

# MIPB

Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin

July - September 2010

PB 34-10-3

# Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

# FROM THE EDITOR



This issue's theme is Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). Several articles focus on the integration of ISR support to nonlethal operations, a concept that has emerged as a critical component of counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy. Lieutenant Colonels McDonough and Conway discuss how the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division established a section within the division's G2 dedicated to providing analytical support to nonlethal operations. Major Kuniyuki discusses the importance of integrating ISR in supporting not only the F3EAD (lethal operations) but also in the PMESII-PT (nonlethal operations) in today's operational environments.

Captain Schlessinger discusses advanced techniques for focusing ISR assets on enemy network exploitation and friendly force COA development. Captain Burgess emphasizes the effectiveness of integrating of nonlethal targeting as a means to reducing the need for lethal targeting within the COIN environment.

Lieutenant Adams and Captain Ray collaborate to provide civilian and military examples of how to resolve serial offenses by employing geographic profiling. Major Click discusses how the COIN fight has forced units to re-organize intelligence architecture and discusses how one unit's created company intelligence support teams.

Mr. Lint and Mr. Reiley discuss the importance of properly executed Intelligence Information Report Evaluations to help connect the dots of the intelligence picture. Captain McKinney offers a historical perspective on the rise of Al Shabab in Somalia and its growing international threat.

This issue also contains a complete update on Intelligence doctrine. Part 1, The MI Doctrine Update explains in detail, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's (TRADOC) Doctrine Reengineering Initiative and how it affects the structure and production of MI doctrine. The future framework, based on four Field Manuals (FMs), is outlined with associated Training Circulars (TC), Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (ATTP) manuals and one MI Publication (MI Pub). Part 2 lists current MI Manuals and those under development with expected publication dates. This valuable reference guide which will be updated periodically in MIPB.

In an effort to catch up, the October December 2009 issue is now the July September 2010 issue. This means that there will be no October December 2009 issue but you will find all of the articles and information scheduled for that issue here. As the Editor, I apologize for any inconvenience to both the writers and readers of MIPB. If you have any questions regarding this please email [MIPB@conus.army.mil](mailto:MIPB@conus.army.mil).

*Sterilla A. Smith*  
Sterilla A. Smith  
Editor

# MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

PB 34-10-3

Volume 36 Number 3

July - September 2010

## Commanding General

Major General John M. Custer III

## Deputy to the Commanding General

Mr. Jerry V. Proctor

## Deputy Commander for Training

Colonel Dennis A. Perkins

## Acting Director for Doctrine Division

Mr. Stephen B. Leader

## MIPB Staff:

### Editor

Sterilla A. Smith

### Design Director

Patrick N. Franklin

### Design and Layout

Patrick N. Franklin

Lawrence Boyd

### Cover Design

Patrick N. Franklin

### Inside Back Cover


Patrick N. Franklin

### Issue Photographs

Courtesy of the U.S. Army

**Purpose:** The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) publishes the **Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB)** quarterly under the provisions of AR 25-30. MIPB presents information designed to keep intelligence professionals informed of current and emerging developments within the field and provides an open forum in which ideas; concepts; tactics, techniques, and procedures; historical perspectives; problems and solutions, etc., can be exchanged and discussed for purposes of professional development.

**Disclaimer:** Views expressed are those of the authors and not those of the Department of Defense or its elements. The contents do not necessarily reflect official U.S. Army positions and do not change or supersede information in any other U.S. Army publications.

- 
- ## FEATURES
- 3 **The Intelligence Reference Guide—An Overview**  
by Dorothy Damone
  - 7 **Intelligence Support to Nonlethal Operations**  
by Lieutenant Colonel William G. McDonough and Lieutenant Colonel John A. Conway
  - 14 **Advanced Analysis Techniques: The Key to Focused ISR**  
by Captain Andrew G. Schlessinger
  - 18 **ISR Support to Non-lethal Operations**  
by Major Yukio A. Kuniyuki III
  - 24 **Who's Driving This Train? Targeting in the Coin Fight: Observations and Recommendations** by Captain Cortis Burgess
  - 41 **Geographic Profiling in Serial Offenses: Methodology**  
by Lieutenant Jim Adams and Captain David Ray
  - 45 **Battalion S2/CoIST Organization for Combat**  
by Major Jeremy L. Click
  - 48 **Feedback Can Help Connect the Dots: IIR Evaluations for Love and Analysis** by James R. Lint and Vincent D. Reiley
  - 51 **Troubled Youth: The Al Shabab Threat**  
by Captain Patrick McKinney

## DEPARTMENTS

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| 2 <b>Always Out Front</b>                                     | 62 <b>Professional Reader</b>                        |
| 5 <b>CSM Forum</b>  | 68 <b>Contact and Article Submission Information</b> |
| 31 <b>MI Doctrine Update</b><br>by Major Michael A. Brake     | <b>Inside Back Cover:</b> UMI                        |
| 60 <b>Intelligence Philatelic Vignettes</b><br>by Mark Sommer |  |

By order of the Secretary of the Army:

Official:



**JOYCE E. MORROW**

Administrative Assistant to the  
Secretary of the Army

**1008504**

**GEORGE W. CASEY JR.**  
General, United States Army  
Chief of Staff

# ALWAYS OUT FRONT

Major General John M. Custer III  
Commanding General  
U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence



---

This issue of MIPB focuses on how Army intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) supports full spectrum operations. ISR is “an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. This is an integrated intelligence and operations function. For Army forces, this activity is a combined arms operation that focuses on priority intelligence requirements while answering the commander’s critical information requirements.” (FM 3-0 Operations) This information enables the commander to make sound decisions.

The important role ISR plays in operational success is unequivocal. The U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE) is not the Army’s proponent for ISR; it is the Army’s proponent for intelligence. The Combined Arms Center is the proponent for ISR at division level and above; there is no ISR proponent for brigade combat teams and below.

Successes in Operations Enduring/Iraqi Freedom are directly traceable to focused, continuous ISR operations. At no time in the Army’s history has it had access to such persistent and broad ISR coverage of the area of operations. This is not to say we enjoy perfect knowledge of the adversary and the environment, but we do enjoy much better situational awareness (SA) than our predecessors. Key to this SA is the synchronization and integration of ISR.

Intelligence professionals comprise the staff element which is at the center of ISR synchronization. ISR synchronization is “the task that accomplishes the following: analyzes information requirements and intelligence gaps; evaluates available assets internal and external to the organization; determines gaps in the use of those assets; recommends ISR assets controlled by the organization to collect on the commander’s critical information requirements, and submits requests for information for adjacent and higher collection support.” (FM 3-0) Clearly, close coordination with all ISR stakeholders (maneuver, fires, aviation, etc.) ensures that the commander’s most important information requirements are met first, reduces unnecessary redundancy, and produces timely information and intelligence. “Perfect” information received ten minutes late does not help the commander’s decisionmaking.

ISR integration is “the task of assigning and controlling a unit’s ISR assets (in terms of space, time, and purpose) to collect and report information as a concerted and integrated portion of operation plans and orders. This task ensures assignment of the best ISR assets through a deliberate and coordinated effort of the entire staff across all warfighting functions by integrating ISR into the operation.” (FM 3-0) Though ISR integration is a G3 function, Military Intelligence (MI) professionals play a key role in ensuring that limited ISR capabilities are optimally employed, thereby reducing unnecessary redundancy/overlap and producing timely information and intelligence.

Teamwork is the key to ensuring ISR capabilities meet the commander’s information needs. Today’s MI Soldiers, working in concert with their operations counterparts, continue to find innovative ways to employ traditional and non-traditional ISR capabilities to improve situational awareness and understanding, drive operational success, and save lives. Effective ISR operations directly support situational understanding so that Soldiers can efficiently and successfully accomplish their missions. Thanks to the dedication and perseverance of today’s Soldiers and leaders, ISR is, and will continue to be, a critical enabler to full-spectrum operations.

*(Continued on page 6)*

# The Intelligence Reference Guide—An Overview

by Dorothy Damone



## Introduction

The Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE) recently approved the publication of the Military Intelligence Publication (MI Pub) 2-0.1, Intelligence Reference Guide. This reference guide was published on 29 June 2010 and supersedes the successful Warfighters' Guide 2009.

## Fundamentals of the Intelligence Reference Guide

The Intelligence Reference Guide, a For Official Use Only resource, is a command publication which captures information relevant to the environments the Army and Army Intelligence are currently experiencing. It is a useful resource tool for commanders, intelligence and operations staff officers, warrant officers, noncommissioned officers, and analysts at all skill levels and echelons.

MI Pub 2-0.1 comprises six chapters addressing current topics of value for a full understanding of the field of MI fundamentals, disciplines, operations, training, and systems. Specifics of particular interest or importance are expanded in 13 appendices, including one on cyberspace operations and another on telecommunications and signal funda-

mentals. Using an extensive mix of graphics and tables, this publication offers a helpful overview of the technologies available to the MI Soldier, especially in the appendices discussing intelligence systems.

*The proponent of this publication is the USAICoE. The views expressed in the reference guide are those of the authors and compilers and not of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. The contents of MI Pub 2-0.1 were provided by program managers responsible for particular systems and subject matter experts proficient in their particular areas. Any actions taken related to MI Pub 2-0.1 must be in compliance with AR 381-10.*

## Chapter 1: MI Modernization.

A campaign-capable expeditionary force is vital to meeting the demands of conducting continuous operations in an environment of persistent conflict. This is the focus of this chapter. The Army is modernizing by converting to a modular force and through Army force generation (ARFORGEN). MI is modernizing by—

- ◆ Increasing MI capacity and skills balance.
- ◆ Revitalizing Army human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities.

- ◆ Giving brigade combat teams (BCTs) and battalion-level access to “flat,” all-source information networks.
- ◆ Improving MI wartime readiness.

## **Chapter 2: Intelligence Fundamentals.**

This chapter provides information on the fundamentals of intelligence, the intelligence enterprise, and the intelligence warfighting function. It also gives an overview of the intelligence disciplines and discusses the intelligence community.

## **Chapter 3: Intelligence Disciplines.**

Intelligence disciplines are categories of intelligence functions. The Army’s intelligence disciplines are—

- ◆ All-source intelligence.
- ◆ Counterintelligence (CI).
- ◆ Human intelligence (HUMINT).
- ◆ Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT).
- ◆ Measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT).
- ◆ Open-source intelligence (OSINT).
- ◆ Signals intelligence (SIGINT).
- ◆ Technical intelligence (TECHINT).

## **Chapter 4: Intelligence Operations.**

This chapter introduces the following fundamentals: intelligence and the operations processes; how intelligence drives operations; the tenets of intelligence; the intelligence process; intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB); intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) planning considerations, and intelligence support to targeting and operations security.

## **Chapter 5: Intelligence Training.**

MI training is a continuing process. From initial training through first assignment and beyond, intelligence Soldiers can expect to continually update their skills by formal and informal means. This process is seen at the unit level in the ARFORGEN process, during which intelligence Soldiers continually train and use their skills. This chapter provides an overview of the training available from various organizations, including USAICoE and the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command. Unit training is based on guidance received from, and coordinated with, these organizations. For more information on Intelligence military occupational specialties and areas of concentration dis-

cussed here, see Appendix G. Contact information regarding these courses are provided in Appendix H of the guide.

## **Chapter 6: Intelligence Systems.**

The intelligence Soldier uses many systems to collect and process information that is communicated as intelligence. This chapter (along with specifics in Appendices I *Collection Systems*, J *Processing Systems*, and K *Communications and Communications Support Systems*) is an overview of the types of systems the intelligence Soldier is most likely to encounter and use in the field. Systems include:

- ◆ *Developmental*—A system suitable for evaluation and performance that is not scheduled for production.
- ◆ *Prototype*—A system suitable for evaluation of design, performance, and production potential.
- ◆ *Quick Reaction Capability*—A system used in the field to meet specific requirements.
- ◆ *Program of Record*—A system that has been evaluated and accepted for production.

## **The Future**

The Directorate of Doctrine, USAICoE will update the Intelligence Reference Guide every two years.

This publication is available at <https://ikn.army.mil> and on AKO. To access the publication on IKN, go to the “Resource” section of the left hand menu bar, and select “MI Active Doctrine.”

Access the publication on AKO at AKO Files Home / Organizations / DoD Organization / Army / Army Organizations / HQDA / CSA / Intelligence / FOUO MI Doctrine.

Please feel free to contact our team lead for the Intelligence Reference Guide, Ms. Dorothy Damone at commercial (520) 533-1065/DSN 821-1065 or [dot.damone@conus.army.mil](mailto:dot.damone@conus.army.mil).



*Dorothy Damone is a team lead assigned to the Writing Branch, Directorate of Doctrine at USAICoE.*



# CSM FORUM

by Command Sergeant Major Todd S. Holiday  
Command Sergeant Major  
U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence

---

ISR, as we all know, is shorthand to refer to the system of collection assets and analysts which brings information about an enemy or potential enemy to the decisionmakers that are fighting our country's wars; in this case, the War on Terror. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) is how we are fighting and winning our battles against our adversaries across the globe, from places such as Iraq and Afghanistan to places such as south of our borders where we continue to fight the war on drugs.

Today, our country is using the latest in technology to continue to improve our ISR capabilities. We continue to improve our Signals Intelligence systems, our Imagery Intelligence systems, our Measurements and Signatures Intelligence systems and even our oldest form of intelligence, Human Intelligence. All over the world the Intelligence Community (IC) is gathering information from observers; from photographs and other imagery; from electronic signals, and from other technically measurable aspects of the target. All these capabilities are within the basic structure of the IC. These systems are constantly improved and conditioned to work with each other. One sensor alone cannot grasp the full spectrum and visual of an enemy situation.

Lately, the Army has been focusing on the analytical aspects of all of the disciplines. This is extremely important because our commanders and troops in the battlefield cannot make timely and accurate decisions without data fusion and validation of the information gathered by our current collections systems. As a result we risk not only losing a lock on our enemies but also on losing the lives of American Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, and Airmen, and risking unnecessary collateral damage. Our adversaries hide within civilian populations or inside mountains. The once straightforward process of identifying potential targets has become much more complex. This is why ISR is so important. Intelligence fusion is equally important in that it is the key to creating a consolidated picture of the nation's various threats.

The enemies of the U.S. are getting smarter and faster, but the IC is always one step ahead detecting, assessing, and capturing their targets. We strive to increase the force's access to information, agility, and versatility while maintaining or increasing the force's lethality. We are directing ISR assets to obtain the highest-quality intelligence at the lowest tactical level, right in the heart of the fight.

Here at Fort Huachuca we train intelligence professionals from every intelligence occupational specialty in the exchanging of intelligence information gathered from systems such as JSTARS, AWACS, PROPHET, GUARDRAIL, PREDATOR, SHADOW, and CHARCS. The Joint Intelligence Combat Training Center (JICTC) is the hub where we train officers, noncommissioned officers, and initial entry Soldiers to work in Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational environments in efforts to build the bigger picture of the fight. The JICTC uses an Iraq based scenario that incorporates the use of the Distributed Common Ground System-Army, lessons learned, and current tactics, techniques, and procedures. Intelligence officers and Soldiers leave the JICTC prepared for assignments on Intelligence staffs at division levels and below and they leave prepared to join their units, deploy, and conduct multi-disciplined intelligence operations.

One of the more important capabilities of the JICTC is that it provides mobile training teams (MTTs) to units abroad. The MTTs train the students by assigning them to an ACE, G2X, BCT S2 section, S2X/OMT, BN S2 section or Coalition ACE. The students perform tasks which mirror those expected of a deployed unit's Intelligence staff. By May 2010, the JICTC will be moving to an Afghanistan based scenario which

# ALWAYS OUT FRONT

---

(Continued from page 2)

The USAICoE is addressing ISR and intelligence issues based on current and future operations. We will continue to address the doctrinal, organizational, training, materiel, leadership, personnel and facilities challenges associated with these issues. Over the course of the next few years, we need your input to help us clearly define the issues, find viable solutions and carefully articulate a conceptual and doctrinal path forward.



## **Always Out Front!**

# CSM FORUM

---

will prepare our intelligence professionals for operations in Afghanistan.

In summary, the IC has advanced much since the Cold War era. It is quite different from the environment of only ten years ago. Major shifts in both the threat to our national security and the technologies available to us (and our potential adversaries) have occurred. As a result, the evolution of technology constantly makes our ISR assets stronger. But we in the IC must never forget that intelligence gathering systems can produce the best quality results if the right intelligence professionals can USE IT, FUSE IT, and VALIDATE IT.



## **Always Out Front!**





# Intelligence Support to Nonlethal Operations

by Lieutenant Colonel William G. McDonough and Lieutenant Colonel John A. Conway

## Introduction

For the past 30 years, U.S. Army operations' doctrine has changed from a singular focus on conventional offensive operations to a more holistic and inclusive recognition of offensive, defensive, and stability operations. However, until recently, the Army's culture largely remained conventionally and offensively focused. As a culture before 9/11, the Army struggled to define the operational environment (OE) in anything but lethal, enemy focused terms. Despite our doctrine clearly identifying non-lethal aspects to describe characteristics of the battlefield environment during the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), intelligence (and non-intelligence) personnel focused on lethal threats.<sup>1</sup> For several years afterwards, the Army as a whole continued framing the OE in predominantly lethal terms. Mostly out of hard earned experience, it has only been in the past few years that we as an institution have embraced a more holistic approach to defining the OE.

Successful counterinsurgency (COIN) operations rely heavily on good intelligence and a thorough understanding of the enemy. "Counterinsurgents have to understand that [every situation is different] in as nuanced a manner as possible, and

then with that kind of understanding try to craft a comprehensive approach to the problems."<sup>2</sup> Insurgencies are fought in a complex environment consisting of government; physical terrain; information, propaganda, and the 24 hour news cycle; insurgent ideology; refugees, displaced persons, and mass migration; ethnic, tribal, clan or community groups; nongovernmental and private volunteer organizations; armed private contractors; porous borders; external funding; social classes; local and foreign armed groups; urban and rural populations; economic and political institutions; unemployment; crime; bandits; narcotics traffickers; smugglers; couriers; black marketers; and religious parties.<sup>3</sup> Many independent and interlinked individuals and groups contribute to the complexity. There are numerous articles stating that good intelligence is critical for COIN operations but few on how to actually create, train, and implement an organization to collect raw information and provide analyzed nonlethal intelligence.

Based on deployed experience to Iraq and Afghanistan, common themes in COIN literature, and knowing that we are predisposed as a culture to view the enemy situation in lethal terms, the

10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division (Light Infantry) (10<sup>th</sup> MTN DIV (LI)) G2 section established an out-of-hide, non-modified Table of Organization & Equipment (MTO&E) analytic section prior to our deployment to Iraq to provide intelligence support to nonlethal operations (INSLO). What follows is not the only way, but a way, to address the art of nonlethal intelligence analysis, the context of how and why we formed the ISNLO section, its training program, and employment in Iraq.

## Background

In Summer 2007 after our return from Afghanistan, the 10<sup>th</sup> MTN DIV (LI) headquarters was notified it would deploy to Iraq to be a multinational headquarters. We were in the process of completely rebuilding the G2 Analysis and Control Element (ACE) when we received notification. At the time of notification, we had approximately 15 percent of our future deploying ACE personnel on hand. We knew very early that the commander and his staff would require nonlethal intelligence analysis.

One of the Commanding General's first directives to the entire division staff was to figure out how we were going to be value added as a staff to him and subordinate units. A pre-Transformation division commander could assist ground commanders primarily in the form of increased logistics, deep attack aviation or artillery, or more intelligence assets. Today, brigade commanders have capabilities once reserved for division commanders. Resultantly, transformed brigade combat teams (BCTs) have capabilities and resources once organic at the division level. In short, our transformed division headquarters role had to change, especially in a decentralized COIN environment in Iraq.

In late Summer/early Fall 2007, the division started forming its staff organization; one section was the Governance, Reconstruction and Economics Coordination Cell (GRECC).<sup>4</sup> As envisioned, the GRECC section would be the lead for synchronizing and integrating information operations, civil affairs and psychological operations; lead for developing governance and economic organizations and reconstruction operations in the area of operations (AO); staff proponent for key leader engagements; staff proponent for Targeting Working Group, Effects Assessment Working Group, Effects Assessments Update Board,

Reconciliation Working Group, Information Operations Working Group (G7), Civil-Military Operations Working Group (G9); and coordinate and integrate an assessments process to support operations, plans, development and transition of the ISF, and development of governance and economic organizations. The GRECC section was not envisioned (or manned until after arriving in theater) to provide analysis in the GRE areas.

The GRECC concept and organization continued to change and morph all the way to deployment (and in theater). The main problem was a lack of personnel, literally resulting in the formation of this section in theater. As a result, there was no division staff entity that could provide GRE data to the ACE, CG, the division staff, or subordinate BCTs as part of their staff function prior to deployment or the first few months in theater.

Additionally, despite the Army's best efforts to field Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) and Human Terrain Analysis Teams (HTATs), we knew that we would not have an HTAT when we arrived in theater and did not know when one would come to our headquarters, if ever. HTT/HTATs focus primarily on Area Studies (History, Sociology, Literature, Culture, and Language) and Anthropology.<sup>5</sup> During the train-up for deployment and actual deployment, we knew that an HTAT would not be available to provide socio-cultural information for inclusion into our intelligence analysis.

However, as intelligence professionals we knew that we needed this type of information and, more importantly, the understanding and impact of these nonlethal factors on the operational environment for our formation and train up during the pre-deployment and in theater. The division commander, his staff, and intelligence personnel needed this analysis in various ways to understand the operational environment in order to issue guidance, make decisions, or create sound staff actions. However, no intelligence or other staff element was resourced or able to provide nonlethal analysis, intelligence or otherwise. We looked to the past for an example.

During the division headquarters' previous deployment to Afghanistan in 2006 and early 2007, we had an Intelligence Support to Information Operations (ISIO) cell in the Combined/Joint Task Force-76 headquarters CJ2 section. The ISIO cell was originally created to "collect and process data

and information to support Civil Military Affairs Operations (CMO), Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Electronic Warfare (EW) operations, and Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) operations. Our goal was to have the capability to fuse all of this information with current and future enemy intentions and provide awareness of the effects..."<sup>6</sup> In practice, the cell predominantly provided Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) analysis via the collection and analysis of all Open Source media. The section had a mixture of seven Soldiers and civilians plus additional civilians to translate various media products.

Because Iraq possessed various headquarters' sections and other contracted organizations that conducted open source analysis (which covered our AO), we chose not to invest any out-of-hide personnel to stand up an OSINT cell. We also knew that the Iraqi Advisor Task Force (IQATF) was already in theater helping to gauge public perception in Iraq, gather atmospheric information, analyze trends in the local Iraqi media, and conduct local polls among the populace. Resultantly, we knew that the headquarters would have a robust OSINT effort in theater and IQATF for population sentiments. The division ACE would be customers of this information and incorporate it into more comprehensive analysis. We wanted to provide nonlethal intelligence analysis to a broader customer base than IO based on the mission focus change we would receive prior to our entry into theater.

So, based on the mission, our experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq (both personnel and subordinate BCTs); the changing environment in Iraq; no staff section capable or responsible for nonlethal analysis or staff actions, and available resources in Iraq, we decided to create an out-of-hide non-MTO&E ISNLO section.

## **Creation**

In Fall 2007, we created a section of hand selected individuals to focus on nonlethal intelligence analysis. Because these subjects (e.g., economics, infrastructure, religion, tribes, etc.) were nontraditional and non-emphasized subjects of analysis, we understood the section would take a long time to research and comprehend these complex issues. Because the division's staff organization and functions were fluid and we did not know what the GRECC would even-

tually be responsible for or how it would be manned, we knew that questions in these areas would invariably come to the ACE.

We started the ISNLO section with seven Soldiers. We manned the section with a core group of four Soldiers eight months before deploying and added three more Soldiers within three months of deploying. This was dictated by ARFORGEN constraints and when personnel arrived at Fort Drum. We did not know how big this section should or would be but rather we knew we wanted a section separate from the All Source section focused on these complex nonlethal subjects. Making this effort more challenging was diverting the very short supply of MOS 35F Intelligence Analysts to this section instead of the All Source section which was also rebuilding from the ground up. We assumed risk but wanted to make an investment in Soldiers with proven critical thinking skills and educational backgrounds. The section was not rank driven. The intent was to put individuals with demonstrated critical thinking skills together, assign them focus areas, and then conduct research with little guidance.

Personnel included a first lieutenant who recently joined the active duty ranks from the reserve component who possessed two Bachelor of Science (BS) degrees plus five years of real world experience in sales and marketing. We also had the senior All Source warrant officer who had a Bachelor of Arts (BA) degree; a captain with a BS degree; a staff sergeant with some college credits and a solid analytic ability; a sergeant with two years of college credits and working on BA in International Studies who read, spoke, and wrote Arabic; a specialist with a BS degree, and a specialist with a BA degree. We later added a Soldier during the deployment for a total of eight. We focused the ISNLO section on the following areas:

- ◆ Tribes (organization, personalities, history).
- ◆ Personalities–Military (Battalion and higher for Iraqi Army/Iraqi Police/Department of Border Enforcement).
- ◆ Personalities–Political (Nahiya (sub district) and higher).
- ◆ Personalities–Local (Nahiya and higher).
- ◆ Infrastructure analysis (oil, electricity, and water)–the “So What” of infrastructure progress/lack of progress.

- ◆ Atmospherics—moods and sense of the AO.
- ◆ Religion.
- ◆ Culture.
- ◆ Production of political, economic, social, infrastructure, and informational (PESII) environment assessments.

Despite pressure to divide the Intelligence Warfighting Function and provide analysts to various staff sections such as IO and create an open source media cell, we successfully maintained this section's integrity in an effort to achieve synergy, economy of force, unity of effort, and an effective/efficient use of high demand/low density intelligence personnel to support multiple customers. As previously mentioned, because there were multiple organizations in theater and CONUS that performed OSINT, ISNLO's function was not to conduct media analysis. Maintaining the integrity of ISNLO (as well as the ACE) was more than empire building or control; we knew that maintaining a robust, centralized intelligence effort was critical at the division level for COIN. As part of this effort, we maintained the integrity of the ISNLO section in order to retain a focused effort on nonlethal intelligence analysis.

For two months, we focused ISNLO analysis on our original division sector. In November 2007, we were alerted that we would deploy to Multinational Division-Center (MND-C), a very different OE than our previous one. We continued training in the same manner but with different topics.

## **Training**

Lacking any doctrinal training program, we established a four pronged and parallel approach to train the section. The training started approximately eight months before the ACE deployed into theater. First, we used the division's Language and Cultural Awareness Center (LCAC) where ISNLO Soldiers could access the cultural awareness library with its various reference books, DVDs, VHS tapes, and magazines; language library; and four instructors. Based on recent deployments of divisional units, the LCAC was already heavily focused on Iraq and Afghanistan.

