCC Commander) as well to the supported unit's ACE. As a current illustration of this Anchor Point role, the Brigade's ACE element from the 205th MI Battalion is postured to provide data and support to the 25th ID and I Corps during the execution of USARPAC's inaugural Pacific Pathways iteration, supporting combined arms maneuver exercises and other partnership activities in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Japan.

Intelligence Readiness Training. 500th MIB training support includes FOUNDRY Platform instruction, LET opportunities, MTTs, as well as SME and Observer/Controller/Trainer support to unit training. Critical to the effectiveness of the training is the close working relationship of the MIB(T) with units as they develop their training strategies and plans. Rather than simply offering a catalog of training courses and LETs for units to choose from, the Pacific FOUNDRY works directly with units to assess their training proficiency and design tailored training strategies. These strategies incorporate FOUNDRY resident and MTT instruction and leverage cross-training, LET, and operational integration opportunities to enhance return on investment for units and USARPAC.

The FOUNDRY 2.0 concept, with its investment of Division and Corps intelligence soldiers into the FOUNDRY cadre, is absolutely central to the effectiveness of these training strategies. Ensuring robust linkages between MIB(T) and Division/Corps intelligence units and providing substantial return on investment to the units when their cadre soldiers return to their unit formations, FOUNDRY 2.0 builds on the past successes of the FOUNDRY program and postures the capability for




Figure 4. Pacific Readiness Process.

the demands of RAF, contingency response missions, combat training center and home station training, and other efforts. The PACIFIC FOUNDRY at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, enjoys extraordinary support from 25TH ID, USARPAC G2, NSA-H, 8TH TSC, and others as those organizations invest on a rotational basis some of their most talented and accomplished intelligence soldiers into the FOUNDRY cadre.

Conclusion

The Anchor Point concept illustrates how the MIB(T) is the Army Intelligence conduit into the theater intelligence enterprise, setting the conditions to achieve intelligence readiness and unity of effort in support of commanders at each echelon. The MIB(T)s synchronize with ASCC, Corps, and Division G2s to ensure optimal intelligence force and resource management as it assists in shaping future intelligence requirements for a range of military operations. This concept strives to develop a broad understanding of how the MIB(T)s facilitate the IWfF in theater and support contingency and crisis response, and how the MIB(T)s are postured to be responsive as anchor points for theater intelligence activities.

The MIB(T) as an Anchor Point concept allows Theater Committed Forces, Regionally Aligned Forces, Global Response Forces, U.S. Joint Forces, and Multi-National Partners to access theater intelligence, intelligence infrastructure, and training opportunities, and leverage expertise resident in the Theater and INSCOM Functional Commands to focus organic intelligence capabilities and enhance situational awareness and mission readiness. The 500TH MIB, along with the other INSCOM MIB(T)s (CENTCOM's 513TH MIB, SOUTHCOM's 470TH MIB, EUCOM/AFRICOM's 66TH MIB, and USFK's 501ST MIB) are valuable assets to be leveraged by Army units at every echelon.

COL Wempe is currently the Commander of the 500TH MI BDE.

MAJ Thompson is currently the S3 for the 500TH MI Bde.

INSCOM's Transformation of the Aerial Layer - The 2020 Vision

by Major Eric S. Dober



Introduction

During the last fifteen years the Army's aerial intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (A-ISR) platforms produced an abundance of actionable intelligence in response to Combatant Commanders' intelligence requirements. This ongoing effort has saved the lives of many Soldiers and civilians thanks to the professionalism and dedication of thousands of Military Intelligence (MI) Soldiers, government civilians, and contractors. As new A-ISR challenges presented themselves within the battle space, the Department of the Army and the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) were quick to provide new Quick Reaction Capabilities (QRC) solutions to outpace the enemy. New ISR tactics, techniques, and procedures were continuously developed and updated to adapt to constantly changing enemy tactics. Today's A-ISR capabilities are highly accurate and use the full range of complex networks to deliver real time ground truth intelligence and analysis to senior leaders and local commanders.

However, as INSCOM moved forward delivering new A-ISR solutions to the Combatant Commanders, INSCOM's Commanding General (CG) noticed that the current A-ISR layer was not organized, equipped, or stationed properly to best support global joint A-ISR operations. Fundamental changes needed to be made to ensure that the appropriate A-ISR capability was deployed and controlled by the correct level of command. The CG stated that INSCOM must reorganize, re-equip, and re-station to best support global A-ISR requirements in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational environment. Under that banner the INSCOM A-ISR 2020 vision was developed and a new concept was born: the Aerial Intelligence Brigade (AIB).

The Aerial Intelligence Brigade Concept

INSCOM's CG established his intent and focused his staff to transform Army A-ISR early in 2013. His end state was a brigade structure that would greatly increase the operational adaptability of the Army's low density, high demand A-ISR capabilities. This new brigade will also enhance A-ISR efficiencies by consolidating like A-ISR assets under one

command as an integrated element of the intelligence enterprise. Additionally, this new brigade will manage the allocation of capabilities as part of the National Reconnaissance Program and execute the Joint-Enabled Distribution of the Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (PED) of all data collected by leveraging the capabilities of both National and Joint locations (Multi-Service/Multi-INT solutions). The AIB was created and structured to provide flexibility to meet enduring and emerging requirements while achieving efficient economy of force operations in the future operational environment. Currently, the Provisional AIB has assumed limited mission command and management of Distributed PED in preparation for the planned Fiscal Year 2016 AIB activation.

The AIB will provide the appropriate level of mission command for the resourcing, managing, and training of the Army's A-ISR assets and units to support commanders at all echelons and across all operational phases. The AIB's central task is to exercise mission command of assigned capabilities for the purpose of enabling operations in support of multiple, simultaneous regional contingency operations. By building tailored A-ISR force packages, the AIB meets Combatant Commander (CCDR) requirements in accordance with the Global Force Management Allocation Plan. CCDRs should not be limited to the use of A-ISR capabilities resident in their regionally aligned aerial exploitation battalion (AEB). Each A-ISR force package will be optimized to meet specific tactical, operational, and/or strategic requirements—thus dramatically increasing both the effectiveness and efficiency of A-ISR support to forward deployed troops.

The unity of command provided by the AIB enables optimal management of low density, high demand A-ISR assets while sustaining timely PED integration and synchronization. The ability to rapidly reconfigure and dynamically manage both collection platforms and supporting PED enables the aggressive maneuvering of A-ISR capabilities in response to CCDR requirements. This design agility and flexibility also postures the AIB to support Special Operations Forces (SOF). The ability to precisely tailor and rapidly deploy capabilities is a critical mission requirement to support SOF

and other potential contingency missions. For major contingency missions, elements of the AIB headquarters will deploy to provide forward intelligence coordination, mission command, and expert management of multiple A-ISR task forces operating in the same theater or region.

In addition to mission command and expeditionary deployment management, the AIB's unity of command enables a level of operational oversight perfectly calibrated to meet mission demands. Flight safety and standardization are centralized at the brigade headquarters level—leveraging the successful management model used by the Army's combat aviation brigades (CAB) and better aligning INSCOM's oversight responsibilities. Risk management is enhanced across the A-ISR fleet via consolidation of capabilities under a single O-6 Commander chosen because of his/her background in both the intelligence and Special Electronics Mission Aircraft (SEMA) aviation communities. The Brigade Commander will be an AOC 15C35, with a wide breadth of experience in intelligence and SEMA aviation assignments.

Unity of command extends to collection management of these capabilities as well. The AIB Collection Manager retains approval authority for subordinate units and coordinates with requesting units to ensure competing priority intelligence requirements are satisfied based on the appropriate level of command guidance. This centralized collection management authority is particularly important in managing consolidated PED operations during simultaneous support of multiple CCDRs.

The AIB-level consolidated asset management will significantly accelerate the integration of QRC fielding initiatives. It is not unrealistic to expect that QRC integration timelines could be significantly reduced as A-ISR assets are transitioned into military operated, sustainable programs of record (POR) and consolidated under the AIB. Efficiencies in mission management, force generation, training, and sustainment will be realized as a direct result of consolidation while effectiveness is sustained or enhanced. Future plug-and-play sensor capabilities will increase the need for centralized AIB management as it continues developing and strengthening the dynamic relationship between collection platform, sensor, and PED.

The AIB will be the nucleus for managing both Multi-INT and Multi-Mode collection intelligence capabilities. Multi-INT collection is defined as a separate collection stream from any combination of two or more intelligence disciplines. Multi-Mode collection is the generation of data and information for use by source specific and all-source analytic personnel by a variety of sensors focused on a single target set. Multi-INT/Multi-Mode collection is the use of

multiple disciplines and dynamic combinations of terrestrial, aerial, and space based capabilities to generate data and information for use by all-source fusion analysts focused on discrete target sets. Multi-INT/Multi-Mode collection includes Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT), and Human Intelligence, which populate a variety of single source and all-source data bases from which fused intelligence products are generated. The AIB will be the Army's principal focal point for injecting aerial layer data and information into the Multi-INT/Multi-Mode architecture.

The PED Battalion

The AIB's PED battalion is a fixed site-based unit with a headquarters element and subordinate PED unit structure. Staffing for the battalion requires reorganizing and realigning PED personnel (currently scattered across INSCOM's AEBs) under a common command and control structure. The battalion headquarters and the majority of GEOINT personnel will operate from a central facility at Fort Gordon, Georgia. The battalion will also include distributed GEOINT detachments integrated at key intelligence nodes such as the Air Force Special Operations Command at Hurlburt Field, Florida; the U.S. Air Force's Distributed Ground Station (DGS-1) at Langley, Virginia; and Joint Surveillance Target Acquisition Radar System at Robins AFB, Georgia. The battalion's SIGINT personnel will be distributed and employed at detachments co-located with Army Strategic SIGINT MI battalions and working targets appropriate to their regional language sets and mission demands. Each of the AIB's subordinate battalions, except the PED battalion, will maintain appropriately sized expeditionary PED and liaison capabilities to enhance agility and responsiveness. The 3rd MI Battalion's current organic PED capability is not included in this restructuring effort.

The AIB PED battalion will increase INSCOM's ability to reinforce and support regionally aligned forces. Additionally, it refocuses A-ISR PED from today's AEB regional alignment to strategic reinforcement of the Army Service Component Command. A core PED requirement is the ability to leverage data and information drawn from across the Intelligence Community (IC) to include the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Geospatial-intelligence Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. Fulltime access to a wide-range of IC capabilities, foreign intelligence data, and information is key to sustaining mission readiness of the Army's Intelligence force. A commitment to "keep the force up and active" serves as both a means to achieve high order training and readiness and to meet supported commander requirements. This commitment applies across all echelons.

This persistent engagement with IC capabilities cultivates relationships that ensure readiness to meet unforeseen and emerging requirements.

The creation of a subordinate PED battalion addresses the rapidly increasing importance of Multi-INT capabilities for meeting supported commander requirements. The battalion will have the resources necessary to sustain production of relevant, time sensitive reporting to meet the demands of the decision makers. These resources include trained and certified Information Technology (IT) specialists providing and sustaining access to the intelligence enterprise IT infrastructure required to store, access, transport, and prepare data and information for use by discipline specific and all-source analysts for dissemination to the end user. Additionally, the AIB will have the flexibility and agility to forward deploy small, expeditionary liaison and PED elements to ensure initial PED support capability in theaters of operation with mature or immature support infrastructure. The expert management and execution of reach operations will be a core AIB competency and will not preclude rapid deployment of appropriately sized PED packages forward as required by the supported command or as the AIB Commander deems appropriate.

Consolidation of existing AEB PED capabilities into an AIB assigned PED battalion reduces operating costs by eliminating multiple small, “designer” (i.e., expensive to operate; situationally and system unique) PED facilities. For example, TF ODIN’s Aerial Reconnaissance Support Teams located in CONUS Reach facilities and the AEBs’ Mission Operations facilities located in Germany, Texas, and Georgia, are all consolidated into a single facility optimized for immediate, on-demand access to the Army’s Operational Intelligence Enterprise. The PED battalion standardizes Reach operations to give them the same level of support that forward deployed and multiple designer solution sets currently provide, but at a reduced cost in personnel and resources. “Reach” is an AIB, INSCOM, and Army Intelligence core competency.

The establishment of a consolidated PED battalion takes maximum advantage of existing, high capacity communications networks. By assuring access to data storage, handling, transport, and staging capabilities, the overall cost is reduced even as effectiveness and efficiency rise dramatically. Establishing a central GEOINT PED facility at Fort Gordon and virtually consolidating the tactical SIGINT PED architecture in partnership with national strategic SIGINT capabilities not only drives cost down, but provides a single integrated architecture from the strategic-national layer all the way down to individual brigade combat teams regardless of their location or operational phase.

The power of the enterprise is harnessed and worldwide access guaranteed via use of a standardized work station and a powerful set of management, collection, analytic, and fusion tools integrated into the Army’s Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS-A). DCGS-A enables cross-domain solutions while providing ubiquitous, near-real-time access to A-ISR data and information. DCGS-A users can “touch the data,” regardless of echelon of assignment or geographic location. The PED battalion concept nests perfectly within the DCGS-A POR; ensuring sustained funding in a post-OEF/Overseas Contingency Operation funding environment.

Joint Enabled PED

The AIB’s PED battalion is the Army’s PED Center of Excellence and, as such, drives the Joint Enabled Distributed PED vision. Joint enabled PED delivers the ability to share and consume real-time full motion video (FMV) feeds as part of the PED solution set. This ability to work with FMV in an agile and responsive manner is particularly critical when Joint/Coalition services’ assets operate in direct support of Army SOF. The PED battalion will be able to work FMV feeds from non-Army A-ISR capabilities tasked in response to Army SOF requirements.

It will also provide DCGS-A workstations and mission command for the U.S. Army Forces Command PED platoons that form the Expeditionary MI Brigade (EMIB) co-located at Fort Gordon. These platoons will conduct PED on the Army’s CAB Gray Eagle unmanned aerial systems (UAS) sensors, and leverage the mission command capabilities organic within the PED Battalion to optimize PED effectiveness through Tactical Control of all PED functions. Furthermore, the EMIB PED includes integration and synchronization of both the traditional GEOINT mission with the embedded Cryptological Support Teams tactical SIGINT operations. Additionally, the AIB PED battalion will enable fusion of INSCOM’s A-ISR capabilities with the Army’s Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition capabilities available across the Gray Eagle UAS fleet.

The PED vision endstate foresees a time when the Army PED battalion personnel actually run nodes on joint/coalition services’ ISR networks. For example, personnel may operate as a “node” on the Air Force’s DGS Weapons System for inter-service support. Integral to understanding this expanded concept is that “ownership” of the collection asset is an irrelevant issue. The core issues of tomorrow will be the mutual leveraging of capabilities and the intelligent operation of satellite capabilities as nodes on joint/coalition services’ systems that will convey the joint partnering fundamental to a “joint at birth environment” and the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff’s Capstone Concept of globally integrated operations.

Current and Projected INSCOM A-ISR Structure

Currently, INSCOM A-ISR is structured under six AEBs with each battalion subordinate to a separate INSCOM brigade. Each AEB is assigned to support a specific CCDR. Under the new AIB concept, three AEBs are re-organized with like A-ISR assets (the 204th MI BN, the 224th MI BN, and 15th MI BN) to enable global availability. The fourth (3rd MI BN) will directly support the U.S. Forces Korea and the last two will be deactivated. The A-ISR assets that will be assigned to the three re-organized battalions are: the Airborne Reconnaissance Low (ARL), the Guardrail Common Sensor (GRCS), the Enhanced Medium Altitude Reconnaissance Surveillance System (E-MARSS), and the Gray Eagle UAS. Each battalion will have its own Expeditionary A-ISR Task Force (except for the 3rd MI BN) with organic PED capabilities (GEOINT, Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT), ELINT, or SIGINT) respective to their supported command.

The INSCOM's A-ISR 2020 Vision reflects the 204th MI BN inheriting the ARL (and future ARL-Enhanced (ARL-E)) aircraft, as well as half of the GRCS (RC-12X) fleet. The 224th MI BN will inherit the MC-12S E-MARSS, and the 15th MI BN will receive all of the Gray Eagle UAS. The 3rd MI BN will also have ARL (and the ARL-E when available) and the remainder of the GRCS fleet. As part of this construct, the Joint Enabled Distributed PED Vision will integrate GEOINT PED at Fort Gordon, Georgia, with outstations at Langley AFB, Robins AFB, and Hurlburt AFB. The SIGINT Distributed PED will be co-located with NSA Georgia (707th MI BN), NSA Hawaii (715th MI BN), and NSA Texas (717th MI BN).

The current UAS fleet will be replaced with the new Gray Eagle UAS. Two UAS companies with six aircraft each will be fielded in Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 and the remaining company in FY 2018. The current proposal is for two companies to be stationed at Fort Hood, Texas, under the 15th MI BN, and a third at Hunter Army Air Field under the 224th MI BN, Savannah, Georgia. However, the 2020 INSCOM Vision reflects all of the UAS companies under the 15th MI BN at Fort Hood, Texas. The new Gray Eagle can be configured for a variety of SIGINT, GEOINT, and MASINT pods and sensors to support various mission requirements. The Warrior Alpha

UAS currently used in Afghanistan will be retired once that mission ends due to force structure reductions and non-compatibility issues.

For manned assets, INSCOM's 2020 Vision calls for 24 MC-12S series aircraft. This aircraft is inheriting the best of breed systems (SIGINT; ground moving target indicator/dismount moving target indicator; hyper-spectral imagery; electro-optical/infrared; high definition FMV; foliage penetration, and light detection and ranging sensors) for maximum capability in a wide variety of missions. The 24 MC-12S will be divided into four categories: SIGINT-Imagery Intelligence (8), MASINT (8), vehicle and dismount exploitation radar (4), and SIGINT (4). The current ARL DHC-7s will be retired and replaced with DHC-8s in all of the ARL formations. The new DHC-8 (which will be known as ARL-E) will also incorporate the best of breed A-ISR sensors. A total of nine ARL-E aircraft are planned with three going to the 3rd MI BN and six to the 204th MI BN. The RC-12X fleet will grow to 14 aircraft and will leverage state of the art SIGINT capabilities and Multi-INT configurations to conduct full spectrum collection operations and support PED distribution.

Conclusion

As we move forward to 2020, INSCOM is on a deliberate path to make this vision a reality. Thousands of Soldiers, civilians, and contractors are part of a coordinated effort to accomplish the goal of evolving the Command in a complex, challenging, and ever changing combat environment. As we continue to tackle the 21st century's intelligence challenges, INSCOM remains engaged in providing the necessary tools and personnel for success on the battlefields of this century. To achieve the operational adaptability mandated by the Army Capstone Concept, INSCOM and the AIB must be an adaptive organization that prioritizes, balances, and integrates subordinate capabilities to satisfy current operational requirements while posturing for success in the future. The Army must respond effectively to changing threats and situations with appropriate, flexible, and timely actions and operate as part of a joint/combined/coalition force to prevent, shape, and win military operations. To that end, no INSCOM Soldier is, or will be, at rest.





Enabling Cyber Mission Teams: Training, Exercising, and Innovating

by First Lieutenant Alexander Farmer, Captain Rock Stevens,
Captain Tyler Jost, and Major Rachael O'Connell

Introduction

The mission to defend the nation in cyberspace requires individuals possessing exceptional technical expertise. This requirement accompanied by the perspective that “cyber is different” has driven a myopic focus on individual training to meet the nation’s cyberspace security needs over the past few years. However, cyber units are an operational force that requires training surprisingly similar to that of traditional combat units. As the cyber mission force continues to develop, the Army’s cyber units require training exercises that hone collective team skills that closely resemble traditional maneuver units’ collective training programs.

Army cyber teams are composed of leadership elements, plans, operations, and an analysis and production cell. The team can be broken into sub-elements defined as a section of a cyber team aligned by function. In the current team structure, sub-elements are divided into analysis, operations, and plans. Teams can be further task-organized into crews consisting of representatives from each function. The requirement to build cyberspace operational capacity at scale demands dividing responsibility associated with the cyber security profession in ways similar to that of a traditional maneuver unit. Intelligence analysts provide support and direction through intelligence products and refined information requirements—similar to the way that an intelligence staff drives operations in a traditional conflict. Computer operators conduct cyberspace actions based upon these information requirements or desired effects—similar to the way that an infantry platoon would conduct a targeted raid based upon reported intelligence. Cyber planners oversee the fusion of information between these two sections and propose courses of action for desired effects in ways similar to an operations staff section.

