# MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN

October–
December 1999

PB 34–99–4

The MI NCO

FROM THE EDITOR

In our previous issue of **MIPB**, we covered some aspects of Military Intelligence as a comprehensive discipline—a collection of complementary disciplines. The far-reaching nature of MI requires a few generalists to lead and coordinate the efforts of such a wide field. However, the multiple disciplines within MI mandate a large corps of competent specialized professionals including noncommissioned and warrant officers as well as civilians.

Noncommissioned officers (NCOs) provide specialized expertise necessary for MI to succeed. Their experience and technical training solidifies our ability to succeed in battle—they truly are the backbone of our Army. More importantly, their experience and technical training allow our NCOs to **lead** confidently. The quality **leadership** that our NCOs give to MI makes them invaluable.

In this issue of the **Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin**, we have several articles written by NCOs for NCOs. Our lead-off topic is NCO training; Command Sergeant Major Vivian Diaz and Sergeant First Class Michael Ray outline the improvements underway in the Basic and Advanced NCO Courses in the NCO Academy at Fort Huachuca. Sergeant First Class Robert Kiefer describes methods for implementing a unit educational training strategy. Sergeant Major Dexter Mohr describes how his geographically dispersed unit effectively and creatively conducted an NCO professional development program through a written research project. Staff Sergeant Richard Lewellyn recounts the heroic World War II actions of Staff Sergeant Robert Kahn in one of those papers.

We also are fortunate to have NCOs sharing their expertise on several topics. Based on experiences in Operation ALLIED FORCE, Staff Sergeant Jennifer Dees provides valuable insight on joint employment of the Joint STARS and Staff Sergeant Martin Schwerzler discusses challenges and improvements regarding the multi-echelon operations of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Additionally, Specialist Heather Sroufe wrote an informative political-military article about the disputed waters off the Korean Peninsula.

This issue includes several articles relating to general MI topics. Major Salvador Gomez describes intelligence operations relating to environmental concerns. In two articles dealing with linguists, Mr. Ray Lane Aldrich explores ways that technology can improve language training while Colonel Brian Tarbet and Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Steinke discuss ways the Army can improve linguist force structure, training, and language policy.

MIPB always welcomes articles on topics adding to our professional acumen. We are seeking articles relating to the following topics in the next year—

- Regional intelligence topics: Kosovo, Bosnia, Iraq, Korea, China, Middle East, Latin America, etc. See page 45 for more information and the map showing global conflicts on page 32 of the last **MIPB** for ideas.
- Intelligence analysis: strategic, theater, operational, and tactical levels; unconventional warfare scenarios, technical analysis, etc.
- Tactical intelligence: lessons learned, new ways to do things, etc.

Writer of the Quarter

Staff Sergeant Jennifer L. Dees is our writer of the quarter for October-December 1999, for her article, "Joint STARS in Kosovo: Can the Army and the Air Force Blend Their Operational Differences?" Thanks to all of our authors for their great articles, book reviews, and letters to the editor. Contributions like yours make **MIPB** the professional development forum for MI professionals.

Military Intelligence

**Check us out on the Internet
http://138.27.35.36/MIPB/mipb
home/welcome.htm**

Purpose: The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) publishes the *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* quarterly under provisions of **AR 25-30**. *MIPB* disseminates material designed to enhance individuals' knowledge of past, current, and emerging concepts, doctrine, material, training, and professional develop- ments in the MI Corps.

Submissions: Please send your manuscripts, letters to the editor, photographs, and any inquiries to: Commander, USAIC&FH, ATTN: ATZS-CLM, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000; send via E-mail to mipb@huachuca-emh1.army.mil and an information copy to mcgoverne@huachuca-emh1.army.mil; or telephone (520) 538-1006/5 or DSN 879-1006/5.

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FEATURES

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VANTAGE POINT

by Major General John D. Thomas, Jr.

When you compare the U.S. Army to other armies, one major difference stands out—the noncommissioned officer. The scope and complexity of our NCOs' responsibilities are remarkable as they train soldiers and manage intelligence operations. Our NCOs provide our Army with its foundation, the backbone that allows the Army to function; the U.S. Army NCO teaches, coaches, mentors, leads, instills and enforces Army values, and most importantly, our NCOs maintain standards. They are superb soldiers and are the core of our Army.

As the Army evolves, so does the NCO; as the MI business become more complex, our NCOs lead the way by expanding their technical abilities and improving their leadership skills. We ask our soldiers to do increasingly more and our NCOs lead the way and get the job done. As we improve our instruction to meet today's missions and operating environments, the NCO teaches the requisite skills. The NCO recruiters bring quality young people into our Army, NCO drill sergeants turn civilians into soldiers, and retention NCOs help retain them. Our NCOs care for our soldiers and their families, and they council and mentor inexperienced junior enlisted soldiers and lieutenants. Yes, NCOs are the foundation of our Army and they make our Army great. Whether serving in the U.S. Army National Guard, U.S. Army Reserve, or the Active Component, our sergeants make the difference.

As the Army moves into the 21st century, we must ensure that our NCOs are ready for the challenges. The efforts detailed in this issue are essential to equipping our NCOs to lead in the information age. Updating and improving technical training in the Basic and Advanced NCO Courses are critical. We are moving along well toward that objective. To demonstrate the MI Corps senior leadership's commitment to NCO education, one needs only to look at the—

- Establishment of advanced intelligence training such as the All-Source Analysis System Master Analyst Course.

- Senior NCO attendance at the G2/Analysis and Control Element Chief Course.

- NCO participation in the post-graduate and under-graduate intelligence programs and courses at the National Military Intelligence College.

We must encourage our NCOs to take advantage of all the opportunities available to them through the NCO

Major General John D. Thomas, Jr.

Education System, their units, and self-paced programs such as correspondence courses and other studies.

As I travel around the Army, the quality and dedication of our NCOs always impresses me, and they have my greatest appreciation and admiration. Despite difficult missions and frequently arduous conditions, our NCOs set the standard by being

ALWAYS OUT FRONT!

Homepage Address

Please send us your Unit's Internet Homepage address. *MIPB* will publish a list of MI unit homepages as a centerfold in a future issue. With the subject line "Unit Homepage," please E-mail your battalion/squadron or higher unit's homepage address to: mipb@huachuca-emh1.army.mil.

CSM
FORUM

by Command Sergeant Major Scott C. Chunn

This is the last edition of the *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* for 1999, and although the New Year is still a few months away, time will quickly pass into the new millennium. This issue of the *MIPB* features the noncommissioned officer (NCO)—we have had a tremendous year. I thank you for all that you have done for our soldiers and ask you to continue to mentor, train, and guide them as you have so well in the past.

There have been many changes regarding NCO issues this year. In this magazine, there are some terrific articles including one discussing some NCO Academy initiatives. It outlines some of the changes we have made and will continue to make as we improve the NCO Education System (NCOES) by improving the technical training in the Basic and Advanced NCO Courses (BNCOC and ANCOC). The recent Subject Matter Expert Conferences provided valuable input from the field on these courses and provided the foundation for the changes and the improvements. Thank you for your conference attendance and contributions. Please continue to provide us with your input—it is very important to the continued enhancement of our NCOES.

By the time this issue of *MIPB* is in print, we will know the names on the new Sergeants First Class (SFC) promotion list. This has been a tremendous year for promotions in all grades, and after several years of minimal promotions, we are again moving in the right direction. Congratulations to all the newly selected SFCs—we look forward to your arrival here at your home of MI as you attend the ANCOC.

We still need your assistance with recruiting and retention. Please continue to support the Hometown

Command Sergeant Major Scott C. Chunn

Recruiting Assistance Program (HRAP) and the other programs discussed on page 49 as well as to assist our career counselors in providing the best options available for our soldiers.

As always, train hard, take care of soldiers and families, and have fun. Thanks!

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Address Verification

Due to new postal regulations, we are updating our mailing list for *MIPB*. The Post Office now requires building numbers, street addresses, and nine-digit zip codes. APO addresses should include unit, box number, and CMR number as appropriate. Other overseas or non-U.S. addresses should be complete, including postal and country codes and names. Please review and update your mailing label. If your address is not correct or is incomplete, please notify us by E-mail at martinezc@huachuca-emh1.army.mil with subject heading "Address Update." Please include both your incorrect (copy it **exactly** from the label) and correct addresses. You can also contact us by telephone at commercial (520) 538-1015 or DSN 879-1015, and by mail (see page 1 or page 64 for the address).

NCO Training

by Command Sergeant Major
Vivian Diaz and
Sergeant First Class
Michael A. Ray (USA, Retired)

A little more than a year ago, training at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center's Noncommissioned Officer Academy (NCOA) was nearly the same as it had been for more than two decades. Despite modifications in the course content made in response to changes in soldiers' critical tasks, we were applying time-honored and timeworn training strategies. Many considered the NCO functions to be basically supervision of soldier level-10 (SL-10) critical tasks, and that is how we taught both the basic and advanced courses for all our military occupational specialties (MOSs).

Revising Training Strategies

The Intelligence Center broke the mold in 1998. Last year, we detailed "Cradle to Grave" studies for all MI MOSs. It was also the year we made our first dramatic changes in MI noncommissioned officer (NCO) training strategies, beginning a "revolution" in the NCOA.

*Editor's Note: see the July-September 1998 issue of the **Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin** for more on the Cradle-to-Grave training strategies.*

The Cradle-to-Grave studies examined the roles and functions of each skill level by MOS and found that NCOs do not merely supervise basic tasks and "take care of soldiers." Staff officers and commanders require more support in planning and execution and NCOs directly manage the intelligence operations and missions.

They are the critical link between the Intelligence Battlefield Operating System (IBOS) and other battlefield operating systems. To do this well, NCOs must be able to **think critically and creatively**, they need to **perceive problems in terms of potential solutions**. Those solutions must be rapid and innovative. These demands will in-crease in scope and intensity in the 21st century.

One of our first tasks was to change the structure of our courses. While Fort Huachuca, Arizona, is the home of MI training, the highest-quality MOS-specific technical training may reside in some other institution, including institutions in the private sector.

> **to ensure our NCOs receive the best possible technical training...we have embraced split-based training**

We intend to go wherever necessary to ensure our NCO's receive the best possible technical training. That is why we have embraced split-based training.

We started with the MOS 98K30 (Signals Collection and Identification Analyst) Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course. The technical phase of the 98K30 BNCOC will no longer occur at Fort Huachuca but rather at the Naval Technical Training Center, Corry Station, in Pensacola, Florida. It will consist of the 19-week Intermediate Communications Signals Analysis Course taught by the U.S. Navy. We expect there will be other split-based NCO courses in the future and that

Technical Training
- Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Mission Management
- Collection Management Tools
- Intelligence Support to the Targeting Process
- Focus Information Operations by MOS or Discipline
- Incorporate Military Operations in Urban Terrain Training
- Understand the Intelligence Battlefield Operating System (IBOS)
- Joint and Combined Operations

Battle Staff and Senior NCO Functions
- Introduce Crisis Action Planning
- Battle Focus Training/METL Development
- Strike Force Concept (Project Warrior)
- MDMP/Critical Reasoning/Creative Thinking/Constructivism

Key:
MDMP - Military decision-making process
METL - Mission-essential task list

Figure 1. Common Military Intelligence Leadership Training.

1. **33W CMF Training**

- HPW and NT Networks
- Telecommunications
- System Security / Information Operations

2. **96 CMF Combined Training**

- Collection Management (CM) and Reconnaisance and Surveillance (R&S)
- Architecture
- Targeting
- Manipulation of Systems through UNIX (Prerequisite)

a. **96B/96D**

- All Source
- Single Remote Workstation
- Joint Collection Management Tools
- Requirement Management System

b. **96R**

- Intelligence and Surveillance (I&S) Platoon Operations
- Process I&S Platoon Support Request
- Battle Tracking
- Lateral Coordination

c. **96H/96U**

- Deployment and Connectivity in Support of AVN, ARTY, ACE, and TOCs
- Mission Support of AFATDS, APACHE, and COMANCHE
- Air Platform Coordination

d. **97B/97E Combined Training**

- Information Operations Focuses on Digital HUMINT
- Portions of Strategic Debriefer Course Included
- CFSO Overview Included
- Collection Management Requirements Addressed in MI Common
- CHATS Training Focused on Connectivity and Troubleshooting

3. **98 CMF Combined Training**

- Collection Management
- National/Joint Intelligence Mission
- Systems Communication Connectivity and Exploit Satellite Technology
- Information Operations
- Understanding Emerging Technologies and How They Affect the SIGINT Community

Key:
ACE - Analysis and control element
AFTADS - Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System
ARTY - Artillery
AVN - Aviation
CFSO - Counterintelligence force protection source operations
CHATS - Counterintelligence/HUMINT Automated Tool Set
CMF - Career management field
HUMINT - Human intelligence
SIGINT - Signals intelligence
TOCs - Tactical operations centers

Figure 2. ANCOC MOS- and CMF-Specific Training.

their venues may be at other Service locations, other government schools, or at civilian universities.

Our technical training has become more complex and demanding and, just like graduate-level courses at universities, we expect our students to be well-grounded in certain core subject areas. To ensure this, we have established a mandatory nonresident training phase for BNCOC consisting of distance learning prerequisite courses. These self-development courses are available through distance learning channels and vary among the MOSs. They address such subjects as collection management, the operation of specific computer equipment, and the fundamentals of analytical techniques. See Figure 1.

Beginning in October 2000, completion of these prerequisite courses will be a requirement for enrollment in BNCOC. We will apply this prerequisite requirement to ANCOC in the future as we continue to implement the new training strategy.

While BNCOC is the course in which we are first implementing the prerequisite requirement, ANCOC is undergoing more dramatic and far-reaching changes. The most visible of these changes is our separation of ANCOC into stand-alone courses containing intensive MOS-specific technical training. (See Figure 2.)

Distance Learning

Distance learning is alive and well at the NCO Academy. Classroom XXI incorporates the training environment. We accomplish this by leveraging information age technology to implement training efficiency and maximize training effectiveness. Our success depends not only on the Warrior XXI initiatives, but also includes the technological modernization of the institution itself.

Project Warrior reflects the new NCO training strategy. **Project Warrior training will develop leaders for the environment.** Our strategy envisions leader development as a continuous process of resident training, self-develop-

Tough Assignments · Self-Development · Residence Courses

Staunch Doctrine
Joint Warfare
Conceptual Thinking
Practical Application

Leader · Learner

ment, and the practical experience of field assignments.

Project Warrior also focuses on the demands placed on the NCO in the early 21st century. These demands are markedly different from those of the past. Project Warrior training will develop leaders who can adapt to rapidly changing missions, environments, and operational requirements.

Our training strategy emphasizes leader skills entailing five distinct and interrelated objectives. They are critical and adaptive thinking, simultaneous planning and operating in multifunctional roles, systems proficiency, team building, and a warrior ethos.

Conceptual–Critical and Adaptive Thinking. Our training strategy will foster critical and adaptive thinking. This kind of thinking involves analysis, synthesis, evaluation and, most importantly, adaptive imagination in solving problems and developing courses of action.

Tactical–Simultaneous Planning and Operating in Multifunctional Roles. Our training will develop the students' capacity for simultaneous planning and operating in multifunctional roles. Our soldiers must process information related to current and future activities across functions (pure Army/joint/combined) for continuity of action, long-term vision, and communication of intent and expected outcomes.

Technical–Systems Proficiency. Our soldiers will require enhanced systems proficiency, not merely at the operator and supervisor levels,

but a full understanding of systems architecture, capabilities and limitations permitting decision-making (using digitized aids), mission planning, and execution. This includes "low tech" techniques to solve problems and an overall continuity among systems to ensure operations in evolving missions.

Interpersonal–Team Building. This includes fostering interpersonal relationships: understanding, communicating with, and integrating members of the organization—whether joint, combined, or interagency. Students will focus on building and maintaining cohesiveness on a continuous basis.

Warrior Ethos (Values/Attributes). Students learn to view problems as challenges to overcome; this is the "true grit" of the U.S. soldier and leader. Its essence is values-centered performance, and it develops in an environment of effective leadership.

BNCOC Training Strategy

In the following section of this article, we touch on new or improved skills required of the 21st century enlisted soldier in each Active Component MI MOS. In some cases, there is a refocus of the MOS due to the changing nature of our operations, broader focus (joint and multinational), and the evolving and emerging technology. Then we briefly discuss the major topics covered for each of these future MOS-based BNCOC courses.

33W (Electronic Warefare/Intercept Systems Maintainer). The new 33W is the overall Military Intelligence System Administrator.

The instruction focuses on system and server administration and fiber optics, and it emphasizes more security training and coverage of firewalls. The following classes form the cornerstone of the future course:

- System Administrator Training.
- Fiber Optics Training.
- Enhanced Security Training.

96B (Intelligence Analyst). The 21st century 96B will become more proficient in collection management and targeting to support commanders during conventional operations and military operations other than war (MOOTW). We will use automation—the All-Source Analysis System Remote Workstation (RWS)—to better support the commander's directives. We will also implement and teach predictive analysis for further understanding of system employment. The cornerstone classes of this course will be—

- Targeting.
- ASAS RWS.
- Joint Collection Management Tools (JCMT).

96D (Imagery Analyst). The focal point of the 96D BNCOC will be not only the exploitation of ground forces, but also the enemy forces as a whole (including naval and air) to better aid the NCO in future or current assignments. It will concentrate more on joint operations because that is the way the 96D assignment trend is going. The course will focus more on reports-editing training and use actual softcopy stations for realistic manipulation of imagery. Digital or softcopy imagery would better co-

incide with what the soldier in the field currently does. These are the cornerstone classes of this future course:

- Imagery Analysis of Enemy Forces.
- Battle Damage Assessment (BDA).
- Computer-Reports Editing.

96H Imagery Ground Station Operator. The 98H course will focus more toward analytical support to the Battle Captain. The emphasis will be more on targeting, system functions, and correcting system malfunctions because the 96H soldiers are responsible for 95 percent of system maintenance, as well as operation. We will also incorporate training on predictive analysis. The following classes provide the foundation of the future course:

- Connectivity Planning.
- Analysis and Control Element (ACE) and Analysis and control team (ACT) Operations.
- AFATDS.

96R (Ground Surveillance Systems Operator). This BNCOC will focus more on infantry tactics, skills in the deployment of the system, as well as academics covering collection management, intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), stability and support operations, and symbology. We will also gear our lessons toward using Classroom XXI and "Plug and Play" systems incorporating digital scenarios and tools. The basic classes of the future course include—

- Ground Surveillance Operations.
- Tactical Employment of Ground Surveillance Systems.
- Symbology.

96U (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operator). We will assist in the effort to standardize UAV doctrine that will aid tremendously in developing a definitive course. The future course will focus more on the collection effort and the role the

UAV will play in that effort. We will develop training that concentrates on aviation terminology, teaches a 96U to maximize intelligence products, add training on External Pilot (EP) responsibilities, and focus more on how to interact with the aviation community as a whole. The classes forming the basis of the future course will be—

- Airspace Management.
- Situational Training Exercises.
- Direct Mission Operations.

97B (Counterintelligence Agent). This course is currently heading in the right direction with the focus on counterintelligence force-protection source operations (CFSO) block of training, direct counterespionage (CE) training, and threat-vulnerability assessment training. We will incorporate advanced interview techniques that develop better-prepared NCOs. The following classes form the cornerstone of the future course:

- CFSO block of training.
- Direct CE Operations.
- Advanced Interview Techniques.

97E (Interrogator). The future course will incorporate combined 97B and 97E training—especially during the situational training exercise (STX). The equipment required to enhance the training are CHATS systems that are all on the same network, with a minimum of one system for every two students and an optimum scenario of a system for each student. Role players for use in interview exercises would be very valuable. An iteration of combined training has already occurred and the feedback from the students was very posi-

tive. The following classes are essential in the 97E BNCOC:

- CHATS.
- Operation Cycle.
- Conduct CFSO Mission Analysis.

98C (Signals Intelligence Analyst). Emerging technologies are essential to the success of the 98C course as a whole, gearing more toward unconventional warfare (e.g., terrorism) and exploiting unconventional communications. In addition to electronic preparation of the battlefield (EPB), we have added hardcopy technical reporting (informal technical notes (ITNs), technical SIGINT report (TSRs), and formal and informal working aids) to the course. The following blocks of instruction provide the basis of the course:

- Computer-to-Computer Analysis (C2C).
- Nontraditional Communications Analysis (cellular telephones, advanced digital communications).
- Communications, Satellite Communications, etc.
- GRASP (Graphic SIGINT (signals intelligence) Product).
- STX (Plug-and-Play training).

98G (Voice Interceptor). We have steered this future course toward target language training, with qualified linguists performing the instruction. The road to that end requires qualified linguists in multiple MOSs over an extended period. The following classes will form the cornerstone of the 98G BNCOC:

- Transcribe highly complex conversations in the target language.
- Site Selection.
- Communications Jamming.
- Direction-finding (DF) Operations.

98H (Communications Locator/Interceptor). The 98H course will focus more on target identification and analysis skills as a means to

making the 98H supervisor a true mission manager. The following blocks are essential in this BNCOC:

- Collection Management.
- Target Identification.
- Verify collection file entries.

98J (Electronic Intelligence Interceptor/ Analyst). The 98J course of today focuses on two areas: the technical and the operational portions. Incorporating training from the EA 279/280 (Intermediate Signals Analysis) Course and the National Operational Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) Course—currently taught at Corry Station—would result in the most optimal training available. The EA 279/280 course would satisfy the requirements for technical training and the National Operational ELINT Course would satisfy the operational training requirements. We intend to take the best from both of these courses and incorporate them into the current BNCOC course; the result would be highly skilled, technically proficient, superior NCOs. The cornerstone blocks of instruction in this future course will be—

- Radar Principles and Concepts.
- ELINT Estimate.
- Quality-Control Emitter Identification.

