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Always Out Front

by Major General Barbara G. Fast
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
One of the most important aspects of intelligence support to operations in the current operational environment is grappling with the complexity of the total environment and the threat, especially during operations within Iraq and Afghanistan. This complexity across all aspects of full-spectrum operations has resulted in a greater demand for flexible, adaptive, and timely intelligence analytical support than at any other point in our past. When considering the threat, the environment, and the dynamics of our operations there are many subtleties and shades of gray. The good news is that we are successfully providing that analytical support, but we also have room for improvement.

The Environment

Understanding the environment and identifying all of the most significant aspects of the various elements of the environment for every operation both in the short-term and long-term is easier said than done. The complex and intricate details and factors of localized and international culture, geography, history, religion, tribal affiliation, other affiliations, economics, other demographic factors, and perceptions are overwhelming. These details and factors are especially challenging where there are many distinct sub-cultures in a dense urban environment. It takes a significant amount of mental skill to overcome our own bias when conducting analysis and understanding the local population. For example, just the perception of time and the judgment of actions over time are significantly affected by culture and perspective.

The Threat

Another challenge is to make sure we understand our threat without oversimplifying, overestimating, or underestimating the threat. For example, the threat



may not be a homogenous element with a Western-style hierarchy. What at first appears as a single movement or element may in fact consist of many different types of elements that only cooperate based on convenience and a similar but not necessarily common goal. At the same time each threat does have some type of leadership and can be modeled. The threat and activity indicators (or observables) are often hard to detect and often subtle, which challenges our collection efforts. In operations like we are conducting in Iraq and Afghanistan, the threat is effectively expressed in terms of target sets. We must make sure we do not get locked into our own perceptions of objectives, timing, and operations; the threat's perspective will often differ from conventional Western thought. Additionally, the threat's ability to regenerate operational capability may challenge our ability to assess the impact of operations.


The Operational Environment and Culture

Complexities of counterinsurgency operations require not only understanding the environment and threat, ourselves, and the effects of operations but also adapting intelligence products like intelligence reports and summaries to reflect this complexity and to meet the commander's decisionmaking requirements. It may be necessary to integrate certain analytic tools like analysis of competing models and leaderless resistance theory in order to improve analytical support. Another area of emphasis may be a full articulation of the many possible distinct courses of action (COAs) as opposed to just developing the most likely, most dangerous, and maybe a few other COAs. Predictive intelligence must grapple with threat operations in a fluid, phased approach to time and contain a high level

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CSM Forum

by Command Sergeant Major Lawrence J. Haubrich
U.S. Army Military Intelligence Corps



As you all know, this past March we held our 2005 Worldwide Command Sergeants Major/Sergeants Major (CSM/SGM) Military Intelligence (MI) conference here at Ft. Huachuca. Once again, it was a great success for our MI community.

The CSM Doug Russell Award was also given out at the conference, now in its fifth year. This annual award recognizes a soldier for significant contributions to Military Intelligence. This year's selection board featured sixteen very professional and competitive soldiers who without exception, have been decisively engaged in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The selection board had the difficult task of reviewing the packets of soldiers who stand in the very forefront of their respective formations and represent the best of our MI Corps.

All of the soldiers you recommended were the best of the best and all are winners by the fact you nominated them for consideration to compete for the 2005 CSM Doug Russell Award.

The winner of the 2005 CSM Doug Russell Award is SGT Amber N. Bennett who is assigned to Bravo Company, 1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, New York. SGT Bennett enlisted in the Army in May 2001. She attended Basic Combat Training at Ft. Jackson, South Carolina and Advanced Individual Training at Ft. Huachuca, Arizona for the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 97E HUMINT Collector. Upon graduation she went to the Defense Language Institute (DLI) to attend the Basic Spanish course. She was then assigned to Bravo Company, 110th MI Battalion, 10th Mountain Division. While assigned to 110th MI Battalion she was involved in several field training exercises and a Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotation. SGT Bennett also de-



ployed with B Company to augment the 173d Airborne Brigade in Iraq. SGT Bennett is still assigned to B Company and is preparing to deploy again to Afghanistan in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Again, our congratulations to SGT Amber N. Bennett as the fifth Annual CSM Doug Russell award recipient.

I want to share SGT Bennett's remarks with all of you as she accepted the award:

"Sergeants Major and guests, I thank you so much for the opportunity to be here today. I have been blessed so much throughout my military career, and God continues to send wonderful things my way. From a young age

I have wanted to be a service member. I was never a military brat, but I always wanted to see what I could do as a soldier. I chose the job of a 97E because it seemed very challenging and exciting. Since the day I made the choice to join the Army, I have realized it was one of the best decisions I ever could have made. I have also realized that no matter where I am, I can make a difference."

"As a soldier in a large unit, you can sometimes feel your contributions don't make a difference to anyone but you. I had a change of heart when I went to Iraq. I met the people whose lives were so greatly impacted just by my presence, and I saw the faces of the soldiers whose lives depended so greatly on the information I obtained. I understood that I could make a difference. Every soldier plays his or her own part to put an end to the terrorism that plagues the world. I realized the role I play has nothing to do with rank, qualifications or how highly decorated my uniform is; but it has everything to do with believing in what I am fighting for. I gained a new appreciation for freedoms I have and a greater love for the country—my country that provides those freedoms to me."

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Technical Perspective

by Chief Warrant Officer Five James J. Prewitt-Diaz
U.S. Army Military Intelligence Corps



Officer Education System (OES) Redesign: A Technician's Point of View

The current Warrant Officer Education System (WOES), developed during the Cold War, is out of step with the demands of our technologically advanced and transforming Army and current operations. The asymmetric nature of the current operational environment is characterized by islands of conflict—there are no front lines. Warrant Officers (WOs) are now performing duties that historically they have not been trained to perform. The focus of this column is two fold:

- To point out the need for the integration of WOES into an overarching Officer Education System (OES), which educates the **entire** U.S. Army Officer Corps throughout its members' military careers.
- To emphasize the need for additional leadership and improved technical training for WOs.

I must point out that there have been no decisions made on the integration of WOES into OES. There are many options being studied and I am sure that our leadership will select the best option to the overall benefit of our Army. Last fall, the WO Training Branches of all fifteen branch proponents were asked to study the integration of the WOES into the OES. Their findings will be briefed to LTG William S. Wallace, Commander, Combined Arms Center (CAC) later this year. The study was prompted by one of the recommendations of the Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP). The main thrust of this recommendation was to create a shift in Army Culture in which the WO Corps is fully integrated into the Officer Corps—"One Officer Corps for One Army." It is important that the reader understand



that by no means am I advocating an equal or single training plan for warrant and line officers. Our professional and educational needs are different.

Integrating WOES into OES

One of the education transformation concepts being studied is the full integration of officer and WO candidates into the Basic Officer Leadership Course (BOLC) Phases 1 and 2; they will attend BOLC Phase 2 together as lieutenants and WO1s. There is little difference between the basic officer leadership training offered to officer and WO

candidates in BOLC Phase 1. Merging these cohorts early in their education and in a controlled training environment makes sense. One major benefit is that it will centralize officer producing schools under one education system with one standard, saving training time and resources. Another benefit is that it exposes lieutenants to WOs early in their careers. Because both cohorts will receive the same initial training; lieutenants, as they progress through the ranks, will learn to regard WOs as officers.

It is easier to merge the training of the warrant and line officer cohorts early in their careers as they share the same training and officer leadership development needs. This task becomes increasingly difficult as they progress through the education levels. After BOLC 1 and 2, lieutenants and WO1s disperse to pursue their respective leadership and technical tracks. For WOs, the need for specialized training tailored to their professional needs increases. This is certainly true of BOLC Phase 3, the "branch qualification" or Officer Basic Course (OBC), where it will be far more difficult to find common ground in order to integrate WOBC and OBC classes.




Figure 1. This diagram depicts a future integrated OES where WO1s and Lieutenants attend training together early on in their training. After completion of BOLC 2, a warrant officer will take advantage of nested training opportunities that fit the officer's professional training need.

Some school proponents might find it feasible to integrate some of the curriculum, while others will not be able to integrate at all. The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Ft. Huachuca (USAIC&FH) led the way in the study to integrate some of the WOBC training into the OBC curriculum. Analysis conducted by CW5 Alfred Myles (Retired) and CW5 Donna Smith, Chief Warrant Officer Training, concluded that it would be feasible to integrate only a few classes such as Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP), and Fighting–Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (F-ISR). The groundwork done by these two officers was presented to other school proponents as an example of how to proceed with the integration.

Good intentions notwithstanding, I must admit that this ATLDP recommendation has created considerable consternation within the officer ranks. It is a radical concept and if it happens, it will cause a fundamental shift in Army Officer culture. Both officer cohorts have always had segregated training. This is neither right nor wrong, just the way it has been. Whatever version of integrated OES is implemented which offers WOs shared training, will have a long lasting effect on the way that WOs are educated.

Need for Improved Leadership and Technical Training

Having said that, the question comes to mind: Why do we want to merge WO training with the existing OES when the current WOES has worked thus far?

Change is inevitable and necessary. During the Cold War years, the pace of technological advances was slower than today. This condition allowed for long-term and stable equipment, doctrine, and education life cycles. In those days, for example, the cradle-to-grave life cycle for most Army

equipment could reach 12 years. WOs, without formal education, could go from assignment to assignment and never encounter new equipment or procedures. This environment allowed the WO to become the technical expert at his job.

This is no longer the case. The end of the Cold War, the fast pace of technological advances, and current combat operations have forced rapid changes in our Army. We are faster, lighter, and more lethal than ever before. Because of the highly technical environment that pervades our transforming Army, WOs are now performing in positions they traditionally have not been trained for or where their training has become quickly dated. WOs are hard pressed to maintain a technical edge under an education system designed for a by-gone era.

Our Army culture has also been slow to keep pace. There is still no perceived pressing need for WOs to receive training in leadership (after the initial transition to WO training is completed), on the joint environment, or at advanced and strategic levels. WOs are still viewed and expected to be technicians but not leaders in a sense of influencing and leading change at senior levels. With few exceptions, their opinions are only sought on technical issues.

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ALWAYS OUT FRONT!

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of detail across many dimensions of the operational environment. Analysts must make sure that intelligence assessments do not just report history. Additionally, the analyst must conduct analysis from a cross-discipline context not only fusing all-source intelligence but also identifying gaps in intelligence and helping shape intelligence synchronization (formerly collection management).

The environment, the threat, and friendly forces and operations all interact in a complex manner making analysis a challenge. Each one of these areas is shaped by a complex set of behaviors and perceptions ... which brings us back to culture! Culture not only impacts the environment and threat but also affects how each party views itself, how each party makes decisions, and the resulting second and third order effects (which we must account for in the development of the measures of effectiveness) to any action. One of the best set of skills to help deal with the complexity of the culture is the skillset associated with negotiations. An understanding of how we shape our own perceptions and dealing with what we consider our own equities are instructive in analyzing human actions.

Cultural Awareness and Understanding

All soldiers need to develop an awareness of the indigenous culture (a significant part of their operational environment) in order to enhance force capabilities while conducting full-spectrum operations. Intelligence personnel require an even greater level of understanding of the nuances of the culture in order to operate effectively. To better prepare soldiers for all operations that require extensive and close contact with foreign cultures, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has mandated cultural awareness and cross-cultural communications training (at the non-language level) throughout the Army. The U.S. Army Intelligence Center has been designated the primary lead in developing and training standardized courseware.

The Intelligence Center has analyzed lessons learned and world events and has developed several cultural awareness training packages based on the geopolitical and geo-cultural realities of the Middle East. The Middle East Cultural Awareness Training (MECAT) is a comprehensive 80-hour course that can be condensed into curriculums of smaller intervals. This training can be conducted here at Fort Huachuca; and is also available through Mobile Training Teams and distributive learning (through the University of Military Intelligence).

The curriculum includes—

- An examination of American culture and history from an anti-US perspective.
- Comparison of American culture and history with target cultures set in the geopolitical context of the global war on terrorism (GWOT).
- Overview and history of the Middle East, terrorism, and the terrorist culture.
- Improvised Explosive Devices.
- Cultural geography of the Middle East.
- Historical roots of the Arab-Israeli conflict and U.S. engagement in the region.
- Major non-Arab cultures in the Middle East.
- Arab culture and the Wahhabi sect of Islam.
- Concept of the Bedouin.
- Tenets and doctrine of Islam and the distinction between Islam as a faith and political ideology.
- Country studies for the Middle East region.

While the effort is now focused on getting soldiers ready for operations, we know that the GWOT is truly a global struggle. Therefore, we will develop course materials designed to meet the global challenge. Eventually, we will create sufficient flexibility in geopolitical and geo-cultural training to effectively prepare soldiers for specific missions anywhere in the world.

Dealing with complexity, like the intricacies of culture, is non-negotiable—it is our challenge! While meeting

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this challenge we must constantly reassess our operations to make sure we have all the necessary tools in our toolkit. While moving forward, grappling with complex issues, we here at the Intelligence Center need your help through feedback and active participation. Together we will effect the right improvements within our Corps and continue to support our Army at war.

ALWAYS OUT FRONT!

CSM Forum(Continued from page 3)

"So, I humbly accept this award for all the soldiers that have deployed abroad to defend those freedoms, those who are fighting for those freedoms now, and those who are soon to go. I accept this award for all those who raised their right hand and swore to protect their country against all enemies, both foreign and domestic. Last but not least, I accept this for all of those that give 110 percent every day because they know they can make a difference. Thank you once again for this great honor."

Leaders, I wanted to share SGT Bennett's remarks with all of you. It is soldiers like her in our formations, our MI Corps and our Army at war that lets the world know that we are **Relevant and Ready**.

I ask all of you to get with your CSMs and SGMs who attended this year's conference for feedback on the briefings and presentations. Conference topics included: Theater Intelligence Brigades, the Modular Force, Developing the Future Force, OCMI, and Human Resource Center, MI Branch. As always our Military Intelligence warriors are doing great things in support of the GWOT. I personally thank each and every one of you for what you all do as MI professionals and warriors. Let's take care of each other, our soldiers, and our families. You train hard, you die hard; you train easy, you die easy. Peace needs protection.

ALWAYS OUT FRONT!

Technical Perspective(Continued from page 5)

Furthermore, because there is no perceived need to emphasize leadership and strategic education for WOs, the Warrant Officer Advanced Course (for CW4s) is four weeks long as opposed to a nine month Command and General Staff course for majors. CW5s attend a two week course, while colonels and sergeants major have educational opportunities at the U.S. Army War College that may last up to one year.

Additionally there are no joint positions for WOs, so no need for joint education. I cannot say whether this is right or wrong, as I do not think we need the **same** education at those levels either; but WOs do need improved and relevant training to enable them to fully participate in a transforming Army.

So, does this mean that the Army is going to totally merge OES and WOES? The answer is a resounding "No." The intent of any future OES redesign will not be to make WO education and training virtually the same as our line officer brethren. In that case, the requirement for WOs would cease to exist. Nor is it the intent to dilute the WO technical expertise capability, as it defines who we are. The intent is not to leave WO education and training methods mired in the past, but rather to take advantage of nested training opportunities in order to improve WO leadership and technical training. Current Army requirements mandate change in order to move into the future. The merger will strengthen our education system by augmenting technical training with key elements of leadership education. Sometimes this is best accomplished in an "integrated" classroom with our line officers and sometimes not. The WO Corps must become more proficient in its mission and prepare for our continuously evolving role in a rapidly changing Army. We can help achieve that through an "integrated" or "shared" training environment that will facilitate our learning.

"Remember the past but look to the future"

Assessing Stability During Counterinsurgency (COIN) or Stability and Support Operations Through Patrol Debriefs

by Captain Brian Gellman

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Task: Develop and implement a collection plan that will result in prioritizing the efforts of all task force (TF) assets. You have very limited military intelligence (MI) collection assets, your area of responsibility (AOR) is huge, the threat is amorphous and does not look like anything they taught you at school, and you have only two weeks until the commander wants to make a decision.

This situation is exactly what I faced in Baghdad in late April 2003. The city of five million was, at the time, broken up into 55 zones and there was very little that we knew about the city. The task was to determine which zones required immediate attention, what kind of attention, and what priority each effort should have. The methodology we created was not only very user-(collector) and analyst-friendly, but it briefed well. After just two weeks of collection, we were able to not only pinpoint which five zones were the most unstable, but we could make very precise recommendations about the type of efforts needed in each zone.

The purpose of this article is to present a methodology for determining the stability of a region within an AOR. This methodology drives collection and assists analysis and assessments. It can also serve as a briefing tool and helps to determine measurements of effectiveness. This methodology was used successfully

in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), and it applies to any COIN, stability operation, or support operation.

Important note: COIN is a tactical mission. We often win or lose counterinsurgencies at the battalion or company levels (sometimes lower). Do not disregard COIN theory because it has traditionally been an operational or strategic discussion. This article focuses primarily on COIN, but it also applies to a stability operations or support operations environment.

Background

COIN is not a mission that the Army teaches in great depth. Successful COIN operations rely heavily on good intelligence and a thorough understanding of the insurgents.

One of the most famous insurgents was Mao Tse-Tung. Mao understood the importance of intelligence, in fact, his guerilla battalion headquarters staff consist-

ed of 31 intelligence members out of a staff of 75. As in Mao's time, today most of the intelligence gathered in COIN is through human intelligence (HUMINT). In Iraq, trained HUMINT collectors represent a very small fraction of the force, but a large percentage of reported intelligence. Nonstandard collectors of human information such as presence patrols, convoys, and

Zone 18: Grid		OVERALL ASSESSMENT: 2.00 DTG:131700ZMAY03	
CRITERIA	ASSESSMENT	REPORTED FACTS	COMMENTS
Population	0	Pro-coalition presence.	
Leaders	4	No Leaders at this time	No one person has been identified
Law/Order	3	No Police Presence	Police station in the zone is not functioning. The people are conducting themselves in a civil manner. Not much reporting on looting.
Media / IO	3	No reporting on Media/ IO	Iranian Presbencin zone; probably spreading Anti-Coalition sentiment
Infrastructure	2	Power and Water running	Power intermittent. Very weak. Runs about 12 hours a day.
Hostile Forces	0	No reports of hostile forces.	
Coalition Military	2	Coalition Presence	3 ID forces conduct brief patrols in the zone.
CA/HA	2	Lack of Money	Local population wants to work but wants to be paid; Locals state that the lack of money is leading to theft and fighting.
		4  0	
UNSTABLE ← → STABLE			

Figure 1. Example of a final end product used to brief the commander.

countless other missions are all important sources of information. To be successful in COIN, we must take advantage of the information obtained by the entire force, not a small fraction of intelligence soldiers. The Army of the future promises lots of great technology that will turn every soldier into a sensor (ES2), but the Army of the future is not fighting in Iraq.

It is also important to have a basic understanding of the insurgents. Regardless of the group to which the insurgent belongs, from Chinese Communists to Latin American guerillas to American colonists or Iraqi Islamic extremists, there is one factor that all insurgents want: instability. Insurgents feed off instability. They will seek out unstable regions in which to operate or they will create instability through various means to support their desired end states. For intelligence professionals, determining what factors contribute to sta-

bility and what regions are stable or unstable is critical in conducting COIN operations. There are many uncertainties in fighting an insurgency, but one thing is certain: if you find instability, you will find insurgents.