Collective Cyber Training

The challenge in creating a cyber team is that it requires not only training the individual in their assigned area of expertise, but training the team on its collective functions as well. For example, it is not enough for a cyber analyst to master intelligence report production—the team must

validate a deliberate and systematized process to leverage intelligence analysis in order to conduct more refined follow-on operations. Such a model capitalizes on division of labor in order to achieve an overall result greater than the sum of its individual parts. In short, a cyber team can achieve more collectively than with each team member operating independently.


The collective operational capacity of a cyber team is strengthened through training scenarios that require the team to exercise processes that connect analysis and operations through plans. Collective training events are frequent in duration and tailored to exercise specific objectives at the team, crew, or unit sub-element level. Resource intensive training events such as CYBER FLAG—the Department of Defense annual capstone training exercise in cyberspace operations—build linkages between teams and higher headquarters. However, internal collective training events build the connective tissue among the elements inside a cyber team.

At 780th Military Intelligence Brigade, there is an ongoing effort to codify meaningful training on mission essential tasks and provide cyber teams’ annual validation through a staged training concept developed from U.S. Cyber Command’s *Training and Readiness Manual*. For instance, tabletop exercises (TTX), crew drills, and live-fire events all correspond to battalion-driven, Phase I events known as 2000 level events. These drills are designed in such a way that individual positional training is interspersed with mission specific staff or element training in order to support the team’s assigned missions. Phase II events or 3000 level events are more process-driven, and would focus more on a Validation Event where the Brigade would verify mission-essential task standards by sub-elements of the team. A good example is CYBER KNIGHT, a collective training exercise hosted by a higher headquarters (e.g., Joint Forces Headquarters—Cyber or Cyber National Mission Force Headquarters) to validate a team’s capacity to meet a commander’s operational requirements.

Successful completion of CYBER KNIGHT certifies that teams are fully prepared to conduct their wartime mis-

sion. This event is analogous to a traditional maneuver unit's rotation through the National Training Center or the Joint Readiness Training Center. A CYBER KNIGHT like exercise hosted by the Brigade would appear similar in scope and direction. Phase III events are seen as "capstone" exercises. CYBER FLAG, for instance, is directed and led by higher headquarters as a Culminating Training Event. They are multi-echelon and externally evaluated. Phase IV is the "sustainment" piece, ensuring training objectives are laid out in pipeline courses, on-the-job activities are current, and annual training requirements are met. So while some see cyberspace operations as distinct from conventional maneuver operations, unmistakable parallels exist in their collective training models.

PHASED TRAINING CONCEPT



Conclusion

Army units have traditionally held that teams of specialized and synergized Soldiers working together are more powerful than the sum of their individual contributions. The same holds true for the Army's cyber teams. 780th MI Brigade is taking an active, hands-on approach and positioning itself in a way to set the standard for individual and collective training. In so doing, the Brigade anticipates a paradigm shift from individual to collective cyber training that will enable Army Cyber Forces to operate successfully in the cyberspace domain, and deny the same to our adversaries.



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Foundry 2.0: Evolution of Intelligence Readiness Training towards Meeting the Needs of Army 2020

by Mr. J. Stan Hinton

Introduction

The Army has continually adapted throughout its long history. By 2020, it will be a rebalanced force and will be at its lowest end strength since before World War II. We will be leaner, adaptive, flexible, integrated, and expected to meet a myriad of diverse security challenges worldwide. While the Army begins to implement responsible reductions in end strength, it faces immediate challenges as well as severely constrained budgets. In this environment, Army Intelligence cannot take a break. We must support the transfer of combat operations to the Afghan military while preparing for global and regional contingencies and unforeseeable crises. All Intelligence Soldiers must be engaged with the next enemy and be an expert in various operating environments (OEs). Foundry, the Army's only intelligence training program for the Operating Force, must adapt to ensure Army Global Readiness.

This article will describe the future Foundry 2.0 training and operational readiness enabler. It will detail the evolution of the Army's Tactical Intelligence Readiness Training (REDTRAIN) Program, the circumstances that compelled the Army Leadership to establish the Foundry Program, and its continuing evolution to Foundry 2.0. The U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) has a broadening mission to enable the tactical MI force with advanced skills training and access to theater and national intelligence. Supported tactical commanders in Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) and the Global Response Force (GRF) need more than just current intelligence. They need to have their Soldiers trained in rapidly changing technologies and capabilities to defeat rapidly adaptive enemies in dynamic OEs. Keeping Army commanders and Soldiers ahead of the enemy is the imperative of Foundry 2.0 and beyond.

Where We Were: A Tactical MI Force On the Sidelines

"This isn't the enemy we wargamed against."

*-LTG William S. Wallace, Commander, V (US) Corps,
during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in 2003*

Prior to 9/11, the focus for tactical MI units and S2/G2 sections was success (or survival) at Army Warfighter Exercises

and the combat training centers. Those events did and still do provide a rigorous and realistic environment for Mission Command, Maneuver and Fires Warfighting Functions. However, those large collective training events were not designed to exercise and assess the full range of Intelligence Soldier technical skills and MI unit Mission Essential Tasks. MI Soldiers in tactical formations could provide great depth on the Krasnovian Order Of Battle, but few could identify signature items of the front line trace of the Iraqi Republican Guard.

The REDTRAIN Program attempted to fill this gap by providing funding for a small number tactical MI Soldiers to train with INSCOM units. As stated in then AR 350-3, Tactical Intelligence Readiness Training Program, "the primary intent of REDTRAIN is to train individual Soldiers in primary MOS skills to meet unit training goals."¹ It fell short. INSCOM's exclusive focus at the time was support to combatant commanders/Army Service Component Commanders (ASCC) and Strategic consumers of intelligence. Although INSCOM managed the REDTRAIN Program on behalf of the Army G2, similar to today's Foundry Program, leveraging the capabilities of INSCOM was not a component of REDTRAIN. As a result, REDTRAIN was a funding source for mobile training teams and TDYs with a tactical MI force not connected to the greater intelligence community's (IC) capabilities. There was no alignment of REDTRAIN to tactical unit missions.

The Army's Foundry Program spawned from urgent needs to prepare the Army MI Force for the realities of war. In the early days of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM (OEF/OIF), technologies, target sets, and OEs became increasingly complex and difficult for the tactical MI force to understand and recognize. Demands for the Intelligence Warfighting Function to support commanders' decision making processes became significantly more complex. Training capabilities available from within unit formations and available at home station did not meet these needs.

In 2005, CENTCOM and Army G2 assessments of deployed MI units identified striking capabilities gaps even after five years at war. The majority of MI unit and Soldiers

lacked a clear understanding of their OE, did not have skills required to operate and employ quick reaction theater-provided equipment, and had little understanding of capabilities of a highly adaptive enemy. The gaps in situational knowledge and a clear understanding of the enemy's tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) were attributed to the inability of many units to access intelligence networks and databases and pull the latest intelligence information to support pre-deployment training. The home station training environment also lacked the ability to rapidly integrate theater lessons learned.

Where We Are: A Connected Army Intelligence Force

In response to these issues, the Chief of Staff of the Army directed the DA G2, U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to implement a program that would ensure "No More Cold Starts for MI." This became the Foundry Program. The Army Campaign Plan directed the CG INSCOM, in conjunction with DA G2, FORSCOM, and TRADOC, to determine the ways and means to enhance and sustain tactical force intelligence skills and capabilities, and to provide regional focus/expertise and technical training. On 13 January 2006, DA G-3/5/7 published the Foundry Implementation Message, establishing the Foundry Program as the Army's intelligence readiness program. The Implementation Message directed INSCOM to provide mission-focused MI training and operational opportunities, assistance with deployment preparations, functional and regional expertise for commanders and G2s/S2s, linkages for tactical formations to the IC, and home station training and certification to enable MI Soldiers to access National Intelligence networks and databases.

This implementation message changed the landscape of tactical intelligence readiness by establishing a home station enabling training capability through INSCOM and providing a connection to the Intelligence Enterprise. Foundry Program resources brought systems, access to networks, and accreditations necessary to access national databases to within walking distance of brigade combat teams. Foundry intelligence cadre reviewed OIF and OEF lessons learned and built them into training for deploying units. Different than REDTRAIN, the Foundry Program incorporated three critical tenets to address the shortfalls previously mentioned:

1. Unit partnerships between INSCOM and the tactical force Active and Reserve Component (AC/RC) commanders to assist in the training of their organic intelligence Soldiers.

2. Functional partnerships between INSCOM and the tactical force commanders (AC/RC) to assist in the training of their organic intelligence Soldiers.
3. Distribution of relevant TTPs and CONOPs to facilitate timely integration of quick reaction capabilities into training and operations.²

Along with impacting the tactical MI force, OIF and OEF reshaped INSCOM's focus. INSCOM serves as the foundation for the Foundry Program, bringing the Intelligence Enterprise to support the tactical MI force. In conjunction with FORSCOM, U.S. Army Pacific, U.S. Army Europe, the MI Readiness Command, and National Guard, INSCOM established Foundry Sites to provide connectivity, access, and subject matter expertise. INSCOM now provides intelligence capabilities to both operational and tactical commanders. These capabilities include intelligence collection teams, analysis, and quick reaction capabilities. INSCOM is "*Not Your Father's INSCOM*." It is the ARMY'S Operational Intelligence Command.

Where We Are Going: Maintaining Intelligence Readiness and Intelligence Professionals

*"The Key to Intelligence Readiness for A Regionally Aligned Army: Beyond these initiatives, there are a number of training programs that are enabling RAF. Of these, none is more important than the Army's Foundry 2.0 Program, with its two key objectives of "No Cold Starts" and "No MI Soldier at Rest."*³

Foundry 2.0 builds upon the last decade of change and success. We will not have the benefit of only two major operations on which the Army will focus training and resources. RAF and GRF units will have diverse missions for contingency support to ASCCs and combatant commands. No one can predict when and where the next crisis or threat will drive commitment of our Soldiers. At the same time, Army Intelligence must support a much smaller Army with an even smaller budget.

Foundry 2.0 will put Soldiers back into the business of training fellow Soldiers and provide comprehensive live environment training that meets intelligence requirements for intelligence officers to support Mission Command. Foundry will continue to provide access to the Intelligence Enterprise, access to the most advanced equipment, and intelligence networks to units at home station. Civilian and contractor cadre will enable and support training, but NCOs and warrant officers will conduct training. Select Soldiers will train with IC agencies at INSCOM centers and units; however, their training will have a clear set of objectives that they return to their home station with expertise relevant to their Commander's RAF or GRF mission. INSCOM will ensure these select Soldiers remain current and relevant within

their discipline and continuously connect to the Intelligence Enterprise. If not connected to the Enterprise, they will not be part of Foundry. Most important, commanders and their senior intelligence officers will “own their Foundry capability.” They must personally direct and guide training to support their mission needs.

Conclusion

“The Foundry instructors were a large upfront cost, but the dividend they will give when they return to the formation will easily pay back the time they spent away.”⁴

As the Army supports a broader range of intelligence training requirements for global readiness, we must also include lessons learned as we evolve to Foundry 2.0 and beyond. Intelligence Soldiers must be their commanders’ trusted Intelligence Professionals. REDTRAIN was not capable of developing Soldiers into Intelligence Professionals, nor did it equal intelligence readiness; Foundry 2.0 is es-

sential to intelligence readiness. Foundry 2.0 depends on leaders to take ownership of their Intelligence Warfighting Function, personally ensuring that their MI Soldiers are technically skilled and operationally focused to support mission command. They must be willing to make the investment of their Soldiers and leaders to keep them connected to the Enterprise and technical and target immersed...An Intelligence Professional. 

End Notes

1. AR 350-3, Tactical Intelligence Readiness Training Program, 30 August, 1995.
2. DA G-3/5/7 Implementation Message, 3 January 2006.
3. Army Foundry Newsletter, Volume 1, 1 November 2013
4. LTC Gregory Ford and MAJ Ammilee Oliva, “25th ID’s Intelligence Outreach Program: Leader Development, Intelligence Federation, and Regional Alignment,” *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin*, April-June 2014, 27-30.

GREAT SKILL Program

Military Intelligence Excepted Career Program

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The GSP identifies, selects, trains, assigns, and retains personnel conducting sensitive and complex classified operations in one of five distinct disciplines for the Army, DOD, and National Agencies.


Who are we looking for?

Those best suited for this line of work do not fit the mold of the “average Soldier.” Best qualified applicants display a strong sense of individual responsibility, unquestionable character, good interpersonal skills, professional and personal maturity, and cognitive flexibility. **Applicants must undergo a rigorous selection and assessment process that includes psychological examinations, personal interviews, a Clscope polygraph and an extensive background investigation.**

Basic Prerequisites:

- ◆ Active Duty Army.
- ◆ 25 years or older.
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THE FOUNDATION LAYER

by Richard Harfst



Introduction

Army Intelligence is transforming the ‘Foundation Layer.’ This transformation has three key aspects:

- ◆ Organizational reform.
- ◆ Operating as an enterprise.
- ◆ Operating as an intelligence activity.

At end state, the resulting organization will be a true hybrid—it will perform both traditional staff and line functions. It will possess characteristics of both the Generating Force (as part of the infrastructure) as well as the Operating Force (by supporting operational missions), and will execute a blend of both Intelligence and Signal Corps competencies. The resulting processes recognize that the Foundation Layer, as the fundamental underpinning to everything Army Intelligence does, must be fully integrated and synchronized with the rest of the Army Intelligence enterprise.

Defining the Foundation Layer


The Foundation Layer is a sub-component of the Army’s LandWarNet. It leverages and is inextricably linked to traditional communications and information systems and Signal Corps Core Competencies such as Network Operations and Network Transport and Information Services—when they

are being conducted in support of intelligence synchronization, operations, and analysis and other aspects of the Intelligence Warfighting Function.¹ The ‘boundaries’ of the Foundation Layer extend sufficiently so there are no gaps. It connects to various sensors and collection platforms, external communications architectures and data bases (both intelligence and non-intelligence), and the interface with intelligence analysts, intelligence managers, and intelligence consumers. The four ‘layers’—Foundation, Space, Aerial, and Terrestrial—are a conceptual framework for understanding and describing the Army Intelligence Enterprise.²

As a conceptual framework the Foundation Layer cannot be defined in absolute terms, but refers to the totality of the architecture that underpins intelligence operations. The Foundation Layer encompasses all of the services, processes, networks, and systems that support data access, transport, and sharing and are the tools that intelligence professionals employ to conduct their mission. This includes key intelligence and communications systems such as the Distributed Common Ground Station–Army (DCGS-A), TROJAN, and the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS); supporting information management repositories and methods, and the associated personnel, organizations, and processes.³

Organizational Reform

Over the course of many years, largely due to urgent needs to support operations in Iraq and/or Afghanistan, Army Intelligence, in concert with the Army Signal community, has developed a series of organizations, systems, and processes to support intelligence-unique requirements within LandWarNet and to provide requisite connectivity to the Intelligence Community (IC). While independently effective, each innovative solution ultimately acquired its own contract support infrastructure, its own hardware and software, and its own set of unique experts to make it operate. Today, these organizations and activities use slightly different business models, operate under different chains of command, manage requirements and architectures in slightly differently ways, and therefore—as a collective—have inherent redundancies and gaps. As currently arrayed, the systems, processes, and structure that comprise the Foundation Layer are fiscally unsustainable



and too institutionally dispersed to operate effectively. They were, quite simply, not designed with any unifying theme or grand design.

To address this problem, the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) is consolidating into a single organization, functions and/or resources (authorizations and/or funding) from across the enterprise. The primary building blocks are: INSCOM G6, Department of the Army Intelligence Information Services (DA IIS), Ground Intelligence Support Activity (GISA), elements of the 66th MI Brigade S6 Augmented TDA, and the U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) Intelligence Network Operations Center (INOC), and G3 Trojan Management Office. Similar functions from across the enterprise will also be included as appropriate.⁴ The resulting organization will be named the Ground Intelligence Support Activity or GISA. (While this new organization inherits the current GISA name and structure, its scope and responsibilities are significantly expanded.) The GISA Director will be a member of the Senior Executive Service (SES) and dual-hatted as the Assistant Chief of Staff, G6 for Headquarters, INSCOM. The current INSCOM G6 position, a Signal Corps colonel, will be re-designated as the Deputy G6 and Deputy Director GISA and also dual-hatted. The purpose for, and benefits of, this dual-hatting will be discussed in the next section. The resulting team has three distinct components: INSCOM G6 staff, GISA-Main, and the regional GISAs.

First, there remains a traditional G6 staff element, responsive to the INSCOM Chief of Staff, to perform key staff functions.⁵ (Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs) MTOE S6 sections are not affected by this restructure.) These functions are broadly described as planning (deciding what and how), policy (oversight), and resourcing (coordination of requirements, programming and budget execution synchronization; manpower authorizations including contractor support), distinct from executing operations. While the line between the two lanes can blur and by necessity there is some overlap for ‘battle handover,’ the intent is to distinguish between setting conditions and oversight—a staff function—and execution—a line function. The G6 is focused on horizontal and vertical integration; its primary connections are to HQDA G6, DAMI-IM (higher), NETCOM, the INSCOM staff and GISA-Main (horizontal), and MSC S6s (lower). The G6’s two primary functions are requirements management (including governance and change management and all aspects of supporting resource management) and leading and managing all aspects of the command’s IA program.

GISA-Main, headquartered at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, consolidates the Foundation Layer operational elements that

provide a service common to all. There are three key components of GISA-Main. The Plans, Engineering, and Installation Division does the technical design of the operational architecture including planning and project management, design, initial install, and Tier 3 Help Desk support. The second major component is the Intelligence Applications Support and Information Management (IM) Division. Built around existing DA IIS structure and processes this Division does enterprise wide content management and availability. The third piece of GISA-Main is the Telecommunications Services Division. This Division provides the common transport mechanisms leveraged by all.

The final component is the three regionally-oriented GISAs. In the transformed construct the USARPAC INOC becomes GISA-West (GISA-W), the current GISA at Ft. Bragg, becomes GISA-Central (GISA-C), and 66th MI Brigade’s Information Technology (IT) Directorate becomes GISA-East (GISA-E). The regional GISAs use the Geographic Combatant Command (CCMD) model—if it is in their area of responsibility (AOR) it is their role and responsibility to support. GISA-W, based in Hawaii, provides coverage of the Pacific including Korea; GISA-C has the Americas, and GISA-E, based at Wiesbaden, Germany, handles Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. (The AORs do not align exactly with CCMD AORs.) Upon Initial Operating Capability (IOC) there will also be a Headquarters or National Capital Region Division that is a direct report to the G6/Director GISA.

The Regional GISAs provide IT services to their customers—Army Commands, regional Army G2s/S2s, and other non-G2/S2 users, INSCOM’s MSCs, Foundry sites, other MI organizations and staffs, Reserve Component G2s/S2s, non-Army users supporting Army intelligence requirements, and non-Army customers on a fee-for-service basis. The specific nature of these services varies depending on the operational environment, particularly which network (SIPR, JWICS, coalition, etc.), whether the supported organization is deployed or in home station, and how the connection to the NETCOM/DISA/DIA/IC/GISA provided backbone is made. At IOC there will be some variance in IT services that will be provided among the three organizations, but by Full Operating Capability (FOC) any MI unit can expect that the GISAs will support the planning, architecture, engineering, procurement, implementation, sustainment, information assurance, IT support, and budget programming for MI IT infrastructure and mission systems.

The management, manipulation, indexing, storage, and preparation of data for use by intelligence analysts is executed in a centrally managed, cloud based architecture, integrated under GISA and consisting of geographic data

anchor nodes at Ft. Bragg (GISA-C), Wiesbaden, Germany (GISA-E) and Hawaii (GISA-W).

The GISAs will provide a common level of service in the provisioning of:

- ◆ SCIF services: classified and unclassified workstations, monitors, switches, keyboards, and mice, Tier 0 and desktop VTCs, printers, telephones, scanners, help desk, IT touch-labor, JWICS SCI Core Services (accounts, data storage, email, business applications, portal management, insider threat mitigation, information assurance, etc.)
- ◆ DCGS-A mission applications and data.
- ◆ Deployable DCGS-A nodes and Department of Defense Intelligence Information System workstations, VTC, and VOIP for Corps, Division, BCT, and Battalion deployments.
- ◆ Intelligence support throughout ARFORGEN phases via fixed DCGS-A nodes, 24/7 customer access to fixed DCGS-A nodes' ISR data for advanced analysis that benefit mission command in all six phases of joint operations.
- ◆ Access to coalition networks as required.
- ◆ Access to IC, other Service, and coalition data as required.
- ◆ Access to IC systems and analysis tools as required.