98K Signals Collection/Identification Analyst. The new training strategy calls for a three-phased 98K30 BNCOC consisting of—

- A mandatory nonresident prerequisite phase (Phase I).
- Three weeks and two days of resident Common Leader Training (Phase II) conducted at Fort Huachuca.
- Nineteen weeks of intensive advanced technical training conducted at Corry Station.

The split-based training will begin in FY00. The technical phase is actually the Intermediate Communications Signals Analyst Course (functional course A-232-0451, ad-

ditional skill identifier (ASI) M7), taught by the Navy. Soldiers who have graduated from the functional course since March 1997 will be exempt from the technical BNCOC track and receive a **DA Form 1059 (Academic Evalutation Report)** and BNCOC Certificate upon completion of the common core at Fort Huachuca.

Soldiers need to **ensure that certification of their graduation from the M7 course is in their permanent U.S. Army Total Personnel Command (PERSCOM) records** (coordinate with your unit S1). The U.S. Navy, executive agent for this course, strongly recommends that students complete some National Cryptologic School (NCS) courses before attending the technical phase of the BNCOC.

> **Our mandate is to produce a more lethal NCO—a true intelligence weapon**

The focal point of this BNCOC is technical training and it implements the following courses: Collection Management, Satellite Communications, Primary and Secondary Modulation, Signals Analysis Terms and Calculations, and Technical Reporting. The implementation of these courses is necessary to provide more and better technical training to the BNCOC soldier. The following classes form the cornerstone of the future course:

- Primary and Secondary Modulation.
- Satellite Communications.
- Signals Analysis Terms and Calculations.

Advanced NCO Course (ANCOC) Training Strategy

The new ANCOC will challenge the student as never before, and it will be a dramatic departure from the traditional learning environments

and processes to which we have grown accustomed. The modern advanced NCO must possess the mental flexibility to deal with complex situations in varied cases that will evolve in unpredictable ways. The traditional Instructional Systems Design approach emphasizes identifying skills to be learned and applying a hierarchy of subskills to support terminal learning objectives in a linear, "step-by-step" process. That approach has served us well over the years, but it is too limited to support the training environments necessary to encourage cognitive flexibility, conceptual thinking, and creative decision-making.

ANCOC is undergoing massive revision—a training development revolution. This is the result of an extensive look at senior leader training from almost every angle and including input from as many sources as possible. In our effort to make soldiers more technical, we will by no means neglect the basic combat skills or NCO leader skills. Our mandate is to produce a more lethal NCO—a true intelligence weapon.

Conclusion

Such a dramatic transformation in training does not happen overnight. We have only begun to improve the NCO Education System (NCOES). Each course iteration is an exploration through uncharted territory, as we refine the concept, the methods, and the content. We are learning as much from the students as they are learning from us—and that is how it should be. ✳

TRAINING THROUGH EDUCATION

by Master Sergeant Robert E. Kiefer

I have heard many complaints that Army soldiers require a lot of training to become proficient. I have observed soldiers "twiddling" their thumbs, "tied" to their racks, waiting for a mission. Some soldiers have appeared before promotion boards with fewer than ten military education points. How do we solve these problems? Training! Training! Training!

Training: Something Every Soldier Needs and Wants

Although rarely admitting to it openly, most soldiers are very eager to learn. We should not squander the occasions available to train soldiers. Educational and training opportunities can fill lapse time between mission phases. In order to fill lapse times and to quench soldiers' thirst for knowledge, the 713th MI Group initiated Individual Training Plans (ITPs) based on available local resources.

The 713th ITPs are phased plans, created to train soldiers on a set of basic subjects and tailored toward each soldier's military occupational specialty (MOS). Figure 1 shows the status of our soldiers in Phase I of the ITP. Each ITP used the locally available National Cryptologic School (NCS) courses, the Army Correspondence Course Program (ACCP), or courses from both. Every unit has the capability to create similar types of plans based on their units' missions and available training resources.

Phase I: The Basics. Phase I of the ITP was for all soldiers (regardless of MOS) and included basic English and mathematics courses. Phase I courses are NCS classes ZZ-018 and ZZ-019 that culminate in the Writing Skills Placement Test (WSPT). The follow-on courses are EG-057 (Paragraph Writing Workshop) and EG-157 (Effective Agency Writing). These two courses have an American Council on Education (ACE) recommendation of three semester hours of college credit.

The results of the WSPT determine the follow-on course in which a soldier can enroll. With an excellent score on the WSPT, a soldier can receive credit for both courses. Soldiers who have a poor score require additional training before enrolling in EG-057. Another Phase I course, EG-243 (Briefing Skills) has been included in the ITP and provides a tremendous benefit to all soldiers. Eventually every soldier will speak in front of a group whether at the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC), visitor and commander briefings, or soldier skill classes.

The mathematics portion of Phase I consists of three selfpaced courses: MA-001 (Basic Arithmetic Concepts), MA-012 (Introductory Algebra), and MA-111 (Intermediate Algebra). MA-111 carries an ACE recommendation of three semester hours of credit. To prevent a logjam of soldiers enrolling into MA-001, an assessment test determines which soldiers have proficient math skills and could skip MA-001. Since


Figure 1. Status of 713th MI Group Soldiers in Phase I of the ITP Program.

	NCS Hours	Possible Promotion points
Introduction to Manual and Machine Crypto Systems	120	24
Introduction to SIGINT Technology	40	8
Digital Communications	40	8
Introduction to COMSAT	40	8
Introduction to ELINT Analysis and Reporting	20	4
Basic Traffic Analysis	60	12
Introduction to Collection Management	20	4
Totals for Phase III	340	68

Key:
COMSAT-Communications satellite **ELINT**-Electronic intelligence **SIGINT**-Signal intelligence

Figure 2. Classes for Phase III of the ITP Program (All 98-Series MOSs).

MA-001 covers basic math concepts, a poor score on the assessment test indicates that those soldiers need refresher training.

The training sessions have lasted from two to three hours depending on the needs of the audience. So far, the passing rate for all soldiers has been with scores of 86 or higher.

four courses which will assist soldiers with their daily job functions as well as completing program prerequisites. Phase III, based upon the NCS courses, is worth promotion points (see Figure 2).

There are seven courses in Phase III that offer the 98s an insight into the other SIGINT disciplines. For example, all 98-series soldiers now take TA-103 (Basic

Course Titles for **Phase V** (98K soldiers)	NCS Hours	ACE Rec	Poss Promo
Basic SIGINT Technology	100		
Modulation Methods (CAI)	36	1	
Shift-Register Generated Sequences	33	1	
Fundamentals of Spread Spectrum	33	1	
Concepts in Modulation and Demodulation	48		
SIGINT Instrumentation a Measurement Techniques	160	3	
Spectrum Analysis	30	1	
Satellite Systems Seminar	4		
Introduction to Satellites	40	1	
Satellite Communications Systems	40	1	
Digital Communications Analysis	40		
Principles of Collection Management	80		
Modem Recognition and Analysis	40		
Totals for Phase V	684	9	
Totals for 98K ITP	1760	18	92

Figure 3. Blocks in Phase V and Total hours for 98K ITP.

Phases II and III: Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Basics. Phases II and III are the same for the four 98-series MOSs at our site—98C (Signals Intelligence Analyst), 98G (Voice Interceptor), 98J (Electronic Intelligence Interceptor/Analyst, and 98K (Signals Collection/Identification Agent). Phase II consists of

Traffic Analysis). A soldier can earn 68 promotion points by completing these courses. Phase II and III and the mathematics courses of Phase I are self-paced, the 713th MI Group encourages soldiers to enroll in at least one course continually.

Phases IV and V: MOS Specific.

Phases IV and V of the ITPs for the 98-series soldiers address their technical proficiency in their MOSs (see Figure 3). Each of the four 98-series MOSs at our site has a rigorous plan of courses designed to maximize each soldiers' SIGINT potential. Several courses in these phases are also worth promotion points and many are worth college credits through ACE recommendations. Because the courses of Phase I as well as many of the courses in Phases IV and V are classroom courses, completion depends on local scheduling.

Making It All Work

Requiring a company-level group of soldiers to take many hours worth of classroom instruction puts a strain on our few instructors. However, within that group of soldiers lies years of experience. All soldiers, regardless of rank, are encouraged to attain the status of Adjunct Faculty through the NCS. This process is time consuming, but the time invested will reap dividends. To become an Adjunct Faculty member, soldiers must complete a four-step process—

• Take the course that they intend to instruct.

• Complete ED-101 (Training Methods for Cryptologic Instructors).

• Submit an application for Adjunct Faculty.

• Co-teach the course for certification (applicants can complete Steps 1 through 3 in any order).

Once a soldier is Adjunct Faculty-certified, that soldier can teach the course according to its outline, administer the course exams, evaluate students, and give completion credit for passing students. The Adjunct Faculty database lists all soldiers who achieve Adjunct Faculty certification for one or more classes, and they may teach not only soldiers but also civilians and members of other Services as well. Adjunct Faculty members can also

only soldiers but also civilians and members of other Services as well. Adjunct Faculty members can also apply for the "H" skill identifier (instructor) by submitting their Adjunct Faculty certification along with a **Department of Army (DA) Form 4187, Personnel Action,** though their military personnel channels. This process not only increases the availability of ITP-required classes but also offers each soldier the opportunity to share knowledge. At the 713th, we have encouraged soldiers to become Adjunct Faculty-certified for ED-101 so we can train the trainers and continually keep the education cycle alive.

Editor's Note: See the article, "The National Cryptologic School Adjunct Faculty Program," by Mr. Larry Hampton for more information. It appeared on page 47 of the July-September 1998 issue of **MIPB.**

Additionally, most of the ITP courses are self-paced, and some soldiers may have difficulty understanding the materials and concepts without having the aid of an instructor. However, soldiers do not have to be Adjunct Faculty-certified to assist their fellow soldiers. The local training facilities have allowed the use of their unoccupied classrooms. If a squad of soldiers is having trouble with a particular self-paced course, there is no reason why that squad leader should not teach them that course, or mentor study the groups.

Once a soldier completes a self-paced course (and has completed it with a thorough understanding of the material) that soldier can instruct, lead a study group, or be mentor for that course. This process initially involves the senior soldiers who have already completed the course having a group of soldiers (team, squad, platoon, etc.) sign up for the course and re-

ceive the appropriate material, and planning and conducting course lessons.

What about the Non-SIGINT MOSs?

Representatives from each MOS are researching the available material from the **Army Correspondence Course Program Catalog, Department of the Army Pamphlet 351-20**[1], and arranging the prescribed subcourses in a phased format (beginning with Phase II since **all** soldiers have the same Phase I). We have organized the ACCP course portion of the ITP program in the same way as the 98-series NCS training discussed above. Soldiers receive their ITP packets with a listing of required courses and subcourses. Here again, the experienced person in each MOS can work through the subcourses in group sessions. ACCP subcourse material is an excellent training package. Non-SIGINT-MOS soldiers can also apply for Adjunct Faculty status; since all the courses in Phase I are unclassified courses, they can teach the course material outside secure areas.

Tracking the Progress

There are two types of ITP packets per MOS. One packet is a "roadmap" of courses that we issue to all soldiers according to their MOSs. The second packet contains a detailed data card for each soldier and a listing of ITP courses required for that soldier's MOS; this second packet is for each soldier's leader. The course listing in the leader's packet has two columns next to each course: "Date Enrolled" and "Date Completed." The leader's packet, therefore, yields at a quick glance the progress of that soldier.

These progress checks are vital since each platoon has to brief the commander during the company training meeting on the progress of

every soldier. During the meeting, the commander holds a copy of the previous week's results and can easily determine the soldiers who have made progress. With this information in hand, the leadership can use it as a tool for recognition of outstanding soldiers.

Who Benefits?

The answer is "**everyone**". Coworkers will enjoy working with a well-educated soldier. Soldiers who move to other assignments will not require as much on-the-job training since they would possess more knowledge. The chain of command will hear fewer complaints about untrainable soldiers. Most of all, the soldiers themselves benefit. By the time they complete their ITPs, they will have accumulated the knowledge and exposure to move into any position, take charge, and succeed. They will also be able to take charge as the promotion points embedded in the ITP system get them their well deserved promotions.

For SIGINT MOSs, the ITP training also paves the way for future accomplishments. Our 98-series soldiers who finish their ITPs will have completed more than half of the requirements for National Security Agency (NSA) professionalization. Training lets us accomplish all of this. ✱

Endnote

1. **DA Pamphlet 351-20** is available on the Internet at URL http://155.217.35.238.

Master Sergeant Kiefer is a graduate of the Military Intern SIGINT Analysis Program (MINSAP) and an NSA Professionalized Intelligence Analyst. He recently earned the NSA Scientific Achievement Award. He has served in a variety of assignments including Operations DES ERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM and as a Platoon Sergeant with the 1st Cavalry Division and the 713th MI Group. MSG Kiefer is currently serving as the S3 for the MI 344th Battalion at Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas. Readers can contact the author via E-mail at robert.Kiefer @goodfellow.af.mil and by telephone at (915) 654-3267 or DSN 477-3267.

Distance NCODP

The 650th MI Group's Way

by Sergeant Major Dexter Mohr

The 650th MI Group's area of responsibility stretches from Norway to Naples. Dispersed among Allied Command Europe's numerous headquarters, the Group's soldiers provide counterintelligence (CI) support to the permanent combined headquarters of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) military command on the European continent.

Chapel interior facing the Altar—Ardennes American Cemetery and Memorial.

Noncommissioned officers (NCOs), isolated in small offices away from other American units, let alone U.S. Army units, presented a challenge in fulfilling the command's responsibility for developing and implementing an effective NCO Development Program (NCODP).

Stringent budgets and high costs rule out travel for face-to-face contact. Traditional classroom NCODPs, where one NCO teaches or trains other NCOs, are impractical. In order to appropriately serve and develop its NCOs, the 650th created a distance education program to implement its NCODP.

Development

The unit's CI mission and its need for service support place heavy demands on its NCOs. The mission includes all counterintelligence functions: investigation, operations, collection, and analysis. Soldiers deploy in support of contingency operations in the Balkans, support frequent NATO and Partnership for Peace exercises, and provide personnel, administrative, security, and logistics support. The high unit tempo makes soldiers unwilling to interrupt a mission for minor training.

However, NCO development is important and rewarding. CI investigative reports, administrative reports, and logistical reports place a premium on effective communications—especially writing. New equipment demands that NCOs learn to operate new data processing equipment, different operating systems, and software applications. Distances from the Group Headquarters in Belgium to the detachments and offices require familiarity with communications packages to transmit information.

Surprisingly, the geographic dispersal throughout Europe provided unexpected advantages. All of 650th's host nations have storied military traditions, battlefields, museums, and other historically significant sites providing opportunities for comparison and contrast of current U.S. doctrine and tactics. In fact, spatial and temporal diversity present such a wide range of choices that they often cause problems of focus. Diversity also provides for a variety of perspectives. When NCOs share perceptions, they quickly discern how different the world seems from other places. The Group's senior NCO population promised additional benefits by sharing individual maturity, self-discipline, and experience.

NCODP programs strengthen leadership skills and professional attributes and guide continuing development. They increase confidence and realize the full potential of the NCO support channel, and they increase unit effectiveness and combat readiness. Finally, they foster an environment enhancing NCO development. Selecting and emphasizing elements to develop, the 650th implemented a challenging hands-on distance NCODP to achieve those goals.

Initial Implementation

The 650th MI Group's first distance NCODP effort required the NCOs to polish their written communications skills. They had to visit a European war cemetery and select a "hero" from among those in-

Photos courtesy of the author.

terred. Then, keying on Army values, they were to discuss how that person exemplified Army values, how the person would have fared in today's Army, and how today's NCO Corps can benefit from the example.

We encouraged the NCOs to visit the American cemeteries in Europe administered by the American Battle Monuments Commission (ABMC). The requirement packet included a map of the American cemeteries in Europe.

Travel to an appropriate site posed some difficulty. We coordinated a visit to the Ardennes American Cemetery at Neuville-en-Condroz, Belgium, and two subordinate elements also arranged collective visits to local cemeteries. A few NCOs voluntarily returned (at their own expense) to the cemeteries to follow up, photograph their heroes' markers, or to reconsider their selections.

Outcomes

The Group Sergeant Major evaluated the finished products against the requirement. Many NCOs considered the requirement tantamount to returning to high school and a few candidly described their irritation with the requirement. However, some soldiers expressed surprise at their personal satisfaction with their visits.

The NCOs approached this requirement in a variety of ways. Responses ranged from extremely introspective reflections on the emotional impact of visiting the American cemetery to an assiduously researched and footnoted description of the life and death of an Air Force fighter pilot.

Hero selection reflected the diversity of American heroes. Members of the Group had wide discretion for identifying the heroes they would discuss. One NCO made it a point to inquire into the award of the Medal of Honor to an Army Air Corps Heavy Bombard-

ment Group leader. He expanded his initial, ground force perspective to recognize the leadership demands that might have motivated this officer to pilot a doomed aircraft to lead a unit's mission accomplishment. Other NCOs found heroes in groups such as the unknowns—the missing, fallen soldiers who shared a particular job type, and even one group probably assembled only by chance during the confusion of the early hours of the Battle of the Bulge.

One NCO picked an uncle, another found a hero in his grandfather's unit history (see the following story), and still another chose a living hero. The NCOs compared and contrasted the conduct and values of an individual or group they selected with those of today's NCO Corps.

Conclusion

Overall, our NCOs produced thoughtful products. They investigated the values that the Army culture has endorsed over the years and contemplated what those values meant when they appeared in the past and what they mean now. The 650th Group NCOs had an opportunity to reflect on the sacrifices of others and to enhance their individual communications skills. Confronted with an odd requirement, they discovered its benefits.

This exercise, as a type of distance NCODP, provides an initial model for further development. Units must research assignments early and the projects' duration must be reasonable and the requirements challenging.

In the 605th Group's case, the NCOs benefited from the opportunity to improve their writing skills and from the impact that visiting military history has. Our NCOs will improve their ability to read, ana-

North facade of Chapel-Ardennes American Cemetery and Memorial.

lyze, and respond in writing via writing assignments. Distance learning helped many of our NCOs improve their technical and tactical proficiency. Some of our NCOs sincerely appreciated the opportunity to investigate values and reflect on the sacrifices of our predecessors. Distance NCODP may not be for all units, but it has its place in 650th.✻

Sergeant Major Dexter Mohr is the Sergeant Major of the 650th MI Group, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers–Europe, in Mons, Belgium. He has served in leadership positions from Squad Leader through Platoon Leader with the 2d and 11th Armored Cavalry Regiments. His MI assignments include duty as a CI Agent, First Sergeant, and CI and HUMINT (human intelligence) Sergeant with the U.S. Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center; 2d Infantry Division; U.S. Army Operational Group; 501st MI Brigade; U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations CI Division; and the Joint Field Support Center. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy, and the Senior Enlisted Intelligence Program. SGM Mohr holds a Bachelor of Arts degree Business Management from the University of Maryland University College and a Master of Science in Strategic Intelligence degree from the Defense Intelligence College.

SSG Robert P. Kahn Hero

**by Staff Sergeant
Dean Lewellyn**

I visited the Ardennes American Cemetery, south of Liege, Belgium, in September 1997. I noticed the grave of a soldier, killed in March 1945, who had belonged to the 106th Reconnaissance Group, my grandfather's combat intelligence collection unit. I remembered that my grandfather had left me his unit history book, written while his unit served occupation duty after the war. Those involved recorded the incidents while still fresh in their minds. The first-hand accounts of combat and everyday life presented a factual record based on the daily and weekly logs, neither over embellished nor over-dramatized. Within the pages of the unit history, I found the story of one noncommissioned officer, Staff Sergeant Kahn, who did not make the newspapers or win the Medal of Honor. Nonetheless, he displayed the values embraced by the Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) Corps, not the least of which was courage.

Staff Sergeant (SSG) Robert P. Kahn, a native of Chicago, Illinois, died in action on 29 April 1945. He was leading the 2d Platoon, C Troop, 106th Reconnaissance Squadron, 106th Cavalry Group, in support of the U.S. 45th Infantry Division during its drive on Munich in the waning days of World War II in Europe.

29 April 1945

On 29 April 1945, C Troop approached Munich with the 2d Platoon as its lead element, and by late afternoon, they stood several kilometers from the outskirts of Munich. Their objective was to reach the outskirts of the city by nightfall. Speed was critical. SSG Kahn blazed ahead *"like a leader"* (so says the unit record), reporting, bypassing, and blasting the way ahead for C Troop and its supporting armor. The slower, heavier elements engaged pockets of resistance that remained after his reconnaissance platoon had punched through.

C Troop had already knocked out two enemy half-track vehicles and an 88-millimeter gun that day, and the advance against German forces had been rapid. In addition, C Troop had liberated a prisoner of war camp holding Allied soldiers, and had captured more than 250 enemy soldiers in the process. According to the unit history, it had been "a glorious day."

As SSG Kahn's platoon approached an area of higher ground, he saw the silhouettes of the large buildings in Munich only nine kilometers away. The terrain sloped gently downhill toward the city and the plain that he looked down upon offered an excellent avenue of approach for his Troop. About two kilometers ahead lay the small German village of Garching. His platoon advanced cautiously, strung out along the highway approaching Garching, and slowed as it approached a group of trees just off the road.