Determining the stability of an area during COIN or stability operations and support operations is a difficult task, comparing the stability of two different

areas is even more difficult. Many times battalions and brigades have AORs that are very large and often diverse, achieving *economy of force* becomes an extremely important tenet. It is the responsibility of the intelligence professional to analyze the AOR, make assessments, and recommend to the commander where to focus efforts to get the most “bang for his buck.”

To do this effectively, the unit must use an objective methodology. We must describe terms such as “stability” and “permissive” with

clear, quantitative definitions used throughout the command. We need to develop a collection plan that asks specific questions during patrol debriefs, which we later translate into quantitative representations and the end product, the briefing slides (see Figure 1). This makes recommendations to the commander very specific, logical, and easy to follow.

Decision Methodology

As complex as this slide may appear, the methodology used to create the assessment it depicts is really fairly simple; in fact, it is no more complicated than a decision brief taught at staff schools. The decision methodology has five steps.

Step 1: Define Your Core Terms.

Here are some terms we used and our definitions of them:

- ❑ “Stable” – No Coalition support required; a stable zone is secure and considered permissive.
- ❑ “Unstable” – Extensive Coalition support required. An unstable zone may require Coalition efforts to remove hostile forces or conduct civil-military operations (CMO). One may consider an unstable zone permissive; however, this can change at any time due to the zone’s instability.
- ❑ “Permissive” – Coalition forces can enter into the zone freely; attacks are very infrequent (less than one every couple of months).
- ❑ “Non-permissive” – Coalition forces can be expected to be attacked at any minute within in this area; attacks occur several times a week or terrain is denied.
- ❑ “Semi-permissive” – Coalition forces are attacked occasionally, anywhere from once a month to twice a week.

These terms will become the backbone of your assessments and will remain general in scope.

Step 2: Intelligence Preparation of the

<p>Population: 1+1+2=1.33 Green to Amber</p> <p>-What are the attitudes of the population towards coalition forces? -Positive/Receptive attitudes toward Coalition=Green -Negative/Hostile attitudes toward Coalition=Red -Fear/Reluctance or anti-Coalition Demonstrations due to residual Regime mentality=Amber</p> <p>-Is there an existence of ethnic tension, i.e. Sunni v. Shia violence? -No (positive intra ethnic cooperation)=Green -Yes (existence of retributive violence)=Red -No cooperation, but no violence=Amber</p> <p>-Is there a link with other hostile elements outside of the city (tribes, families, religious sects, etc.)? -No (rejects or ignores hostile elements outside of city)=Green -Yes (link to hostile element confirmed and demonstrated)=Red -Unconfirmed links with no evidence of hostility=Amber</p>	<p>Infrastructure (Indigenous Capability per Zone): 1+2+1+1+3=8/5=1.2 Green to Amber</p> <p>-Is there access to medical treatment and supplies? -Yes=Green -No=Red -Inconsistent=Amber</p> <p>-Is there access to power? -Yes=Green -No=Red -Inconsistent=Amber</p> <p>-Is there access to clean drinking and running water? -Yes=Green -No=Red -Inconsistent=Amber</p> <p>-Are access roads serviceable? -Yes=Green -No=Red -High level of congestion due to debris or traffic creating choke points=Amber</p> <p>-Is the population making repairs to the above factors on their own, not relying on Coalition help? -Yes=Green -No=Red Trash all over streets, no one is taking initiative, they are waiting for us to do it for them -Inconsistent/delayed repairs to selected areas/services of zone=Amber</p>
<p>Second Report, 1st April 04 Anti-U.S. graffiti grid 12345776</p>	
<p>Population 1.33 Infrastructure 1.2 Overall Zone = 1.26 Green to Amber</p>	

Battlefield (IPB).

Specifically, define and describe your operational environment. Break your AOR into zones or areas (named areas of interest or NAIs). Be sure to make these zones easy to distinguish, delineated by markers such as main roads and major terrain features, so that the patrol leaders can easily discern the zone where they are. These zone boundaries do not need to be contiguous. A map of them can look like a checkerboard or it can look like a series of islands.

Step 3: Define Your Criteria.

Each situation will require different criteria, which are nothing more than indicators of stability, that you can develop based on your experience. You can also use the different dimensions and variables of the operational environment, found in **FM 2-0, Intelligence**,¹ or the best method may be to bring in all members of the staff for a brainstorming session. Do not forget to include civil affairs (CA), information operations (IO), and other special staff. As an example, we developed the eight criteria shown in Figure 1.

Step 4: Turn Criteria into Information Collection Tasks and Assign Quantitative Values to Your Definitions.

The next step is to turn these criteria into a set of questions the patrol has to answer. The debriefer will assign the answers a numerical value and average the criteria together for an overall assessment value. This sounds complicated but is actually very easy.

Develop a set of questions about each criteria and turn them into tasks that have simple “Red, Amber, Green” answers. These are the patrol’s reporting requirements. For example, “Is power available to the population of the zone?”

Figure 2. Example of a Patrol Debrief depicting an overall assessment for a zone.

- Yes, power is on 24 hours a day: Green.
- No, power is not available: Red.
- Partial power: Amber.

To make this process objective and easy to repeat by multiple echelons, your questions must be very clear. Be careful not to ask patrol leaders to make judgments or force them to interpret the tasks. Remember who your collectors are and phrase the questions so they are easy for them to understand.

Next, the patrol will answer all of the tasks and your unit will debrief them. After the debriefer completes the debriefing, he or she has to translate the patrol's answers into a quantifiable report. If the patrol's answer is "Green," assign it a value of 1, assign a 2 for Amber, and a 3 for Red. When you average multiple indicators (SORs) within a criterion, you get the overall assessment for the criterion. When you determine the average of the numerical assessments for all your criteria, you get the overall area assessment of the zone (see Figure 2).

Figure 2 is an example of what the patrol debrief card might look like if two of your criteria are Population and Infrastructure. The patrol leader circles the color, and an analyst later assigns it a value, averages it, and comes up with an overall assessment for the zone.

TTP (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures) 1. Also add blank spaces for priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), additional specific intelligence requirements (SIRs), and talking points on your patrol debrief card. Always include SIRs in the patrol's mission tasks. Give them a reason to patrol other than simply making a "presence" appearance.

You also have to assign the core terms numerical values or ranges. These values will help us determine how we define success. We defined the core terms as:

- Green equals 1 to ≤ 1.25 .
- Amber to Green >1.25 to ≤ 1.75 .
- Amber >1.75 to ≤ 2.25 .

- Amber to Red > 2.25 to ≤ 2.75 .
- Red >2.75 to ≤ 3 .

TTP 2. When briefing "Amber to Green" or "Amber to Red," brief it in the direction you believe it is heading; for example, if a zone is getting worse, brief, "*The zone is Green to Amber.*" If the zone is getting better, you may brief, "*The zone is Red to Amber.*" Again, the important thing is consistency in your definitions and a common understanding of the terms.

Step 5: Implementation—the Debrief.

The single most important procedure in this methodology is an effective debriefing. It is important to train the debriefers and standardize the procedure. Develop debriefer guidelines that will aid them in conducting the prebrief and the debrief (see Figure 3).

A major issue raised by leaders about debriefings is "*Who should conduct them?*" "*Isn't that an MI function?*" There are not enough MI soldiers to debrief every patrol and sometimes companies are not physically located with the battalion. Until MI soldiers are added to the infantry company modified tables of organization and equipment (MTOEs), the prime candidate for patrol debriefs in a COIN or stability operations and support operations environment is the fire support officer.

Intelligence Prebriefing: Keep it brief.

1. Current enemy situation and terrain.
2. New, recent TTPs observed.
3. Current assessments of zones along patrol's route.
4. Priority Information Requirements (PIRs) and Black List.
5. Specific Information Requirements (SIR) for patrol.
6. Information Operations (IO) talking points.

Intelligence Debriefing: This should occur as soon as possible once the patrol returns; the more patrol members in attendance, the better.

1. Were any PIRs answered? Discuss each PIR.
2. Patrol discusses (using map):
 - Route with times
 - Any significant events (Fill out Hostile Incident Report if patrol was attacked)
3. Were any SIRs answered? Discuss each SIR.
4. Debriefer receives Patrol Debrief card, discusses changes and asks for elaboration.
5. IO talking points:
 - Did the population receive the talking points?
 - Has the population heard these talking points before? If so, how
 - Did the population understand and believe the talking points?
 - How did the population react to the talking points?
 - What questions did the population have?

Figure 3. Patrol Prebriefing/Debriefing Guidelines.

TTP 1. The debriefer should also keep a text document that describes the area. This written assessment is not for the briefing, but it makes a great analyst tool for continuity and answering questions about the environment and threat for newcomers.

TTP 2. Another technique we used was listing each zone on the wall with a colored circle. Next to the list, a notebook had a copy of all the slides so that anyone who wants more information can view the slide and the analysts' notes. We also had a map of the city next to this list so that soldiers could plan their routes to avoid unstable zones.

The final product will be a compilation of briefing slides (Figure 4). You will be able to rate each zone in order of least to most stable (based on values determined from patrol debriefs). Color code an overlay of your AOR and the problem spots will "jump out" at you when you see unstable zones clustered together. Remember, this is just another tool in your tool kit; you can also add another overlay containing significant actions to help further refine the picture.

Once your analysis is complete, you are ready to make an educated assessment and recommendation to your commander. After he makes his decisions, the unit takes actions. Now you can use this same system to measure the effectiveness of your unit's actions.

Zone 18: Grid		OVERALL ASSESSMENT: 2.00 DTG:131700ZMAY03	
CRITERIA	ASSESSMENT	REPORTED FACTS	COMMENTS
Population	0	Pro-coalition presence.	
Leaders	4	No Leaders at this time	No one person has been identified
Law/Order	3	No Police Presence	Police station in the zone is not functioning. The people are conducting themselves in a civil manner. Not much reporting on looting.
Media / IO	3	No reporting on Media/ IO	Iranian Presbencen zone; probably spreading Anti-Coalition sentiment
Infrastructure	2	Power and Water running	Power intermittent. Very weak. Runs about 12 hours a day.
Hostile Forces	0	No reports of hostile forces.	
Coalition Military	2	Coalition Presence	3 ID forces conduct brief patrols in the zone.
CA/HA	2	Lack of Money	Local population wants to work but wants to be paid; Locals state that the lack of money is leading to theft and fighting.

4 0
UNSTABLE ← → STABLE

Figure 4. Example of a Final End Product Used to Brief the Commander.

Conclusion

A COIN campaign will never be successful without solid intelligence and a clear understanding of the operational environment. To achieve success in our current campaign in Iraq, we must evolve our doctrine into a workable solution based on an ever-changing set of complexities. This methodology was primarily developed and first implemented by one of our senior analysts. I consider the ingenuity and resourcefulness of young noncommissioned officers and officers at the battalion and brigade levels to be vital ingredients in our success on a battlefield where most of the intelligence is bottom-fed. We must continue to encourage this evolution of ideas as today's war writes tomorrow's doctrine.

I would like to thank former Staff Sergeant Michael E. Brown for first engineering this methodology. SSG Brown served as one of our senior analysts during the invasion of Iraq and he was one of the key players in the initial infiltration of Special Forces into Afghanistan in 2001.



Endnote

1. FM 2-0, Intelligence, 17 May 2004, page 1-20.

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An Adaptive Methodology for Developing Enemy Courses of Action

by Jack Kem

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

One of the key responsibilities of intelligence staff officers is the development of enemy courses of action (ECOAs) as part of the military decisionmaking process (MDMP). As part of the wargaming process, it is essential that S2s develop at least two different ECOAs: the most likely ECOA and the most dangerous ECOA. These two products provide the realistic enemy for the wargaming process; however, the problem is that we have no standard methodology for developing ECOAs that is adaptable and assists in maintaining a “running estimate” of the enemy once operations begin.




Figure 1. Basic Ends-Ways-Means Problem-Solving Methodology for Developing COAs.

Methodology for Developing an ECOA

I propose a simple methodology for developing ECOAs. The MDMP is essentially the process for problem-solving, keying on three essential elements:

- Definition of the problem (mission analysis).
- Creating a solution to the problem (course of action [COA] development and selection).
- Testing the solution (wargaming).

This second step—creating a solution to the problem—is the key step for developing not only friendly COAs, but also ECOAs.

Developing a COA consists of three components:

- Determining the ends (the purpose for the COA).
- Determining the ways (the methods, or how you will achieve the ends).
- Determining the means (the resources available to achieve the ways).

This ends-ways-means methodology helps to provide coherent COAs for both friendly and enemy forces. Figure 1 provides a graphic depiction of this process.

The best way to develop ECOAs is to adjust the steps in the ends-ways-means approach. The first step is to




Figure 2. Adjusted Ends-Means-Methods ECOA Methodology.

important steps that the analyst must complete before determining an ECOA is the “enumeration of enemy capabilities” paragraph in the intelligence estimate. This should include all the possible combinations of capabilities that the enemy can achieve with his resources.

Looking at it simplistically, if I have a dollar bill, I can buy a 20-ounce soda or two candy bars, or I can make four telephone calls at a phone booth. With my resource of \$1, I can do one of the following combinations:

- Buy one 20-ounce soda
- Buy two candy bars.
- Make four telephone calls.
- Make two phone calls and buy one candy bar.

In this example, I have enumerated all of the possibilities that I can think of for my dollar bill. Of course, there are other options that I have available to me for a dollar, but I have not thought of them yet. The same applies for the enemy capabilities. Think of all of the possible combinations for the resources you know the enemy has and list (“enumerate”) them in the intelligence estimate. Keep in mind that you are not aware of other possible options. This is a key part of the homework in the estimate process that is essential for developing an ECOA.

This also provides a methodology to know what the enemy cannot do once he has “expended” his resources. For example, if I have already bought one candy bar, I can no longer buy that 20-ounce soda. If I now buy a soda, then you know that I had resources of which you were not initially aware—this becomes a way to keep a rolling estimate and allows the analyst to update the resources available to the enemy based upon enemy actions.

Of course, you do not expect me to throw away my precious dollar bill, you would expect me to spend that dollar for some purpose that meets my needs. The same applies to the enemy—you would expect him to use his means and resources in a way that meets his purpose. Since you have already done your homework by developing the “enumeration of enemy capabilities” as part of the intelligence estimate process, you are now ready to do the first

develop the ends—the task and purpose for the ECOAs. Then it follows to determine the actual resources available to achieve that purpose, or to determine the means. Finally, the analyst should then “package” these resources in coherent ways to achieve the means. This adjustment for developing the ECOAs is ends-means-means. Figure 2 presents a graphic depiction of this adjusted methodology.

Figure 2 depicts a quiver of arrows for a good reason. The different means and resources available to the enemy should be thought of as a quiver full of arrows—different resources and capabilities to package into a coherent COA. For this reason, one of the im-

step in developing the ECOA by determining the ends—the purpose for the enemy actions.

The clearest methodology for determining ends is to determine the end state that the enemy wants to achieve. To achieve that end state, the enemy will normally have a COG that he will attack, and attacking that COG will require key decisive points. Figure 3 graphically shows an example of how an enemy might approach the construct of the end state, COG, and decisive points.

In this “hypothetical” example, the end state is a clear description of the goals that the enemy wants to achieve. The COG is the “belly button” that the enemy wants to push to achieve that objective. Each of the decisive points listed can lead to the COG.

When developing an ECOA, it is useful to visually lay out the end state, COG, and decisive points as shown in Figure 3. This again is an aid to the “running estimate” because it is likely that the enemy may change his desired end state based on his success or failure, may decide that the COG should be adapted, and will change decisive points. It is also critical to ensure (as much as possible) that the end state, COG, and decisive points **are from the enemy's perspective**. Explicitly showing these concepts and continually asking “*is this right*” is one way to mitigate “mirror imaging” on the part of the analyst.

Once you have determined the “ends,” it is time to examine the resources. It may be apparent at this time that the “enumeration of enemy capabilities” is incomplete. This would be particularly true if the analyst based the enumeration of enemy capabilities on offensive operations but the reality is stability operations or a counterinsurgency. Other resources may become readily apparent when matched with the decisive points, such as affiliated forces and asymmetric means available to the enemy. Take this extra step to update the enumeration of enemy forces, you can be sure that a thinking enemy will closely scrutinize all of the resources available, even if you do not.

Most Likely ECOA

Once you have determined the ends (purpose) and updated the means (resources), it is time to put it together as a package. The first package to assemble should be the most likely ECOA. (I like to describe this package as the way that the enemy prefers to fight or his comfort zone.) It is time to think again of the resources (“enumeration of enemy capabilities”) as the arrows in the quiver—pull out each of the arrows and apply them to the decisive points in the way that you feel the enemy wants to fight. This becomes the most likely ECOA, as shown in Figure 4.

This process also helps with the running estimate. When the enemy fights in a way that this COA did not lead you to expect, it is time to reassess—either the enemy is not fighting as expected or the enemy is using the resources (or not using resources) that were assessed. You can be sure that a thinking enemy will not fight the way you expect, but when it is different than expected, the reason for the change is due to the enemy's ends, ways, or means being dif-




Figure 3. Example of an Enemy Approach to End State, COG, and Decisive Points.




Figure 4. Most Likely Enemy COA.

his resources in such a way to really confound friendly forces? It may not have made sense to rational people to fly airplanes into the World Trade Center, but it certainly worked to get our attention. The more creative you are in developing the most dangerous COA, the less surprised you will be when the enemy adopts part of that COA. Figure 5 illustrates the development of the most dangerous COA.

Summary

The following are the steps to use in developing ECOAs:

- Complete a detailed “enumeration of enemy capabilities” paragraph in the intelligence estimate.
- Develop the “ends”: the end state, the COG, and the decisive points from the enemy’s perspective.
- Develop the “ways”—reassess the enemy capabilities and resources available.
- Develop the “means” for the most likely ECOA, fighting the way the enemy prefers to fight.
- Develop the “means” for the most dangerous ECOA, fighting the way that causes friendly forces the most problems.
- Continually reassess. Ask, “Did I get that right?”

Using this methodology, it should not matter if you are in the offense, the defense, or in a stability operation. If the enemy changes his ends, ways, or means, you should be in step with him as long as you are continually looking at the ends, ways, and means the enemy has available to him.

ferent than assessed. You do not have to start from scratch (unless you have really blown it); you can adjust on the fly when the enemy adjusts. If you have done your homework on the enumeration of enemy capabilities, you will also know when the enemy has eliminated some of his options (when he has spent his dollar on a soda, so it is no longer available for the telephone calls).

Most Dangerous ECOA

Developing the most dangerous ECOA is much the same process as the most likely ECOA. Put all of the arrows back in the quiver and then apply the resources the enemy has in the way that would cause friendly forces the biggest problems. Be creative in this step...how could the enemy apply




Figure 5. Development of the Most Dangerous COA.



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


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Sterilla A. Smith
Managing Editor

Developing a Predictive Capability in the Counterintelligence Integrated Analysis Center (CIIAC)

by Charles E. Harlan

The mission of the Counterintelligence Integrated Analysis Center (CIIAC) is to conduct near-real-time analysis and provide force protection (FP) information that enhances situational awareness in support of the 902d Military Intelligence (MI) Group, at Fort Meade, Maryland. The 902d formed the CIIAC following the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 to function as the 902d analysis and control element (ACE) to support the Group's FP activities. The 902d ACE initially used the All-Source Analysis System-Light (ASAS-L) system; it did not have the signals intelligence (SIGINT) and imagery intelligence (IMINT) sections found in a fully staffed ACE.

