MIPB

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Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin

January - March 2012

Language & Cultural Competency

FROM THE EDITOR

In 2007 Army leadership directed the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) G3 to serve as the executive agent in developing a service-wide solution for career continuum and pre-deployment learning about foreign cultures and languages. The Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy (ACFLS) was the response. First published in December 2009, it is now being implemented as an enterprise of culture and foreign language advisors (CFLAs) and training developers positioned in many TRADOC "schoolhouses" and other training institutions to provide education in culture and language. Its evolution as a program and future efforts are detailed in the first article.

This issue is devoted to the topics of language and cultural competency. A majority of the articles are from CFLAs discussing such topics as cultural relativism, ethnography and culture training. Two articles discuss patron-client relations and possible applications in Afghanistan. Another article discusses the stand up of AFRICOM from an African perspective. A second article takes a look at operational culture training for the French military in Africa.

Throughout 2012, the MI community (USAICoE, INSCOM, DA G2, and FORSCOM) will be commemorating the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the MI Branch and the 25th anniversary of the MI Corps. Activities are planned to educate as well as build professional interest in the history and heritage of Army Intelligence starting with the American Revolution through experiences and events throughout the year.

MIPB is proud to participate in this celebration by publishing a July September 2012 50th anniversary commemorative issue in collaboration with Lori Tagg, USAICoE Command Historian and Michael Bigelow, INSCOM Command Historian.

April June 2012	S: 30 May 2012
July September 2012	Commemorative Issue MI Branch
October December 2012	S: 30 August 2012

Sterilla A. Smith
Editor

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Purpose: The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) publishes the **Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin** (**MIPB**) quarterly under the provisions of **AR 25-30**. **MIPB** presents information designed to keep intelligence professionals informed of current and emerging developments within the field and provides an open forum in which ideas; concepts; tactics, techniques, and procedures; historical perspectives; problems and solutions, etc., can be exchanged and discussed for purposes of professional development.

Disclaimer: Views expressed are those of the authors and not those of the Department of Defense or its elements.The contents do not necessarily reflect official U.S. Army positions and do not change or supersede information in any other U.S. Army publications.

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

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ALWAYS OUT FRONT

by Major General Gregg C. Potter
Commanding General
U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence

Leading the MI Force of 2020

Engaging Your Subordinates–Coaching, Teaching, and Mentoring

As we move to the Army of 2020, we in the MI Corps must more effectively coach, teach and mentor our Soldiers and leaders. I often hear about the lack of mentors and professional development within the MI Corps. General Cone, Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, surfaced a similar Army-wide concern during the recent Maneuver Warfighter Symposium. So I challenge everyone across our branch to help address this shortfall; every leader is a teacher and coach as well as a potential mentor to a subordinate. Engaging your subordinates in face to face dialogue, in order to professionally develop them is vital and applies to all of you: officers, warrant officers, NCOs, junior enlisted, and Army civilians.

Throughout history, mentorship has contributed to the development of some of the most influential American military leaders. General Marshall studied under Pershing, Eisenhower under MacArthur, and MacArthur under his own father. Today, leaders continue to help talented young leaders realize their full potential. In my current position I take considerable effort and pleasure in engaging our young leaders on their future and the future of MI. A few minutes of your time means the world to someone struggling with self-improvement, professional development, or a career decision.

We often use counseling, professional development and mentoring interchangeably. I believe a mentor is a leader, usually outside the chain of command, who has an informal relationship with a subordinate for the purpose of professional development. I believe mentorship is a critical part of a leader's development. It is one way we prepare leaders for the uncertainties of combat and the complexities of positions of higher authority. Mentorship improves our profession and strengthens our competitive edge. It is more than charting a career path; it helps strengthen competence, values, and our ethos.

Army Field Manual 6-22, Army Leadership, is a sound doctrinal publication that addresses mentors and mentorship. I encourage everyone to read Chapter 8. The manual places the responsibility for finding a mentor on the subordinate's shoulders. However, mentorship really starts with leaders engaging and communicating with their subordinates. While the relationship can vary from informal advice through a very structured relationship, mentorship is about honest two-way communication. Leaders must know the desires, strengths and weaknesses of subordinates. The goal is to provide everyone the advice they need, even if it is not always what they want to hear. Everyone deserves an opportunity to reach their full potential. Leaders should seek opportunities to mentor subordinates.

While everyone deserves the opportunity to have a mentor, not everyone will have a formal and long-term mentor relationship. The mentoring relationship can be intensely personal; therefore, it must be built on mutual trust. Young leaders need our help in discovering the various roadmaps to success. Your time and sincerity is essential to building a strong mentoring relationship

We all must continually strive to improve our coaching, teaching, and mentoring of our subordinates. It all begins with knowing your subordinates and face to face dialogue. Mentorship is not about replicating your own success; it is a two-way exchange involving a balance of tact, candor, and respect.

The Army's culture is one of selfless service, and young leaders deserve our help. We must perpetuate professionalism and excellence within the intelligence community. As leaders, one of the most important aspects of what we do is to help others realize their own potential and support their long-term success. If we call ourselves professionals, we must take an interest in those we serve. Please take the time to reach out and become involved with your subordinates—be a teacher, coach, and a mentor.