SSG Kahn, a combat intelligence collector, reported over the radio that he could see a company of German soldiers in the woods, but that they had not yet fired at him. The end of the war was near, with the total defeat of the German Army just around the corner. This lack of resistance was not unusual, so Staff Sergeant Kahn pushed on towards Garching. Approaching the outskirts of Garching and still not taking any hostile fire, Staff Sergeant Kahn slowed to better assess the area on the edge of the village.

Conclusions

To be honest, I do not know how SSG Kahn would fare in the modern Army. The era in which he served had a certain clarity that no longer exists. He did not shrink from seeking responsibility or performing selfless service. These qualities are both timeless and priceless, and these are the standards to which all NCOs should strive. Many problems that beset the Army today would diminish if more soldiers, NCOs, and officers displayed the personal commitment to duty and personal courage that SSG Kahn obviously possessed.

The approach into the Ardennes Cemetery, leads to this memorial, a rectangular stone structure bearing a massive American eagle and other symbolical sculpture.

In a peaceful meadow in the Ardennes American Cemetery lies the evidence of the true cost of war, and the terrible price that freedom demands. Most of the men buried there received no acclaim or honors for valor. Their sacrifice, as well as the sacrifice of so many others, and the feats they accomplished, made them heroes, quite rightly, the men who saved the world. ✳

Suddenly, four German self-propelled guns, one German tank, and an entire German infantry company fired on the column. Enemy cannon, machine gun, and rifle fire raked the line of vehicles as the Germans caught the 2d Platoon in a deadly ambush; they destroyed four U.S. armored cars and four jeeps. SSG Kahn died in the lead armored car and four other soldiers in the column died in the attack while five other soldiers, including the Troop Commander, suffered from serious wounds. Some had attempted to rescue SSG Kahn's lead group.

The next day, Munich fell. One week later, the war in Europe ended with the unconditional surrender of Germany. Staff Sergeant Kahn received the Bronze Star, posthumously.

Who Was SSG Kahn?

Personal information about Staff Sergeant Kahn in the unit history is sketchy at best. He first appears in the unit history as having sustained serious wounds in France during the breakout of Normandy in July 1944. He returned to his unit in the fall of 1944, and he participated in the bloody battle of the Foret de Parroy in late fall.

Unit entries of the winter of 1944 and 1945 indicate the type of courage he displayed. At times, Staff Sergeant Kahn was the acting platoon commander while his unit conducted dangerous reconnaissance patrols in the Alsace-Lorraine region of France along the German border. In the months leading to the ambush of 29 April, the record indicates that he constantly put himself on many dangerous reconnaissance missions. The circumstances in which he died, at the head of his Troop, show clearly that he constantly sought out and aggressively engaged the enemy with little regard to his own safety. The unit history reflects a special feeling of loss on the part of the whole unit, made all the more poignant by the almost total lack of German resistance met by the unit after the incident and the cessation of hostilities soon thereafter.

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Joint STARS in Kosovo:
Can the Army and the Air Force Blend Their Operational Differences?

**by Staff Sergeant
Jennifer L. Dees**

For the first time in almost ten years, the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) supported a mission other than peacekeeping. During Operation ALLIED FORCE, Joint STARS provided real-time intelligence to the ground and air commanders. Despite the effectiveness of the system in Kosovo, three major doctrinal differences between the Army and the Air Force for the employment of Joint STARS became apparent. First, the Army and the Air Force had different overall views of the Joint STARS mission. The Air Force views the system as a battle management tool, while the Army views it as an intelligence collector. Second, these views dramatically affected the collection strategy and mission profile under which Joint STARS operated. Finally, all ground stations focused on the entire province of Kosovo, instead of dividing up the battlefield and maximizing the analytical effort.

Differing Views of the Joint STARS Mission

The Army and Air Force have greatly differing views of the Joint STARS applications. The Army has proven that Joint STARS can be a highly effective intelligence tool. Ground station operators' analytical skills on patterns and trends greatly enhance the ground commander's view of the current battlefield and enemy's intent. By using this analysis process, we can predict the enemy's movements and behavior, identifying possible choke points and potential avenues of approach. Additionally, analysis of Joint STARS data can identify important details of the enemy's operating patterns, such as supply routes and logistical points. This all gives the ground commander a more complete view of the enemy's weaknesses. One detraction from this application of Joint STARS is that it cannot independently confirm or deny specific activity based on moving target indicators (MTIs) alone. The activity must be cross-cued with other sources to give a complete and accurate view of the battlefield.

In Kosovo, this doctrinal approach directly supported the commander of Task Force (TF) Hawk. The ground stations collocated with the TF provided real-time intelligence along lines of communication (LOCs) and during the continuous realignment of Serbian forces. Use of this intelligence both en-

hanced and supported information from other imagery intelligence (IMINT) as well as signals intelligence (SIGINT) sources. Cross-cueing with the Hunter Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) proved vital in supporting the intelligence gathered from Joint STARS.

The Air Force, on the other hand, views the system as a battlefield management tool designed to provide immediate and direct support to the Air Commander. Working very closely with Air Force and

The AEPDS and MGSM downrange in Albania.

Army aircraft flying in the area of interest, the Joint STARS aircrew can immediately identify movements on the battlefield and cue those aircraft to the vicinity of this activity. The aircrew of the E-8 Joint STARS aircraft is able to keep a tight watch on enemy movements and thus provide essential data as to the

Key:

AWACS - Airborne Warning and Control System **JOINT STARS -** Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System **NATO -** North Atlantic Treaty Organization **Recon -** Reconnaisance **UAV -** Unmanned aerial vehicle

Figure 1. The Common Ground Station CONOPS.

speed, direction, and total size of enemy MTIs.

During Operation ALLIED FORCE, this application of the Joint STARS system was very effective for the Air Force. It provided a set of far-seeing eyes for the Air Commander. Air Force aircraft received a clearer vision of the battlefield via real-time voice communications with the E-8 aircrew, and the Air Commander gained a greater understanding of where the assets most needed to be. However, this brings us to the second dilemma: trying to apply both doctrinal approaches simultaneously.

Effective Collection

In Operation ALLIED FORCE, these separate views of Joint STARS employment caused some conflict in the theater collection strategy. The differing views, although not mutually exclusive, did

have a significant impact on the needs of the two Services. For use as a battlefield management tool, it was essential that the E-8 aircraft fly when the aircraft it supported were in the air. As an intelligence tool, it was vital that the E-8 fly at times assessed to be crucial times of enemy movement. Because the geographic area targeted for collection in Kosovo was relatively small, terrain did not play a major effect on assets planning but should be a consideration for future missions. During this conflict, time was the critical element. The actual flight times and radar usage during ALLIED FORCE tended to support the system mainly as an air combat execution tool rather than as an intelligence-gathering tool.

While we could do some effective analysis of enemy movements and actions using the information gathered during these times of direct

support to air operations, it did not fully meet the intelligence needs of the Ground Commander. This method provided only a current snapshot in time and failed to explain "why" or to provide a prediction of "when." It did not help the commander's overall view of the battlefield in terms of time, space, and intent.

Priorities for a system like Joint STARS should take into account all collection requirements and operate on a basis that will support the operation as a whole. Understanding that Operation ALLIED FORCE started as and remained an air campaign, we must also understand that the targeting intelligence provided by TF Hawk did play an important part during several stages of the operation.

Ground Stations

The final issue with the use of Joint STARS directly relates to the

Another view of Ground Station Module.

use of ground terminals for data collection. Regardless of the type of ground terminal used, either the Joint STARS workstation (Ground Station Module) or the Common Ground Station (CGS), an operator must work at the station for data collection and analysis. Additionally, regardless of the application, either battlefield management or intelligence tool, the operator must provide both reliable and immediate results. To do this with any quality of resolution, the operator must have a stated area of interest (AI). This AI can be rather large but according to ground station operating doctrine in operations at echelons at corps-level or above, watching all of Kosovo is outside the realm of a single operator's abilities.

During the operation in Kosovo, multiple ground terminals in the theater supported many different kind of units, both Air Force and Army. (Figure 1 depicts the CGS in (CONOPS) contingency operations). Of all the ground terminals in Kosovo, TF Hawk was the only unit with more than one

workstation for collection. Most of the other operators had to watch an area too large for them to cover, forcing them to provide potentially unreliable information or to miss some data altogether. In either doctrinal application of Joint STARS, this severely downgrades the quality of information collected.

Improved Reporting

The problem of not specifying an AI needs addressing. Most of the units in the Kosovo Theater directed the operator to search a wide area, because if the operators monitored restricted AIs, they would lose sight of hot spots or important data collected during the mission. While operators could always review data later in post-mission analysis, it would often be too late for any immediate actions the commander may have wanted to take.

Establishing areas of responsibility before ground terminals enter a theater and developing a central reporting point via a classified website or central reporting terminal can solve this problem. Additionally, all terminals have the ability to receive information from the E-8 aircraft. By passing all priorities for reporting to the aircrew via the Collection Emphasis Message, we can negate the problem with data outside the unit's AI through the larger pool of reporting operators. Additionally, by considering all collection requirements, the Services could set priorities for coverage and reporting fairly to support both in their vital missions.

Conclusion

Joint STARS has repeatedly proven its effectiveness in almost

any environment and mission. Effective collection and reporting are the system's greatest assets. By identifying its shortcomings and working around both Services' doctrinal approaches, the information gathered can prove to be the commander's microscope into the internal workings of the enemy. Identifying the gaps that appeared during the Operation ALLIED FORCE collection process will increase the efficiency of the Joint STARS system and enable it to overcome the collection problems that may arise in the future. ✱

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Multiple Echelon Exploitation of UAV Imagery
Does It Work?

by Staff Sergeant
Martin A. Schwerzler

During the Balkan conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the U.S. military community initiated a program to address some specific problems regarding communications and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) video distribution. This initiative gave rise to the Joint Broadcast System (JBS), which the Global Broadcast System (GBS) will replace in late fiscal year (FY) 99 or early FY00. JBS allows multiple echelon exploitation of the raw UAV imagery in near-real time. This will allow organizations that cannot directly task UAVs to perform primary- and secondary-level exploitation of UAV imagery. If implemented in a uniform and organized manner, JBS will enhance exploitation and be a significant combat multiplier. However, without prior detailed planning and coordination, this powerful distribution system could disrupt the common picture of the battlefield.

In order to understand the dilemma, one must first understand the three systems involved: the JBS system, the Hunter UAV, and the JBS injection or very small aperture transmitter (VSAT). The currently deployed JBS—a highly reliable, durable, mobile system— is a receive-only, digital downlink, video display system comprised of four transit cases. They house a Sun SPARC 20® workstation, a KG-194 communication security device, a small television, a video cassette recorder, three video tuners, an uninterruptable power supply, and a 1.2-meter satellite dish. The system is capable of receiving several video channels, which include multiple UAV feeds and two Cable News Network (CNN) feeds,

as well as several encrypted data feeds (see Figure 1).

The second system, the Hunter UAV, is a collection platform controlled by a ground control station (GCS) via radio link. The radio link allows the ground station to manipulate the aircraft and payload, while simultaneously receiving the video downlink. Finally, the JBS can deploy with an injection platform, a platform capable of broadcasting a video uplink to all other JBS systems. Due to the tether constraints of the Hunter UAV sys-

The JBS provides near-real-time raw video information. The initial difficulty in receiving this information is that the recipient must fully understand the information displayed on the screen. The system will also dis- play marginal data on the screen if the collectors so desire or their higher headquarters so directs. Anyone observing this data must be able to discern the meaning and understand the difference between reliable and unreliable data. Easily learned, competent interpretation is critical. Additionally, with the display of raw information


Key: AFRTS - Armed Forces Radio & Television Service   JTF - Joint Task Force

Mbps - Megabytes per second   NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Figure 1. The Bandwidths Used by the JBS Downlink.

tem, it was necessary to deploy the JBS system with the VSAT capability to allow distribution of the video feed back to Task Force (TF) Hawk. Figure 2 depicts the architecture of the JBS-UAV network. The UAV platforms send data to their respective ground stations, and they rebroadcast it via a VSAT network to Molesworth, United Kingdom. Molesworth relays it to the Joint Intelligence Management Center (JIMC) who broadcasts it over the JBS network.

not including direct contact with the collector, an analyst may not know of any technical difficulties with the platform or errors displayed on the collector's screen. Finally, the receiving unit should have trained imagery analysts since they are the only personnel qualified to perform analysis and draw intelligence from this raw information.

Controlling the Flight

TF Hawk maintained a very active communications channel with TF Hunter in Skopje, Macedonia,

Figure 2. Architecture of the JBS-UAV Network.

which posed potential communications difficulties. To overcome these obstacles, TF Hawk implemented several strategies.

The first, time-proven strategy of exchanging liaison officers (LNOs) began before the deployment of any troops. TF Hawk provided LNO support from aviation as well as intelligence assets, additionally TF Hawk received UAV liaison support in Tirane, Albania. This provided a single point of contact at each site capable of answering system-specific questions about capabilities, limitations, collection strategies, and mission planning and who could translate the commander's intent into the technical language familiar to the distant operator or collector. Mission plans for the UAV flight were also the responsibility of the UAV liaison officer at TF Hawk. The Collection Manager and the Deputy Commander approved the mission plan before it went to TF Hunter via the Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).

Upon receipt of the mission plan, TF Hunter plotted the actual flight path and sent the data back to TF Hawk. This free exchange allowed the TFs to verify that they both understood the route and that it fulfilled the ground commander's needs. Additionally, if they located

a dynamic target after the mission began, TF Hawk could quickly determine the viability of redirecting the UAV in order to cover the target. Overall, the liaison officer played a pivotal role in solving communication and planning problems.

Communication is Essential

Another strategy of TF Hawk was that of direct communications among the collectors, TF Hunter, and TF Hawk. TF Hawk dedicated three different communications systems to maintain this level of communication. The primary means of communication between the JBS operator and the UAV operator was one dedicated Defense Secure Network (DSN) telephone line secured with a STU III (secure telephone unit third generation). This line provided the best and most reliable means of maintaining constant two-way communications during the UAV flight. The secondary system was a dedicated MSE DNVT (Mobile Subscriber Equipment Digital Nonsecure Voice Terminal), and the third system was a dedicated TROJAN Special Purpose Integrated Remote Intelligence Terminal II (TROJAN SPIRIT II) telephone. The near-real-time video allowing for redirection and refocusing of the collector

necessitated constant contact. Dynamic tasking rapidly became the normal means of maximizing the effectiveness of this resource.

Any analyst in the TF Hawk Intelligence Cell who found a probable target would report it to the Battle Captain or the Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Chief. The ACE Chief would then decide whether to cue the UAV in order to confirm the suspected activity. We could then relay pertinent information telephonically via operators, allowing a continuous targeting cycle.

An additional benefit of the open communications channel was that it allowed the analysts to confer with each other regarding what each was seeing. Analysts discussed what they saw to obtain another opinion, possibly a second look, or to continue to observe a target until they could clearly identify it. Through this ongoing conversation, the operators were able to establish a working rapport and to develop better communications skills, so that when we identified a "hot" target, it required minimal explanation allowing for rapid targeting.

The final benefit was the value of consensus in targeting. By discussing all observations as the UAV flew, it enabled us to synchronize the reports and provide more complete spot reports and end-of-mission summaries. Communication is the keystone in bridging the gap between the collector and the exploiter.

JBS Casts a Broad Shadow

The JBS provides the simultaneous downlink to anyone with the proper equipment and within satellite range (see Figure 3). Due to the ease of accessing this information, various units were active in the exploitation. Although TF Hunter was under the operational control of TF Hawk, the parent organizations of the 66th MI Group and the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) tasked them to provide an-

Figure 3. The JBS Locations which Received Every Broadcast of UAV Video.

alytical reports on the Hunter UAV flights. Consequently, at times conflicting reports were in the TFs' distribution, all reporting on the same UAV flight. TF Hawk attempted to address this problem, but it continued to plague the TFs throughout the operation.

One of the more significant advantages of JBS is the increased observation of the UAV video. It is possible to employ analysts around the world at multiple organizations, therefore increasing the analytical base. Area experts not assigned to or located with a forward unit can assist in the analysis, as time and resources permit, without a full-time dedication through deployment to a potentially hostile environment. Additionally, personnel at the national level could analyze and annotate large databases and historical patterns for further compilation and use by any organization interested in the tactics, terrain, current inventory, or current situation of the observed area or enemy.

The major drawback to this mix of analysts is that of differing opinions. Currently there is no definitive organizational structure in place to resolve disagreement of what is on the display. Organizations receiving the JBS downlink are not bound to cooperate or collaborate with other users, which can cause a multitude of problems. Two of the problems experienced during Operation ALLIED FORCE were different reporting criteria requiring rapid decisions with little analysis time and no correlation with other intelligence assets. This resulted in duplicate reporting with differing conclusions.

When multiple analysts view the same imagery, they may have a difference of opinion about exactly what they are seeing. During Operation ALLIED FORCE, TF Hawk consolidated all reports generated by subordinate sections, reconciled any conflicts, reviewed the imagery as necessary, correlated it with other intelligence products, and produced a final mission summary for each UAV mission. This effort generated a unified intelligence product. Units not subordinate to TF Hawk continued to produce their own products as their headquarters directed. Often there was little guidance on consolidating or deconflicting these varying reports. A theater- or national-level decision to determine the primary reporter or to delineate the responsible unit for reporting what type of information would help. Limiting the reporting would help to eliminate some of the excess E-mail, limited SIPRNET space, and free some of the deployed units' bandwidth.

Another consideration in using the JBS is the ability of a unit in the rear to perform the majority of the exploitation. In essence, TF Hawk integrated the JBS and UAV feeds in the same manner as any unit anywhere in the world could do, maximizing split-based operations. By using a unit in the rear, the analysts have more space, better equipment, and more stable connections for telephones, SIPRNET, and power, as well as greater access to alternate communications systems and secure databases. The cost and collateral difficulties of deployment could be less. The JBS system is a new resource; as with many new technologies, we have yet to use it to its full potential. Improved training, clarification of the reporting process, and continual improvements and refinements in the communications will result in a system capable of fully exploiting the Army's most dynamic collector, the UAV.✳

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by Chief Warrant Officer Three Ray Lane Aldrich (USA, Retired)

Available technology can help solve many of our foreign language problems. While nothing can take the place of a fluent, well-trained and -educated linguist, available technology can multiply a linguist's presence and substitute for the linguist in some less demanding jobs. Linguist-in-the-loop, machine translation, computer "point and talk," remote interrogation, and remoted intercept are the currently available solutions described in this article.

Linguist-in-the-Loop

The Linguist-in-the-loop is a simple, cost effective, interpreter solution that inserts a linguist, electronically, between two speakers of different languages. The Army has the communications equipment and either has or can hire the linguists to perform as interpreters. In the field, each speaker uses a radio or cell phone relayed through a "virtual" linguist pool.

The speakers can be face-to-face, hear each other's voices, and read body language, but their conversation comes through an interpreter. The interpreter can be at a base camp or in another country; it makes no difference as long as communications equipment connects them to the speakers. Using this method can reduce the number of linguists required for certain operations.

The Linguist-in-the-loop features include the abilities to change dialect and language quickly, to serve numerous callers, and to record conversations for clarification. "Language Line," American Telephone and Telegraph's (AT&T) version of this solution, is in use in hospitals, businesses, and police departments.

Machine Translation

Machine translation is another form of technology that can assist with the language problem. Some current products, such as the Army's lightweight, ruggedized Forward Area Language Converter (FALCON), allow a non-linguist to perform quick "triage" on the foreign language documents. Using FALCON, even a non-linguist can determine which documents require immediate translation by a trained linguist and which ones can wait for 6th translation later. Intelligent use of machine translation will allow us to get faster, more usable work and increased productivity from the available linguists. We can react to information rather than compile histories.

Computer "Point and Talk"

Computer "point and talk" can provide basic communication without requiring a linguist's intervention. The (DARPA) Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency One-Way is a handheld, voice-actuated phrase book. Sponsored by DARPA, and based on work by the Naval Operational Medical Institute, this device plays back foreign language phrases (recorded by a native speaker) when English goes into the system. It is not a two-way translator, but it can facilitate basic communications. Question design requires a "yes or no" response.

Earlier versions of the DARPA One-Way have functioned in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Arabian Gulf. Based on these employments, DARPA has incorporated modifications into the current version of the One-Way. Manual "point and talk" is also available in the (DLIFLC) Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Cen-

ter's Survival Guides[1]. These excellent materials served from Operations DESERT SHIELD and STORM through Somalia to Bosnia.

Remote Interrogation

Remote interrogation multiplies the effectiveness of interrogators and moves many of them back to rear areas or other countries. Video teleconferencing allows an interrogator at a remote location not only to conduct a conversation with subjects but to read their body language as well. Specially trained members of the same "virtual" linguist pool used for linguist-in-the-loop would provide this capability in addition to their other interpreter duties.

Remoted Voice Intercept

Military intelligence forces can use remoted voice intercept world-

Linguists in the Army—Paradise Lost or Paradise Regained?

by Colonel Brian L. Tarbet,
Utah ARNG, and Lieutenant
Colonel Ralph R. Steinke, USA

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the offi- cial policy or position of Harvard University, the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, or the U.S. Government.