The CIIAC is the current intelligence branch of the Army Counterintelligence Center (ACIC). The ACIC is the Army Service-level counterintelligence (CI) production center and responds to both scheduled production, managed under the Department of Defense Intelligence Production Program (DODIPP), and ad hoc requests. **AR 381-11, Production Requirements and Threat Intelligence Support to the U.S. Army**, dated 28 June 2000, covers the procedures for requesting intelligence production support from the ACIC.

Since 11 September, the CIIAC has undergone several restructures to meet evolving mission requirements. Presently, the CIIAC is structured to focus on identifying FP threats to Army installations, personnel, and activities in the continental United States (CONUS). The CIIAC functions as both a modified ACE, providing direct support to the 902d MI Group, and in a general support role as a strategic analysis section to provide

FP research and analysis to the Army in CONUS.

This article will describe the evolving business processes of the CIIAC, how these processes provide a framework to perform predictive analysis of FP threats, and how they facilitate collaboration between the CIIAC, the Anti-Terrorism Operations and Intelligence Cell (ATOIC), and the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) Information Dominance Center (IDC).

Predictive Analysis

The objective of current intelligence research and analysis is to provide predictive analysis. The goal of predictive analysis in support of FP is to identify threats and warn leaders of threat actions in time to defeat or mitigate them. Predictive analysis techniques identify the level of probability of an event based on combinations of indicators, trends, patterns, and historical events. The ability to perform predictive analysis is especially important for FP but it is extremely hard to achieve given the—

- Tremendous amount of information available.
- Complexity of interpreting the reliability of sources.
- Evolving modus operandi of foreign terrorists.
- Open nature of our society in the United States.
- As well as other factors.

Given this complexity, the CIIAC has developed several new products and business processes incorporating evolving computerized analytic tools in an effort to achieve the ability to predict FP threats.

Predictive Analysis Tools

Central to the predictive analysis process are threat streams, indicators and warning (I&W), and analytic programs such as Analyst's Notebook, Starlight, and the Structured Evidential Argumentation System (SEAS).


Threat Streams. The concept of threat streams has been used for some time and can be equated to a commander's critical information requirement (CCIR). The CIIAC has developed long-term and short-term threat streams. Long-term streams are generally strategic concerns, such as the threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or the employment of Man-Portable Air Defense System (MANPADS) weapons by terrorists. Short-term threat streams reflect threats to specific activities or events.

Analyst's Notebook. The Analyst's Notebook enables

analysts to prepare and share link-analysis charts. Figure 1 shows an example of a chart from an Analyst Notebook. The CIIAC uses Analyst's Notebook to identify links between known or suspected terrorists, their activities, phone numbers, locations, and their associations with other persons, events, or groups. Analyst's Notebook charts are in increasingly being used in the ACIC Terrorism Summary (ATS) to help readers understand linkages in the information provided.

Analytic Tools. The CIIAC also uses several advanced analytic tools that are part of the INSCOM IDC suite of tools in support of predictive analysis. These include Starlight, and SEAS.

Starlight is a data visualization tool that captures and graphically portrays relationships among multiple pieces and types of information to include text documents, database records, images, maps, and web pages.



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Figure 1. Sample link-analysis chart with a temporal timeline from Analyst's Notebook.




Figure 2. Sample Starlight analysis charts.

Figure 2 shows sample Starlight analysis charts.

SEAS is a predictive analysis program and one of several artificial intelligence programs developed by the Artificial Intelligence Center at a government contracted firm. SEAS enables analysts to enter intelligence information and record their thinking through a series of structured arguments. SEAS allows collaboration between analysts on common arguments and relating arguments to indicators. It enables analysts to “drill down” through layers of arguments to discover the basis and rationale of arguments.

CIIAC Organization and Products

The CIIAC, (see figure 3) with a staff of 34, performs analysis and provides technical support. It is organized into two analysis sections that focus on FP: the ACIC Terrorism Summary (ATS), and Homeland Defense (HLD) sections and includes two technical support teams.

ACIC Terrorism Summary (ATS) Section. Each workday the ATS section prepares a summary of significant FP information relevant to Army forces within CONUS and outside CONUS (OCONUS). The goal of the ATS is to provide readers a daily compilation of significant FP information along with an assessment of the relevance and impact of the information on the Army. The ATS analysts use the CONUS threat streams as a guide to identify FP concerns for Army senior leaders based on current and planned operations. The CIIAC coordinates these threat streams with the ATOIC and INSCOM Intelligence Operations Center (IOC) on a monthly basis; they update the CONUS I&W list as needed.

Immediately after 11 September, the U.S. Army Criminal Investigative Command (USACIDC) assigned a criminal investigation detachment (CID) agent to the 902d to support the exchange of FP information between the two commands. The CID liaison officer (LNO) performs both a liaison and analysis function as part of the ATS section. Since 11 September, the CID LNO has made significant contributions to the CIIAC FP mission




Figure 3. CIIAC structure.

by providing timely access to law-enforcement information and facilitating the fusion of CI and law-enforcement information. The increased capabilities provided by the CID LNO are an indicator of an evolution in the relationship between INSCOM and USACIDC that will have a positive long-term impact on both organizations.

Homeland Defense (HLD) Section. There are five teams that focus on the four geographic regions of the U.S. Army Installation Management Agency (IMA) and the Military District of Washington (MDW) in the HLD section. The section's analysts maintain a "Blue force" and "Red force" laydown of Army installations and activities in CONUS and monitor FP threats. The HLD section has drafted threat assessments for each of the CONUS Army installations that fall under the IMA. They post these installation threat assessments on the ACIC web pages and update them on a regular basis. The objective of preparing these assessments is to provide a higher level of situational awareness to 902d CI agents throughout CONUS, garrison intelligence and security personnel, and the Army law-enforcement community.

The HLD analysts use the CONUS threat streams as the basis for their daily research. As analysts identify new FP information, they compare it to the CIIAC threat streams and the I&W list. If they determine the information is of value, they add it to the appropriate threat stream model in SEAS. The analysts specify the weight assigned to each piece of intelligence based on the factors of relevance, credibility, and impact. SEAS then performs a probabilistic analysis of the various pieces of information and provides a color-coded assessment of the probability or threat level. The value of SEAS increases over time as the database grows.

Technical Support Teams. The 902d IDC-Extension team maintains the 902d MI Group's IDC-Extension node and consists of a system administrator for the 902d IDC network, programmer/assistant system administrator, Geospatial Information Systems (GIS) developer, and a senior analyst. The CIIAC Production Support team consists of a web developer, a techni-

cal editor, and a GIS analyst. Together, these technical support teams are building a robust system to perform predictive analysis.

Enabling Technologies

A number of technologies have converged over the past several years that improve the ability of analysts to perform predictive analysis. Each of these technologies is important in supporting research, analysis, and information sharing. These include the push within the Intelligence Community to establish common standards for—

- Digital production.
- Increased bandwidth.
- Development of data-mining tools.
- Improved data-tagging methods such as extensible markup language (XML).
- Data migration tools such as Trusted One-Way Links (TOWL) that permit one-way data flow between networks, and Trusted Workstations, which allow two-way data flow between networks.

Threat Reporting and Collaboration

Access to a broad range of information is critical to situational awareness and conducting predictive analysis. Each analyst in the CIIAC has access to four networks: Nonclassified Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET), Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET), Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS), and the INSCOM IDC Network. The INSCOM IDC Network is a Top Secret-level research and development network that resides on the JWICS. The ACIC is coordinating access to the National Security Agency (NSA) Net to improve the CIIAC's all-source intelligence analysis capability. The CID LNO/analyst provides access to law-enforcement databases and systems.

The three core competencies of the CIIAC are research, analysis, and collaboration. Collaboration is the newest addition and reflects the growing need to

increase the level of agency-to-agency and analyst-to-analyst contact. In CONUS, each of the military services faces the same basic challenges in providing FP support to installations, personnel, and activities. We face a common enemy in the Global War on Terrorism. To anticipate or predict global threats effectively, we must collaborate through formal communities of practice (COP) and communities of interest (COI). Each of these is part of an organizational knowledge management program designed to capture individual experience and intuitive knowledge and codify it into explicit knowledge.

The CIIAC has been using the Joint Regional Information Exchange System (JRIES) to collaborate with law-enforcement officials across the United States. The Department of Homeland Security has fielded JRIES to all 50 states. Additionally, the CIIAC has access to the Joint Protection Enterprise Network (JPEN) that U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) is fielding. NORTHCOM has fielded JPEN to a number of Department of Defense (DOD) installations to include 23 Army installations. Installation security and law-enforcement personnel are using JPEN to submit Talon reports, the DOD standard for reporting suspicious incidents that may be terrorism-related.

The 902d MI Group maintains the Army Talon database of suspicious incident reports on the SIPRNET. Since February 2003, agents from the 902d have submitted more than 2,600 Army Talon reports. The CIIAC provides Army Talon reports to the Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA) where they add it to the Cornerstone database of suspicious incident reports from all of the military services. The ability to submit suspicious incident reports online provides the current intelligence needed to support predictive analysis.

The ACIC has also developed a web-based map on the SIPRNET using the Arc Geographical Information System (ArcGIS) suite of products from a commercial company. All Army Talon reports are automatically posted to the GIS map. Additionally, the ACIC can add data


to the map as needed from its other mission areas, to include technology protection, information operations, and investigations and operations. Based on the movement toward digital production within the Intelligence Community, the ACIC and CIIAC are moving toward pushing information with the expectation that users will find the information they need and be able to tailor it to meet their needs. Consumers who are not able to find required information can then submit requests for scheduled or ad hoc production to the ACIC through the Community On-Line Intelligence System for End-Users and Managers (COLISEUM).

Conclusion

The goal of the CIIAC is to develop a solid predictive analysis capability in support of the Army and homeland defense in CONUS. New business processes have streamlined research and analysis using state-of-the-art systems and new intelligence products support situational awareness and the dissemination of force protection information. The CIIAC is building on existing collaborative systems to establish agency and peer-to-peer relationships that will enhance predictive analysis and FP. The CIIAC, ATOIC, INSCOM IOC, and USACIDC will integrate information based on a common understanding of long- and short-term threat streams, CONUS I&W, and threat levels based on the use of SEAS and other advanced analytic tools.



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by Keith D. Martin (Chief Warrant Officer Four, U.S. Army, Retired)

Asymmetric combat, with lack of linear constraints and brief, but intense levels of action, requires a special emphasis on deductive and inductive analysis to recognize activity patterns, develop analytical conclusions, recognize intelligence gaps, and formulate intelligence requirements to fill these gaps. The asymmetric operational environment also creates conditions that stress detailed analysis and increase the degree of analytical difficulty.

Analytical Thinking

Unfortunately, the analytical skills (especially the inductive and deductive reasoning skills) necessary for analysts to be effective are difficult to teach, and are often generally only acquired through field experience under the mentorship of experienced senior analysts. Junior military intelligence (MI) officers and enlisted MI analysts properly received an introduction to cognitive analytical reasoning and intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) techniques during their initial training. They arrived at their initial units where the emphasis on the linear battlefield, exercise repetition, and an ever-developing familiarity with IPB eventually developed analysts capable of recognizing activity patterns and accurately predicting enemy intentions.

Analytical Thinking in Asymmetric Environments

However, our increasing focus and reliance on technology appears to have diluted and weakened this process to some degree. This makes it even more difficult to respond to the analytical challenges of asymmetric combat where incidents often appear to be unrelated, enemy patterns are difficult to recognize, and the pace and nature of operations complicates the formulation of precise intelligence requirements. Analysts who cannot understand and apply situational inductive and deductive reasoning will be ill equipped to immediately grasp the asymmetrical analytical requirements, where every soldier is a sensor and incoming information is often overwhelming.

The training and conduct of analysis, the process of turning combat information into finished intelligence, is often approached as somewhat of a mystery. And while analysis is a combination of art and science, it is always somewhat less complex than the manner in which it is presented. The Army and other Services still “grow” analysts. Although certain individuals are born with greater intelligence and logical reasoning ability than others, and certain Army test scores are generally the basis for selection of candidates for analyst training, no test yet devised can accurately predict who will perform well as an intelligence analyst.

Analytical Techniques and Process

Although there are a number of techniques that can be employed to assist in analytical thinking, only the repetitive application of logical inductive and deductive reasoning processes can develop and increase the analytical skills necessary for the analyst to perform in an asymmetric environment. It is therefore incumbent on trainers to develop scenarios that require the developing analyst to apply cognitive reasoning techniques repetitively in order to achieve accurate analytical conclusions and situational awareness. These scenarios must also replicate the flow of incoming information as accurately as possible.

It is not enough to simply demonstrate techniques such as sorting, chronology and timeline analysis; analysis of competing hypotheses (hypothesis testing); decision and event analysis; and matrix development—although these are, and will probably continue to be, the most frequently taught techniques. While each technique has its utility in problem-solving and analytical development, all suffer from the same weakness in that they are often cumbersome and can be difficult to apply in a rapidly changing situation. Even the standby, IPB, which is the basis for our operational decisionmaking, is best completed before operations in order to better respond to the developing situation during ongoing operations. All of these techniques run the risk of having the technique and any associated decision aide becoming the ends in themselves. Repetitive cognitive scenarios teach the analyst to select the portions of each analytical technique that best apply to the situation, much like a detective selects applicable techniques to evaluate evidence and fit pieces of the puzzle together to solve a crime.

Like the detective, the analyst considers the “who,” “what,” “when,” “where,” “why,” and “how” of the event, incident, or occurrence in the context of the overall situation. In doing so, he applies sorting, chronology, and timeline analysis techniques to place the event in its proper sequence and context and to do initial identification of differences and similarities between this and other events, past and present. This allows the analyst to establish basic activity patterns and provides a basis for considering events in the correct context. The most important event or incoming piece of information will have little impact if viewed in an improper context.

In most cases, as the analyst reviews the event or series of events in context, patterns begin to become evident, or he begins to form hypotheses that are the eventual basis of analytical conclusions. The analyst then uses selected portions of one or more analytical techniques (e.g., event analysis, analysis of competing hypotheses, devil’s advocacy, etc.) to “test” and either prove or disprove his hypotheses within the overall situational context.

Experienced analysts do this mentally, generally without conscious thought (another reason that analysis is so difficult to teach). Less experienced analysts may wish to use written lists, chronologies, timelines, spreadsheets, and matrices to assist in their thinking. Again, the use of realistic asymmetric training scenarios can familiarize developing analysts with the analytical processes and begin conditioning them to make the “cognitive leap” necessary to derive analytical conclusions from raw information.

As activity patterns become apparent and the analyst confirms or refutes hypotheses, inductive analysis occurs. The analyst begins to draw general conclusions from the specific events. However, analysts must exercise caution during this process because it is here that preconceptions and self-deception can radically alter the perception of specific events, disrupt the inductive process, and skew conclusions. Analysts must also avoid the pre-conception that “general” conclusions must be overly abstract. Many analysts delay the analytical process and invariably skew their conclusions by being overly concerned with the fact that their “general” conclusions seem too specific. They often forget that conclusions are situation-dependent, and the more specific, detailed information they have, the more specific their conclusions will normally be. Therefore, specific “general” conclusions are often the result of the nature of the analytical problem.

This brings us to the concept that analytical conclusions should be entirely information- and situation-dependent. One major problem is that analysts are often unwilling to change their conclusions when challenged with new information or a changing, developing situation. This is especially true when the new information refutes conclusions that have been based on preconceptions or self-deception. A single piece of information can change even the most carefully developed conclusions.

As the analyst develops his conclusions, like the detective, he begins to recognize that pieces of the puzzle are missing. What he does not know (e.g., the gaps in the “who,” “what,” “when,” “where,” “why,” and “how”) becomes apparent. These are the intelligence gaps that the analyst must fill to complete the puzzle. Although one cannot ever call an intelligence puzzle complete, the analyst must formulate the specific intelligence requirements(SIR) necessary to provide the missing pieces.

Using his conclusions as a general premise, the analyst applies deductive reasoning to formulate his SIRs. Again, the analyst should not fall into the trap of being overly concerned that his “specific” requirements appear to be too general. His principal concern should be whether they are precise enough to provide the information necessary to develop the intelligence picture further, yet sufficiently flexible to overcome any bias that may have crept into his conclusions.

Intelligence requirements also must be subject to constant review to respond to the changing situation and to provide feedback regarding their suitability and responsiveness to the analytical challenges. The analyst should also be careful not to restrict his requirements to a set number. Compound, complex requirements are often confusing, and the recipients therefore ignore them. Even when complex requirements are satisfied, the resulting reports can be difficult to interpret. The right number of SIRs is the number required to provide the necessary information. The best requirements are generally straightforward enough to provide specific information, yet broad enough that they do not merely serve to reinforce a conclusion or existing preconception.

Example of an Application Using Notional Scenario

To apply and reinforce what we have discussed, let us examine the following notional scenario from an analytical perspective. (I condensed and summarized the events to generally reflect an event chronology.)

- ❑ Over a period of ten days, patrols have reported discovering six improvised explosive devices (IEDs) they described as “*blocks of concrete with wires coming out of the top*.” The devices were placed either along or in the medians of major roads within a 1.5-kilometer radius. None of the six IEDs exploded.
- ❑ A U.S. patrol reports that they discovered a seventh concrete block IED in the same area, and placed in the same manner as the previous six. The device exploded while the patrol was cordoning off the area. There were no casualties.
- ❑ Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) analysis reveals that the IEDs all consist of a 130-mm, 152-mm, or 155-mm artillery projectile encased in concrete, with an electronic blasting cap set into plastic explosive in the fuse well. The blasting cap is connected to a receiver similar to the type used in garage-door openers. The concrete blocks were recently cast and were 24-30 inches long, 9-10 inches wide, and 9-10 inches deep. The blocks weighed between 60 and 75 pounds depending on the type of projectile encased in the concrete, making them generally too heavy and awkward for one person to easily carry, handle, or conceal.
- ❑ All of the devices were located near construction, building repair, or building sites. Several donkey carts, often associated with moving construction materials, have been observed near where three of the IEDs were.
- ❑ Similar IEDs were found at other locations in the country. However, these devices differed slightly in construction and emplacement.

Using **inductive analytical reasoning**, we can probably make the following general analytical conclusions from our scenario:

- ❑ We are probably only dealing with a small group of individuals that live in the area where the IEDs are found. This could be a single insurgent group, or even a single clan or family. (We arrive at this conclusion by examining factors that include the small number of devices discovered, consistent method of operation, limited radius of action, and the consistency of the discovery locations.)
- ❑ The group has access to at least small stocks of artillery ammunition, detonators, and explosives. The stocks are probably located close to where the insurgents constructed the IEDs. (We arrive at this conclusion by examining the factors of the consistency of the IEDs' construction, and the fact that artillery projectiles are generally hard to handle and conceal. Caution: the projectiles may be coming in from a distance under some type of cover, such as darkness.)
- ❑ There are probably a limited number of individuals, possibly only a single individual, involved in the IEDs' construction. They have at least a general knowledge of radiofrequency propagation and electronics. They have a minimal knowledge of explosives. (We arrive at these conclusions from the consistency of IED construction, the fact that they used a radio-controlled detonator, and the fact that the wires coming from the top of the devices may serve as antennas. The use of artillery projectiles does not require significant explosives knowledge, but some explosives knowledge is required to create the detonators.)
- ❑ The group's headquarters or activity center, and their IED construction facility/point are probably somewhere inside the 1.5-kilometer radius where the patrols discovered the IEDs. (We arrive at this conclusion due to the limits on the radius of operations—if the location was outside the radius, the discoveries and the radius itself would probably move in that direction.)
- ❑ The group may not have the means to conceal and transport the devices (and the IED-making material, especially the artillery projectiles) over long distances. (We arrive at this conclusion by examining the limited

radius of action for the discoveries, and by examining the weight and size of the devices.)