Always Out Front!



by Sterilla A. Smith

Introduction

ALC 2015 affirms the "requirement for Soldiers to possess a broad foundation of learning to better prepare them to meet future challenges across the spectrum of conflict." [1] Two of these challenges are culture and language:

> ***"The Army operates with and among other cultures, engaging adaptive enemies where indigenous populations, varying cultures, divergent politics, and wholly different religions intersect. This requires developing Soldiers who understand that the context of the problem matters and that their understanding of the non-military world of foreign societies and cultures be broadened. Soldiers and leaders need to learn general cultural skills that may be applied to any environment as well as just-in-time information that is specific to their area of operations. The Army culture and foreign language strategy requires both career development and predeployment training to achieve the culture and foreign language capabilities necessary to conduct full-spectrum operations." [2]***

To achieve this leaders and Soldiers must increase their expertise through operational experience, self-development, or as a learning opportunity through professional military education (PME).

Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy

In 2007 Army leadership directed the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) G3 to serve as the executive agent in developing a service-wide solution for career continuum and pre-deployment learning about foreign cultures and languages. The Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy (ACFLS) was the response. First published in December 2009, it is now being implemented as an enterprise of culture and foreign language advisors (CFLAs) positioned in many TRADOC "schoolhouses" and other training institutions to provide education in culture and language.

These advisors, drawn from academia (and often having Human Terrain System experience), in collaboration with the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) and the TRADOC Culture Center (TCC), are assisting the Combined Arms Center (CAC) leadership with integrating culture and foreign language training into existing PME courses. The desired end state is to "build and sustain an Army with the right blend of culture and foreign language capabilities to facilitate full spectrum operations, now and into the future." [3] The ACFLS goal is to establish a baseline of CFL capabilities for all leaders and Soldiers to support the accomplishment of unit missions. The strategy's end state is to build and sustain an Army with the right blend of capabilities to facilitate full spectrum operations. The resulting force will have the ability to effectively conduct operations with and among other cultures.

CAC, at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, was assigned the lead to implement the ACFLS in 2011 within all TRADOC organizations. As part of this implementation, CAC is working to integrate ACFLS learning objectives into existing programs of instruction (POIs) using assets (CFLAs and training developers) at the Centers of Excellence (CoEs) and other Army educational institutions using the basic collaborative schema:

- TCC and DLIFLC develop standardized core 3C lesson plans.
- Core lesson plans are provided to Initial Military Training (IMT) Command/Cadet Command/CoEs/Command and General Staff College/U.S.

Army War College/U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy for integration into applicable POI by cohort or other appropriate applications.

- CFLAs/training developers at CoEs and schools further refine resource and curriculum requirements based on specific branch/military occupational specialty.
- The CFL Management Office (CFLMO) provides quality assurance/quality control for integrated plans to ensure standardization and synchronization.
- The Army Research Institute (ARI) and the Culture Knowledge Consortium (CKC) assist in the implementation of the enterprise (below) with research and as a resource for materials and analytic tools as well as access to and collaboration with others of similar interests.



Figure 1. ACFL Enterprise.

Coordination of the ACFLS implementation is being accomplished through the Army Learning Coordination Council's (ALCC) three-tier process. The Army Senior CFLA, Dr. Mahir Ibrahimov, is serving as the co-chair of the ALCC Soldier *Competency Panel 3: Cultural and JIIM Competence*. This panel is made up of ACFL and joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) subject matter experts from TRADOC schools, centers, and colleges. Panel objectives include:

- Ensuring that ACFL learning outcomes are progressive and sequential along each continuum.
- Monitoring alignment of PME courses' terminal learning objectives with the ACFL learning outcomes endorsed by the ALCC.
- Identifying and resolving gaps or redundancies in ACFL training along the career continuums as well as within the operating force.
- Ensuring that learning outcomes are assessed and reported through the ALCC Working Group to commandants and commanders sitting on the ALCC.

Underlying Concepts

The life-long curriculum is focused on two concepts–cross cultural competence (3C) and regional competence, aimed at preparing Soldiers to operate in JIIM environments.



Figure 2. Career Development - Lifelong Learning Strategy.

3C is the set of knowledge, skills, and attributes that enables Soldiers to adapt effectively in any environment. It can develop over time through experience, but can be accelerated by principled learning methods. Other aspects of 3C are:

- Provides awareness of culture and of one's own cultural context, general cross-cultural schema and culture-analytic models, and an increasingly complex understanding of the impact of culture on military planning and operation (Knowledge).
- Critical aspects of 3C are interpersonal and communication skills, flexibility in seeing different cultural frames and perspectives, and the ability to regulate one's own reactions (Skills).
- Necessary characteristics for 3C are non-ethnocentric attitudes, motivation to learn about culture, accepting and internalizing new information as it is encountered, and the ability to empathize (Attributes).