The United States Army is at a crossroads regarding its linguists and their future within the Army force structure. Because language is the most complex of human behaviors, the issue of language capability has long perplexed all branches of the military service.[1] There has been much discussion, but very little progress toward any meaningful resolution of many of the problems embedded in the issue of the capability and readiness of linguists. This article highlights some of the critical problems facing the Army regarding its linguist structure and offers some modest proposals to help alleviate the problems that plague military linguists. Our observations are from the perspective of the linguist and commander, not from the standpoint of Army planners.

Issues

Retention. For years now, the Army has had difficulty in retaining its trained linguists. This problem manifests itself both in the Active Component (AC) and the Reserve Component (RC) U.S. Army National Guard (ARNG) and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR). As a benchmark, the overall Army rate for first-term reenlistments for fiscal year (FY) 1998 was 30.1 percent, but within the linguist structure, the retention rate was only 23.3 percent for the same period.[2] This disparity was similar for FY92, FY94, and FY96, the sample years. The retention rate for linguists has been

Then Major Gary DiGesu, aide-de-camp to the commander, assisted with simultaneous translation between General Lucio Innecco, Italian Army, and the Greek Army Commander of the Hellenic 1st Allied Land Forces Southern Europe in 1992.

much lower than desired and significantly lower than the overall Army retention rate for less costly training-intensive military occupational specialties (MOSs).

The reasons that this is such a difficult retention area for the Army are the substantial cost and time spent to train linguists. Coupled with the time and cost of processing security clearances and providing experience to these linguists, the Army has an enormous investment in each linguist. Estimates of the cost range from $80,000 per linguist from the Defense Language Institute (DLI) to the estimate of an overall investment of $123,000 from the Department of the Army (DA).[3]

Force Mix. One of the problems that continually surfaces in this context is the challenge to project accurately the linguist requirement for future operations. The difficulty of apportioning target languages between the AC and RC compounds the problem. This issue is largely

unavoidable because it relates to a shifting geostrategic environment, much of this force-mix problem is self-inflicted.

For example, in the past decade, the Utah National Guard's 300th Military Intelligence Brigade (Linguist) has seen its requirement for Turkish linguists move from 5 to 75 to zero.[4] This fluctuation was primarily due to regional commander in chief (CINC) responses to DA surveys. Nonetheless, this occasioned considerable consternation at the unit and the U.S. Army National Guard Bureau. Such structural changes to the modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) are difficult to manage in an AC unit and are virtually impossible to manage in an RC unit. Another example was the Army's decision in the late 1980s to eliminate the Serbian-Croatian section in the 142d MI Battalion (Linguist) based upon the Army's determination that the geostrategic environment no longer called for these linguists.

There is a lack of an overarching, consistent framework between the AC and RC to deal with the issues of low-demand languages, contingency surge requirements, and the necessity of maintaining a reservoir of linguists across the spectrum to deal with unforeseen eventualities. The altering of the language mix in a reserve unit is analogous to changing the course of a supertanker—it takes time and, in the case of a language unit, resources. We would recommend that such changes be incremental, marginal, and thoroughly considered.

Demographics. If RC linguist units are not located in linguist-rich areas (as in Utah), they are essentially programmed for failure. To locate linguist units in areas without significant ethnic enclaves or universities and colleges is folly.

There also persists the notion among Army planners that the ARNG and USAR can simply recruit linguists separating from active duty into their units. This fails to take into account the fact that not all RC languages are also in the AC. In addition, most of the separating linguists will locate too distantly from existing Guard and Reserve units (or are not interested in further service) for this to be a viable solution.

Modest Proposals

Rank Structure. Recently, there have been efforts to reduce the rank structure for linguists in MTOE units throughout the Army force structure. In general, the proposals involve downgrading slots from E6 to the E5 level and from E5 to the E4 level.

It is important to note that the typical graduates of DLI report to their next units at an average rank of E4. After twelve to eighteen months of service, they may look forward to possible advancement to grade E5 within the proposed structure of a typical language section. Thus, they "top out" early in their careers and there is little incentive for them to pursue extended careers as linguists.

Although this is the proposal for the section structure of MI linguist units, similar reductions have been proposed throughout the MI force structure and across the full spectrum of MI linguist MOSs. This will undermine the retention of linguists no matter what specialty they choose. The better course is to embrace MTOEs that have a more generous rank structure such as those of the Special Forces, Aviation, or Medical Corps units. Like soldiers in these career specialities, linguists are highly trained, must often operate independently, and their recruitment and training were at great cost to the government.

Adequate Proficiency Pay. Over the past few years, several efforts to address this issue with the Congress have failed for a number of reasons. There has been tension within the Services among personnel administrators who resist the creation of special programs and those in the intelligence community who recognize the necessity. The Secretary of Defense is proposing a raise to this sum and the addition of proficiency pay for more languages.[5] While this is a step in the right direction, it still does not address the problem of equality for the RC.

Currently, the Department of Defense (DOD) pays Foreign Language Proficiency Pay to those personnel who occupy language-coded positions in a variety of units. The amount of this proficiency pay can vary based upon proficiency and the target language.

The maximum amount for personnel on active duty is $100.00 per month, but the RC remains bound by the 1/30th rule. Reserve linguists receive only 1/30th of the proficiency pay of the AC because they are on duty only that portion of the time. For RC soldiers, a monthly drill will net them the princely sum of $13.33.

This concept may cause some consternation to the personnel managers who suggest that such parity would set an unacceptable precedent for other types of proficiency pay such a jump pay, flight pay, etc. This argument is unavailing—none of the other special pay categories involves the same non-duty commitment as does the maintenance of a foreign language.

We recommend that the amount of proficiency pay be increased markedly and create equality between the AC and RC to offer a meaningful incentive to all linguists. Whether DOD chooses to call this incentive "proficiency pay" or a "bonus" is transparent to the soldier. In our view, proficiency pay needs to triple to $300 per month for the language, with an additive of up to $150 more per month if the soldier can demonstrate proficiency in one or more additional foreign languages. Proficiency pay must be meaningful to provide some reasonable equivalence to RC soldiers for their efforts in maintaining their language competence. In contrast to the other special pay categories, linguists receive proficiency pay only if they demonstrate their proficiency annually.

Additional Training Assemblies. The Reservists in the USAR and ARNG presently attend forty-eight unit-training assemblies per year. A modest increase of twenty-four unit training assemblies per year would offer the linguists a huge increase in time that they could devote to increasing their language skills. Time spent in language train-

ing at the unit equals training mission accomplishment.

It is a fact that the RC linguists in the USAR and ARNG are subject to the same mandatory requirements each year as the AC soldier. Mandatory briefings, physicals, HIV tests, maintenance of mobilization packets, and other administrative requirements all decrease the training hours available for language training. Language proficiency directly relates to the time spent learning and using the language—there is no substitute for time and hard work to develop language skills. The addition of these additional training assemblies would be pivotal in increasing the language proficiency of the RC linguists.

This concept is not new. For years, pilots in RC aviation units have had the opportunity to attend additional drills to maintain their skills. It is no less apparent that this would also generate great benefits for linguists and their units. The DLI Foreign Language Center has demonstrated that language skill directly relates to "time on task."[6]

Linguist Military Occupational Specialty (97L MOS)

In the early 1990s, then Commandant Major General Paul E. Menoher, Jr., directed the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School to develop a linguist MOS, the 97L Translator/Interpreter. The notion behind this MOS was to establish a vehicle whereby native linguists or those possessing exceptional civilian-acquired language ability would be assessed into the Army at minimum training cost to the Service, and would provide much needed language ability. Their training would include basic training and a four-week advanced individual training (AIT) as opposed to the typical cycle of basic training, a thirteen-week AIT, and 63 weeks at the DLI.

The 97L MOS now constitutes a significant number of the MTOE slots of ARNG and USAR MI units. To date, the AC has not adopted this MOS. Thus, the 97L is an RC-only MOS. Therein lies the problem. It has proven enormously difficult to assess individuals into the Army due to the scarcity of 97L school slots and because each course is taught exclusively by language group.[7] Note that although the courses are not "in language," the school groups the students for the courses by language. Out of two weeks of 97L-specific training, only four to five days are in the target language, two in document translation, and two in simultaneous interpretation.

The schedule of course offerings has not been sufficient to facilitate the RC recruitment process. Since the introduction of the MOS, Fort Huachuca has trained 15 soldiers in basic training and 489 soldiers during their annual training.[8] For example, let us suppose that the school teaches a 97L Chinese Mandarin group in March. In April, an RC unit recruits someone who speaks fluent Chinese Mandarin and desires to enlist in an RC linguist battalion and attend basic training and AIT during his summer break from college. Is this potential soldier likely to wait a year to enlist? Any recruiter will tell you that the chances of enlisting this college student will diminish with the passage of time. The course offerings are too sparse to permit the aggressive recruiting necessary to fill the RC linguist units. To date, the Utah National Guard has been the only unit that has actively recruited soldiers for the 97L program.

The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) plans a language component for the 97L Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC) which will to allow any soldier-linguist to attend the course through the Internet and distance learning technology. The 97L Advanced NCO Course

(ANCOC) will not have a language component, but will emphasize leadership skills as they apply to a translation team. Here again, the problem is course density—there are insufficient course offerings each year to support the number of 97L soldiers.

The solution is to teach the AIT and NCO courses on a generic basis. There is nothing in the course requirements stating that the course be in the target language. The 97L course work must be generic, and the practical application exercises should apply emerging distance learning technologies. We stipulate that the course would be better if all classes were in the target language. However, the bottom line is that the number of course offerings must increase for this MOS to be viable.

Furthermore, until the AC embraces the 97L MOS, an entire generation of commanders will have little idea how to properly employ soldiers trained in this MOS. RC linguist unit commanders speak freely of reluctance on the part of line-unit commanders to accept soldiers for training who have not had training in the so-called "hardskill" MOSs: 97E (Interrogator), 97B (Counterintelligence Agent), and 98G (Voice Interceptor). Unless and until the 97L soldiers enjoy more widespread acceptance, their skills will be lost. The resultant cost to the Army will be linguists lost, both by an inability to recruit them and by the attrition of those trained linguists who become dissatisfied.

Command Structure

It is natural in a resource-constrained environment to look for economies at all levels of military organizations. Unfortunately for linguists, one of the current targets of opportunity is the command structure in RC linguist units. Some have advocated an idea that we can save money by eliminating brigade and battalion headquarters elements and

using these slots as "bill payers" in future force reductions.

Most of the officers and soldiers assigned to these headquarters elements are themselves accomplished linguists; most of them have demonstrated language ability and are the most experienced linguists in the units. Additionally, many of the senior NCOs are the most talented and experienced linguists in these units and have been promoted into positions of increasing administrative responsibility during their careers as linguists. Such a career progression also appears to be the case in AC units. Targeting the linguist unit's command structure is a false economy.

There are currently nearly 2700 linguist slots (FY00) in the ARNG and USAR, including those in the headquarters elements.[9] In each case, those units have recruited the linguist into the Reserves, nurtured and trained them, and readied them for mobilization. The idea that those linguists in the five-person language teams would have materialized without leadership and a supporting command structure is nonsense. Unlike their active duty counterparts, RC units have the responsibility to recruit and retain their own personnel. They have no "replacement battalions," no reservoir of personnel recruited and trained by the Army, and no full-time recruiting force nationwide.

Commissioned Officer Language Capability

The time is ripe to require that officers in the MI Corps be conversant in a foreign language. Not only would this be of educational benefit to the officer, but certainly to the Army and to the Nation. MI officers would be better prepared to understand the needs of linguists in the process of intelligence collection and these officers would be able to apply their language and cultural awareness skills in working with allies and in better understanding enemies.

We now live in a geostrategic environment wherein the focus will be on a CONUS- (continental United States) based, power projection Army. Officers will have fewer and fewer opportunities to live and operate in foreign lands on an ongoing basis, and thus will become less well-rounded and world-wise at a time when those qualities are of increasing importance. Demonstrated proficiency in a foreign tongue will have the inevitable result of exposing the officer to different cultures and thought processes; such exposure will be critical in developing a well-rounded, sound, and savvy MI officer.

There will also be a significant but less obvious benefit for those who will command units consisting of linguists. Commanders and operators will finally have an intuitive feel for the needs of linguists and for those critical missions wherein linguists integrate and support intelligence requirements that are vital to the Army and the Nation. It will be apparent to commanders that intensive interaction in the language and interface with meaningful operational and training missions are pivotal to the long-term success of linguists in the Army.

Conclusion

Language-capable soldiers and officers, through their increased access and insights, are force multipliers in any operation. Improving rank structure flexibility, meaningful incentives, a viable linguist MOS, and a command structure comprising officers trained in languages will all better serve the linguist, the Army, and the Nation.✳

Endnotes

1. Dr. Ray T. Clifford, Provost of the Defense Language Institute, interviewed 14 March 1999.

2. Ed Christie, *Defense Manpower Data*, interviewed 28 April 1999.

3. LTC Dennis F. Johnson, *National Guard Linguists: A National Treasure Squandered? An Evaluation of the Army National Guard Language Program*, August 1998.

4. COL Ruediger Tillmann, Commander, 300th MI Brigade (Linguist), interviewed 13 March 1999.

5. MAJ Greg Hadfield, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (ODASD[I&S]), interviewed 30 April 1999.

6. Clifford interview, 14 March 1999.

7. LTC Peter Shaver (USA Retired), Chief, AIS Language Branch, USAIC&FH, interviewed 14 March 1999.

8. LTC Stephen E. Ponder, (USA Retired), former Army National Guard Advisor, USAIC&FH, interviewed 14 March 1999.

9. MAJ Barbara Hirst, 300th MI Brigade, interviewed 17 March 1999.

Colonel Brian Tarbet, UT ARNG, is an MI Officer with more than twenty-four years of experience on active duty and in the National Guard. His command tours include the 97th Troop Command, 300th MI Brigade (Linguist), and the 142d MI Battalion (Linguist) in the Utah National Guard. He received his commission through the Reserve Officers Training Program at Utah State University, where he graduated with a Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science, Business Administration, and German. After completion of an active duty tour, Colonel Tarbet received a Juris Doctor degree from the University of Utah. A Senior Service College Fellow at Harvard University from August 1998 through June 1999, Colonel Tarbet has since returned to his position as Division Chief of the Tax and Revenue Division of the Utah State Attorney General's Office. Readers may contact him via E-mail at atkey01.btarbet@state.ut.us.

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Do You Have What It Takes To Attaché?

by Chief Warrant Officer Two Robert J. Baldi

Serving in more than 90 nations and territories around the globe, Army noncommissioned officers (NCOs) in the Defense Attaché System (DAS) represent their Services and nation at the highest levels of government. Interestingly enough, as the Army continues to "rightsize" its NCO corps, this small career track has grown, commensurate with a new respect for its worth.

NCOs serving in the DAS are overwhelmed with unprecedented opportunities for personal and professional growth as well as phenomenal strategic experience, and they are **getting promotions**. The most recent Sergeant First Class (E7) promotion board selected fully 35 percent of eligible staff sergeants on attaché duty for advancement—this against an overall Army-wide selection rate of just 28 percent. Even more encouraging are the statistics from the last two war-

rant officer selection boards where DAS soldiers averaged an 80-percent selection rate. It is worth noting that motivated and qualified NCOs who serve as little as one tour in the DAS many submit Warrant Officer application packets to become MI 350L Attaché Technicians.

There are some very good reasons why promotions and officer selection rates are so high among Army NCOs in the DAS. First and foremost is the fact that the DAS actively recruits and accepts only the best-qualified applicants. Standards are high and the job is demanding. Working and living conditions at some locations can be harsh and members may find their multifaceted responsibilities almost all-consuming. The hours are notoriously long and the job sometimes seems to consist of an unsteady shifting sea of constantly changing priorities. Despite these challenges, many of those who have chosen this particular career track say the personal and professional rewards vastly outweigh the drawbacks.

Despite a few hardships, there are some welcome tradeoffs, which can be particularly appealing to soldiers who have spent the majority of their military lives "in the field" or deployed. With rare exceptions, all Defense Attaché assignments are command-sponsored accompanied tours. Soldiers may be required to perform occasional temporary duty (TDY) at other locations; however, they are usually already considered "deployed," so they can expect to sleep in their own beds at night.

Photos courtesy of the author.

Those who are curious about what it is like to live and work in embassies overseas may acquire a widely divergent set of perspectives by interviewing two or more current or former DAS members. Missions, political climates, and available station resources vary dramatically from one Defense Attaché Office to another.

The historic and primary mission of the Defense Attaché has not changed appreciably over time. Military attachés are charged with for openly collecting and relaying information about foreign militaries to consumers at all levels of the U.S. military and associated agencies of the Federal Government. In addition, individual Service attachés—

- Represent their respective Services to the military of the host country.

- Advise the U.S. ambassador on defense matters.

- Manage security assistance when there is no separate group designated to run a military aid program.

- Actively promote and coordinate engagement activities such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Partnership for Peace program and bilateral and multinational exercises.

NCOs entering the DAS can expect training in automation, foreign languages, DAS and State Department-specific administration, security assistance, and other more specialized fields. Overseas tours are for two to three years, many with an option to extend. Subsequently, DAS NCOs can typically expect to spend anywhere from six months to a year back in the Washington, D.C., area for additional training—and then go back out to a new station.

In 1987, there were 89 operating Defense Attaché and Defense Liaison offices in existence; in 1999, the number has risen to 114. Currently, many Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) officers expect this number to increase to 135 during the next five years. The obvious message here is that this is a high-growth field in need of quality, self-motivated MI NCOs who have a proven track record of independent action, maturity and good judgment. As with Special Forces, soldiers need to be in the grade of E5 or higher to apply for the program. Other requirements include:

- General technical (GT) aptitude area test score of 115 or higher.

- Clerical (CL) Aptitude score of at least 120.

- Typing test score of 40 words-per-minute or higher (can obtain a waiver if sufficiently skilled in office automation).

- Depending on country of assignment, a score of 100 or better on the DLAB (Defense Language Aptitude Battery).

In addition, soldiers and their families must meet the medical and security standards for the country of assignment.

Refer to **AR 611-60, Assignment to Attache Duty**, and the Adjutant General Branch News-letter@PERSCOM Online. Call Sergeant First Class Bernard Jensen at DSN 923-3901 or commercial (301) 677-3901 for more information.

Occasionally, there are openings in the Attaché Technician ranks not filled by Attaché NCO-feeder field accessions. Qualified warrant officers from other MI fields who possess the necessary prerequisites are encouraged to submit their packets for consideration. For information on Warrant Officer accessions into the 350L career field, contact Chief Warrant Officer Mark Pickenstein at commercial (301) 677-2134, extension 2631, or DSN 923-2134, extension 2631.✳

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The Continuing Conflict between the Two Koreas Over Disputed Waters

by Specialist
Heather Ann Sroufe

During June 1999, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea (North and South Korea respectively) became embroiled in a dispute over a stretch of water in the Yellow Sea. The disputed area lies midway between the North Korean mainland and five small Republic of Korea (ROK) islands located 60 miles southwest of Seoul; the area is valued for its rich crab harvest. The United Nations (U.N.) Command demarcated the disputed waters following the armistice in July 1953 that halted the fighting between the two countries. It is important to note that the sea border imposed by the U.N. Command was not included in the armistice that the North Korean (DPRK) Government signed in 1953.

Due to this fact, North Korea has, since the 1970s, regularly sent its fishing boats and naval ships into the area protesting the sea boundary. In these instances, ROK patrol boats were able to elicit the quick withdrawal of DPRK vessels. This remained the pattern between the two nations until June 1999, when DPRK vessels crossing the sea boundary refused escort out of the buffer zone by ROK patrol boats.

Eight-Day June 1999 Standoff

This incident began an eight-day standoff between the two Koreas, during which the North warned the South to withdraw its warships from the area or face military strikes. The South responded to the North's threat by putting its 65,000 troops on heightened alert and placing more ships in the area. The standoff finally culminated into a firefight between the two nations on 15 June, resulting in the deaths

of thirty DPRK sailors when South Korean warships sank their torpedo boat. According to the ROK Defense Ministry, DPRK vessels provoked the attack by firing upon ROK ships, wounding seven ROK sailors. The attack occurred just thirty minutes prior to the first meeting between leaders of the U.N. Command and North Korea in which they were to discuss the naval standoff.

High-Level Talks on Reuniting Families

On 22 June, seven days following the incident, the governments of North and South Korea met in the highest-level talks held in more than a year. Originally scheduled for 21 June, North Korean officials postponed the meeting until the arrival of a 22,000-pound shipment of fertilizer promised to them by the ROK Government. The shipment was part of an agreement made in early June to entice the North to the bargaining table. Delayed by

inclement weather, the shipment reached the North Korean port of Nampo early on 22 June, thereby clearing the way for DPRK negotiators to resume talks.

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the issue of reuniting families separated by the partitioning of Korea after the Korean War and the possibility of the ROK Government providing aid to the famine-stricken North. After just 90 minutes of talks held in Beijing, People's Republic of China, the North Korean Government refused to meet with the South again until they received an apology for the 15 June confrontation. Later, however, the North Korean delegation, headed by Park Young Su, agreed to a second round of talks without conditions. The same day, generals from the U.S.-led U.N. Command held a second meeting with DPRK generals at the border village of Panmunjon to discuss ways to avoid further confrontation. The two groups failed to produce any agreement.

The second round of talks between the two Koreas occurred on 26 June and was again marred by the memory of the naval clash in the Yellow Sea as well as the detention of an American citizen visiting a North Korean economic zone near the Chinese border. In a goodwill gesture, however, the North Korean Government finally released a ROK tourist held for six days for allegedly trying to persuade a DPRK tour guide to defect.