- The group may be using simple methods, such as donkey carts, which provide limited mobility and concealment to transport the IED-making materials and the finished devices. (Again, we arrive at this conclusion by examining the limited radius of action for the discoveries, by examining the weight and size of the devices, and by considering the observation of donkey carts near some discoveries.)
- The group may be using building repair or construction to conceal their activities. They may be concealing devices in or disguising them as construction materials. Donkey carts often transport materials at these sites. (We arrive at this conclusion from the fact that the devices are near construction sites, the fact that the devices themselves resemble simple concrete blocks, and the fact that a suspected transport method is associated with the sites).
- Either the systems designed to jam known detonation frequencies are effective against the type of radio-controlled detonator used in these devices or it is also possible that the insurgents placed the devices where the triggerman cannot effectively see them, outside the range of the transmitter, or where something is blocking the transmitter's signal. (Only one of the seven devices has exploded.)
- The group may have contact with or is sharing information with other groups outside of the area. (Patrols have found similar devices, which differ in the type of detonator used, in other locations.)

Using **deductive reasoning**, we now determine what intelligence requirements need developing and tasking to confirm or refute our conclusions and further expand our analytical effort. Here are some of the intelligence requirements that we might develop from our general conclusions:

- What groups are active within the general area where the patrols discovered the devices?
 - Do these groups have links to any specific organization, religious grouping, clan, or family?
 - Which groups, clans, families, or specific individuals control the area?
 - Which groups, clans, families, or specific individuals in the area have expressed hostility towards U.S. forces?
 - Which groups, clans, families, or specific individuals in the area have expressly threatened other area residents?
 - Where are these groups, clans, families, or specific individuals based, or where do they reside?
- Are there any strangers or outsiders in the area (close-knit cultures and societies are highly attuned to strangers and outsiders)?
 - Who are they and where are they?
 - What ties or links do these strangers have to the area?
 - Did someone threaten or order the regular residents to not discuss or report the strangers' presence? If so, who issued the orders or threats?
- Are there individuals in the area with knowledge of radios, electronics, or electrical construction? Who are they and where do they reside?
- Are there individuals in the area with prior military experience, especially in the artillery, engineers (sappers), electrical and mechanical maintenance, or ordnance maintenance? Who are they and where do they reside?

- From where are the artillery projectiles and detonators coming?
 - Are there any military (especially artillery) garrisons, depots, storage sites, or fighting positions in the area? Where are they?
 - Was there any activity that would suggest someone brought individual artillery projectiles into the area? If so, what type of activity and how was it noticed?
- Where are they manufacturing the IEDs?
 - Are there any brickyards or concrete-forming sites in the area? Where are they?
 - At which construction sites is concrete or mortar in use? Where is someone forming concrete blocks on site?
 - If no one is forming bricks or blocks at the construction sites, how do they transport them from the forming sites to the construction sites?
- How do the insurgents transport and place the IEDs (e.g., by hand, donkey cart, wheelbarrow, pushcart, other vehicle)?
- Where are the construction, building, and building repair sites? Who is performing the construction, and what links or ties do they have to groups, clans, or families previously identified?
- What frequencies are the detonators employing? What is their general range of operation? Are our counter-detonation jamming devices effective against these frequencies?
- Are there any reasons that the insurgents would leave unexploded devices for friendly forces to find? What are the reasons?
- Has someone reported all incidents involving similar-appearing devices in the area?

These requirements must now be properly tasked to the collectors in order for reporting to occur. The requirements, except for the radio frequencies, are primarily human intelligence-directed, and should be tasked to subordinate units and HUMINT teams or forwarded to higher headquarters as requests for information (RFIs).

However, before tasking or forwarding any RFI, analysts should first thoroughly check local databases. This is one of the biggest mistakes that analysts at all levels make because very often, much of the information necessary to develop the intelligence picture further is already on hand. Review previous reporting from your own subordinate and supporting elements and summaries from higher echelons. In the case of our notional scenario, there would probably be information on active groups in the area; artillery sites, storage depots, and garrisons; the radio frequencies that the devices used (EOD usually has this information); construction site locations; and population details based on area searches and sweeps that provide at least partial answers to these intelligence questions.

Of course, this analysis is based on a set scenario. Slight changes in a rapidly developing situation, analytical nuances, and differing analytical opinions would likely result in somewhat different analytical conclusions and perceived intelligence gaps. Even using this scenario, analysts viewing the same information are likely to arrive at slightly different conclusions and consequently develop differing intelligence requirements to satisfy perceived information needs. Differences in analytical opinions do not mean that one or another of the analyses is incorrect, only different. As long as the same inductive and deductive reasoning methods lead to the conclusions, analysts should consider differences healthy and view them as a means of generating additional collection requirements.

Conclusion

As intelligence has moved forward in response to the perceived battlefield requirements of the 1980s and 1990s, analysts increased their reliance on automated processing and “analysis” systems. In the opinion of some, this increased reliance has been at the expense of providing analysts with necessary logical reasoning techniques that allow them to interpret the meaning of what their automated systems are showing. These systems have and continue to prove their worth at the higher operational levels where their processing capabilities are best applied. However, the small unit operations and isolated violent actions that characterize asymmetric combat have again placed the burden squarely on the human analyst to develop the situation, arrive at conclusions, and recognize intelligence gaps correctly, and to take appropriate action to fill these gaps.



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CULTURE MATTERS

By Dr. George A. VanOtten, PhD

Introduction

As the twentieth century gave way to the twenty-first, most Americans thought little, if at all, about the potential for a devastating attack on the United States. On 10 September 2001, the day before Al Qaeda's attack on the U.S., most Americans were blissfully unaware that such an attack was imminent or even possible.

Subsequent investigations searching to explain the nation's lack of foresight and preparedness revealed multiple causes. One of the most significant may be the general lack of knowledge most Americans possess about the values, attitudes and beliefs that are the cultural foundations of other nations and regions. After the tragedy of the 2001 attack, people wanted to know how and why the nation was unprepared to anticipate such a devastating blow. The American people struggled to understand the resentment and hatred that motivated individuals from the Islamic world to sacrifice their own lives in order to kill thousands of innocent people in the U.S. These questions in themselves are instructive in that it points out that most Americans know very little about the values, beliefs and world views of other cultures and other civilizations.

Current complications in efforts to liberate Iraq and Afghanistan further demonstrate that Americans are ill prepared to predict the responses of people in the Middle East to the presence of Coalition Forces on their soil. After quickly removing the Taliban and Saddam Hussein, the U.S. seems to have been surprised by the violence



Iraqis share a laugh with a soldier of the 101st Airborne in the city of Najaf.

that has become a familiar part of the coalition occupation of the region. It is clear that in order to effectively bring stability, democracy, and prosperity to Iraq, both leadership at the highest levels of government and American military in the field must understand the motivations, goals, and beliefs of those they seek to liberate. Such knowledge will make it easier to predict hostile actions and reactions and will enhance American efforts to win the hearts and minds of people in the region. The purpose of this article is to reinforce the notion that in the course of world events, culture matters.

Background

For more than twenty years, professional geographers and anthropologists as well as others, have warned that Americans know too little about the world in which they live. In fact, many states do not require students to study geography or anthropology to graduate from high school and social science majors in many universities are not specifically required to study other cultures. From the average citizen to those who hold the highest offices, Americans tend to remain extremely parochial in their view of the world and relatively insensitive to the cultural values that motivate and direct the behaviors of people from other nations and regions.

In 1993, Samuel Huntington warned that the world is now entering a new era in which tensions between nation states will no longer dominate the geopolitical stage of history. Instead, he argued, global politics will increasingly be about clashes between civilizations and cultures. Furthermore, Huntington suggested that in order to avoid disasters in the years ahead, Americans must pay more attention to the cultural fault lines that tend to divide people and create tensions and conflict¹.

Huntington was not the only one to notice that geopolitical focus would shift as a result of the end of the Cold War. In February of 2000, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT) of the U.S. Army published a white paper, "Capturing the Operational Environment." The intent was to define potential environments in which U.S. forces may be required to carryout military operations and to call for incorporation of this information into the Army training environment.

Like Huntington, the white paper was prophetic. While noting that nation states would remain the "dominant actors" in future world affairs, the authors

also noted that as the world's supreme military and economic power, the U.S. will increasingly be the target of attack. The analysis also suggested that growing inequality between the advanced and the destitute will lead to growing anger, resentment, and frustration on the part of the "have-nots" who will likely adopt terrorism and other means of asymmetric warfare to resist the West and promote their own interests.²

Beyond these insightful authors, there were many others within the American intelligence community and within the ranks of American academe who from time to time warned of the growing danger that cross-cultural misunderstandings and global terrorism posed to the stability of the world order and the security of the U.S. However, for the most part these commentaries did not resonate with the American people and clearly the federal government failed to accurately anticipate the potential for a major terrorist attack on the American homeland.

So despite the Army's innovative push in 2000 to radically revamp professional military training in keeping with the changing nature of the contemporary operational environment (COE), no formal plan for rigorous cultural awareness training was introduced.

Cultural Basics

Cultural Norms

It is important to realize that the concept of "culture" is much like the concept of "region" in that both require generalizations in order to make sense. In the broadest sense of the term, culture is "learned, collective human behavior".³ All people view the events of life through their own cultural filters. These filters are the result of the values, attitudes, and beliefs that dominate the culture in which they live. From these cultural aspects that serve as the foundation of a culture come the behavioral norms that regulate interactions among members of the group. Ideals relative to right and wrong, what is beautiful and what is not, and what is appropriate or inappropriate behavior are the products of cultural norms. To function effectively, and in some cases safely, an individual must understand the cultural norms of a given society.

Where an individual is born and raised has considerable impact on the development of his or her personality. Some people are naturally more intense than others, some are more generous, and some are less energetic. Although these differences cross cultural lines, the norms against which individual behavior is

measured in any society are the result of what is valued in a given culture. Individuals who do not conform to or violate the norms of the culture may be ridiculed, ostracized, or worse.

Example of a Cultural Norm

Americans are time observant, they have a tendency to want to get to the heart of an issue immediately (hence the impatient "I got it!"). People in many other cultures view this insistence on getting to the point as rude and uncultured. In most rural communities of the world, rules of decorum and social interaction must be followed even when doing business. The business transaction at hand can be discussed only after all involved have had an opportunity to inquire about each other's health, family, and share the latest gossip. The American tendency to insist on cutting to the "bottom line" can be very offensive to people from cultures for whom the "bottom line" is not all that important.

Potential for Conflict

Anytime people from different cultures come into contact with one another, there is the potential for tension and misunderstanding. When interactions are voluntary and take place in a non-threatening environment, it is easier to overcome misunderstandings and cultural differences. Conversely, when people are forced to interact in times of stress or war, there is usually less time to repair damage done over accidental insults and explore and explain differences in values, attitudes, and beliefs.

Military Intelligence (MI) professionals who work with other cultures need at least a general knowledge of the social norms of the region in which they will be stationed. Soldiers who have only superficial contact with the indigenous population need to know how to behave so as to avoid unnecessarily causing offense and anger.

Those who will regularly interact with local people and government officials must develop a level of cultural sensitivity that will make it possible for them to not only avoid giving unnecessary offense but to correctly recognize emotion and reactions. They need more sophisticated levels of cultural awareness education that make it possible for them to effectively read and predict the reactions of the people with whom they will interact. This can be accomplished only through considerable study and exposure.

Understanding Culture and Cultural Variance

Understanding the norms governing the behavior

associated with such cultural variables aspects as gender roles and family structure, aging, the nature of social status (who fits where in the social order and why), the importance of time, wealth, education, what is considered beautiful and what is not, what is considered right and what is considered wrong, mental processes, ways of communication, and ideals of the perfection will provide useful insights into the basic nature of a culture. Consider the following examples.

Family Structure

Some cultures are paternal while others are maternal in orientation. In some groups, fathers are considered the heads of the household. In others, they are not. Bedouins in the Middle East are part of a patriarchal society that is kin-oriented. The prestige and honor of a Bedouin patriarch is determined to a great extent by his ability to effectively impose his will on the members of his family. A man who is unable to accomplish this will lose face and be humiliated.⁴ Conversely, within the Hopi Nation however, traditional husbands do not control the land and they do not normally discipline their children. That responsibility is usually left to the child's maternal uncle.

Gender Roles

In modern America, the ideal woman must be able to do it all. She can compete with men in the work environment, raise her children if she so chooses, and maintain her feminine qualities as she accomplishes all of this. For women throughout much of the Middle East however, there is a very different ideal.

Even in the most liberal Islamic regimes, the activities and roles of women are far more restricted and regulated than in any Western nation. Throughout most of the Islamic world, women live within male-dominated societies. In some countries, women do not vote, drive automobiles, or leave their homes without a suitable male family member as an escort. The perfect Muslim woman knows her place, takes care of her children and submits to the wishes of her husband and the males in her family. She will, above all else, never bring shame or dishonor to her family.

For obvious reasons, these differences in what are considered appropriate roles for men and women greatly complicate interactions between those who follow the fundamental teachings of Islam and those from the secular societies of the Western world.

Aging

Almost all cultures show concern for the welfare

of the elderly. There are, however, definite differences among cultures relative to the role that the elderly are allowed to play. In the traditions of the Sioux and Navajo Nations older people exercised considerable power through councils of elders. In the Bedouin culture of the Middle East, the aged patriarch has great influence within his family.

In western nations, age was once associated with wisdom and authority, but this attitude has changed in recent times. Older people now continue to work past retirement and young people may be elevated to positions of authority. As a result, people in cultures where positions of power are achieved only by waiting for the older generation to pass on, may find dealing with very young American leaders uncomfortable. Young Americans, who now often supervise and even compete with older people, do not understand that in many cultures the young are expected to defer to their elders.

Authority and Social Status

Determining who has status and authority in various cultures is sometimes difficult. In some tribal groups, a leader is simply a person others follow. A brave warrior might be able to draw a sizable following during conflict but might also be ignored in other circumstances. Americans, Europeans, and others hold the idea that leaders should be elected, appointed, or at the very least, in some way certified. People in other cultures, especially tribal cultures, often do not share that view.

Although status is important in one way or another to most people, the ways in which status is achieved vary greatly from one culture to another. In American culture, status is achieved through position, beauty, charisma, and wealth. In other cultures, status may be achieved through family ties (the British aristocracy), piety, the number of children one has fathered, or a host of other attributes, accomplishments, or characteristics. Once again, what is valued and held dear is at the heart of the question of status.

Time and Time Consciousness

The concept of time varies between cultures and plays an important role in cross-cultural interactions. To most Americans, time is "money" and people are encouraged not to waste it. Being on time is important, being late is unacceptable. Americans and Europeans have a linear view of time, preferring to accomplish one task at a time on a strict schedule.

In other cultures, people are less interested in minding the clock and worry less about being punctual. In Italy, Spain, and the Middle East, conferences, discussions, and conversations do not always end at a specified time. In these cultures, the meeting itself is far more important than whether or not it took place on time. For Germans, Americans, and others, being late or failing to follow an agenda represents a breakdown of order and efficiency.

Individuals from some eastern cultures believe that humans should adapt to time instead of the reverse. To them, time is cyclic. The earth rotates around the sun, the seasons come and go, people live and die -- the cycle never ends. Time is not in short supply and it cannot be wasted. As a result, many Asians take a great deal more time to make decisions than would a typical American or European.

Not all Asians however hold this view of time. In China, the norm is to be on time and to get down to business as quickly as possible. In the frenzied work week of a successful Japanese professional, time is of the essence and time usage tends to be phased. As in most aspects of Japanese life, there is a definite, clearly recognizable beginning and end. Whereas Americans and Europeans usually want to get to the heart of a matter quickly, the Japanese prefer unfolding one phase of an event at a time. In Japan the way something is done (the ritual) is as important as the accomplishment of the final goal.

In general, Americans believe that individuals, through good planning have considerable control over their own destinies. Other cultures place much greater emphasis on the role of fate. People who see time as cyclic rather than linear do not believe very much in planning. Instead, they focus on finding ways to fit with the natural scheme of things. There is a time to plant, a time to harvest, and so on.

In contrast to the concepts of time presented above, some cultures are focused on the past. This is exemplified in tribal cultures where ancestor worship is common. For these people, the past is known while the future is unknown and therefore, cannot be controlled. In places where life is based primarily on what has already happened, planning for the future is not a high priority so one expects that trains will not run on time, busses will leave the station when they are full and not according to a schedule, and items will be replaced when the supply runs out, not in advance.⁵

Concepts of Right and Wrong

Concepts of right and wrong differ among cultures. The Japanese for example do not believe it wrong to change items that have been previously agreed upon. Americans and the British dislike this. In some cultures it is not considered ethical to tell anything but the truth. In others, the truth is a relative concept. Americans in general do not believe in the practice of nepotism. In tribal cultures however, it would be considered unethical to deny a job to a member of one's family in favor of an outsider. In order to understand the ways in which people from other cultures think, it is always necessary to identify their basic ideas of right and wrong.

Logic and Emotion

Individual cultures vary as to the emphasis they place on striking a balance between logic and emotion. In general, Americans profess to rely on facts and logic more than emotion. Conversely, many other cultures tend to rely more on emotion and traditional responses to situations. It is often very difficult for people who base their decisions primarily on their feelings and personal experiences to work well with people who orient their lives around facts and logic.

To individuals in cultures with long-standing traditions based on centuries of experience, there are eternal truths that must be accepted as a matter of faith. These truths are the foundation upon which their societies are built. Those who place greater emphasis on the scientific method however do not accept much of anything as a truth without substantive data and proof.

Communication Styles and Body Language

Americans are informal and tend to downplay status and rank. They like to call people by their first names and act in a relaxed fashion. This is not always well received by the more formal Germans, Japanese, or French. The Japanese sometimes make Americans and others nervous by their apparent lack of emotion. Spanish and Italians who show considerable emotion in conversations are made uncomfortable by people who listen politely but do not react to what they are saying.

In some countries, silence is golden; in others, it makes people uncomfortable. Americans sometimes think out loud, Arabs delight in rhetoric, and Italians are sometimes extremely personal in conversation. These variations in communication styles, while interesting, contribute to the breakdown of communications and to misunderstandings.

Differences in the interpretations of body language may create discomfort among people from different cultures. American men believe that they should always demonstrate a strong grip when shaking hands. In many cultures however, a firm handshake is seen as an act of aggression.

Americans in particular do not like to be crowded, preferring instead that other people stay out of their personal space. When a Mexican wants to communicate, he or she normally moves closer. Americans may respond by backing up in order to preserve their personal space. To the Mexican person wishing to talk, moving away from her or him may be insulting.