Concurrently, the ACE Chief assigned research topics to various ISNLO Soldiers to research and brief. The research topics were intended to be a forcing function to make analysts research the informa-

tion, synthesize the information, prepare analysis, and present the intelligence in a graphic and oral manner. The ACE Chief provided feedback to include briefing techniques and knowing the target audience (command group, staff primaries, other select staff members, and BCT representatives); critical thinking; slide construction and presentation techniques; the difference between guessing and assessing; knowing sources; presentation timing; where to get information/intelligence; who their analysis would support, and getting at the "So What" of the presentation. Some sample topics included:

- ◆ Basra—include what it is, importance, current status, Basra Oil Terminal, port, etc.
- ◆ Displaced persons—include where, impact, who is assisting—Iraqi government, nongovernmental organizations (NGO), Jaysh al Mahdi (JAM), Badr Organization.
- ◆ Education system in Iraq.
- ◆ Fadilah Party—include history, leadership.
- ◆ History of Sunni and Shia—include reasons for split, key figures, religious sites (particularly areas both claim as their own).
- ◆ Iranian/Persian influence in the AO/Area of Influence—include tribes affiliated with Iran.
- ◆ Iraq's Economy.
- ◆ Iraqi Government—include composition, functions, current status, party affiliations, key leaders, corruption.
- ◆ JAM—include organization, key leaders, support structure.
- ◆ NGOs in the AO—include who they are, how they operate, type of aid provided, affiliations.
- ◆ Political leaders (local, provincial, federal).
- ◆ Progress report on infrastructure repair/projects—include electrical, oil, water, medical, transportation.
- ◆ Provincial Reconstruction Teams in MND-C AO.
- ◆ Sons of Iraq.
- ◆ What Coalition Forces (CF) messages are working and which ones are not in MND-C AO?
- ◆ Key tribes/sub-tribes in MND-C? Include who we may be able to influence and how, who are clearly anti-CF and will most likely remain so.
- ◆ Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF)? What is its role in Iraq?

Additionally, because ISNLO Soldiers were focused on different areas, they conducted a mostly self-study reading program. For example, for the one ISNLO Soldier focused on infrastructure, he would locate and read books and other soft and hard copy literature on various infrastructure topics for Iraq. ISNLO Soldiers also read “baseline” books or watched select movies on Iraq; most were available at the LCAC or ordered for the Soldiers. Titles included:

- ◆ *Arab Awakening and Islamic Revival: The Politics of Ideas in the Middle East*, Martin Kramer.
- ◆ *Culture and Conflict in the Middle East*, Philip Carl Salzman.
- ◆ *Inside the Mind of a Suicide Bomber DVD*.
- ◆ *Islam for Dummies*, Malcolm Clark.
- ◆ *Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph*, T.E. Lawrence.
- ◆ *The Arab Mind*, Raphael Patai.
- ◆ *The Closed Circle: An Interpretation of the Arabs*, David Pryce-Jones.
- ◆ *The Cult of the Suicide Bomber DVD*.
- ◆ *The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11*, Lawrence Wright.
- ◆ *The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace*, Ali A. Allawi.
- ◆ *The Prince of the Marshes: And Other Occupational Hazards of a Year in Iraq*, Rory Stewart.
- ◆ *The Reckoning: Iraq and the Legacy of Saddam Hussein*, Sandra MacKey.

Closely related to the baseline reading was the plethora of Open Source internet resources available to the ISNLO Soldiers. They routinely read Iraq specific reports created by the U.S. Government Accountability Office, Department of Defense (quarterly reports to Congress—Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq reports), Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (reports to Congress), and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Additionally, the Soldiers regularly accessed various websites to include [www.iraq.net](http://www.iraq.net), the English version of Al Jazeera, Early Bird, United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, U.S. Agency for International Development in Iraq, Joint Contracting Command Iraq weekly Iraq Reconstruction updates, Iraq Investment and Reconstruction Task Force, and Independent High Electoral Commission. Finally, in conjunc-

tion with the four training lanes, the ISNLO section researched and maintained a personalities’ database.

## Deployment

Prior to the deployment, we decided to describe the OE by the operational variables listed in the 2008 FM 3-0, Operations. As such, ISNLO was the lead ACE entity for PESII analysis. The All Source section was the lead ACE entity for Military, the ACE Updates, special projects, and Request for Information (RFI) responses. We had previously used the operational variables to frame and describe the OE in Afghanistan and these worked very well to help make the complex simpler. Understanding PESII variables in a COIN environment is absolutely critical to understanding the OE.

As previously noted, we envisioned the ISNLO section as a standalone analytic organization not in the All Source section. The primary reason for this was the All Source section is typically under tremendous pressure for “normal” analysis intermixed with sporadic short fuse analytic products. This section typically gets a majority of analytic projects and RFIs. As such, ISNLO Soldiers would be sucked into meeting suspenses as opposed to focusing on the detailed and time consuming process of researching nontraditional intelligence topics from a myriad of sources to include open source, key leader engagement summaries, and operational reporting. So, prior to the deployment and in the first few months of deploying, the ISNLO section was a separate section in the ACE. There were certainly some growing pains with this; specifically, the division of labor between the All Source and ISNLO sections and the disparate levels of analytic expertise. This took several months to resolve.

Later, as the division continued to work on its staff organization for combat, how we would conduct lethal and nonlethal targeting became a key area of focus. As such, we were interested in how we would support the division’s targeting effort. Because targeting became such a focused effort, we combined ISNLO and the traditional lethal targeting section. ISNLO’s focus would be to provide nonlethal targets (mainly in the form of biographies and Key Leader Engagement information) into the staff process and targeting would conduct its traditional lethal targeting effort. Prior to the deployment and for the first two to three months in theater, the ISNLO section

continued to be the section that provided a majority of nonlethal targeting information and analysis. This role changed with the GRECC providing a majority of nonlethal targets and ISNLO supporting the GRECC effort.

ISNLO as part of the targeting effort did not work out for several reasons. First, the division struggled on how to conduct nonlethal targeting and ISNLO was not the best organization to provide input. The GRECC proved to be the superior entity since its charter was the oversight of various reconstruction, economic, and political efforts as well as Information and Psychological Operations (these later moved under a different staff section). Second, by placing ISNLO under targeting, it was ill suited to do this task since its strength was the ability to conduct PESII analysis. ISNLO was better suited to support GRECC, ACE Targeting, and ACE All Source with analysis as opposed to being the section that proposed nonlethal targets. Finally, because of some personnel changes, while the section had strong analysts, it did not have a mature and seasoned officer in charge (OIC) with a strong analytical background to mentor the young ISNLO analysts. After 90 days in theater, we placed the ISNLO section under the All Source section as a separate team. To mitigate the risk of ISNLO Soldiers conducting a lot of the “firefighting” analytical projects typically assigned to the All Source section, the All Source OIC made ISNLO a separate team with their normal areas of focus. ISNLO remained in this configuration throughout the remainder of the deployment.

ISNLO’s focus areas did not change during the deployment. However, there were some changes. First, prior to deployment, the ISNLO section was the main or only section that could provide information or analysis on Iraqi infrastructure, culture, social, telecommunications, etc. As previously mentioned, the GRECC was still forming prior to deployment and in the early months of the deployment. Literally, the GRECC formed in theater with 10<sup>th</sup> MTN DIV (LI) personnel, a Civil Affairs battalion, and several other augmentees all meeting for the first time in Iraq. Roughly put, this was like trying to repair an airplane while it is in flight and under fire. At about the four month mark, the GRECC had established its functions, staff role, and responsibilities. It had more of a staff coordination and oversight role for

governance, economics, and reconstruction—the “Blue/Friendly” side of things. As such, the focus of the GRECC in these areas was different in many respects to the ISNLO section; the ISNLO section remained the analytical element for these areas. Both sections worked together and established a collaborative relationship that proved beneficial to both organizations. For example, for the pre-, during, and post-provincial election period, the GRECC had staff lead for coalition actions required to support the Iraqis for their election. ISNLO conducted the analysis on political parties, key political leaders, threats to the elections or candidates, and friction points. The GRECC and ISNLO sections worked closely and regularly exchanged information and intelligence.

Approximately five months into the rotation, the division received its HTAT. When we heard that we would receive an HTAT, we envisioned placing this section with the ISNLO section outside the ACE (not all HTAT personnel had Top Secret clearances). After further deliberation, we opted to place the HTAT under the GRECC. The HTAT quickly assumed the lead for tribal information and the ISNLO section went into a supporting role. Additionally, we worked with the HTAT lead and integrated them into the weekly ACE updates with HTAT personnel briefing the Social portion of the updates.

Just prior to deployment, the ISNLO section grew to eight Soldiers and remained this size from May 2008 to May 2009. A few Soldiers were changed out for a variety of reasons. One of the Soldiers we added to the section was our Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Equipment Technician. Based on his college degrees and desire to contribute to the mission, we assigned him to the ISNLO section where he became the agriculture and water subject matter expert (SME). On a side note, in the Fall of 2007 and onward, we maintained a college degree and life skill roster for every Soldier in the ACE so if we needed to tap into a particular expertise, we could peruse the roster and approach the individual for expertise or reassignment inside the G2 section.

ISNLO’s primary briefers, all enlisted from the rank of Specialist to a Staff Sergeant, routinely briefed the Commanding General, the Deputy Commanding Generals, Division Command Sergeant Major, Political Advisor, and senior field grade and non-commissioned officers. These Soldiers were consid-

ered the SMEs in their areas. The creation of this section, nurturing and honing its critical thinking, and training it to convey and display information paid huge dividends for the division. These young Soldiers always briefed in other venues where fellow briefers were company or field grade officers and routinely displayed the confidence and mastery of their respective subjects.

As a routine matter, the ISNLO section supported-through reports, meetings, products, analyst to analyst dialogue-various ACE subsections; G2 sections such as plans, operations, and G2X; GRECC subsections such as the Economics & Governance Cells, Military Deception planning, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, Key Leader Engagements, and Information Operations; the higher Corps ACE; subordinate BCTs; and various Special Operations forces.

The ISNLO section routinely received support from all of the above mentioned entities as well as the Division Engineer; Political Advisor; Iraqi Security Forces cell; Sons of Iraq Cell; IQATF; Public Affairs, Aegis Defence Services; Corps and Forces headquarters; senior leader engagement reports; and other national agency partners. It also expanded its comprehensive personality database and populated the ACE webpage with culture, infrastructure, religion, tribal, and other ISNLO research and analysis so a variety of customers could access this information at any time.

## Conclusion

Given the complexity of operations we face in the foreseeable future, a nonlethal focused analytical cell is worth consideration if time, mission, and personnel manning permit. A section like ISNLO provides a focused, deeper, and richer understanding of the OE to the Intelligence Warfighting Function—a vital requirement for the art of nonlethal intelligence analysis. Certainly, our experience in establishing, training, and employing an ISNLO section is not the only way to address nonlethal intelligence analysis. It was based on the context that we faced prior to and during our deployment. However, given the preponderance of COIN operations the U.S. military will face, organizations must find a way to focus analytical efforts in order to provide nonlethal intelligence analysis to the commander, his staffs, and subordinate units. Hopefully, this article addressed why we created the ISNLO section, the problems we faced,

what worked and what did not work, and offered a way to address nonlethal intelligence analysis. 

## Endnotes

1. FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, 8 July 1994, 2-3 to 2-4. *NOTE: The Army is acknowledging this problem through the recent FMI 2-01.301, Specific Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures and Applications for Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, 31 March 2009.* Instead of FM 34-130's Step 1 Define the Battlefield Environment, FMI 2-01.301 uses the term Define the Operational Environment for Step 1. This semantic, but important, word change changes the focus from the lethal (battlefield) to a more comprehensive lethal and nonlethal focus (operational).
2. Carlotta Gall, "Insurgents in Afghanistan Are Gaining, Petraeus Says", *The New York Times*, 30 September 2008, accessed at <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/01/world/asia/01petraeus.html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rss>.
3. FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 15 December 2006, 3-3 to 3-4, 3-13, accessed at [https://rdl.train.army.mil/soldierPortal/atia/adlsc/view/public/23285-1/FM/3-24/FM3\\_24.PDF](https://rdl.train.army.mil/soldierPortal/atia/adlsc/view/public/23285-1/FM/3-24/FM3_24.PDF).
4. Specialist Justin Snyder, "Chameleons of MND-C: GRECC", Multi-National Division-Center Media Release, 7 January 2009.
5. Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), *The Human Terrain System: Mission, Organization, and Capabilities*, 9 April 2008, accessed at [http://www.saic.com/sosa/downloads/human\\_terrain\\_system.pdf](http://www.saic.com/sosa/downloads/human_terrain_system.pdf).
6. Captain Laura A. Levesque, "Intelligence Support to Information Operations: Open Source Intelligence Operations at the Division Level," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin*, October-December 2005.

*Lieutenant Colonel William G. McDonough is the former G2 Analysis and Control Element Chief for the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division (LI) during Operation Iraqi Freedom VI. He has served for the past 26 years in a variety of assignments from the platoon to Joint Task Force level as an infantry and MI Soldier including deployments in support of Operations Hurricane Andrew, Restore Hope, Uphold Democracy, Joint Endeavor, and Enduring Freedom IV and VII. He holds a BA and MA in History from the California State University, Sacramento; an MS in Military Operational Art and Science from the Air Command and Staff College; and a MS in Airpower Arts and Science from the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies.*

*Lieutenant Colonel John A. (Jake) Conway is the former G2 for the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division (LI) for Operation Iraqi Freedom VI. He has served for the past 20 years in a variety of artillery and MI positions to include Infantry Battalion S2 in support of Operation Uphold/Maintain Democracy and BCT S2 in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom IV. He holds a BA in Pre-Law from Penn State University, an MA in Management from Webster University, St. Louis, Missouri, and is a graduate of the Post-Graduate Intelligence Program, Washington, D.C.*



# Advanced Analysis Techniques: The Key to Focused ISR

---

by Captain Andrew G. Schlessinger

---

## Introduction

Your unit is in an area that has been inundated with improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Without a doubt the Soldiers know what routes in their area are dangerous and how to get around them. But every day is a challenge. Every day is a roll of the dice. They try to vary their routes so that their patterns are less obvious, but there are only so many ways to get from the company command post to the forward operating base for refit, resupply and a couple of hours of R&R. There are only so many avenues of approach into and out of the platoon and company patrol areas. As the battalion intelligence officer you have identified several engagement areas in the area of operations (AO) you'd like the commander to address, but which one will give you the results you need? Which engagement area is the enemy going to use next? Which location is best to attack?

This situation is faced by every S2 in Afghanistan and Iraq. The battalion commander and company commanders look to us for these answers, but it's the Soldiers who depend on our ability to be right. There is a lot to be said for "winning the hearts and minds," it is the only way to truly transform the area to a stable and secure environment, and should be the primary focus of the command group and staff. But we still have to effectively do our other job: deliver the bad guys on a silver platter.

There are two parts to this problem. First, how do we effectively target the engagement area? Second, how do we effectively target the network responsible? During Operation Iraqi Freedom 06-08 in eastern Baghdad, the S2 shop from 1-8 Cavalry, 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade Combat Team, 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division attacked the problem using advanced analysis processes that directly led to successful counter-attack operations on the ground. Our information development significantly increased the unit commander's situational

awareness and our ability to target the enemy with focused intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) and maneuver operations.

## Targeting an Engagement Area

Pattern analysis is the likely approach an S2 will use to identify engagement areas. At his disposal is the older Time/Event Plot Wheel and a newer resource which is the density plot capability offered by Distributed Common Ground Station-Army. Together they facilitate both time and space analysis. With today's technology, however, we can better understand the activity by not only looking at the day and time patterns, but also by engagement area, and by prioritizing each area in relation to frequency. Predictive analysis can be conducted with quantifiable degrees of accuracy at the push of a button. This process further helps the staff develop enemy networks responsible for the activity.

In 1-8 CAV, to get to a greater level of detail, we needed to develop a system whereby raw information could be processed instantly into something that was quantifiable, as free from human bias and error as possible, and do it on a frequently recurring basis. This, we believed, would maximize the analyst's time to explore enemy networks, maximize the unit's use of high-demand collection assets, and give the commander the ability to plan operations that had greater than 50 percent chance of success. We envisioned a program that could instantly generate engagement time patterns down to the hour, location patterns down to 1 kilometer, and do it for multiple forms of contact, not just IEDs.

Our first breakthrough came in the form of the flattened Time/Event Plot Wheel that is now widely used. We added engagement percentages by hour and by day, used 15 percent as the threshold for

high-risk days, and used 40 percent of daily activity as our minimum target attack windows. This gave us the ability to instantly focus our ISR and maneuver assets to specific times of the day on specific days of the week. In other words, we never needed to ask for large swaths of time. We asked for small, specific blocks of time (typically only 6 to 8 hours per week) with a greatly increased *probability* of success.

Figure 1 shows typical returns. In this example the target windows for ISR and maneuver assets would be Sunday, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday from 1700 through 2100, or only twenty hours per week. If we only had a few hours of ISR time allotted to us we would begin with the window of engagement that had the highest probability of success, then work down. In this case, Sunday from 1700 to 2100 is the best ISR window.

| Last 30 Days of Acty | 0    | 1    | 2    | 3    | 4    | 5    | 6    | 7    | 8    | 9    | 10   | 11   | 12   | 13   | 14   | 15   | 16   | 17    | 18    | 19    | 20   | 21   | 22   | 23   | Total | Percent |
|----------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|------|------|------|------|-------|---------|
| Sunday               |      |      |      | 3    |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | 2    |      |      |      |      | 1    | 1     | 1     |       |      |      |      | 8    | 21.6% |         |
| Monday               |      |      |      |      |      |      | 1    | 1    |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |       | 1     |       |      |      |      | 3    | 8.1%  |         |
| Tuesday              |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | 1    |      |      |      |      |      | 2    | 1     |       | 1     | 1    |      |      | 7    | 18.9% |         |
| Wednesday            |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | 1    |      | 1    | 1    |      |      |      |      |      | 1    |       | 2     |       | 1    |      |      | 7    | 18.9% |         |
| Thursday             |      | 1    |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | 1    |      |      |      |      |      |      | 2     | 1     | 1     |      |      |      | 6    | 16.2% |         |
| Friday               |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |       | 1     | 1     |      |      |      |      | 2     | 5.4%    |
| Saturday             |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | 1    |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |       | 2     |       | 1    |      |      |      | 4     | 10.8%   |
| Total                | 0    | 1    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 3    | 3    | 1    | 1    | 0    | 3    | 0    | 3    | 0    | 0    | 1    | 0     | 5     | 5     | 6    | 3    | 2    | 0    | 0     | 37      |
| Percent              | 0.0% | 2.7% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 8.1% | 8.1% | 2.7% | 2.7% | 0.0% | 8.1% | 0.0% | 8.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 2.7% | 0.0% | 13.5% | 13.5% | 16.2% | 8.1% | 5.4% | 0.0% | 0.0% | % Day |         |
| 2-Hour Window        | 3%   | 3%   | 0%   | 0%   | 8%   | 16%  | 11%  | 5%   | 3%   | 8%   | 8%   | 8%   | 8%   | 0%   | 3%   | 3%   | 14%  | 27%   | 30%   | 24%   | 14%  | 5%   | 0%   | 0%   | 8.3%  |         |
| 4-Hour Window        | 3%   | 3%   | 8%   | 16%  | 19%  | 22%  | 14%  | 14%  | 11%  | 16%  | 16%  | 8%   | 11%  | 3%   | 16%  | 30%  | 43%  | 51%   | 43%   | 30%   | 14%  | 5%   | 3%   | 3%   | 16.7% |         |
| 6-Hour Window        | 11%  | 19%  | 19%  | 22%  | 22%  | 30%  | 22%  | 22%  | 19%  | 16%  | 19%  | 11%  | 24%  | 30%  | 46%  | 54%  | 57%  | 57%   | 43%   | 30%   | 16%  | 8%   | 3%   | 3%   | 25.0% |         |
| 8-Hour Window        | 22%  | 24%  | 22%  | 30%  | 30%  | 38%  | 30%  | 22%  | 22%  | 19%  | 19%  | 32%  | 38%  | 54%  | 54%  | 59%  | 59%  | 57%   | 57%   | 46%   | 32%  | 16%  | 8%   | 11%  | 19%   | 33.3%   |
| 10-Hour Window       | 24%  | 32%  | 30%  | 38%  | 38%  | 38%  | 32%  | 24%  | 35%  | 46%  | 62%  | 62%  | 68%  | 59%  | 59%  | 59%  | 59%  | 46%   | 32%   | 24%   | 24%  | 22%  | 24%  | 24%  | 41.7% |         |
| 12-Hour Window       | 32%  | 41%  | 38%  | 38%  | 41%  | 41%  | 46%  | 51%  | 65%  | 70%  | 76%  | 68%  | 68%  | 59%  | 62%  | 62%  | 59%  | 59%   | 54%   | 49%   | 35%  | 30%  | 24%  | 32%  | 50.0% |         |

Figure 1. Day/Time Analysis

Our second breakthrough centered on the location of attack. First we had to establish a system of pre-determined, fixed named areas of interest (NAIs) that covered our entire AO. We subdivided our main supply routes into one kilometer sections and gave each of them a unique identifier. Then we divided the rest of our AO into sub-muhallahs, giving us a 2 ~ 5 block NAI. This system of smaller, permanent NAIs not only gave us the ability to associate significant activity (SIGACT) with any location on the ground, but it also focused our ISR and maneuver assets into more manageable areas for route clearance, counter-IED or counter-indirect fire (IDF) operations.

Second, we figured out how to have the program automatically show which NAIs were active, how many engagements occurred in that NAI and in our AO in general, whether the activity mandated making the NAI gray, light gray, dark gray or black, and in what priority they should be targeted. Figure 2 shows typical returns for this part of the program.

In this example there are only five active NAIs in our AO (we had over 300 possible NAIs.) Two attacks in that NAI met the criteria for light gray, six for dark gray, and ten for light gray. The priority of asset allocation goes first to NAIs 731 and 734, then to 736, 761, and 767, respectively. The analyst can also view the Day/Time results on just those NAIs in order to see their respective patterns.

| Last 30 Days Activity |      |         |
|-----------------------|------|---------|
| NAI                   | POOs | % NAIs  |
| 731                   | 13   | 35.14%  |
| 734                   | 10   | 27.03%  |
| 736                   | 8    | 21.62%  |
| 761                   | 3    | 8.11%   |
| 767                   | 3    | 8.11%   |
| Total AO              | 37   | 100.00% |

Figure 2. NAI Chart

## So What?

Combining both of these analytical processes gave us the ability to predict, with a high level of accuracy, the day, time, and location of future attacks in a matter of seconds, whether it was IED, IDF, rocket propelled grenade or small arms. In December 2006, two weeks after our relief in place/transfer of authority, three IDF teams were identified in only four weeks using this method of analysis. And in May 2007, using ground forces to deny less active NAIs, the brigade identified and destroyed a rocket team responsible for increased attacks into the International Zone. *Bottom Line: We knew where to look and when to look there; it was only a matter of time.*

Whether the commander's intent is to destroy the team on site or to observe the follow-on locations and target the enemy network, the staff and company commanders now have the ability to plan operations that are more likely to succeed. The updated program can track up to 10,000 different SIGACT types

(yes, that's ten thousand). Next, we focused our time on enhancing the network targeting process.

## Targeting a Network

Solving this problem proved to be a little less difficult because the answers were readily found in doctrine. Target Selection Standards (TSS) are developed around what enemy assets have to be neutralized or destroyed for our commander's plan to succeed (High Pay-Off Target List, or HPTL). They are also developed around what enemy assets have to be neutralized or destroyed to prevent the enemy from accomplishing his mission (High Value Target List, or HVTL). The Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) was regularly used to determine both.

The 1-8 CAV staff met together weekly for MDMP sessions, with special attention being paid to lethal and non-lethal targeting during semi-weekly targeting meetings. During these planning meetings the TSS were reviewed to determine their continued applicability and importance in the current environment. If it was assessed that a TSS was more important in the up-coming week than in the week before, it would move up in importance. Each TSS received a value, and every potential target that crossed the analyst's desk (or that of the fire support officer, S5, Civil Affairs (CA), Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) or even the battalion maintenance officer) would be measured against the TSS and receive a matching value. The priority of effort was determined by this value (HPTL and HVTL), and the weekly order reflected these changes. Once the targeting standards were developed we worked to discover ways to automate our process and save valuable analytical and operational time.

Our goal in this effort was to create a program that would assign TSS values to targets and sort them, in effect creating an automated HPTL and HVTL. It also had to be able to take all types of reporting, whether it was a SPOT report, a Human Intelligence (HUMINT) or Signals Intelligence report, or a patrol debrief. Finally, it had to act as a type of "one-stop-shop" for situational awareness of what was needed to successfully detain or neutralize a target. Therefore, it had to update the target summaries with whether the targets had been positively identified (PID), whether we had a known location,

and whether there was enough evidence to support an operation.

We again used Excel and found solutions to each of these requirements. We also had the ability to subdivide targets into "Actionable", "Reconnaissance Needed", or "Disruption" targets. The example in Figure 3 shows typical results from the program.

In this example, while Henry and Tom may be the number one and number two targets, they both need to be PID, and Tom's location needs to be confirmed. Even though all targets are active, only four are *actionable*-Ringo, Lisa, Paul and John because they are the only ones who have been PID, have a known location, and meet the minimum prosecution requirements.

| HPTL# | Target Number | Target Name | Target Value | Last Report | PID? | LOC? | # of Sources | # of Reports |
|-------|---------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|------|------|--------------|--------------|
| 1     | 3125          | Henry       | 123          | 25          | N    | Y    | 2            | 12           |
| 2     | 1402          | Tom         | 122          | 2           | N    | N    | 3            | 7            |
| 3     | 4130          | Ringo       | 120          | 1           | Y    | Y    | 3            | 4            |
| 4     | 2123          | Mary        | 115          | 12          | Y    | Y    | 1            | 7            |
| 5     | 4127          | George      | 96           | 1           | N    | Y    | 3            | 3            |
| 6     | 5304          | Lisa        | 92           | 9           | Y    | Y    | 2            | 3            |
| 7     | 6031          | Ted         | 87           | 29          | Y    | N    | 4            | 5            |
| 8     | 6342          | Kevin       | 76           | 4           | N    | N    | 2            | 11           |
| 9     | 4128          | Paul        | 73           | 1           | Y    | Y    | 3            | 3            |
| 10    | 4129          | John        | 73           | 1           | Y    | Y    | 3            | 3            |

Figure 3. The Target Tracker

The effectiveness of this program surpassed even our most optimistic expectations. At first we were struggling to maintain collection requirements and visibility on just twenty to thirty targets. We quickly learned, however, that it was possible to track and prioritize many more. We discovered that we could process every name and every location that appeared in any report. Our HPTL and HVTL tracker eventually held over 500 targets (I say again, five hundred targets at once).

On the surface it sounds impossible, but once we uploaded the program with the historic data, maintaining and adding to our targets only took a few hours per day. Our analysts now had more time to dedicate to learning the details, intricacies, nuances and dynamic characteristics of each network. Their knowledge of the enemy ultimately encompassed the entire span of the battle space and far into other unit's areas of responsibility.

Granted, most of these were only mentioned in one report, making much of the list static and never changing. I estimate that we worked with about 25 percent of those targets on a regular basis. But with so many names associated with so many locations conducting so many activities it was impossible to know which ones were going to

be important in the future. So we decided to track them all.

The analytical ability of the shop took a great leap forward. As with the pattern analysis enhancements, this process maximized the analyst's time spent developing enemy networks, maximized the time developing enemy courses of action (COAs), and allowed the analyst maximum time to assist the S3 shop with the battalion's COAs, both lethal and non-lethal.