Again, the two sides were to discuss the possible reunion of families and providing aid to the North. However, the DPRK delegation demanded that the South assume responsibility for what it called an *"armed provocation."* Two hours of talks produced only a commitment to further talks on 1 July and the

Figure 1. Korean Peninsula and the Disputed Area in the Yellow Sea.

North's promise to consider South Korea's plan for reunification of an estimated 10 million families. In a third session with North Korean generals, the U.N. Command urged the North to keep its ships north of the sea border and proposed several ways of improving communications between the navies of the two nations to avoid further conflict.

The Northern delegation, headed by Lieutenant General Ri Chan Bok, remained steadfast in their declaration that the South should stay out of North Korea's territorial waters. Lieutenent General Ri Chan Bok told the U.N. Command

that "more serious bloodshed" will be inevitable unless South Korean battleships stop intruding into the North's territorial waters.

In a final attempt to discuss the issue of family reunions, the North and South came together again on 1 July. The meeting ended with the ROK Government pulling its negotiators after just 75 minutes of talks. They left due to the North's insistence on receiving an apology for the naval clash and their refusal to discuss the family reunions unless Seoul sent more fertilizer to the famine-stricken North. In response to his country's disappointment at

the North's unwillingness to cooperate, Chief South Korean delegate Yang Young-Shik stated, "We believe it is meaningless to continue on like this and have decided to go back to Korea."[1] They set no date for further talks.

Missile Launch Discussions

In the meantime, ROK President Kim Dae-jung and U.S. President William Clinton met to discuss the looming suspicion that North Korea is preparing to test-launch another long-range missile similar to the one luanched over Japan last year.

Intelligence reports suggest that the North Korean Government now has the capability to follow up last year's test with a missile capable of reaching Alaska or Hawaii. During the 2 July meeting, the two Presidents agreed that any further long-range ballistic missile tests conducted by North Korea would pose a *"serious obstacle to peace."* The two-hour meeting ended without providing specifics for dealing with any missile test conducted by the North. After the meeting with President Clinton, President Kim met with Former Defense Secretary William Perry, who is conducting an extensive reevaluation of the U.S. policy towards North Korea.

Outlook for the Future

North Korea's conduct in the midst of the sea confrontation with the South has shown that it will continue to feign persecution by ROK actions in the area despite strong indications that the North itself is the source of the aggression in many instances. The North's unwavering stance on the issue of the sea confrontation also indicates that it will make further incursions into ROK waters. These incursions, however, are simply distracters used to test the South's resolve and to cause a scene, so to speak, in which the North might curry support from the larger international community. During this confrontation, the North has also shown that is has no qualms about using its cooperation in talks to garner aid for its starving citizens. This is a strong indication that the ROK and U.S. administrations should seriously consider changing their policy toward the North favoring a policy that is less reliant on complying with demands set forth by DPRK.

The North uses its missile program (which has caused agitation in Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo alike) to some extent in the same manner as their cooperation in talks—as a bargaining chip. Although it cannot complete economically with the South, the North through its possession of missiles can at least militarily assert itself as a credible force in the face of any perceived threat from its southern neighbor and its allies.

The North's missile program also functions a bargaining chip for receipt of further aid from the United States, which has been working toward convincing the North Korean regime to give up the program—albeit to no avail. In lieu of any missile launches by North Korea, Japan has already promised to stop the flow of funds to North Korea from the 100,000 North Koreans living in Japan. In the end, actions taken against North Korea's vulnerable economy may serve as the greatest tool to deter northern officials from testing their neighbors by disguising aggression in the form of a long-range missile test launch.✳

Endnotes

1. Hutzler, Charles, "Talks Between Korea's Stall Again," *Washington Post*, 2 July 1999, Online. Internet address http://search.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/WAPO/19990702/V000157-070299-idx.html.2.

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INVESTIGATIVE AGENTS: PUTTING THEORY INTO PRACTICE

by Major Joseph P. Hoppa (USAF, Retired) and Abigail Gray-Briggs, Ph.D.

Editor's Note: In this article, the authors describe how information collectors (such as counterintelligence or criminal investigation agents) can use the Geert Hofstede model to assess and classify organizations based on four dimensions of cultural variability. It can serve as a guide for establishing rapport and effective relations when circumstances necessitate working with foreign groups or agencies. Use of his model can facilitate and possibly expedite the collection of force protection information.

A primary mission of intelligence personnel during military contingency operations is to obtain accurate threat information for the protection of U.S. military forces operating in a foreign country or region. Commanders are acutely aware of the necessity to protect their forces and depend heavily on the intelligence elements for such information.

Often the intelligence or investigation teams collect force protection information through interfacing with allied military or paramilitary groups, foreign law enforcement agencies (LEAs), political parties, and former warring factions. These teams include the Services' groups such as the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) and Army counterintelligence (CI) teams and Criminal Investigation Division (CID) personnel. Both the increase in U.S. military operations overseas and the decrease in permanent overseas U.S. military installations compound the challenge of this mission.

This article examines Geert H. Hofstede's[1] four dimensions of cultural variability (uncertainty avoidance, individualism-collectivism, power distance, and masculinity-femininity)[2] and applies these dimensions to collection operations. It is clear that CI/CID agents can use Hofstede's dimensions of cultural variability to plan, direct, and explain their efforts to collect threat information from foreign LEAs and other groups in first-contact situations. In addition, Hofstede's dimensions of cultural variability can assist agents in addressing the critical tasks of establishment of credibility, use of incentives, selection of sources, and evaluation of information.

Dimensions of Cultural Variability

In his landmark work, Geert Hofstede identified four dimensions of cultural variability that provide broad explanatory concepts for differences between cultures (see Figure 1). An examination of Hofstede's variability dimensions leads to powerful implications for first-contact situations between agents and foreign military, law enforcement, and other groups.

Uncertainty Avoidance

Hofstede suggests that a fundamental dimension of any culture is the level of tolerance it has for uncertainty and ambiguity. He labeled this dimension "uncertainty avoidance." According to Hofstede, cultures with high uncertainty avoidance value conformity, maintain rigid codes of belief and behavior, and do not tolerate deviation, while those with low uncertainty avoidance maintain a *"more relaxed atmosphere where deviance is more easily tolerated."* [3]

Agencies as well as individual officers use groups, rituals, codes, and myths to help them deal with the uncertainty of their work. How members of a foreign agency perceive and handle danger and uncertainty is a critical factor in first-contact situations. On the one


Figure 1. Hofstede's Dimensions of Cultural Variability.

hand, the level of uncertainty avoidance explains how they treat strangers, including foreign personnel. A myriad of rules and regulations governing potential situations may express a high degree of uncertainty avoidance. Agents need to discover the rules governing cooperation between agencies and follow them if they are to gain access to the agency. On the other hand, a high degree of uncertainty avoidance may also determine the quality and type of information available. Organizations with high uncertainty avoidance generally have established a tight network of reliable informants to maximize their available quality information. The existence of an established, reliable source network has tremendous implications for an outside agency interested in accurate threat information.

Conversely, law enforcement forces willing to tolerate a great deal of uncertainty and ambiguity may assume a more reactive posture. They may not have established a productive human source network, which means an outside agency would have to recruit and cultivate its own sources.

Individualism Versus Collectivism

Hofstede's second dimension of cultural variability is that of "individualism-collectivism." He says that individualistic cultures place emphasis on the achievements, initiative, and goals of the individual, while collectivist cultures subordinate those to group membership and the goals of the group.

Despite rituals, codes, and regulations, organizations expect their personnel to function independently in making discretionary, often hasty, judgments in any given situation. They strive for individual accomplishments, such as discovering a guerrilla hideout, making difficult arrests as a means to gain recognition, promotion, or citations.[4]

LEA personnel often decide whether a situation will result in formal charges, and if it does what the outcome will be.[5] As Bittner suggests, *"The fact that all police officers are in some sense individual entrepreneurs while they are also dependent on one another gives their unity a fraternal cast."*[6]

The dimension of individualism carries unique implications for communication with foreign groups in initial-contact situations. For example, the degree of emphasis placed on individual initiative and achievement assists an outside agency in determining the best (or least offensive) way to use incentives or gifts. Further, the lure of formal recognition or citations of merit, perhaps as a means for promotion, from a ranking U.S. official might inspire foreign officers to devote significant energy to assist our agents' collection efforts.

"Collectivism" is likewise laden with potential for communication with foreign groups. Military or LEA officers form tight bonds with each other and exclude untested outsiders. While the likelihood that foreign personnel would invite agents into their inner circles during first-contact situations is slim, agents can use their military or law enforcement status to gain access to foreign groups and establish a degree of solidarity.[7] They can concentrate their efforts on a particular group, such as officers or detective corps. Learning their rituals and unwritten rules is an effective means to accommodate and join that group. The quality of information and more importantly the level of effort foreign personnel are willing to expend using their network to find the information the agent seeks changes dramatically.

CI/CID agents must also explore additional implications of this dimension that extend beyond the foreign military and LEAs to the broader society of a particular country. For example, understanding this dimension in a society assists

agents' efforts to recruit and motivate outside sources of information. This dimension also helps agents understand the general nature of threats they may face. For example, seemingly isolated criminal or terrorist actions by members of a highly collectivist society may actually be part of a well-coordinated effort by a hostile group.

Power Versus Distance

Hofstede defined his third dimension of cultural variability, "power distance," as *"the extent to which the members of a society accept that power in institutions and organizations is distributed unequally."*[8] Individuals in cultures with high power distance accept power and authority as part of life and consequently place high value on obedience to superiors and following orders. In a culture having low power distance, individuals value equality and may question the orders of superiors before following them.[9] The power distribution custom within the organization has important consequences for an outside agency attempting to gain access to the right sources of authority or information.

It is imperative in an initial contact situation to determine early the authority structure and hierarchical elements of a foreign organization. A recent study of large LEAs in Europe indicated that the best cooperation between forces takes place at the broad level of detectives and investigators.[10] However, in a small country or region, the chief, captain, or his deputy may be the right point of contact.[11] Although establishing contact with senior foreign officials is an essential part of professional courtesy, agents must assess the implications of spending a great deal of time with them. This is especially true of large agencies where the most senior officials are primarily administrators, while the critical threat information and corresponding human source activities reside at a lower level.

U.S. agents must also determine the level of power and authority perceived and maintained by a foreign organization and its personnel. Individual officers in a foreign law enforcement agency can exercise considerable, even unopposed, power in their dealings with the public. This has tremendous implications for first-contact situations with a foreign LEA. The level of power and authority perceived and maintained by that agency and its officers can help our agents decide whether requesting help from them or offering to assist them would be more productive in their quest for information.

Masculinity–Femininity

Hofstede's fourth dimension of cultural variability is "masculinity-femininity." This dimension addresses the fundamental issue of the way a society allocates social roles to the sexes. Hofstede found that a culture high in masculinity tends to maximize the social differentiation between the sexes. For example, in a culture high in masculinity, men have outgoing and assertive roles and women have caring and nurturing roles. Hofstede found that a culture high in femininity tends to minimize social differentiation between the sexes; for example, women can take assertive roles and men can take caring roles. Highly masculine cultures value power, assertiveness, and heroism; they find motivation in achievement, performance, recognition, and admiration of the strong. Highly feminine cultures tend to value people, modesty, quality of life, and nurturance and gain assurance in solidarity, relationships, and sympathy for the weak.[12]

The demographics of a foreign group assist agents in determining the masculine or feminine dimension of cultural variability within that group. In **Police for the Future**, David Bayley notes that law enforcement is a male-dominated profession and that females account for two percent of law enforcement officers in Japan and seven- to ten-percent of all law enforcement officers in the United States, Australia, Great Britain, and Canada. He argues that the low percentage of female law enforcement officers is due to the "*physicality, danger, and sleaze*" of the work and the fact that many male law enforcement officers do not welcome women. They find the employment of women "*subtly demeaning to their pride*" and "*a threat to the often bawdy and lowbrow atmosphere of their work environment.*"[13]

When in initial contact with a foreign agency, observing a large number of female officials or law enforcement officers is a powerful indicator that the agency tends to minimize social differentiation between the sexes and therefore could be assessed as high in "femininity." However, the implications of observing a small percentage of female law enforcement officers in a foreign LEA are not so clear. Hofstede found that males popu-late most institutions in both masculine and feminine cultures.[14] U.S. agents must therefore carefully observe other indicators, such as the interaction of law enforcement officers (both with each other and the public), before making an assessment of the masculinity or femininity of that agency.

Understanding this dimension as it applies to a foreign agency provides powerful clues for our agents attempting to gain access, establish credibility, and obtain their support. The rank, position, and title of the U.S. personnel may be more useful in gaining access and establishing credibility with a highly masculine foreign agency than with a highly feminine one. Our agents must establish credibility with a foreign organization. Officials in a highly masculine foreign agency may respond favorably to an agent who is assertive and aggressive, and may welcome that agent into their inner groups. Conversely, officers in a highly feminine agency may respond more favorably to the

High Uncertainty Avoidance High Power Distance Individualistic Masculine 1	High Uncertainty Avoidance Low Power Distance Individualistic Masculine 2	High Uncertainty Avoidance High Power Distance Collectivist Masculine 3	High Uncertainty Avoidance Low Power Distance Collectivist Masculine 4
High Uncertainty Avoidance High Power Distance Individualistic Feminine 5	High Uncertainty Avoidance Low Power Distance Individualistic Feminine 6	High Uncertainty Avoidance High Power Distance Collectivist Feminine 7	High Uncertainty Avoidance Low Power Distance Collectivist Feminine 8
Low Uncertainty Avoidance High Power Distance Individualistic Masculine 9	Low Uncertainty Avoidance Low Power Distance Individualistic Masculine 10	Low Uncertainty Avoidance High Power Distance Collectivist Masculine 11	Low Uncertainty Avoidance Low Power Distance Collectivist Masculine 12
Low Uncertainty Avoidance High Power Distance Individualistic Feminine 13	Low Uncertainty Avoidance Low Power Distance Individualistic Feminine 14	Low Uncertainty Avoidance High Power Distance Collectivist Feminine 15	Low Uncertainty Avoidance Low Power Distance Collectivist Feminine 16

Figure 2. Possible Combinations of the Dimensions of Cultural Variability.

Value of the Four Indices for Thirty Countries and Two Regions*

Country	Individualism	Power distance	Uncertainty avoidance	Masculinity
Argentina	46	49	86	56
Brazil	38	69	76	49
Chile	23	63	86	28
Colombia	13	67	80	64
Costa Rica	15	35	86	21
Equador	08	78	67	63
Greece	35	60	112	57
Guatemala	06	95	101	37
Hong Kong	25	68	29	57
Indonesia	14	78	48	46
India	48	77	40	56
Iran	41	58	59	43
Ireland	70	28	35	68
Israel	54	13	81	47
Korea (S)	18	60	85	39
Malaysia	26	104	36	50
Mexico	30	81	82	69
Pakistan	14	55	70	50
Panama	11	95	86	44
Peru	16	64	87	42
Philippines	32	94	44	64
Salvador	19	66	94	40
Sweden	71	31	29	05
Taiwan	17	58	69	45
Thailand	20	64	64	34
Turkey	37	66	85	45
Uruguay	36	61	100	38
United States	91	40	46	62
Venezuela	12	81	76	73
Yugoslavia	27	76	88	21
West Africa (R)	20	77	54	46
Arab Centers (R)	38	80	68	53

* Hofstede, "Cultural Dimensions in Management and Planning," pages 94-95.

Figure 3. Relative Scores for 30 Countries and 2 Regions on the 4 Indices of Cultural Variability.

agent who takes a less aggressive or more modest approach.

To gain their support, agents can gauge the use and type of incentives based on the dimension of masculinity-femininity manifest in a foreign organization. The use of money, individual citations, or other forms of recognition may motivate personnel in a highly masculine foreign group to assist the agent. However, officers in a highly feminine foreign LEA may find reward, satisfaction, and motivation solely in the establishment of a working relationship with the CI/CID agent.

Assessing the Dimensions of Cultural Variability

While each of Hofstede's dimensions of cultural variability is actually a spectrum that spans the gradations between two possible assessments (poles), one could use just the poles to simplify classi-

fication of an agency. The dimensions of uncertainty avoidance and power distance are "high" and "low." In contrast to a "high-low" assessment, the dimension of individualism-collectivism is individualistic or collectivistic and similarly, the spectrum of the masculinity-femininity dimension runs from masculine to feminine. One of the 16 combinations represented in Figure 2 can describe any agency.

U.S. agents must assess the general manifestations of the four dimensions as early as possible in a first-contact situation. They should then make critical observations and inquiries to help them identify the combination of dimensions of cultural variability that best represents the foreign organization. Agents can also benefit from knowing how the particular country or region manifests the dimensions of cultural variability. Hofstede identified relative scores on each of his four dimensions of cultural variability for many countries and several regions but not contingency areas (see Figure 3).[15] He ranked the dimensions on an approximate scale of zero to one hundred. Although the list does not address all countries or regions of the world, it can help agents assess the dimensions of cultural variability's manifestations for a particular country and the organizations and agencies within that country.

Conclusion

Efforts to collect timely and accurate information are especially critical in first-contact contingency situations when protection of U.S. forces from a variety of threats is foremost. Despite advanced training opportunities and programs, we often leave collection efforts to ingenuity of the individual agent or his immediate commander. The consequences of using a "hit or miss" approach with foreign agencies in initial contacts, however, can prove costly or even fatal to

U.S. forces operating in a country or region.

Hofstede's dimensions of cultural variability provide early positive direction for our agents' collection efforts. An understanding of these dimensions moves the United States one step closer to providing the best assessment of a country's cultural variability and enhancing our force protection. ✳

Endnotes

1. Geert H. Hofstede is a Professor of Organizational Anthropology and International Management at the University of Limburg at Maastricht, The Netherlands, where he is the founder and first Director of the Institute for Research on Intercultural Cooperation (IRIC). In his landmark work, **Culture's Consequences**, this internationally renowned scholar empirically derived four dimensions of cultural variability in a large-scale study of multinational corporations. This work is considered a classic in the field of international culture. Hofstede is one of the true trailblazers in the field of international and intercultural relations.

2. Geert H. Hofstede, **Culture's Consequences** (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1980), pages 92-100, 153-161, and 213-219.

3. Geert H. Hofstede, "Cultural Dimensions in Management and Planning," in **Readings on Communicating with Strangers: An Approach to Intercultural Communication**, William B. Gudykunst and Young Yun Kim, Editors (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1992), page 91.4. Egon Bittner, "Florence Nightingale in Pursuit of Willie Sutton: A Theory of the Police," in **The Potential Reform of Criminal Justice**, Herbert Jacob, Editor (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1974), page 22.

5. David H. Bayley, **Police for the Future** (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1994), pages vii-viii and 73.

6. Egon Bittner, **The Functions of the Police in Modern Society** (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), page 65.

7. This worked exceptionally well for the security arrangements before and during the United States–Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Presidential Summit in Malta (December 1989). The Maltese police welcomed Major Hoppa (representing AFOSI) as a fellow law enforcement member, and he gained access to critical information not available through military channels.

8. Geert H. Hofstede, "Cultural Dimensions in Management and Planning," page 91.

9. William B. Gudykunst and Young Yun Kim, **Communicating with Strangers: An Approach to Intercultural Communication**, (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1992), page 47.

10. John Benyon, "Policing the European Union: The Changing Basis of Cooperation on Law Enforcement," **International Affairs**, Volume 70, July 1994, page 503.

11. Air Force Office of Special Investigations, **Trip Report—The Malta Summit**, 9 December 1989, page 2.

12. Hofstede, "Cultural Dimensions in Management and Planning," page 92.

13. Bayley, page 72.

14. Hofstede, "Cultural Dimensions in Management and Planning," page 92.

15. Hofstede's original chart evaluated 50 countries and 3 regions on the indices.

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Intelligence Activities And Environmental Concerns

by Major Salvador E. Gomez

As the leaders of the United States and Latin America observe the twilight of the 20th century, they can take credit for their success in eliminating dictatorships and implementing democratic governments throughout the American continent. However, as our leaders view the dawn of the new millennium, they must recognize the threats that await our continent and its nascent democracies in the 21st century. Corruption, external debt, drug trafficking, and environmental degradation are four significant threats that our national leaders face today and will continue to encounter in the next century.

The focus of this paper is the role the U.S. intelligence community can play in assisting Latin American (LATAM) countries in halting environmental degradation. The United States can and must support the LATAM countries in the environment with the same fervor it displayed in stemming the expansion of Communism throughout the region in the 1970s and 1980s.

Background

At the Conference of the Americas held in Miami in 1994, the Clinton Administration *"agreed to a detailed plan of cooperative action in such diverse fields as health, education, science and technology, [and] environmental* protection..."[1] The United States can offer support and fulfill this agreement by expanding the use of its intelligence collection platforms and analytical assets to deal with Latin America's environmental concerns.

Undoubtedly, there will be those who oppose this initiative to expand the intelligence community's mission. Opponents will most likely be skeptics who do not believe that there is an environmental crisis or those who believe it is inappropriate for our government intelligence agencies to work on environmental issues. To appreciate fully the need for this initiative, it is important to recognize the following points.

- Environmental threats are pervasive and affect the entire hemisphere including the United States.

- Environmental degradation diminishes economic gains in Latin America.

- Environmental degradation may result in political instability and violence.

- Protecting the environment is in the United States' national interest.

- U.S. support "legitimizes" conservation efforts by the LATAM governments and non-government organizations.

- The global situation now allows us to focus on environmental concerns.

- Intelligence assets are in place; minor personnel changes are required.