Some people rely on body language as a part of communication and are very demonstrative. For those who appreciate a more subtle use of body language, the more obvious gestures of Italians, South Americans, and Arabs are sometimes shocking.⁶

Understanding Islamic Culture

Although there are differences among the many Islamic subcultures, it is possible to make generalizations.

In the Middle East, as elsewhere, there are definite expectations that guide the molding of boys and girls into two very different personalities. The superior position of males in Islamic culture over females is stressed from almost the beginning of an individual's life. The resultant idealized roles of males and females strongly influence the social order and influence almost all levels of interpersonal relations.

As infants, the children of Islamic families in the Middle East are taught that the preservation of family and tribal traditions is extremely important. Therefore, in terms of the concept of time, the past is given more attention than the future. Just as traditional people in the Middle East do not forget the traditions of their ancestors, they also do not easily forget battles and perceived humiliations even if these events occurred long ago⁷.

Whereas the past is very important in the scheme of things, most people in the Middle East do not place as much emphasis on present time. In many tribal cultures, the social graces, being polite, showing respect and personal interactions are more important than being on time. Most Arabs do not think of time as money and regard social interaction before, during, and after meetings as critical.



The candidate on this poster urges the Iraqi people to vote, saying it is their duty.

Language is the glue that holds cultures together. People think in their own language. Some languages are able to express great subtlety of thought and complicated concepts; others are less expressive. The Arabic language in the Middle East is more than merely a way in which people communicate. For those who speak it, Arabic is an instrument of expression and using it well is an art. Rhetorical excellence is a highly valued personal attribute in the region. As a result, many Arabs enjoy talking and do not necessarily economize on words during a presentation or conversation. Westerners who want to get along with people in the Middle East should be good listeners and should be prepared to engage in conversation.

Within Middle Eastern cultures based on the Bedouin tradition, great emphasis is placed on honor, "face", and self-respect. Personal affronts are not taken lightly and will often result in retaliation because to do otherwise would mean humiliation. The honor of the women in a man's household is extremely important.

MI professionals who interact with people in the Middle East as a regular part of their duties should take the time to identify behaviors and actions that might be perceived as insults to the people with whom they work.

The Importance of Tribalism

Many Americans believe that clans and tribes are mostly relics of an earlier time, but a significant number of people, to include those in the Middle East, continue to identify more closely with their tribal or clan affiliations than they do with the nation state in which they live. In South Asia and North Africa, for example, tribal groups are politically powerful. Kinship ties are politically important throughout the Arab world.

Thomas Friedman argues that Arab countries are not governed by "voluntary social contracts between citizens inside their borders." These nations are really "tribes with flags." According to Friedman, Coalition forces have not liberated Iraq. Instead, they have unleashed a "latent civil war". Friedman also argues that Americans cannot win the war in Iraq because the insurgents and terrorists are not fighting to liberate Iraq from the grips of American control. Instead, they are fighting, to reestablish the hegemony of the Sunni-Baathist minority over the rest of the tribes in Iraq. He maintains that the election process in Iraq is essential, because this gives the Iraqis something for which they are willing to fight; freedom from domination by the minority.⁸

The Role of Religion and Belief

In the modern world, some cultures are rooted in their spirituality while others are more secular. Americans have always maintained a strong desire to keep religion and government officially apart even though religion plays an important role in American culture.

In much of the Middle East, Islam is the transcendent theme of life. Religion dominates almost every aspect of life. According to their religious concepts, the policies of the government should reflect the basic tenants of Islam. Furthermore, they view Americans

(and almost all people who are not Muslim) as immoral, hedonistic infidels who must be converted to Islam (through violence if need be). Therefore, the hatred expressed by terrorists for the U.S. is at least as much about differences in values, attitudes and beliefs as it is about the realities of American geopolitical activities and policies.

It is fairly well known among Americans that there are five pillars of Islam that include repeated expression of the basic creed, daily prayer, a month of daytime fasting (Ramadan), the giving of alms, and at least one pilgrimage to Mecca if possible. Most Americans, however, do not know that Islam tends to place great emphasis on following religious law whereas Christians focus more on the importance of belief. Furthermore, Muslims are encouraged to lead a pure life and spread Islam to other parts of the world. The word *jihad*, which most Americans believe means to make war, actually means to struggle. The concept of *ummah*, the worldwide Islamic community is also important because it stresses pan-Islamic solidarity and mission⁹.

As is true with most religions, there are different interpretations among Muslims about the essence of faith. The most obvious differences occur between the Sunni and Shii Muslims. In 632 AD, after the Prophet Muhammad's death, Abu Bakr was selected as the new leader (caliph). Some Muslims did not approve of him as the successor because he was not a blood relative of Muhammad. This group split away and became the Shii who followed Ali, Muhammad's cousin and husband of his daughter. This split almost immediately resulted in violence and clashes continue from time to time between the Sunni and Shii branches of Islam even today. Differences between these two groups present a dilemma for Coalition forces who are now striving to bring democracy to Iraq.

Another variation of Islam is Wahhabism, one of the most conservative variations of Islam. In the Saudi Arabia, the Wahhabi form of Islam is dominant. The Wahhabi name comes from Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, who in the late eighteenth century articulated a strict fundamentalist view of the Islamic faith. He, along with tribal leader, Muhammad Ibn Saud, introduced Wahhabism as a part of their subjugation of the tribes of the Arabian Peninsula. The practitioners of Wahhabism view all who do not agree with them as infidels (unbelievers). In modern times, the Wahhabi of Saudi Arabia have sought to spread their version of Islam throughout the world and, with the wealth gained

by the sale of oil, have given aid, developed schools, built mosques, and funded jihads in the name of Islam¹¹.

To those who practice the Wahhabi version of Islam, the nature of American and Western culture is an abomination. The role of women, open sexuality, the use of profanity, and the laxity of social restrictions in Western secular nations insults and threatens their most deeply held beliefs and values. Many among them do not believe that they can peacefully coexist with western nations because they see western culture as a poison that will infiltrate their society and, if allowed to survive, will eventually destroy their culture and their people. The geopolitical crisis in the Middle East remains unresolved partly because it is extremely difficult to find points of compromise when fundamental religious beliefs are at stake.

Culture and Conflict

Over the last several decades, the policies and activities of the U.S. have increasingly been identified by many in the Middle East as the primary cause of the economic problems and geopolitical crisis of the region.

There are many perceived reasons for anger and resentment against the U.S. Probably the most obvious of these is the existence of the state of Israel and the pervasive belief that it would long ago have been defeated and even eliminated were it not for the policies and actions of the U.S. That Israel remains a powerful force in the region, despite sixty years of conflict and war, is the source of intense frustration to many of its neighbors.

Terrorists from many parts of the Middle East (as well as other parts of the world) have come to Iraq in order to defeat Coalition efforts to bring democracy and stability to the region. They clearly believe that a Western style democracy in Iraq would allow infidels to establish an operational base in the heart of Islam from which western values and power would challenge the dominance of Islam and the structure of traditional Middle Eastern society. Increasingly, the U.S. has come to represent everything that conservative Muslims fear and dislike.

Sometimes, groups or nations do harm to others because they seek to take land and resources. Islamic terrorists however, are not so much interested in taking for themselves what Americans and others have as they are in destroying it. Here again, it is their erro-

neous perceptions of American culture that makes the situation very dangerous. They believe that Americans are motivated only by material wealth and pleasure and are therefore not willing to endure a prolonged struggle in order to protect their families, communities, and way-of-life. Seeing Americans in this way leads terrorists to believe that they can bring the U.S. to its knees by continuing terrorist activities whenever there is an opportunity to do so.

Terrorists do not understand the resolve of Americans because they fail to penetrate the artifacts of popular culture often graphically portrayed by the media. Historically, Americans have always come together in times of crisis and risen to the challenge no matter the level of sacrifice required.

It is important that Americans, especially those who are charged with working in various cultures throughout the world, do a better job of transmitting to the world community the true nature of the people of the U.S.

Conclusion

The technologies of the twenty-first century coupled with the volatility of modern geopolitics and the unpredictability of asymmetric war make the world an increasingly dangerous place. Now, the danger is not just the political failure of diplomacy between nations, but also the likely possibility that special interest groups will hold the U.S. responsible for perceived injustices or insults and respond through terrorist attacks.

Americans can no longer afford to remain unaware of the values, attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs that influence the behaviors and actions of people in other nations and cultures. The U.S. must place more emphasis on cultural awareness education and must strive to present the true nature of American culture to the rest of the world. Those charged with implementing American foreign policy will require an increasingly sophisticated depth of understanding of the values, attitudes and beliefs of all potential participants on the world geopolitical stage.

Increasingly, the security of the nations rests on the ability to rapidly gain and accurately analyze vast amounts of information about the thoughts, goals and probable activities of a wide range of participants. In national defense and the affairs of state, culture matters.


In recognition of the importance of cultural awareness, the U. S. Army Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH), Arizona has initiated the development of cultural awareness training and educational materials for soldiers and civilians at all levels. Numerous discussions and debates among training developers, trainers, and MI professionals have resulted in agreement on what should be included in cultural awareness training. These professionals are grappling with determining what every MI soldier and civilian ought to know about particular culture in general, and about the particular culture of the regions in which they will work .



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Every Soldier Is a Sensor (ES2) Simulation: Virtual Simulation Using Game Technology

by Major Daniel P. Ray

In late 2003, the Army G2 began developing the concepts for Actionable Intelligence, one of the Army Chief of Staff's Focus Areas. Directly tied to Actionable Intelligence was the fundamental idea that "Every Soldier is a Sensor" (ES2).

The Army, Task Force Actionable Intelligence, and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) immediately began working on the problem of improving soldiers' observation and reporting skills. Equipment and technology for soldiers on the ground to provide "point of origin" information in real time to intelligence analysts—then back to the leaders and soldiers—is making great strides. All soldiers must be information collectors because there are no longer any "front lines."

Background

The Institute for Creative Technologies has created a prototype program to support the ES2 initiative for the Army called the ES2Simulation (ES2Sim) or unofficially "ES3" for short. In its conceptual stages, the initiative went by the name "Intelligence Weaponeer." The initiative has gone from concept to prototype in nine months.

ES2 aims to improve soldiers' basic observing and reporting skills. The "bottom up" feedback from soldiers on the ground has always been critical to intelligence operations. Our doctrine has the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) embedded, but how many soldiers in the grades of E1 through E4 know what CCIR are, or even why or how they have a role in satisfying them? "CCIR" is not an acronym in the soldiers' Common Task Test (CTT).

One major CTT task does relate to ES2: "Report Intelligence Information," the SALUTE (size, activity, location,

unit, time, equipment) report. Until now, the conditions and standards of this task were more along the lines of "*three tanks, moving north, grid 123456, unit 23d Division, 0435*"—decidedly a "Fulda Gap" or "73 Easting" type of scenario. Our ongoing Transformation is all about the change we are introducing from initial military training (IMT) to the way the Army interacts with the Intelligence Community.

Based on the asymmetric threat environment we are seeing in combat today, we expect our soldiers to perform increasingly complex and unconventional roles and missions on a regular basis. In fact, formerly "rear-echelon" troops are sometimes more likely to face a threat than those on the "front lines." Although the phrase "everyone is a rifleman" is not new, today it is a stark reality for every soldier, regardless of specialty. We must train soldiers not only to engage and destroy threats, but also to interact with their environments to gain and use intelligence at the tactical level. This intelligence may also be information of operational and strategic importance because of the blurring of the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war in this insurgency. Human intelligence (HUMINT) in full-spectrum operations is a crucial requirement today. Lessons learned from current operations have shown us that all soldiers need training in the fundamentals of information gathering and reporting.

Soldiers are learning their new duties as information collectors (sensors) in theater and "on the job" but this is not acceptable. The Army should train fundamental observation and reporting techniques early and often at all levels within all branches and specialties. All soldiers must learn to identify and report information vital to the fight.

Why Use a "Computer Game" to Teach This?

While no simulation replaces personal leadership, operational experience, or live training, virtual simulations provide three primary advantages that live training and

classroom instruction do not. These benefits are in the areas of resources, standard doctrinal baselines, and ease of distribution and monitoring.

Resources. Role players (contracted or military) at a combat training center for all soldiers are expensive. Simulation can provide some rudimentary training during IMT and for the U.S. Army National Guard (ARNG) and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR).

The acquisition process to build or integrate a high-end virtual simulation for individual training is very time-consuming. On the other hand, a simple commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) "game interface" can accomplish the basics. Sometimes, stand-alone training tools will suffice if we develop and build them quickly and inexpensively.

Standard "Ground Rules"—Doctrinal Baselines. Leaders must train their soldiers "hands-on," but every leader trains differently, using a unique style based on his or her experiences. A standard, approved introduction using simulations provides an official doctrinal baseline for predeployment training.

Distribution and Monitoring. The simulation on a computer is "repeatable," in a format that soldiers will enjoy and want to do repeatedly (because they like it!). Their leaders will know that they are using a common, distributed training regimen.

The potential to download and train both Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) is a significant force multiplier. Furthermore, given a TRADOC-approved host, we can "watch" the usage and performance of various units and even monitor individual soldiers.

From Concept to Prototype in a Few Months

The concept of an interactive training tool to support ES2 training was born from the current and immediate requirement to fully implement ES3; not in five years, but now. The Institute for Creative Technologies (ICT) is a collaborative effort between the Army, the University of Southern California, and the entertainment industry. Their goal is to create the Experience Learning System (ELS), which "*provides the ability to learn through active, as opposed to passive, systems.*" The ICT has developed two combat games, "Full-Spectrum Command" and "Full-Spectrum Warrior," in an effort to leverage easily implemented commercial game applications with inexpensive hardware as training tools.

The ES3 project launched in early July 2004 after the U.S. Army Research, Development, and Engineering

Command (RDECOM) Program Manager approved the effort as a proof of principle. From a technical standpoint, the challenge was to build a reasonably good application quickly and relatively inexpensively. For the Army, the question was whether the "system" can produce an operational training tool for soldiers that is acceptable to the leadership in less than one year.

ICT contracted with an online entertainment company to develop the application. The team delivered Version 1.0 of the ICT's "Self-Directed Learning Internet Module (SLIM)-ES3" on 27 September 2004, three months after the project began. After evaluating several developmental and player applications for three-dimensional (3D) virtual environments, the contractor and ICT decided that Virtools™ software was the most appropriate for their needs.

ES3 uses a unique blend of 3D terrain, objects, and figures with 2D "sprites" (bitmaps of real-world images). Manipulation of the database in Microsoft® Access can alter and replace the objects, or observables, that populate the user's "world."

Lessons Learned So Far

Several lessons and issues have been identified. They involve security, software, and hardware.

Distribution and hosting. As a training tool, ES3 uses representations of key observables and notional CCIRs in a complex urban environment. It then requires the soldier to accomplish various interaction, reporting, and memory tasks to obtain a positive outcome (a high score and "kudos," for example). Finally, the after-action review (AAR) portion gives information on the objects and people the user found during his "run." The application, therefore, depicts some basic tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), even though all the information in the prototype was from public sources. While this is necessarily an unclassified simulation, it would be very unwise to provide full public-Internet access. Would we want the terrorists to see and evaluate this simulation? No. It became obvious that a system such as Army Knowledge Online (AKO) must be used to facilitate limiting distribution of ES3 to the force.

Software and Army accreditation. Virtools™ is not an Army-accredited application. It works much like Windows Media Player by playing the game file but it provides a unique, 3D visualization capability. This means one cannot install ES3 on government computers (especially those on a network) unless the local information-system security officer (ISSO) approves the installation.

This is not an issue for soldiers who will use ES3 at home. It does require local approval to run it on unit hardware. The solution is obtaining accreditation of Virtuools™ at the office of the Army G6 (Chief Information Officer)—a time-consuming process.

Hardware capabilities. The minimum hardware specification for this application is 1.5-GHz, 256-MB RAM, and a 64-MB graphics controller, working together. The average government-owned computer is lacking in some areas, especially graphics. “Moore’s Law,” which states that computer capability doubles every 18 months, will take care of this. Next year, the above specifications will be the “standard” baseline for government hardware.

Conclusion

The ICT is now distributing the ES2Sim prototype to a limited number of Beta testers. Anyone interested in testing and providing feedback on the prototype should contact the author at daniel.ray@us.army.mil.

This application, based on commercial game technology, can help prepare all of our soldiers for the demands that the Army will place on them. ES3 will help them understand that they are an integral part of the fight and the intelligence architecture, their job is not just to kill the enemy, but to help find him as well. ES2Sim is not just a

skill trainer but also a “brain trainer” for improving cognitive skills.

We know that marksmanship and force protection are the most critical skills. Nevertheless, every soldier is also a sensor: the best intelligence collector! Every soldier needs to know what that entails. The ES3 will become an important tool in teaching that lesson.



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The United States Army Presents

EVERY SOLDIER A SENSOR

ES2

SLIM-ES3 is a Web-based micro-training application designed to reinforce two essential components of the Every Soldier is a Sensor (ES2) concept: active surveillance and threat indicator identification. ES3 emphasizes cognitive judgment and observational acuity so users may become more aware of the elements of their surroundings, while prioritizing reporting and honing memory and recall skills. The application consists of three main phases: Patrol, Patrol Debrief, and Evaluation as well as a Mission Brief and After Action Review (AAR) section.

Through the limited modeling of a Presence Patrol in an urban environment, players must observe, retain, report and prioritize observed information. The setting is a limited area of a fictional middle-eastern city. The player must navigate a world populated with selectable objects and choose from a context list of actions for those objects such as note-taking and reporting options.

The Patrol Debrief phase will require the player to remember what he saw and where he saw it, as well as finalize his prioritization of observations for his Patrol Report. He will have at his disposal a queue of observations made from the patrol, along with a simulated satellite photo of approximated 1:12,500 resolution. The player must associate each object to its correct location on the map. Increased levels of difficulty will require greater placement accuracy.





Representation of a screen save explaining the training application.



The 203d MI Battalion (Technical Intelligence) in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM

by Second Lieutenant Daniel R. Arnold, USAR

The 203d Military Intelligence (MI) Battalion is the Army's only tactical technical intelligence (TECHINT) asset. Doctrineally, TECHINT is intelligence derived from the exploitation of foreign equipment. The TECHINT process begins when a soldier identifies a piece of new or modified equipment and takes steps to report it. The equipment is then exploited at successively higher levels until a countermeasure is developed to neutralize the enemy's technological advantage. The mission of the 203d MI Battalion is to deploy worldwide to conduct TECHINT reconnaissance, establish the Captured Materiel Exploitation Center (CMEC) where the captured enemy materiel (CEM) is concentrated and exploited at the tactical and operational levels, and to prepare it for shipment to intelligence production centers where it can be exploited at the strategic level. The 203d is also responsible for disseminating the resulting intelligence to combatant commanders and any other relevant parties.

Background and History

The 203d MI Battalion is the successor to the Foreign Materiel Intelligence Battalion (FMIB) and the 11th MI Company, which successfully conducted TECHINT operations during Operation DESERT STORM. Following DESERT STORM, the FMIB lost the battalion flag due to downsizing.