One of their first accomplishments was to disprove the theory of independently operating cells. The analysts were able to identify large portions of the enemy's orders of battle, from IED emplacers and IDF team members, up the chain of command to national level targets. They also began to see the second and third order effects of keeping a target in place or detaining him. They began to see the results of CA and PSYOP operations. They could spend time supporting the staff, particularly the S5, doing their part to develop more effective Information Operation strategies. They became so competent that any one of them (junior enlisted) could sit in on brigade's targeting meetings and speak ad nauseum about any target in our sector, how they related to other targets in adjacent unit's AO, the most likely points of weakness to facilitate collection, exploitation, and/or detention, and our ISR strategy to accomplish our unit's goals. My problems with the shop were not centered on justifying their use of time, rather they centered around keeping them focused on only our AO.

## On the Ground

There were several positive results, and they were mutually supporting. First, it gave us a way to directly target hostile activity effectively and consistently. Our commander used the NAI prioritization as the foundation for his "Deny and Destroy" operations. The companies that owned the second and third most frequent IDF and IED NAIs denied the enemy the ability to employ their system at those locations during their attack window. This forced the enemy into the location *they* felt most comfortable using, and it exposed our forces for only short periods of time. It rarely took more than three weeks to identify an IED or IDF team from the beginning of an operation.

Second, once we identified the enemy at the NAI, it became a decision point for the commander—Did we destroy them or pursue them to follow-on locations for future detention? Both were effective COAs. Both eventually stopped the activity, if only for a couple of weeks. This allowed us to focus energies on establishing, maintaining, or rebuilding relationships of trust with the formal and informal leaders of the community. It also gave us credibility in the community for being able to target those that were attacking us. As the enemy took a tactical pause to regroup, the community had periods of less violence, which helped them remember that businesses and economies do better in times of peace. This also had a positive effect on our HUMINT operations, which improved, with more reliable sources reporting more accurate information.

Third, the more we were able to identify specific key personalities, identify their job and influence in the enemy organization, and tie them to specific activities in the AO, we were able to decide whether to target them with non-lethal or lethal fires. If the analyst determined that they were a good candidate for non-lethal targeting, we worked with community leaders, businesses, and even made direct contact to accomplish this mission. If, on the other hand, it was determined that it was more advantageous to remove them from the equation all together, we developed an operation to detain them. Whichever COA was decided upon, both led back to further time, space, and link analysis.

## Conclusion

Understanding what to do with information is just as important as the information itself. Each piece means something by itself, but it also means something in relation to every other piece of information. And with so much at our fingertips it is easy to miss the forest for the trees. Technology can enhance our processes, increase product accuracy, accelerate routine product development, and focus our ISR and maneuver assets to a degree never before imagined, creating valuable analytical time for enemy network exploitation and friendly force COA development. As intelligence professionals, we have a responsibility, and now the capability, to bring more clarity and objectivity to the decisionmaking process faster than ever before.





# ISR Support to Non-lethal Operations

by Major Yukio A. Kuniyuki III

The observations and recommendations expressed below are based on my experiences while assigned to the MultiNational Corps and Forces-Iraq (MCF-I) Collection Management & Dissemination section during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 06-08 as part of the National Systems Development Program CAPSTONE exercise and while assigned as the division Collection Manager for MultiNational Division-Baghdad (MND-B) during OIF 07-09. The article does not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

## Introduction

***"In one moment in time, our service members will be feeding and clothing displaced refugees, and providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they will be holding two warring tribes apart—conducting peacekeeping operations—and, finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle—all on the same day...all within three city blocks."***

—General Charles C. Krulak, USMC, 1999<sup>1</sup>

In the late nineties, General Krulak coined the term “Three Block War” to describe the demands of conducting full spectrum operations within urban terrain of failed states like Somalia and the former Yugoslavia. Since then, technology has advanced at an unprecedented rate while globalization flowered unhindered, producing a world more interconnected than ever before. While the modern battlefield is not constrained to three blocks, the same challenges persist. Today’s military operations demand simultaneous integration of non-lethal operations to succeed. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, non-lethal operations emerged as critical components of counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy and full spectrum operations. However, despite the preeminent rise of non-lethal operations to shape conditions and achieve operational results, intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance (ISR) struggles to answer the demands of both lethal and non-lethal operations. Invariably, lethality wins and priority goes to finding and killing the enemy.

A recent report by Major General Michael Flynn, the senior intelligence officer in Afghanistan, stated that, “our vast intelligence apparatus still finds itself unable to answer fundamental questions about the environment in which we operate and the people we are trying to persuade.”<sup>2</sup> The report attested that intelligence focused too much on lethal targeting of networks and not enough on answering the questions of “high level decision makers seeking the knowledge, analysis, and information they need to wage a successful counterinsurgency.”<sup>3</sup> This article will discuss categories of non-lethal operations and provide examples of tactics, techniques and procedures for consideration when requesting ISR support. Topics will focus on unclassified technical methods of collection.

## What are Non-lethal Operations?

FM 3-0 Operations delineates non-lethal operations in Chapter 3, Full Spectrum Operations amid discussion of stability operations and civil support operations. Therein, it elucidates intelligence as an important warfighting function for the commander:

***Stability and civil support operations emphasize nonlethal, constructive actions by Soldiers working among noncombatants...Commanders use continuous information engagement shaped by intelligence to inform, influence, and persuade the local populace within limits prescribed by U.S. law.<sup>4</sup>***

This statement, in conjunction with MG Flynn's Afghanistan assessment, reveals that intelligence professionals need to do more than study their own field manuals to stay relevant. Actionable intelligence includes enabling the commander with the information he needs to interact with all aspects of his operational environment (OE). FM 3-0 further defines the effect achieved through successful non-lethal operations:

***Nonlethal, constructive actions can persuade the local populace to withhold support from the enemy and provide information to friendly forces. Loss of popular support presents the enemy with two bad choices: stay and risk capture or depart and risk exposure to lethal actions in less populated areas. Commanders focus on managing the local populace's expectations and countering rumors. However, they recognize that their Soldiers' actions, positive and negative, are the major factor in the populace's perception of Army forces.<sup>5</sup>***

| <b>Offensive Operations</b>  | <b>Defensive Operations</b>  |
|--|--|
| <b>Primary Tasks</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Movement to contact</li> <li>• Attack</li> <li>• Exploitation</li> <li>• Pursuit</li> </ul> <b>Purposes</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Dislocate, isolate, disrupt, and destroy enemy forces</li> <li>• Seize key terrain</li> <li>• Deprive the enemy of resources</li> <li>• Develop intelligence</li> <li>• Deceive and divert the enemy</li> <li>• Create a secure environment for stability operations</li> </ul>   | <b>Primary Tasks</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mobile defense</li> <li>• Area defense</li> <li>• Retrograde</li> </ul> <b>Purposes</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Deter or defeat enemy offensive operations</li> <li>• Gain time</li> <li>• Achieve economy of force</li> <li>• Retain key terrain</li> <li>• Protect the populace, critical assets, and infrastructure</li> <li>• Develop intelligence</li> </ul>   |
| <b>Stability Operations</b> <b>Primary Tasks</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Civil security</li> <li>• Civil control</li> <li>• Restore essential services</li> <li>• Support to governance</li> <li>• Support to economic and infrastructure development</li> </ul> <b>Purposes</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide a secure environment</li> <li>• Secure land areas</li> <li>• Meet the critical needs of the populace</li> <li>• Gain support for host-nation government</li> <li>• Shape the environment for interagency and host-nation success</li> </ul> | <b>Civil Support Operations</b> <b>Primary Tasks</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide support in response to disaster or terrorist attack</li> <li>• Support civil law enforcement</li> <li>• Provide other support as required</li> </ul> <b>Purposes</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Save lives</li> <li>• Restore essential services</li> <li>• Maintain or restore law and order</li> <li>• Protect infrastructure and property</li> <li>• Maintain or restore local government</li> <li>• Shape the environment for interagency success</li> </ul> |

**Figure 1. Elements of Full Spectrum Operations<sup>6</sup>**

FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency adds to the discussion of intelligence operations in a COIN environment by delineating the intelligence considerations across all dimensions of political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information systems, physical terrain, and time (PMESII-PT) analysis.

Joint Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations states:

***The OE for all joint operations is the sum of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect how the commander uses the available capabilities and makes decisions.***

***The OE encompasses physical domains, non-spatial environments and other factors. The OE includes the information environment, sociocultural considerations, and civil considerations. A holistic understanding of the OE includes all these aspects and helps the commander understand how the OE constrains or shapes options...<sup>7</sup>***

Before we begin to tailor intelligence support to operations, intelligence professionals at all echelons must have a common understanding of the commander's requirements and a sound appreciation for doctrine.

## **ISR within the Framework of Non-lethal Support**

Despite the discussion of non-lethal operations to shape conditions and enable success, operations and intelligence communities tend to be predominantly target focused when leveraging ISR. Typical discussion of ISR support to operations includes Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Assess, and Disseminate along with a target package or concept of operations. Whether the enemy is a member of a complex network or the advanced guard main body, we regard ISR employment in lethal terms because there is a cause and effect that we can comprehend and an outcome we can assess. Intelligence develops target data; target data is handed over for operations planning; military forces capture or kill individual; exploit new data, and the cycle begins again.

However, intelligence professionals must think outside the alluring crosshairs of kinetic operations. Support to non-lethal operations in today's OE is a critical line of effort. It requires integrating intelligence personnel into the planning of civil, information, and psychological operations as well as with efforts to build host nation capacity to provide security, governance, and the basic needs of its people. This integration must extend across PMESII-PT variables within a given OE.

## **Advancing Host Nation Governance**

In both Afghanistan and Iraq, support to governance and support to the electoral process have become mission essential tasks and measures of effectiveness to evaluate the success of COIN strategy. But most intelligence professionals would be lying if they said they knew exactly how to leverage ISR to support the electoral process. In reality, for ISR to support such a broad multi-agency effort requires

the integration and synchronization of various warfighting functions, not just intelligence. In order to execute support to elections successfully, the intelligence professional needs to understand the various sources of information as well as the OE (the physical, human, virtual, temporal, and ideological terrain) in which the events will take place.

In Iraq, before the 2009 provincial elections, the MND-B G2 established a cell to monitor the economic and political variables within the OE to support key leader engagements and develop situational understanding of the OE leading up to the elections. Additionally, the Intelligence Plans officer drafted a synchronization matrix to align the efforts of other elements to support of the electoral process. Both were attempts to gain control of an otherwise unregulated source of information and intelligence.

Figure 2 (on next page) is an example synchronization matrix devised to track and coordinate the various sources of elections reporting. As the Army focuses more on non-lethal tasks to support COIN, it is important to develop tools to synchronize collection activities, develop assessments of population perceptions, and direct the exploitation of the information environment. This matrix aligns the threat assessment with friendly activities including phased information requirements, commander decision points, and reporting agencies. More importantly, sharing information and intelligence became critical as well, not just to host nation security forces but also across the spectrum of other U.S. government agencies and coalition partners.

## Securing the Population

*“The army must become one with the people so that they see it as their own army. Such an army will be invincible.”*

—Mao Zedong

Mao's statement echoes the sentiment in FM 3-0 regarding a populace's perception of the Army. Achieving invincibility sounds easy enough, but how do we accomplish it with ISR? Groundwork for successful ISR strategy begins with an in depth assessment of the OE and an understanding of how the threat and the populace interact based on PMSEII-PT.

Just as Mao described guerillas relying on a population as fish rely on the sea, an army must seek to work in the interest of a people to gain their support and become ‘invincible.’ This is hard enough

to achieve in one's own country, it is exponentially more difficult when the army must fight the image of being a conqueror. Yet, there are various methods to task ISR and support population security.


Imagery is one of the most readily available products to support population security. Through its manipulation, imagery can gather information on patterns of life to determine normal activity in an area of operations. Use of full motion video, advanced geospatial imagery (AGI), or Measurements and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT) analysis supports this collection activity. Visual assessments, AGI and MASINT products are essential to begin the intelligence preparation of the battlefield. More importantly, understanding a population's pattern of life enables intelligence to anticipate enemy targets. For example, knowing when markets are most active and then using imagery to identify markets with poor security may produce a list of probable targets. Similarly, imagery can identify refugee locations to support humanitarian relief agencies or confirm host nation security force activities.

Other wide area imagery surveillance can reveal criminal activity through forensic analysis and enable host nation security forces to perform their duties, further legitimizing its role and gaining confidence from the people. It is important to note that while technical means support security, effective Human Intelligence and patrol debriefing provide invaluable context to what would otherwise be literal images left to individual interpretation. An image of a mass gathering may only indentify the approximate number of people in attendance, but it will not tell you what they discussed.

## Building Civil Capacity

The collection manager has the unique task of being the access point for providing support to civil affairs or engineer operations to build civil capacity. These mission areas focus on the SWEAT-MSO<sup>8</sup> acronym and are found in Appendix C to FM 3-34.170 Engineer Reconnaissance. Some ISR missions to consider include:

- ◆ Evaluate the effectiveness of trash pick up or identify trouble areas.
- ◆ Provide imagery to identify the status of power generation.
- ◆ Provide multi-spectral products to agriculture to determine arable land.



**Figure 2. Example of a Non-lethal Synchronization Matrix.**

- ◆ Provide multi-spectral products to identify sewage spills, broken water mains, or soil contamination.
- ◆ Provide assessment of urban traffic patterns to focus road or transportation improvements.
- ◆ Provide AGI to identify changes in the environment such as expansion of market places or transportation hub activity.

Using the charts and checklists in Appendix C for infrastructure assessments provides the collection manager with a list of specific intelligence requirements and essential elements of information or information requirements with which to task collection assets.

While it is often difficult to justify theater collection of infrastructure targets when threat networks have priority, secondary exploitation of existing products can overcome this hurdle. An imagery analyst can manipulate existing imagery on his workstation to reveal intelligence to support non-lethal requirements. For example, a wide field of view multi-spectral product can reveal nuances of the physical environment as long as it records within the appropriate spectra and in the area of interest.

Linking non-lethal collection requests with lethal priorities, though frowned upon, is another means to get results. The collection manager and analyst must think about how the non-lethal requirement may relate to lethal activities performed by the enemy and write the requirement accordingly. This is where the intelligence professional must have situational understanding of existing lines of effort (LOEs) and an aptitude for conveying intelligence requirements in operational terms.

## National Emergencies

Though not necessarily related to operations in Afghanistan or Iraq, ISR must be ready to respond to national emergencies as it does to combat or COIN operations. The best example in recent history of support to national emergencies occurred in the aftermath of hurricane Katrina. The military provided imagery to local and national emergency services to identify the affected areas, while unmanned aerial systems flew reconnaissance missions to find survivors and assess damage. Another example was the U.S. Air Force's support to California wildfires.

In a more recent example, if we examine this winter's impact of cold weather on crops in the south and southeast, we can provide information to help

national decision makers prioritize support and disaster relief efforts. Consider how multi-spectral imagery may be used to assess the damage to orange crops in Florida and the decisions our leaders have to make across the PMESII-PT spectrum. The same process may be applied to a host nation country to protect crops from unexpected weather events or to shape conditions to allow a populace to focus on economic development through agriculture and shift from a cycle of violence.

## Standardizing the Collection Effort to Support Non-lethal Operations

To be effective, the collection manager and analyst must develop sound practices for managing information and requirements as well as standardizing naming conventions and processes. Developing relevant named areas of interest (NAIs) can be a daunting task in an urban environment, especially with the diverse array of problem sets requiring coverage or collection. But it is not impossible to develop effective operations-based NAIs over the perfunctory products learned in the classroom. In fact, understanding how to develop effective NAIs is an essential task for all intelligence personnel.

For example, NAI requirements to support full spectrum operations must be easily discernable and receive input from subject matter experts outside the intelligence community. The division Fire Effects Coordinator S2 may develop standing NAIs for counter indirect fire while the counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) task force conducts the NAI analysis for route clearance operations.

Not only does this method of managing NAIs help ISR integration, it also helps synchronize enablers across the warfighting functions. For example, C-IED NAIs not only synchronize airborne ISR with the route clearance operations, they provide Air Force fighter aircraft and electronic attack assets with situational awareness of the threat on the ground. The key to success to both operations is formalizing the process in a weekly operations order to ensure ISR support and NAI development continue to be relevant to support the changing OE.

Furthermore, due to the multiple LOEs in COIN operations, it is necessary to develop a naming convention for NAIs to quickly distinguish between multiple threats and their support zones as well as NAIs associated with nonlethal operations. One

technique is to use a format that reveals ownership, category, and threat: (Two letter unit ID) (NAI category code)(Threat ID)(Sequence number).

- ◆ The two letter unit ID (digraph) identifies the landowning unit by an abbreviation of its call-sign. For example, Peacemaker would equate to PM or Warmonger would be WM.
- ◆ The NAI category code is a single letter identifier to specify the line of operation or type target associated with it. For example, 'S' may identify enemy support zones while 'T' indicates an infrastructure NAI.
- ◆ A threat ID is important to differentiate between the insurgent groups. An OE may have multiple actors and each should have its own identifier. For example, Al Qaeda (AQI) may be designated 1 while Taliban may be designated as 2.
- ◆ The sequence number is merely a number from 01 to 99.
- ◆ Thus, PMS101 would translate to Peacemaker Support Zones for AQI, number 01.

Finally, the intelligence professional must have a basic understanding of the various reporting and planning processes to effectively integrate ISR with operations and synchronize collection tasks. This includes an understanding of processes across the PMESII-PT spectrum and warfighting functions.

## Conclusion

*“...we give express charge, that in our marches through the country, there be nothing compelled from the villages, nothing taken but paid for, none...upbraided or abused in disdainful language; for when lenity and cruelty play for a kingdom, the gentler gamester is the soonest winner.”*

—From the play “Henry V”

This quote is King Henry's response to intercede for Bardolph, his old friend, who has been condemned to hang for looting a church. Henry's army is in the Picardy province of France after marching for almost twenty days after the siege of Harfleur. Whether this actually occurred historically and whether or not King Henry made such a proclamation are immaterial. The scene illustrates an ancient truth of modern war—that we cannot neglect the tangible PMESII-PT terrain of a country where we conduct operations.

In our information age of global networks and interdependence, achieving military victory is much

more difficult as the fruit of collateral damage and acts of brutality rot on the world stage. Brute force used to compel one's foe into submission is more likely to result in resistance as Sun Tzu remarked, “Confront them with annihilation, and they will then survive; plunge them into a deadly situation, and they will then live. When people fall into danger, they are then able to strive for victory.” The modern OE requires more of the ‘gentler gamester’ than ever.

We must consider the corollary and Mao's statement that victory depends on the outcome of influencing the people to support the army. For intelligence professionals, the challenge is how to leverage the expanding kingdom of ISR capabilities to support the ‘gentler gamester’ when the priorities do not support it. Ultimately, we must not just become students of intelligence but scholars of operational art. Intelligence professionals need to understand how to effectively integrate into the operations cycle and develop processes that lead to an effect or an assessment to support future non-lethal and lethal operations.



## Endnotes

1. Quoted in FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, December 2006, 8-3.
2. Major General Michael T. Flynn, *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan*, 2010, 2.
3. Ibid.
4. FM 3-0 Operations, February 2008, para 3-26.
5. Ibid., para 3-27.
6. Ibid., Figure 3-2.
7. JP 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations, 5 October 2009, xxii.
8. FM 3-34.170 Engineer Reconnaissance, March 2008, Appendix C, Sewage, Water, Electricity, Academics, Trash, Medical, Safety, and Other Considerations.

## Other References:

- FM 3-06 Urban Operations, 26 October 2006  
JP 3-06 Joint Urban Operations, 8 November 2009

*Major Yukio Kuniyuki is a National Systems Development Program graduate who served as the Collection Manager and Intelligence Planner for MND-B during OIF 08-09. He currently works within the Requirements Determination Directorate at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence as the OIC for the Cyber and Electronic Warfare Branch.*



# Who's Driving This Train? Targeting in the COIN Fight: Observations and Recommendations

by Captain Cortis Burgess

*The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Departments of the Army and Defense, or the U.S. Government.*

***"It is your attitude, and the suspicion that you are maturing the boldest designs against him, that imposes on your enemy."***

***-Frederick the Great, 1747***

## Introduction

Since the beginning of the War on Terror, leaders across all services have been discussing and applying fresh looks at what could be considered paradigms of full spectrum operations. Those topics include but are not limited to center of gravity analysis, effects based operations, and focusing collection efforts across all lines of operations (LOOs). Most of these are not paradigms but evolution or re-assessments of lessons learned forgotten until recently, or an attempt to apply doctrine for a high intensity conflict on a counterinsurgency (COIN) fight. Targeting is, from my perspective, the lever with which we can shape the battlefield using knowledge of the environment gained through accurate center of gravity analysis and collection along all LOOs under the auspice of effects based operations. With complete visibility of the dynamics within his operating environment (OE), a commander can target specific attitudes, people, locations, and events that are in the way of achieving his desired end state. Aside from being arduous, complex and time consuming, ultimately accurate targeting can be the difference between achieving dominance on the COIN battlefield or getting caught in a protracted, resource consuming fight.

Tactical commanders must constantly assess their unit's impact on the OE and the progress of their operations toward achieving the initial intent.<sup>1</sup> The glaring question most commanders are likely to ask themselves is, "Are we winning the fight?" Successes in a COIN fight are hard to measure. I've heard in several briefings that bean counting is not the best method for measuring success. For example, the number of improvised explosive de-

vices (IEDs) detonated or discovered in your area of responsibility may be an applicable metric that security is increasing. However, the effectiveness of those fewer IEDs and their lethality may be increasing. Furthermore, in full spectrum operations, security is only one LOO. Some might consider security to be the most important in a COIN campaign. In effects based operations, it is only one measure for determining the impact a friendly commander is having on the environment. Targeting that is based on thorough analysis of the environment and synchronized with desired effects will provide quantifiable successes in the COIN fight.

Currently at the tactical level, targeting and effects coordination is primarily the responsibility of the senior Field Artillery (FA) officer.<sup>2</sup> Perhaps I am biased as an Intelligence officer but I have to ask why. Perhaps an FA officer is ideal because historically it has been the FA officer who has been the subject matter expert on the *decide, detect, deliver, assess (D3A)* targeting methodology. In high intensity conflicts, targeting is almost always lethal, the effects are actually measurable, because battle damage assessments are easily quantified. However, in the joint contemporary OE, which is low intensity conflict, is it not the *find, fix, finish, exploit, assess, disseminate (F3EAD)* targeting cycle we adhere to? I would argue that 'find' implies the obvious conclusion that intelligence is the key enabler to the entire process. Also is it not true that intelligence drives operations? This may be common sense to some, an error in semantics to others; but ultimately, if tactical commanders do not know where to apply combat power to achieve the decisive advantage

from accurate targeting, how can they expect to be successful?

Now that I have explained why targeting is important in a COIN campaign and how fundamental accurate targeting is to success, there are several observations I made over the course of two deployments and twenty-six months targeting insurgents in Iraq. Along with each observation there are recommendations for altering current methods for targeting in the COIN fight.

### **Observation: Target determination.**

During a replicated COIN practical exercise at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE) Captains Career Course, an instructor asked me, "How are you going to determine who to target?" My initial response was that targets just present themselves. Rarely, if ever, from my past experience have I had to seek out lethal targets for kill or capture. Of course, that's a simplistic answer to a complicated question. Furthermore, the question of who determines what to target, when, and how is also difficult to answer. The common response is the commander always makes that decision. It is our job as diligent S2s to provide the necessary targeting input and recommendation to the commander. The method for prioritizing and recommending targets for the commander is the high value target (HVT) list. It is imperative that standardized procedures be in place for updating the HVT lists and that those procedures are responsive and based on quantifiable metrics for determining a target's value.<sup>3</sup> Commanders approve the HVT or high value individual (HVI) list depending on your application of doctrine, but the S2 creates the list. Sadly, most S2 sections, like several I have worked in, have fluid metrics for determining target prioritization.

Currently USAICoE teaches the use of the CARVER method for ranking target priorities. CARVER assigns weighted values for a target's *criticality* to his insurgent cell, *accessibility* for capture, *recognizability* for positive identification after capture, *vulnerability* to capture, positive *effect* on the environment if captured, and the lack of *recuperability* within the insurgent network if captured. With a weighted metric such as CARVER, a target that may not be as critical or have as much of an effect on the environment by capture could move up on the HVI list and replace a target that was not accessible for priority of asset support. In regards to low density assets

and collection platforms above division control, the HVI list number is a key determinant for whether a unit will receive asset support requests.

The availability and application of intelligence assets is vital to conducting targeting-deliberate or dynamic. Without the necessary assets, staff S2s cannot complete the F3EAD targeting cycle. I have seen first-hand S2s altering their HVI list in order to garner asset support for a target, where suddenly the HVI ranked number ten was number one overnight. Granted, it did help get support for the target but after a while HVI numbers became less of a criterion for getting asset support and the asset managers began reading target packets instead and making their own decisions on priority. Ideally the higher headquarters such as Corps would establish a tier system or prioritization categories so that subordinate unit's targets could be nested and ranked according to the Corps commander's intent. By doing so asset requests for targeting could be easily deconflicted.

Another common problem was establishing standardized criteria for lethal targeting. Units would attempt to kill or capture a target without a complete target picture. Week after week targets would be captured without any measurable effect on the environment. After one target was captured, the insurgent cell to which the target belonged would take a couple of days to reorganize and change their methods so they would not get caught as easily the next time. During this process, they are likely to do their own analysis and attempt to figure out the source of information that led to the recent capture of a cell member. Targeting in this manner, by not knowing the potential outcome of a capture can lead to a possible loss of a valuable source of information. Sometimes tactical patience with regards to targeting is a viable method to reduce the likelihood of source information disclosure while developing an accurate target picture of the insurgent network and putting Soldiers' lives unnecessarily in danger.

### **Recommendation: Target determination.**

Establish a metric for determining a target's value and the effects of capture. The CARVER process is a simple approach to making that determination so that you may prioritize your efforts accordingly. Ensure that target prioritization metrics and all targets are nested, not only with the higher headquarters, but

with neighboring units as well. Through whatever means necessary, develop an accurate target picture on each insurgent network and cell in your area of operations (AO) before attempting to capture a member of that cell. Go beyond the couched answer that by capturing an HVI there will be less attacks and the environment will be more secure. Force analysts to consider who will fill the void created by capturing a target. Also work with the commander and other staff sections to establish when a target is developed well enough to engage. In other words, determine “action” criteria.<sup>4</sup>

At any given time an S2 section will be working on gathering information on multiple targets. Most commanders will thirst for targets within their OE. Then they turn to the S2 for potential targets. Rather than offering up any target that can be captured, employ action criteria that can be applied to all targets. Ask your S3 these questions before an operation to engage a target is triggered: How clear does the target picture need to be? Can we risk conducting simultaneous operations to capture multiple targets at one time if they are in the same cell? Ultimately establish a standardized process and direction for targeting while balancing the risk versus gain of capturing a target.<sup>5</sup> Once this is achieved you can determine which targets should be engaged by comparing the CARVER score and the risk versus desired effect incurred during capture. See Figure 1.




Figure 1.

### **Observation: Connecting lethal and non-lethal targets.**

I recently observed a training exercise for MOS 35F10 Intelligence Analysts. The analysts were par-

ticipating in an exercise which replicated being an S2 section in a unit in Iraq. They had two top ten target lists, lethal and non-lethal. Over the course of several days, they continued to capture lethal targets. That list would change and be updated but the non-lethal list did not change and it was not updated. Clearly they had completely negated the use of non-lethal targeting.