The regional GISAs provide their support through either subordinate nodes or contact teams—a node (or spoke off of the central hub) when and where there are sufficient requirements, primarily due to the density of the customers at remote locations, to warrant a full-time, on-site presence, or a contact team, when the demand signal isn't as high, to provide virtual support and physically travel to the site as required.

All new requirements are submitted in the Enterprise Ticketing System and all tickets can be viewed by all GISAs. Routine tickets, (e.g., new accounts, minor equipment replacements, etc.) are handled by the appropriate regional GISA or GISA-Main. Major tickets/requirements are elevated for appropriate configuration management and budget chop, and management approvals. After the requirement has been approved it will be assigned for architecture, engineering, funding, and project management.

The overarching concept is to have an enterprise set of organizations functioning as a single team that designs, builds, and operates the system that supports the entire life cycle of a piece of data from ingestion into the system, through being secured, stored, organized, transported, until it is either retrieved by or pushed to a user—MI Enterprise IT and IM services from garrison through deployed operations.

Operating as an Enterprise

A central concept toward achieving the *Intelligence 2020* vision is that effective intelligence operations require an enterprise approach that holistically addresses all components of the Intelligence Warfighting Function. While this issue is addressed through Mission Command, training, organizational design, leader education, and other ways, lack of an enterprise approach within the Foundation Layer quickly leads to redundancies and inefficiencies, at best and to mission failure, at worst. A similar theme exists in the Army's Signal doctrine in that the Army is "transitioning from the philosophy of connecting secure network autonomous enclaves in the different theaters to an interdependent security posture operating as a system of systems."⁶ Quite simply, users—at all levels—require a common set of tools and processes to access a common set of data whether at home station or deployed. Interoperability isn't a convenience, it is a mission requirement.

A key component of the transformed Foundation Layer is the Cloud architecture. Cloud anchor points consisting of huge server farms strategically positioned around the world and available to meet expeditionary demands, will provide immediate data access, solve continuity of operations challenges, and provide software as a service, thereby dramatically reducing both tactical and operational intelligence units' hardware and software footprint. Cloud anchor points are envisioned to exist as GISA-W (Hawaii), GISA-C (Fort Bragg) and GISA-E (Germany). INSCOM's functional brigades serve as anchor points/gateways to the National Centers/IC. The Cloud moves us to a centrally-managed single platform with shared dynamic IT services and other shared resources.

An enterprise approach is an operational necessity, but it also makes good business sense. As noted earlier, the current system is fiscally unsustainable and too institutionally dispersed to operate effectively. It creates redundancies and inefficiencies and deconfliction is too often either after the fact or requires elevation higher than necessary. The combined G6/GISA construct provides a mechanism to resolve these problems. The combined entity will provide clear leadership and direction, unity of effort, centralized oversight and planning of requirements and resource management, and architecture design and development. The concept mirrors current Signal Corps doctrine where the Commander of the Theater Signal Command and ASCC G6 are also dual-hatted.

The envisioned end-state is improved unity of effort, a common set of services to all users world-wide, and increased efficiencies as a result of total asset visibility. The

combined G6/GISA provides a holistic approach scaled to an enterprise-level solution, eliminating the need to continue conducting fragmented and disassociated one-off solutions. The critical components work together to achieve universal access to data sources and information management in order to satisfy intelligence requirements in support of operational force commanders across geographies, command structures, intelligence disciplines, classification domains, and networks.

Operating as an Intelligence Activity

The ‘Foundation’ Layer is named as such for a reason! It underpins everything Army Intelligence does and is absolutely essential to mission success. Three stages of the intelligence process: processing and exploitation, analysis and production, and dissemination and integration occur primarily by, with, and through the systems and processes that comprise the Foundation Layer. Moreover, in many cases, particularly with technical sensors, data and information collected, either through intelligence operations or other means of information collection, are often not useable until brought into the system.

Conversely it is readily apparent that the Foundation Layer absolutely depends upon the full complement of expertise brought by Signal Corps professionals. While success clearly requires a skillful blend of both intelligence and communication skill sets, ultimately the Foundation Layer must be viewed an intelligence activity. The reasons are two-fold. First, Army Intelligence must take ownership of its supporting architecture at all levels (and recently published doctrine on establishing the Intelligence architecture in recognition of this critical skill set). Second, and more importantly, is the underlying purpose of the Foundation Layer—it exists exclusively to enable intelligence activities.

To support these objectives the Foundation Layer is led by intelligence professionals who possess a sophisticated understanding of the intelligence cycle, the articulation and prioritization of intelligence requirements, and the intelligence activities and operations that satisfy those requirements in support of operational force commanders; intelligence professionals who understand and practice the complex push-pull associated with data access, data sharing, and information management to connect customers with the right data and information regardless of time, circumstances or location, required to satisfy warfighting intelligence requirements.

Way Ahead

The Foundation Layer exists today. It doesn’t, however, yet operate either as effectively or as efficiently as desired or necessary. The first step in transformation is to bring

together the disparate entities. This process began a few months ago and the basic task organization was effective at the start of the new fiscal year. (The final structure, including the transfer of GISA-W to INSCOM, is effective in Fiscal Year 2016.) Over the next few years the new organization will gradually transition towards FOC. Among the many tasks yet to be completed, the new organization must:

1. Hire an SES Director to lead and synchronize its efforts.
2. Develop its identity to move beyond current mindset and work towards the DA G2 and INSCOM CG’s vision.
3. Develop and implement a leader education strategy to help MI professionals at all levels understand what it is, what it does, and how to use it, including promulgation of a catalog of services (including any relevant user fees).
4. Develop internal standard operating procedures with the detailed techniques regarding the ways and methods to accomplish the organization’s core mission, functions or tasks.
5. Develop an enduring programming strategy.
6. Finalize organizational design and make TDA adjustments.



Endnotes

1. *LandWarNet* is the Army’s portion of the Department of Defense Information Networks. It is a technical network that encompasses all Army information management systems and information systems that collect, process, store, display, disseminate, and protect information worldwide. (FM 6-02, Signal Support to Operations, January 2014, 1-1.)

Network operations are the activities conducted to operate and defend the Department of Defense information networks. (JP 6-0, Joint Communications System, 10 June 2010, GL-10). See also FM 6-02, 1-0.

Network transport is a system of systems including the people, equipment, and facilities that provide end-to-end communications connectivity for network components. *Information services* enable the planning, controlling, and manipulating of information throughout its lifecycle. They include, but are not limited to, web services, E-mail, common directories, search services, and data services. Information services allow forces to access, store, and share information among unified action partners and civilian organizations, as well as dynamically tailor and prioritize information requirements to support the mission and affect the operational environment. The resources to connect the clients may belong to U.S. Services or forces, non-U.S. Services or forces, host nation or commercial assets. (FM 6-02, 1-9)

2. DA G2 Intel 2020 briefing. See also ADP 2-0, Intelligence, August 2012.

3. *Information management* is the science of using procedures and information systems to collect, process, store, display, disseminate, and protect data, information, and knowledge products (ADP 6-0, Mission Command).

4. Under provisions of the U.S. Army Pacific–INSCOM MOA, 3 June 2013.

5. G6 and S6 responsibilities are identified in FM 6-02, paragraph 2-3, and FM 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations, May 2014, paragraph 2-66.

6. FM 6-02, 3-1.

Ensuring ‘No Cold Starts’ in Army HUMINT

by Sergeant Major Wade C. Wilson



Introduction

The U.S. Army Operations Group (USAOG) specializes in Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and is the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command’s (INSCOM) Functional Major Subordinate Command for all aspects of HUMINT—from the FOUNDRY HUMINT Training Proponent to the conduct of full-spectrum HUMINT operations. This unique unit will become more important for the U.S. Army and Military Occupational Specialty 35M HUMINT Collectors as the Army transitions away from Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) platforms.

USAOG was established to fill a specific need: to conduct HUMINT operations in support of Army requirements at the operational level. The operational level bridges the gap between tactical collection conducted by U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) elements at echelons corps and below (ECB), and strategic collection conducted by Department of Defense (DOD) HUMINT. Though established in a time of war to support the operational requirements of ground combatant commanders, USAOG also has a critical peacetime mission—to look over-the-horizon at future operational threats and to provide a persistent presence in support of Army Service Component Command/combatant command operational planning in preparation for potential future conflict.

As such, USAOG must be able to conduct operations worldwide, including non-deployed/non-Joint Operating Area (JOA) environments, which are by Intelligence Community definition, in the Title 50 domain of strategic intelligence operations. This characteristic makes USAOG unique as the Army’s only full spectrum HUMINT organization. It is this uniqueness which will serve as a combat multiplier for the Army in the years to come to ensure the Army is adequately postured and prepared to conduct HUMINT operations on day one of the next OCO.

HUMINT Operations in a Post-OCO Army

One of the limiting factors for Army units seeking to conduct HUMINT is that HUMINT operations may only be conducted in an environment where both the Soldiers’

HUMINT training credentials and their unit’s HUMINT executor authorities allow the conduct of such operations. For most 35M Soldiers, especially at FORSCOM ECB units, their HUMINT credentials are sufficient only for the OCO, but not for a peacetime environment. Further, virtually no Army unit with assigned 35M Soldiers has the authority to conduct full spectrum HUMINT operations in a peacetime environment. Only one unit in the Army formation can operate within this authority—USAOG. Unfortunately USAOG has no 35M Soldier authorizations on its TDA that would allow for Soldiers to rotate through and gain this important HUMINT experience.

In the grand scheme of things, the lack of Soldiers at USAOG impacts the U.S. Army and the career development of 35M Soldiers in general far more than it hurts USAOG, which is sufficiently manned and staffed with highly qualified civilian employees. However, without Soldiers at USAOG, there is no mechanism by which the Army can rotate HUMINT Soldiers through the unit to gain the unique HUMINT skill sets conducted there and then return/reinvest that experience back into the greater Army formation. As such, 35M HUMINT Collectors, in a post-OCO/non-deployed Army, may become simply overt debriefers. The full-spectrum capability of HUMINT will rapidly become a skill set unavailable to FORSCOM elements, thereby disadvantaging the Army that will deploy to meet future contingency requirements.

The Army G2 has noted we cannot afford to make any more “cold starts.” In order to comply with this guidance, the Army must find a way to cycle, secure, and return this technical expertise to deployable FORSCOM elements. When we return this talent to Big Army, we help to ensure sufficient experience and talent is provided to FORSCOM units to train, manage, and supervise the next generation of deploying HUMINT Soldiers, thereby better preparing those units to execute their go-to-war mission. Only by continually cycling and investing this experience back into tactical formations can we ensure that mistakes of the past will not be repeated. Operations will be conducted by highly trained and experienced operators and managers, access to infor-

mation will not be lost, and the Army will gain the best return-on-investment available for its HUMINT enterprise.

A concerted effort to develop HUMINT professionals is required because managing human relations is an art, not a science. The skill set of conducting HUMINT operations requires extensive practice to develop a level of proficiency that can be sustained over time. Proficiency in these operations does not occur simply by attending a basic and advanced course of instruction. Training must be paired with operational utilization and that utilization tour must include a development and mentorship program to help junior collectors hone and refine their skills to become proficient collectors.

USAOG provides mentorship and professional development to its junior HUMINT officers via the small team environment as well as close collaboration with more senior officers and direct supervision by each team's highly experienced and trained operations officers and team chiefs. After one tour at USAOG, talented HUMINT collectors will seek follow-on assignments that round out their knowledge of the HUMINT process through such mechanisms as advanced inter-agency training or assignments as regional desk officers or in a language-dependent billet. After two tours and more advanced training, these highly experienced collectors are then ready to compete for supervisory positions as operations officers and team chiefs so they can help develop the next generation of HUMINT professionals.

USAOG lives by the Army G2's mandate of "Employ to Deploy." In other words, our members employ their go-to-war job functions everyday in a peacetime environment so there will be "no cold starts" when it comes time to deploy those skills in an OCO environment. HUMINT organizations learned quite painfully at the beginning of Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom that untrained/unpracticed source handlers may make mistakes resulting in the loss of HUMINT-derived information. These are mistakes we cannot afford to allow again, and USAOG ensures it will not occur on our watch through the "employ to deploy" mantra.

HT-JCOE and the KB Reid HUMINT Award

Expanding those "employ to deploy" opportunities for 35M Soldiers will require a rotational assignment mechanism at USAOG. A possible mechanism is now in the works that may make this goal a reality and solves multiple problems at once. The first problem, a lack of Soldier experiential rotations, was previously discussed. A second problem is how to increase attendance at the DOD HUMINT Training Joint Center of Excellence (HT-JCOE).

HUMINT training seats at HT-JCOE are sometimes not filled to capacity, which wastes a valuable, finite DOD resource.

While training seats are provided at no cost to the unit, there have not been enough applicants for the HUMINT courses to fill every seat. One suggested reason has been a lack of advertising concerning the training opportunity. A second possibility is that units do not want to lose Soldiers for a period of time, even if the unit will gain a more highly trained Soldier on the back end. A third possibility is that Soldiers are hesitant to apply for training with no perceived chance of utilization given the limited opportunities to conduct the HUMINT mission outside of the JOA environment.

The truth may lie somewhere in the middle or there may be multiple contributing factors, though no single factor is so complex that a solution cannot be found. Indeed, the G2's initiative to develop the KB Reid HUMINT Award is one such innovative solution to overcome the third potential factor—hesitance to apply due to lack of perceived utilization opportunities. This solution may also help solve the primary issue presented in this article—keeping HUMINT experience in the Army in a post-OCO world.

HT-JCOE recently established a Distinguished Honor Graduate Program for the Source Operations Course and the Defense Advanced Tradecraft Course. Distinguished Honor Graduates must exceed course standards set by the student evaluation plan for each of the two courses. When more than one student exceeds course standards, an internal panel will make a recommendation for selection of the Distinguished Honor Graduate based on established criteria. Soldiers named as the HT-JCOE Distinguished Honor Graduate will have the distinction noted on their DA 1059, Service School Academic Evaluation Report, as well as their graduation certificate.

Army Distinguished Honor Graduates will also receive the KB Reid HUMINT Award, named in honor of Colonel Kurush Bharucha-Reid (Deceased). This award will further facilitate the Army's effort to identify those HUMINT Soldiers and civilians best suited for further advanced HUMINT training.

INSCOM and the Army G2 are also exploring opportunities to provide the Army's HT-JCOE Distinguished Honor Graduates with a mechanism by which they could serve a utilization tour at USAOG. I propose it is that assignment mechanism which will encourage Soldiers to apply to HT-JCOE because finally a means will exist by which a utilization tour in the HUMINT function, in the post-OCO world, will be possible. Importantly, that combination of training at HT-JCOE and assignment at USAOG will also solidify the HUMINT Collector's expertise via the train, utilization, mentorship-model previously discussed.

Of course, along with the expertise gained from a utilization tour at USAOG, the Army will also gain an experienced

HUMINT Collector at the end of the assignment, thus returning crucial experience to deploying regionally aligned forces and completing the cycle. That return of experience is absolutely necessary to ensure HUMINT operational success on day one of the next OCO. It is impossible to build experience and expertise overnight. It must be done deliberately and continuously in preparation for the day that such experience is required.

Conclusion

The combination of HT-JCOE training, the KB Reid HUMINT Award, and assignment rotational mechanism at USAOG

combine to solve major problems facing Army HUMINT in the post-OCO environment. Altogether these mechanisms ensure there will be “no cold starts” in Army HUMINT in the years to come.



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On 7 August 2014, MG Robert P. Ashley, Jr., Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence and Fort Huachuca presented Ms. Letitia A. Long the Knowlton Award for distinguishing herself as a premier Intelligence Professional and Intelligence Community Leader during her tenure as as the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence (GEOINT) Agency (NGA) from August 2010 to October 2014. Throughout her tenure, she demonstrated unequalled commitment to the U.S. Armed Forces and to the Army in particular, as she propelled the National System for GEOINT and Allied System for GEOINT forward to achieve spectacular success in all facets of GEOINT. Director Long’s steadfast commitment to deployed forces ensured that Soldiers in “Harm’s Way” received robust and timely GEOINT through combined NGA forward-deployed and “reachback” support.

Advances in the GEOINT architecture have made GEOINT data more accessible to Soldiers and “Put the Power of GEOINT in the Hands of the Army.” Her unwavering partnership with Army Intelligence, contributed to a flawless transition of an essential operational capability from NGA to the Army, a first such transition from a National Agency to a Military Service. A resolute partner of key Army Senior Operational and Intelligence Leaders, Director Long figured prominently in advancing GEOINT training and tradecraft, professional certification, architecture evolution, and governance.

The strides in GEOINT taken under her leadership, contribute appreciably to achieving the goals and objectives of Intelligence 2020 in support of Army 2020, and will help assure “No Cold Starts” and “No GEOINT Soldier at Rest.” It is fitting that the Knowlton Award be awarded to recognize her outstanding leadership and contributions to Army Intelligence.



Photo by Rob Cox, NGA Office of Corporate Communications.

MG Ashley presents NGA Director Letitia A. Long with the Knowlton Award for Military Intelligence Excellence at NGA's Springfield, Virginia headquarters.

Vigilant Ready: 205th MI Battalion Ensures Trained and Ready Intelligence Teams for Pacific Engagement



by Second Lieutenant Ciara Stewart, Captain Benjamin Huff, Major James Fournier, and Lieutenant Colonel Heidi Urben

While the concept of regionally aligned forces was introduced two years ago, Army units understandably wrestle with how to operationalize it.¹ However, the U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) doesn't have that problem. With more than 82,000 Soldiers assigned to the U.S. Pacific Command, the Department of Defense's rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific region coupled with a decades-long tradition of theater security cooperation program (TSCP) events, ensures that U.S. Army units in the Pacific are staying "globally responsive and regionally engaged."² The emergence of the "Pacific Pathways" initiative, which seeks to establish "a semi-permanent presence in parts of the Pacific," demands not only ready brigade combat teams, but a host of key enablers.³

The 205th Military Intelligence (MI) Battalion, part of the 500th MI Brigade's Anchor Point in the Pacific, plays an integral role in this regional engagement by providing trained and ready intelligence teams ready to deploy in support of a host of contingency operations and partnering opportunities. "As the Army Force Generation model transitions, the concept of standing readiness takes on heightened importance," reflected the 205th MI Battalion S3. "Should there be a humanitarian assistance/disaster relief mission, a larger-scale contingency operation in the Pacific, or an opportunity to support a regionally aligned unit, we must be ready to deploy our teams in a moment's notice."

Managing this standing readiness, while continuing to provide daily intelligence support to Phase 0/1 Operations, requires a careful balance and constant prioritization of resources. From Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Collection teams to Counterintelligence (CI)/Force Protection Support Teams, to the Trojan-enabled Deployable Intelligence Support Element (DISE), the 205th MI Battalion maintains a number of trained and ready intelligence teams. The diverse

nature of TSCP exercises in the Pacific guarantees that these teams are routinely tested in a host of environments and diverse mission sets. In Fiscal Year 2014 alone, more than 40 Soldiers from across the battalion deployed in support of 16 different TSCP missions, providing real-world intelligence support in countries such as Thailand, the Philippines, Mongolia, Korea, and Australia just to name a few.

The centerpiece of the 205th MI Battalion's deployable capability is its Trojan-enabled DISE. The DISE's mission is to provide tailored intelligence support to include liaison and reach-back capabilities with the USARPAC Analysis and Control Element (ACE) at Fort Shafter, Hawaii. On order, the DISE serves as an alternate location for the ACE to conduct forward intelligence operations. An integral feature of the DISE is the Trojan Lite which allows for secure communications and SIPRNET, JWICS, and NSA Net access. The Trojan system enables and maintains multiple intelligence systems, such as the Distributed Common Ground System-Army, all-source and single source work stations, and video teleconferencing capabilities. This provides senior commanders on the ground a secure means of communication wherever the DISE is deployed. A key feature of the DISE is that it can be customized to support the needs of the mission and the




Photo by 205th MI BN

The 205th MI Battalion Trojan-enabled DISE established in the Kahuku Training Area, Oahu, Hawaii. This is the standard package, which provides secure communications capability, automated intelligence fusion systems, and tailored intelligence support.

particular region. The ACE has developed three different broad packages for the DISE, each with differing footprints, personnel, equipment, and logistical requirements which can be further scaled to the particular mission to ensure an efficient and tailored employment of its capabilities.

The Battalion uses a series of team-based charts to constantly track readiness down to the Soldier and equipment level. In addition to being a mechanism for leaders at the company-level to manage readiness of key deployable intelligence teams, these charts also serve as invaluable tools and quick capability references for the USARPAC staff as they conduct contingency planning in support of the Theater Joint Force Land Component Command (TJFLCC).