The Army reconstituted the battalion in a new way as a combination of Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) soldiers—becoming a multicomponent or “multicompo” unit—in 1998. AC soldiers formed A Company and elements of the Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), to include the executive officer (XO) and S3, while RC soldiers filled B and C companies and the remainder of the HHC company, to include the battalion commander and command sergeant major.

A and C Companies perform the majority of the TECHINT reconnaissance portion of the 203d's mission. The two AC and four RC mobile TECHINT collection teams collect and report on CEM from forward areas of the battlefield. These teams consist of experts in several fields, including foreign mobility (tracked and wheeled vehicles and rotary-wing airframes), weapons and munitions, communications and electronics, and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD). The teams provide intelligence on enemy weapons and equipment to combatant commanders and prepare CEM for further exploitation by the Exploitation Platoon (2d) of B Company. This platoon consists of experts in the same fields as that of the collection teams, but it is their job to conduct a more thorough analysis of the materiel. This includes detailed measurements, analysis of subcomponents, and assessments of upgrades to known enemy materiel.

B Company also includes a packaging and warehousing platoon that receives, tracks, and temporarily stores all CEM. The 203d not only collects intelligence for the current battlefield, it also collects for future conflicts as well. Therefore, the platoon has the ability to package and ship various weapons, missiles, munitions, aircraft, and naval vessels to production centers back in the United States or coalition countries in order to conduct more detailed testing and evaluation to combat enemy capabilities in future conflicts.

The unit prioritizes enemy-materiel collection requirements according to a national collection requirements list submitted to and vetted by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and other intelligence production centers. Using this list as a starting point, the Collection Management and Dissemination (CM&D) Platoon of B Company identifies potential targets of interest for TECHINT reconnaissance and works with the S3 in developing and coordinating TECHINT missions.

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM

As war clouds gathered over Iraq in fall 2002, it was clear the 203d MI Battalion would have a role to play. Obviously, there was national-level interest in the kinds of equipment possessed by the Iraqi armed forces as well as their countries of origin. In October 2002, members of the battalion staff were briefed on the Coalition Force Land Component Command (CFLCC) vision of the 203d's role in upcoming operations. The AC portion of the battalion was ready to deploy, but the RC companies were woefully understrength in terms of personnel, equipment, and training. Bringing them up to speed would be the first in a series of challenges that provided some important lessons for TECHINT in future contingencies.

On 26 December 2002, A Company received or-

ders to deploy to Kuwait on 22 January 2003. Following transportation delays, they arrived in theater on 30 January. After training for months in the northern Kuwaiti desert, A Company crossed the berm into Iraq with V Corps and the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) on 5 and 6 April 2003.

Alpha Company performed more than 100 missions from bases at Al Hillah, Al Kut, Balad, and Baghdad. A typical collection mission consisted of the following steps:

- The teams went to the sites, cleared them of unexploded ordnance and booby-traps, then conducted exploitation of the site.
- The team photographed the sites and gathered measurements and specifications of the equipment found.
- Specific reports, called complementary technical intelligence reports (COMTECHREPs or COMTECHs), were compiled to send to higher echelons and requesting national agencies.
- Finally, after-action reviews (AARs) were conducted to determine what went right and wrong on the missions, how to improve operations the next time, and to report their results if the mission objectives were met.



Soldiers from Alpha Company exploit captured Iraqi munitions.

Key Observations

During their six months in Iraq, the A Company soldiers made several key observations. TECHINT doctrine was for a conventional battlefield, not the asymmetrical battlefield in OIF. Because the Iraqi Army disintegrated so quickly, A Company was collecting in Phases III and IV of the conflict.

The biggest problem affecting A Company was the looting of materiel by local Iraqis. Looting of weapons and equipment of intelligence value by local Iraqis was the most frustrating part of this deployment, according to the noncommissioned officers (NCOs). *"The most frustrating thing was going and finding something worthwhile, but finding that it had already been stripped by Iraqis,"* observed the First Sergeant. Another senior sergeant added, *"We just needed to get across the berm sooner than we did."*

Despite these setbacks, A Company found several interesting pieces of equipment, including a home-built laser-warning device mounted on a T-72 tank, a modified artillery piece, naval mines, and suicide vests.

While A Company was training in Kuwait, the RC portion of the battalion mobilized on 4 February 2003; it was a massive undertaking. Resourced at 25 percent strength as of October 2002, the Army was slowly transferring soldiers involuntarily into the 203d in anticipation of its mo-

bilization. After 4 February, the cross-leveling reached a fever pitch. The time from mobilization to deployment was two and one-half months, due exclusively to personnel and equipment shortages.

By the time the RC companies and part of HHC deployed at the end of April, a full two-thirds of their personnel had not been members of the battalion before October 2002. The battalion commander, XO, S3, and one company commander were new to the battalion, and all the company commanders were new to their positions. Given the unique nature of the 203d's mission, integrating and training so many new soldiers on their new missions was a significant challenge.

TECHINT analyst positions in the 203d are filled by NCOs with experience on U.S. equipment. For example, a rotary-wing aircraft mechanic might fill a rotary-wing aircraft analyst slot in the 203d. The battalion expects them to learn about the threat's counterpart equipment with their assignment to the 203d. It takes time to bring a new TECHINT analyst up to speed on the threat equipment. With time being so short to train so many new soldiers, they received abbreviated training. *"Instead of trying to make the soldiers TECHINT experts, we concentrated on basic tactical soldier skills, leader tasks, and the TECHINT reporting process,"* according to the C Company Commander.

The 203d MI Battalion mobilized at its home station at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, a fact that offered some advantages to offset personnel and training challenges. The 203d shares a facility with the Materiel Operations Division, National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC). The battalion was able to tap their experts to provide briefings and hands-on training on threat equipment.

Additionally, the battalion staff was able to operate from its own headquarters. This allowed the CM&D section to use its secure facility to begin developing TECHINT targets before the bulk of the battalion deployed. CM&D spent its time at the mobilization site culling warfighter order of battle (OB) databases for Iraqi targets of TECHINT interest, developing target folders that contained all relevant intelligence on



Members of C Company train at Aberdeen Proving Ground for helicopter insertion.

the targets, and firming up standard operating procedures (SOPs).

HHC, B, and C Companies finally deployed to Kuwait at the end of April. The battalion consolidated at Camp Udairi in early May. At this point, perhaps the most critical decisions regarding the 203d's deployment were made.

HHC and B Company arrived in Kuwait without their organic equipment, which was coming by sea. C Company flew with their equipment. The battalion could either wait in Udairi for the equipment to arrive, or borrow enough to move into Iraq and begin collecting. The battalion commander described his decisionmaking process at the time:

"First, the sooner we get started, the sooner we will finish. Second, the security situation is reasonable now but may deteriorate over time as the resistance elements get more organized. Third, the looting is severe and any equipment that is out there and on our collection list could well be lost two months from now. Also, Charlie Company has its equipment and since we obviously have to collect the material before we do anything else, I can see them running missions for a couple months, collecting enough equipment to give Bravo a good amount of work to do once the balance of the equipment arrives."

However, to move at all, B Company and HHC needed vehicles and basic life support. The commander described how he obtained it in his diary.

"I gave the group about four days to get used to the heat and the time change before moving into Iraq. Since we did not have most of our equipment, we are significantly handicapped, but one of my fellow battalion commanders is a friend from Georgia. His unit has spent the entire war at Udairi and is anxious to help in any way. He agreed to loan us about 15 vehicles and trailers and a mobile kitchen until our equipment arrives. I also got the [513th MI] Brigade to agree to provide me 54 of their long-range surveillance (LRS) platoon soldiers—all excellent infantrymen—to serve as security elements during movement and missions. This is the first of many handshake deals with friends that will prove to make up the backbone of our logistical support going forward."

Our commander sought the addition of the LRS soldiers because he believed the 203d had neither the training nor

heavy weapons required to adequately serve as security elements in the current semi-permissive environment. The 203d's doctrine anticipated performing collection missions in a non-permissive conventional battlefield. Collection teams would follow the warfighters and evaluate captured equipment for TECHINT value once it had been secured. Since the 203d arrived in country after the major combat but during the insurgency phase, its collection teams would be roaming the country independent of the warfighting units in a semi-permissive environment. The attachment of the LRS soldiers from H Company (Long-Range Surveillance), 221st MI Battalion, provided proficient infantrymen who understood intelligence collection. They accompanied almost every joint CMEC (JCMEC) collection mission.

The second important decision was to establish a combined and joint CMEC (C/JCMEC) Forward at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP). This decision shaped TECHINT operations in Iraq for the duration of the 203d's deployment. Early in the conflict, Tallil Air Base (AB) was the designated theater collection point for captured enemy materiel. However, the Iraqi units with the most advanced equipment melted away in and around Baghdad. For this reason, the battalion commander decided to establish a presence at BIAP in addition to the presence in Tallil mandated by CFLCC.

On 11 and 12 May, B Company and HHC moved to Tallil AB to establish the C/JCMEC. Its primary mission was to pack and ship the CEM concentrated there by British and U.S. Navy TECHINT elements that had already moved forward to BIAP. B Company, 3d Platoon (Warehouse) was the primary element that carried out this mission, while its 2d Platoon (Exploitation) conducted some local collection and exploitation missions. HHC worked hard to provide life support and morale, welfare, and recreation in the windy and dusty environment that characterized Tallil AB.

After accompanying the move to Tallil, the battalion commander, portions of the operations and intelligence staffs, CM&D, a slice of HHC, and C Company established the C/JCMEC Forward at BIAP. The 203d soldiers collocated with the British TECHINT experts already there. The 203d staff began planning and coordinating operations with their coalition partners. There were literally hundreds of weapons cache sites in the immediate Baghdad area, the task fell to CM&D to evaluate them for TECHINT value and to prioritize them. The S3 then decided which ones warranted a visit and began planning the missions.



Members of 1st Platoon, Company C, recover a captured Iraqi MiG-25 aircraft at Al Taqaddum AB.

Meanwhile, C Company established its headquarters in another walled compound further up the road and prepared for the collection missions that the staff was planning. While the staff worked feverishly to get operations running, the NCOs worked diligently to improve the quality of life for all since there were few, if any, amenities left in the buildings due to looting and combat. The NCOs and soldiers found ice, air conditioners, refrigerators (working or not), and lighting and plumbing fixtures. They built showers, installed fans and air conditioners, and strung lighting.

By the end of May, the C/JCMEC forward had the beginnings of a battle rhythm. CM&D would identify potential targets and bring them to the staff's attention. The section would also assemble what intelligence it could on the target and include it in a target folder that helped the staff and the collection team plan the mission. The staff would then schedule missions and organize C Company teams and coalition colleagues for a reconnaissance or collec-

tion mission. Every evening after dinner, the commanders and staff gathered to hear briefings on the next day's missions and the S2 would brief the latest enemy situation.

Each morning, the commander rose for an 0500 briefing by CM&D analysts on any changes to the threat situation that might change his mind about allowing a mission to go forward. Soon after this threat briefing, the mission convoys would begin to assemble outside the compound, usually consisting of two to six vehicles, always accompanied by a few "gunships" from the LRS detachment of the 221st MI Battalion providing additional force protection (FP). In the early days of C/JCMEC Forward, three or four missions would go out early each morning.

June 2003 was a significant month in the history of the 203d BI Battalion and the C/JCMEC. During this month, we consolidated the 203d and C/JCMEC at BIAP and the combined element came under command of the newly formed Iraqi Survey Group (ISG).

Integration with the ISG was instrumental in bringing together all of the elements of the C/JCMEC. At its peak, the C/JCMEC consisted of 450 individuals from:


- ❑ All four branches of the U.S. Armed Forces.
- ❑ The United Kingdom's Army, Navy, and Air Force.
- ❑ The Australian Army and Air Force.
- ❑ The National Air Intelligence Center, Missile and Space Intelligence Center, Office of Naval Intelligence, NGIC, DIA, and others.

Although the ISG assumed command of the C/JCMEC on 1 June 2003, it did little to modify the missions the C/JCMEC was already doing, except to “*broaden its scope*,” according to the commander. Although its command changed and the C/JCMEC fell under the command of an Australian Brigadier, the mission of the consolidated 203d and C/JCMEC did not alter.

Also in June, the bulk of the battalion consolidated at BIAP. B Company and HHC moved up from Tallil, and A Company came from Al Hillah. The battalion’s equipment arrived at the same time. These events precipitated a shift in mission for 2d Platoon of B Company. Doctrinally, the 2d Platoon works in the CMEC doing detailed exploitation of equipment in order to provide timely intelligence on threat equipment capabilities to battlefield commanders. Since major conventional combat operations had ended in early May, there was no need for 2d Platoon to do its exploitation in theater. Exploitation of most of the CEM was slated for conduct in the United States by the intelligence production centers. By this time, CM&D had identified approximately 150 sites worth TECHINT missions, so the 2d Platoon contributed to the collection effort.

Several senior sergeants from B Company’s 2d Platoon received training in commanding a TECHINT mission from A Company’s NCOs. They received training in FP from the LRS soldiers under operational control of the 203d. DIA experts provided training for the 2d Platoon soldiers on equipment identification. By the end of the deployment, the 2d platoon had conducted more than 70 collection reconnaissance missions.

By the end of August, the C/JCMEC staff was confident it had identified and visited every site of potential TECHINT interest in Iraq. B Company’s 3d Platoon was packaging the last of the 300 tons of materiel collected by the C/JCMEC for shipment to the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia. They had run more than 400 collection missions, resulting in only four combat casualties. It was the largest U.S. TECHINT collection effort since World War II.



A 203d soldier finishes washing down an Iraqi vehicle before shipping it out for detailed exploitation.

Final Thoughts

The 203d MI Battalion’s experience in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM brought to light several crucial lessons.

- ❑ Foremost is the need for TECHINT elements to be in theater in force well before hostilities begin. The CEM with the greatest intelligence value will be found early in the conflict, and it is important for one headquarters, the CMEC, to track and coordinate the early collection efforts.
- ❑ A corollary to the first point is that it is imperative that a unit with a mission as unique as that of the 203d be a priority as far as personnel resourcing and equipment so that they get to the theater in a timely fashion.
- ❑ Establishing the CMEC forward where the majority of the collection is taking place is imperative. It gives the staff a better understanding of the security situation and provides for better command and control.

(Continued on page 55)

Proponent Notes

Military MI Promotions and Professional Development

by Lieutenant Colonel Harvey Crockett

The changes in Army Transformation and military personnel management have not abated over the past few months. Instead, I believe they have increased in number and pace. The Office of the Chief, Military Intelligence (OCMI) remains dedicated to staying abreast of the many changes and giving you our best effort to ensure you have what you need to succeed. The Military Intelligence (MI) Corps is doing well: MI promotions are doing very well, soldiers continue to join our corps in great numbers, and many want to stay. Thank you for your efforts to keep the Corps healthy and relevant for the future.

Enlisted Professional Development Opportunities

MI Enlisted Promotions. Congratulations to our senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) selected for appointment to Command Sergeant Major (CSM), promotion to Sergeant Major (SGM), and selection for attendance at the U.S. Army's Sergeants Major Academy. The board selected 37 MI professionals for appointment to CSM and 46 for promotion to the rank of SGM. These numbers were out of 181 soldiers considered. The overall Army selection rate was 14.3 percent. All MI Career Management Fields (CMFs) beat this selection average with the following selection rates:

- CMF 33 (Military Intelligence Systems Maintenance and Integration) was at 20 percent.
- CMF 96 (Military Intelligence) was at 36 percent.
- CMF 98 (Signals Intelligence/Electronic Warfare Operations) was at 34 percent.

This proves again that even as the Army reorganizes and the Global War on Terrorism continues unabated, promotions also continue. Let us remember to take the time to

congratulate these outstanding senior NCOs in our formations.

Update of AR 600-25, NCO Professional Development Guide. The Army is currently revision of AR 600-25 and has directed the revision of all MOS Career Maps. They are available on line. Feel free to review and recommend changes as they apply to MI MOSs. Please send your comments to maurice.mitchell@us.army.mil.

Upcoming Enlisted Boards. At the time the OCMI wrote this article, the results from the latest Master Sergeant (MSG) board were not available but they should be by the time you read this. Check online at the HRC site referenced below to see an analysis. The board schedule for the rest of fiscal year 2005 (FY05) and FY06 should also be available when this issue of MIPB is going to press. You can find updated and promotion-zone information posted at <https://www-perscom.army.mil/select/EnlBdSched.htm>.

Warrant Officer (WO) Professional Development Opportunities

FY04 Chief Warrant Officer 3/4/5 (CW3/4/5) Promotion List. The MI Warrant Officer Corps continues to do very well on promotion boards. The FY04 CW3/4/5 promotion board results showed an overall 88.7-percent promotion opportunity for MI across all ranks. This is better than last year's results and was just above the Army average. Congratulations to all of the MI Warrant Officers selected for promotion. For a specific breakdown by grade, see Table 1.

FY04 MI WO Accessions. The promotions board results were the good news. The Warrant Officer Accessions Board results are the not-so-good news. For the fifth year in a row, MI missed its WO accessions goal.

CW3	Aviation PZ = 92.5%	Technical PZ = 93%	MI PZ = 94.7% (108 of 114 considered, 7 of 12 AZ, and 6 BZ selects)
CW4	Aviation PZ = 94.8%	Technical PZ = 93.5%	MI PZ = 96.6% (28 of 29 considered, 1 of 1 AZ, and 1 BZ select)
CW5	Aviation PZ = 51%	Technical PZ = 50%	MI PZ = 75% (3 of 4 considered, 2 of 7 AZ, and 1 BZ select)

Table 1. Breakdown of MI CW3/4/5 Promotions by Grade.

This situation is critical, especially now since the MOSs for which we have not achieved 100-percent accessions are the same ones most needed to support the Army's Transformation.

The overall FY04 WO accession allocation included 141 MI WOs and we had only 94 qualified applicants. Table 2 provides a breakdown of applications by MOS and gives you some sense of what we are up against as a Corps.

MOS/Status	Accessions	Qualified Applicants	Remarks
350B/Green	19	19+	6 AFS* Waivers
350D/Amber	10	8	3 AFS Waivers, 2-96H
350L/Green	7	7+	1 AFS waiver
350U/Red	10	5	2 AFS, 1-96H
351B/Red	37	10	2 AFS waivers
351E/Amber	13	11	3 AFS waivers, 4-98G
352C/Red	13	9	
352G/Green	4	4+	2 KP, 2 AR
352H/Green	3	3+	
352J/Green	4	4+	
352K/Red	7	4	
353A/Red	4	1	

*AFS - Active Federal Service

Table 2. FY04 MI WO

Upcoming WO Boards. The FY05 Warrant Officer Accession Board schedule through the end of the fiscal year is: 16 through 20 May 2005, 18 through 22 July 2005 and 19 through 23 September 2005. NCOs interested in becoming WOs should contact the WO Recruiting Team at <http://www.usarec.army.mil/hq/warrant/> for information.

New Warrant Officer of the MI Corps. Chief Warrant Officer Five (CW5) James Prewitt-Diaz enlisted in the U.S. Army in May 1974. He attended basic training at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, and advanced individual training (AIT) for MOS 96D (Imagery Analyst) at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. As an enlisted soldier, he served in every leadership position up to the position of First Sergeant.