Environmental degradation is pervasive and affects the entire hemisphere, including the United States both directly and indirectly. The negligent activities of a country or group of individuals anywhere on the American Continent can adversely affect the citizens of many other countries on the continent; undoubtedly *"the world is increasingly interdependent environmentally as well as economically."*[2] Until recently, the United States has not tenaciously dealt with envi-

The Costa Rica Rain Forest attracts many ecotourists.

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ronmental concerns. As the remaining "superpower," the United States must take the lead in curtailing the deterioration of the environment.

Latin America has historically been vulnerable to political instability due to imperialism, economic disparities, and corrupt and inept governments. Environmental decay is now another on this list of destabilizing factors. That "environmental change may contribute to conflicts as diverse as war, terrorism, or diplomatic or trade disputes"[3] should not surprise anyone. Conservationists in Guatemala have already been the targets of hostilities having had their workers kidnapped and squatters destroying their station in the Petén Region.[4]

Potential LATAM Environmental Problems

Potential problems and hazards stemming from environmental concerns are surfacing throughout Latin America and posing potential challenges for the United States. "Some experts propose that environmental change may shift the balance of power between states either regionally or globally, producing instabilities that can lead to war."[5] The following list is simply a sample of the environmental concerns throughout Latin America and does not imply that only the countries identified have these problems.

Mexico. The situation in Mexico is a matter of considerable concern. Mexico's deserts are expanding quickly while the irrigated areas are dwindling, as is productivity. Mexico's population growth rate compounds this problem: estimates put Mexico's population at 109 million people by the year 2,000.[6] Migration across the 2000-mile border we share with Mexico is one result of these two factors.

El Salvador. In El Salvador, more than 5 million people occupy an area about the size of Massa-

chusetts. Agriculture is vital to the nation's economy. Unfortunately,

soil erosion is extensive and often severe. [The] Salvadoran forests are a matter of history....As a result of general degradation of agricultural resources among other factors, El Salvador is increasingly unable to feed itself.[7]

Migration may have been one of the causes of the 1969 "Soccer War" between El Salvador and Honduras. This crisis will undoubtedly lead to mass migration from El Salvador to other regional countries and most likely the United States.

Guatemala. Guatemalan authorities are making great efforts to preserve the Petén. Unfortunately, the squatters illegally settling in the region are challenging them.

The government is in a delicate position. In December 1996, it signed a peace accord ending a bloody, three-decade-long guerrilla war. Many peasants mistakenly believe that the treaty includes promises of free land for the landless, and they are coming to the Petén Region to claim it.[8]

Dominican Republic. In the Dominican Republic, "government actions strongly influenced deforestation"[9]; this sort of activity is dangerous to the well being of the population. Unfortunately, "prospects for rehabilitation of the deforested area are gloomy." [10] Elsewhere in the Caribbean the coral reefs that offer protection as well as food are also in serious danger. "Two thirds of the Caribbean's coral reefs are threatened by human activities."[11]

Colombia. In addition to its constant battle with narco-guerillas, Colombian officials must also worry about the threats to its environment such as deforestation, air pollution, and water pollution.

Numerous forest, fisheries and wildlife resources have been over-exploited resulting in the

fragmentation of habitat and the associated species loss. In the last 25 years, the deforestation rate has fluctuated between 300,000 and 800,000 hectares per year, which has destroyed over 30 percent of Colombia's native forests.[12]

Madidi National Park in the Bolivian Amazon.

Political and Economic Impacts

Damage to the environment also threatens the economic growth and stability of many Latin American countries. In the recent past, goods and services related to a healthy environment have proven to be a great source of income and foreign currency to countries throughout the region. The following are the leading economic trends, industries, and services that a blossoming environment can offer Latin America.

Ecotourism. Individuals who have never experienced the beauty or thrill of traveling in a rain forest can now do so through ecotourism; many countries depend on tourism to enhance their economies. One need look no further than Costa Rica, "the [number] one earner of foreign exchange, generating roughly $700 million annually"[13], to witness the success of ecotourism.

Deforestation due to road construction in Suriname.

Debt-for-Nature Swaps. These swaps help countries decrease their debt while preserving the environment. Bolivia, Costa Rica, and Ecuador have all participated in such swaps, which allow conservation groups to purchase a portion of the national debt in return for the establishment of parks by the government. It is important to note that *"there is no loss of sovereignty over natural resources."*[14]

Carbon Storage. This concept of carbon storage has proven to be another viable source of income for Latin American countries and is forging a partnership between industry and conservationists in Costa Rica. Carbon storage

projects allow polluters to offset their CO_2 [carbon dioxide] emissions by guaranteeing that an equal amount of gas is absorbed from the atmosphere by young, growing trees or stored as carbon in mature forests.[15]

Bioprospecting. Pharmaceutical and medical research companies have also discovered the promise of the rain forests. Some researchers believe that the cures for cancer, acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), and other life threatening diseases can be found in the in the rain forests. Colombia

and Costa Rica, with the help of pharmaceutical researchers, have *"turned the genes and chemicals inside forests organisms…into commodities."*[16]

No doubt should exist that a healthy environment is economically, socially, and politically advantageous for the LATAM countries. Despite the prospects that environmental preservation offers, it is clear by the information presented above that the threat of environmental degradation is ubiquitous. Fortunately, U.S. leaders recognize that *"environmental forces transcend borders and oceans to threaten directly the health, prosperity and jobs of the American people….The environment has a profound impact on our [U.S.] national interest."*[17] To deal with any and all of the issues addressed in this paper, U.S. foreign policy must include environmental issues.

The highest levels of the U.S. Government express concerns over environmental issues. Vice-President Al Gore's book about the environment, **Earth in the Balance**, is indicative of the importance that the Clinton Administration places on the issue. While visiting Stanford University, former

Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated,

our Administration has recognized from the beginning that our ability to advance our global interests is inextricably linked to how we manage the Earth's natural resources….We are determined to put environmental issues where they belong: in the mainstream of American foreign policy.[18]

Increased Intelligence Focus on the Environment

In order to develop, propose, and implement appropriate policies, decision-makers require accurate and reliable intelligence. For the past fifty years, the U.S. intelligence community has predominately focused on defense-related issues. *"Until now the Cold War provided an alibi to avoid tackling many global issues."*[19] Today the Communist threat has nearly disappeared. Now is the time to dedicate intelligence assets on other issues that threaten our nation, this hemisphere, and its citizens. This does not imply that we ignore potential "hot spots" such as North Korea or Iraq. The intent of this initiative is simply to focus the intelligence community's attention on other threats to our way of life.

It is important to remind skeptics that the intelligence community's purpose is to provide decision-makers with accurate and reliable information. *"The U.S. intelligence effort is composed of information gathering and information analyzing activities in support of the process of policy formulation."*[20] The fundamental intelligence mission will not change by increasing the level of attention directed towards environmental issues. Consumers will continue to request information, collection assets will target areas of interest or concern, and we will collect, analyze, and disseminate information.

The increased focus on environmental issues by the intelligence

community will be transparent and cost effective. Former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director John Deutch stated during a speech in Los Angeles that *"environmental intelligence is not a new or expensive area of endeavor for the intelligence community."*[21] The vast majority of systems needed to collect information are already in place. The imagery intelligence (IMINT) platforms now in orbit will receive the lion's share of the requests for data collection. This does not imply that human intelligence (HUMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) assets will not play a role.

Applying the "INTs" to the Environment

IMINT platforms can systematically monitor deforestation and expanding deserts such as those in Mexico. In the past, use of these systems in Africa was for this very reason. In Africa, overhead platforms allowed *"experts to track any ongoing deforestation by analyzing satellite images...when it became too dangerous for field staff to venture into the region."*[22] These platforms also track meteorological data, which is vital in cases of severe weather or natural disasters that may result in loss of life and property. Employment of imagery platforms permits the analysis of crop size. This facilitates the quick deployment of foodstuffs thus avoiding tragedies like those experienced in the African countries of Sudan and Ethiopia.

Environmental concerns have resulted in various treaties and agreements designed to protect the environment. One example of such an agreement is found in the Organization of American States (OAS) document *Declaration of Santa Cruz and Plan for Action for the Sustainable Development of the Americas.* In this declaration, the signatories state:

Planning and decision-making for sustainable development re-

© Edward C. Wolfe.

Deforestation in Bolivia.

quire understanding and integrating environmental considerations, as well as social and economic factors. We will assess the environmental impact of our policies, strategies, programs, and projects nationally and in the framework of international agreements to ensure that we adverse environmental effects are identified, prevented, minimized, or mitigated, as appropriate.[23]

President Ronald Reagan's rule of *"trust but verify"* when dealing with arms control should apply also to issues dealing with environmental preservation. Use of intelligence systems for verification of environmental treaties is crucial to protecting the environment and keeping the signatories honest. HUMINT and IMINT assets can both serve in the verification process.

Through debriefings, we can effectively exploit HUMINT sources and activities in gathering intelligence. Strategic debriefers can systematically interview U.S. military personnel returning from missions throughout Latin America. Of particular interest would be members of medical teams returning

from Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP) missions and engineer units, such as those employed in Honduras during missions like *Habriendo Caminos.* These individuals often work in rural areas and constantly interact with the local population. They can provide information about the environment and projects in the surrounding area. For example, before clearing a portion of the rain forest, it is necessary to acquire plans, equipment, and laborers. Through debriefings, the proper authorities can quickly learn of these sorts of activities.

Intelligence activities are often sensitive issues and demand very delicate handling. We must assure our allies in Latin America that we are not "spying" but merely collecting intelligence to assist and support their efforts in preserving the environment. To do this, the United States must establish a politically acceptable mechanism for collecting, disseminating and sharing intelligence.

One option is for the intelligence community to work closer with members of academia and nongovernmental organizations such as Conservation International. A

successful precedent for this approach exists: at the behest of then Senator Al Gore, the CIA created the Environmental Task Force in 1992 to work with various scientists from outside the intelligence community. These individuals received access to intelligence material collected in the past and the information they provided to the task force was invaluable.

Another option is the establishment of an Inter-American Environmental Intelligence Team. The United States, through the auspices of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), can establish such a team. The team would disseminate all of the information collected to the proper authorities through either the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) or the appropriate committee of the OAS. Disseminating information through the IADB or the OAS would assure all countries that the United States was not spying on one country at the behest of another.

Outlook

The intelligence community has served this country well. It can continue to do so in this post-Cold War era by diversifying its focus. Environmental threats are real and pervasive. In addition to armed threats, *"we must also contend with the vast new danger posed to our national interests by damage to the environment and resulting global and regional instability."*[24] Former CIA Director Deutch attested to the fact that the intelligence community can and has supported policies regarding the environment. This expanded mission is cost-effective because the systems and methodologies already exist. Minor changes in personnel recruiting may be necessary to meet the need for additional analysts with backgrounds in environmental sciences and perhaps agronomy.

This notion of expanding the employment of U.S. intelligence collection platforms and analytical assets to address environmental issues is very promising. Lester R. Brown of the Worldwatch Institute stated, *"we do not have generations...we only have years in which to turn things around."*[25] Our technologically advanced intelligence systems allow us to compete with time. This effort has the potential to save thousands, if not millions of lives through conservation plans, early warning, and land management. We will also save countless species from extinction. Intelligence systems and operatives can greatly assist in verifying environmental agreements and in providing information about possible hostilities or actions that may lead to instability. The intelligence community can contribute significantly to preserving our environment if tasked appropriately. As one CIA source poignantly stated, "We won the *Cold War, what can we do for you now?"*[26] ✱

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Major Salvador E. Gomez is currently an instructor in the 304th MI Battalion, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca. He is a Latin America Foreign Area Officer. His previous assignments include positions as a Company Commander, Battalion S2, G2 Planner, and Area Intelligence Officer. Major Gomez has served in the Republic of Panama, Republic of El Salvador, Fort Devens, Massachusetts, and Fort Riley Kansas. Commissioned as an MI Second Lieutenant through ROTC, he has a Bachelor of Science degree in Sociology from Suffolk University and a Master of Public and International Affairs degree from the University of Pittsburgh's Graduate School of Public and International Affairs degree from the University of Pittsburgh's Graduate School of Public and International Affairs (GSPIA). Major Gomez is a graduate of the Command and General Staff Officer's Course at the U.S. Army School of the Americas (USARSA) in Fort Benning, Georgia. Readers can reach him at via E-mail at gomezs@huachuca-emh1.army.mil and by telephone at (520) 538-7788 or DSN 879-7788.

LETTERS

To the Editor:

I very much enjoyed the article by Staff Sergeants Dick and Lydon, "LRSU: Eyes of the Commander," in the July-September 1999 issue of *MIPB*.

Long-Range Surveillance Units (LRSUs) are a great collection source that needs all the positive publicity it can get. However, as much as I enjoyed the article, I feel compelled to comment on the planning process (as described in the article) from a force protection perspective.

As stated by the authors, LRSU is a collection asset "owned" by the corps or division commander and thus, any LRSU operation is a division or corps operational planning event. The article described a process essentially divorced from the corps and division planning influence. This is a mistake for several reasons.

LRSUs cannot insert themselves; therefore, it is imperative to bring their source of transportation into the planning cycle immediately upon receipt of their mission. The coordination for current intelligence, airspace and passage of lines (depending on the mission), fires, air defense weapons status, and planning security is not something the LRSUs have the resources to execute, plan, or coordinate. The article described a process that was essentially without the essential battlefield operating system (BOS) planners or representatives. To not include these personnel would be to risk inserting an LRSU team into an enemy position, or worse, to create the perfect environment for fratricide. Having had my own personal experience with LRSU operations, I can report that "hand waving" at the intensive details is essentially inviting disaster and placing soldiers in harm's way unnecessarily.

Secondly, I would venture to guess that all LRSU soldiers want to know the how and when of their extraction. The same intensity of planning, discussion of details, and participation by essential BOS representatives is also required for extraction operations before mission execution.

Also not emphasized in the article is the fact that all the tactical and operational planners, and even the division or corps commander (or at least the assistant division commander) would attend the LRSU rehearsal. The personnel involved with the rehearsal and the associated terrain board process are worthy of a separate article.

The article briefly touched on the aforementioned areas, but left the reader with the impression that LRSU operations are a routine "check the block" list of coordination measures that are stand-alone LRSU functions. I mention these points so that we do not assume a business-as-usual attitude regarding the lives of our soldiers.

Major Mark A. Farrar
Fort Knox, Kentucky

SSG Lydon's Response:

In response to Major Farrar's letter, it seems that SSG Dick and I need to clarify some points with reference to our article. The notion that coordinations are a "check the block" procedure was one that we did not mean to convey. Major Farrar makes some excellent points but the main focus of the article was on the team. Additional articles could discuss the roles of various BOSs on the planning and execution of LRSU missions.

However, the first point Major Farrar makes is valid. The planning cycle for the corps or division must integrate LRS planning. It does in fact, but that occurs at a level above that at which the team plans and the team receives the information pertinent to their mission. However, planning infiltration air routes, fires available, and so forth is above the team's planning authority—they can only request such support. The operations section and the G2 and G3 elements will coordinate much of that information and support during the planning process.

It is true that everyone wants to know when the extraction will be. Those details are covered at the same time as the insertion planning. The team also coordinates for and plans their EPA (Evasion Plan of Action) which includes evade and recovery (E&R) corridors, routes to contact points within (safe area for evasion) sectors, and numerous other contingency plans in minute detail.

Planners do not and should not take LRSU operations lightly. The personnel who take this the most seriously are, of course, the team members. They know that if anything goes wrong, they could be out on their own for quite a while.

Staff Sergeant Kevin M. Lydon
Fort Benning, Georgia

RESERVE COMPONENT

TAA 07 and the USAR MI Force

The recent Total Army Analysis 2007 (TAA 07), although still tentative, promises both growth and change for the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) MI units. The growth, while small, reverses the trend of the past ten years that saw the number of USAR MI unit authorizations reduced by half. Note that the impacts of TAA 07 changes, outlined below, will not be effective until fiscal year 2002 and beyond.

Under TAA 07, the Army will activate Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 201st MI Group, I Corps, as a multi-component unit at Fort Lewis, Washington. We anticipate a total of 39 to 47 additional USAR authorizations. The Active Component (AC) element will be a 4- to 6-soldier planning cell.

We will activate a portion of the 205th MI Battalion, 500th MI Brigade, in Phoenix, Arizona. This unit is also multi-component with 69 USAR spaces. This stationing will reduce the negative personnel impacts created by the deactivation of the 259th MI Brigade headquarters element, which was also in Phoenix. It will also capitalize on existing and projected intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) equipment fielding.

The TAA also activates a multi-component Interrogation Prisoner of War (IPW) Company at Fort Sheridan, Illinois. This company—which will align with the 165th MI Battalion, 205th MI Brigade, in Germany—involves approximately 80 USAR positions. The collocated North Central Army Reserve Intelligence Support Center (ARISC) will provide connectivity to the parent unit headquarters. The 306th MI Company (Linguist) will activate at Fort Sheridan and in Detroit, Michigan.

A multi-component Interrogation and Exploitation (I&E) Company will stand up as part of the 202d MI Battalion, 513th MI Brigade, at Fort Snelling, Minnesota, with 104 authorizations. The Army will inactivate the Fort Snelling-based 352d MI Company (Linguist).

Based on TAA 07, the Army will inactivate the 351st MI Company (Linguist) but will maintain the 300th MI Company (Linguist). Both are in Austin, Texas.

TAA 07 directs the addition of 60 counterintelligence (97B CI Agent) positions to the existing 323d MI Battalion at Fort Meade, Maryland. Stationing is still tentative at this time.

Change at the Reserve Forces Office

Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Ponder, formerly the senior Army National Guard representative to the MI Proponent, retired in September 1999. His replacement is Major Timothy Keasling. Lieutenant Colonel Ponder left the Service after more than 22 years of Active and Reserve service. No single individual has had a greater impact on the ARNG's tactical MI unit force than Lieutenant Colonel Ponder. His contri-

butions cover the spectrum from training to force structure to equipment fielding. Of particular note was his initiative to bring MI automation to the ARNG's combat divisions and brigades.

Major Keasling comes to us from the U.S. Army–Europe Office of the Deputy Chief for Operations. While there he managed the Army National Guard (ARNG) Overseas Deployment for Training (ODT) program, ARNG participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organi- zation (NATO) Partnership for Peace exercises, and ARNG unit deployments in support of Operation JOINT FORGE in Bosnia. Major Keasling also served as an assignments officer at the National Guard Bureau, Assistant G2 with the 38th Infantry Division, and S2 for the Combat Aviation Brigade, III Corps, Fort Hood, Texas.

Colonel John Craig is the USAR point of contact and the Chief of the Reserve Forces Office. Readers can contact him at (520) 533-1176, DSN 821-1176, and by E-mail at craigj1@huachuca-emh1. Army. mil. Major Timothy Keasling is the ARNG POC; his telephone number is (520) 533-1177 or DSN 821-1177 and his E-mail is keaslingt@huachuca-emh1.army.mil. Their facsimile number is (520) 533-1762 and their mailing address is Commander, USAIC&FH, ATTN: ATZS-RA, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613- 6000.

Attention NCOs

Send us your articles and book reviews. If you have experience you can share on MI doctrine, professional development, or "how-to" tips, please send them to *Military Intelligence*. Topics of interest for future issues include:

- Analysis at various echelons and types of units.
- Global conflicts (see map on page 32 in the last issue).
- MI skills training.
- "Helpful hints" on work-arounds and better ways to do things.
- Tactical operations.

Please E-mail them to mipb@huachuca-emh1.army.mil or call (520) 538-1005/6 or DSN 879-1005/6.

CONCEPTS & DOCTRINE

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Electronic Attack

**by Staff Sergeant
Christopher W. Barton**

The first recorded instance of radio jamming occurred in September 1901 in the United States. Its aim was to create a commercial gain rather than to achieve a military objective. At the time, there was considerable interest in the America's Cup yacht races, and the first newspaper to reach the stands carrying the results stood to reap a large financial gain. John Pickard, an engineer, devised a way to jam the signal of the other companies, while at the same time reporting the progress of the race.

The communication age has brought a flow of information never imagined, and with this flow, came dependence on information. The threat commander is dependent upon his flow of information to make informed decisions during planning and operations. Electronic attack (EA) can exploit this dependence.

A New Manual

Currently, the Doctrine Division at Futures Directorate, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca is revising EA doctrine through development of a new manual—**FM 34-45, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) for Electronic Attack**. We will publish the initial draft in September 1999. The revision will provide a clear frame-work and TTP for more productive use and deployment of EA assets.

In the past, we were constrained in our employment of EA assets by having to use an equation for the minimal power necessary to disrupt communications. This equation took time and would not guarantee the disruption of the targeted receiver.

If one did not reach the desired effect, the operator increased the system power in small increments until he jammed the target. This process was slow and unwieldy. A precise deliberate attack was not possible, and therefore, decreased the value of this nonlethal fire. In practice, it could take ten minutes before the jamming was actually affecting the targeted receivers and during this time they could pass information and stop communications on that frequency.

We have never adequately discussed EA employment in our doctrine. Currently, most units use a standard priority target list for EA. This target list comprises habitually high-priority targets (HPT) such as artillery digital nets, reconnaissance nets, command and control (C^2) nets, and forward observers and calls for fire. This misuse of EA limits its overwhelming ability on the battlefield. The planning and placement of these systems on the attack guidance matrix, sensor and attack matrix, and fire support execution matrix is essential. This acts as a battlefield multiplier, taking control of the electromagnetic spectrum—at the specific time when the enemy is most vulnerable. The planning of EA targets in the context of the commander's targeting objective raises the importance of this endeavor.