Sample DISE Readiness Chart

For the DISE Security NCOIC, flexibility is one of the DISE's most attractive features. "The DISE is a rapid deployable element with unparalleled reach-back capabilities in a variety of austere environments. It is also readily tailored to any mission requirement set forth, to include humanitarian efforts, stabilization operations, and on-site tactical support." He went on to say that, "the inclusion of ACE Block II into our DISE allows analysts direct access to raw data from throughout the intelligence community without the need for a significant increase of bandwidth via the Trojan communications array. This allows for steadier network connections and more reliable transmissions of information to elements both tactical and strategic."

While TSCP exercises offer superb opportunities to test teams such as the DISE, certifying them requires a deliber-

ate training approach. The 205th MI Battalion recently validated the tactical deployment of its DISE during a battalion field training exercise (FTX) in the Kahuku Training Area on the island of Oahu from 29 May to 2 June, 2014. The exercise began with the air movement of DISE personnel and the slingload of DISE equipment in two ISU-90 containers by CH-47 Chinook helicopters from the 25th Infantry Division (Light) Combat Aviation Brigade. Once on the ground, Soldiers from the Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) Team and DISE worked diligently to establish full connectivity of systems in the first 48 hours, simulating conditions in a contingency environment.

For most TSCP missions in the Pacific, the Trojan and DISE deploy via ship or in some cases, via fixed wing aircraft. However, this FTX afforded the IEW and DISE team the opportunity to validate load plans and conduct pre-combat checks for rotary-wing movement and slingload operations. Such training ensures the Battalion's critical intelligence teams are postured to meet the challenges and demands of the operational environment across the spectrum of conflict. "During this FTX, we validated that our leaders can plan for and our Soldiers can perform a short notice, rapid movement of our DISE via tactical airlift, to an austere location," said the Battalion Network Management Technician. "With this capability, we can provide the means for forward intelligence analysis and dissemination." He concluded, "Our Soldiers were able to work as a team



Soldiers of the 205th MI Battalion load onto UH60 helicopters for movement during the Battalion's FTX in the Kahuku Training Area, Oahu, Hawaii, June 2014.



Photo by SSG Padilla, 500th MI BDE

Soldiers of the 205th MI Battalion conduct slingload operations to redeploy the DISE at the conclusion of the Battalion's FTX in June 2014 at the Kahuku Training Area, Oahu, Hawaii. The rotary wing movement of personnel and equipment validated the DISE's ability to rapidly deploy and provide tailororable intelligence support in an austere location.

and really build cohesion during this event, as well as honing their skills on both our communications platforms and intelligence systems. We are postured to provide a quick-reaction force-like intelligence support to contingency operations in the USARPAC area of responsibility."

In addition to validating the DISE's tactical deployment, the Battalion FTX also offered an opportunity to further train and assess the cohesion, agility, core competencies, and proficiency in Army Warrior Tasks for all of the Battalion's deployable teams. Set against the backdrop of a fictional contingency operation on an island-nation in the Pacific, intelligence teams had to navigate ten dynamic situational training exercise lanes designed to not only test their ability to shoot, move, and communicate, but their ability to adapt to an uncertain and ever-changing scenario and apply their skills and training as Intelligence Soldiers first and foremost. The integration of Army Warrior Tasks alongside basic intelligence tasks, such as gathering information from host nation personnel to using an interpreter, made the scenario more realistic and helped further validate the readiness of HUMINT, CI, and All-Source intelligence teams alike. A Soldier from Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, echoed this sentiment during the After Action Review, commenting that "the scenario gave each lane complexity which required each squad member think about the skills being tested as they pertained to the tactical environment. This made the training more realistic and more challenging. It was a good opportunity to evaluate myself and others."

Conclusion

As the Army transitions from more than 13 years of sustained combat operations, the responsibility for maintaining standing readiness to deploy against a wide scope of contingency operations rightly falls to unit leaders to lead

and manage. Focusing on the readiness of key intelligence teams while never forgetting our critical Phase 0/1 obligations ensures ready and relevant intelligence support to the USARPAC Commanding General, the TJFLCC, and a host of Army elements conducting regional engagement in the Pacific theater. And while less quantifiable, instilling in our units the values of agility and the ability to thrive in uncertainty, helps forge teams ready to succeed on any mission and in any environment.



Endnotes

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LTC Urben commands the 205th MI Battalion at Fort Shafter, Hawaii. She has served in a variety of operational assignments including tours in Bosnia (1999-2000) and Afghanistan (2004-2005 and 2010-2011). Her past assignments include the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), the 25th Infantry Division (Light), multiple INSCOM units, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and faculty at the U.S. Military Academy. She holds a PhD in Government from Georgetown University and a BA in Government and International Studies from the University of Notre Dame.



The Army Force Protection Program in the SOUTHCOM AOR

by Pablo Velasquez and Robert Rendon



Introduction

The Force Protection Detachment (FPD) Program has matured considerably since its inception in 2002 and when the first 470th MI Brigade FPD office in the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility (AOR) opened in 2004. With eight offices under the Army administrative control in the SOUTHCOM AOR, it is the largest program in the Western Hemisphere. With the large number of Army personnel assigned to the FPD program, the 470th MI Brigade hosted the first FPD certification training at the unit level in February 2014.

The training helped solidify agent skill sets while formalizing the training requirement according to the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) priorities. 470th MI Brigade FPD offices have demonstrated through their hard work and critical mission support that they are an essential part of the U.S. Country Team and necessary to ensure the safety of Department of Defense (DoD) in-transit personnel.

Background

On 12 October 2000, al-Qaeda conducted a suicide attack against the USS Cole, a U.S. Navy guided-missile destroyer, while it was harbored and being refueled in the Yemeni port of Aden killing 17 American sailors and injuring 39. As a result, the U.S. Congress established the USS Cole Commission to study the problem. The Commission identified several factors that could mitigate any future repeat of this tragedy including the immediate need for the military Services to provide counterintelligence (CI) support to the force protection (FP) of DoD personnel and resources while in-transit in overseas locations. The Office of Secretary of Defense subsequently sponsored the FPD Program based on the findings of the Commission.

FPDs would further serve as a “force protection, force multiplier” for U.S. Embassy Country Teams to maintain a high posture of FP for the DoD presence in those locations. The FPD was charged to operate from embassies conducting overt liaison with host and partner nations to establish

threat warning procedures regarding potential intelligence, criminal, environmental, and other threats that could adversely affect the security of DoD in-transit personnel/resources. Other missions included providing routine DoD CI and FP services to the Country Team, as well as surge capabilities in the event of crises, contingencies, or other DoD requirements. All FPDs act as “first-responders” to incidents involving in-transit military or DoD civilian personnel.

Each military Service serving as an Executive Agent for FPDs is responsible for sponsoring and administratively supporting the offices assigned to them. It is possible for each FPD office to have members from the other services serving as special agents. The 470th MI Brigade is the executive agent for eight out of thirteen FPDs in the USSOUTHCOM AOR.

SOUTHCOM FPD Missions

In recent years, SOUTHCOM FPDs have executed some high profile missions. In 2013, FPD Colombia secured Colombian military air support to fly into the jungle to recover the remains of U.S. and Panamanian personnel who perished in an aircraft incident in a remote jungle location. They recovered the flight data recorder and other sensitive U.S. equipment, thus preventing any potential compromise and respectfully returning the remains of U.S. personnel back to the U.S. FPD personnel were tasked by the U.S. Ambassador and the Senior Defense Official to assist in that recovery mission. FPD personnel were given high accolades by the Ambassador for their responsiveness to this critical mission and later recognized by Commander, USSOUTHCOM.

In 2010, FPD Dominican Republic provided critical coordination and operational support services to Army South and SOUTHCOM during an earthquake that devastated neighboring Haiti. Meanwhile, in Brazil, the FPD provides continuous coverage for numerous U.S. dignitaries to include senior White House, Cabinet, and Joint Chiefs personnel and coordinated the CI support to DoD forces when Brazil hosted the 2014 World Cup and in preparations for the 2016 Olympics.

In 2013, FPD Paraguay took the lead, in conjunction with 470th Cyber Security team to provide cyber security training to the Paraguayan military. The government of Paraguay recognized that it did not have the technological expertise to deal with daily criminal and insurgent threats and thus requested FPD assistance which they needed and appreciated. Additionally, in Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala the FPDs counsel, advise, and assist US forces who operate in extremely high-crime nations where violence is the considered among the worst in the world.

The 470th MI Brigade's Certification Program

The personnel who serve in FPD assignments can deliver a wide array of experience and expertise as they hone their trade. The FPD program expects special agents to be discrete, professional, and adept at negotiating with their host nation counterparts to instill trust and confidence to achieve FP objectives. The FPD agents must also act as good team members with their U.S. colleagues on the country teams and be able to persuade, motivate, influence, and be a valued component of the political, operational, and security entities governing the U.S. presence. They must be "self-disciplined" personnel who will work long hours with meager resources.

Based on these requirements, INSCOM and the 470th MI Brigade must ensure these agents have all the resources required to perform their mission. The basis to initiate a certification program arose from FPD agents operating in this dynamic environment and the need for more formalized training. Additionally, the 470th MI Brigade Commander wanted to reinforce the efforts of those serving, establish a baseline of expectations, and provide the training necessary for any individual to perform under sometimes difficult circumstances.

Meanwhile, the INSCOM CG issued a list of training priorities which emphasized ethics and standards of conduct; financial management; intelligence contingency funds; information intelligence reports and FPD specific reporting formats; serving in a diplomatic assignment overseas; identifying operational and support shortfalls; and best practices among FPDs which can be leveraged to improve CI support to the force protection of DoD in-transit forces in the SOUTHCOM AOR. With INSCOM priorities in mind, the 470th MI Brigade developed and hosted the first FPD Certification Training Course at a unit level from 3–14 February 2014 at Fort Sam Houston and Camp Bullis in San Antonio, Texas. Thirteen Army Special Agents and one Navy Criminal Investigative Service Agent, representing their respective FPDs in Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic,

El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Peru attended this important training.

The certification training included a three day Embassy Operations Course as the focal point of the certification. Additional blocks of instruction from subject matter experts included a concealed weapons course, FPD agent roles and responsibilities, ethics/standard of conduct, SHARP, TARP, EEO, financial management, theater intelligence security cooperation and defense language proficiency testing as specific training modules, with the emphasis given to promoting the health of the force. In addition, analysts from the 470th MI Brigade Analysis and Control Element also benefited from the certification training. The analysts had the opportunity to meet with the agents in a roundtable setting to discuss current trends in the AOR, and analytical support to force protection operations. This is an important resource for FPD personnel to have at their disposal, an intelligence asset ready to provide background, research, analysis, and critical intelligence support to their daily activities.


This certification training was essential for personnel who are located in high threat-countries in South America such as Colombia where the drug cartels have a significant presence. In total, 14 agents and five guest attendees met the strict qualification standards set by INSCOM and the 470th MI Brigade to operate in embassy environments and in hostile environments outside the embassy compound.

Looking forward, the 470th MI Brigade is willing and able to host other Service FPD personnel along with other Army FPD candidates wishing to obtain certification to be competitive for a future assignment in the program. As CI professionals, it is the duty and responsibility of each assigned agent to maintain a high standard. U.S. Embassy employees have a code of conduct as representatives of the U.S. Government abroad. Not only is each agent a representative of the our Government, but is also an ambassador for the CI community. Therefore, it is imperative to continue to train the force to meet the high standards.

Conclusion

Overall, the certification training went beyond expectations which enhanced the capability to support forward-deployed elements and the ability to provide timely, accurate and responsive CI support to FP. The FPD personnel departed San Antonio more confident in their abilities to manage their offices and conduct effective missions to help prevent another USS Cole-type attack. They are current in their skill set and ready to perform at a level we have come to expect and which the position demands.





Introduction

In order to meet the Commander's requirements for the Army 2020 vision, the Army has reshaped the Aerial Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (A-ISR) Force by creating the Aerial Intelligence Brigade (AIB). This new Brigade, headquartered at Fort Gordon, Georgia, under the leadership of an Aviation-Military Intelligence Officer (AOC 15C35), will bring new capabilities to the A-ISR enterprise. New sensors, platforms, and capabilities create the requirement for new approaches to advanced technical training for operators, analysts, and maintainers. More than just individual level training, the complex and essential process of Tasking, Collection, Processing, Exploitation, Dissemination and Feedback (TC-PED-F) requires realistic collective training.

For the first time in history, a single brigade will control the aircraft; sensors; architecture; Distributed Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (DPED), and MI system maintenance. These changes require a critical look at intelligence operator, analyst, and maintenance training requirements. Three primary objectives must be accomplished for the transition to be successful—the professionalization of Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 35G Geospatial Intelligence Imagery Analyst (IA), development of tooth to tail crew level collective training, as well as educating the force at large.

Background

Thirteen years of war has necessitated the development of a dynamic Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) spectrum of capabilities including Wide Area Persistent Surveillance (WAPS), Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR), Dismounted Moving Target Indicator (DMTI), Hyper Spectral Intelligence (HSI), Optical Change Detect (OCD) and Coherent Change Detect. All of these capabilities were developed and em-

ployed by our defense industry partners in response to an immediate need levied by the Battle Space Owners (BSOs) in Iraq and Afghanistan. Starting with TF ODIN-E (Observe, Detect, Identify, Neutralize-Enhanced) in Afghanistan at the end of 2012, the long process of transitioning these single GEOINT Quick Reaction Capabilities (QRCs) and the Army Operated Medium Altitude A-ISR assets to the sensor agnostic GEOINT focused enterprise began. This started by layering various GEOINT and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) A-ISR Assets in synergistic methods to answer BSO essential elements of information (EEIs) and priority intelligence requirements (PIRs). Simultaneously, the transition to conduct PED via Reach began at CONUS locations in order to reduce the forward deployed footprint with zero degradation to the quality and timeliness of intelligence reporting. Suddenly, TF ODIN-E analysts required a robust knowledge and understanding of all assets flying in theater, not just the asset that they were responsible for conducting Full Motion Video (FMV) exploitation. DPED analysis and reporting brings its own new sets of challenges to the battle space. Providing quality GEOINT products to supporting units (BSOs) along with providing products to the supported Analysis and Control Element and greater Intelligence Community requires a better understanding of the new sensors and capabilities to allow our Collection Managers and MOS 35F Intelligence Analysts do timely tasking and accurate reporting.

The emerging AIB/PED Center of Excellence (CoE) professionalization of the 35G Soldier process centers on the creation of the Novice, Senior, and Master model. Each 35G is expected to be trained and proficient, and maintain a sustained knowledge in FMV imagery analysis. This will be the baseline level of proficiency for each 35G. The AIB/PED CoE currently executes this baseline proficiency training/certification program for all Imagery Analysts. Once fully certified

as a FMV analysts, selected 35Gs will be given the opportunity to specialize in a sensor agnostic GEOINT specialty. The specialties align with the future Army A-ISR program of record sensors and aircraft configurations.

In fulfilling the Army's A-ISR 2020 Vision, the Army will capture and retain the most successful QRC operated sensors in (24) B350ER Aircraft. (8) EMARSS (M) will be SIGINT focused, (4) EMARSS(V) will be DMTI/GMTI focused with Synthetic Aperture Radar and SIGINT, (8) EMARSS(G) will be GEOINT/Wide Area Airborne Surveillance focused with AWAPS, MASIVS and LIDAR and lastly, (4) EMARSS (S) will be Advanced SIGINT focused.



Training the Force


The Novice-Senior-Master progression will be developed for OCD, LiDAR, HSI/High Resolution Imaging, WAPS and DMTI progression utilizing a series of National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)-College AGILE web Training, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command Foundry Courses and Live Environment Training, and finally a QA/QC Certification course to reach the Senior level. Master Level Certification will require the Analyst to be trained and qualified for each sensor type of specialization, as well as the Collection Requirements Manger Course at the U.S. Army Intelligence CoE. We must leverage our national intelligence partners at NGA and the National Security Agency (NSA) to ensure that we are capable of not only training our Force but also professionalizing our tactical Intelligence Soldiers to ensure we provide the best trained military intelligence professionals to the Combatant Commanders, as is already so well done by our Title 50 partners at NSA and NGA.

Initially, the AIB will require the participation of, and instruction by, our defense industry partners. Most of our defense industry partner analysts have been working the same mission set/sensor for the past five to seven years and offer superior expertise and continuity to their military counterparts. Capturing the institutional knowledge of these defense industry partners during the transition from an Army Lead QRC solution to an Army Lead and Army Operated solution is essential to achieving the Army 2020 vision. This will require the AIB to adopt the program of instruction originally developed by our defense industry partners as well as retain their best and brightest as instructors and subject matter experts.

More than just the IA, the entire aircrew must be working towards the same common goal. The pilots must have the same understanding of the mission they are supporting as the Aerial Sensor Operator (ASO) does. This is the same level of understanding that the IA must have. The pilot in command of the aircraft must also be in command of the mission. Without knowing the importance of the mission they are supporting, the Pilot-in-Command cannot properly assess risk and prioritize mission requirements. The IA is part of that aircrew. Through a Crew Communication Capability, the IA must be able to communicate with the pilots, ground forces and ASO. This verbal communication increases the situational awareness of all parties and shaves critical seconds when supporting kinetic operations or troops in contact. With the rapid fielding of MARSS aircraft and the increase of fixed wing aviators supporting FMV type ISR mission, the first time the majority of the pilots flew with a sensor operator in the back of their aircraft was


during their first combat mission in Afghanistan. No collective crew level training was ever conducted prior to deployment. Not only did this result in a less than perfect collection, it also prevented an opportunity for leaders to stress the importance of the mission they were conducting.

Crew level training prior to any future deployment will fix the majority of these issues. From aircraft to sensor to network architecture, DPED to MI Systems development to individual and collective training from front-end to back-end must take place to ensure that our MI Soldier have the correct skill set required to meet the ever increasing demands of our War Fighting commanders. Part of this is developing a crew level professionalization program, so that the aircrew can train the pilot, ASO, and IA in both simulated and live environments. Debriefs and after action reports, whether in person or via VTC, are essential to professional Army A-ISR TC-PED-F. IAs and ASOs can give each other real-time feedback and pilots can develop tactics, techniques, and procedures and future doctrine on an appropriate level of mission involvement.



This crew level training can be conducted by a combination of two methods. One method is through advanced simulations equipment which exercise the pilots, ASOs, and IAs all through the same simulated mission. The interface must be Distributed Common Ground Station-Army (DCGS-A) based and the ASO and IA must utilize the same exact DCGS-A software they would be using to exploit a live mission. The second opportunity to conduct crew level training is through regular combat training center (CTC) support rotations. Aircrews and the ASO will de-

ploy and support each CTC rotation with a variety of intelligence capabilities. The TC-PED-F will be conducted at the AIB at Back Hall in Fort Gordon, Georgia. This holistic approach will train from sensor to collection to network architecture to MI systems maintenance for all Soldiers involved in conducting A-ISR Support.



Mission Room, AIB, Fort Gordon, Georgia



ISR Coordination Cell and Operations Floor, AIB, Fort Gordon, Georgia

To ensure we have the capability to do TC-PED-F, we must ensure that we have a workforce that is trained and able to maintain MI Systems and understand the complex architecture that these systems operate in. The core requirements for our MOS 35T MI Systems Maintainer/Integrators include a working knowledge of SEMA systems and sensors, OGS (operational ground station) DCGS-A, Trojan Spirit and Tactical Ground Station. The multitude of systems and the numerous net-

works that our network administrators and maintenance technicians must maintain include NIPR/SIPR/CXI/BICES/JWICS/NSAnet. Understanding the accreditation process and IA requirements for each network is also a necessity.

Even with an intensive education effort, many of the Officers and Soldiers who most need ISR support are not aware of the incredible A-ISR suite of options available to them. Due to the classified nature of the A-ISR assets provided, the dissemination of capabilities has been limited to units with direct SIPRNET access. With the standing up of the AIB ISR Coordination Cell (ICC), teams of MI Soldiers are assigned to each CCMD/ASCC/MIB(T) in order to fulfill the most crucial, but often overlooked aspects of TC-PED-F. This ensures that those who are requesting ISR support understand the capabilities and sensors available to answer their individual intelligence information problem set leading to effective asset/sensor tasking. Without an effective feedback process, timely supported consumer to AIB/PED CoE analyst, it is impossible to determine if we are meeting the Ground Force Commanders EEIs and PIRs. The ICC meets this feedback requirement for the A-ISR layer.