In September 1985, he was appointed as a WO after completing the Warrant Officer Candidate Course (WOCS) at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and the MI Warrant Officer Basic Course at Fort Huachuca. As a WO, CW5 Prewitt has served in leadership and technical positions at the tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence levels. As an Imagery Analyst, he provided intelligence support to Operations URGENT FURY, JUST CAUSE, and DESERT SHIELD/STORM. He also supported U.S. operations in Somalia, Haiti, El Salvador, Kosovo, and Colombia. As a Senior Chief Warrant Officer, he served as the MI representative to the Army Development System (ADS) XI task force addressing WO personnel policies and he was the MI Warrant Officer Assignments Manager responsible for Army personnel resources requirements for all 13 MI WO MOSs.

CW5 Prewitt is a graduate of the U.S. Army Warrant Staff Course and the U. S. Army Warrant Officer Senior Staff Course. He holds a Master of Public Administration degree from Troy State University and a Master of Science in Strategic Intelligence degree from the Joint Military Intelligence College.

Officer Professional Development

2004 Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Promotion Analysis. Graduation from the Command and Staff College (CSC) is necessary. Overall performance is important, but outstanding performance in tough jobs continues to be a crucial factor in selection. Key developmental jobs recognized by this board were Analysis and Control Element Chief, Brigade S2, Executive Officer (XO), and S3. Manner of performance bore greater weight than resident or nonresident CSC or the School of Military Arts and Sciences (SAMS). Notably, the board selected many more of those who served only as Brigade S2 and performed well for promotion in spite of having no S3 or XO time. Unfortunately, officers who had only center of mass (COM) reports at the Major (MAJ) level (an overall COM file) were at risk for delayed promotion.

Applications by MOS

We continue to aggressively pursue solutions. Currently, we are working with the Army G1 staff on several MI initiatives dealing with bonuses, pay, and compensation. We expect to start seeing results from these efforts by mid-summer 2005. However, we need your help. Please continue to educate all those around you about our great WO programs. Get involved in identifying promising NCOs who might like to pursue careers as technical leaders in the Warrant Officer Corps.

For Functional Area (FA) 34 (Strategic Intelligence) officers, CSC completion was also mandatory. There was no indication of a difference between resident and nonresident CSC. Manner of performance continues to be the single biggest factor in selection. Again, having exclusive COM reports places the officer at risk—only one of the officers selected had all COM reports. The majority of officers selected for promotion had at least 24 months in an FA 34 position and all but one officer had completed the FA 34 training.

Selection of Division G2s. In a decision made by the Army Chief of Staff earlier in fall 2004, there will be centralized selection for both G2 and G6 positions at division level. One central selection board will meet for G2 and battalion command positions. G2 will follow Tactical as one of the four categories and join the original three: Tactical, Training and Strategic Support, and Institutional. Therefore, officers in the future will serve as either G2s or battalion commanders but not both. MI officers will have the opportunity accept or decline competition for G2 as they can for any command category.

Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, Officer Professional Development and Utilization. The Army will soon publish the new DA Pam 600-3 (a draft is available on Army Knowledge Online). The major change in this publication is the elimination of the term “branch qualification” across the Army. This term has been considered equivalent to “ticket punching” rather than focusing on the acquired skills, knowledge, and experience officers receive in some assignments. The new philosophy is to identify significant developmental assignments that will help prepare the officer for successful service at the next level.

The Army has also eliminated the Functional Area designation process, which normally occurs at the five- to six-year point. While officers will still be able to state a preference of which FA they would like to hold, there will be no formal board and no requirement for all officers to select an FA. FA selection will be part of the online officer preference process and officers will have the authority and opportunity to make changes to their preferences often. The Army is reconsidering the timing for Career Field Designator for some branches and even for FA 34. Currently it remains as before, with selection to FA 34 following selection for promotion to MAJ. The change may allow FA 34 to select officers prior to selection to MAJ to get them into the training pipeline earlier and out to their utilization tours immediately following selection for promotion to MAJ.

Upcoming Officer Selection Boards. The next officers' boards were or will be:

- Career field designation (CFD) year group (YG) 95 selection on 29 March through 8 April 2005
- Army senior service college (SSC) on 5 through 29 April 2005
- Army LTC promotion board on 12 April through 12 May 2005
- Army COL promotion board on 26 July through 19 August 2005

OCMI Points of Contact

The point of contact (POC) for enlisted actions is Sergeant Major (SGM) Mitchell. Readers may contact him via E-mail at maurice.mitchell@hua.army.mil. The POC for warrant officer actions is Chief Warrant Officer Five (CW5) Prewitt-Diaz. Readers may contact him via E-mail at james.prewitt-diaz@hua.army.mil. The POC for officer actions is Ms. Borghardt. Readers may contact her via E-mail at charlotte.borghardt@hua.army.mil.

OCMI Website

Interested readers can reach the OCMI website at <https://cms.portal.hua.army.mil/channels/ocmi/webpage/index.htm>. You will be able to find information on issues ranging from enlisted career field overviews to officer, warrant officer, and civilian updates.



Lieutenant Colonel Harvey L. Crockett is the Director, Office of the Chief, Military Intelligence (OCMI). Readers may contact him via E-mail at harvey.crockett@hua.army.mil. Robert C. White, Jr., is the Deputy OCMI. You can reach him via E-mail at bob.whitejr@us.army.mil.

The U.S. Army Intelligence Center
and
The Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center

invite you to the 7th annual

Military Language Conference

Theme

Foreign Language & Culture Awareness: Force Multipliers

- Training in the use of language speakers and cultural advisors for operational commanders.
- Up-to-date language and cultural information from the field for program designers, developers, and researchers.
- Discussions, with outcomes assigned as action items, on surge language capability, coalition language requirements, and U.S. education system in support of DoD requirements, among other topics.

Location: MITRE Bldg., Washington, D.C.

Date: 8 to 9 November 2005

On line registration: <http://flrc.mitre.org/register.pl?eid=1>

See conference website

<http://www.universityofmilitaryintelligence.us/mifltc/default.asp>
for panel and group topics, conference brochure, site directions,
lodging information and conference updates.

Background (l to r): US COL, Iraqi soldier, Iraqi MG, Iraqi Interpreter

CSA's Focus Area 16: Actionable Intelligence...

Effects of High Deployment OPTEMPO and Constrained Resources on the Pace of MI Transformation

by Lieutenant Colonel Stephen K. Iwicki

The focus of this column is usually on MI force structure designs and new concepts of intelligence support. In this issue, I am focusing on the effects a high deployment operations tempo (OPTEMPO) and a resource-constrained environment are having on the pace of MI transformation (see Figure 1). The main point to remember is that supporting the war effort is our top priority. Logically, one would think that units undergoing modular transformation and returning to Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM (OIF/OEF) would get all the necessary resources to meet the new Objective Table of Organization and Equipment (OTOE) structure design. We have charged the system with recruiting additional personnel and procuring more equipment, but there is an unavoidable, short-term time lag associated with this process. We have challenges ahead of us.

Over the past 18 months, senior leaders of the Army staff conducted numerous visits with our de-

ployed forces in the field and those units undergoing a modular conversion. These visits keep our Army's leadership current with lessons learned from ongoing operations and often identify issues returning units have with their future modular design conversions. As a result, we are going through a period of refinement in the Army's modular conversion.

It is important that everyone understands some of the realities associated with growing new intelligence capabilities within the modular force. We are successfully competing with other Army resourcing requirements. We are balancing operational requirements with those of transformation and are simultaneously bringing as much stability as possible to our intelligence force. Army intelligence continues to rapidly move forward with our modular transformation while continuing to be a key enabler for the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)

The Army has a new strategic context to how we cycle Army training and readiness. It recognizes that continuous full-spectrum operations is the **default condition**. It acknowledges that major combat is followed by sustained stabilization and reconstruction to create conditions for enduring victory in the GWOT. Most importantly, it recognizes that the old readiness paradigm is obsolete. Our new unit rotation, reset, and unit stabilization model means the Army is **not "all ready, all the time."**

Army Intelligence Is Rapidly Transforming While At War

- ☛ **Intelligence operations tempo is high.**
 - ☛ **MI soldiers deployed more than 1 year out of 2**
 - ☛ **Using stay behind equipment solutions for multiple rotations**
 - ☛ **Retention is falling in high OPTEMPO units**
- ☛ **We are growing MI capabilities and force structure to improve and sustain the fight under our modular transformation efforts**
 - ☛ **Major Growth areas: HUMINT, Analysis, SIGINT**
- ☛ **We are using a spiral development approach to rapidly integrate new effective capabilities against an asymmetric threat**
 - ☛ **Analysis: DCGS-A, Information Dominance Center (IDC)**
 - ☛ **Connect the Soldier to the Network**

Figure 1. The State of Army Intelligence.

The new ARFORGEN model provides a steady-state supply of trained, ready, cohesive, modular Army Forces for continuous full-spectrum operations. It means more predictable unit-rotation schedules for the Army, soldiers, families, and employers. The basis of the model is a common operational readiness cycle defined as the recurring, structured progression of increasing unit readiness through the Reset/Train, Ready, and Available phases, culminating in full mission readiness and availability to deploy.

- ❑ Active Component (AC) Operational Deployment Cycle. For planning purposes, AC units are available for one operational deployment every three years.
- ❑ Reserve Component (RC) Operational Deployment Cycle. For planning purposes, RC units are available for one operational deployment every six years and available for non-federalized commitments for every year not deployed.

For the active component, the goal of this cycle breaks out to three distinct one-year phases:

- ❑ Reset/Train Phase. The first phase of the operational readiness cycle when units redeploy from operations, recover, reorganize, stabilize personnel, receive new equipment, and conduct individual and collective training culminating in the commander's validation that the unit is ready (Year 1).
- ❑ Ready Phase. The second phase of the operational readiness cycle when units are apportioned to combatant commanders for planning, conduct mission preparation and collective training with higher operational headquarters, and may deploy if additional operational capability is required (Year 2).
- ❑ Available Phase. The third phase of the operational readiness cycle when units are in their assigned deployment periods and may receive alert, mobilization, and deployment orders (Year 3).

In the near-term as we grow the Army from 33 to 48 brigade combat teams (BCTs), we have compressed the Reset/Train and Ready phases into a one-year cycle. This will improve as we grow more BCTs and GWOT rotational requirements eventually decline

with increased stability in Iraq. The RC will follow a similar operational readiness cycle stretched out of six years.

Resourcing Priorities

Units deploying in support of GWOT missions are at the top of the priorities list for personnel resourcing and equipping. Even as a priority one unit, there will still be some "just in time" fills of personnel and equipment. Many wonder what is causing this to occur.

In the case of equipment, it is often the production capacity of companies producing our systems. The Shadow Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) is a great example where production of this system is optimized and running 24 hours a day. It would take significant Army investment and two years for the manufacturer to build a second factory and production line to increase output.

For our personnel, the challenge is greater as we grow. The assignment of our initial entry soldiers is rather straightforward based upon unit priorities. The assignment of experienced soldiers complicates the process. The real issue is that our MI soldiers are rotating faster than our MI unit flags. Resolving this issue is our top priority.

Every time an MI unit comes home from a deployment, the personnel go on "stop move" status for 90 days to recover the unit's equipment and spend some time with their families. After 90 days, the soldiers are eligible for a permanent change of station (PCS) move. Often, our MI soldiers will relocate to a new unit already preparing for its next deployment. On average, this gives our soldiers six to nine months to move their families, train with their new units, and redeploy back into GWOT. Resolving this high level of deployment tempo is our greatest concern.

What to Expect in the Near-Term

MI Branch is facing another tough year in meeting our ever-growing mission requirements. The Intelligence Center and School is doing a great job of training the MI Force, particularly 2,500 additional Skill Level-10 soldiers this year, as well as supporting our Army at War with the numerous mobile training teams (MTTs).

The Army Staff is working to begin activation of the MI battalion(-) in the Battlefield Surveillance Bri-

gade (BFSB) starting in January 2006. The Army has agreed to resource a minimum of five new active component MI battalions(-), and potentially we may see as many as nine AC battalions. There will also be four new MI battalions(-) in the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) and two new MI battalions(-) in the U.S. Army National Guard (ARNG). These new units are critical to developing a larger MI force pool, thus reducing the MI deployment tempo.

The MI battalion(-) will consist of a headquarters and headquarters company (HHC), a collection and exploitation (C&E) company, and two counterintelligence and human intelligence (CI and HUMINT) companies. The two unresourced elements are a UAV company and a technical collection (Prophet) company. The UAV company is unfeasible before fiscal year 2007 (FY07) due to equipment production shortages.

We are also standing up a new organization that will contribute to the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC). This battalion-size organization will have a specific mission of resourcing a theater interrogation and debriefing center such as Abu Ghraib. There will be two AC JIDCs and two RC JIDCs. The first AC JIDC will activate in January 2006 and deploy during the 06-08 OIF rotation. The AC JIDCs will align with the 470th MI Brigade and the 513th MI Brigade. While these are under the Unit of Employment Y (UEy, a blending of corps and army capabilities) for command and control, they may deploy to any theater. The addition of the JIDCs will further reduce the resourcing strain on the rest of the MI force.

Overall, the MI priority of fill for personnel resourcing and equipment is:

- BCT MI company.
- Unit of Employment X (UEx, currently division level) G2.
- MI battalion (BFSB).
- Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC).
- Theater Intelligence Brigade (TIB).

Relief is on the way. This current year (2005) (and OIF rotation 05-07) represent the peak year for Army MI. The activation of new units starting in FY06 will begin to reduce the current deployment tempo for the MI Corps. We are continuing to "grow" the MI Corps and the Army will continue to recruit and train more soldiers. The U.S. Army Intelligence Center has the throughput capability to train the required MI growth.

We are expecting increased promotions for our enlisted and junior noncommissioned officers (NCOs). We are helping the Army rewrite warrant officer accession requirements to include eliminating the P2 (physical) profile restriction, extending time-in-service eligibility to 15 years, and eliminating the requirement to attend training at Fort Rucker, Alabama, for staff sergeants and above. We also are working on increasing retention bonuses for all our MI specialties.

As the Army G2 and I travel around the Army, commanding generals consistently tell us great stories about their MI soldiers and your contributions to successful missions. MI is on the front lines providing needed support to our combat arms comrades. There are many MI heroes amongst us receiving deserved recognition. The 202d MI Battalion had 11 awards for valor during this last rotation. The 224th MI Battalion conducted an eight-hour operation in Afghanistan this summer that saved the lives of a Special Forces team. The Hunter UAV units continue to provide outstanding support with this high-demand low-density system. The U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) Information Dominance Center is providing continuous tactical overwatch of the 3d Infantry Division in Iraq. MI is clearly a major element of combat power and...Always out Front!



Lieutenant Colonel Steve Iwicki will retire from the U.S. Army on 29 April 2005. He has accepted a position as Vice President of Intelligence Planning with a civilian firm in Washington, D.C. Readers may contact him via E-mail at stephen.iwicki@us.army.mil.

Training the Corps

*111th MI Brigade: Expanded Training for an Army at War
by the Office of the Dean of Training, 111th MI Brigade*

The faculty, staff, and leadership in the 111th Military Intelligence (MI) Brigade have experienced significant increases in the training load and have made major adjustments in programs of instruction (POIs) and lesson plans. Furthermore, the 111th has supported the war effort by fielding numerous instructional mobile training teams (MTTs) to provide just-in-time training for deploying units. Currently, in addition to training MI military occupational specialties (MOSs) to standards, the training battalions within the 111th are incorporating increased levels of basic warrior skills, cultural awareness training, and training in the contemporary operational environment (COE) into the curriculum.

The 344th MI Battalion is working on a complete overhaul of the 98 Career Management Field (CMF). Their goal is to revolutionize signals intelligence (SIGINT) training in order to give soldiers the skills they need for success in the COE. The 344th also plans to establish a GEOCELL Boot Camp course at Goodfellow Air Force Base (AFB), Texas.

The 304th MI Battalion is actively engaged in adapting officer training to the mission requirements of Operations IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF). These changes in training are manifest in new applied lessons on culture, ethics, and the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that have proven successful in the war effort. The new Joint Intelligence Combat Training Center (JICTC) exercises and tests these TTPs. The JICTC accommodates joint training endeavors by providing joint, realistic, live-play exercises.

The Army has extended the 2/84th MI Battalion on active duty at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, for another year in order to train Counterintelligence Agents (97B), Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Collectors (97E), and Intelligence Analysts (96B) for the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) and U.S. Army National Guard (ARNG). Their POIs and training standards are the same as those of the Active Component. In the fourteen months since activation, the 2/84th has trained enough 97B and 97E soldiers to fill 54 HUMINT Collection teams.

The 305th MI Battalion has trained hundreds of soldiers who are now serving effectively in the war effort as Imagery Analysts (96D), Electronic Intelligence Interceptor/Analysts (98J), Ground Surveillance System Operators (96R), Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operators (96U), and Military Intelligence Systems Maintainers/Integrators (33W). The 305th also trains ten functional courses and is the Army's sole provider of additional skills identifiers (ASIs) F3 (Improved GUARDRAIL V) and F4 (GUARDRAIL Common Sensor) for qualified aviators. During the last year, the 305th has directly deployed subject matter experts to Iraq to assist units on the ground.

In response to the war effort, the 309th MI Battalion has made significant changes in POIs and lesson plans within its curriculum. All initial military training (IMT) lesson plans now include cultural awareness training and lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. In recognition of the importance of basic warrior skills, the 309th has substantially increased the length of culminating field training exercises (FTXs) in order to teach core warrior tasks.

The 306th MI Battalion is responsible for providing MTTs to provide special training in a variety of locations throughout the world (including Iraq and Afghanistan). The training that these teams have provided includes courses in interrogation, cultural awareness, countering terrorism, PROPHET operations, information systems security monitoring, and foreign disclosure. During the first two quarters of 2005, the 306th provided just-in-time training via MTTs to more than 750 soldiers and they are currently scheduled to train hundreds more.



Readers may contact the 111th MI Brigade Dean, George A. VanOtten, Ph.D., via E-mail at george.vanotten@us.army.mil. The Associate Deans are Richard B. Loomis (richard.b.loomis@us.army.mil), Francis W. Smith (francis.smith@us.army.mil), and Ken L. Welsh (ken.welsh@us.army.mil).

(Continued from page 46)


- FP needs to be more of a consideration in the battalion's doctrine and modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) because of the future likelihood of operating in a semi-permissive environment without the benefit of escort from combat arms units. Either the 203d needs heavy weapons, armored HMMWVs, and significant training time devoted to FP, or some provision has to be made for the attachment of soldiers proficient in that kind of work upon deployment.

A final comment is in order here. I have discussed some of the doctrine above, quoted a few soldiers, and pointed out many problems that we overcame. What truly made the 203d's time in Iraq a success were the NCOs and soldiers of the 203d who exemplified our Army values. Specifically, the NCOs built solid teams with soldiers who for the most part had met just a few weeks before deployment. All the soldiers remained patient and committed despite a difficult mobilization and a deployment filled with challenges, adversity, and on-the-job training.



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Language Action

by Peter A. Shaver

"The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Departments of the Army and Defense, or the U.S. Government."

The National Language Conference

The National Language Conference, co-sponsored by the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Center for Advanced Study of Language (CASL), was held at the University of Maryland at College Park, Maryland in June 2004.¹ The conference was prompted by the recognition of the greater need for citizens with foreign language competence to help respond to requirements of the 21st century and the Global War on Terrorism, the increasing globalization of industry, and the need to provide government services to a diverse and multi-lingual population in the United States.