Targeting Methodology

The methodology discussed in **FM 6-20-10, TTP for the Targeting Process**, provides the basis of **FM 34-45**. We are attempting to develop **FM 34-45** carefully so that it thoroughly integrates the targeting process as described in **FM 6-20-10**. It is critical to integrate EA (a nonlethal fire) with the more

traditional lethal and nonlethal fires using the same methodology and terminology. If successful, the manual will facilitate greater use of EA during operations.

For this field manual (FM) to be doctrinally sound, the feedback and suggestions of those in the EA environment are critical. We need the expertise of electronic warfare officers (EWOs), G2s, and G3s in the planning and employment of EA. Methods of incorporating these "fires" with the more conventional fires are also invaluable. The intent of this article is to provide a framework in which to analyze the electromagnetic environment in an EA environment; it will not provide a detailed description of EA.

Steps of the Targeting Process

Decide. As the first step in the targeting process, selecting targets provides the overall focus and sets priorities for intelligence collection and attack planning. The targeting cell, with the guidance of the target selection standards, decides on targets in conjunction with the military decision-making process and determines the plan of attack for usage of lethal and nonlethal fires during various phases of the operation. Deciding on targets consists of five parts: develop targets, analyze requirements, assess capabilities, coordinate operations, and control operations.

Throughout these tasks, the signals intelligence (SIGINT) cell will assist the EWO. The SIGINT cell will develop requirements for EA support (electronic warfare support or ES) to track communications and noncommunications nodes. With the order of battle data from the all-source cell, these two cells will

ensure that targets remain valid and targetable. The EWO will fuse intelligence from these cells and from these other products:

- High-payoff target list (HPTL).
- Collection plan.
- Attack guidance matrix (AGM).
- Target spread sheets, target sheets.
- Electronic warfare target list (EWTL).
- Electronic warfare annex.

The EWO will identify the critical nodes in communications nets and noncommunications and will determine specific targets.

Detect is the second critical function in the targeting process. The G2 or S2 is the main figure directing the effort to detect HPTs identified previously. To specifically identify the "who, what, when, and how" for target acquisition, the G2 or S2 must work closely with the analysis and control element (ACE), field artillery intelligence officer (FAIO), EWO, and the targeting officer or fire support officer. This process determines the requirements for accurate and timely collection. The SIGINT cell is responsible for ensuring that the collection system understands these requirements. There are three steps to follow when detecting an EA target: deploy ES systems, collect their data, and process that data. Detection is a continuous process in which tar-

gets ES assets identify, track, and then assess targets.

Deliver. This involves execution based on the target attack guidance and supports operations once the HPTs have been located and identified. EA assets attack based on the attack guidance that the intelligence staff develops when deciding on a target. The *deliver* step of target attack requires several decisions that fall into two categories.

Tactical Decisions determine the time of the attack, the desired effect or degree of damage (or both), and which attack system to employ.

Technical Decisions describe the method of jamming, the duration of the attack, and the specifics on wave-type, frequency, and target location (for both receiver and emitter). Other data possibly included are encryption, call signs, jump frequencies, jump call signs, and more.

The *deliver* step of the process has three phases: deploy EA assets, conduct EA, and assess EA results.

Assess. The disruption of the flow of information provides the basis for the assessment of EA effectiveness. The extent which our attack neutralized time-sensitive critical information, harassed enemy communications, and impeded information flow all determine EA effectiveness. The degree of degradation

to the threat's C^2 will determine the necessity for another attack.

Conclusion

It is critical that the fire support coordinator uses all forms of non-lethal fire. The haphazard use of EA, not coordinated with other fires, will not maximize its capability. As information operations (IO) become more important, EA will also increase in importance and will play an important role in future conflicts as forces vie for information superiority and dominance. As information is gathered and analyzed, soldiers must still deliver it. EA denies the transmittal of information and also denies the use of information nodes.

We need your input on EA. If you want to provide input on this topic, feel free to contact Staff Sergeant Barton at commercial (520) 538-0959, DSN 879-0959, or via E-mail at bartonc@huachuca-emh1.army.mil. Also, watch for the initial draft of **FM 34-45** on our web page (http://138.27. 35. 36/ Doctrine/dbl.htm) available in September.

Staff Sergeant Chris Barton is currently a doctrine writer at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center working on FM 34-45, TTP for EA. He served in the 311th MI Battalion at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, as both a TLQ-17 squad leader and a target acquisition squad leader. SSG Barton also served with the 6/101st as a crewmember of the QUICKFIX helicopter. In 1995, he moved to the 511th MI Company in Fort Irwin, California, where he held the positions of team leader, squad leader, and platoon sergeant.

QUICK TIPS

Human Fax

**by First Lieutenant
Alexander Robinson**

With ever-increasing technological advances and numerous moving parts, intelligence has become more complex for the everyday user. The Intelligence Section and Scouts of the 3d Battalion, 187th Infantry, 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, have adopted a technique that eliminates some of the complexities usually surrounding intelligence collection at the battalion level. This is done with the use of the "Human Fax" (also known as the "Scout Fax"), a simple yet very effective method of passing information. It provides detailed visual information, saves time, and dissemination can be over non-secure communications lines.

Figure 1. Imagery Such as This Can Form the Base of a "Human Fax."

Defining the "Human Fax"

The "Human Fax" is a detailed, visual graphic representation of an objective that the scouts can use to send information using FM (frequency-modulation) radios, high-frequency radios, or tactical satellite (TACSAT) communications. The "Human Fax" uses a 7" x 8" grid with letters on the top and numbers down the side that the Scout teams use for sketching. Using the "fax" grid designations, the scouts call information back to the Scout platoon leader who in turn passes the information to the intelligence section located at the Battalion Tactical Operation Center.

Developing the "Fax" Base

Before deploying, the scouts form the base of the "Fax" using satellite imagery, human intelligence reporting, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) imagery, and any other available intelligence. The base consists of superimposing buildings, roads, waterways, and vegetation on the 7" x 8" grid representing the objective. The first figure is a sample piece of imagery used to form the base sketch (see Figure 2)..

The scout team at the site will add detail to the base sketch once they can actually survey the objective. Using the letter and numbering system, they will add information such as—

- Exact number of windows on the buildings.
- Locations of doors.
- Distance from a wood-line to an obstacle.
- Detailed information about an obstacle across a road.

The "Human Fax" gives each commander a detailed graphic representation of what is at the site, not just a verbal brief from someone who has not seen the objective. Figure 3 shows an annotated sketch that the scouts at the site have updated.

The size of the objective and how many teams may cover it will determine how many different base copies (one for each team) the Scout Platoon will have in use. Using multiple "faxes" provides overlap-

**Figure 2. Sample "Human Fax" Base Sketch.**

Figure 3. Scouts Annotate It with Symbols and Report the Information Using the Grid.

ping coverage and hastens the collection and dissemination of information. Using location "coordinates" on the sketches, scouts can quickly pass detailed information such as positions of buildings hidden from imagery, water in formerly dry creeks or rivers, new roads and trails, or the presence of personnel. This method takes much less time than sending a SALUTE (size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment) report. This decreases transmission time on the radio, lessens the chance of compromise, and increases the time they can use actually surveying the objective.

Passing Visual Data Reports

Secure communications when using the "Human Fax" is not a major issue. Because they pre-established the base of the grid, the scouts need not discuss actual positions—only the "Human Fax" locations. If a building is at grid DV123456 which corresponds to "A-6" on the sketch, then the only thing the scout

should say is building at *"A-6."* The scout can then specify the details at the spot, such as single-strand concertina and one M-60 machine gun in the third first-floor window from the north. Because they used existing imagery to form the base, the scout does not have to give much detail about the dimensions of the building, saving time and reducing the chance of compromise.

Also using that same sketch, scouts can communicate distances by using the grid coordinates as reference points (similar to target reference points). For instance, one could identify a machine gun position by saying *"200 meters east of A-6, 50-caliber machine gun pointing northeast."* Saving even more time, scouts can confirm predetermined enemy templates without risking compromise by simply stating *"enemy template at F-3 and G-8, confirmed."* The S2, Scout Platoon Sergeant, or an intelligence analyst receiving the information can quickly decipher and depict the message content

using the duplicate copy of the base "Human Fax" sketch.

The Bottom Line

The "Human Fax" provides detailed information and saves time. Even better, it is secure because the grids are strictly an internal technique. Our scouts can focus on evading the enemy and surviving while still communicating the exact details of an objective by using the "Human Fax."

First Lieutenant Robinson is a Battalion Assistant S2 serving in the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), the Iron Rakkasans, at Headquarters, 3d Battalion, 187th Infantry, 3d Brigade, at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. 2lt Robinson has a Bachelor of Science degree in Electronics Technology from Savannah State University. Readers can contact him via E-mail at robinsona@emh2.campbell.army.mil and telephonically at (502) 798-1479 and DSN 635-1479.

QUICK TIPS

Equipment Maintenance and Accountability

by Master Sergeant
Timothy P. Carroll, Jr.

Proper equipment accountability is more than conducting maintenance and simple inventories. This important noncommissioned officer (NCO) responsibility should require no prompting from the command. Too often, due to high operational tempo (OPTEMPO) or ignorance, NCOs may not fully account for all their sections' equipment. NCOs should be fully aware of what it means to account for their equipment properly, especially for the numerous unique MI systems requiring special attention.

Meet Operations and Maintenance Standards

Perhaps the most obvious task is to ensure your assigned equipment meets the specific **Technical Manual 10 (TM 10)** operating standards. This is the easiest task to complete because, for nearly every MI and non-MI tactical system and most strategic MI systems, there is a manual that describes in detail the maintenance checks that the operator must perform. Similarly, the higher level **TM-20** or similar manuals provide the same standards for the maintenance personnel.

What about the items not addressed in the operator manuals? For example, what about cleaning under the floor mats and the superstructure of a vehicle to ensure that corrosion and rust do not build up? What about ensuring all of the parts such as safety and ground wires are intact? NCOs must see beyond the **TM-10** checks and attend to every item on a vehicle affecting not only current system operations, but also those that may affect long-term operations.

NCOs must convince their leaders of the need for proper and complete equipment recovery after a field deployment. If the OPTEMPO is driving too hard, NCOs must find the time in the field to conduct complete system checks beyond the routine daily checks.

An additional issue is following up on replacement parts requests. NCOs must follow up on all parts orders since too often, personnel at the next level of maintenance are overwhelmed and they sometimes neglect to process your order. If you follow up at least weekly, then you will know the status of your order. When requesting replacements, the NCO must anticipate that parts are nearing the end of their life cycles. Too many systems are non-operational, awaiting a part because no one thought ahead. This is critical for unique MI systems where parts often come from a single-source and are not common in the supply system. Further, the earlier the command knows about required parts, the sooner they can obtain the needed funds.

What constitutes equipment ownership? Should you accomplish the previous discussed tasks on only your assigned equipment? NCOs need to be responsible if they, or their soldiers, are in temporary possession of a piece of equipment. If you drive a loaned vehicle, then you should perform the same maintenance as if the vehicle belonged to your own unit. In addition, just because you have a piece of equipment on a temporary basis does not mean you should abuse or neglect it. It is all our equipment and we should treat it as such.

Turn In Unneeded Items

Too many units retain equipment that is no longer necessary to their mission accomplishment. These items tend to collect and can consume your time just conducting inventories and simple maintenance, not to mention the amount of storage space it can waste. It is an NCO responsibility to know the current equipment authorized and to work with the command to ensure you turn in equipment deemed no longer necessary. This is a difficult, sometimes time-consuming task, which may require NCOs to gain the commander's emphasis, coordinate with the supply NCO or the S4, and begin the turn-in process. This is especially challenging when turning in unique MI systems. You may even have to submit a **DA Form 2028, Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms,** through the command chain recommending the removal of the equipment from your unit's modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) or table of distribution and allowances (TDA).

For example, the All-Source Analysis System has undergone several upgrades during the past five years. Many units probably have the replaced equipment from one or two previous upgrades stored in a building when they could have removed it from their inventories.

However difficult it may be to accomplish this task, turning in old equipment is the right thing to do; the time you will save for your unit over the long term can pay

PROPONENT NOTES

OCMI Website

The Office of the Chief, Military Intelligence (OCMI) website contains timely information on proponent issues ranging from enlisted career management field (CMF) overviews to warrant officer current and archived newsletters. The address is http://huachuca-dcd.army.Mil/ocmi/index.html. We will update the website often, so please use it as a "favorite" resource for the latest information on the MI Corps.

Warrant Officer

Two of the MI Warrant Officer Accession Boards have met to select candidates for fiscal year (FY) 2000 training seats. The next MI board will be in January. We have a continuing need for applicants in all military occupational specialties (MOSs) but have significant requirements for MOS 351B (Counterintelligence Technician), 351E (HUMINT Collection Technician), and 350D (Imagery Intelligence Technician). For the first time in two years, MOS 351E will permit accessions for Spanish, German, and Persian Farsi. We have a constant need for Korean-, Arabic-, and Russian-speaking 351E applicants. The basic requirements for all MOSs are four years operational experience, two operational assignments, and completion of the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC). **DA Circular 601-99-1, Warrant Officer Procurement Program**, discusses the specific requirements for each MOS as does the U.S. Army Recruiting Command's web page at www.usarec.army.mil.

Candidates should forward their applications to USAREC no later than the first week in December; this will permit adequate processing time for your application to reach the January Board for consideration. For further information, contact Chief Warrant Officer Five Rex A. Williams, Chief Warrant Officer, Military Intelligence Corps, via E-mail at williamsx@huachuca-emh1.army.mil and by telephone at (520) 533-1183 or DSN 821-1183.

Recruiting MI Soldiers

by Sergeant Major Paul J. Moore

The Army and MI need **your** help: we all need to promote and sell the Army and MI to increase the number of young men and women joining **our** ranks. Yes, I am talking about recruiting. Okay, before we go any further your question probably is *"What have we done for you lately?"* That is the same question "Generation Net" is asking.

The Outlook for NCOs

The Army is doing a "full court press" to improve the quality of life for single soldiers and families. Please remember the old adage, *"we recruit individuals and reenlist families!"* This year we have a moderate pay raise, increased and targeted selective reenlistment bonuses (SRBs), and terrific promotion opportunities in all NCO grades. This promotion trend will continue as our Army moves into the next millennium. We are in the process of putting NCO positions back into the force structure. We have experienced a resurgence in reenlistments due to the above-stated factors coupled with a strong command influence. Keep up the good work. We continue to work schooling opportunities, but this remains a quota-driven requirement.

Assisting Recruiting Programs

Total Army Involvement in Recruiting (TAIR), Operation SMART (Sergeant Major of the Army's Recruiting Team), and the Hometown Recruiting Assistance Program (HRAP) are the areas in which we need your help. You should be familiar with these programs and, more importantly, actively support them. We will never fill our ranks without new recruits.

The **TAIR** program provides recruiters with Army personnel and equipment to help them to gain access to schools and reach prospects. The provided personnel and equipment include, but are not limited to drill teams and foreign language-speaking MI-qualified soldiers from local military installations. Work with your local recruiting battalion to develop a partnership, thereby enabling local recruiting commands to call upon you and your commanders for support.

Operation SMART is an initiative to assist our recruiting force in providing the strength for our Army. Soldiers learn the procedures for referring friends, family members, and associates to the local Army recruiter. Any soldier who refers an applicant resulting in an enlistment will receive a certificate from the Sergeant Major of the Army. At the end of each FY, the soldier who has provided the most referrals and the most enlistments from those referrals will be invited to the Annual Chief of Staff of the Army's Recruiter of Excellence Award Ceremony in Washington, D.C., where he or she will receive personal recognition from the Sergeant Major of the Army.

HRAP is not just for recent graduates of initial entry training enroute

to their first duty assignments. It is also for permanent party soldiers and you do not have to be in permanent change of station (PCS) status. In the past, this was a permissive TDY at no cost to the Government but you would now be in temporary duty (TDY) status collecting full per diem. Imagine going back and supporting the recruiting battalion in Los Angeles. Yes, you would be working but you would also have some fun in the Southern California sun. This is only one of the many locations throughout the United States. The requirements for HRAP are:

- Twenty-five years of age or younger (maybe waived by USAREC).

- High school diploma or general equivalency diploma (GED) with 15 semester hours of college.

- Normally reside within 50 miles of the requested recruiting station.

- Meet height and weight standards (no exceptions).

Crucial Support

Please use your NCO support chain to obtain more information on these extremely valuable programs. Your participation in supporting our recruiting efforts is crucial.

Sergeant major Paul Moore leads the OCMI Enlisted Soldier Section. Readers can contact OCMI via E-mail at ocmi@huachuca-emh1.army.mil or telephonically at (520) 533-1173 or DSN 821-1173.

Foreign Language Technology

-wide. These operations combine the intercept— of target voice communications, which has been a major provider of intelligence since World War II— with currently available relay capabilities. In most instances, the actual presence of linguist voice interceptors on the battlefield is no longer necessary. Antennas and intercept systems focused on the battlefield and relaying intercepted signals to a distant location can provide the same level of coverage with significantly less danger and exposure to the linguist. "Split-Based Operations" is one of the five MI doctrinal tenets; it allows for a much smaller footprint forward in the highly lethal future battlefield and yet ensures complete and trained intelligence support from a sanctuary location. Expansion of this capability and "virtual" co-location of the linguists in the linguist pool would increase both flexibility and efficiency.

Conclusion

These language tools will not replace a good, well-trained linguist. Machines cannot begin to match the flexibility of the human mind. As there never seem to be enough linguists to satisfy mission requirements. These technologies can, augment the available linguists and make them more efficient. In addition to the deployed military linguists, we currently employ more than 500 civilian linguists on one contract in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The rational use of technology would allow us to use the linguists we have and those we hire more efficiently and possibly to reduce the overall requirement for their services. *

Endnote:

1. The Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) **Survival Guides** are pocket-sized packages with the basic vocabulary a soldier will need to survive in a particular country. They consist of a laminated command-and-control card with the top 100 military phrases, including pronunciation hints; a booklet with more basic words and phrases; and a cassette recording to help with pronunciation.

Mr. Lane Aldrich currently represents the Army Foreign Language Proponency Office for the U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence where he has worked for nearly a decade. He retired as a Chief Warrant Officer Three from the U.S. Army. Following dismal attempts at Spanish and French in high school and junior college, he had to get serious about foreign languages (Russian and German) under the Air Force's firm hand. He has been involved with the military

aspects of foreign languages through Air Force Enlisted, Army Warrant Officer, and, ultimately, Army Civilian Staff positions to this day. He gathered training in training in Russian at the Indiana and Syracuse Universities' Air Force programs, in German at the German at the Defense Language Institute, a Bachelor of Arts degree in Russian Area Studies and Russian at the University of California, and graduate focus in the Army Management Staff College along the way. Readers may contact Mr. Aldrich via E-mail at ray. aldrich@hqda.army.mil and telephonically at (703) 601-0708 or DSN 329-0708.

Read Any Good Books Lately?

We welcome reviews of books related to intelligence professional development or military history. Please mail or E-mail your book reviews with your phone number, address, the title, author, publisher, price, number of pages, and the publisher's address listed on the table of contents page. Please send them to mipb@huachuca-emh1.army.mil or mail them to Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, ATTN: ATZS-CLM (McGovern), Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000.

MI CORPS
HALL OF FAME

Colonel William H. Gardner (USA, Retired)
MI HOF Inductee: 1992
Discipline: Aviation

Colonel William Gardner received his commission through the Reserve Officer Training Corps at Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Nebraska in 1967. He attended the Signal Officers' Basic and Communications Center Officers' Courses at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, then graduated from flight school as a fixed-wing aviator in 1961. He served as a project officer until attending the rotary-wing transition course in August 1962.

The then Captain Gardner served as a platoon leader and adjutant in the 7th Aviation Battalion, 7th Infantry Division, Eighth U.S. Army in Korea, and in the 227th and 229th Assault Helicopter Battalions, 11th Air Assault Division at Fort Benning, Georgia. In 1965, he served as the Communications Officer and adjutant of the 11th Air Assault Division Task Force deployed to the Dominican Republic.

After graduating with honors from the Signal Officer Advanced Course,

he served as a helicopter flight instructor at the Aviation School until September 1966. Promoted to Major, he moved to Korea where he served as Aviation Advisor to the First Republic of Korea Army at Detachment L with the Korean Military Advisory Group.

Following another stint as a flight examiner and instructor at Fort Rucker (from November 1967), he again went to Vietnam in June 1969 where he held the first of four significant assignments warranting induction into the Military Intelligence (MI) Hall of Fame (HOF). Assigned to the 224th Aviation Battalion (Radio Research), part of the 509th Radio Research Group of the Army Security Agency (ASA), he commanded the 138th Aviation Company at DaNang with distinction during 1969. He served as the 224th's Executive Officer in 1970. His outstanding performance in both of these positions resulted in his branch transfer to become one of the MI's initial aviators.

In 1970 and 1971, during his service as an aviation officer at the ASA Headquarters in Arlington, Virginia, he played a major role in shaping the future of the Military Intelligence Aviation force structure in the post-Vietnam period. In 1975, Lieutenant Colonel Gardner worked in the Cryptology Division, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army. This third important assignment included outstanding staff work as Chief, Budget Division, and working on all MI Aviation actions. He was the action officer for the highly successful Guardrail IV system (airborne communications intelligence intercept and direction finding) which deployed to Korea in 1975.