Flash backward to Iraq during my most recent deployment. Brigades were using non-lethal targeting more than lethal. Many of today's officers have wholeheartedly accepted the concept of non-lethal targeting. As I am writing this article right now, units throughout Iraq are rebuilding schools, roads, and essential services. This is no longer a paradigm shift; it is not an afterthought in the COIN fight. However, when conducting Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), many S2 sections do not connect lethal and non-lethal targets. Many intelligence officers are likely to see non-lethal targeting as a function of civil affairs, the fires and effects cell or the reconstruction team.

As an example, I would argue that, if anything, the push to reconcile disenchanted Sunni Iraqis during the “surge” of 2007 by creating the Sons of Iraq program is the prime example of how effective non-lethal targeting is as a means to reduce the need for lethal targeting.<sup>6</sup> Contrary to what seems to be an accepted antiquated way of thinking, Iraqis do not randomly decide to become insurgents, there is a motivation. At least in context with Operation Iraqi Freedom, with every insurgent killed or captured, there is the potential to grow more insurgents unless cultural mitigating factors are not considered.<sup>7</sup>

### **Recommendation: Connecting lethal and non-lethal targets.**

Warfare will continue to be an act of force compelling your adversary to concede to your requirements.<sup>8</sup> The same effect can be gained by linking lethal targets to non-lethal targets.<sup>9</sup> If we understand a lethal target’s motivation we can force him to concede to our will non-lethally. While conducting IPB in a COIN fight, analyze the identified insurgent networks in comparison to the environment. Attempt to determine what about the environment is generating motivation for the insurgent cells. Some examples are poverty, disenfranchisement from the local governance, ethnic tensions, and with regards

to groups such as Al Qaeda, it may be a religion based end-game which equates to a death wish.

Therefore, rather than telling the commander who the recommended HVIs are and where they live, provide information instead that can lead to a non-lethal approach to marginalizing the enemy along multiple LOOs. (See Figure 2). The effect is still the same, secure the populace and reduce attacks on friendly forces, but the means for causing the same effect is approached from a different angle. Granted, as I mentioned earlier, targets like members of Al Qaeda and any members of external terrorist networks who are only visitors to the OE will be harder to effect non-lethally. Although over time, if the environment is secured and the populace is accepting of your unit's presence, they will deny sanctuary to Al Qaeda or any members of external terrorist networks. To sum up, I would argue that the true test of a unit in a COIN environment is their ability to secure their AO through non-lethal targeting.




Figure 2.

### **Observation: The quantity versus quality approach to targeting.**

The analogy of comparing targeting methodologies to fishing or hunting seems apt in this case. Most units during the 2007 "surge" found it necessary to front load their targeting efforts by conducting a majority of analysis on a target and its insurgent network prior to capture. After weeks and months of collecting information about a target, eventually a raid would be conducted when the unit felt it had enough information to detain an individual. In general most units apply a targeting criterion which includes the comparison of risk versus gain, effect of

capture, and the likelihood that the individual will not be released. Other units, I would have to say a minority, geared their targeting process towards exploitation in the F3EAD cycle. After they had met their necessary capture criteria, before conducting a raid on an individual they would also seek out members of the same insurgent cell for possible action. Simultaneously they were able to conduct raids on multiple targets within one cell that could potentially lead to the dismemberment of the cell. Often these raids were launched having only a name, location and knowledge that the target was part of a particular insurgent network. A well thought-out exploitation plan requires a detailed understanding of social networks, insurgent networks, insurgent actions, and the community's attitude toward counterinsurgents.<sup>10</sup>

Honestly, this approach increases the risk of having to release a captured individual which no one likes to do. However, they were careful to ensure that each individual detained was viably linked to the cell and there had to be enough information available on the individuals that exploitation could be conducted post capture. Perhaps the phrase 'quality versus quantity' is not applicable because both methodologies require at least one quality target. In the quantity approach with their one or two well developed "quality" targets, they would have several less than developed targets. With at least one quality target they were able to exploit the other targets within the same insurgent cell by applying knowledge gained on the cell from each detainee, thereby each detainee provided a piece of the puzzle. Through thorough exploitation they were able to complete the picture and gain the information necessary to send all the detained cell members to prison, as well as generate future targets. Risk of having a detained individual released is the greatest challenge to the quantity approach.

### **Recommendation: The quantity versus quality approach to targeting.**

Both methodologies have their place in the COIN fight. The ability to capture multiple members of one cell in one night is awe inspiring to both friendly and enemy commanders. Sadly, most brigade intelligence efforts are not capable of conducting the necessary footwork involved in exploitation of several targets post capture. For this reason alone, I would recommend that S2s ask themselves the fol-

lowing questions before attempting to conduct actions against networks versus one HVI at a time: Do we have an accurate picture that puts each person we want to detain in the insurgent cell? Do we know which events each individual was involved in and to what degree? Do my intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets and collection efforts allow for accurate monitoring of reflections post capture? Do we have the ability to positively identify a target once we capture him? Finally, are my interrogators capable of handling the necessary workload of exploiting multiple detainees?

If the answers to any of these questions are no then I would not recommend attempting this methodology. The idea of having to release a detainee after a successful capture is often a hard concept to swallow. That is why it is imperative to have the ability to exploit a target post capture. If a detainee is released, he may have done the mental math and surmised how he was captured, which is never good, or it may harden his and his friends' dislike of your unit being in the area. In effects based operations, conducting raids in the middle of the night which result in the release of detained individuals results in a negative effect. Therefore capturing one big fish, to use the fishing analogy, is better for the environment, but remember that you are going to have to sit in the boat for a long time before you catch the big fish. In Iraq, sitting in the boat equates roughly to allowing the insurgents freedom of maneuver, which invites attack.

## **Observation: Target Packet Development.**

As time goes by target packets have a tendency to collect unanalyzed data. When the time finally comes for a selected target to be maneuvered on, there is a last minute rush by analysts to create a succinct packet for the tasked maneuver element and its commander. Fusion analysts, as they develop target packets, often become vested in the packet much like an artist would his art. I myself fell into this relationship with the target packets I created when I was a battalion assistant S2. This relationship has positive and negative effects, because the creator of a target packet wants to be creating informative, thorough, and actionable targets. However, he or she may not want to exclude any gathered information. Also, sometimes analysts develop biases regarding target information and choose

to exclude information they feel is not in line with their own beliefs regarding the target. Therefore, the target packet may become too large for consumption by the maneuver commander and his Soldiers. Also, as a target packet grows it becomes too large to send via email without using an optimizing tool which flattens the data, sometimes that in itself is not enough and the slideshow has to be parsed into sections and sent in several emails.

## **Recommendation: Target Packet Development.**

Microsoft PowerPoint seems to be the preferred medium for target packet development among intelligence analysts. It has, over time, proven the best means for collecting, analyzing, and briefing target information. However, Special Operations Forces analysts do not use this medium for their target packets. Instead data is collected and analyzed in word processor format. Both methods for target information development and dissemination have pluses and minuses.

PowerPoint target packets are easily briefed, but analysts tend to avoid updating them as often. The information is usually spread throughout a number of slides in a target packet. In order to mitigate this, analysts create a one slide overview that has the "bottom line up front" (BLUF) for anyone who reads the packet. However, by doing this, useful information gets placed in a box in the lower corner of a slide in the smallest font readable. On the BLUF slide analysts often paste large pieces of imagery containing possible bed down locations. During most time sensitive target (TST) missions I have seen, the analyst's imagery rarely lined up with the actual target location. If you have ever had to take one of these BLUF slides onto an objective at midnight and tried reading it with a red lens flashlight you know how this good idea has failed. This slide is meant to be easily understood, and it's normally accompanied with another slide covering exploitation procedures upon capture such as recommended tactical questions. The intended information is necessary for tactical planning before a mission but unfortunately, in the haze of battle, I would argue that these slides do not typically leave the cargo pockets of their intended audience on an objective.

It can be said that word processor documents would endure the same fate on an objective, yet these documents are smaller and easier to share

via email. Because of this, I recommend keeping PowerPoint target packets for in-house targeting meetings, and have analysts use word processors to collect and analyze target specific information. You must ensure they are updating, at a minimum, the word processor version. Rather than cut and paste data into a slide show, make them rewrite the word processor version every time new information is available.

With TST missions, which are the current trend in Iraq, the mission commander needs succinct information regarding the target and some micro IPB on the target location for planning prior to conducting an operation. Time is wasted by analysts doing last minute scrubs on PowerPoint target packets while he or she is trying to figure out which slides they should print and hand to the TST commander to best prepare him for a mission. At the very least, if the mission commander prefers BLUF slides, analysts should separate target packets for operations and the larger versions for briefing at targeting meetings. Hasty IPB cannot be avoided prior to a TST mission, an elaborate target packet alone is not enough. Ultimately, the mission commander, TST or not, and adjacent units need relevant, concise, and updated target information to conduct mission planning.

On a side note, high side packets should also be consolidated into as few slides as possible for the same reasons above, and since these packets do not leave SCIFs, PowerPoint is the preferred medium. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) analysts, like all source analysts gravitate towards making target packets into large slide shows of unanalyzed data that are hard to transmit via email without parsing them into multiple emails.

### **Observation: Flattening target information sharing**

Targeted individuals will often leave their home and travel. Aside from being human nature to visit friends, family, or insurgent buddies (at least in regards to Iraq) sometimes targets run because they fear capture. Perhaps, like mine, your unit conducted an unsuccessful raid and the target got spooked, subsequently leaving your AO or perhaps even your division's AO. When this occurs there may be a proactive attempt for a member of your S2 section or your fire and effects cell (FEC) to pass the relevant target packet to the land owning unit

where your target has fled. Even in situations where it is not an HVI, but just a known associate of your HVI that resides in another unit's battle space, the desire to pass the relevant information along to the land-owning unit still arises.

However, in order to pass the target data there exists an archaic method to passing that data (See Figure 3). It first has to go up to your division, your division then sends it to Corps, and then Corps sends it to the land owning unit's division and its division sends it to its brigade where ultimately the target information is passed to the intended audience. At any time in that information flow an intended recipient or facilitator of the information may not check his or her email or answer the phone. The relevance of that target may also get lost in the transmission much as in a game of phone tag. This hierarchical flow of target information can, at any point, be slowed or completely halted along its path to the intended recipient.




Figure 3.

### **Recommendation: Flattening target information sharing.**

The good news is that the Distributed Common Ground Station will help flatten that information flow. The bad news is every deployed brigade cannot afford to hang all their HVI, developing, or emerging target packets there. Nothing is faster than calling the land owning unit and emailing it the necessary target information. Of course, be prepared to explain why this target information is relevant to the recipient, even if a target is not actionable. Just by giving another unit the target, it may help them to build situational awareness and possibly fill an information gap or further confirm known information.

In the SCIF this information flow is possible because there is generally contact information for analysts in other SCIFs throughout the Theatre and beyond. The same ability should be transferred into the S2 section or the FEC. If every brigade targeting officer had the phone number and email address for every other brigade targeting officer in Theatre, target information could be easily shared rather than relying on the hierarchical flow through the various division and Corps staff sections (See Figure 4). In this way, there is one point of contact for all targeting matters at each brigade. This does not relinquish the necessity for keeping the division and Corps staffs in the information flow, but it would eliminate inundating their staffs as the sole conduit of target sharing.




Figure 4.

Sharing target data even inside the division between sister brigades should not be done during weekly or biweekly targeting meetings. Targetable information tends to have a shelf life especially in the SIGINT community; if it is not shared in a timely manner, it cannot be leveraged. Close coordination, cooperation, and communication among the participants are essential for the best use of available resources and to mitigate the targeted individual's ability to use unit boundaries as an advantage.<sup>11</sup> Some would argue this purpose is already served by having liaison officers (LNOs) from each brigade at division and division LNOs at Corps. The brigade LNOs at a division do help facilitate target sharing but this still relies on a hierarchical information flow and leads to the impediment of rapidly passing target information which can be done much faster by

picking up a phone and calling one person at the land-owning unit's targeting cell. Visibility of targeting efforts across the country and the movement of targets across division boundaries should not be limited to echelons above division. The ability to track and share a dynamic target's data should be flattened because the shortest distance between two points will always be a straight line.

## Conclusion

Targeting in the COIN environment is the sole mechanism for determining where and when to apply combat power to achieve success. It requires thorough analysis in order to develop an accurate picture of the OE. With complete visibility of the environment an S2 can recommend targets that will result in the desired effect. Finding appropriate targets; fixing the insurgent networks; cells and members; finishing the targets; exploiting all further information gained; assessing the changes in the OE, and the constant dissemination of target information across the entire theatre to other units operating in unison is imperative to winning the COIN fight. The observations and recommendations I derived from intelligence operations during two deployments to Iraq will give you, as an intelligence officer, insight into some of the common stumbling blocks in the collective force that is targeting.



## Endnotes

1. JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, 13 April 2007, Appendix C, 1-a.
2. U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Fires and Targeting Handbook, 2007, Appendix A, 1-b.
3. JP 3-60, II-8, para 8-a.
4. FM 3-24, Counter Insurgency, 2006, 5-106.
5. JP 3-60, I-6, para 6-d.
6. Gary Bruno, "The Role of the Sons of Iraq in Improving Security," *The Washington Post*, 28 April 2008 accessed at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/28/AR2008042801120.html>.
7. Peter W. Chiarelli and Patrick R. Michaelis, *Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations*, *Military Review*, 85:4, July-August 2005.
8. JP 3-60, I-1, para 2-a.
9. FM 3-24, 5-103
10. FM 3-24, 5-108.
11. JP 3-60, III-1, para 1-c.

# MI Doctrine Update

by Major Michael A. Brake

## Introduction

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Doctrine Reengineering Initiative described in the July-September 2009 issue of MIPB had a significant impact on Military Intelligence (MI) Doctrine. The primary impacts are a change in the types of manuals that the MI Doctrine Directorate will produce and the new distinct division of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) manuals from other doctrinal publications. Under the new structure there will be only four Intelligence Field Manuals (FMs):

- ◆ FM 2-0 Intelligence (FOUO).
- ◆ FM 2-01.3/MCRP 2-3A Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace (IPB) (FOUO).
- ◆ FM 2-19.1 Division and Above Intelligence Operations (FOUO).
- ◆ FM 2-22.3 Human Intelligence Collector Operations (FOUO).

Many of the manuals that are currently FMs will be converted to Training Circulars (TCs) and/or Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (ATTPs) manuals and still carry the “full weight” of officially authorized Army doctrine. As manuals are updated or re-written, these changes will take effect. Additionally, we will develop MI publications to supplement the formally published doctrinal manuals. All other forms of publications such as Handbooks and STs will be converted to TCs, ATTPs, MI Publications, or rescinded. Below depicts the eventual endstate for the MI doctrinal structure.

|         | Current     | After                     |
|---------|-------------|---------------------------|
|         | Restructure |                           |
| FMs     | 24          | 4                         |
| FMIs    | 8           | 0                         |
| ATTPs   | 0           | 24                        |
| TCs     | 26          | 19                        |
| HBS     | 4           | 0                         |
| MI Pubs | 0           | 1 (Remains to be updated) |

The TRADOC Commanding General's intents for the reengineering initiative are to:

- ◆ Manage doctrine more effectively by redefining what constitutes doctrine; then producing, maintaining, and making doctrinal material more accessible to the user.
- ◆ Reduce the number of FMs in order to focus on critical combined arms publications.
- ◆ Reduce the size of FMs and ATTPs to facilitate ease of use, ease of maintenance, and clarity.
- ◆ Allow individuals in the field direct access to modify ATTPs based on their expertise. (This is currently a test program using a Wiki interface for FM 2-91.6 Soldier Surveillance and Reconnaissance.)

## Definitions

**Field Manual (FM).** An FM is a Department of the Army publication that contains doctrinal principles with enduring TTPs, terms, and symbols that describe how the Army and its organizations conduct operations and train for those operations. FMs pertain to the operating force, and those parts of the generating force that deploy with or directly support the operating force in the conduct of operations.

**Training Circular (TC).** A TC is a proponent approved publication that contains enduring principles, procedures, terms, and symbols that describe the basic fundamentals of how an Army proponent and its organizations conduct operations and train for those operations (e.g., a U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence TC describing how the Intelligence Warfighting Function and its organizations conduct operations.)

**Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (ATTP).** An ATTP manual is a proponent approved publication that contains “how to” guidance for organizations and military occupational specialties detailing how to conduct missions and operate equipment. ATTP are tied to tasks or functions and should detail specific steps for individuals/sections/organizations to execute, and describe who specifically executes those steps.

**MI Publication (MI Pub).** An MI Pub is a proponent produced, approved, and printed publication containing proponent specific information that does not fit into the above listed publications. An MI Pub is intended to be a more flexible and dynamic document that can be updated often and does not have to follow the TRADOC doctrinal publication guidelines. It is not approved and authenticated doctrine.

**NOTE:** Although MI Doctrine does not produce them, there is another category of publication—General Subject Technical Manual (GSTM) which describes weapons systems and equipment usage (night vision devices, 9 mm pistol, etc.). All current FMs that fall into this category will be converted to this nomenclature.

The primary website for finding current, unclassified doctrine and training publications is the Army Publishing Directorate (APD) at [www.apd.army.mil](http://www.apd.army.mil). Additionally, this website has current electronic forms and regulations.

The doctrinal restructure described in this article was developed in mid-2009. As MI Doctrine adapts with the changing Army and the Army's changing focus, the original restructure plan has been and will continue to be modified, as necessary, in order to provide the best and most relevant doctrinal support to our MI force. Thus, some manuals identified in the below restructure may never be developed or published as individual publications, and some may be consolidated with other manuals.

New manuals that were not identified in the restructure, but which were requested by the field or agencies or identified as a requirement to fill a new gap may be added. No doctrine that is currently valid will be deleted; it may simply be incorporated in new manuals. For example, Imagery Intelligence discipline doctrine will now be incorporated into the Geospatial Intelligence manuals. While doctrine is normally written in a deliberate and methodical process, the MI Doctrine Directorate is attuned to the needs of the Army MI community and remains flexible in developing the doctrine that our MI force requires.

## **Intelligence Doctrinal Restructure**

|                            |  |
|----------------------------|--|
| FM 2-0 Series Intelligence | FM 2-0 Intelligence<br>MI Pub 2-0.1 Intelligence Reference Guide<br>TC 2-0.2 Machine Foreign Language Translation HB<br>TC 2-01.11 ISR Synchronization HB<br>FM 2-01.3 IPB/MCRP 2-3A<br>ATTP 2-01.31 Specific IPB TTP  |
| FM 2-19 Series Echelon     | FM 2-19.1 Echelons Division and Above Intelligence<br>ATTP 2-19.12 Division and Above Intelligence TTP<br>TC 2-19.4 Brigade Combat Team (BCT) and Below Intelligence<br>ATTP 2-19.41 BCT and Below Intelligence<br>TC 2-19.13 Aerial Exploitation Battalion/Aerial Reconnaissance Battalion  |
| FM 2-22 Series Disciplines | TC 2-22.1 All-Source HB<br>TC 2-22.2 Counterintelligence HB<br>FM 2-22.3 Human Intelligence Collector Operations<br>ATTP 2-22.33 2X TTP<br>TC 2-22.4 Technical Intelligence HB<br>TC 2-22.6 Signals Intelligence<br>TC 2-22.7 Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) HB<br>ATTP 2-22.71 GEOINT TTP<br>TC 2-22.8 Measurement and Signatures Intelligence HB<br>TC 2-22.82 Biometrics Enabled Intelligence HB<br>TC 2-22.9 Open Source Intelligence HB |

FM 2-33 Series Analysis

TC 2-33.4, Analysis

ATTP 2-33.41 Analytic TTP

TC 2-33.41 Analysis Training HB

TC 2-33.43 Critical Thinking within Analysis HB

FM 2-91 Series Support to Operations and Tactics

TC 2-91 Intelligence Support to Unique Missions HB

ATTP 2-91.1 Intelligence Support to Stability Operations TTP

ATTP 2-91.2 Intelligence Support to Antiterrorism/Force Protection TTP

ATTP 2-91.3 Intelligence Support to Urban Operations TTP

ATTP 2-91.5 Intelligence Support to Document Exploitation TTP

ATTP 2-91.6 Intelligence Support to Site Exploitation TTP

TC 2-91.7 Intelligence Handbook to Civil Support Operations

ATTP 2-91.71 Intelligence Support to Homeland Security TTP

Major Brake may be contacted at [michael.brake@us.army.mil](mailto:michael.brake@us.army.mil).



## Current Manuals

| U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence<br>Capabilities, Development, and Integration<br>Directorate of Doctrine |   |                  |   |
|--|---|------------------|---|
| Publication Number   | Title                                       | Date             | Description (and Current Status)  |
| FM 2-0 (FOUO)  | Intelligence                                | 23 March 2010    | <p>The Army's keystone manual for MI doctrine. It describes the fundamentals of intelligence operations; the intelligence warfighting function; the intelligence process; MI roles and functions within the context of Army operations; intelligence in unified action; intelligence considerations in strategic readiness, and the intelligence disciplines.</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> Update completed. Change 1 projected for fiscal year (FY) 2011.</p>   |
| FM 2-01.3/MCRP 2-3A (FOUO)   | IPB   | 15 October 2009  | <p>A dual-designated Army and Marine Corps manual which describes the fundamentals of intelligence preparation of the battlefield/intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB); its use in directing the intelligence effort, and its role in driving the staff's planning for military operations. Conforms to the overarching doctrinal concepts presented in Army doctrine (FMs 3-0 and 2-0) and Marine Corps doctrine (MCWPs 3-1 and 2-1). Does not describe the TTPs and applications of IPB. For this information, refer to FMI 2-01.301.</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> Currently being updated with an expected publication date in FY 2012.</p>  |
| FM 2-19.4 (FOUO)   | Brigade Combat Team Intelligence Operations | 25 November 2008 | <p>Provides developmental doctrine for the brigade combat team (BCT) and Stryker BCT (SBCT) intelligence operations. It describes the brigade intelligence fundamentals, roles, and responsibilities of the intelligence staff, and the operations of the MI company. It establishes the doctrinal foundation for BCT and SBCT intelligence operations, addresses requirements expanding on doctrine in FMs 2-0, 3-0, 5-0, 6-0, 34-130, and incorporates intelligence and operational doctrine and terminology from FMs 3-90.6 and 3-20.96. Provides a basic framework for intelligence professionals on the evolving doctrine, TTP, materiel and force structure, institutional and unit training, and standard operating procedures (SOPs) for BCT echelon intelligence support and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations, and introduces the new six step intelligence process.</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> Currently being updated as TC 2-19.4 with an expected publication date in FY 2011.</p> |

**U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence**  
**Capabilities, Development, and Integration**  
**Directorate of Doctrine**

| Publication Number  | Title  | Date             | Description (and Current Status)  |
|---------------------|--|------------------|---|
| FM 2-22.2 (FOUO)    | Counterintelligence  | 21 October 2009  | <p>Provides doctrinal guidance, techniques, and procedures for the employment of Counterintelligence (CI) special agents in the Army. Outlines CI investigations and operations; the CI special agent's role within the intelligence warfighting function; the importance of aggressively countering foreign intelligence and security services and international terrorist organizations; the roles and responsibilities of those providing command, control, and technical support to CI investigations and operations; the need for effective dissemination of CI reports and products; the importance of cross-cueing other intelligence disciplines, and the significance of cultural awareness as a consideration to counter the foreign intelligence threat. Expands upon the information in FM 2-0 and supersedes FM 34-60.</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> Currently being updated at TC 2-22.2 with expected publication date in FY 2012.</p>   |
| FM 2-22.3 (UNCLASS) | Human Intelligence Collector Operations  | 6 September 2006 | <p>Provides doctrinal guidance, techniques, and procedures governing the employment of human intelligence (HUMINT) collection and analytical assets in support of the commander's intelligence needs. Outlines HUMINT operations; the HUMINT collector's role within the intelligence warfighting function; the roles and responsibilities of the HUMINT collectors and those providing the command, control, and technical support of HUMINT collection operations. Expands upon the information contained in FM 2-0.</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> Manual is reviewed annually.</p>   |
| FM 2-91.4 (FOUO)    | Intelligence Support to Urban Operations   | 20 March 2008    | <p>Expands and clarifies the doctrinal foundation found in FM 3-06 and JP 3-06, incorporates intelligence and operational doctrine and terminology from FMs 3-06 and 3-06.11, and provides intelligence professionals a basic framework with which to focus on providing commanders with effective intelligence support for their operations in the urban environment.</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> Manual will be consolidated into TC 2-91. In the interim, ATTP 2-91.3 Intelligence Support to Urban Operations TTP, will be developed and will be an update to this manual.</p>  |
| FM 2-91.6 (FOUO)    | Soldier Surveillance and Reconnaissance: Fundamentals of Tactical Information Collection | 10 October 2007  | <p>Establishes the Army's doctrine in support of the Every Soldier is a Sensor (ES2) initiative. It expands on the information contained in FM 2-91.6 and provides a foundation for developing tactical questioning and reporting and supersedes all other tactical questioning handbooks produced by the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence, specifically the Tactical Questioning Soldier's Handbook. Provides the doctrinal framework for Soldiers and leaders at all echelons and forms the foundation for ES2 curricula within the Army Education System. It is a compilation of tools to help all Soldiers collect information through tactical questioning, detainee handling, and document and equipment handling in offensive, defensive, stability operations, and civil support operations. Introduces the basics of questioning and reporting and provides some tools for patrols and S2s and applies to full spectrum operations. This manual is not intended to make the Soldier an expert on intelligence collection operations.</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> No update in progress.</p> |
| FMI 2-01 (FOUO)     | Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Synchronization                           | 11 November 2008 | <p>Provides the foundation for Army ISR synchronization doctrine. It updates doctrine to conform to the current operational doctrine and incorporates the intelligence warfighting function concept from FM 3-0. Outlines intelligence and operations responsibilities for planning, synchronizing, integrating, and executing ISR operations and augments doctrine set forth in FMs 2-0, 3-0, 5-0, 6-0, 7-15.</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> Currently being updated as TC 2-01 with an expected publication date during 4th Quarter FY 2010.</p>   |
| FMI 2-01.301 (FOUO) | Specific TTP and Applications for Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield            | 31 March 2009    | <p>Describes IPB and its applications, its use in directing the intelligence effort, and its role in driving the staff's planning for military operations. Provides doctrinal guidance for the use of IPB in directing the intelligence effort and its role in supporting the commander and staff.</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> Currently being updated as ATTP 2-01.31 with an expected publication date in FY 2012.</p>  |