More than 300 people attended the event, representing federal agencies, academia, the nation's educational system, industry, language experts, and researchers. Conference speakers and panelists outlined the needs of the federal sector and industry, and the capabilities and possibilities of the American educational system. Conferees then met to propose actions that might be taken to make the United States population more competent in foreign languages.²

Dr. David S. C. Chu, Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, summarized the desired outcomes in his forward (see below) to the conference follow-on White Paper, **A Call To Action for National Foreign Language Capabilities: The National Language Conference, 1 February 2005**. The White Paper proposes national policies and programs to address foreign language needs, a first step toward spurring national action on this issue.

"The Call to Action for National Foreign Language Capabilities is the culmination of an unprecedented 2004 gathering of leaders from government, industry, academia, and language associations. At this National Language Conference, the leaders recalled October 4, 1957, when the Soviet Union successfully launched Sputnik 1. Congress immediately passed the National Defense Education Act to respond to the threat of Soviet technological superiority. The generation of scientists, engineers, mathematicians, linguists, and area

*Update on National Language Priorities—
The National Language Conference,
Language Transformation Roadmap,
and The Military Language Conference*

specialists created by this act put a man on the moon, helped win the Cold War, and today has a spacecraft 756 million miles from Earth soaring amidst the rings of Saturn.

"During the Conference, the participants agreed that the terrorist attacks of 9/11 had served as a second "Sputnik moment": Our national security requires foreign language education and regional expertise in the United States.

"The objective of the Call to Action is to describe the thoughts of the conference participants of a vision for the future, a future in which the United States enhances its global leadership through increased proficiency in foreign languages and understanding of and respect for the cultures of the world. While the views expressed in this white paper do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense, A Call to Action identifies a number of areas in need of national leadership and lays out a series of recommendations to address those urgent needs.

"Improving the Nation's foreign language capability requires immediate and long-term engagement. Every sector of our society has a role to play. The publication of this document is meant to spur the necessary effort that will move the country forward. This is a Call to Action."

The White Paper Executive Summary (see below) states the 21st century vision and outlines the basic assumptions and recommendations of the conference:

"Our vision is a world in which the United States is a stronger global leader through proficiency in foreign languages and understanding of the cultures of the world. These abilities are strengths of our public and private sector and pillars of our educational system. The government, academic, and private sectors continue to, and mutually benefit from, these national capabilities.

The terrorist attacks of September 11th, the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), and the continued threat

to our Homeland have defined the critical need to take action to improve the foreign language and cultural capabilities of the Nation. We must act now to improve the gathering and analysis of information, advance international diplomacy, and support military operations. We must act to retain our global market leadership and succeed against increasingly sophisticated competitors whose workforces possess potent combinations of professional skills, knowledge of other cultures, and multiple language proficiencies. Our domestic well-being demands action to provide opportunities for all students to learn foreign languages important to the Nation, develop the capabilities of our heritage communities, and ensure services that are core to our quality of life."

Success in this crucial undertaking will depend on leadership strong enough to:

- Implement policies, programs, and legislation that build the national language and cultural understanding capability.
- Engage federal, state, and local agencies and the private sector in search of solutions.
- Develop language and cultural competency across public and private sectors.
- Develop language skills in a wide range of critical languages.
- Strengthen our education system, programs, and tools in foreign languages and cultures.
- Integrate language training into career fields and increase the number of language professionals, especially in the less commonly taught languages.

Leadership must be comprehensive, as no one sector—government, industry, or academia—has all of the needs for language and cultural competency, or all of the solutions. Some actions must be initiated immediately by specific agencies and federal departments should organize to work on proposed recommendations. Other necessary solutions must be long-term, strategic, and involve multiple organizations at all levels. To accomplish this agenda, the Nation needs:

- A National Language Authority appointed by the President to develop and implement a national foreign language strategy. **NOTE:** Senior Language Authorities and the Defense Language Action Panel (DLAP) are already meeting and functioning at the DOD senior level.
- A National Foreign Language Coordination Council to coordinate implementation of the national foreign language strategy.

Defense Language Transformation Roadmap

Post 9/11 military operations reinforce the reality that the DOD needs a significantly improved organic capability in emerging languages and dialects, a greater competence and regional area skills in those languages and dialects, and a surge capability to rapidly expand its language capabilities on short notice.⁴

Therefore, DOD has launched a major initiative to develop foreign language and cultural expertise among its military and civilian members.

The initiative, reflects a long-standing priority of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, to achieve three major goals: to create foundational language and cultural expertise in the officer, civilian and enlisted ranks for both active and reserve forces; to create the capacity to surge language and cultural resources beyond in-house capabilities; and to establish a cadre of language specialists with advanced levels of proficiency.

It also intends to improve the language skills of the officer corps in general as well as consider language ability in the promotion of general officers.

"We simply must develop a greater capacity for languages that reflect the demands of this century," Rumsfeld said. "No technology delivers this capability; it is a truly human skill that our forces must have to win, and that we must have to keep the peace."

The department's Defense Language Transformation Roadmap is a commitment to our men and women that they will have that skill and ability."⁵

The Roadmap is based upon the following assumptions:

- Conflict against enemies speaking less commonly taught languages will not abate. Robust foreign language and foreign area expertise are critical to sustaining coalitions, pursuing regional stability, and conducting multi-national missions, especially post-conflict and stability and support missions (i.e., security, humanitarian, nation-building, and stability operations).
- Changes in the international security environment and in the nature of threats to U.S. national security have increased the range of potential regions for conflict and expanded the number of likely coalition partners with whom U.S. forces will work.

- Establishing a new “global footprint” for DOD, and transitioning to a more expeditionary force, will bring increased requirements for language and regional knowledge to work with new coalition partners in a wide variety of activities, often with little or no notice. This new approach to warfighting in the 21st century will require forces that have foreign language capabilities beyond those generally available in today’s force.
- Adversaries will attempt to manipulate the media and leverage sympathetic elements of the population and “opposition” politicians to divide international coalitions.⁶

The Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG) for FY 2006 through 2011 directed Dr. Chu to develop and provide to the Deputy Secretary of Defense a comprehensive roadmap for achieving the full range of language capabilities necessary to support the 2004 Defense Strategy. The SPG established four goals for the language transformation:

- Create foundational language and cultural expertise in the officer, civilian, and enlisted ranks for both Active and Reserve Components.
- Create the capacity to surge language and cultural resources beyond these foundational and in-house capabilities.
- Establish a cadre of language specialists possessing a level 3/3/3 (reading, listening, speaking) ability.
- Establish a process to track the accession, separation, and promotion rates of language professionals and Foreign Area Officers (FAO).⁷

Some specific recommendations include:

- Revision of policy, doctrine and planning guidance to optimize the accession, development, and employment of those with language skills and reflect the need for deliberately planned operational and contingency language support.
- Building a capabilities-based language requirements determination process and tracking language readiness.
- Surveying the current military and civilian force for language proficiency and providing incentives for the sustainment of that expertise.
- Requiring junior officers to complete language training and expanding study abroad programs and experiences in foreign countries.
- Establishing foreign language ability criterion for general and flag officer advancement.
- Determining the need for enhancing civilian language and regional expertise in the workforce.⁸

The Upcoming Military Language Conference

The Military Language Conference will be held on the 8th and 9th of November 2005 in Washington, D.C. The theme of the conference is *Foreign Language and Culture: Force Multipliers*. Most of the issues outlined in the National Language Conference White Paper and the Language Transformation Roadmap will be addressed in panel and discussion groups throughout the conference.

Some specific topics are:

- Use of military versus contract linguists.
- Survival language and cultural knowledge required by unit soldiers.
- Accuracy of information and intelligence derived from translated documents.
- Coalition language and cultural awareness requirements.
- Maintaining language proficiency.
- Non-verbal communications contingency and surge language capabilities.
- U.S. education system foreign language training in support of military and DOD language requirements.
- Non-linguist translation devices.




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ENDNOTES

1. The Center for Advanced Study of Language, a research center at the University of Maryland, manages programs designed to enhance the ability of federal employees across all agencies and branches to speak and understand other languages at high levels of proficiency. The CASL website is at <http://www.casl.umd.edu>.
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Professional Reader



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Paperback, 568 pages, \$19.95, ISBN
0-393-32671-3

The 9/11 Commission Report by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 are defining events of modern U.S. history. Interpreting "9/11," conveying its meaning to Americans, and assigning it a place of reverence in U.S. history remains a difficult, emotionally charged process. The July 2004 publication of the *Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States*, hereafter referred to as the **9/11 Commission Report**, marks a tremendous achievement. It is a document that successfully transcends domestic politics and provides the American people an accurate, factual, and detailed account of not only the terrible events of that day, but also the rise of Islamic extremism that led to the 9/11 attacks. During its 21-month existence from 27 November 2002 to issuance of the final report in July 2004 to its closure 26 August 2004, the 9/11 Commission worked in a divisive U.S. political environment. Despite the temptations to politicize their work, the Commission members instead viewed their charter as a historic mission.¹ The **9/11 Commission Report** is a remarkable document that will likely withstand intellectual scrutiny as time passes and as new interpretations of 9/11 emerge.

Parallels between 9/11 and the Attack on Pearl Harbor

Many Americans consider 9/11 and its aftermath unique in our history. In fact, there are many parallels between 9/11 and the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.

Just as we were surprised by 9/11, the Japanese attacks on U.S. military installations in Hawaii sixty years earlier shocked Americans. Both attacks galvanized the U.S. public by their magnitude, devastation, and same approximate loss of lives. Both attacks unleashed war, one against the Empire of Japan, the other against global terrorism. And to understand how these cataclysmic attacks occurred, the U.S. Government established independent panels to determine the root cause of both disasters.²

During the deliberations of the 9/11 Commission, some commentators noted similarities between the current Commission and its Pearl Harbor predecessors. The mission of the panels—getting to the bottom of what went wrong during a national calamity—read like carbon copies. The panels differed in one critical aspect. The histories of the Pearl Harbor investigations



remain rife with assigning blame for the catastrophe and politicizing their deliberations. The 9/11 Commission understood the difficult history of the Pearl Harbor panels and charted a different course based on a factual understanding of 9/11. As the commission spokesman Al Felzenberg noted, the panel's inquiry and report addressed "*how it could happen and what went wrong, as well as what worked and what did not work, and what recommendation would we have for the American government and the American people to make it safer.*"³ The temptation to interject politics into its deliberations and blame individuals or presidential administrations was carefully avoided. The final report was a document free of the rancor and political infighting that lessened the relevancy of the multiple Pearl Harbor investigations.⁴

To understand the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. public and elected leaders recognized the necessity to engage in public discussions concerning the war on terror, security of the homeland, and how these affected citizens in their daily lives. An integral part of this public discussion was the **9/11 Commission Report**, for within its 567 pages and 116 pages of footnotes, the report offered Americans and future students a critical baseline document on the events of 11 September.⁵

Pearl Harbor Investigations

Often following a national calamity, creation of a government-sponsored commission is an appropriate step in demonstrating to the public the government's

resolve to document the event, determine its causes, develop corrective actions, and finally, apply blame. Among the most famous investigations in modern U.S. history before the 9/11 Commission were the series of panels convened to decide whether dereliction of duty by senior U.S. military personnel, errors of judgment, and a failure of intelligence led to the successful surprise Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. There were nine investigations of the attack. The first panel, the Roberts Commission, finished its work within six weeks and blamed the local Army and Navy commanders in Hawaii, General Walter Short and Admiral Husband Kimmel, for failing to prepare their respective commands against a possible attack. The availability of intelligence proved critical in understanding the Pearl Harbor attack, yet knowledge that the U.S. had broken Japanese codes was not made available to the Roberts Commission. Historians have since widely acknowledged the Roberts Commission rushed to judgment and did not have all the necessary facts to complete a comprehensive investigation.⁶

The other prominent investigation of Pearl Harbor came after victory in 1945. Congress established the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack to "*make a full and complete investigation of the facts relating to the events and circumstances leading up to or following the attack.*"⁷ Despite being highly classified, the successful U.S. code-breaking effort against Japan was revealed at

these hearings. The Congressional panel delved much deeper into the role of intelligence and what U.S. commanders knew of Japan's intentions before the attack. Public hearings commenced in November 1945 and continued until May 1946 with testimony from 43 witnesses totaling 15,000 typewritten pages. This investigation led to the early retirement of some of the military's highest leadership and blame was widespread.⁸

9/11 Commission Investigation

Once formed in early 2003, the 9/11 Commission faced delays in selecting members, obtaining security clearanc-



es, setting guidelines for how the panel would handle classified material, and gaining access to pertinent intelligence and law-enforcement files.⁹ Despite these difficulties, the 9/11 Commission made progress as it engaged in a monumental information gathering effort, with an eye to completing its final report by July 2004. Like the Pearl Harbor investigations, much of the 9/11 Commission's efforts focused on the ability of the U.S. intelligence community to predict the attack: What did we know? When did we know it? Was intelligence disseminated to the highest levels and, if so, why were actions not taken?¹⁰ A scholar of 20th-century U.S. history, Professor Alan Brinkley, noted that "*it's a good comparison both because the events [Pearl Harbor and 9/11] are comparable and the issues are almost exactly the same, which is what intelligence was available in advance of the event and why did no one act on the intelligence that was available.*"¹¹

The commission issued the report in July 2004. How will the **9/11 Commission Report** hold up to academic and public scrutiny as the years pass? Probably quite well. Written as a reconstructed nonfiction narrative, the **9/11 Commission Report** is a testament

to the efforts of the ten Commission members and their 82-person staff who, while interviewing 1,200 people and reading volumes of classified material, focused on producing a relevant account. The book documents two parallel stories: the resolve of Islamic fundamentalists to attack the United States, and the U.S. Government's well-intentioned but disorganized attempts to assess and cope with that threat as well as the events of 9/11. Specific, often microscopic detail is discussed but supports the parallel narratives.¹²

Affirmation of the **9/11 Commission Report** came from a number of quarters. The book earned rave reviews, remained atop *The New York Times* nonfiction best-seller list for 11 weeks, and was a finalist for the National Book Award—uncommon praise for a government document.¹³ Prepared by a large group of staff authors—attorneys, investigators, politicians, and historians—the 9/11 Commission understood that given the highly charged subject matter of its task, receiving the necessary bipartisan political approval to issue the report would prove difficult. Instead of permitting the Commission's efforts to flounder on trying to assign blame, accusing certain government officials of dereliction of duty, or castigating the Intelligence Community, the 9/11 Commission focused on developing the report's narrative quality. The report's sparse writing style served it well in presenting the fascinating, yet complex story of 9/11. Not keeping with the facts of the story would have resulted in a deeply divided Commission that would have failed from bi-partisan bickering.¹⁴

Given the scope of the **9/11 Commission Report** and the staggering amount of research, resources, and time required, it is unlikely we will see another comprehensive history written in the foreseeable future. The Commission prepared a monumental yet readable document that serves not only to help the current U.S. population work through the tragedy of 9/11, but future generations as well. In this document, one can understand the parallel stories of 9/11; the attacks occurring that day, and the years leading up to the attack as the U.S. Government vainly struggled to counter Islamic fundamentalist plans to attack the U.S. homeland.¹⁵



Conclusion

Analysts today face challenges similar to those their Pearl Harbor predecessors encountered, analyzing and interpreting intelligence, clouded by noise and opponents' secrecy, to understand intent and provide warning. The 9/11 attacks reversed the downward trend of resources provided to the Intelligence Community over the last decade. While the United States continued to field technical intelligence assets, in a sense the Intelligence Community—due to the reduction in ranks, personnel retirement, and inability to hire replacements—lost a generation of trained intelligence analysts in the 1990s. The increase in resources since 2001 has improved the Intelligence Community's capability for the war against terrorism. However, as the **9/11 Commission Report** affirmed, while technical means are critical, the creation of a new generation of intelligence analysts focused on the emerging threats remains the critical component for victory.

Editor's Note: The complete 9/11 Commission Report can be found at <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911>.



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3. Boehlert, Eric, *Bush's 9/11 Cover-up?*, *Salon* (online edition), 18 June 2003, 1.
4. Kuhn, 1-2 and Schorr, 1.
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12. Ben Yagoda, *The 9/11 Commission Report: How a Government Committee Made a Piece of Literature*, MSNBC Online, 8 November 2004, 3-4.
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15. Yagoda, pages 3-4.

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Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL): Meeting the Information Needs of an “Army at War”

The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) is a dynamic organization that has, like all other organizations, undergone many transformations since the events of 11 September 2001. However, we have not transformed for transformation's sake. CALL—which was founded 20 years ago—has expanded its purpose from simply capturing tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) at the National Training Centers to serving as the Army's agent for change by connecting the Army's senior leadership and soldiers with the realities of conducting “Army business” on the battlefield.

Since our inception, CALL has become many things to many echelons. To squad leaders and company commanders we are a source of information and education by offering direct insight from a peer in another division on what TTPs worked in Iraq or Afghanistan and what TTP did not. To the Army's senior leaders we help identify and prioritize the challenges and issues facing our soldiers in combat so they can work to fix them. We are rapidly extending this zone of influence further into the Joint, interagency, and multinational (JIM) communities by expanding our coverage of operational and strategic issues.

We do these things by capturing what is going well and what needs improvement within our units and forward-deployed headquarters by deploying collection and analysis teams (CAATs) into theater, by embedding personnel in select headquarters, and by receiving and reviewing the after-action reports (AARs) of deployed units. This data is referred to as “OIL”, or observations, insights, and lessons. NOTE: The term is “lessons” not “lessons learned.” A lesson does not become a lesson learned until the issue surrounding the OIL is resolved (e.g., the problem gets fixed or the behavior in the field changes).

For this reason, CALL has worked to enhance its dissemination tools (the CALL website is one example) and has increased our direct interaction with the branch proponents (in the case of military intelligence, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca). In special cases requiring immediate actions we can also assist by elevating a critical issue through the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command headquarters to the Department of the Army Staff for resolution.

CALL has also improved the user-friendliness of its website by removing many of the administrative control measures (e.g., extra passwords) that frustrated users in the past. By integrating our security measures with “Army Knowledge Online,” one can now log onto the Department of Defense user's portion of the CALL website using your AKO userid and password. In addition, we have increased the number of personnel that support our Request for Information (RFI) Program. These personnel, most of whom are retired military officers who hold advanced degrees in computer technologies, will conduct searches on your behalf and forward you the results via the Nonclassified or Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET or SIPRNET, respectively). To request RFI support, all one must do is click on the link that says “Request for Information” and fill out the RFI form. As a “green-suiter” with first-hand knowledge, I can testify that these civilians give the same professional attention to RFIs no matter who submits them.

Last, CALL has enhanced its SIPRNET presence immensely in the last couple of years. This increase in capability has greatly improved our ability to interact with forward-deployed units and disseminate information unsuitable for the NIPRNET as well as reduced the amount of time required to get information we gathered to our customers.

To get started, please visit our websites via the links provided below.

- NIPRNET Site: <https://call.army.mil>.
- SIPRNET Site: <http://call.army.smil.mil>.

*For additional information, please contact Major David R. King, **Intelligence Representative, CALL DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel and Facilities) Team**, via E-mail at david.king4@us.army.mil or telephonically at (913) 684-7380 or DSN 552-7380.*



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