In addition, the ICC offers recommendations to the Collection Managers to ensure they are using the optimal sensor and collection techniques for whatever EEI or PIR they are attempting to collect against. Through classified and unclassified briefings on the A-ISR capabilities of the AIB to leaders from the Division Commander's Pre-

Command Course all the way down to company and platoon level leaders, we will empower new and creative thinkers with the tools and knowledge to ensure we are tasking effectively and getting the products that the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marine so desperately require. CTC rotations, along with continuous education and coordination with the CCMD/ASCC through the aligned ICC team and associated MIB(T), we will ensure that the capabilities of the A-ISR layer will be propagated to the lowest levels and allow the war fighters to train with and plan for live A-ISR support. Only then, when the Soldiers who live or die by the Intelligence provided are aware and able to request the capabilities needed, will the effectiveness of tasking be at a level to satisfy the time critical intelligence requirements.

Conclusion

The professionalism of the GEOINT Soldier is the only way to meet the Army's 2020 vision and ensure the A-ISR layer is ready for our next conflict, humanitarian, or natural disaster. By co-locating and integrating EMIB Soldiers with the AIB/PED CoE, we will ensure the same training is available to all PED Soldiers and ensures no MI Soldier is at rest. AIB Soldiers from pilots, to ASOs, to IAs, to MI System Maintainers will be trained and ready to deploy world wide as a light expeditionary capability or support all TC-PED-F operations via Reach back in support of all future conflicts order to fulfill the Ground Force Commander in any future capacity.



The next article (facing p. 40) is recommended by MG Ashley for insights on the relationship between the intelligence officer and the commander. Please read his comments below:

Intelligence has and will always play a crucial role in the success of any military conflict, or better yet the prevention of future conflict. As we continue to examine the future operational environment and the new Army Operating Concept of "Win in a Complex Environment," our ability to ensure "no cold starts...and no MI Soldier at rest" only grows in importance. The Military Intelligence Corps' ability to deal with future "complexity" will require leveraging groundbreaking technology to deal with the enormous volume of information, but more importantly will be our work in the human dimension to enhance cognitive performance to deal with complexity. In some cases enhancing cognitive performance is as basic as taking time to mentor young intelligence professionals and sharing our experiences.

As we look ahead to future challenges, it is just as important that we look back at history. Lessons and insights found in the pages of history can accelerate the learning process. Former U.S. Central Command General Jim Mattis' comment about finding time to study history is a priceless insight and warning for all our intelligence professionals to heed. Gen Mattis said, "The problem with being too busy to read is that you learn by experience, or by your men's experience (i.e., the hard way). By reading, you learn through others' experiences, generally a better way to do business, especially in our line of work where the consequences of incompetence are so final for young men. Thanks to my reading, I have never been caught flat-footed by any situation, never at a loss for how any problem has been addressed (successfully or unsuccessfully) before. It doesn't give me all the answers, but it lights what is often a dark path ahead."

Our education as intelligence professionals requires we be students of history. This is because the maneuver commanders we serve are students of history—it is part of their culture, their language, and is as foundational as their study of doctrine. We are reprinting an article that first ran in the INSCOM Journal (March-April 1996) because it provides key insights regarding the importance of the G2/S2 relationship with the commander and how the commander receives intelligence. LTG Phillip Davidson was an intelligence officer for Generals MacArthur, Westmoreland, and Abrams—all whom valued intelligence but consumed it differently. In this short article you will see the importance of critical thinking, but more importantly you will see the need to understand that how your commander consumes intelligence is integral to enabling mission command. Enjoy!

Major General Robert P. Ashley, Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence

How the Big Three (MacArthur, “Westy” and “Abe”) used Intelligence

Lt. Gen. Phillip B. Davidson, who served three generals in two wars, explains these commanders’ use of intelligence in making decisions

By Jeanette D. Lau

Stategic and tactical intelligence historically has been critical to any battle. In the future, the intelligence community will play an even more vital role. To help us learn from the experiences of intelligence used in two wars under three commanders, we interviewed Lt. Gen. Phillip B. Davidson Jr., the honorary colonel of the Military Intelligence Corps in 1994-1995.

Lt. Gen. Davidson was a squadron commanding officer and regimental executive officer in World War II of a Mechanized Reconnaissance Group in Patton’s Third Army. He was a staff officer, G2, Far East Command, at headquarters in Tokyo, Japan, during the Korean War. During the Vietnam War, he began as the G2, headquarters, US. Army Pacific before becoming the J2, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam from 1967-1969. He later became the assistant chief of staff for intelligence, Department of the Army, and deputy assistant secretary of defense for intelligence, before his retirement in 1974.



Gen. Creighton Abrams (left) congratulates then Maj. Gen. Phillip B. Davidson, assistant chief of staff, J-2, after awarding him the distinguished service medal and joint services commendation in May, 1969. (Photo by SP5 Robert Fromm)

In a conversation from his Texas home, he shares his experiences with three battlefield commanders, telling how each leader used intelligence in making decisions in war.

Lau: Looking back over the field of intelligence activities, what approach would you take in discussing it?

Davidson: Let me start with a generalization—in a war, intelligence is never going to be perfect. You can go back through history, and you’ll find there was always one or two things—some major, some minor—which intelligence officers, regardless of how close they came to predicting enemy action, didn’t forecast. (Some) intelligence is going to be either missing or incorrect. The commander must understand this.

Lau: You are in a unique position to look back at the events leading to three wars; World War II, the Korean War and the War in Vietnam. You served three famous generals, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Gen. William Westmoreland and Gen. Creighton W. Abrams Jr., who were engaged in those wars. More importantly, you offered the intelligence they needed to make battlefield decisions. Please take a few minutes and offer your comments on how these commanders used intelligence.

Davidson: Before we can discuss how each used intelligence, we have to understand the debilitating position from which each American had to conduct his operations. That weakness—not generally even now appreciated—was that the enemy held the strategic initiative. MacArthur gained it with his Inchon Landing, but lost it again to the enemy when the Chinese came into the war.

Westmoreland and Abrams never held the strategic initiative in Vietnam because President Lyndon Johnson restricted them to the boundaries of South Vietnam. President Johnson's decision allowed the enemy (through the movement into and out of his "out-of-South Vietnam" sanctuaries) to determine the type of combat (conventional, guerrilla, or something in between), the timing of enemy offensives, the objective(s), the size of the offensive, the number of casualties incurred, etc. In short, the Americans in both wars could only react to the North Vietnamese and North Korean/Chinese plans and operations.

Now, if a commander is placed in a reactive role (as these three leaders were), he and his G-2 (J-2) must



Although Gen. Douglas MacArthur (right) wanted intelligence reports in writing, he had a wealth of experience in Japan and Korea. He used both to make decisions. (U.S. Army photo)

attempt to foresee the nature of future enemy operations. It is with this forecast that the commander and his intelligence officer are most likely to fall into two deadly traps

in the use of intelligence. These are: ethnocentrism and preconception.

Let me define both. Ethnocentrism in intelligence operations means an ignorance of the enemy nation's values, history and culture. With it comes an unrecognized sense of superiority of one's own value system and culture. The failure to appreciate ethnocentrism becomes fatal to the commander when the commander/intelligence officer applies the standards and values of one's own culture to the decision making of an enemy.


Robert McNamara, secretary of defense during a large part of the Vietnam War, once said when he wanted to know what Ho Chi Minh would do in a given situation, he (McNamara) imagined himself in Ho's position. He lamented later that in applying his (McNamara's) value system, he was always wrong about Ho's action.

Phillip B. Davidson Jr. 1915-1996

The INSCOM military intelligence family extends its sympathy to the family of Lt. Gen. Phillip B. Davidson Jr., who passed away in February at his home in San Antonio, Texas.

Lt. Gen. Davidson was a veteran of World War II, the Korean War and the Vietnam War. He began his military intelligence career shortly before the Korean War; he retired from the position of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Intelligence in 1974.

Lt. Gen. Davidson gave his last interview, which appears in this issue of the Journal, in October 1995. In later discussions, the general acknowledged his illness and asked that we "march on" and publish it. He was a great asset to the MI community and the Army and he was a gentleman to the end.



General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, commander-in-chief, U.N. Command, confers with Maj. Gen. John B. Coulter, Commander, XX Corps, at IX Corps Headquarters, just prior to the start of a gigantic U.N. offensive against the communist-led North Korean forces. Gen. MacArthur flew to Korea to discuss details of the push with his commanders in the field.

(U.S. Army photo)

Preconception—the premature and fixed acceptance by the commander/intelligence officer that the enemy will carry out a certain (and only that certain) line of action. The mistake is after reaching this preconception, the commander/G-2 emphasizes only the intelligence confirming the preconception, while ignoring or denigrating all intelligence which refutes it.

Finally, the method (oral briefing, conference, written brief) by which the various commanders received intelligence indicated how each viewed intelligence and how each sought to use it.


Lau: How did Gen. MacArthur use intelligence?

Davidson: Now, MacArthur was a genius with one of the most retentive memories I've ever seen. He didn't want to be briefed

orally. He wanted it to be put in writing (which we did daily; a document of about three or four pages). It was called the All Source Intelligence Summary, or something like that. This was the intelligence on which Gen. MacArthur made his decisions,

and incidentally, on which his major subordinate commanders made their decisions...to great extent. Of course, the other commanders had intelligence input from their own organizations.

As a young lieutenant colonel, I briefed him every night about 6 p.m. on enemy happenings during the past 24-hour period. What MacArthur wanted was the enemy actions of the day before. He wasn't interested particularly in our interpretation of intelligence, although he was quite willing to read it. Once you gave him the facts of the enemy situation, MacArthur was his own intelligence officer. We were fortunate because we were really getting solid



Americans received solid intelligence on the Koreans and later received good intelligence on the Chinese as well. (U.S. Army photo)

intelligence in Korea, except on the Chinese when they first came into the war. Later on, we were getting good intelligence on them, too.

Lau: Please take a few minutes to comment on Gen. MacArthur's ethnocentrism and preconception.

Davidson: Of the three men... MacArthur was far in advance on ethnocentrism. He had enormous experience in the Orient from 1905, when as a lieutenant, he had been his father's aide-de-camp there. He knew the Japanese in World War II, the Koreans later and others, didn't think or act like Americans, so you have to give him high marks on ethnocentrism.

One preconception, of course, has been stated several times: MacArthur didn't think the Chinese were going to come into the war. In his opinion, they would have come in at what MacArthur considered to be the most favorable time for the Chinese...when we were cooped up in Pusan perimeter. Of course, he was wrong.

Lau: What about Gen. William Westmoreland?

Davidson: Now, Westy. Westy was a product of World War II and the European theater, where real intelligence was almost nonexistent at division level and below.

As a squadron commander, as a regimental executive officer and for a short time a regimental commander, I don't really remember that we got much of any kind of intelligence. Certainly, not any that would be much help. Eventually, we would find out what was on the opposite side of the line from us because a German would defect, or we would capture a prisoner.

It was a terrain war...they gave you terrain objectives, such as to

capture the ridge ahead of you. In one case, we were to cross the Moselle River (I was in the Third Cavalry Reconnaissance Group Mechanized). We were supposed to cross the Moselle then cross the Saar and end up on the west bank of the Rhine. Again, it was always a terrain objective rather than anything to do with the enemy. Westmoreland was a product of this concept of operations by terrain objectives.

Lau: How did Gen. Westmoreland use intelligence?

Davidson: I didn't think, until well into his tenure, about 1967-1968, he really appreciated intelligence. Of course, he accepted and used it, but I don't think he saw it as the critical determinant in the formation of his own concepts and counteroperations.

Lau: Did Gen. Westmoreland have a procedure concerning intelligence use?

Davidson: Westy's principle means of intelligence reception was a conference type briefing which he



Lt. Gen. William Westmoreland (center) was a flexible commander. He constantly warned his staff, "Let's not get our minds fixed on one course of enemy action." (Photo by SP5 Robert Fromm)

personally installed, called the Weekly Intelligence Estimate Update. And of course, being in the Army, it became known as the WIEU (pronounced woo).

The WIEU was held every Saturday morning in the U.S. Military Assistance Command's (MACV) top secret briefing room at 8 a.m. It was attended by Gen. Westmoreland, Gen. Creighton W. Abrams Jr., his deputy; and Robert W. Komer (with the rank of ambassador) as his deputy for pacification. Other attendees: the commanding general of 7th Air Force (who furnished air support in theater) and the admiral commanding, U.S. Navy, Vietnam, plus the principal staff officers in Vietnam. All were generals.

Here the intelligence on the North Vietnam Army/Viet Cong (NVA/VC) for the week was carefully presented by regional (corps area) experts. It was an open and free

discussion. People certainly disagreed, and this was a good thing. All the principal actors in the theater saw the intelligence. They heard the disagreements. They got interested in intelligence. It was an excellent way to disseminate intelligence to a small leadership group.

Lau: What about ethnocentricity and preconception?

Davidson: Of all three commanders, Westy had the least grasp of ethnocentricity. He had been the commander in South Vietnam for four years. He sensed there was an "X factor" here which we weren't getting and weren't understanding, but I don't think he ever clearly realized the existence and importance of ethnocentricity.

As for preconception, he was excellent. He carefully restrained

himself from preconception. He constantly warned the staff, "Let's not get our minds fixed on one course of enemy action." This was particularly true when events were leading up to the Tet Offensive. We didn't suffer from preconception, thank goodness, because what did happen at Tet wasn't what any of us had in the back of our minds. But, that's another story.

Lau: What else do you remember about Gen. William Westmoreland?

Davidson: Westmoreland was a flexible commander. The night before the enemy's main Tet Offensive began, the NVA/VC launched five or six small premature attacks against villages in central South Vietnam...turned out to be a calendar mix-up. As soon as I saw this intelligence, I went to Westy and



Gen. Creighton W. Abrams was "an intelligence officer's dream...He loved to talk informally about the enemy situation." Above, he rides on a utility articulated vehicle. (Photo by Spc. 5 Robert Fromm)

told him this was the form of the Tet Offensive, and these type attacks would be launched all over South Vietnam that night. He said, "yes, I agree." He reached over and called the telephone operator and said, "Get me a conference call with all the major commanders." He began to put them all on alert. I was impressed how he quickly, flexibly, transferred his whole thought, his entire focus, to his counteroffensive.

Lau: What was it like to work for Gen. Creighton Abrams?

Davidson: Abrams. Well, Abe was an intelligence officer's dream. Abe thought intelligence was the most important factor in the conduct of his operations. He was right for the reason that I've given before: the loss of the strategic initiative.

Lau: What was Gen. Abrams procedure for receiving intelligence?

Davidson: Abrams continued the WIEU as his formal procedure for receiving intelligence. He (Abe) took the WIEU one step further—he had every session tape-recorded.

Abe was the only senior commander I knew who loved to visit the intelligence collectors in the field. He would go out and listen to them, listen to some of their theories they were getting from the raw intelligence they produced. He would tell them what a good job they were doing, and it just worked wonders on their morale and effectiveness. (*Here's something a G-2/J-2 should remember!*)

Abe was very careful, however, not to act on any of the raw intelligence he got in the field. If he got raw intelligence, he would come back and tell me, "Here's what I heard down in the field...what do you think about it?" And we'd work it over, analyze it, staff it.



A Troop "B" member of the 11th Armored Cavalry, taking part in the staging of a capture and interrogation of an enemy soldier, searches the "Viet Cong" soldier "captured" near Fire Support Base "Henderson."

(Photo by Spc. 4 H. M. Peacock)

He loved to talk informally about the enemy situation. By 1969, we had a general officers' compound with a bunch of trailers and in the middle of it was the general officers' mess with a bar. A lot of times Abe would call me down to the end of the bar, and we'd quietly stand there and just chat about the enemy situation. He was fascinated by the enemy's situation, his condition, and plans.

Lau: How would you rate Gen. Abrams concerning ethnocentrism and preconception?

Davidson: He sensed the importance of ethnocentrism, but he didn't see it much more clearly than Westmoreland did. I confess I didn't see it any more clearly than they did either. It was only after a great deal of reflection and study in the years after my tenure in Vietnam as the J-2 that the importance and the criticality of this factor became clear to me. Preconception? Abe got high marks here. He resolutely refused to set his mind on what the enemy was going to do. Flexibility? Yes, after the Tet offensive when the enemy went into small unit tactics,



Inside a plane, a U.S. Army Signal Corps photographer shoots motion pictures of supplies being dropped by aircraft to Chinese Forces in the interior of China. (U.S. Army photo)

he immediately switched his entire concept from the big battle concept to the small unit operations. So I think we would have to give him good marks on preconception and flexibility.

That's about the way these three men, all of them competent and dedicated, saw intelligence, the way they used it.

Lau: Looking back, is there a lesson to be learned from all three of these generals concerning intelligence?

Davidson: All of them were different, but I think there was one notable failing among all three of

them and their intelligence officers, as well. I don't think any of them ever got to the stage we now would want: a complete integration of the commander and the intelligence officer. (See FM No.34-8, Combat Commander's Handbook on Intelligence.) This concept envisions the commander telling the intelligence officer, "Here's what I want to know specifically and when I want to know it." Then the commander puts these intelligence requirements in priority.


In short, the commander must focus the intelligence effort. The commander must know what intelligence systems are available to support...and their capabilities and

limitations. The commander must hold subordinate commanders strictly responsible for collecting priority intelligence requirements. Finally, the commander **and** the intelligence officer constantly monitor changes in the enemy situation and its potential effect on friendly plans and maneuvers.

This integration of the commander/intelligence officer is the next step which will move intelligence into its rightful position as the key staff.



Mrs. Lau is the chief of public affairs at INSCOM headquarters, Fort Belvoir, Va.



by Lieutenant Colonel Chad Hackley, Lieutenant Colonel Brian Cunningham,
Lieutenant Colonel David Coker, and Major Anthony Fennell

Introduction

This article describes how the Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) concept can be supported by an MI Brigade(Theater) (MIB(T)). In this new era of conflict, intelligence analysis is federated and distributed across multiple echelons of the intelligence community (IC) to achieve the same end state with fewer resources. Having a stable organization with direct supporting requirements and “skin in the game” ensures a much more reliable federation of intelligence support to operations in theaters.

Such was the case during the recent U.S. Army Central Command (CENTCOM) Forward Jordan (CF-J) where an MIB(T) (the 513th MI Brigade) and its RAF parent unit (the 1st Armored Division (1AD)) worked together to provide distributed analytical support. As a Regionally Aligned Force, 1AD did not have the depth to prepare for all potential contingencies. Conversely, the MIB(T) could not be resourced to fulfill all missions supporting CENTCOM. Together, the concentrated capacity of the RAF connected to the persistent overwatch of the MIB(T) provided a focus needed to meet a specific mission. Separately, the MIB(T) could not adequately focus on one regional problem nor could the RAF develop a timely understanding of the problem and leverage continuing support to meet the needs of the commander.

In this operation, the 513th MI Brigade successfully demonstrated the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command’s (INSCOM) theater anchor concept by providing an anchor connection for 1AD intelligence. The Brigade not only provided multi-discipline intelligence support, it provided a window to everything behind it—access to the vast resources

of INSCOM and the greater IC. The INSCOM functional commands, its Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) capabilities, the databases, and depth of operational expertise available through the MIB(T) far exceed the capability of the MIB(T) itself and certainly 1AD. This connection is crucial for a RAF commander in the execution of a specific contingency in a complex theater.

Here we detail the challenges, successes, and workings of 1AD’s approach to the RAF concept with recommendations for other divisions and brigades that are aligned to a combatant commander, and how a RAF unit federates intelligence production in conjunction with an MIB(T).

Deploying the Force

Between May and June 2012, staff members assigned to the U.S. Army Central (USARCENT) and the 513th MI Bde deployed to Jordan and established a headquarters to support national interest requirements within the CENTCOM area of responsibility of the Levant region of the Middle East, an area which includes Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. This headquarters, serves as a forward CENTCOM staff element in response to the ongoing conflict in Syria and to support the request by the U.S. State Department and the Kingdom of Jordan for a U.S. military force presence in the region. CF-J’s essential tasks include security engagements with the Jordanian Armed Forces, preparations for transition to a Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTF-HQ) within the Levant, and support to foreign humanitarian assistance.

In March 2013, the 1AD was tasked to deploy as the core of this nascent JTF-HQ and relieve deployed personnel from USARCENT and the 513th MI Bde. Within 90 days, elements of the 1AD Headquarters had deployed, with less than 20

members of the 1AD G2 staff assuming positions within the CF-J J2 Directorate. The remainder of the Division G2 staff remained at Fort Bliss, Texas to provide sanctuary/reach back intelligence support from home station. With this, the Headquarters became the first deployed Army division headquarters to serve as a RAF.¹

Prior to 1AD's assumption as the CF-J HQ, ARCENT and U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) resourced several preparatory combined training events spanning Fiscal Years 2012 and 2013. Eager Lion, a two week exercise executed in the fall of 2012, partnered members of the 1AD Headquarters with elements of the Jordanian Armed Forces' General Headquarters. Subsequent to Exercise Eager Lion, the Division conducted another partnered exercise with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, further expanding the regional knowledge base and cultural understanding. Within a few short months, after completing this training event, fifteen members of the Division's G2 staff deployed to Jordan in support of contingency planning operations. Their expertise as a RAF was quickly demonstrated.