**U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence**  
**Capabilities, Development, and Integration**  
**Directorate of Doctrine**

| Publication Number | Title   | Date             | Description (and Current Status)   |
|--------------------|---|------------------|--|
| FMI 2-22.9 (FOUO)  | Open Source Intelligence  | 5 December 2006  | <p>Facilitates a common understanding of Army Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) operations. As interim doctrine, it serves as a catalyst for analysis and development of Army OSINT training, concepts, materiel, and force structure. It brings Army intelligence doctrine in line with the characterization of OSINT as an intelligence discipline in JP 2-0.</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> Currently being updated as TC 2-22.9 with an expected publication date in FY 2012.</p>  |
| MI HB 2-5 (FOUO)   | Intelligence Systems  | 22 July 2008     | <p>Provides descriptions, configurations, and employment level data for the Army's Intelligence systems. It does not replace technical manuals for the systems described, but provides details useful to system operators and supervisors.</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> Will be incorporated into MI Pub 2-0.1 and rescinded upon publication of the updated MI Pub 2-0.1.</p>  |
| TC 2-19.13 (FOUO)  | Aerial Exploitation Battalion/Aerial Reconnaissance Battalion Intelligence Operations | 18 May 2010      | <p>Provides doctrine for intelligence organizations, officers, noncommissioned officers, and Soldiers in modular units and ISR planners on the proper use of aerial exploitation battalion and aerial reconnaissance battalion assets. It describes these battalions' organization; history; mission and support sets; and TTPs for efficient use of these assets in full spectrum operations.</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> Recently published. No update in progress.</p>  |
| TC 2-22.303 (FOUO) | The 2X Handbook   | 31 July 2006     | <p>Provides the doctrinal foundation and general TTPs required by MI personnel serving in a 2X staff section in the modular force. The 2X is a doctrinal term that refers to the staff officer and the staff element that manages CI and HUMINT operations at all echelons of the Army from BCT to Corps/Division, or higher. It describes command and control of CI and HUMINT operations; CI and HUMINT operations management organization; missions and functions of each component of the 2X staff section, the operational management team, the CI team and the HUMINT collection team; 2X and planning, targeting and analysis; 2X section mission essential task list; the Tactical HUMINT Operations section, and a sample 2X SOP.</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> No update in progress.</p>  |
| TC 2-22.304 (FOUO) | Military Intelligence Battalion (Interrogation)                                       | 3 August 2009    | <p>Provides doctrinal guidance concerning the MI battalion (Interrogation) and complements existing doctrine, in particular FM 2-22.3, and incorporates lessons learned from recent operations. The MI battalion (Interrogation) is specifically designed to operate within a joint interrogation and debriefing center (JIDC). The TC discusses MI battalion (Interrogation) operations through the lens of the Army force generation (ARFORGEN) process. This TC fills a gap in existing intelligence documentation on how a MI battalion (Interrogation) operates; addresses recommendations that doctrine be developed for the organization and operation of a JIDC, and complies with the Army Campaign Plan 2008 direction to have TRADOC develop doctrine to guide employment of the current and future modular force in joint operations.</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> No update in progress.</p> |
| TC 2-22.4 (FOUO)   | Technical Intelligence HB   | 19 November 2009 | <p>Provides doctrinal guidance, direction, and TTPs for conducting TECHINT operations. It provides guidance to operating forces on the exploitation of items deemed to have intelligence value. (See FM 2-22.401 for multi-Service TECHINT TTP.)</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> No update in progress.</p>  |
| TC 2-22-601 (FOUO) | Army Counter-Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Device Electronic Warfare Handbook | 9 April 2008     | <p>Provides guidance concerning the implementation of the Army's Counter-Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Device Electronic Warfare (CREW) program. This publication does not replace technical manuals for the individual CREW systems, but outlines roles and responsibilities for tactical commanders, EW officers, and noncommissioned officers supporting operations in various theaters.</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> No update in progress.</p>   |

**U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence**  
**Capabilities, Development, and Integration**  
**Directorate of Doctrine**

| Publication Number | Title   | Date           | Description (and Current Status)   |
|--------------------|---|----------------|--|
| TC 2-33.4 (FOUO)   | Analysis  | 1 July 2009    | <p>Describes the fundamentals of intelligence analysis, its use in the intelligence effort, and its role in driving the intelligence running estimate of enemy courses of action and the operational environment. Conforms to the overarching doctrinal concepts presented in FMs 3-0 and 2-0. It provides doctrinal guidance for the use of analysis in the intelligence effort and its role in supporting the commander and staff.</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> Update in progress to include the development of an ATTP 2-33.41 Analytic TTP with an expected publication date in FY 2012.</p>   |
| TC 2-50.5 (FOUO)   | Intelligence Officer's Handbook   | 6 January 2010 | <p>Replaces FM 34-8-2, dated 1 May 1998. It does not replace the fundamental principles and TTPs contained in the other FM 2 series manuals; however, it does focus on their application. It is to be used in conjunction with the other FM 2 series manuals and conforms to the overarching doctrinal concepts presented in FM 3-0 and FM 2-0. The target audience for this manual is the intelligence officers serving as the G2/S2 and their staffs.</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> Will be incorporated into MI Pub 2-0.1 and rescinded upon publication of the updated MI Publication 2-0.1.</p> |
| TC 2-91.701 (FOUO) | Intelligence Analytical Support to Counter Improvised Explosive Devices | 30 March 2007  | <p>Provides guidance concerning fundamental principles for countering threat improvised explosive device (IED) operations. Based on existing doctrine and lessons learned from recent combat operations. The purpose of this TC is to provide intelligence analytical support concerning TTPs directed at combating threat IED operations.</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> No update in progress.</p>  |
| TC 2-91.8 (FOUO)   | Document and Media Exploitation   | 8 June 2010    | <p>Provides doctrinal guidance to Army professionals in a tactical, operational, or strategic environment who conduct and support document and media exploitation (DOMEX).</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> Awaiting publication.</p>   |

## Manuals under Development

**U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence**  
**Capabilities, Development, and Integration**  
**Directorate of Doctrine**

| Publication Number          | Title                                    | Date            | Description (and Current Status)   |
|-----------------------------|--|-----------------|--|
| FM 2-01.3/ MCRP 2-3A (FOUO) | IPB                                      | 15 October 2009 | <p>A dual-designated Army and Marine Corps manual which describes the fundamentals of intelligence preparation of the battlefield/intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB), its use in directing the intelligence effort, and its role in driving the staff's planning for military operations. Conforms to the overarching doctrinal concepts presented in Army doctrine (FMs 3-0 and 2-0) and Marine Corps doctrine (MCWPs 3-1 and 2-1). Does not describe the TTPs and applications of IPB. For this information, refer to FMI 2-01.301.</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> Manual is currently being updated with an expected publication date in FY 2012.</p> |
| FM 2-19.1 (FOUO)            | Echelons Division and Above Intelligence | TBD             | <p>A guide that assists intelligence staffs and units in the operations and training requirements associated with ARFORGEN. Establishes a common frame of reference and intellectual tools that intelligence leaders assigned to theater, corps, and division intelligence organizations can use to plan and conduct operations.</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> Under development.</p>  |
| TC 2-0.2 (FOUO)             | Machine Foreign Language Translation HB  | TBD             | <p>An overview of the Machine Foreign Language Translation program, components, and configurations. Describes the implementation into operational scenarios as well as other resources available to facilitate incorporating the capability into workflow.</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> Under development with an expected publication date in FY 2011.</p>   |

**U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence**  
**Capabilities, Development, and Integration**  
**Directorate of Doctrine**

| Publication Number | Title                                       | Date | Description (and Current Status)  |
|--------------------|---|------|---|
| TC 2-19.2 (FOUO)   | BCT and Below Intelligence Operations       | TBD  | <p>A companion manual to FM 2-19.4. Incorporates TTP related to intelligence operations developed by intelligence organizations in the field over the last 20 years, including TTP developed in operations in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Iraq. Includes TTP developed at the Army's combat training centers and describes the brigade intelligence fundamentals, roles, and responsibilities of the intelligence staff and the operations of the MI company. Addresses requirements expanding on doctrine in FMs 2-0, 2-01.3, 3-0, 5-0, 6-0, and provides a basic framework for intelligence professionals on the evolving doctrine; TTPs; materiel and force structure; institutional and unit training, and SOPs for BCT echelon intelligence support and ISR operations.</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> Under development with an expected publication date in FY 2011.</p> |
| TC 2-22.1 (FOUO)   | All-Source Intelligence HB                  | TBD  | <p>Fills an existing doctrinal gap covering the all-source intelligence discipline and provides doctrinal guidance concerning the use of all-source intelligence. Complements and is consistent with doctrinal guidance provided in FMs 3-0, 5-0, and all FM 2 series doctrinal publications. Provides a description of all-source intelligence and provides guidance on the uses of all-source intelligence throughout the military decision making process (MDMP), ISR synchronization, and the targeting process. It provides a discussion of products and tools associated with all-source intelligence.</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> Under development with an expected publication date in FY 2012.</p>  |
| TC 2-22.2 (FOUO)   | Counterintelligence HB                      | TBD  | <p>Replaces FM 2-22.2 and will fill an existing doctrinal gap to provide doctrinal guidance concerning CI support to both peacetime and conflict level operations. Covers the specific mission, structure and organization of CI units and operations. Covers CI investigations and operations to include the legal principles and reporting aspects of each. Outlines administration of the CI program and the specifics of the CI collection program. Will discuss specific CI missions to include Cyber CI and Technical CI Services and Support.</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> Under development with an expected publication date in FY 2012.</p>  |
| TC 2-22.6 (FOUO)   | Signals Intelligence                        | TBD  | <p>Provides a common framework for understanding Army Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) operations and organizations within the SIGINT community. Serves as a foundation for analysis and development of Army SIGINT training, concepts, organizations/force structure, and equipment. Brings Army intelligence doctrine in line with the characterization of SIGINT as represented in FM 2-0. It is the first SIGINT TC produced in doctrine.</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> In final editing with an expected publication date in late FY 2010.</p>  |
| TC 2-22.8 (FOUO)   | Measurements and Signatures Intelligence HB | TBD  | <p>Is the Army's intelligence doctrinal reference concerning MASINT and provides additional detail on MASINT contained within FM 2-0. MASINT uses information gathered by technical instruments such as radar, lasers, passive electro-optical sensors, radiation detectors, seismic, and other sensors to measure objects and/or events to identify them by their signatures.</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> Under development with an expected publication date in FY 2012.</p>  |
| TC 2-22.41 (FOUO)  | Weapons Technical Intelligence              | TBD  | <p>Provides doctrinal guidance, direction, and TTP for conducting weapons technical intelligence (WTI) operations. Provides guidance to operating forces on the exploitation of WTI of intelligence value. Informs Joint force commanders and staff about the missions, requirements, and capabilities of WTI collectors, as well as providing essential information to effectively employ and utilize WTI capabilities.</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> Under development with an expected publication date in late FY 2010.</p>   |
| TC 2-22.7 (FOUO)   | Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) HB         | TBD  | <p>Is the Army's manual for GEOINT doctrine. It describes GEOINT (imagery, Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), and geospatial information); implementation of GEOINT in the Army, and GEOINT support to planning and operations. Provides guidance for commanders, staffs, trainers, engineers, and MI personnel at all echelons and forms the foundation for GEOINT doctrine development.</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> Under development with an expected publication date in FY 2012.</p>  |
| TC 2-22.82 (FOUO)  | Biometrics Enabled Intelligence HB          | TBD  | <p>Contains guidance on the use of biometrics data by intelligence and protection personnel, including military police and law enforcement personnel, those involved in detainee vetting and targeting operations, and units in the Army supporting commanders' requirements at all echelons. Describes biometrics enabled intelligence, the fundamentals of biometrics, and biometrics systems as well as tools in use in current operating environments. The primary audience for TC 2-2.82 is experienced Army intelligence professionals engaged in intelligence production and full spectrum operations.</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> Under development with an expected publication date in FY 2011.</p>   |

# U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence

## Capabilities, Development, and Integration

### Directorate of Doctrine

| Publication Number   | Title   | Date | Description (and Current Status)  |
|----------------------|---|------|---|
| TC 2-22.9 (FOUO)     | Open Source Intelligence HB   | TBD  | <p>Will replace FMI 2-22.9, dated 5 December 2006. Will facilitate a common understanding and foundational concepts and methods of the Army OSINT discipline and its enabling of the intelligence process in support of full spectrum operations. Highlights its applicability to Army and Joint intelligence operations in support of full spectrum operations. Provides fundamental principles, TTPs, and terminology for Army OSINT operations.</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> Under development with an expected publication date in FY 2012.</p>  |
| TC 2-33.4 (FOUO)     | Analysis  | TBD  | <p>Describes the fundamentals of intelligence analysis, its use in the intelligence effort, and its role in driving the intelligence running estimate of enemy courses of action and the operational environment. Conforms to the overarching doctrinal concepts presented in FM 3-0 and FM 2-0. It provides doctrinal guidance for the use of analysis in the intelligence effort and its role in supporting the commander and staff.</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> Manual under development with an expected publication date in FY 2012.</p>   |
| TC 2-33.42 (FOUO)    | Counterthreat Finance   | TBD  | <p>This unclassified manual establishes doctrine for Army counterthreat finance (CTF) operations. It addresses CTF missions from brigade- through Army-specific activities at national-level agencies and centers. Includes examples of threat finance activities and Soldiers might encounter in CTF operations. The primary audience for this TC is experienced Army intelligence professionals and senior leaders serving as analysts in a CTF element at any echelon. Other audiences include commanders, staffs, trainers, and MI personnel at all echelons. To understand this TC, Soldiers must first read FMs 2-0 and 2-33.4.</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> Manual in final editing with an expected publication date in FY 2010.</p>   |
| TC 2-91.2 (FOUO)     | Intelligence Support to Antiterrorism/Force Protection Programs         | TBD  | <p>Provides doctrinal guidance concerning intelligence support to the antiterrorism and force protection program. Complements guidance provided in AR 525-13 and describes how the Army implements Department of Defense (DOD) antiterrorism policy. The target audience for TC 2-91.2 is Installation Commanders, MI unit commanders, staffs, and Soldiers conducting activities to support antiterrorism/force protection.</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> Manual under development with an expected publication date in FY 2010.</p>   |
| TC 2-91.7 (FOUO)     | Intelligence Handbook to Civil Support Operations                       | TBD  | <p>Provides Army doctrine for Intelligence Support to Civil Support (CS) Operations. This manual follows FM 3-28.1 and expands on providing intelligence support to the commander and staff during CS operations at the brigade and battalion levels. Also applicable to Joint Task Force J2s, Army G2s at the various levels, and Joint Force Headquarters-State J2s (NG). Explains how the intelligence Soldier can use standard intelligence skills (overseas operations) to provide intelligence support to CS operations by adapting the use of IPB, intelligence analysis and ISR for use in the Homeland. Discusses some of the legal restrictions and other prohibitions on collecting intelligence and information within the U.S. and the Commonwealth and Territories of the U.S. Describes the homeland security framework, mission areas, functions, and related areas of critical importance. Discusses federal policies, DOD directives, and U.S. Army regulations pertinent to establishing military procedures governing intelligence support to CS operations.</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> In final editing with an expected publication date in FY 2010. An update to this manual is currently in progress with an expected publication date in FY 2012.</p> |
| ATTP 2-01.31 (FOUO)  | Specific IPB TTP  | TBD  | <p>Describes IPB and its applications to include its use in directing the intelligence effort and its role in driving the staff's planning for military operations. Provides doctrinal guidance for the use of IPB in directing the intelligence effort and its role in supporting the commander and staff.</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> Under development with an expected publication date in FY 2012.</p>   |
| ATTP 2-19.102 (FOUO) | Intelligence Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Division and Above | TBD  | <p>A guide intended to assist intelligence staffs and units in the operations and training requirements associated with ARFORGEN. Provides specific intelligence TTP that intelligence leaders assigned to theater, corps, and division intelligence organizations can use plan and conduct operations.</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> Under development.</p>  |

**U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence**  
**Capabilities, Development, and Integration**  
**Directorate of Doctrine**

| Publication Number  | Title  | Date | Description (and Current Status)   |
|---------------------|--|------|--|
| ATTP 2-22.21 (FOUO) | Counterintelligence TTP                                    | TBD  | <p>Provides TTP clarification and expansion for its parent manual TC 2-22.2 and specific guidance and examples of CI functions applicable at the tactical level of execution. Classified doctrine is contained in this manual. To obtain a complete picture of the CI effort, these two manuals must be used together. Supersedes FMs 34-60A, 34-62, 30-19 and the CI portions of FM 34-5 (Chapters 1 and 6).</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> Under development with an expected publication date in FY 2012.</p>  |
| ATTP 2-22.33 (FOUO) | 2X TTP   | TBD  | <p>Expands and clarifies the doctrinal foundation found in TC 2-22.303. Presents TTP regarding the mission, organization, and capabilities of the 2X element managing CI and HUMINT operations at the BCT level and includes TTP related to the 2X during full spectrum operations. Includes TTP for conventional operations derived from legacy doctrine as well as current TTP from recent operations. The target audience includes commanders, staffs, Soldiers and civilians engaged in, or supporting, the management of CI and HUMINT operations in a tactical or operational environment.</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> Under development with an expected publication date in FY 2012.</p> |
| ATTP 2-22.71 (FOUO) | GEOINT TTP   | TBD  | <p>Fills an existing doctrinal gap by providing doctrinal guidance concerning the GEOINT and IMINT disciplines and their roles in Army operations as based on agreements with the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. Provides information on the GEOINT cell formation, planning, and production. The IMINT discipline and its unique capabilities are addressed throughout the document as integrated elements or stand-alone functions, and is designed for geospatial engineers and imagery analysts at Army Service Component Command, corps, division, brigade, and company levels.</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> Under development with an expected publication date in FY 2012.</p>   |
| ATTP 2-33.41 (FOUO) | Analytic TTP   | TBD  | <p>Provides Army TTP doctrine for Intelligence Analysis. This manual follows FMs 2-0, 2-01.3 and FMI 2-01.301 and expands on TTP for the intelligence analyst to use while creating products for the commander and staff during operations at all levels of command. Provides the intelligence Soldier with the methodologies that enable the creation of intelligence products the intelligence warfighting function.</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> Under development with an expected publication date in FY 2012.</p>   |
| ATTP 2-91.1 (FOUO)  | Intelligence Support to Stability Operations TTP           | TBD  | <p>Provides TTP concerning intelligence support to stability operations and additional detail on the intelligence support to stability mission as stated in FM 3-07. This manual complements doctrinal guidance provided in FMs 2-0, 2-01.3, and FMI 2-01.301 and is consistent with stability operations doctrine found in FMs 3-0 and 3-07. The target audience for this manual includes commanders, staffs, Soldiers and civilians engaged in, or supporting, intelligence activities in support of stability missions at any echelon.</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> Under development with an expected publication date in FY 2012.</p>  |
| ATTP 2-91.21 (FOUO) | Intelligence Support to Antiterrorism/Force Protection TTP | TBD  | <p>Provides doctrinal guidance concerning intelligence support to the antiterrorism/force protection program. Complements guidance provided in AR 525-13 and describes how the Army implements DOD antiterrorism policy.</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> Under development with an expected publication date in FY 2012.</p>   |
| ATTP 2-91.3 (FOUO)  | Intelligence Support to Urban Operations TTP               | TBD  | <p>Reorganizes and expands FM 2-91.4 and the doctrinal foundations found in FM 3-06 and JP 3-06. Incorporates intelligence and operational doctrine and terminology from FMs 3-06 and 3-06.11, and provides intelligence professionals TTP and checklists to provide focus while providing commanders with effective intelligence support for operations in the urban environment.</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> Under development with an expected publication date in FY 2012.</p>   |
| ATTP 2-91.5 (FOUO)  | Intelligence Support to Document Exploitation TTP          | TBD  | <p>Designed to fill an existing doctrinal gap encompassing the TTPs on how personnel at the tactical level conduct DOMEX operations during full spectrum operations. Complements doctrinal guidance provided in TC 2-91.8. Includes TTP for conventional operations derived from legacy doctrine as well as current TTP from recent operations.</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> Under development with an estimated publication date in FY 2011.</p>   |

# U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence

## Capabilities, Development, and Integration

### Directorate of Doctrine

| Publication Number    | Title   | Date | Description (and Current Status)  |
|-----------------------|---|------|---|
| ATTP 2-91.6 (FOUO)    | Intelligence Support to Site Exploitation TTP | TBD  | <p>Focuses on the intelligence support to the site exploitation (SE) operations described in ATTP 3-90.15. Contains detailed information on how intelligence supports SE during the MDMP and IPB processes. Discusses the intelligence process as the framework to describe the various intelligence activities and tasks which supports the SE operational activities and details specialized support and information the S2 can leverage to support operations. Other information includes intelligence support for target folders, handling items of potential intelligence value, informational resources, search activities, and forensics. The target audience for this ATTP includes commanders, staffs, Soldiers and civilians engaged in, or supporting, intelligence activities in support of SE at brigade and battalion.</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> Under development with an expected publication date in FY 2012.</p>  |
| MI Pub 2-91.71 (FOUO) | Intelligence Support to the Homeland          | TBD  | <p>Provides Army doctrine for Intelligence Support to Homeland Security (HS). Follows JPs 3-27 and 3-28 and expands on providing intelligence support to the commander and staff during HS operations. Explains how the Intelligence Soldier can use standard intelligence skills (overseas operations) to provide intelligence support by adapting the use of IPB, intelligence analysis, and ISR for use in the Homeland. It further discusses Joint, interagency, multinational and law enforcement support to other agencies outside the Department of the Army. Discusses some of the legal restrictions and other prohibitions on collecting intelligence and information within the U.S., U.S. territories and possessions, and the surrounding territorial waters and airspace. Describes the HS framework, mission areas, functions, and related areas of critical importance. It discusses federal laws and policies, DOD directives, and U.S. Army regulations pertinent to establishing military procedures governing intelligence support to HS.</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> Under development with an expected publication date in FY 2012.</p> |
| MI Pub 2-0.1 (FOUO)   | Intelligence Reference Guide                  | TBD  | <p>A reference for Army intelligence as it continues with the transformation effort. Describes the Army Intelligence Enterprise and explains the Intelligence Warfighting Function, its organization, duties, and responsibilities of the Soldiers assigned within the organizations. Includes information on the organizational design and capabilities of the units and organizations within the Enterprise and warfighting functions. This guide will include intelligence support to planning and conduct of operations. The publication will discuss the intelligence support to ISR operations and targeting operations. The guide will also include information on intelligence systems within the inventory.</p> <p><b>STATUS:</b> Under development with an expected publication date in FY 2010.</p>  |

Current MI Doctrine manuals can be found on the Intelligence Knowledge Network (IKN). After logging in, go to "MI Active Doctrine" under the 'Resources' header located at the bottom left of the webpage.

Draft MI Doctrine manuals in staffing can be found on IKN. After logging in, go to "Workgroups" under the 'KM Toolkit' header located on the left of the webpage. Follow the path: Doctrine/Writing Division/Draft Doctrine and request access for the specific manual you need to review.

Current and draft MI manuals may also be accessed through the Army Knowledge Online (AKO) MI Doctrine folder at AKO Files Home/Organizations/DOD Organization/Army/Army Organizations/HQDA/CSA/Intelligence/Draft MI Doctrine or FOUO MI Doctrine.

Check Out MIPB Online 

[https://ikn.army.mil/apps/mipb\\_mag/](https://ikn.army.mil/apps/mipb_mag/)





## Geographic Profiling in Serial Offenses: Methodology

by Lieutenant Jim Adams, Sierra Vista Police Department and Captain David Ray, U.S. Army

### Background

Most people are familiar with criminal personality profiling as it pertains to pursuing prolific offenders, most notably serial killers. Though it has proven to be a useful tool in the overall investigative effort relative to these types of crimes, its success is based upon statistical probabilities and the expertise of the profiler, who must depend on the validity of the information received for analysis. Since this type of profiling only focuses on identifying a suspect within a specified cross-section of society, this particular type of analysis is unlikely to be of tremendous value when targeting combat militants in regions of the world with cultural norms significantly different than our own. What has proven beneficial in these situations is the application of geographic profiling to narrow the focus of the investigation.

Geographic profiling, pioneered by Dr. Kim Rossmo, examines Competing Interests in an effort to identify a Point of Origin (PO). The PO can be the perpetrator's residence, place of employment, or some other location the suspect is comfortable frequenting. In Law Enforcement, the PO is most often the suspect's residence. In the military application, it is common for the PO to be a safehouse or headquarters building.

The two Competing Interests which are analyzed to obtain the PO are the 'Fear of Discovery' (of the PO) and the suspect's psychological propensity to operate within a 'Comfort Zone.' Fear of Discovery suggests the suspect is making an effort to operate far enough away from his PO, so as not to have it compromised by the response or investigation which follows his criminal actions. A burglar, for instance, would not perpetrate his craft at all in his neighbor's homes for fear the police would link the activity to him based simply on his proximity to the events. This Fear of Discovery consciously (and unconsciously) compels the offender to commit his deeds away from his PO.

The concept of operating within a Comfort Zone, on the other hand, compels the offender to commit his deeds closer to his PO, so as to have ready access afterwards to real or perceived safety. This Comfort Zone can almost be thought of as an intimate 'area of operations (AO),' someplace with which the perpetrator is familiar and feels at ease moving about in. This Comfort Zone can vary in scope depending upon factors such as how long the subject has lived in or operated in the area, as well as other collective intelligence the subject can gain from his cohorts.

Understanding this dynamic, and knowing how to manipulate it, can bring successful resolution to

a persistent series of incidents, as noted below in Captain Ray's counter-sniper investigation. A final consideration is noted in the closing to this article regarding my personal observation of geographic profiling's telltale patterns in a serial rape case I resolved in 2001.

There are three final considerations in the application of geographic profiling. The first is an examination of whether the offender is local to the area (resident) or just passing through (nomadic). This can be understandably difficult to identify, unless good communication between jurisdictions exists. Second is a determination as to whether there is evidence the victim was appreciably stalked or was simply an unfortunate target of opportunity. Finally, the analysis must include a target assessment, weighing factors such as whether the affected location/person was a soft target, a high-value target, or whether the victimization was personal.

### **3-6 Iraqi Army's Sniper Defeat**


In the fall of 2006, 3-6 Iraqi Army (IA) experienced its first casualty from enemy sniper fire. There would be 16 more casualties over the next 90 days before the snipers were captured. This following describes how 3-6 IA used geographic profiling to defeat the enemy snipers in its AO.



**Overview of the town of Abu Ghraib.**

Abu Ghraib is a city of approximately 190,000 people, the first town west of Baghdad. The terrain is flat, the climate hot and arid, and the economy is primarily agricultural based. Its buildings are one and two story structures, except for the five story Al-Ban apartments in the east-central part of town. Abu Ghraib is part of the southern boundary of the Sunni Triangle, and consequently has a large

Sunni majority and small Shiite minority. The old road to Jordan connects Abu Ghraib to Ramadi, Fallujah, and Baghdad.




**Days 1-30.**

Sniper activity in Abu Ghraib began in the fall of 2006, and within the first 30 days had inflicted six casualties. Initial analysis seemed to point to two teams-'East' and 'West.' There were several similarities amongst all the attacks, three of which are relevant to this article:

1. If one stood in the center of the circles for the East and West teams, one could travel to all the attack sites without encountering an observation post (OP) or traffic control point (TCP). The snipers more than likely had safe houses or weapons caches inside the circles near the attack sites, or both.
2. Second, all casualties were stationary targets working at an OP or TCP. Not only would a stationary target be easier to engage with a weapon, but easier to reconnoiter as well.
3. Third, all shots came from the west within two hours of sunset. This meant the snipers were putting the sun to their back. An added benefit to conducting attacks later in the day was that the Soldiers tended to strip off their heavy, cumbersome protective gear to escape the late afternoon heat, making them more vulnerable to sniper fire.

To counter these attacks, 3-6 IA began implementing countermeasures to protect its soldiers. Concrete Jersey Barriers were erected at TCPs, and sandbags and camouflage were increased at OPs. Unit leaders visited TCPs and OPs daily to ensure soldiers were wearing their protective gear. Also,

the commander ordered active patrolling around all TCPs and OPs four hours before sunset. This tactic was meant to reassure his soldiers as well as disrupt and pressure the snipers.




**Days 31-60.**

Days 31-60 were the most deadly, with seven casualties. All attacks followed the same pattern as before, except on two occasions when the shots were fired mid-morning from the east. Although the time of day was different for these attacks, the same tactic of the sniper placing the sun to his back was followed. To 3-6 IA the snipers changing to morning attacks proved the evening patrols were effective, so a policy of daily patrols at unpredictable times was instituted.