In March 1975, he became the first MI officer ever to command a non-MI aviation battalion when the Army chose him to command the 19th Aviation Battalion (Aerial Exploitation) in Korea. His outstanding performance as the 19th's Commander set the stage for MI Aviators to be the sole commanders of AE aviation units.

He attended the Naval War College in July 1976. From July 1977 until his retirement in August 1982, he served at Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) He served in the both the Planning and the Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Directorates of Combat Developments. From June 1978 to September 1978 and from May 1979 to July 1982, he served as Director of Combat Developments. This assignment was his final key position. His outstanding performance contributed directly to the Army's MI force structure for the 1980s and 1990s. As Chairman of the Quadripartite Working Group (QWG) for Electronic Warfare, he significantly improved the ABCA countries' (United States of America/Britain/Canada/Australia) EW interoperability and understanding.

Dorothe K. Matlack
(Deceased)
MI HOF Inductee: 1987
Discipline: HUMINT

Dorothe Matlack had a very distinguished 27-year career in Military Intelligence. Her extraordinary career culminated in her assignment as Special Assistant to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence (ACSI), Department of the Army (DA). A pioneer and champion of the Army's human intelligence (HUMINT) efforts, she entered government service in 1948 and became an intelligence analyst in

and as the Deputy Director of Operations for Collection. Personally responsible for many of the Army's HUMINT programs in effect today, she played an instrumental role in establishing the Department of Defense procedures for debriefing defectors, escapees, and refugees of intelligence interest. In 1956, she organized and directed the debriefing of 37,000 Hungarian refugees entering the United States.

In 1962, she sparked joint agency efforts that resulted in the refugee debriefings that first located the Soviet missiles in Cuba. In the 1960s, the Army cited her for her crucial contributions that established a variety of overt and sensitive HUMINT programs in the Republic of Vietnam. She retired from federal service with the Department of the Army in 1975. In

late September 1991, the MI Corps lost one of its foremost architects of today's intelligence systems.

After her induction onto the Hall of Fame in 1987, the MI Corps cited Dorothe Matlack in recognition of her exceptional contributions in the intelligence collection field that will remain a significant part of the history of our corps. During her outstanding career, she excelled in the collection of foreign intelligence from human sources. Her judgment, industry, and breadth of vision as a member of national policy committees of the United States Intelligence Board, advisory to the National Security Council, have made her one of the most widely respected professionals in the American intelligence community.

1951. Before attaining the position of Special Assistant, she served the DA ACSI successively as a section, branch, and division chief,

PROFESSIONAL READER

(Decision for Disaster: Betrayal at the Bay of Pigs) by Grayston L. Lynch (Washington, DC: Brassey's, Inc., 1998), 187 pages, $24.95.

Decision for Disaster is a welcome addition to the literature on the subject of the Bay of Pigs invasion. Grayston Lynch is one of the two Americans who were on the ground during the invasion. As a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) liaison officer to the Cuban exiles, Lynch possesses a unique insight to the information provided them, as well as to what actually happened during those fateful three days in 1961.

Mr. Lynch states in the book's preface that now all the facts can be revealed and the true story told. The book is more a polemic against the Kennedy administration (members of which he continually refers to as the "New Frontiersmen") than a history or memoir. Chapter 14 refutes the only three accounts of the Bay of Pigs: **A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House** by Arthur Schlesinger, **Kennedy** by Theodore

Sorensen, and **The Bay of Pigs: The Leaders' Story of Brigade 2506** by Haynes Johnson. While Lynch's book gives a good account of the tactical action, it unfortunately sheds no new light on an area still unresolved in the Bay of Pigs history—how much assurance of U.S. military support to Brigade 2506 was given or implied? It is clear in most accounts of the invasion that CIA planners and some U.S. military personnel at least alluded to U.S. military support of the invasion if things started to go wrong.

One of the two major Bay of Pigs planning assumptions was the successful destruction of Castro's small air force on the ground before the amphibious landing. The first strike was only partially successful. The main "betrayal" theme of the book, the cancellation of the second pre-invasion air strike by the Brigade's B-26 bombers, is acknowledged by almost all accounts, as a major factor contributing to the invasion's failure. When this decision was made, all CIA and military personnel near the Oval Office were in

agreement—the invasion was now doomed.

The author dismisses out of hand the second planning assumption—an expected major uprising by the Cuban people triggered by the invasion—by stating that no *"uprising contingency [was] included within the early stages of either plan."* In fact, the Commandant of the Marine Corps at the time, General David M. Shoup, did not consider an uprising as being **part of** the mission, it **was** the mission. The assessment that the majority of Cubans was militantly anti-Castro and would "rise up" to support the exiles was a major intelligence failure on the part of the CIA's clandestine services.

The literature of intelligence cites this miscalculation as a classic example of organizational bias. The operations side of the CIA house made this assessment—the same people who were planning the operation and had the largest stake in seeing it go forward.

TSM NOTES

ASAS New Equipment Training Team

by Colonel Jerry V. Proctor

In an age of rapid technological advancements, have you ever wondered who trains the Army on new equipment? In MI, the New Equipment Training Team (NETT) meets the challenge of training the Active Component (AC) U.S. Army, U.S. Army National Guard (ARNG), and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR). If the system is ASAS, it is the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) NETT's job.

ASAS is a tactically deployable, ruggedized, automated information system. It is only one of the five parts of the Army Battle Command System (ABCS). ASAS is the cornerstone of the Army's intelligence system and supports automated intelligence analysis, production, dissemination, and asset management. It fuses threat information from all intelligence disciplines and provides correlated intelligence to maneuver commanders and staffs. It receives data from national, theater, and tactical intelligence sensors and sources at multiple echelons and correlates the information to produce a common, multi-dimensional view of the enemy situation and battlefield.

What is the ASAS-NETT? Based at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, the NETT consists of 30 ASAS experts headed by a warrant officer and a senior noncommissioned officer (NCO). The team comprises of the following military occupational spe- cialties (MOSs): Intelligence Analyst (96B), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Analyst (98C), Electronic Intelligence Interceptor/Analyst (98J), and Electronic Warfare/Intelligence Systems Repairer (33W). The team also employs contractors who provide subject matter expertise within each of the sections.

The team's primary function is to train all the AC, USAR, and ARNG MI units throughout the Army equipped with or supported by the ASAS. ASAS NETT teaches all aspects of ASAS to include the system upgrades that reach the field every 6 to 12 months. Additionally, NETT members do the training required prior to an operational test of a ASAS product. Team members can also conduct refresher training for units that request it throughout the year, often done in conjunction with the CECOM SEC (ASAS software support component) ASAS training team.

Upon assignment to the team, individuals attend the Basic Instructor Training Course (BITC) at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. They then receive additional training for a specific section in the NETT (i.e., single source, all source, communications control set, remote workstation, or maintenance). New team members conduct training as assistant instructors, and receive evaluation and certification before becoming a primary instructor. As mission priorities shift, team members cross-train in the other respective ASAS sections.

Throughout the year, teams of three to six instructors travel (in two- to six-week blocks) to conduct training in Korea, Hawaii, Germany, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. We also train at various posts in the continental United States including Forts Carson (Colorado), Hood (Texas), Bragg (North Carolina), and the Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. We also conduct training for the National Guard and the Reserves at Fort Huachuca.

Being an instructor on the ASAS NETT is one of the most exciting and career-enhancing job opportunities in the MI career field. There is no better place to become an expert on MI's Flagship system and become an operational expert in each theater as you train their soldiers.

Thanks to Master Sergeant Karen Powell, the ASAS NETT NCO in Charge, for her substantial input to this article.

Colonel Jerry Proctor is the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) System Manager (TSM) for ASAS. Readers can contact him via E-mail at proctorj1@ huachuca-emh1.army.mil and telephonically at (520) 533-3504 or DSN 821-3504. The Deputy TSM is Mr. Michael Strack. Readers can reach him by E-mail at strackm@huachuca-emh1.army.mil and telephonically at (520) 533-3507 or DSN 821-3507.

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ASAS Master Analyst Program
Sly Fox den ASI 1F Notes

Noncommissioned Officers in the MI Corps—
"Competence is My Watch-Word"

by Sergeant Douglas P. Thompson

his article summarizes those experiences that have given shape to my technical perspective as a noncommissioned officer (NCO) in the MI community. The MI soldier requires grooming and mentoring from the beginning. We start with the foundation for the initial entry soldier and work to the top—becoming the mentor or "master." The traditional theory behind leader development in the Army consists of three pillars: institutional, unit, and individual training. The basis of all training management is that it should lead to **tactical and technical proficiency**.

Historically, the Army recognizes merit based upon tactical performance and proficiency, especially through the rank of Staff Sergeant. In MI, our mission has become increasingly intricate and interdependent on automation, and this requires an NCO who is skilled and technically oriented. The stubby pencil and map do not meet today's requirements. How do we achieve technical proficiency in our junior soldiers? Today's trends indicate that we depend too much on institutional training to assume the technical training responsibility of the unit level. We gain proficiency through experience; the same should be true of leader development—a systematic growth in responsibility tied to promotions. MI soldiers experience limited technical aspects of intelligence. However, over time, without a strong sustainment-training program and mentoring, the soldier is at risk of losing that foundation. The MI NCO must maintain soldier-leader skills that are critical to unit team building. Concurrently, we must not overlook the soldier's highly perishable technical skills.

Institutional training, the first pillar of leader development, should build a solid foundation for the soldier's military occupational specialty (MOS), threat awareness, and automation skills. Flexibility and willingness to grow professionally imply that the soldier actually receives the right mix of training and experience. We are in the process of migrating to a digitally enhanced tactical operations center (TOC), where we achieve battlefield awareness by sharing data via network communications. The danger to the analyst in this new dynamic battlespace is to focus only on a small amount of information while failing to see the big picture. MI NCOs must master collaborative thinking (total battlefield visualization) in order to realize a smooth transition into a digitally enhanced environment. In short, the NCO not only sees the big picture but can also extract critical information from that big picture at the right time. Hence, we actualize the "Strike Force NCO—a multi-functional action-oriented battle staff analyst," capable of operating in a digital or non-digital environment.

The second pillar of leader development is unit training. It is essential to have a command-supported training program run by knowledgeable NCOs as the foundation of a sound sustainment program. The foundation may include—

- Rigorous exposure to integrated staff operations.
- Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and mission analysis.
- Reconnaissance and surveillance planning and synchronization.
- Characteristics of the complex battlespace in which MI NCOs must operate.

A majority of growth takes place for the MI soldier who is fortunate enough to have a role model to emulate and aspire.

Individual training is the third pillar of leader development. In the specialized area of the All-Source Analysis System, the ASAS Master Analyst Course (AMAC) has been producing NCOs who are multi-functional and competent with emerging technology to start laying a foundation. AMAC produces an NCO who is—

- An **analyst** capable of planning, supervising intelligence operations, and integrating automation into mission operations.
- A **trainer** able to direct the unit ASAS sustainment training program and to evaluate indi-

- A **troubleshooter** knowledgeable in resolving hardware faults and software anomalies.

The Master Analyst is also capable of integrating system capabilities into mission operations—illustrating the link between the NCO's technical and tactical proficiency. The AMAC builds a knowledge base and repeatedly applies that knowledge to performance-oriented tasks. When the task becomes second nature to the soldiers, they have achieved master-level proficiency.

Training and mentoring during all three stages of leader development are critical if we are to maintain the MI NCO legacy. We can "grow" great leaders with the proper nurturing.

Staff Sergeant Doug Thompson is the Senior All-Source Instructor for the ASAS Master Analyst Branch, Directorate of Continuous Learning, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca. He previously served as Senior Intelligence Sergeant, S2 Section, 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (Light). His operational deployments include Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti) and Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM (Southwest Asia campaign). He is a graduate of the ASAS Master Analyst Course and the Intelligence Analyst Course. SSG Thompson has earned an Associate of Arts degree from Cochise College and will begin work toward a Bachelor of Science degree in Business and Information Systems from the University of Phoenix. Readers can contact him via E-mail at thompsond1@huachuca-emh1.army.mil and telephonically at (520) 533-8974 or DSN 821-8974.

Master Sergeant Kristine M. Sleighter is the current Chief of the ASAS Master Analyst Program. For more information, contact AMAP via E-mail at amap@huachuca-emh1.army.mil, telephonically at (520) 533-4652 or DSN 821-4652, and through the AMAP web page at http://138.27.202.66.

Quick Tips—Equipment Maintenance and Accountability

important dividends. Do not keep it in your inventory just in case you might someday need it—ask yourself *"does our unit's war-time mission require this piece of equipment?"* Do not just leave obsolete equipment for your replacement's action. The successful NCO acts promptly and follows through until the task is complete.

Conduct Monthly Inventories

Conducting monthly inventories of 10 percent of your assigned equipment is easy to do and gives everyone the reassurance of knowing they can account for everything for which they have signed. Although the company commander normally conducts the 10-percent inventories, NCOs should ensure inventory completion, even if the commander is not checking your equipment that month.

We Can All Do Better

My personal experience has been that every unit can improve equipment maintenance and that every unit has obsolete equipment around consuming too much maintenance and inventory energy. Yes, the OPTEMPO can make it more challenging to conduct proper equipment accountability. However, good NCOs always find a way to do it, teaching their subordinates proper accountability along the way. In training deployments and mission operations, there is no excuse for poor equipment maintenance and accountability.

Master Sergeant Tim Carroll currently works at the Office of the Chief, Military Intelligence at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, and will move to Korea in December. He is a career 98C who has served as a First Sergeant at the NCO Academy and in many other tactical and strategic assignments. Readers may contact him via E-mail at carrollt@huachuca-emh1.army.

Professional Reader

The CIA's Directorate of Intelligence, the analysts paid to make these kinds of assessments, was not asked to conduct an analysis. They were not even aware of the planning. Ironically, during late 1960 and early 1961, Kent's estimators were stating that Castro had the support of his people at that time. Furthermore, there was no organized opposition to his regime, as many dissidents were in jail or exiles in Miami.

The reader can forgive Grayston Lynch for defending his service, the CIA, so long after the fact, and for being bitter over the fiasco created by the far-removed bureaucracy in Washington. This kind of loyalty and emotional attachment to a cause is common in great Americans like Captain Lynch. He is a retired Army Captain and former Special Forces officer, who was wounded at Normandy. He served at the Battle of the Bulge and Heartbreak Ridge. He bears two Silver Stars and one Bronze Star, and has been a fighter for the freedom of others until his 1971 retirement. This Master Sergeant would gladly serve with him.

MSG Tracy D. Staab (USA, Retired)

Colorado Springs, Colorado

How to Submit an Article to MIPB

Select a relevant topic of interest to the military intelligence community. For example, it could discuss current operations and exercises, equipment, TTP, or training. It could be historical, explain lessons learned, or it could be an essay-type thought-provoking piece. It could be a short "quick tip" on better use of equipment or personnel, or fast "work-arounds" for problems. Articles from the "hot spots" are always welcome. Seek to add to the professional knowledge of the MI Corps. Propose changes, describe a new theory, dispute an existing theory, explain how your unit has broken new ground, give helpful advice on a specific topic, or explain how a new piece of new technology will change the way we operate.

Write an outline to organize your work and include a working title and headings. Plan to write 1000-2500 words (about 2-4 pages single-spaced text with normal margins, not counting graphics) and include graphics that enhance understanding of your topic. Quick tips should be 300-800 words. Put the "bottom line up front" and write clear, concise introduction and conclusion paragraphs. Follow proper rules of grammar. Consult **DA Pamphlet 600-67**, **Effective Writing for Army Leaders**, or William A. McIntosh's **Guide to Effective Writing**.

In order to write a clearer, more forceful article, avoid several stylistic pitfalls.

- **Maintain the active voice as much as possible**. Write, "*The soldier performed the task*" rather than "*The task was performed by the soldier.*"
- **Make your point**. Avoid writing about internal organization administration. If your topic is a new piece of technology, tell the readers why it is important, how it works better, and how it will affect them. Avoid lengthy descriptions of who approved the new system, quotations from senior leaders describing the system, reports your organization filed regarding the system, etc.
- **Use the fewest words to state your points**. Write "*Leaders must emphasize training*" rather than "*It is imperative for MI professional leaders to refocus their attention to training issues.*"

Please send the article via E-mail to mipb@huachuca-emh1.army.mil with a courtesy copy to mcgoverne@huachuca-emh1.army.mil or mail it (with a soft copy on disk) to Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, ATTN: ATZS-CLM (MIPB), [FedEx/Priority Mail: Bldg 61730, Room 127], Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000. (Please do not use special document templates and do attach the graphics separately. We can accept articles in Microsoft Office 97®, Word 6.0™, Word Perfect 6.0a™, and ASCII and PowerPoint™ or Corel®.) Please include with your article:

- A cover letter with your work, home, and E-mail addresses and telephone numbers, stating your wish to have the article published. Please include your social security number (SSN) so that we can find you if you transfer, PCS, or ETS/retire before we publish your article; we will protect your SSN and make no other use of it. Also, indicate whether we may put your article on our Internet web site even if we do not publish it in the printed magazine.
- Pictures, graphics, and crests/logos with adequate descriptions. Try to find good "action" photos that illustrate your article; photos and other graphics really enliven an article. We need complete captions for the photos (the who, what, where, when, why, and how; the photographer credits; and include the author's name on photos). We can return photos if so requested—be sure to include an address to which you want the photos sent after we use them. We will gladly accept photos without articles too.
- A release signed by your local security officer or SSO stating that your article is "unclassified, nonsensitive, and releasable in the public domain." (**MIPB** is available for sale by the Government Printing Office and posted on the Internet.)
- The full name of each author in the byline and a biography for each. The biography should include the authors' current duty positions, other related assignments, civilian degrees (degree, school, major), and advanced military education (CGSC, War College, SAMS, MSSI, SEIP, and PGIP). (Tell us if we can print your telephone number and E-mail address with the biography.)

We cannot guarantee that we will publish all submitted articles. We will send you an acknowledgment that we received your article. We may notify you again when we get ready to run it. Please inform us of your current E-mail, telephone numbers, and postal addresses if you change jobs, move, or PCS. It can take a year or more before we run some articles.

748th Military Intelligence Battalion

The U.S. Army's 748th Military Intelligence Battalion, 702d MI Group, has a long history and rich heritage. The men and women of the battalion follow in the footsteps of MI professionals who have served this unit for almost 57 years.

The unit's origin began with its activation in 1942 as Monitor Station One at Vint Hill Farms, Warrenton, Virginia. Designated Vint Hill Farms Station, Monitor Station One remained at Vint Hill Farms until in 1973 when it relocated to Kelly Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas, and was redesignated U.S. Army Security Agency (ASA) Field Station, San Antonio. In July 1974, the Daughters of the Republic of Texas gave their permission for ASA Field Station, San Antonio, to be known as the "Alamo Station." The Alamo Station then operated as part of the Consolidated Security Operations Center (CSOC), a joint U.S. Army and Air Force operation. In May 1980, the Army redesignated ASA Field Station as the U.S. Army Field Station, San Antonio.

On 1 January 1988, the Army redesignated the unit as the 748th MI Battalion. In June 1995, the 748th MI Battalion began the standup of the Medina Regional Technical Control and Analysis Element (MRTCAE). The MRTCAE became operational in August 1995, with full supporting capability in September 1995. In October 1997, the Army officially designated the MRTCAE as Delta Detachment, 201st MI Battalion, 513th MI Brigade, and attached it to the 748th MI Battalion for operational and administrative control.

The Medina Regional Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Operation Center (MRSOC), a multi-Service operation, activated on 19 August 1993. The 748th MI Battalion operates as an integral part of the MRSOC, providing highly trained soldiers and civilians in support of this mission.

The 748th MI Battalion has received the following awards in recognition of its crytologic excellence. In 1975, the Alamo Station, operating as part of an Army and Air Force Consolidated Security Operations Center, was the recipient of the Travis Trophy presented each year to the most outstanding Service cryptologic unit. During its history, the 748th MI Battalion has received the Air Force Outstanding Unit Award three times and received a nomination for the Army Outstanding Unit Award in 1998. Celebrating the 748th's twenty-fifth anniversary as Alamo Station, San Antonio Mayor Howard W. Peak proclaimed 25 June 1999 as "Alamo Station Day" in San Antonio.

The 748th MI Battalion has deployed soldiers to various locations supporting Operations JOINT FORGE/GUARD/ENDEAVOR as well as Task Forces Eagle Focus and Falcon. The Medina Regional TCAE provides actionable intelligence, collection opportunities, and technical guidance to the Land Component Commander's direct support SIGINT organizations in the U.S. European, Southern and Special Operations Commands (EUCOM, SOUTHCOM, and SOCOM, respectively. The MRTCAE was an essential contributor in developing the tactics, techniques, and procedures for the initial implementation of split-based SIGINT operations and effectively used this new doctrine to support three force-protection deployments. During the summer of 1998, the U.S. Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) chose the MRTCAE to receive and validate its most recent addition to the TROJAN System, TROJAN Classic XXI (Milestone Capability 03 (MC03)). Testing this new system is a crucial element in the effort to develop the intelligence architecture for the Land Component Commander in the 21st century.

In recent years, the 748th MI Battalion's 500+ soldiers have supported military operations and U.S. national policy in two distinct geographic regions. Our analysts and linguists regularly deploy to support tactical operations and force-protection missions in South America and crisis areas in Europe including the Balkans. Throughout its history, the soldiers of the 748th MI Battalion have served the U.S. Army and the proud nation it defends—in peace, in crisis, and in war.

Alamo Station—Twenty-Five Years of Service!

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