Upon their arrival in June 2013, the 1AD's HQ assumed C2 of CF-J consisting of elements from the ARCENT staff, subordinate units, and the Division's HQ in support of our partner building relationship with our Jordan. In an effort to minimize the U.S. footprint, manning restrictions were placed on the headquarters, requiring a robust reach back capability to meet all our intelligence requirements. While the 513th MI Bde reduced its original footprint as the 1AD personnel rotated in, the federated and distributed intelligence production aspect of RAF began to grow out of necessity. Through the remaining embedded 513th personnel, CF-J was able to draw upon the regional expertise of the MIB(T) and its federated intelligence network while simultaneously pulling from their organic home station intelligence support. This distributed analytical effort has enabled the 1AD and CF-J to provide a clear and coherent intelligence picture while minimizing their forward footprint.

In August 2013, FORSCOM extended the 1AD's tasking for CF-J from a 12-month cycle to a 24-month cycle, requiring a sustained presence and rotational plan for the Division HQ. Once again, through the combined efforts of the CENTCOM J2, ARCENT G2, 513th MI Bde, and 1AD G2 the expertise to sustain the long term manning of CF-J was resourced without going to outside units through the effective use of the federated intelligence effort and the distributed method of production used by CF-J.

Coordination Efforts

To effectively implement the regional alignment for MI personnel, the long term study of a problem set such as

the Syrian conflict and the connection to a combatant command's intelligence network was an optimal opportunity. The dedicated intelligence support from the MIB(T) and embedded 513th personnel forward deployed with the RAF HQ provided fertile ground to develop a robust federated and distributed intelligence effort. During the 2013 relief-in-place, members of the 1AD G2 section met with their counterparts from ARCENT and the 513th MI Bde while in Jordan and subsequent to their return to the U.S. Personnel in ARCENT and the 513th MI Bde remained in regular communications with the 1AD G2 personnel. In addition, members of the 1AD G2 staff have had the opportunity to attend video teleconferences from across the IC, allowing for a further flattening of the federated intelligence effort. Home station Intelligence Soldiers within the G2 section continued to hone their analytical skills during weekly intelligence updates on the Levant region to the Division staff, keeping them abreast of the current situation while serving as a great training event for all team members.

During these weekly briefs, members of the CF-J J2 staff provided current intelligence updates and observations, further increasing the situational awareness of the Division G2. G2 staff leaders regularly conducted site visits to supporting headquarters (CENTCOM, ARCENT, and the 513th MI Bde's mission sites at Fort Gordon), which were reciprocated by the leadership of the 513th MI Bde and ARCENT G2 to reduce redundancies and synchronize intelligence efforts.

As part of pre-deployment training and reach support to CF-J, the SIGINT section has a standing requirement to develop products and support the command's priority intelligence requirements forward. As requests for information (RFIs) are developed forward, the home station Analysis and Control Element generates a suspense tailored to the needs of the team in Jordan.

Intelligence Resources

The GEOINT section, which includes both Topographical Engineers and GEOINT Soldiers, has access to the systems needed to meet the majority of its production requirements in theater. However, when the need arises the GEOINT team at Fort Bliss is fully prepared to answer RFIs or assist with other products that necessitate their involvement to facilitate the success of the mission in Jordan. In-theater GEOINT analysts have the ability to perform first phase imagery, along with GEOINT reach support by the 513th MI Bde. The 24/7 analysis and processing of GEOINT provided by 513th also provides significant on call resources.

The CF-J GEOINT lead represents the command in almost every aspect of GEOINT activities, with the Topographical

Engineer Soldiers supporting CF-J by providing topographical support to the deployed command and other U.S. entities working under the umbrella of the U.S. State Department. Prior to deployment all GEOINT Imagery Analysts receive training at Fort Gordon, attending a two week course conducted by the GEOINT section of the 513th MI Bde, during which time the Soldiers are given an introduction to all the resources available from the 513th team and work with the individuals who will be supporting them while they are forward deployed.

While the mission was still in its infancy, the 1AD G2X remained continually available for reachback support of the forward deployed CF-J J2X, specifically by editing reports and conducting research for additional requirements within the scope of topical reporting in the forward area of operations, and editing numerous reports which were subsequently published to the IC. Now established, The CF-J J2X team is able to execute all current operations internally, while expanding their efforts to support the Force Protection Team with the headquarters.

The teams at 1AD, 513th, and CF-J work together to fuse the many of products together to form cohesive, targeted, relevant, and goal oriented products. Building this success took time and more importantly creating relationships within the various members of the IC to gain a shared common operating picture. Paramount to continued success is ensuring the continued training and integration from home station. “no MI Soldier at rest” best describes the continued mission involvement from home station. Establishing a “deployed mindset” at home station and creating Live Environment Training opportunities prior to deployment facilitates the engagement and knowledge base of all our Soldiers.

The RAF provides all soldiers arriving into the G2 section a real world mission to track. They are immediately immersed into the CF-J problem set. Soldiers that are designated for future deployment to CF-J become part of the CF-J reach back team where they focus their analytical efforts in support to CF-J, culminating in the weekly joint CF-J/1AD Intel brief to the soldiers and command group of the Division. The benefits for a young “home station” analyst are immeasurable and while they may not necessarily provide insights to deployed personnel, the sharing between the two ensures that analysts deploy to theater with a stronger baseline of knowledge.

Federated Intelligence Support Challenges

While federated intelligence support provides excellent value, several challenges exist that are difficult to overcome.

First, the realities of a garrison environment hinders the effectiveness, value, and timing of reach back support, while CF-J Forward members are able to concentrate on one problem set all day long. This can only be resolved by fencing off designated personnel from outside tasks and enabling the analysts to focus their efforts on reach support, otherwise the RAF program will never be entirely successful. A lesser concern however, given the ephemeral operational environment, even recently re-deployed analysts struggle to keep up with the constantly changing operational environment and must constantly work to sustain their situational awareness. Realistically, deployed personnel will always have a far greater understanding of the operational environment than home station analysts. Both parties attempt to mitigate this by remaining in regular communication. Another consideration is the effective exploitation of Open Source Intelligence. To effectively execute these operations both translation software and native linguists are needed to maximize the benefits of this medium.

In 1AD’s case, the RAF intelligence pre-deployment training program created by the 513th MI Bde using the Foundry catalog, and subsequently employed by all the MIB(T)s, had not been fully implemented and would have significantly advanced our interactions with our primary theater intelligence support provider. While ad hoc exchanges and interactions facilitated that effort, their Foundry program was specifically designed to facilitate that exchange of information and team building.

Lastly, long term relationships and affiliations are critical to RAF success. Whether it is between the 513th and 1AD intelligence professionals or the relationships developed between the Jordanian Armed Forces and 1AD soldiers, these bonds once made and nurtured can enhance future engagements with our partners and allies.

Conclusion

We have come a long way in the past 12 years of war in how we federate and share intelligence, and while the concept of RAF is not new, the ways in which we can access and share information and intelligence have drastically changed with technology. It allows a tactical unit to share information from national and theater level intelligence organizations, a concept that was not practical at the turn of the century. The tactical unit is able to take these national and theater level Intel and apply assets against it. Where a national/theater level organization may only have a few analysts looking at Syria or more specifically the southern Syria problem set, by federating the analytical effort over 100 analysts can work the problem set. The continued success

and development of the RAF concept and its adoption by more and more headquarters throughout the U.S. Army is paramount to our future success as a fighting force and will help to maintain the fighting prowess we have built over the past decade of war and will help ensure that our national interests are maintained throughout the world.



Endnote

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At its core, RAF is the Chief of Staff of the Army's initiative for aligning Army capabilities to an expanded set of requirements for the Joint Force—post-2014. As General Odierno stated, "we will leverage the Army's mission command capability by organizing our missions around highly trained squads and platoons for specific mission sets and regional conditions." This "regional

"alignment of forces" will not only offer combatant commanders access to the full range of capabilities resident in the Army today, it will provide maximum flexibility and agility to national security decisionmakers."

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


LTG Sidney T. Weinstein Award for Excellence in Military Intelligence

Nominations are being accepted for the 2015 Weinstein Award through 4 March 2015. To be eligible, a candidate must be a Military Intelligence Officer of the rank of Captain (CPT/O-3) in the Active Army, Army Reserve or Army National Guard. He/she must have performed actions which positively promote, impact, advance, and bring honor to the MI profession during the period 1 January–31 December 2014. The candidate must possess either an MI Officer Area of Concentration (AOC) or a 15C AOC, be fully eligible for continued service for at least one year after award presentation (i.e., through June 2015), and not in a promotable status as of the date of nomination. No posthumous awards will be presented. Candidates also must meet the height and weight standards specified in AR 600-9, maintain a current passing grade on the Army Physical Fitness Test (waived for deployed nominees unable to take the APFT), and must not be under an unfavorable personnel or UCMJ action. Recipients of the Weinstein Award are recognized annually at a luncheon during the MI Corps Hall of Fame Week in June at Fort Huachuca, Arizona.

In 2007, the LTG Sidney T. Weinstein Award for Excellence in Military Intelligence was established to recognize the outstanding achievements of one Army Captain within the Military Intelligence Community who embodies the values and ideals for which the late LTG Weinstein stood. LTG Weinstein, who passed away in 2007, is fondly remembered as the father of modern military intelligence. More than just a fine officer, LTG Weinstein was a leader, mentor, role model, friend, and dedicated family man. He once said about MI Soldiers, "[You] got to be tactically and technically proficient, but by God, Duty, Honor, Country is not a bumper sticker."

Nominations for the 2015 Weinstein Award must be received NLT 4 March 2015. Mail complete nomination packets to Command Historian, ATTN: LTG Sidney T. Weinstein Award, U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence, 1889 Hatfield Street, Building 62723, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613-7000. Soft copy nominations may also be emailed to Ms. Tagg. For questions/assistance or to obtain full nomination procedures, please contact Ms. Lori Tagg at (520) 533-4113/DSN 821-4113. You can also see more information on past recipients of this award on the MI Corps Hall of Fame website: <https://www.ikn.army.mil/apps/iknwms/default.aspx?webId=2180>.



Terrorism in China: The Muslim Uyghurs and the Han Chinese

by Specialist Four Cathy Cai

Background

For over five decades, the People's Republic of China has been implementing social, political, and economic programs aimed at placing the country on the global stage. Former Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Mao Zidong, labeled these programs as the "Great Leap Forward." Since the days of Chairman Mao, China has made great strides towards its mission of becoming a global leader. However, behind the red curtain of ambitious five-year economic and industrialization plans there are the undercurrents of internal ethnic and territorial conflicts between China's minority Muslim Uyghurs and the dominant Han group.

As China enters the international arena, it must prioritize and address its internal conflicts. Uyghurs have struggled for equal rights and independence from the mainland ever since the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1989. The northwest region of China—*Xinjiang*—has been especially tumultuous in the past decade over concerns of separatism, factionalism, and terrorism. The CCP's mishandlings of several major riots in Xinjiang call into question the strength of its national security apparatus and the sustainability of current public policies, especially towards the Uyghurs.

Of particular concern to the CCP are the East Turkestan Liberation Organization (ETLO) and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). Both groups have been recognized by Western nations as terrorist organizations, and the majority of their members are of Islamic Uyghur descent with ties to al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

Religious extremist influences from bordering countries such as Turkmenistan, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan have been spilling into western China, inciting ethnic tensions between the Uyghurs and the Han Chinese. China now faces a series of non-governmental, asymmetric threats whereby rules of engagement and strategic warnings do not exist, and attacks are dynamic and random.¹ The CCP quickly realized that religious extremism and terrorism have become a matter of national security concern, and that the "not in my backyard" theory no longer applies.

On May 2008, the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) claimed responsibility for a bus bombing in Shanghai, China. Two months later, Chinese police killed five Muslims who were planning jihad in Xinjiang, and TIP claimed responsibility for a second bus bombing, this time in Yunnan province, killing two. On August 2008, reports arose of another 17 police officials killed days before the 2008 Beijing Olympics. On April 2009, China executed two Muslim males in Kashgar for alleged "terrorist attacks" for the murdered police officials. Finally, on June 2009, ethnic Han Chinese workers attacked and killed several Uyghur workers in Guangdong province over a false Internet report, spurring an all-out offensive by Muslim Uyghurs in Xinjiang, China.²

On July 5, 2009 (7/5), Urumqi, Xinjiang experienced its first large scale, deadly riot by opposing Uyghurs against the Han populous; the latter representing 90 percent of China's population. Chinese officials immediately began finger-pointing at the Uyghurs despite the lack of official claims by ETIM, ETLO, or TIP. However, days later, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM) released a statement that it will avenge the purportedly 46 Uyghur deaths from the 7/5 riots by

targeting the estimated 50,000 Chinese workers in Algeria and elsewhere in Northern Africa.³ Consequently, the attack by Muslim Uyghurs against the dominant Han population served as a wakeup call for the CCP and rest of China.

What are China's Political Concerns with Regard to Xinjiang?

The CCP and the Public Security Bureau (PSB), China's security and intelligence arm, are highly concerned with the political instability in Xinjiang. China viewed terrorism as a foreign policy issue, plaguing only the U.S. and Western Europe. However, after 7/5, PSB officials concluded that the individuals involved in the Olympics bombing scheme were affiliated with the ETIM, with a majority of its followers residing in Xinjiang, China. For the first time in China's history, Uyghurs, otherwise labeled as separatists, were now called terrorists. There is a heavy presence of Chinese Special Police Units (SPU), a paramilitary law enforcement branch of the PSB, stationed in Xinjiang, China. According to a high-ranking SPU official, Muslim Uyghurs united against the Han Chinese on 7/5 and "burgled, murdered, [and] robbed" more than 190 innocent bystanders—the majority of which were Han Chinese, not Uyghurs. The official stated that the attack was premeditated, purposeful, and politically motivated.⁴

The underlying hatred and tension between Uyghurs and the Han Chinese stemmed from the 1759 annexation of Xinjiang by the *Manchu Qing Empire*. In the 1990s, the CCP sponsored resettlement campaigns whereby large populations of Han Chinese would migrate into Xinjiang.⁵ As a result, Muslim Uyghurs in Urumqi were pushed further south of Xinjiang to Kashi and Yili Valley. The CCP mandated that all Uyghur Chinese adopt standard Mandarin Chinese as their official language and prohibited Uyghur minors from participating in religious activities in Xinjiang. Officials purged all religious and "ethnic separatist" ideologies in schools, including the wearing of religious head garb, in Xinjiang.⁶ The alleged "ethnic cleansing" campaigns are enforced through surveillance and "Strike Hard" campaigns, an official cover by some critics to stamp out any resistance against the CCP.⁷ In the eyes of the Communist Party, Xinjiang separatism and ethnic tensions are considered national security threats that undermine and threaten the very existence of China.

According to a 2008 demographic study, the total percentage of Han Chinese in Xinjiang was 39.2 percent whereas the Uyghurs represented 46.1 percent.⁸ In 2013, those figures shifted to 46 percent Han and 40 percent Uyghur, with a wider demographic gap compared to the 6.2 percent Han population in a 1945 study.⁹ The drastic increase of Han in Xinjiang was a result of the Communist Party's enforced re-

settlement campaigns and the 2010 Strike Hard campaign.¹⁰ Opponents of the Strike Hard and resettlement campaigns claim that the CCP is utilizing an age-old "divide and conquer" strategy in combating ethnic separatists in Xinjiang. Uyghurs have limited political clout, and critics believe coveted academic, economic, and government positions have been reserved only for the Han Chinese. The CCP has denied this and argued that the resettlement campaigns are aimed to prevent overpopulation in major Chinese regions and to tap into new frontiers.

What are China's Economic Interests with Regard to Xinjiang?

In 1955, the CCP officially renamed the area as Xinjiang Autonomous Region and granted the local government a limited degree of independent governance. In this environment, radical religious and ethnic ideology also increased, prompting the CCP to initiate "resettlement" campaigns. The Communist Party's strategy was to attenuate the Muslim Uyghur population by resettling large numbers of Han Chinese and pro-Party individuals in Xinjiang and to guard the new frontier of large reserves of petroleum, natural gas, and minerals.

In Xinjiang, oil and petrochemicals represent an estimated 71.7 percent of the regional productions and exports.¹¹ Xinjiang is an undeniable domestic provider for energy in China, justifying the CCP's keen social, political and security interests. The area is comparable to that of Saudi Arabia's natural resources, and one can even argue that Xinjiang's Talimu petroleum pipeline routes are parallel to that of the Strait of Hormuz—a highly strategic and volatile chokepoint. In addition, Xinjiang has vast oil, hydrocarbon, and mineral reserves, primarily ferrous ores. With an increasing appetite for economic development, China has become the second largest energy-consuming nation in the world, and its dependence on Xinjiang continues to grow.¹²

The first official oil exploration began in 1951, and the CCP viewed it as a strategic domestic resource and independence from Iran. More recently, China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) planned to develop an oil and gas production and processing base within the next 10 years. By 2015, CNPC hopes to increase its oil refining capabilities to produce over 26 million tons per year.¹³ According to CNPC President Jiang Jiemin, development of oil and gas business in Xinjiang is "irreplaceably important" to the company's (and country's) strategy.¹⁴ On the other hand, Xinjiang, formerly one of the most landlocked regions in the world, is experiencing an economic makeover. As a result of the CNPC Talimu project, the company has invested nearly 9 billion yuan (1.414 billion USD) in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang. The region's

proximity to the Central Asian states makes Xinjiang a geopolitical asset for China in terms of economic value and regional security. China will seek to protect Xinjiang and its ability to provide cheap, accessible, domestic energy “at all costs.”¹⁵

Xinjiang contains profitable reserves of fossil fuels, minerals, and water resources. Similar to the 1995 Iraq Oil-for-Food program, the Communist Party offers investments, infrastructure development, standardized education, universal healthcare, and water to Xinjiang, in return for mining and oil exploration rights. Historically, Muslim Uyghurs have depended on the CCP for water, and in return, allowed government contractors to control the oil and natural mineral industries.¹⁶

In 1999, Xinjiang established a trans-border railroad and 15 border crossings to facilitate trade activities. As a result, its import and export volume exceeded one billion USD, accounting for 58 percent of the region’s total foreign trade and making it one of China’s largest trade zones. In just a little over a decade, China has replaced Japan as the world’s second-biggest economy, next to the U.S. Further, Xinjiang holds 122 mineral reserves, to include an estimated 730 million tons of iron ore and 318 million tons of salt. The region also has approximately 88 billion cubic meters of surface water and 25 billion cubic meters of exploitable groundwater, not to mention 30 billion tons of petroleum and natural gas reserves, and coal that generates 38 percent of the nation’s total. As such, given Xinjiang’s vast oil and natural gas reserves, the region’s political stability will remain of paramount concern to the CCP.

What are China’s National Security Concerns with Regards to Xinjiang?