As more attacks occurred and more information was analyzed, a clearer picture of a typical attack began to emerge. The snipers were engaging OPs and TCPs that had been effective at restricting enemy movement. The shots were never less than 200 meters and generally were 300 meters or more. There was always some type of diversion or obstacle between the sniper and the target, such as a road, intersection, bridge or irrigation canal. These patterns allowed us to more accurately pinpoint our patrols to increase their effectiveness. Most importantly, it appeared the sniper's headquarters was the only high ground in Abu Ghraib: the Al-Ban apartments.

I came to this conclusion based on a class I had at the MI Captains Career Course on Geographic Profiling. Lieutenant Jim Adams of the Sierra Vista Police Department (SVPD) taught the class and explained how the SVPD caught a serial rapist using this technique. Whenever a serial crimi-

nal commits a crime, he automatically fears being caught. This fear of discovery causes the criminal to operate closer and closer to his comfort zone, which is his PO (his home). What the criminal doesn't realize is that his patterns of working closer and closer to his comfort zone allow law enforcement to determine his PO. Days 1-60 were showing a pattern of attacks that seemed to point to Al-Ban apartments (the high ground) as the sniper's PO. When presented with this information the Iraqi commander decided to increase the patrols in hopes that the increased pressure would drive the snipers even closer to their PO. From days 61-90, that's exactly what happened.



**Days 61-90.**

Days 61-90 saw the snipers score their final four kills. As you can see in the above image, the snipers did exactly what we expected; continuing to operate closer to Al-Ban apartments. The increased patrol pressure resulted in nearly 3 weeks of no attacks, until finally on day 77 there was an attack near Al-Ban apartments. We had calculated the sniper teams needed 3 hours prep time for a successful shot, and recommended a patrol be sent to Al-Ban 5 hours before sunset. Sure enough, on the first try, a blue Daewoo Prince sedan with 5 occupants was leaving Al-Ban apartments as the IA patrol arrived. The driver panicked and tried to flee. The soldiers stopped the car and detained the 5 occupants: one driver, 2 spotters with spotting scopes, and 2 snipers with Dragunov sniper rifles. After the arrests all sniper attacks stopped.

The enemy snipers were initially effective but quickly became predictable. We found the enemy's predictable

patterns fit perfectly with the doctrine of geographic profiling, and used this to accurately predict Al-Ban apartments as the PO, leading to the capture of both sniper teams and an end to all sniper attacks in Abu Ghraib. In this case, the PO was narrowed concentrically. This was accomplished by observation and understanding of the enemy's tactics, coupled with aggressive and timely patrols in areas the enemy was likely to be operating in during a given time period.

## Civilian Application of Geographic Profiling

In 2001, the City of Sierra Vista (Arizona) served as an unwilling host to a serial rapist. His activities are noted in following diagram.



**Victim 1.** (June 21<sup>st</sup> at 0342). A 5 year old girl is abducted from her bed and taken outside, where she was assaulted. The victim screamed for help during her assault, which caused the suspect to flee. He was observed leaving the area in a small car by a neighbor.

**Victim 2.** (August 31<sup>st</sup> at 0330). A 28 year old woman was abducted off the street while jogging. She was assaulted before getting free of her assailant and running to a nearby hotel. The suspect had been seen parking a small car near where the victim was running immediately preceding the attack.

**Victim 3.** (October 21<sup>st</sup> at 0354). A 35 year old woman was attacked in her home while asleep. It was believed the suspect walked to the site of the crime.

**Victim 4.** (November 18<sup>th</sup> at 0317). A 39 year old woman was attacked in her home while asleep. It was believed the suspect walked to the site of the crime.

In analyzing these cases, it became apparent that the suspect chose the young girl to be his first victim, because she was easy to control. He committed the offense away from his PO (his pregnant girlfriend's residence represented by the star) to insulate himself from capture. The distance traveled back and forth required use of a motor vehicle. His internal concerns over having been potentially compromised (by the girl screaming and the immediate police response) and being so far away from his Comfort Zone, compelled him to move closer to it.

The same was true in the second offense when the victim got away from him and ran for help. In the third instance the suspect wore a mask. It was later determined that he knew the victim from a previous place of employment. In this instance, his internal concerns over her potentially identifying him, compelled him to move closer still to his PO. Travel to events 3 and 4 were on foot. I subsequently identified and captured the suspect after the 4<sup>th</sup> incident. He was sentenced to 69 years in prison.

As stated earlier, Captain Ray's analysis of the sniper attacks in Iraq revealed that his efforts to modify and intensify patrols (external pressure) led to the suspects moving closer to their PO in a concentric fashion. In my analysis of the serial rape cases, the suspect moved closer to his PO in a linear fashion. This was due to internal pressure he imposed upon himself and external pressure exerted by our agency's aggressive patrols in the perpetrator's AO.

*Captain David Ray served as the All-Source Intelligence team leader at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. He served one year at Camp Constitution, Iraq as the assistant Brigade S2 Intelligence advisor (MiTT) for 3-6 Iraqi Army.*

*Lieutenant Jim Adams is presently assigned as the Special Operations Bureau Commander for the Sierra Vista Police Department in Arizona and has served 19 years on the force. His career includes nine years in Special Operations as a detective and 10 years in the Patrol Bureau. He was also one of the founding members of the Special Response Team where he served as the Sniper Element Leader. He has been a guest instructor at the MI Captains Career Course at Fort Huachuca since 2005 and has also provided operational support for the Advanced Source Operator's Course since 2007. Lieutenant Adams holds a BA in Psychology.*

# BATTALION S2/COIST ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT



## Introduction

Prior to the War on Terror, little emphasis was placed on ensuring battalion S2 sections had adequate manning, training and equipment to succeed. Battalion S2 shops were organized against a Cold War intelligence feed, fighting an enemy on a linear battlefield using doctrinal tactics and procedures. Most operations were top down driven and required basic bottom up refinement. The operational tempo and exploitation process was deliberate and premeditated allowing a smaller S2 section the ability to manage analysis and exploitation. Since then, more and more requirements, expectations, and responsibilities have been placed on lower echelon intelligence sections. The counterinsurgency (COIN) fight has challenged units to adopt new ways of organizing their intelligence architecture to effectively collect, analyze, disseminate and exploit in a rapid and dynamic operational environment.

The targeting process in a counterinsurgency is a 180° turn around from traditional Cold War practice. The bottom line in a COIN environment is “intelligence drives maneuver operations.” Approximately 80 to 90 percent of operations are now bottom up, driven by intelligence collected from “boots on the ground.” Information collected may require quick analysis to develop actionable intelligence. In many cases, there is little time for higher echelon analysis due to the enemy’s quick

## Major Jeremy L. Click

reaction to Coalition Forces actions. Processed information at the brigade and higher levels too often provides historical or regurgitated data and no new or targetable intelligence to the battalion and below. Atmospherics change, targets move or go to ground, and caches are repositioned creating a short Last Time Information is of Value in a COIN environment. Due to this increased reliance on bottom up collection and time sensitive intelligence, more and more assets, tools and capabilities continue to be pushed down to the lowest levels. This shift has created a need to reorganize the intelligence warfighting function to create a more robust intelligence capability at the battalion and company levels.

## Reorganizing for the CoIST

As an observer/controller at the National Training Center (NTC), I have seen many units struggle with how to reorganize their combat power to increase their intelligence capacity. The modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) for an Infantry Battalion S2 shop has failed to keep up with the demanding environment and increased workload placed on battalions and companies. This need to reorganize a deficient intelligence MTOE has created numerous challenges at these levels.

At the battalion level, S2 shops struggle with organizing an undermanned section to meet Tactical

Operations Center/Staff requirements and quickly become overwhelmed with the amount of incoming information covering the full spectrum of the environment. S2s must allocate personnel into day/night current operations cell, day/night future plans cell, fusion/information cell, collection management, Company Intelligence Support Team (CoIST) liaison/advisor as well as a multitude of additional duties and tasks associated with these sections. As assets traditionally found at the brigade become organized into battalions, battalion S2 shops begin to morph into miniature Analysis and Control Elements (ACE). This has created a need for a more robust battalion S2 section to effectively manage assets, process information, and provide the commander with relevant intelligence. The expectations on S2 sections to do more with less has resulted in many S2s to fall short and either become irrelevant staff members or focus their efforts on one area of the COIN fight, typically kinetic targeting.

The CoIST concept has proven to be a very valuable asset in a COIN environment. Just as battalion S2 shops have become mini-ACES, companies have formed mini-battalion S2 shops in the form of CoISTs. Commanders must now reduce their maneuver combat power by identifying personnel to work out of their military occupational specialties (MOS) to form a company level intelligence cell. Typically, the soldiers who are the most suited for the position are the soldiers no one wants to lose in their platoon or squad. It is definitely a tough decision, but one that could make or break a company's or battalion's success in combat. The old adage of "if it doesn't hurt, he is the wrong person" certainly applies in this circumstance. Quality input will produce quality output.

Some considerations commanders need to take in account when selecting CoIST members is that it is a full-time commitment. CoIST soldiers should not be tasked with additional duties. The practice of having part-time CoIST members has typically failed and proven ineffective. Data becomes lost or not captured providing little to no value for the company commander or battalion. Commanders must also understand that once his CoIST is identified and begin training, they must be managed as strictly as a qualified gun crew. This team will become a combat enabler with a specialized skill set that must not be mismanaged

or separated without scrutiny and/or the battalion commander's approval. Replacement or loss of trained team members prior to a deployment will result in a degraded intelligence capability and reduced effectiveness during the crucial first 90 days in combat.

Training soldiers to be good analysts can be a very arduous task. The Intelligence "school house" doesn't produce skilled analysts. They are given a standard knowledge base, but it is up to the unit S2 to develop the analyst. With the development of CoISTs, companies are now expected to do the same with non-school trained soldiers who have no basic foundation. It is key for commanders to identify and personally select soldiers that display an aptitude towards intelligence functions as early as possible. Identification of this team early on will mitigate stumbling blocks like personnel change over due to the Army Force Generation Process timelines, clearance issues, and training time which all affect the team's progress. Additionally, it allows the battalion/brigade S2s to develop a comprehensive training plan for CoIST members prior to the next deployment. Many of the courses do offer mobile training teams; however, some courses will require off post travel and will need to be coordinated well in advance. The sooner the commander identifies his CoIST, the sooner the S2 can begin working on the security clearance process and coordinating for training through the Army G2 Foundry Training Program.

## One Battalion's Solution

One common solution to compensate for an insufficient intelligence MTOE is to pull soldiers from other staff sections or line companies into the battalion S2 section, and many have done just that. This augmentation provides the section with the additional soldiers needed to keep up with the increased demands. Just as it is with the CoISTs, this requires non-MOS trained soldiers to begin cross training as intelligence analysts. Once again, these newly recruited analysts need to be identified as early as possible to provide dedicated training time prior to an upcoming deployment.

Another solution, in my opinion the preferred solution, is to not only augment the battalion S2 MTOE, but also allocate an intelligence analyst

to each company. This would provide each CoIST with an MOS trained soldier to act as the lead analyst, team advisor and battalion S2 liaison. This addition to the company would help alleviate issues with a lack of understanding of the intelligence processes by having an in house expert on hand. This “in house” analyst will be able to collect, report, and analyze using firsthand knowledge and experience. It allows the analysts to get out on the battlefield, meet the local population, and gain a better understanding of the environment which will lead to better collection and more insightful assessments.

One way to reorganize the intelligence section was demonstrated by the 1-68 Armor Battalion, 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, during a recent NTC rotation. The battalion fused both proposed solutions, creating a robust intelligence capability and decided it would be very beneficial to push down an intelligence analyst from the S2 shop to each company CoIST. In exchange, the other staff sections and line companies provided the battalion S2 section with a competent Soldier. The S2 pushed a total of four analysts down to the company level and retained three, which included the Assistant S2. Those remaining intelligence analysts provided over the shoulder training and oversight of the “new” S2 team members. The overall effect resulted in better collection and cut the time spent turning raw information into actionable intelligence. The reorganization provided CoISTS with MOS-trained MI personnel to effectively collect, analyze, and train other CoIST members on the tasks involved at the lowest possible level. At the battalion, it increased the number of 11-series personnel across the battalion being cross-trained in Intelligence tasks and thought processes, increasing awareness of the needs and benefits of the

Intelligence function among the combat formations. These 11-series intelligence analysts provided the S2 section with additional minds to collect, read, and analyze more information increasing their overall operational picture.

## Conclusion

Reorganization of the intelligence warfighting function is only part of the solution. Regardless of how a battalion or company decides to reorganize and manage their intelligence systems and architecture, it still requires a huge investment of time and resources at all levels. The other half of the solution is that battalion commanders, S3s, XOs, S2s, and company commanders must stay involved and provide guidance and direction to keep the intelligence system focused to provide relevant intelligence. The intelligence function will work for the commander, but it needs to be directed based on the commander’s priorities and unit’s main effort, whether that be lethal or non-lethal. Intelligence business is not just S2 business; it is the commander’s business. The level of investment by commanders directly correlates to the level of intelligence return the commander will receive. Without direct involvement by commanders to provide guidance and emphasis the intelligence return will diminish.

Bottom fed intelligence will drive maneuver and is a must in a COIN fight. It is imperative that units relook their intelligence organization for combat and adapt to meet the needs of their particular mission. Commanders and leaders must remain involved and actively invest themselves in the intelligence process to reap the benefits. If reorganized and left alone, it will fall on its face. However, if guided and developed, their intelligence personnel and systems will be far more successful in today’s dynamic combat environment.



*Major Click is currently a TF Intelligence Trainer at the NTC, Fort Irwin, California. He is a graduate of Washington State University. Previous assignments include company platoon leader and executive officer, 1-8 CAV, 2<sup>nd</sup> Bde, 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division; S2, 2-504 PIR, 1<sup>st</sup> Bde, 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division, MICO Commander, 1<sup>st</sup> BSTB, 82<sup>nd</sup> AB Div and Deputy Bde S2, 1 BCT, 82<sup>nd</sup> AB Div. He may be reached at jeremy.click@us.army.mil.*

*Other contributors: LTC Thomas Mackey, Senior TF Maneuver Trainer and SFC Loyd Rhoades, TF Intelligence Trainer.*

1-68 AR S2 and CoIST Cross-Leveling

|   |   |
|---|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• S2 Section (by MTOE)           <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-1 x CPT (S2 OIC)</li> <li>-1 x 2LT (Asst S2)</li> <li>-1 x SFC analyst (S2 NCOIC)</li> <li>-1 x SGT analyst</li> <li>-4 x PVT-SPC analyst</li> </ul> </li> <br/> <li>• CoISTS (not MTOE authorized):           <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-1 x CoIST OIC</li> <li>-1 x CoIST NCOIC</li> <li>-4-6 x 11B (cross-trained on MI tasks)</li> </ul> </li> </ul> | <p><b>After cross level:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• S2 Section:           <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-1 x CPT (S2 OIC)</li> <li>-1 x 2LT (Asst S2)</li> <li>-1 x SFC analyst (S2 NCOIC)</li> <li>-1 x SGT analyst</li> <li>-6 x 11B (cross-trained on MI tasks)</li> </ul> </li> <br/> <li>• CoISTS (not MTOE authorized):           <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-1 x CoIST OIC</li> <li>-1 x CoIST NCOIC</li> <li>-1 x PVT-SPC analyst (analyst/trainer)</li> <li>-4-6 x 11B (cross-trained on MI tasks)</li> </ul> </li> </ul> |
|---|---|

Figure 1. 1-68 AR S2/CoIST Manning Chart.



## Introduction

How often do we hear intelligence professionals say they do not have the information they need? *We need better information, We need focused information.* These types of comments may be indicators of poor intelligence offices and program management. Additionally, criticisms of this nature may indicate a larger failure to leverage proper collection management tools, currently available.

On 7 January 2010, the President discussed intelligence and analysis of intelligence. In his remarks in “*Strengthening Intelligence and Aviation Security*,” he stated that, “the intelligence community did not aggressively follow up on and prioritize particular streams of intelligence related to a possible attack against the homeland.” He continued by observing that “this contributed to a larger failure of analysis—a failure to connect the dots of intelligence that existed across our intelligence community and which, together, could have revealed that Abdulmutallab was planning an attack.”<sup>1</sup>

These are powerful statements by the Commander-in-Chief. The President’s pointed comments proceeded the after action review pertaining to the failed 2009 Christmas Day terrorist attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 to Detroit, Michigan. There are powerful forces desiring changes in the Intelligence Community (IC), of which Military Intelligence is a member. Most of the problems have not been that

---

**by James R. Lint and Vincent D. Reiley**

---

we did not have intelligence; rather, we did not have intelligence focused on what was needed by the individual analyst. This article will show some ways to improve.

**One of the best tools that is sometimes overlooked is the Intelligence Information Report (IIR) Evaluation**, also commonly referred to as an Eval. I have heard the complaints about the Eval program in Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Collector units, in Counterintelligence (CI) units, as part of national intelligence analysis organizations, and now currently as a Department of the Army G2 and customer of intelligence reporting and products. The Eval takes time to prepare and disseminate. Obviously, your boss has plenty to task you with and your boss has priorities. It is strange and problematic that there are no consequences for lack of evaluation of intelligence reporting. You get in trouble if you do not have time for your boss’ priorities. But there is no trouble if you do not evaluate the intelligence reporting you use. Maybe that is one of the problems.

There are numerous benefits in completing HUMINT IIR Evals properly and effectively. **Analysts and consumers can strengthen the feedback loop to an intelligence collector or reporting unit by using an IIR Eval.** Collectors and reporting units do not have extra sensory perception. They do

not know the priorities of the end user or the nuances of your intelligence requirements. The collectors only know the broad Collection Requirements. Eval's give the analyst and customer that ability to fine tune the reporting. Evaluations are the tools to make a collector notice your organization needs and requirements.

**Evals have five simple ratings** as outlined in Defense HUMINT Manual, Volume I, dated 30 January 2009. Often it is easier to think about what impact the IIR report had on your unit. Examples of the rating thought process:

- ◆ C: Used in organization's weekly threat newsletter.
- ◆ B: Used in briefing with Commanding General who found information interesting and relevant.
- ◆ A: Used in OPSUM, Briefing, or newsletter which influenced decision makers to change operations, business practices, or improved operations.

### IIR Evaluation Rating Chart

Defense HUMINT Manual, Vol. I,  
30 January 2009

A = Major Significance  
B = High Value  
C = Of Value  
D = Low Value  
E = No Value

There are few IIR Evaluations rated as A or commonly referred to as MAJOR SIGs. Most analysts will produce B or C level. Both are respectable for collectors to receive. Collectors are often happy for any feedback. Supervisors should be in the decision making or approval process for MAJ SIGs or Low or No Value evaluations.

Low Value and No Value ratings are rarely given. Low Value may be given with many additional questions that can lead to a much better Eval on a collection requirement that your unit issued. No Value

would be given in response to an IIR reporting on a Source Directed Requirement (SDR) that your unit produced. SDRs are specific unit requests for information. Often when an IIR has an SDR number but no information pertaining to the IIR, it is due to an administrative error putting the wrong SDR number on the IIR. If supervisors have analysts who want to write No Value IIR Evaluations, they should question why the analysts are reading IIRs which do not pertain to mission needs.

**All IIR Eval's can have additional questions from the analyst** which helps the collector fine tune the collection into what the analyst desires. While the grade will be interesting, the questions are extremely useful to the collector and analysts to enable the IC to develop better finished intelligence products. MAJ SIGs often result in awards, Army Achievement or Commendation Medals, or for civilians a monetary bonus. There is a motivation to excel in a HUMINT collecting organization. Analysts who over inflate grades have the potential to lessen the impact of Eval's from an organizational perspective. Frequently, analysts are evaluating IIRs written for someone else's requirement. It may be similar to your requirement and you end up piggy back ing that requirement to let the collectors know your needs. Asking questions in an Eval may get you the nugget of information which allows one to connect dots of a different puzzle.

**Some advice for commanders and supervisors is to encourage and allow intelligence analysts to do IIR Evaluations.** Some misconceptions in the past make analysts believe that Eval's are not important or appreciated by the commander. In my unit, analysts are graded on their annual report card on their participation in the evaluation program. This can impact promotions or civilian bonuses. Analysts are expected to use all of the tools at their disposal to accomplish the organizational mission. Adding this reminder in the initial counseling and support forms helps to reinforce the importance of the program and its utility for the IC community at large. With the new DCIPS pay for performance system, completing Eval's could become a component of the pay for performance grading rubric to further emphasize the important role of the feedback loop.

An innovative and brilliant program has been started at the D2X (Intelligence Plans Division) of

the Defense CI and HUMINT Center which is recognizing consistent analytical feedback in the cyber realm. D2X will award a Cyber Collection Support Plaque to analysts who submit at least 100 Substantive IIR Evaluations in fiscal year 2010. It seems that D2X is focused on fine tuning and refining the Department of Defense's (DOD) overall collection program by better understanding the value to end users. This is a smart way to align and properly adjust programs and the collection of needed data rather than overloading the analytic system with unappreciated or irrelevant data.

**The ease of creating IIRs has been greatly improved by the invention of HUMINT Online Tasking and Reporting (HOT-R).** HOT-R is a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) system that has been adopted across the DOD IC as a common IIR, Notice of Intelligence Potential, SDR, and IIR EVAL publishing system. It is user friendly and can publish an Eval within 10 minutes, eliminating a component of the time intensive nature of dissemination which previously had been an inhibitor for analysts.

DOD is not the only organization with evaluation programs. Most Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) finished intelligence reports have a single sheet evaluation on the last page of the document that can be faxed back. The Central Intelligence Agency has a highly computerized system to perform internal evaluations of reporting and collection analysis. In 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) start-up cyber intelligence section sent out over 100 evaluations on cyber intelligence and cyber espionage. The IC does do evaluations but needs to do more.

We often hear that "Intelligence Drives Operations." Well, *intelligence analysts* drive intelligence, which drives operations. **The IIR**

**Evaluation is a tool to put intelligence analysts back in the driver seat.** IIR Evaluations are feedback, food, and even love to HUMINT collectors. IIR Evaluations are a great tool to help organizations gain focused intelligence for unit and departmental activity. Use of all tools available to intelligence analysts will further help them to connect the dots of the intelligence picture and better serve this nation.



#### **Endnote**

1. Remarks by the President on Strengthening Intelligence and Aviation Security, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 7 January 2010, accessed at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-strengthening-intelligence-and-aviation-security>, retrieved 9 January 2010.

*James Lint has 30 years of Military Intelligence experience within the U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Army, contractor, and civil service. He is retired from the U.S. Army and is a MICA MI Corps Mentor. He has served in the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis and at the Department of Energy S&S Security Office. He is currently the G2 for the CECOM Life Cycle Management Command. His military assignments include Korea, Germany and Cuba in addition to numerous CONUS locations.*

*Vince Reiley has worked on both sides of the IIR Eval equation, as both a HUMINT Collector and an Intelligence Analyst. He served as a collector in the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force, in DIA's Defense HUMINT, and with the Army Operations Activity. As an analyst, he has served in the National Military Joint Intelligence Center. Currently, he is the Senior Intel Analyst in Current Intelligence for the CECOM Life Cycle Management Command.*

**The IIR Evaluation is a tool to put intelligence analysts back in the driver seat.**

# Troubled Youth: The Al Shabab Threat



by Captain Patrick McKinney



## Introduction

Al Shabab, Arabic for “The Youth,” is a Somalia-based terrorist organization that poses a real and growing threat to Somalia, East Africa, and the U.S. Al Shabab originated as a radicalized element of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) that controlled Somalia from mid-2006 until its forced removal in 2007 by neighboring Ethiopia. Upon Ethiopia’s withdrawal, it returned as an independent opponent to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia, the ICU, and to Ethiopia. Stemming from earlier ties to Somalia in the 1990s, al Qaeda developed a working and growing relationship with al Shabab which provides training, recruits and staging areas for terrorist attacks in the region. Due to U.S support for Ethiopia and the TFG, al Shabab has threatened the U.S. and the West with future attacks. Adding validity to this threat, Americans of Somali ethnicity are believed to be receiving terrorist training in Somalia under al Shabab’s direction and may have secretly returned to the U.S. Several suicide bombings in the region are tied to the group, and the threat for future attacks, especially in the West, is serious.

*Author’s Note: There are several spellings and alternate affiliate names for al Shabab and the Islamic Courts discussed in this article, and except where quoting other sources, the author will use al Shabab and ICU for simplicity.*

## Rise of the ICU in Somalia

On 5 June 2006, fighters under the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism (ARPCT) withdrew from Mogadishu, Somalia, leaving the

capital city in the control of militias from the ICU. This defeat marked a watershed moment, as the coalition of former Somali warlords, unofficially supported and funded by the U.S., ceded power to an alliance of Islamist jurists and their militia fighter supporters. Islamic Courts emerged in 1994 during the Somali civil war, filling a vacuum of order and authority and gradually rose in stature and power. Supported by a militia force, the courts united under the banner of the ICU and forcefully challenged warlord rule. As in Afghanistan following its civil war in the 1990s, a band of Islamic jurists and fighters united and challenged the political status quo, hoping to restore order to a chaotic state. And, as in Afghanistan, their rule was ended by military intervention of a foreign state (in this case Ethiopia, supported by the U.S.).

After a decade of chaos and civil war, international negotiations and pressure in 2000 resulted in the creation of the Somali Transitional National Government (TNG), hoping to pave the way for future reconciliation and a permanent unity government. These goals proved too elusive, and the government failed to gain legitimacy and produce real benefits for the Somali people. Kenyan peace talks in 2004 again attempted to create a viable government, and resulted in the TFG, which again struggled to win widespread support and legitimacy. Infighting within the government, including actual chair throwing in parliament, prevented the development of a national plan, and the government failed to prevent dissension. Seeing an opportunity, an alliance of former

warlords, militia leaders, and businessmen created the ARPCT in Mogadishu, creating their own government and security elements. Though formerly opposed in 1992 and 1993, the U.S. cooperated with the ARPCT as a means for intelligence collection, targeting al Qaeda and other Islamic militants, and deterring the rise of an Islamist Somali government. Unfortunately for the U.S., backing the ARPCT did not have the intended effect.<sup>1</sup>

The TFG, already failing to live up to its charter or promises, was seriously challenged by the rise of the ARPCT and with the loss of Mogadishu, exacted little influence outside of its provisional capital, Baidoa.<sup>2</sup> The various Islamic Courts, sensing TFG weakness, and fearing the ARPCT's use as a proxy for the U.S., united under the ICU and initiated an offensive. Built on a militia core of 400 committed and well-trained fighters, the ICU rallied its supporters and drove the ARPCT from their positions. ICU fighters entered Mogadishu in March, and by 5 June 2006, they controlled the city. For the first time in fifteen years, a single entity and authority controlled the capital, though it was not the authority desired by the U.S. or Ethiopia.<sup>3</sup>

Within three months of the fall of Mogadishu, the ICU extended its control to all but three regions of Somalia: the autonomous state of Puntland, TFG areas in the south, and secessionist Somaliland.<sup>4</sup> In the areas under its control, the ICU imposed Sharia, Islamic law, varying in the degree of severity and militancy from court to court. Somalia has a long tradition of moderate Sunni and Sufi Islam, and only recently has a growing percentage of the population turned radical. Some attribute this rise to the chaos and violence over the past three decades. One piece of evidence to this trend is the presence of more veiled Somalia women, which was uncommon prior to the 1980s. Despite the ICU's rise in popularity, though, most Somalis worry about extremism but are willing to accept it for the time being because it has brought stability, law, and order.<sup>5</sup> Mark Bowden, author of *Black Hawk Down*, a chronicle of the U.S. intervention in Somalia from 1992 through 1993, puts it, "Even harsh religious government, it seems, is preferable to no government at all."<sup>6</sup>

## **Reaction of Ethiopia to the Threat**

Ethiopia, Somalia's neighbor and frequent enemy, worried about the rise of an Islamic government in Somalia, with its potential for violence and

terrorism. Ethiopia accused ICU leaders of having ties to al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations; while the U.S. similarly accused the ICU of hiding and supporting wanted al Qaeda members (including several tied to 1998 American Embassy bombings in Africa). The ICU denied these claims, and declared their intentions were nationalist, focused on the Somali state, but infighting within the ICU suggested that a broader Islamic campaign was developing. Hundreds of volunteers from the Somali Diaspora overseas flocked to the ICU to train and fight, and received training in guerilla warfare and explosives, swelling its ranks, and posing a threat to both the region and their home countries. Radical leaders within the ICU called for jihad against Ethiopia, encouraged attacks on Ethiopian troops in the south, provided bases and support to anti-Ethiopian insurgent groups, and established ties to Ethiopia's enemy, Eritrea. Kenneth Menkhaus argues in *Current History* that Ethiopia may have taken action even without these factors, but, "the jihadists, irredentist posturing and the alliance with Eritrea ensured an Ethiopian response."<sup>7</sup>

"Playing with fire," as Menkhaus describes it, the ICU provoked Ethiopia into a military campaign, overconfident in its strength, and miscalculating Ethiopian actions. The ICU planned to drag Ethiopia into a costly quagmire of guerilla warfare and terror attacks, as Ethiopian forces struggled to control Mogadishu and Somali land. The ICU hope was that the attack on Islamic forces would inspire Muslims in Ethiopia, the Horn of Africa, and elsewhere to rally to the fight and take up arms, and in turn, bloody the Ethiopian force. It did not anticipate the speed and power with which Ethiopia responded, and failed to evaluate the capabilities of its own forces. The ICU previously defeated militias, not a legitimate and well-equipped military, and as Menkhaus writes, "The fact that hard-liners hijacked the...foreign policy and led the Islamists into a jihad with one of sub-Saharan Africa's largest and most seasoned armies was a monumental mistake."<sup>8</sup>

On 24 December 2006, Ethiopian forces crossed into Somalia and attacked the ICU. Few expected the rapid success Ethiopia enjoyed, as it quickly forced ICU units from the countryside where the militias proved no match for the conventional army units. ICU leaders and fighters fled back to Mogadishu,

and prepared for what many worried would be a violent and lethal last-stand in the dense urban area. Civilian, ICU, and Ethiopian casualties were expected to be high, but again, surprising everyone, the ICU disbanded and ordered its forces to withdraw. In the ensuing chaos, most of the Shabab militia and ICU leaders fled south, and took up a defense near the Juba River. Again, the Ethiopian military was too strong, and inflicted severe casualties to the militia, whose survivors fled to the Kenyan coastal area. Unknown to the ICU, American military assets monitored the withdrawal, waiting for al Qaeda fighters and targets of opportunity. American airstrikes destroyed two fleeing convoys of suspected al Qaeda fighters, and killed several al Shabab members and wounded several jihadists. No al Qaeda were confirmed killed, but clearly, the U.S. feared the escape of any of the Somali jihad or militia forces.<sup>9</sup>

By the end of January, Ethiopia controlled the key regions of Somalia, and the ICU was defeated; its leadership in exile, fighters killed, captured, or hiding, and its legitimacy gone. Ethiopia supported the return of the TFG to power, and called for African Union (AU) peacekeepers to eventually replace its forces. The U.S. hoped that the Ethiopia victory ended the Islamist threat in Somalia, but again, this proved false. Al Shabab and other militia fighters resented their abandonment by the ICU and what they saw as the quick surrender and flight by its leaders; and though in retreat, al Shabab saw itself betrayed by the ICU, rather than defeated by Ethiopia and the U.S. An International Crisis Group (ICG) briefing prepared 26 January 2007, immediately after the conflict, assessed al Shabab as still capable and ready to attack the TFG and Ethiopian forces. The report states, "Ethiopia's military victory has dismantled only the most visible part of the Courts...

Other elements, including the militant Shabaab leadership, remain largely intact and are dispersed throughout the country, threatening to wage a long war."<sup>10</sup> The report continues that although it lost its safe havens, al Shabab would likely just return to its clandestine cell structure that existed before the rise of the ICU, (when it focused on assassinating journalists, professionals, civil leaders, and aid workers) while exploiting public discontent and the presence of a foreign military<sup>11</sup>. Further, the report warns, that much of the infrastructure, grass root networks, mosques, schools, and business that support the spread of the Salafist interpretation of Islam, which supports al Shabab's goals and worldview for Somalia, remain intact.<sup>12</sup>



The ICG report proved correct as al Shabab focused on restoring its ranks, rebuilding logistics, and conducting an armed insurgency in southern Somalia against the Ethiopian forces. With the ICU leadership abroad and discredited, al Shabab rallied around an even stricter interpretation of Islam, and began a campaign for its own eventual control over Somalia. An article from *The Middle East Times* on 28 February

2008, suggests that the ICU were nationalists, whereas al Shabab was more religiously motivated. The article quotes a senior al Qaeda African leader, who stated, "[W]hile the courts has a goal limited to the boundaries placed by the Taghoot [impure], the Shabab had a global goal including the establish-

ment of the Islamic Khilafah [caliphate] in all parts of the world.”<sup>13</sup> The Ethiopian, and later Ugandan AU peacekeepers, did not engage the insurgent al Shabab in open combat, but instead suffered guerrilla attacks, roadside bombings, assassinations, and later suicide bombings, which was previously alien to Somalia. Al Shabab conducted hit and run attacks, as the sophistication and length of their operations increased, ultimately resulting in the capture and occupation of cities. Now occupying territory, the group installed harsh Sharia law, created formal training camps, and increased its recruitment of fighters from Somalia, the wider region, and the Diaspora. Increasingly, al Shabab posed a serious threat not just to the Ethiopian and AU peacekeepers, but to the TFG, and the ICU.

## Present Situation

Bowing to financial, international, and domestic pressure, Ethiopia finally began withdrawing its forces in late 2008, with final units reluctantly leaving in early 2009. The TFG, then on its own, and challenged by the ICU and other militant groups such as al Shabab, sought to co-opt its opposition, and reached out to the ICU for membership in the government, hoping to prevent what many worried would break into inter-factional power struggles.<sup>14</sup> The new Somali President, Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, in power since January 2009, led the ICU during its short control in Somalia, and is considered by many to be a moderate Muslim. He has identified al Shabab as a direct threat to his government and to the people of Somalia. In February 2009, he appointed Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmanke, the son of a murdered former Somali leader, as his Prime Minister, in an attempt to win support from both Somalis and the Diaspora. Al Shabab, not surprisingly disapproved, issuing the statement, “An unlawful camel never gives birth to lawful ones.”<sup>15</sup>

In February, President Ahmed issued a general call for disarmament and reconciliation, not singling out al Shabab, even though that was its intended audience. He stated, “If they agree to dialogue, they are in, whatever their past positions were. If they are against dialogue, there is no way we can deal with them, except to be harsh.”<sup>16</sup> Further hoping to win al Shabab’s cooperation, or at least to buy time for the strengthening and development of the Somali government, President Ahmed announced an initiative to install Sharia, Islamic law, in Somalia. Still

pending the approval of Parliament, Sharia would be a distinct departure from the traditionally moderate version of Somali Islam. Atrocities, harsh punishments, and strict rule imposed by al Shabab in areas under their control worries the general populace, though the President insists it will be controlled and not as radical as al Shabab’s interpretation.<sup>17</sup> The TFG under President Ahmed is weak, and in need of substantial foreign economic and humanitarian aid. Its military forces are weak, and in need of foreign assistance if they are to repel a strong coalition against the TFG. Al Shabab currently controls Kismayo, a key port city, and has made inroads into Mogadishu. President Ahmed hopes to form his own alliances and strengthen his position, but al Shabab remains a direct threat to Somalia and its government.

Already an Islamic group, the betrayal by the ICU and its defeat by Ethiopia further radicalized al Shabab, and pushed its leaders towards an ideology similar to that of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and al Qaeda, the international terrorist group. Al Shabab’s alleged ties and shared ideology with al Qaeda, led the U.S. State Department to label the group as a terrorist organization in 2008.<sup>18</sup> Al Shabab has created training camps, caches, and staging grounds for terrorist operations against the TFG, other countries in the region, and potentially the U.S.. Much like the Taliban in Afghanistan, al Shabab practices a violent and strict Islamic ideology and is willing to work with like-minded groups, regardless of their methods, to reach its goal of an Islamic Somalia.

## Birth and Rise of al Shabab

From its earlier days in 2004, al Shabab existed as a cellular network of Islamic militants, resistant to the secular TNG and TFG, opposed to foreign Ethiopian presence, and increasingly militant against “the West” in general, and later, the U.S., in particular. In 2004, al Shabab murdered foreign aid workers, peace activists, professionals, foreign clergy, and journalists; and plotted the disruption of parliamentary elections in Somaliland, targeting election officials, candidates, and observers.<sup>19</sup> The Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point, suggests that al Shabab may have initially begun as a defense force for its original leader Aden Hashi Ayro, who was targeted by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency for harboring suspected al Qaeda bombers involved with the 1998 American Embassy

bombings in Tanzania and Kenya, and from there, grew in its size, scope, and power.<sup>20</sup> Supportive of Islamic rule, al Shabab was drawn to the ICU, forming the core of its militia. Drawing from foreign aid and fighters, the group developed into an international group fighting for an Islamic Somali state.

Founded by Aden Hashi Ayro in 2004, al Shabab grew from the small group of bodyguards into a core of several hundred highly disciplined fighters, and by the end of 2006, a force of more than 5,000 in just the Mogadishu area alone. At its height, al Shabab may have had the support of 10,000 fighters, though this number was reduced by the conflict with Ethiopia, and al Shabab's re-emergence as an insurgent and terrorist group. Ayro's first fighters were recruited from the poor and disillusioned male youths of Mogadishu, as he combined a message of Somali nationalism with a "traditional reverence for Islam." These male youths, in their teens to early twenties, attended an abridged training regimen in secret camps near Mogadishu, and became his foot soldiers in the ICU struggle against the ARPCT, where they proved decisive. Not all of these fighters were Islamists or radical; however, and the majority were fighting for Somali nationalism, drugs, or profit. From this pool, though, Ayro was able to begin the construction of a radical Islamist force with a different mission and tactics.<sup>21</sup>

From his growing force, Ayro identified several hundred committed and radical members, who were motivated and willing to declare loyalty to Ayro, and to the reinstatement of an Islamic caliphate in Somalia. An extreme difference in outcome from the mere reestablishment of order, these fighters wanted Sharia and Islamist rule over Somalia and its neighbors, and were willing to kill or be killed in its pursuit. Reports indicate that these selected fighters travelled to neighboring Eritrea, the enemy of Ethiopia, and received extensive training in guerrilla tactics, explosives, and in constructing roadside bombs, car bombs, and suicide vests.<sup>22</sup> These fighters then returned to Somalia, and successfully used their training against Ethiopian and later AU forces, signaled by the use of roadside bombs, car bombs, and suicide attacks.

After its defeat against Ethiopia, al Shabab developed into a decentralized cellular structure, largely based on geography and clan affiliation, giving its leaders freedom of action and operational secu-

rity. With Ayro at its head, and his mentor Shaykh Hassan Dahir Aweys providing guidance, the group leadership provided a message and oversight to the regional commanders that generally chose their targets and operations autonomously, in support of al Shabab's overall goals.<sup>23</sup> The group was not strong enough to directly challenge Ethiopian forces but conducted guerilla and terror attacks when able. Al Shabab was still strong enough to challenge the TFG though, and would openly engage its forces and occupy cities. The TFG is weak, and is unable to expel al Shabab from the areas it controls. Exploiting technology for rapid communications, and to protect identities and operational security, *BBC News* refers to the group as "Somalia's text message insurgency," as leaders communicate with their soldiers through text messages and prepaid phones, showing their adaptability and ingenuity in the field.<sup>24</sup>

Al Shabab's current size and structure is a tightly guarded secret among its leadership, and estimates vary from several hundred core fighters, to near 8,000. It is split between its militia force and its terrorism cells, and the direct link between the two is unclear. The militia force is likely made up of several hundred core cadre, several thousand experienced and loyal fighters, and an auxiliary of several thousands of temporary, conscripted, or mercenary fighters as needed. The size of the terrorism apparatus is unknown, but it is significant enough to run and support terrorist training camps, produce recruitment products and media, and to conduct terror operations.

The al Shabab leadership is a carefully selected cadre, who task out missions and requirements to their lower leaders, or emirs, who control at the tactical level. Its secrecy is so effective that the identity of its leaders is largely unknown, relying largely on public statements and releases from the group to identify its members.<sup>25</sup> Ayro, its founder, was reportedly killed in an American air strike in May 2008, and his deputy, Muktar Robow, emerged as its new spokesman.<sup>26</sup> That said, the leadership of al Shabab is experienced and well trained; several are veterans of al Qaeda Afghan terror training camps, and the recent campaign against Ethiopia has battle hardened its ranks. Its leaders understand the political realities of the region and developed ties with neighboring states such as Eritrea and Egypt,

who officially and unofficially desire a weakened Ethiopia, for weapons and support, and with international Islamic donor organizations and the Somali Diaspora for financing. Foreign fighters from Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia are present in al Shabab's ranks, demonstrating the range of their message and recruitment. Al Shabab runs a media and technology savvy operation, with websites, videos, DVDs, and recruiting products which may have recruited dozens of Somalis in Europe and America to join al Shabab, which will be discussed later in the article.

## Al Qaeda in Somalia

Al Shabab's increased radicalization after 2007 made it an ideal partner for al Qaeda, which had attempted inroads in Somalia as early as 1992. The CTC report, *Al Qaeda's MisAdventures in the Horn of Africa*, chronicles al Qaeda's failed attempts at establishing permanent bases, winning widespread support, or installing an Islamic state in Somalia. Though unsuccessful in their overall goals, al Qaeda did provide support to the fighters resisting international intervention in Somalia in 1992 and 1993, claiming a role in the Battle of the Black Sea in Mogadishu that resulted in the downing of American helicopters and killing of over a dozen American Soldiers. The 1998 American Embassy bombing attacks in Tanzania and Kenya were planned and orchestrated by al Qaeda members in Africa, who were believed to be hiding in Somalia, allegedly under the protection of Ayro himself. Later attacks on tourist targets, and passenger airlines in the region were traced to al Qaeda members operating or staging in Somalia.

Despite these attacks, al Qaeda failed to plant permanent roots in Somalia due to the same factors that inhibit al Shabab or any force from enjoying complete control over the country, namely the lack of infrastructure, security, and logistics; combined with strict inter-clan competition, and a moderate tradition of Islam. Lastly, and most importantly, al Qaeda appeared as outsiders, and could not win the trust of the Somali people. Despite these initial failures, it appears al Qaeda is again attempting to extend its influence and message to Somalia, but this time is working through the indigenous al Shabab, which provides legitimacy, logistics, and an experienced and eager body of fighters to carry on the jihad.

Expert opinion differs on whether al Shabab shares an intrinsic and direct affiliation with al Qaeda, or whether it is a relationship of convenience, providing both groups with legitimacy and cover for their operations. Regardless, the trend appears to be that the two groups are growing closer, and establishing more concrete links, which does not bode well for the TFG, Horn of Africa, the Middle East, the U.S., and the world as a whole. Al Shabab and its terror infrastructure trained terrorists now active in states outside Somalia, and who could potentially conduct al Qaeda inspired or directed attacks.

In December 2006, immediately before the Ethiopian invasion Kenneth Menkhaus, an expert on Somalia, conducted an interview with *Foreign Policy* magazine and was asked if the ICU were controlled by al Qaeda. His response was:

**No, absolutely not. There is a legitimate debate over whether a small number of leaders in the Islamic Courts have linkages with a small number of leaders from al Qaeda. That's not the same as saying that the two are in a deeply intrinsic partnership. The problem that the Courts face is that they are not, by any stretch, a unified movement. It's an umbrella group that includes moderates, hard-line salafists, and jihadists. And a small number of jihadsts can do an enormous amount of damage and can bring in elements from outside that create a whole new level of security problems.<sup>27</sup>**

Menkhaus appears correct in his 2006 assessment, which generally still holds true today. The majority of al Shabab is regular foot soldiers, and not Islamic terrorists. That said, a structured and functioning terror structure has emerged, and its ties, methods, and ideology appear to be moving closer to al Qaeda.

In public, both groups find it valuable to claim a partnership and affiliation, as it provides support, credibility, and access to both. Muktar Robow, al Shabab's spokesman, declared in August 2008 that, "We will take our orders from Shaykh Usama bin Ladin because we are his students. Most of our leaders were trained in al-Qa'ida camps. We get our tactics and guidelines from them. Many have spent time with Usama bin Ladin."<sup>28</sup> Despite these claims, though, David Shinn in the *CTC Sentinel* writes, "While there are clearly ties between the two organizations, it is important not to overstate their significance." Supporting this claim, Shinn cites the

U.S. Military Intelligence chief, Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples' testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 10 March 2009 that predicts a "formal merger announcement" between the two is forthcoming, but does not yet exist.<sup>29</sup> Nine days after this testimony, though, al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden released an audio recording stating support for the mujahedeen, or holy warriors, of Somalia resisting the TFG under President Ahmed. Though the message does not name al Shabab directly, its message is tied to al Shabab's public statements and goals, and calls for all Somali Muslims to, "fight the apostate government, not stop fighting it." He forbids cooperation with the TFG and its secular allies, demanding its overthrow, and calls on Muslims worldwide to support the fight with finances or volunteers.<sup>30</sup>

An *International Crisis Group* report on Somalia in December 2008 admits that assessing al Qaeda's involvement in Somalia is "highly controversial," and accepts that some al Qaeda elements may be active or involved with al Shabab's leadership, but as a whole, sees al Qaeda as more of an inspiration, as "Al-Shabaab militants do not hide their admiration. They revere bin Laden," and, "identify with his dream of a Pax-Islamica." Regardless, they admit it is difficult to prove more than al Shabab's ideological sympathy for al Qaeda and the wider jihad movement.<sup>31</sup> If this is the case, al Shabab has copied al Qaeda's tactics, which is a serious development.

One signature al Qaeda tactic copied by al Shabab is the suicide bomber, as several such operations have occurred in Somalia against TFG, Ethiopian, and African Union forces.<sup>32</sup> Ahmen A. Hassan writes that in fact, al Shabab has introduced suicide attacks into Somalia, which until recently were "alien to Somalia," and have targeted both military and civilian targets.<sup>33</sup> More troubling, an al Qaeda suicide bomber in March 2009 in American ally, Yemen, allegedly received training in Somalia before his mission.<sup>34</sup> The target of numerous recent terror attacks, including the American Embassy and warship U.S.S. Cole, Yemen is home to a large Somali population, which could easily be exploited by al Qaeda to infiltrate Somali terrorists. Foreign fighters already support al Shabab, and now could potentially train and infiltrate throughout East Africa and into the Middle East and, combined with the

radical Islamist mindset, could conduct suicide attacks elsewhere.

## Radicalized Somali-Americans

The Somali Diaspora in the U.S., a major source of financial support for all parties in Somalia, is now feared to be providing volunteers for al Shabab and jihad, and is now part of an ongoing investigation by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). In the summer of 2007, an American was convicted of receiving training at a terrorist camp in Somalia, where he swore to support jihad and trained in explosives and hand to hand combat.<sup>35</sup> Then in September 2007, al Jazeera broadcast a segment on the ICU, and focused on an alleged American volunteer that not only fought, but trained others in explosives.<sup>36</sup> In October 2008, a naturalized U.S. citizen conducted a suicide attack in Somalia that killed dozens.<sup>37</sup> The *CTC Sentinel* reported in July 2008 that al Qaeda was seeking African-American Muslims to recruit for support and operations.<sup>38</sup> The NEFA Foundation worries that al Shabab will welcome fundamentalists from anywhere in the world, and will train anyone with the intent to target the West. More alarmingly, this training focuses on "lone wolf" attackers, who can operate on their own in their attempt at jihad.<sup>39</sup>

With this threat in mind, in late 2008, the FBI acknowledged that it was investigating the disappearance of dozens of young Somali males from the Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota area, which, not coincidentally, was also the former home of the October 2008 suicide bomber. Estimates range from between 6 to 40 males missing, and it is unknown how many traveled to Somalia, or received actual training. These males were not believed to be radical when they entered the U.S., and due to their poor surroundings and limited opportunities, turned to local mosques where they may have become radicalized. The FBI did uncover a local support system that assisted in travel and paperwork, but did not determine who was funding the operation.<sup>40</sup>

In February 2009, FBI Director Robert Mueller warned of the risk to American cities from small groups of extremists that "with large agendas and little money can use rudimentary weapons" against Americans. He specifically warned of the threat coming from America's status as a nation of immigrants. He stated, "The prospect of young men, indoctrinated and radicalized in their own commu-

nities is a perversion of the immigrant story.”<sup>41</sup> Not surprisingly, media focus on the issue shifted in March, as numerous newspapers and media organizations released reports on terrorist recruiting in the American Midwest and its possible threat. Many did not suspect an organized and ready network, but as one article cited, “Are they the ones that are going to plan the next major terrorist attack in the U.S. and carry it out? Probably not. But could they provide some of the foot soldiers for it? Yes.”<sup>42</sup> Another expert opines, “They are going to Somalia to fight for their homeland, not to join al-Qaeda’s jihad against the U.S., so far.”<sup>43</sup> Another states, “Some get there and become cannon-fodder. These folks aren’t going over there to become part of terrorist cells.”<sup>44</sup>

The FBI is continuing its investigation, and has begun grand jury investigations for several individuals connected to the case in Minnesota, but full details of the case are not yet publicly released. Recent reports indicate that at least one of the suspected missing males was spotted in a mall in Minneapolis in November 2008, but his current whereabouts are not public.<sup>45</sup> Several others were located on the social website, Facebook.com, which investigators believe may be playing a significant role in radicalization and communication for terrorist groups such as al Shabab.<sup>46</sup>

An al Shabab video released on a jihad website in late March 2009, shows fighters and combat training, features English language anti-American rap music, and presents American al Shabab members discussing their mission and duty for jihad. Investigators and intelligence officials are hoping the video will provide clues for al Shabab’s recruiting strategy and methods, so they can predict future activity and counter the message.<sup>47</sup> On 5 April 2009, a second video was released, this time with a press conference featuring two of the missing Somali-Americans. In the video, one states, “We came from the U.S. with a good life and a good education, but we came to fight alongside our brothers of al-Shabaab...to be killed for the sake of God.” He then added, “Some of us are still in training, others are on the frontline of the Jihad. Sadly a few of us are dead, one of whom carried out a suicide bombing.” The other said, “We are here to invite others to come and join us.” The video appears to be a recruiting video for Somali-Americans, and confirms the affiliation of the October 2008 bomber. Federal officials are investigating the video, and con-

tinuing their search for the missing males, including new investigations in Columbus and Cincinnati, Ohio; Boston, Massachusetts; Seattle, Washington; and San Diego, California, suggesting the recruiting scope may be larger than originally believed.<sup>48</sup>

Potentially providing an even better lead, sources indicate that several of the missing males returned to America, and may be under surveillance or pending arrests. One source said, “Some of the guys who were missing aren’t missing anymore. Some of them got blown up and some of them came back, and some of them are still there [in Somalia].” The FBI’s intentions and planned actions are unclear, but one official did state, “We do not have a credible body of reporting right now to lead us to believe that these American recruits are being training and instructed to come back to the U.S. for terrorist attacks. Yet, obviously, we remain concerned about that, and watchful for it.”<sup>49</sup>

## Conclusion

What began as a group of bodyguards has grown into a formidable militia that controls southern Somalia and threatens the recognized legitimate Somali government. Part nationalist, al Shabab hopes to restore order and security to Somalia. Its more dangerous part, however, is its radical Islamist wing, which is forging ties to groups like al Qaeda, supports global jihad, provides camps, training, and volunteers for suicide terror attacks, and is committed to the restoration of Sharia in Somalia and its wider region. Most at risk from al Shabab is the TFG under President Ahmed, which is struggling to build coalitions and restore order and stability to the Somali state. As its ties to al Qaeda develop, though, regional governments, and governments seen as enemies of al Qaeda may find themselves targets or victims of al Shabab volunteers, or terrorists trained under al Shabab’s supervision. American federal law enforcement, intelligence, and military leaders acknowledge the potential risk of an al Shabab lone gunman or a mass casualty civilian bombing, and are monitoring its activities, but need to better communicate the threat to the American people, and its international allies. Increasingly an international organization, al Shabab is a threat to the world, and likewise needs the world’s attention and focus to counter its spread, and deter its attacks.



## Endnotes

1. Kenneth J. Menkhaus, “The Somali Catastrophe: Bigger than the Horn—and Not Over Yet,” *Current History*, May 2007, 195-97.