The CCP shifted its agenda toward ethnic minorities, religious tolerance, and national security following the 7/5 riots. Based on a dialogue with several SPU senior officials, 7/5 resulted in the deaths of more Han Chinese than Muslim Uyghurs, and the event was premeditated and incited by Muslim Uyghurs against the Han.¹⁷ According to one official, Western media cables reported that the underlying factors behind 7/5 were the lack of human rights, economic advancement, and educational opportunities within the Uyghur community. A high-ranking SPU officer stated that the CCP has been providing employment and education incentives to Muslim Uyghurs and does not enforce the One Child Policy for ethnic minorities. However, according to a local tour guide and translator, even two years after 7/5, the Internet and other communication channels are still being monitored by the PSB and SPU in Xinjiang. Video and human surveillance are conducted, and conversations regard-

ing the 7/5 incident are kept to a minimum behind closed doors.¹⁸ The source disclosed that rather than openly stating that Internet and social media websites were under surveillance by the PSB and SPU, locals would substitute with code words describing the weather (i.e., “good weather” meant the websites functioning and not monitored, “bad weather” meant that the websites were being monitored).¹⁹

Additionally, Chinese news media reported that the Uyghurs attacked the Han first but did not cite “retaliation” by the Han Chinese in order to maintain public security and safety. Public confirmations of Han or Uyghur death, followed by retaliation and revenge could exacerbate ethnic tensions and spark civil unrest. One SPU official stated, “Immediately following the 7/5 attacks, newspapers reported, ‘theft, violence, death’, then shortly after, only ‘theft, violence’ was reported. This was because the Communist Party and PSB did not want to incite further tensions between Uyghurs and the Han Chinese.”²⁰

Following the 7/5 riot, Xinjiang’s Islamic Uyghur community leader and representative, Nuer Bekri, addressed the public by declaring that “Islam promotes peace, harmony, education...there needs to be an understanding between the different ethnic groups.”²¹ The individuals involved in the violent protests of 7/5 should not be affiliated with Islam. What they did was criminal and wrong.” However, the 7/5 attacks were not considered isolated events. The ETIM has claimed responsibility for over 200 violent terrorist activities, resulting in an estimated 162 deaths and 440 cases of injuries. Furthermore, reports show that al-Qaeda has provided ETIM and its affiliates with direct support in the form of financial aid, training, and intelligence. Following the identification, capture, and arrest of more than a dozen Muslim Uyghur terrorists, members of the ETIM terrorist group were sent to Cuba’s Guantanamo Bay. According to the Asian Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS), the U.S. needs to partner with China to combat terrorism inflicted by “Uyghurs who use violence... [and] are categorized as terrorist organizations.”²²

The CCP has reached out separately to the U.S., Russia, and other neighboring states to secure domestic security through intelligence sharing and military exchanges. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), originally referred to as the Shanghai Five, is a primary example of China’s solicitation of international security assistance.²³ Founding SCO states include China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan, and following 2001, Uzbekistan, India, Iran, Mongolia, and Pakistan joined as observers.²⁴ Essentially, the SCO serves as a safety net for both China and the Central Asian states, promoting partnership on economic, political, cultural exchange and security initiatives,

and most importantly, reducing the possibility that domestic terrorists could escape to neighboring safe haven countries. It is imperative and a matter of "saving face" for the Chinese that ETLO, ETIM and affiliate agents are identified, captured, and brought to justice in a Chinese court. The Chinese have followed for centuries the tradition of resolving domestic matters in a private way and without "foreign meddling."

China undoubtedly is calling upon foreign allies to address domestic terrorism concerns. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, it offered to assist and cooperate with the U.S. in preventing, identifying, and eliminating terrorist organizations in return for U.S. assistance and acknowledgement that the ETLO is an international terrorist organization.²⁵ However, critics have remarked that China's domestic counter-terrorism campaign serves as a "guise" for the country's intolerance towards political dissent, religious practices, and separatist activities by ethnic minorities.²⁶

China and the U.S. are working on a series of dialogues that promotes collaboration on combating domestic and international terrorism. China has called upon the U.S. and the United Nations to designate and fully recognize ETLO and ETIM as terrorist organizations. The ETLO (and ETIM) are not similar to al-Qaeda and affiliated groups in that they lack a central figurehead, technology, centralized operational structure, and a modus operandi. Al-Qaeda attacks the U.S. and Europe based on a “West versus Islam” narrative; in other words, the impetus behind many terrorists is that the U.S. and other Western powers directly threaten the foundations of Islam and therefore these countries, their people, and their ideology must be eliminated.

ETLO is different in the sense that it has no narrative. Radical Muslim Uyghurs assert that Xinjiang used to belong to East Turkestan prior to the Han takeover. This is the same message promoted by Uyghur activist and leader, Rabiya Kadeer. What originated as a nationalistic message by senior Uyghurs wanting to reclaim Xinjiang as East Turkestan has morphed into a radical Islamic propaganda that, according to Professor Maajid Nawaz, the West is waging a war against Islam. And that the only way to stop this war is for Muslims to start fighting back on all fronts against the West.²⁷

A close-up portrait of Rabiya Kadeer, an elderly woman with grey hair, wearing a dark headscarf and a blue jacket. She is gesturing with her right hand while speaking. The background is blurred, showing what appears to be a banner or wall with some text.



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26. Ibid.
27. Maajid Nawaz, "60 Minutes Extra: What is the Narrative?" 25 April 2010, at http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=6430899n&tag=contentBody_housing.

SPC Cai obtained her undergraduate degree at the University of California Irvine in Criminology, Law and Society and completed her graduate school studies at the University of Pennsylvania. Prior to applying for graduate school, she spent nearly two years in South Korea teaching English and has visited a total of 13 countries in Latin America, the Middle East, Europe, and East Asia. Following graduate school, she spent two years at a defense and foreign policy research institute in Washington, D.C. and has traveled to the capital of Xinjiang, China to study the political and socioeconomic dynamics between the ethnic Muslim Uyghurs and Han Chinese. SPC Cai is currently an Intelligence Analyst with the 11th PSYOP Battalion in Maryland.



Contact and Article Submission Information



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When submitting articles to MIPB, please take the following into consideration:

- ◆ Feature articles, in most cases, should be under 3,000 words, without embedded graphics. Maximum length is 4,000 words.
- ◆ We cannot guarantee we will publish all submitted articles and it may take up to a year to publish some articles.
- ◆ Please note that submissions published in MIPB may be released to other government agencies or nonprofit organizations for re-publication upon request.

What we need from you:

- ◆ A release signed by your information/operations security officer/SSO stating that your article and any accompanying graphics and photos are unclassified, nonsensitive, and releasable in the public domain and that the article and accompanying graphics and photos are unclassified (IAW AR 380-5, DA Information Security Program.)
- ◆ A Public Affairs release if your installation or unit/agency requires it. Please include that release with your submission.
- ◆ Your article in Word and any pictures, graphics, crests, or logos which are relevant to your topic. We need complete captions (the 5 Ws), and photographer credits. Do not embed graphics or photos within the article. Send them as separate files such as .tif or .jpg and note where they should appear on the article. PowerPoint (not in .tif/.jpg format) is acceptable for graphs, figures, etc. Photos should be at 300 dpi.
- ◆ The full name of each author in the byline and a short biography for each. The biography should include the author's current duty assignment, related assignments, relevant civilian education and degrees, and any other special qualifications.

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Send articles and graphics to usarmy.huachuca.icoe.mbxdoctrine@mail.mil. Contact numbers are: 520.538.0956/DSN 879.0956.

Culture Corner



Cultural Self-Reflections on a Journey to Albania



by Kujtim Thomai



The idea of writing this article came to mind while I was travelling to Albania with a group of U.S. Army Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) cadets as part of the COTM program, which stands for Cadet Overseas Training Missions. The program is run by the U.S. Army Cadet Command (USACC) headquartered at Fort Knox, Kentucky. Each year hundreds of Army ROTC cadets from all over U.S. are selected through a merit-based process to participate in different cultural missions around the world. Some of these missions are: Culture Understanding and Language Proficiency (CULP) Program, Cadet English Language Training (CELT) teams, nursing, and military-to-military training exercises. The goal

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Culture Center (TCC) is a legitimate, experienced and, relevant partner of COTM and the culture network within the Army that focuses on cultures and peoples that influence, shape, and inspire readiness and operability. The TCC-COTM partnership serves as the Army's progressive culture for warfighting. "It doesn't matter how it started. What matters is where is going."

I was one of the few TCC directors of instruction/culture advisors participating in this program. My mission was a journey of 41,000 plus flying miles that took me to different cultures starting in the small town of Sierra Vista (Fort Huachuca, Arizona); Fort Knox (Kentucky); Hong Kong; Cilodong, Bandung, and Jakarta (Indonesia); Tokyo (Japan); Munich (Germany), Vienna (Austria), and Albania over a two month period.

At first, I wanted to write something about my thoughts on returning to my birth country. However, as the mission was coming to an end, I realized that I had seen and learned much about my first culture of which I wasn't aware. I had to write about something more than just my emotions. I had to write about my cultural experience in Albania. It was strange, I was born and raised there yet I didn't know everything about the country. I had left Albania over 20 years ago and the country I thought I knew wasn't the same.

Who are these Albanians who at a first glance seem as normal as any American yet still have "the communist-era mentality of trying to impress visitors?" Hospitality is an old Albanian tradition. According to the Kanun of Leke Dukagjini (Ancient North Albanian civil code), "the house is always open for guests," especially for foreigners who are treated with special respect. Known as the "Land of the Eagles," ("Shqiperia" in Albanian language), this is a small Mediterranean country of epic cultural heritage and mys-



Photo by author:

U.S. ROTC cadets during a CELTT mission in Albania.

for the ROTC participants is "to engage in cross-cultural dialogue (communication) and develop an understanding of the target culture with a host country counterpart," which includes observable behaviors (surface culture) such as customs, traditions, cuisine, artifacts, literature, history; and accepted beliefs, values, norms, folktales, symbols, and attitudes (deep culture) shared by members of the society.

teries exhibiting traces of different civilizations and cultures including Illyrian, Hellenic, Roman, Byzantine, and Ottoman. Home to famous people like Mother Teresa or Gonxhe Bojaxhi, as she is known among Albanians and iso-polyphonic folk music, (an epic form of the oral art of singing protected by UNESCO), Albania is part of the “big human terrestrial family” that dates at the beginning of the third millennium B.C.

I was familiar and comfortable with Albanian culture, yet at the same time I found myself in situations where I was just another American who did not know or hardly understood the culture. I wasn't too familiar with the influence of Italian culture on Albanian cuisine. I had a hard time understanding the currency. Albanians would talk in “leke te reja” and “leke te vjetra” (old currency versus new currency), which was confusing at times. The design of the currency was different. Gone were the communist slogans printed on the currency. On a few occasion I visited shopping centers (malls) that didn't even exist as a concept when I grew up. Most of the changes were consequences of the democratization and globalization processes that have taken place in the post-Communist era.

Other cultural shortcomings on my part were simply out of my control. I did not know much about some of the places we visited, because during my childhood days in Albania, nobody was allowed to approach, visit, or travel to these places. Indeed, during the communist era there was no easy way to travel due to the inadequate infrastructure (cars and railways.)

I remember going to Albanian Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) headquarters for the first time, not knowing what to expect. I had only seen the place from the outside. While I was growing up, nobody could get inside it unless one was a high ranking official of the communist regime or the military. During the communist era, the TRADOC

ians” of the regime. Now, I was training and living there with my American cadets. It was a huge contrast, emotional, yet simple to understand its symbolism from an Albanian Cold War perspective. I knew how to interpret the historical context of its symbolism. My cadets didn't. I explained to them in great length what it historically meant to be inside the TRADOC, but I'm not sure whether they really grasped it. These 18 and 19 year old cadets were born in a post-Cold War era. In fact, I'm not sure whether young Albanians, born after 1990s, themselves understood the “myth” of TRADOC. Indeed, they were just like the American cadets, born in the era of smart phones, internet, videogames, and Facebook. It hit me then that the generational differences were part of the culture changes. It struck me that the symbolism of the TRADOC compound had no life or meaning without placing it in the Cold War context.



Photo by author.

Bunker in the center of Tirana (Albanian Capital City) from the communist era.

During our visit at the “Naval Base of Pashaliman,” the cadets and I had the opportunity to stand on top of an old Soviet submarine—“nëndetsja” 104—as it's known among Albanians. It was one of the 5 or 6 submarines that the Soviet military left behind in 1961 when Albania cut its diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and took full control of the joint navy base. For 30 years these submarines were the pride of the Albanian communist regime, military, and its people. For 30 years the submarines were symbols of communist propaganda embedded in the Albanian mindset. They were a symbol of Albanian resilience to Soviet revisionism and U.S. and Western imperialism—a masterpiece of cultural expression in the form of sentiments, attitudes, and perceptions codified in the myth, memories, values, and symbol of Pashaliman—an entirely reconstructed national character. Yet, most Albanians had never travelled to Orlikum, the closest town to Pashaliman, let alone visited the navy base. Communist culture was all about the mysterious veil with which the propaganda machine surrounded these places. One did not need to see. One only needed to believe and obey. Standing on top of submarine 104 with



Photo by author.

Albanian TRADOC HQ in Tirana (former Albanian Military Academy Skenderbeg).

was called the “Skenderbeg Military Academy,” where most of the army commissars trained on how to be the “guard-



Old Soviet Diesel Submarine 104 (nendetsja 104).

12 cadets in U.S. military uniform was emotional, unforgettable, tragic, and joyful at the same time. Who could have thought it?

These mixed feelings could only make sense to someone who grew up during the Cold War era when a direct invasion by either the Soviets or U.S. more likely could have caused a greater psychological impact. The anticipation period of such “virtual invasion” was part of Albanian mindset preparing “for the prospect of future stress” that lasted for 45 years. Regrettably, the “stress” developed into a way of life—a functional equivalent of extreme paranoia. Perhaps, for these young cadets and their American bias Albanians looked normal, yet they probably couldn’t understand why someone “would rather be poor in America than rich in Albania.” As one of the cadets stated in her short essay, “I’ve always been around the concept of American Dream, but these people take it to a whole new level.” Our presence in

Albania and our American stories “filled them with hope.” The friendship we shared wasn’t part of the plan, but I’m sure they will remember that the U.S. cadets were there.

In the end, I feel that both the Albanian NCOs and ROTC cadets gained a crucial understanding of each other’s cultures. This experience immersed our cadets into Albanian norms, values, beliefs, and culture. I’m sure our cadets will never forget the experience. As LTG Robert Brown, commander of the Army Combined Arms Center, stated during the “Human Dimension” panel that took place at the AUSA convention, “Now we need [Army officers] who are not only comfortable in conditions of ambiguity, [but also] improve and thrive in conditions of chaos.” I believe, Cadet Overseas Training Missions opportunities are a great investment in preparing such future Army leaders who can thrive in a culture, regional expertise and languages (CREL) environment. 

The Army Publishing Directorate authenticated and released Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 2-01.3/MCRP 2-3A, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace, dated 10 November 2014. ATP 2-01.3 supersedes FM 2-01.3/MCRP 2-3A, 15 October 2009, and FMI 2-01.301, 31 March 2009.

ATP 2-01.3/MCRP 2-3A is a dual-designated Army and Marine Corps manual that constitutes current doctrine on how to systematically evaluate the effects of significant characteristics of the operational environment for specific missions. It describes how the commander and staff examine mission variables to understand how these variables may affect operations. It discusses intelligence preparation of the battlefield/intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) as a critical component of the military decisionmaking process (MDMP)/Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP) and how IPB supports decisionmaking, as well as integrating processes and continuing activities.

This publication expedites delivery of doctrine that the proponent has approved for immediate use in IPB support to operations. It facilitates a common understanding, foundational concepts, and methods of the IPB process.

ICoE Lessons Learned Branch

by Chet Brown, Chief, Lessons Learned

How Lessons Drive Change

We had anticipated describing the changes to the Army's LL regulation in this issue. The Army is still staffing the regulation based on recent changes in the LL enterprise. Instead, we will describe how LL drives change at the Intelligence Center of Excellence (ICoE). ICoE processes will not be affected by the changes within the Army's new regulation, based on our review of the initial and final draft versions. Another factor in assessing if ICoE internal processes will remain stable is the authority by which ICoE accomplishes its intelligence functional proponent responsibilities.

Authority

The Army Force Modernization Proponent System (AR 5-22, 6 February 2009) specifies the ICoE Commanding General as the force modernization proponent for military intelligence. Force modernization is the process of improving the Army's force effectiveness and operational capabilities which are reflected in Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) requirements. The changes within the Army's emerging LL regulation will not affect how ICoE integrates lessons into intelligence force modernization proponent processes.

The ICoE LL Team supports force modernization by collecting and presenting best practices and lessons from Army operations or training. In practice the Army's LL process consists of four phases; discovery, validation, integration and assessment. Obtaining LL information occurs within the discovery phase. How the ICoE LL team obtains information (discovery) was described in the Apr-Jun 2014 issue of MIPB. This column describes how ICoE LL information is validated and integrated into the various DOTMLPF force modernization processes.

Not every lesson or best practice is appropriate to initiate a DOTMLPF change. The overwhelming majority of items collected by the ICoE LL Team reflect unique experiences bound to specific mission variables: mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time

available and civil considerations (METT-TC) (ADRP 5-0, The Operations Process, May 2012). It is imprudent to direct Army-wide changes in DOTMLPF based on the experiences of a single unit or one Soldier's performance. Conversely, there are instances in which information contained in a single LL report requires action. Several similar LL observations often, but not always, indicate a trend. The resulting LL trend then becomes a catalyst for DOTMLPF change consideration.

Validation

Whether a trend, or a single report, all LL information must be validated before it is offered for consideration in any DOTMLPF process. Those of you familiar with ICoE LL Team collection reports may have noticed the emphasis placed in identifying the report consists of "raw observations, insights and lessons" and is not "an analytical product..." These clarifying statements also inform the reader that the reports contain accurate representations of the information collected or of the statements made by those interviewed. Only items proven to be factual are suitable for further validation.

The impending revision to AR 11-33 will include a definition for validation which centers on whether others can adapt or apply a lesson or best practice. A lesson we (ICoE LL) have learned is that validation requires evaluating a few more attributes: accuracy, timeliness, and relevance.

Accuracy

Some may associate validating information with assigning Source Reliability and Information Content ratings (FM 2-33.3, Human Intelligence Collector Operations). Validation for LL purposes is simpler. Being familiar with the considerations Human Intelligence collectors apply to sources and information does help LL personnel identify which aspects of information or sources may require more confirmation. Experience has proven that sources of LL information are overwhelmingly reliable. Soldiers routinely offer their lessons expecting others will be able to benefit from the information shared with us.

Timeliness

Timeliness is assessed in several ways. The easiest method is to compare the LL product date with the associated *latest time information is of value (LTIOV)*. Timeliness also depends on if ICoE Force Modernization efforts can receive, process and use LL information to support various milestones or production schedules. Being aware of a unit's pre-deployment timeline and destination (operations or training) also helps determine if a piece of LL information may be provided in time to be useful. It is a constant challenge to become aware of work which may benefit from timely LL information. The LL team participates in many collaborative events to gain awareness of the work being done that can be informed by LL collection results. The monthly *MI LL Forum*, covered in the Apr to Jun 2014 MIPB issue, is another mechanism which helps identify LTIOV for some LL consumers.

Is an Observation Relevant?

All lessons are, or have the potential to be, relevant. A lesson that is not relevant today may be relevant in the future. Determining relevance is simply assessing an item's pertinence to current and emerging DOTMLPF and policy conditions or efforts. There are three questions we use to establish pertinence. If the answer is yes to any of the following three questions the information is relevant to ICoE force modernization.

- ◆ *Does the information have the potential to effect positive change within DOTMLPF or Policy?*
- ◆ *Does the information indicate a deficiency in current DOTMLPF or Policy?*
- ◆ *Does the information indicate a potential deficiency in projected DOTMLPF or Policy?*

LL team members attuned to force modernization efforts are sometimes able to identify and pursue relevant interview topics more thoroughly and comprehensively during collection. The LL Team does not unilaterally determine what is relevant. IWfF and ICoE leader guidance, oversight, and direction assist the team in knowing what is, or may soon be, relevant. Relevant items are identified in the first step of integration.

Integration

A lesson or best practice is integrated once it is adapted and applied to policy or DOTMLPF. Integration converts a "lesson recorded" to a "lesson learned." An associated axiom offers that a lesson is not truly learned until it results in a change in organizational or individual behavior. Effecting behavioral change begins with submitting a lesson to the force modernization proponent (which includes training).

Effecting DOTMLPF change is rarely, if ever, vested in one ICoE person or office. Continuous progress within a single or multiple DOTMLPF domains is the routine state at ICoE. At any given time personnel across several organizations are working to improve aspects of DOTMLPF. ICoE senior leaders possess the situational understanding of the varied dynamic and diverse DOTMLPF operations underway across the IWfF. We start the integration phase by presenting LL to the two senior leaders at the top of the bifurcated ICoE force modernization structure; the Deputy Commander for Training (DCT) and the Director, Capabilities Development Integration (DCDI). Some force modernization leaders and projects report directly to the ICoE Commanding General (CG); however, the DCT or DCDI are aware of these relationships and are able to provide informed guidance to the LL Team.

Guidance and Direction

The Director of Doctrine, Concepts, Experimentation & Lessons Learned (Dir DCELL) oversees ICoE's LL effort and is the first leader in the integration process who reviews the team's discovery and validation phase products. A critical conclusion of this review is which LL items should be integrated into ICoE Force Modernization improvement and which should be submitted to Army (more than one function or branch proponent's) force modernization processes. For internal ICoE items, and obtaining the Dir DCELL's approval, the LL Team presents their observations to the DCT and DCDI in separate sessions. These senior leaders identify which organizations or processes the LL Team provide specific observations for further integration consideration.