2. Matt Bryden, "Can Somalia Salvage Itself?" *Current History*, May 2006: 226-227.
3. Menkhaus, 197.
4. Menkhaus, 197.
5. "Profile: Somalia's Islamic Courts," *BBC News*, 6 June 2006, accessed 2 April 2009 at <http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/5051588.stm>.
6. Mark Bowden, "The Guns of Anarchy," *The Washington Post*, 21 December 2008, B03.
7. Menkhaus, 199.
8. Menkhaus, 199.
9. Menkhaus, 200.
10. International Crisis Group, "Somalia: The Tough Part is Ahead," *Africa Briefing #45*, 26 January 2007, 1.
11. International Crisis Group, 8-9.
12. International Crisis Group, 1.
13. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, "Will Divisions Undermine Somali Rebellion?" *Middle East Times*, 28 February 2008, 1.
14. Abukar Arman, "Somalia after the Ethiopian Occupation," *WorldPress.org*, 29 October 2008, accessed 31 March 2009 at [WorldPress.org](http://WorldPress.org).
15. "New Somalia PM Appointed," *alJazeera.net*, 13 February 2009, accessed 31 March 2009 at <http://english.aljazeera.net>.
16. Sarah Childress, "Somali Leader Asks Groups to Disarm," *Wall Street Journal*, 17 February 2009, accessed 2 April 2009, 1.
17. Stephanie McCrummen, "Somali President Courts Insurgents," *The Washington Post*, 12 March 2009, A16.
18. U.S. Department of State, "Designation of al-Shabaab as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist," Press release, 26 February 2008, accessed 2 April 2009 at <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/08/102448.htm>.
19. International Crisis Group, 4.
20. Anonymous, "Somalia's al-Shabab Reconstitutes Fighting Force," *CTC Sentinel*, 1:3 February 2008, 17.
21. Anonymous, 17-18.
22. Anonymous, 17.
23. Anonymous, 18.
24. Mohamed Mohamed, "Somalia's Text Message Insurgency," *BBC News*, 16 March 2009, accessed 2 April 2009 at <http://newsvote.bbc.uk>.
25. Anonymous, 18.
26. David H. Shinn, "Somalia's New Government and the Challenge of Al-Shabab," *CTC Sentinel*, 2:3 March 2009, 2.
27. Interview: Kenneth Menkhaus, "Seven Questions: War in Somalia," *Foreign Policy.com*, December 2006, accessed 2 April 2009 at <http://www.foreignpolicy.com>.
28. Shinn, 2-3.
29. Shinn, 3.
30. Usama Bin Laden, "Fight On, Champions of Somalia," *The NEFA Foundation*, 19 March 2009, accessed 2 April 2009 at [www.nefafoundation.org](http://www.nefafoundation.org).
31. International Crisis Group. "Somalia: To Move Beyond the Failed State," *Africa Report Number 147*, 23 December 2008, 15.
32. "Suicide Blasts Hit Northern Somalia," *AlJazeera.net*, 29 October 2008, accessed 2 April 2009 at <http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2008/10/2008102993331438553.html>.
33. Ahmed A. Hassan, "Al Shabab Threat Clouds the Horn of Africa," *Wardheernews.com*, 3 February 2009, accessed 2 April 2009 at [www.wardheernews.com/articles\\_09/Feb/03\\_alshabab啊med.html](http://www.wardheernews.com/articles_09/Feb/03_alshabab啊med.html).
34. Reuters, "Qaeda Bomber Behind Yemen Attack Trained in Somalia," *The Washington Post*, 17 March 2009, 1.
35. Allison A. McGevna, "Somalian Terror Organization Shabaab al Mujahideen Looks to Throw the West into Hell," *Fox News.com*, 25 November 2008, accessed 2 April 2009 at <http://www.foxnews.com>.
36. MEMRI: Special Dispatch-No. 1739, "In Al-Jazeera Report Showing U.S. Citizen Training Islamist Militants, A Leader of the Al-Qaeda-Affiliated Somali Islamic Courts Union Vows to Annihilate Ethiopia. *MEMRI*, 12 October 2007, accessed 2 April 2009 at <http://memri.org>.
37. Shinn, 3.
38. Benjamin Haas and Daniel McGrory, "Al-Qa'ida Seeking to Recruit African-American Muslims," *CTC Sentinel*, 1:8 July 2008, 13-15.
39. McGevna, 1.
40. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, "Jihad Recruiting Effort May Explain Missing Somalis in Minneapolis Area," *Fox News.com*, 4 December 2008, accessed 2 April 2009 at <http://www.foxnews.com>.
41. Carrie Johnson, "FBI Director Warns of Terror Attacks on U.S. Cities," *The Washington Post*, 23 February 2009, 1.
42. Lolita C. Baldor, "Terrorist Group Recruits in Midwest," *The Washington Times*, 5 March 2009.
43. "U.S. Men 'Joined Somali Islamists,'" *BBC News.com*, 12 March 2009, accessed 2 April 2009 at <http://bbcnews.com>.
44. Randall Mikkelsen, "FBI probes immigrant Somali link to Al Qaeda," *The Star.com*, 12 March 2009, accessed 2 April 2009 at <http://www.thestar.com>.
45. Mike Levine, "Source: Missing Somali-American Spotted at Minneapolis Shopping Mall," *Fox News*, 22 March 2009, accessed 3 April 2009 at <http://www.foxnews.com>.
46. Levine.
47. Mike Levine and Catherine Herridge, "New Video May Help FBI Solve Somali-American Terror Case," *Fox News*, 2 April 2009, accessed at <http://www.foxnews.com>.
48. Mark Levine, "American Al Qaeda Holds Rare 'Press Conference,'" *Fox News*, 6 April 2009, at <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,512627,00.html>.
49. Mark Levine, "Source: 'Several' Missing Somali-Americans Back in U.S. After Overseas Terror Mission," *Fox News*, 19 March 2009, accessed 3 April 2009 at <http://www.foxnews.com>.
- Captain Patrick McKinney is an Army MI officer. He previously served as a Field Artillery officer in an Airborne Field Artillery Battalion, where he served in a variety of battery and staff positions, including Gun Truck Platoon Leader in OIF IV and as the Battalion S2. He is a graduate of the MI Captains Career Course. CPT McKinney graduated from The College of the Holy Cross in 2004 with a B.A. in Political Science. His email is pat.mckinney@us.army.mil.*

# *Intelligence Philatelic Vignettes*


by Mark Sommer

## **U.S. Naval Intelligence Forces In Russia (When It Was Still The U.S.S.R.!)**

Although the return address indicates this was mailed from the Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington, D.C., this correspondence was written in the former Soviet Union when sent on October 13, 1944 to Boston, Massachusetts.

The two Russian stamps are among the many issued with strong patriotic themes (i.e., "20k" showing woman worker, "30k" pilot), which were issued during the "Great Patriotic War," as the Soviets called World War II.

There is a circular censor marking on the bottom, with handwritten initials.



## **Official Envelopes From 1873**

By an Act of Congress, 31 January 1873, the postal privileges for most U.S. government employees were changed as of 1 July 1873 by the Postmaster General, John A. J. Creswell. He authorized use of prepaid (embossed) official envelopes (probably for better accounting and recordkeeping.) At the same time, official stamps were prepared for all Departments. This envelope, with a three cent denomination and the portrait of George Washington, was sent from "ROCK CREEK O. MAR 29" to the Signal Corps, U.S. Army in Washington, D.C. It was issued for the War Department, with the standard inscription in the lower left of "This envelope will only be used by Postmaster for the transmission of Weekly Reports on Form 29."



## A Reminder from North Korea


The USS Pueblo was captured by North Korea on January 23, 1968 and held captive until December 23, 1968. North Korea makes clear note of this with this issue showing the vessel as being the “Armed (actually minimal defensive capabilities) Spy” ship with the crew in the upper left hand corner being paraded in the surrender position. The USS Pueblo is still being held in North Korea and is used as a propaganda museum. Even with North Korea’s propaganda efforts, they still got the ship’s picture on the stamp wrong. They incorrectly depict the USS Pueblo as GER-2, instead of the correct AGER-2. The dates of 6/25 to 7/27 refer to the dates of the U.S. involvement in the Korean Conflict, as if to say, the “War” is still going on.



## Four Years before Entebbe-Terrorism Thwarted

Much has been made of the Israeli rescue of hostages at the Entebbe Airport in Uganda on July 4, 1976. This commemorative Special Event Cover was prepared for collectors and postmarked accordingly on May 9, 1972. Unfortunately, the Israeli security forces could not enjoy their triumph for too long, as only three weeks later the Japanese Red Army, operating with the General Command-Popular Front for the libera-

tion of Palestine opened fire on the same airport killing 26 people. Of these 16 were Puerto Rican Christians on a pilgrimage to the holy sites in Jerusalem.



Mark Sommer holds a BA in Political Science from Yeshiva University and an MA in International Relations from Fairleigh Dickinson University. His philatelic memberships include The American Philatelic Society ([www.stamps.org](http://www.stamps.org)); Military Postal History Society ([www.militaryPHS.org](http://www.militaryPHS.org)); Forces Postal History Society (UK), and The Psywar society ([www.psywarsoc.org](http://www.psywarsoc.org)).

# *Professional Reader*


**Honor Bound: American Prisoners of War  
in Southeast Asia 1961-1973**  
**by Stuart I. Rochester and Frederick Kiley**

(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007).  
Paperback Edition, 706 pages.  
ISBN: 1557506949

This well-documented book examines the lives of American prisoners of war (POWs) while they were in captivity in Southeast Asia and documents how these individuals coped with the negative circumstances of their captivity. It also describes the events and conditions of their captivity, effects on the prisoners, strategies and tactics of both prisoners and their captors, and notes differences relating to captivity in North Vietnam and South Vietnam.

Although it may be common to assume that there are similarities among POWs during different wars, the authors bring out some interesting differences. For example, the American POWs of Southeast Asia represented the longest-wartime captivity of any group of American prisoners in U.S. history; yet they were the smallest group of Americans captured during any major war in this century. They also differed in the sense that their war-time activity was unconventional because the government did not fight the war as it did with other wars in terms of a zest for a more pronounced victory. In addition, the war they were fighting was quite controversial at home and abroad, reflecting a lack of support from a number of individuals. Another difference is also notable. American POWs who served in Southeast Asia were mostly officers and aviators.

The goal of the book is to project an accurate account of what happened during captivity to these POWs. "Arriving as objectively as possible at an understanding of what the prisoners of war did and did not accomplish—is the guiding purpose of the this volume." (xii) The book also notes that the American POWs during the Vietnam War were "an extraordinary company of men who endured an extraordinary captivity, though not without chinks in the armor." (xii)



Although the book has twenty-seven chapters and focuses on the treatment of American POWs in Southeast Asia there is also some commentary about earlier treatment relating to the French who preceded the American intervention in Vietnam. However, the majority of chapters basically describe the reaction of the Vietnamese to the presence of American servicemen as POWs. What we find is that the treatment varied from place to place, time to time, and individual to individual. However, as expected, the treatment of the Americans is generally oppressive and inhumane, reflecting a chilling and brutal experience.

The authors have used many resources in the writing of this book which include articles about the subject, memoirs, and interviews. However, they found the availability of prison-camp histories complied by multi-service teams of former POWs developed at the Air War College to be quite valuable. Interestingly, they allude to the inaccessibility of Vietnamese records which might have brought some more important insights into this book.

This work is important and valuable for a number of reasons. First, it does provide information about the treatment of American POWs in a controversial situation—particularly a wartime conflict not having the support of certain American elements. Second, it informs us about the limitations of American ser-

vicemen under severe stressful situations. Third, it identifies various ways that American servicemen avoided compliance with interrogators which may provide lessons learned to those who may in the future find themselves in a similar situation.

This work should appeal to a wide variety of readers. Students of the war in Southeast Asia during the period of 1961-1973 will find numerous references to

events of the controversial period. Military historians should also benefit because the book does cover a very important and controversial part of American history relating to those who served our government under the most adverse conditions. The younger generation of military personnel will also find the work appealing because it represents a description of incalculable bravely under the most trying circumstances.



**Reviewed by William E. Kelly, PhD, Auburn University, Political Science Department**



## Professional Reader




### *The Missouri Compromise and Its Aftermath: Slavery and the Meaning of America* by Robert Pierce Forbes

(Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 369 pages, \$20.95, ISBN 978-0-8078-3105-2

The Missouri Compromise is one of those land-mark events of the first half of the nineteenth century in the U.S. that students of American history regularly encounter when they study the period. Hence, it is understandable that there are many fine works on the subject and that some of them disagree about the effect of the Compromise. Yet, Robert Pierce Forbes's book, *The Missouri Compromise and Its Aftermath*, provides a refreshing analysis of an event which had a major effect on the future of this country. This book attempts to answer the question of how the U.S. moved from a post-Revolutionary period characterized by a negative view of slavery to the Jacksonian-era rejection of abolitionism and a willingness to live with slavery.

In the book the author identifies the significance of the Missouri Compromise, the key participants involved in bringing it about as well as their political goals and strategies, and the political ramifications of the Compromise. The book is also a commendable commentary about Antebellum America with a focus on the institution of slavery as viewed by northerners and southerners. The Missouri Compromise allowed slavery in that state but prevented its emergence in other areas of the country. In essence it



was a temporary halt to what later would become a full-fledged war between two different parts of the country—North and South—affected in a large way by institution of slavery. Interestingly, the book notes that most of the arguments both for and against slavery were developed around the time of the Compromise. These arguments were put forth vigorously by their advocates and became popular topics at the time.

This work suggests that the political maneuverings of the advocates demonstrate a type of high-level deal making, diplomacy, and deception to bring about the Compromise. Interestingly, the author notes that many scholars believe the demise of the Compromise was a leading cause of the Civil War. The book is an excellent commentary about how slavery affected the U.S. in terms of political ramifications before the Civil War. As expected for a scholarly work, the author used a large amount and variety of professional

sources in writing this book. Hence, should one be interested in major works concerning the time period and the issue of slavery in the U.S., the *Notes* in this book would be an excellent source.

Although the book should be of keen interest to serious students of the Antebellum American political culture, early nineteen century political interests, and various views of the institution of slavery in the U.S., it will appeal to others who are interested in

how various factions within a society developed political strategies to bring about their desired goals. Thus, although the institution of slavery is no longer an issue in the U.S., there are new political issues which could be fought out using some of the same strategies and devices that were used by those political actors involved in the Missouri Compromise. Perhaps this is another interesting contribution of this well-written work. 

**Reviewed by William E. Kelly, PhD, Auburn University Political Science Department**



## Professional Reader




### *Data Mining for Intelligence, Fraud, & Criminal Detection: Advanced Analytics & Information Sharing Technologies by Christopher Westphal*

(Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2009). 411 pages, \$17.95, ISBN-10: 1420067230

***"I believe this book should be mandatory reading for every Crime Analyst. I've seen a lot of this information before but never in one publication and never with this level of explanation and example."***

***Comments by the reviewer in a letter to the author.***

Historians will long debate the issues surrounding the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. What they will not argue is that that day brought changes that continue to impact our world. Nearly everything was touched by the attack to include how we travel, the war on terrorism, and the faltering global economy. Among the most significant changes are those impacting our Intelligence and Law Enforcement (LE) communities. What should have been an evolutionary change in procedure and technology was forced by necessity into the revolutionary arena. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the development of urban, regional and state Intelligence (or Information) Fusion Centers (IFCs). In 2001 seven IFCs were in operation or under development. Today there are 86 fusion centers and others are under construction.



The first effective sharing of actionable information among U.S. LE agencies can be traced to the mid 1880s and use of the telegraph. By 1895 the ability for outlaw gangs and lone bandits to operate in anonymity had disappeared. General use of the telephone and later radio communication systems further improved LE information sharing capabilities. In the 1930s formation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) marked yet another milestone when the FBI established guidelines that improved the flow of information between local and state LE agencies and the U.S. government.

In the 1980s another information sharing tool appeared in the form of the desktop computer. Cheap and readily available the computer offered mass storage, data synthesis and information dissemination on a scale not previously possible. It was

however a two-edged sword as cyber crime and information overload became shared LE and intelligence problems. The next evolutionary step was the formation of fusion cells and fusion centers. Though already in use by the military only a few civil LE agencies possessed fusion centers on 9/11.

Congressional inquiry into the intelligence failures leading up to the attack revealed many flaws in our intelligence gathering, analysis, and dissemination abilities. These shortcomings resulted in a Congressional mandate to fix the problem and to assist in this effort Congress provided a grant program administered by the newly formed Department of Homeland Security (DHS). These grants would jump started development of the today's fusion centers.

**A fusion center is a collaborative effort of two or more agencies that provide resources, expertise, and/or information to the center with the goal of maximizing the ability to detect, prevent, investigate, apprehend, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity. DHS/Department of Justice (DOJ)**

By nature an IFC is a complex integration of people and technology focused on obtaining predictive analysis (in a best case scenario) and combining relevant data in situations that have already occurred. Additionally, since DHS/DOJ provided this definition it has been expanded to include criminal activity. Because there was no template (DHS/DOJ did not publish *Fusion Center Guidelines* until August 2006) each FC is different in its construct. While this eventually became manageable internal to each IFC, for a number of reasons it still does not adequately support netted fusion centers. There is no common terminology, manning in each IFC is different, reporting protocols vary from IFC to IFC, there is no single standard for Criminal Intelligence Analyst operations, and there is significant technological diversity from center to center.

It should also be noted that there are also differences in focus as some FC were managed by LE agencies, some by Emergency Services, others by the National Guard and still others by Independent (State or City) Directors of Homeland Security. The various management disciplines cannot help but put their own stamp on the IFC. The result is what we have today, a plethora of fusion centers that have proven effective within their areas of re-

sponsibility and do employ systems like Regional Information Sharing Systems, National Crime Information Center, and the FBI's Law Enforcement Online (LEO) but are still limited by the lack of a common operating methodology, terminology, training and the failure to place Intelligence professionals in senior leadership positions.

**Just how does this apply to Mr. Westphal's 2009 publication?** Very simply the worst thing about *Data Mining for Intelligence, Fraud & Criminal Detection* is that it was not available in 2003. Had it been available then it would have saved IFC design teams and analysts much time, research, trial, and error.

In developing *Data Mining* Mr. Westphal combined his technological proficiency with experience gained supporting LE organization efforts against organized crime, narcotics, trafficking, money laundering, terrorism, tax evasion and other criminal enterprises. He readily identifies many of the problems associated with the focus and methodologies employed by our Criminal Intelligence Analysts but even more importantly, he reduces those problems to their basic elements then provides a blueprint for their correction. Finally, *Data Mining* identifies critical IFC infrastructure and provides the opportunity to place all Criminal Intelligence Analysts on the same sheet of music.

Today most IFCs are correcting problems and oversights experienced during their start-up. This book is the ideal tool to use in this effort as it incorporates and consolidates many of the lessons learned during the last five years. *Data Mining* is rich in content, addressing subjects like pattern, association and link analysis, border protection, financial crimes analysis, data types, fraud analytics and other subjects. Additionally *Data Mining* addresses many of IFC core elements such as the Global Justice XML Data Model, National Information Model 28 CFR 23 and information sharing systems such as the Joint Regional Information Exchange System, LEO and others.

Today's LE, military, and intelligence organizations face threats undreamed of 30 years ago. To address new threats individuals and organizations at all levels must develop or modify analytical methodologies and operating procedures to make the best use of a new generation of technology and procedure. Mr. Westphal's *Data Mining for Intelligence, Fraud & Criminal Detection* shows us some of the

ways this can be accomplished. It serves not only as a technological blueprint but as an instructional and reference manual, and should be required reading for any Criminal Intelligence Analyst and an is-

sue item for each LE organization and Intelligence Fusion Center. I highly recommend “*Data Mining for Intelligence, Fraud & Criminal Detection*” to all LE and Intelligence professionals.



**Reviewed by Michael P. Ley, Antiterrorism Officer (ATO) and Intelligence Coordinator  
U.S. Marine Corps Support Facility-Blount Island, Jacksonville, Florida**



## Professional Reader




### *A Savage Conflict: The Decisive Role of Guerrillas in the American Civil War* by Daniel E. Sutherland

(Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 440 pages, ISBN: 978-0-8078-3277-6

The Moccasin Rangers, Swamp Dragoons, Dixie Boys, and The Mountain Marksmen are not organizations typically associated with the American Civil War. Instead, it is likely that the Battles of Gettysburg, Antietam and Bull Run are what usually are considered when reflecting on the tragedy of that war and the preservation of the U.S. In *A Savage Conflict* by Daniel E. Sutherland, commonly held perceptions of what constituted the Civil War and how it was fought are brilliantly challenged, and for this reader, adapted into a better understanding of this critical conflict. Sutherland’s thesis rests on the impact of Guerrilla Warfare as a political and military tactic and how this type of warfare impacted the conventional military operations of large, set-piece battles such as Gettysburg. Importantly, Guerrilla Warfare in the Civil War also had a powerful impact on Confederate and Union Government policies and an especially crucial impact on public morale.

*A Savage Conflict* chronologically describes the prevailing anarchy that unraveled America as the Civil War devolved into an incredibly ruthless and violent war; and this is all in addition to battles such as Antietam. In many ways the persistent fighting between small and less known bands of fighters, such as the mentioned Swamp Dragoons and Moccasin Rangers, formed a backdrop to the more



famously known conventional battles. What makes Sutherland’s book fascinating is the explanation of how intimidation, fear, retaliation, and blood feuds on local levels throughout the south and especially in border states such as Missouri, Kentucky, Maryland, and Virginia set the conditions for the type of brutality of battles such as Antietam and the aggressive strategies and tactics of Generals Ulysses S. Grant and Tecumseh Sherman.

Furthermore, Sutherland’s book reveals the incredible local tension throughout the country that focused on basic security of individuals and families and how that far superseded the political maneuverings for succession from the Union or preservation of it. This type of problem was compounded when communities were plundered by groups that were often formed to originally protect them. In many cases described in the book, such


groups were sometimes manipulated or motivated to act through grudges or, in some cases, just bent on destruction and attacked civilians in addition to Yankee or Confederate troops. Sadly, this type of confusion occurred on both Confederate and Union sides of the conflict. (As a side note, for readers familiar with the book and movie, *Cold Mountain*, the band of marauders that antagonized numerous villages and the protagonists in that story exemplify the type of local level violence that occurred during the Civil War.) Generally, for any readers interested in the conditions that foster Guerrilla Warfare, *A Savage Conflict* is highly recommended.

Interestingly, and a wise move on the part of the author, no comparison is made to more recent insurgencies or actions in Afghanistan or Vietnam. It must have been very tempting; however, as there are considerable parallels which could be made be-

tween historical examples and how human beings interact and behave when confronted with the intimidation of marauding guerrillas in their communities. Sutherland's description of Kentucky alone and how it was utilized as a buffer state between the Union and the Confederacy is fascinating and causes the reader to critically think about how our contemporary operating environment may be better understood through the study of history. For this reviewer, for example, Kentucky in the Civil War was a historical antecedent to contemporary Afghanistan in that both have been politically postured as buffer states during times of political maneuvering. Ultimately, *A Savage Conflict* is an excellent historical work that causes a reader to think critically about Guerrilla Warfare and develop ideas about how Guerrilla War is conducted and how it impacts every facet of life in which it unfolds.



**Reviewed by First Lieutenant Nathaniel Moir**



# Read any good books lately?

---

We welcome reviews of books related to Intelligence or Military History. Please review our list of available books and book review submission standards under the Professional Reader Program at [https://ikn.army.mil/apps/mipb\\_mag/](https://ikn.army.mil/apps/mipb_mag/).

---

Email your book reviews along with your contact information to [MIPB@conus.army.mil](mailto:MIPB@conus.army.mil).

---



# CONTACT AND ARTICLE Submission Information



*This is your magazine. We need your support by writing and submitting articles for publication.*

**When writing an article, select a topic relevant to the Military Intelligence (MI) and Intelligence Communities (IC).**

Articles about current operations and exercises; TTPs; and equipment and training are always welcome as are lessons learned; historical perspectives; problems and solutions; and short “quick tips” on better employment or equipment and personnel. Our goals are to spark discussion and add to the professional knowledge of the MI Corps and the IC at large. Propose changes, describe a new theory, or dispute an existing one. Explain how your unit has broken new ground, give helpful advice on a specific topic, or discuss how new technology will change the way we operate.

**When submitting articles to *MIPB*, please take the following into consideration:**

- ◆ Feature articles, in most cases, should be under 3,000 words, double-spaced with normal margins without embedded graphics. Maximum length is 5,000 words.
- ◆ Be concise and maintain the active voice as much as possible.
- ◆ We cannot guarantee we will publish all submitted articles and it may take up to a year to publish some articles.
- ◆ Although *MIPB* targets themes, you do not need to “write” to a theme.
- ◆ Please note that submissions become property of *MIPB* and may be released to other government agencies or nonprofit organizations for re-publication upon request.

**What we need from you:**

- ◆ **A release signed by your unit or organization's information and operations security officer/SSO stating that your article and any accompanying graphics and photos are unclassified, nonsensitive, and releasable in the public domain OR that the article and any accompanying graphics and photos are unclassified/FOUO (IAW AR 380-5 DA Information Security Program).** A sample security release format can be accessed at our website at <https://icon.army.mil>.

- ◆ A cover letter (either hard copy or electronic) with your work or home email addresses, telephone number, and a comment stating your desire to have your article published.
- ◆ Your article in Word. Do not use special document templates.
- ◆ A Public Affairs or any other release your installation or unit/agency may require. Please include that release(s) with your submission.
- ◆ Any pictures, graphics, crests, or logos which are relevant to your topic. We need complete captions (the Who, What, Where, When, Why, and How), photographer credits, and the author's name on photos. **Do not embed graphics or photos within the article. Send them as separate files such as .tif or .jpg and note where they should appear in the article. PowerPoint (not in .tif or .jpg format) is acceptable for graphs, etc. Photos should be at 300 dpi.**
- ◆ The full name of each author in the byline and a short biography for each. The biography should include the author's current duty assignment, related assignments, relevant civilian education and degrees, and any other special qualifications. Please indicate whether we can print your contact information, email address, and phone numbers with the biography.

We will edit the articles and put them in a style and format appropriate for *MIPB*. From time to time, we will contact you during the editing process to help us ensure a quality product. Please inform us of any changes in contact information.

Submit articles, graphics, or questions to the Editor at [mipb@conus.army.mil](mailto:mipb@conus.army.mil). Our fax number is 520.538.1005. Submit articles by mail on disk to:

MIPB  
ATTN ATZS-CDI-DM (Smith)  
U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca  
Box 2001, Bldg. 51005  
Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-7002

Contact phone numbers: Commercial 520.538.0956  
DSN 879.0956.

# **What is the UMI? Where is it? How do I use it?**

## **Current UMI Courses**

- Cryptologic Linguist Reclassification-Phase 1
- Dari Familiarization Course
- Defense Strategic Debriefing Course
- Division Electronic Interceptor Analyst Course
- Every Soldier a Sensor Leader
- Garrison S2 Coordinating Staff
- Imagery Analyst Course
- Information Security
- Intelligence Analyst Military Decision-Making Process
- Intelligence in Combating Terrorism
- Intelligence in Combating Terrorism-Analytical Methods
- Intelligence in Combating Terrorism-Anti-Terrorism
- Intelligence in Combating Terrorism-Terrorist Threat Assess
- Intelligence Oversight
- Intelligence Support to Garrison Operations
- Iraqi Language Training
- ISR Synchronization
- MI Anthropology: Afghanistan
- MI Anthropology: Iraq
- Pashto Familiarization Course
- Pashto Headstart
- Pashto Headstart-Font Downloads and Instructions
- Stability Operations & Support Operations (v.2)
- Tactical Questioning



**The University of Military Intelligence (UMI)** is a training portal of MI courses maintained by the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE) at Fort Huachuca, Arizona for use by authorized military (Active, Reserve, National Guard) and non-military (e.g., DOD civilian, Department of Homeland Security, other U.S. Government agencies) personnel. UMI provides many self-paced training courses, MOS training, and career development courses. In addition, the UMI contains a Virtual Campus that is available to users with an abundance of Army-wide resources and links related to MI: language training, cultural awareness, resident courses, MI Library, functional training, publications, and more.

*UMI is undergoing improvement and expansion to become available for any approved MI courses (from any U.S. Army MI source) that are designed to be offered as Distributed Learning (dL) via the UMI technologically advanced online delivery platform(s).*

### **Use of the UMI requires:**

- User registration (it's free!).
- An active government email address (such as .mil or .gov).
- A sponsor (if user has no .mil or .gov email address) who can approve user's access to training material.
- Verification by UMI of user's government email address.
- Internet access. UMI courses require Internet Explorer 7 or newer browser and Adobe Reader, Adobe Flash Player, Adobe Shockwave Player, Windows Media Player, and/or a recent version of MS Office.

**UMI online registration is easy** and approval of use normally takes only a day or two after a user request is submitted. Go to [http://www.universityofmilitaryintelligence.us/DOD\\_Authorization.asp](http://www.universityofmilitaryintelligence.us/DOD_Authorization.asp), read and accept the standard U.S. Government Authorized Use/Security statement, and then follow the instructions to register or sign in. The UMI Web pages also provide feedback and question forms that can be submitted to obtain more information.



ATTN: MIPB (ATZS-CDI-DM-12)  
BOX 2001  
BLDG 51005  
FORT HUACHUCA AZ 85613-7002



Headquarters, Department of the Army.  
This publication is approved for public release.  
Distribution unlimited.

PIN: 086258-000