Training Integration Process

In addition to the specified LL recipients to whom the LL team reports the items directly, the items are also briefed at the Training Advisory Group (TAG). The TAG meets every other week and is an action officer level forum hosted by the DCT. The intent of the TAG is to provide information and support from the various ICoE agencies directly to the DCT; allow the DCT to provide guidance and clarification directly to ICoE entities on directives and initiatives in support of training; and raise issues in execution of directives and initiatives to the DCT. The LL Team presents an overview of the LL items specified by the DCT for integration to meet all three TAG intent components. Briefing LL results to the TAG facilitates collaboration, coordination and inclusion of elements not addressed in the initial dissemination. Those charged with considering LL for integration into their respective training processes are also responsible (effectively tasked by the DCT) for tracking and reporting the progress and final disposition of the LL item to the DCT.

Capabilities Development Integration Process

In a method similar to briefing the DCT, the LL Team presents its findings to the DCDI who also identifies which organizations subordinate to CDI should receive LL items for integration consideration. The DCDI also identifies, and directs the LL Team to coordinate with, elements not subordinate to either the DCT or DCDI who may benefit from the LL items' information.

Follow-Up

There are more than a few separate processes within training and capabilities development which manage LL integration. Describing each in this column is impractical. Each of the processes results in separate integration decisions for LL items. The criterion for making a DOTMLPF change almost always requires discussing potential effects across DOTMLPF and warfighting functions and resource decisions.

The LL Team tracks and reports the LL item DOTMLPF integration process status to the ICoE CG at a Quarterly LL Integration Status Update. At this update the LL Team presents an overview of the LL collection missions, items and issues resulting from those missions. The integration sta-

tus of the LL items are briefed to the CG by the respective Commanders or Directors for each DOTMLPF capability area. They describe which separate processes are affected, what changes are being made; how future changes will be made; from where resources will be provided and the desired end state of the changes. The LL Team strives to include as much of the aforementioned information as possible in the quarterly review to the CG to include the positions espoused in discussions or coordination with elements or action-officer level personnel external to ICoE.

Assessment

LL integration ends when solutions are implemented and the force begins using the change originating with LL items. The LL process does not end with integration. ICoE continues to collect observations directly and receives unit after action reports to determine if the changes address the identified or hypothesized issues. If the issue is not resolved, or only partially resolved, the issue will most likely be submitted for further collection and reinserted into the DOTMLPF integration process. Perhaps a more accurate version of the axiom stated earlier is needed, "A lesson is not truly learned until it results in a desired change in organizational or individual behavior." 

TRADOC CULTURE CENTER

TRAINING AND EDUCATION



Mission Statement: Established in 2004, TCC provides relevant and accredited cultural competency training and education to Soldiers and DA Civilians in order to build and sustain an Army with the right blend of cultural competency capabilities to facilitate a wide range of operations, now and in the future.

Request training through ATRRS
Course Number:
9E-F36/920-F30 (CT-MTT)

Available Training: The TCC provides training and education in cross-cultural competence skills, regional expertise, and functional topics in support of the CJCSI 3126.01A Culture, Regional Expertise, and Language (CREL) competency factors at the basic or fully proficient levels. The course is tailored to meet the requesting unit's cultural competence requirements in these areas.

Cross-Cultural Competence Skills Topics:

- What is Culture?
- Cross-Cultural Communication
- Cross-Cultural Negotiation
- Cross-Cultural Rapport Building
- Self-awareness and Perspective-taking

Regional Expertise:

- AFRICOM, CENTCOM, EUCOM, NORTHCOM, PACOM, SOUTHCOM
- Smart Cards and Smart Books are also available

Functional Topics:

- Key Leader Engagement
- Culture and Female Engagement Teams



Primary Training Focus:

- OEF Pre-Deployment Training
- Regionally Aligned Forces
- Train-the-Trainer events
- Advanced Specialty Training

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Moments in MI History

Dennis Nolan Appointed G2, May 28, 1917

USAICoE Command History Office


When General John J. Pershing took command of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) in June 1917, his entire combat force consisted of a small headquarters and a division of infantry troops, with no staff organization and certainly no intelligence assets. Seventeen months later, the AEF had grown into a force of twenty-nine combat divisions. Pershing's staff section included a full-fledged theater intelligence center that was engaged in a wider range of intelligence activities than anywhere else in the U.S. military.

Once in Europe, Pershing decided to adopt the French staff system throughout the AEF: Administrative (G1), Intelligence (G2), Operations (G3), Logistics (G4), and Training (G5). Pershing selected Major Dennis Nolan, whom he had served with in Mexico, as the head of his G2 Section. Nolan moved into his first headquarters in Paris, sharing an office room with his entire staff section—two officers and two clerks—and immediately set out to study how the French and British armies structured their intelligence sections. He then proceeded to build the AEF G2 from scratch. The General Staff organization was repeated in tactical units down to the battalion level. Each level, therefore, had its own intelligence staff and organic intelligence assets, and the intelligence officers at each echelon were expected to look at progressively further distances behind enemy lines.

When Major Nolan took over as head of the Intelligence Section on May 28, 1917, he became the Army's first G2. He organized the G2 Section following the British example, dividing duties amongst four principal divisions: Information, Secret Service, Topographical, and the Censorship and Press

Divisions. This structure was an overlapping and mutually supporting intelligence system that stretched from the AEF Headquarters in Chaumont, France to the front lines of the war.

In addition to the traditional methods of intelligence collection: patrolling, observation, prisoner interrogation, and document translation, Nolan added aerial observation, aerial photography, and radio intelligence. Nolan also initiated the Corps of Intelligence Police (CIP), a group of 50 enlisted specialists who spoke French fluently and had experience in investigative work. The CIP, which would eventually become



Pershing and his General Staff at Headquarters, Chaumont. Nolan, the G2, is in the second row, second from the right.

the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) in 1942, was a permanent counterintelligence organization that outlived the war into peacetime.

Many of the soldiers who were assigned to the AEF's Intelligence teams did not have formal intelligence training.

The AEF had to improvise and started an intelligence school at Langres, France in 1918. Interrogation and Document Exploitation were taught at this school.

Nolan's G2 Organization was the largest to date, incorporating a number of modern disciplines and intelligence functions for the first time: Acoustic Intelligence, Communications Security, Photo Intelligence, Signals Intelligence, and Counter Intelligence. By the time Germany signed the Armistice on November 11, 1918, the AEF had evolved into a modern, combat-tested army recognized as one of the best in the world. The efficiency of the intelligence service helped contribute to the American Army's success, and Nolan was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal "for organizing and administering the A.E.F. intelligence service."



COL Dennis Nolan sitting at his desk, May 23, 1918.

The 2014 issues of MIPB can now be accessed on the outside of IKN (no CAC login required) at <http://ikn.army.mil>. Both regular and e-reader versions are available.

To access archived back issues, logon with your CAC and click on the MIPB icon under IKN Community Sites. Go to past issues to select the issue.

Proponent Notes



Revision of Additional Skill Identifiers Q2 and T5

The ODCS G1 (DAPE-PRP) approved a proposal submitted by the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE) and Fort Huachuca Office of the Chief, MI, (OCMI) to make Additional Skill Identifiers (ASI) Q2 (Target Digital Network Analyst) and S5 (Target Digital Network Analyst) available for MOS 352S and 35S, respectively. The ASIs are being added to 352S and 35S due to the expanded work roles of both MOSs.

The effective date of ASI T5 with MOS 35S and ASI Q2 with MOS 352S for use in personnel classification is 1 November 2014. Implementation instructions will be announced by Memorandum, Notification of Future Change (NOFC) W-1410-04/E-1410-12 and posted in the electronic DA Pam 611-21, MilSuite/Smart-book.

For more information contact the 35N/S/V Life Cycle Manager at Comm: (520) 454-1125.

Deletion of ASIs S5 and T6

The ODCS G1 (DAPE-PRP) approved a proposal submitted by the USAICoE OCMI to delete ASI S5 (Community Imagery Analysis Course (CIAC)) and T6 (Tactical Exploitation System (TES)) from MOS 35G, 35N, and 35X, respectively. These courses are no longer being conducted. Implementation for deletion of ASI S5 and T6 from MOS 35G, 35N and 35X in position/authorizations coding is 1 October 2016. Effective date of withdrawal of ASI S5 and T6 from Service Member's records will be no later than 30 September 2016 by G1 or HRC. ODCS G1 posted Notification of Future Change (NOFC) E-1410-06 that contains the implementation instructions to the electronic DA PAM 611-21, Smartbook.

For more information contact the 35G Life Cycle Manager at Comm: (520) 533-9346.

Remaining 35Gs with ASI of Y3 on 1 October 2014–No More Classes

If a Soldier has not completed the transition requirements and still holds the ASI Y3 on/after 1 October 2014, IAW AR 614-200, paragraph 3-19a(4)(b), commanders are required to initiate separation actions on the Soldier who

is ineligible to hold the PMOS. If a Soldier's separation is disapproved and the commander directs reclassification, then the Soldier can reclassify. The following documents are required for reclassification: separation/reclassification determination (signed by Special Court Martial convening authority); current APFT card with HT/WT annotated; copy of any required waiver, and e-Profile (if applicable). The servicing Career Counselor needs to be involved in the process and will process the action via the RETAIN system.

For more information contact the 35G Life Cycle Manager at Comm: (520) 533-9346.

Revision of MOS 35Q Initial Entry Term of Service Obligation

ODCS G1 has approved the request submitted by OCMI to revise MOS 35Q to increase the initial entry term of service obligation from 48 to 72 months. Implementation instructions are announced by Memorandum, Notification of Future Change (NOFC) A-1410-03 and posted in Smartbook DA PAM 611-21. The effective date of this revision is 1 May 2014.

For more information contact the 35Q Life Cycle Manager at Comm: (520)-538-8569.

The Office of the Chief, MI (OCMI) is the MI Corps Personnel Proponent office and executes the personnel life cycle management functions relative to DOTMLPF for MI and Functional Area 34, Strategic Intelligence. The USAICoE and Fort Huachuca Commanding General, as the MI Proponent, enlists the help of OCMI, to ensure the Army has the sufficient number of MI Officers, WOs, NCOs, and Enlisted Soldiers, with the correct occupational specialty, correct training, and are available for assignment at the right time.

Contact Information:


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Professional Reader



George Washington's Secret Six: The Spy Ring that Saved the American Revolution by Brian Killmead and Don Yaeger

Penguin Group, New York, NY, 2013, 226 pages
ISBN-13: 9780698137653

"If the Americans wanted to emerge from this conflict, they would not try to overpower their enemy; they would simply refuse to back down or go away. They didn't need to be conquering heroes—they just needed to survive."

The above quote truly sets the stage of the dire situation that General Washington faced in the fall of 1776. Redcoats occupied Manhattan, military success on the battlefield had been elusive, and his first attempt to spy on the British in Manhattan resulted in the capture and execution of his young operative, Nathan Hale. Brian Killmeade and Don Yeager relay a gripping tale based on the exploits of a little known group of intelligence collectors, the Culper Spy Ring.

George Washington realized he desperately needed accurate and timely intelligence but because of the ill-fated Hale spy mission, he knew he needed to proceed with caution. He appointed a young major by the name of Benjamin Tallmadge to head up his intelligence collection operations in Manhattan and gave him latitude to recruit spies and organize them in such a way to reduce the risk of discovery and capture.

Tallmadge instituted a number of initiatives that present day intelligence professionals might recognize. He ensured that all operatives had code names and compartmentalized identities so that no one agent knew the identities of all of the ring's participants. Spies wrote their intelligence reports on common documents such as letters and invoices in invisible ink to avoid detection should British forces detain any operatives. The ring transported intelligence reports using "dead drops" to reduce contact between agents that might raise suspicions. Tallmadge also displayed tactical patience to allow the ring to go dormant during times of high risk of capture, which occurred more than once.


These innovative techniques provided the foundation of an intelligence collection platform that performed splendidly. The Culper Spy Ring provided timely and accurate intelligence to General Washington during numerous key moments during the American Revolution. When the French entered the war on the side of the Americans, the Culper Ring warned General Washington about a pending British spoiling attack on the newly arrived French forces. General Washington used this information to deceive the British that he intended to attack Manhattan causing the British to cancel the attack.

The Spy Ring discovered a plot by the British to produce counterfeit American currency to create financial turmoil. General Washington passed this intelligence to the Continental Congress which took steps to change the American currency before the British could begin the counterfeit plot. The Culper Spy Ring played a central role in discovering Benedict Arnold's plan to surrender West Point to the British, allowing General Washington to anticipate this betrayal and prevent it.

George Washington's Secret Six is an engaging read that intelligence professionals will find hard to put down. Although a historical novel with some dialog that is fictitious, the authors base the dialog on actual conversations that did occur and contains numerous citations from genuine documents including actual recovered intelligence reports produced by the Ring. Intelligence professionals will recognize several time-honored intelligence collection and analysis concepts that at the time were novelties. Concepts such as operations security, need to know, intelligence preparation of the battlefield, and balancing tactical patience with the need for timely intelligence. *George Washington's Secret Six* is a great read for anyone interested in an engaging story about true intelligence professionals doing vital work behind the scenes at great personal risk.



Reviewed by Richard A. McConnell, Assistant Professor, DTAC,
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Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty

by Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson

Crown Business, 2013, 544 pages

ISBN-10: 0307719227

"*Why Nations Fail*" attempts to explain in excruciating detail why some nations succeed and thrive economically while others simply fail. The authors argue that the end all answer is "institutions." Developed countries are the ones that create "inclusive economic institutions" that diversify opportunity and power in the hands of many, (i.e., the free market, capitalist institution of the U.S.) These inclusive institutions allow anyone to succeed, to share and protect their ideas and to have the means to succeed. Failed nations employ "exclusive institutions" where power is consolidated in an elite group of oligarchs and technocrats who control the economy and are able to exploit people and resources to their own end only, without sharing wealth.

Inclusive economic institutions breed inclusive political systems, where everyone has a vote and the mass of society can effect political change and secure liberties. Exclusive institutions are the opposite, stifling individual rights and controlling the political process.

The argument that institutions alone determine the economic success of a nation is simply naïve and disregards geography, natural resources or lack thereof, military might, and international relations. While inclusive institutions are a common thread amongst successful nations, they are the effect rather than the cause of that success and growth. Imagine a country with a robust democratic process where everyone has a vote and individual rights are protected. A nation where there are no barriers to economic growth, an enviable education system and "inclusive" institutions and policies. Now imagine if this same state were landlocked, had geo-political conflicts on its borders, recently gained independence and had few natural resources it could develop internally. Would this nation succeed just because of its institutions? The answer is no. A nation with zero resources, very little internal development, few exports and a massive trade deficit will never succeed. The institutions only work when there is something in place for growth. The U.S., China, Germany, and every other economic "success" has done so not because of institutions but because of resources, the ability to self-industrialize, and an obscene amount of money spent on development by the central government (at one point in its history). China in particular, has the quintessential "exclusive" economic and political system yet has experienced incredible amounts of growth, although the authors may be correct in assuming that this is not sustainable in the long term.

"Banana republics" pose a further challenge to the thesis of the authors. The oil producing nations of the Middle East have one single commodity for export and are economic success stories despite exclusive, authoritarian systems that exclude all rights and amass power in very few. The United Arab Emirates, especially Dubai, are heavily dependent on oil yet have managed to diversify their economies into service, tourism, and banking because of their oil wealth. These exclusive regimes have succeeded where the authors would argue they should have failed. While Africa develops exponentially, the raw numbers are still staggeringly low and limited to a few countries. No amount of inclusive institutions can help, or even be established, in nations where resources are exploited by the highest bidder without regard for local infrastructure. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is not going to develop despite having an inclusive political system due to internecine conflict, border disputes, and zero external assistance.


Many countries in the world are landlocked and have few natural resources. These will never succeed despite the best intentions. Many nations need only a simple impetus of change (North Korea and Iraq as examples) to finally see development not because of a change in institutions but by grassroots movements that topple the current programs. The end of militarism and constant conflict is what many nations need to see change. Institutions are not the end all answer. They are the result of societal shifts and incremental change that simply is not possible in many parts of the world right now. Geography cannot be changed, resources cannot be found where they do not exist. Corn and wheat will not grow in Saharan Africa, famine and poverty are a way of life in some places and it is a global shift in development and aid that will

see more nations succeed. Acemoglu and Robinson are correct that inclusive institutions are critical to success but they won't come to most of the world without external intervention.

Why Nations Fail offers a thesis that seems to imply that these "inclusive institutions" look eerily similar to the free market democracies of the western world, America in particular. The idea that development is determined upon a political system is a fallacy and untenable. The authors need to beware of espousing a Fukuyama like worldview where nations must be democratic and liberal to succeed in the global economy. We need only look at the failed nation building efforts in Iraq to see that democratization and this notion of "inclusive institutions" is not globally transportable. Development is not about political policy, it is about have the resources and means to exploit resources, manufacture goods, and support a vibrant middle class.



Reviewed by 1LT Raheel Alam, 304th MI Battalion, Fort Huachuca, Arizona



A Tactical Ethic: Moral Conduct in the Insurgent Battlespace by Dick Couch

Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2010, 160 pages
ISBN 9781591141372

The U.S. military does a good job in preparing its young men and women to act ethically on today's battlefield; however, we are occasionally reminded of our shortcomings when they are splashed on the news headlines within a 24/7 news cycle. Retired Navy CAPT Dick Couch, in his book, *A Tactical Ethic: Moral Conduct in the Insurgent Battlespace*, makes the case that, while the U.S. military does indeed do a good job at acting ethically, it needs to do better. Couch makes a strong case for the importance of having men and women within the ranks who act morally and the difficulty of this within a fluid and dynamic counterinsurgency. Couch delineates the difference between a top-down hierarchical approach and that of a small unit bottom-up approach. It is this bottom-up approach, Couch argues, that will have the greatest effect on moral action on the insurgent battlespace. As such, the book is intended for that audience, the small unit leader.

Couch has divided *A Tactical Ethic* into six chapters. He introduces the reader to the nature of the issue and then illustrates the initial training processes alongside the clash of values. Lastly, he purports practical solutions to alleviate these clashes. The middle of the book slows down somewhat, especially for the seasoned leader. Couch offers some illuminating information, albeit mostly anecdotal, as to why there is a clash in culture. The average young American makes a dramatic change in values during initial training; however, contemporary American culture is a powerful thing, leaving a few who cannot get rid of their past baggage. Thus, for Couch, the key issue is not initial training but the small unit culture in which one arrives after initial training. Some choose to revert back to previously held values that are not in line with the military and, when left unchecked, may "pirate" the moral compass of a unit. This in turn explains what Couch sees as the main reason for ethical breakdowns, namely the value of loyalty or, more appropriately, misplaced loyalty.

Couch emphasizes embedding ethics into small unit classroom and training exercises; this is illustrated in his lengthy description of close quarters defense training, which special operations forces (SOF) routinely undergo, that helps internalize an ethical warrior ethos. Couch sees the lack of a formal method in the regular forces (i.e., non-SOF units) as a shortcoming that needs to be remedied. In the last chapter Couch offers the reader his rules of ethics (ROE) as a practical set of guidelines for the small unit leader. The reoccurring theme within his ROE is a familiar one—the need for leaders to know their people and know the ethical climate within their units; to educate, communicate, and reinforce high ethical expectations; to model high ethical standards; to actively deal with substandard behavior; and to properly focusing loyalty on organizational principles and values rather than on individuals (i.e., "pirates").

In the end Couch makes a compelling argument, linking moral conduct on the battlefield with the success of the mission. He gives an accurate, but anecdotal, depiction of contemporary American culture, the baggage youths bring with them to the military and how clashes often occur. The most common clash being misplaced loyalty, especially at the small unit level. He emphasizes weeding out the pirates who have corrupted the moral compass of the unit and embedding ethical training at all levels throughout the training cycle. *A Tactical Ethic* is not an academic work, and it is not intended to be. It is a practical book written for the small unit leader, the corporal, sergeant, and lieutenant; however, it is a welcome read for a more seasoned leader as well. To that seasoned leader the tools that Couch provides may seem like good old-fashioned leadership principles (and they are), but to the young reader, they are presented in a refreshing modern-day approach that should be appealing to them. The practical advice is not just for the small unit leader who is heading to the chaotic world of the insurgent battlespace; it is just as relevant for those who lead here stateside every day.

The bottom line is that *A Tactical Ethic* is a must-read for anyone who has young men and women in their charge. The commanding officer of the USMC Officer Basic School agrees as he has placed this book on the reading list for lieutenants at the school. 

Reviewed by Major Clinton A. Culp, USMC (Ret)

As suggested by MAJ Heriberto Perezrivera, XO, 309th MI Bn, Fort Huachuca, Arizona

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


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