Regional competence is the set of knowledge, skills, and attributes related to a particular country, region, organization, or social group, which enables effective adaptation to that specific culture. Specifics are:

- Awareness of the historical, political, cultural (including linguistic and religious aspects), sociological (including demographic), economic, and geographic dimensions of a foreign country, global region, or other specific culture.
- Ability to adopt perspectives common to a culture; ability to regulate one's own behavior, communications, and emotional expression to match cultural norms where appropriate. Includes positive attitudes toward a population and motivation to learn about the culture, to include how decisions are made within that culture.

In tandem with 3C, regional competence enables negotiation and persuasion; mediation and conflict resolution; leadership and influence; cultural evaluation; synthesis, and predictive analysis during staff planning and other abilities that pertain to a specific geographic area or area of operations.

3C Learning Objectives

Cross cultural training and education are built on the foundation of an individual's existing leader attributes (Character, Presence, and Intellect), which in turn reinforce the core leader competencies of lead-

ing others, developing oneself, and achieving results.[4] Across the enterprise, the development of cultural awareness/understanding will be the principal objective and introduction to a foreign language (basic phrases and elemental proficiency) will be a supporting effort.[5]

In order to build and sustain an Army with the right blend of CFL capabilities to facilitate full spectrum operations, existing PME programs, organizational and functional training, and continuous lifelong learning must be leveraged to attain a level of understanding and expertise.

Taking a descriptive path for implementation, CAC and CoEs/Schools will incorporate the following learning outcomes in their education and training programs with terminal or enabling objectives and assessments that can clearly be tracked back to sequential and progressive outcomes:

- *Character.* Demonstrate interaction and cross cultural communications skills in order to effectively engage and understand people and their environment. In order to achieve this outcome an individual must demonstrate a level of cultural awareness that includes a positive openness to other people and understanding of prevailing values, beliefs, behaviors and customs, and a desire to learn more about cultures and language. This includes an introduction to a language that supports current military operations with the intent to promote additional study through self-development at the institution, home station, or at university.
- *Presence.* Demonstrate communication, influence, and negotiation skills essential for leaders to effectively operate in a JIIM environment. Leverage the knowledge gained by challenging students to employ skills to deal with ambiguous and complex situations, to regulate one's own behavior, and to use interpersonal abilities to deal with people from one's own or other cultures. This includes an understanding and ability to engage other joint and allied military personnel, and host country leaders with a moderate level of confidence.
- *Intellect.* Demonstrate a familiarization with a geographic region of current operational significance. In order to achieve this outcome an individual must be able to leverage critical thinking and cognitive skills through organizing information that supports cultural self-awareness. Depending on level of leader development PME, the Soldier will expand 3C skills by gaining an awareness or understanding of a geographic area that highlights the implications of a region's economic, religious, legal, governmental, political and infrastructural features, and of sensitivities regarding gender, race, ethnicity, local observances and local perception of the U.S. and its allies.

The student will learn to apply relevant planning considerations, terms, factors, concepts and geographic information to mission planning and the conduct of operations. Course development must be nested within the imperatives of Army Learning Concept 2015 and the Army Leader Development Strategy (2009). This includes leveraging other TRADOC and Department of Defense schools, partnerships with universities and academia, gaming technology, and opportunities that stress students' ability to concisely and persuasively speak and write, engage in discussions, and employ cognitive reasoning and thinking skills.

Instructional Methods

Due to the nature of the subject matter, a blended approach to training is preferred, as recommended in the Army Learning Concept 2015. CoE instructors will use a variety of learning-enabled training, educa-

Learning Objectives and Tasks

Learning Objective 1 (Character). Demonstrate interaction and cross-cultural communications skills in order to effectively engage and understand people and their environment.

- Understand one's self; internalize the Army Values, our Professional Military Ethic and Warrior Ethos.
- Assess cultural perspectives and values different from one's own; compare differences and sensitivities in order to modify one's behavior, practices and language; and operate in a multi-cultural environment.
- Apply cross-cultural communication skills.

Learning Objective 2 (Presence). Demonstrate communication, influence and negotiation skills essential for leaders to effectively operate in a JIIM environment.

- Develop communication skills that enable effective cross-cultural persuasion, negotiation, conflict resolution or influence.
- Apply communications skills during cross-cultural negotiations.
- Develop confidence in learning and applying language skills.

Learning Objective 3 (Intellect). Demonstrate a familiarization in a geographic region of current operational significance.

- Apply culturally relevant terms, factors, concepts and regional information in the development of mission plans and orders.
- Assess and describe the effect that culture has on military operations specific to countries or regions of operational significance to the U.S.

tion and self-development techniques to teach students attending IMT and PME courses. Cultural instruction may be programmed, integrated into other training objectives, or as reinforcement through the use of self-paced learning tools or as research for presentations and writing requirements. Teaching methods may include:

- ***Facilitated instruction.*** Classroom instruction based on instructor-led discussions and facilitated problem-centered exercises to assist the student in understanding basic cultural awareness and challenging students through use of relevant scenarios that they may encounter in their unit and/or during a deployment. Facilitated learning focuses on initiative, critical thinking, and accountability for actions. Small group instructors will receive cultural training assistance from the CoE CFLA to enable them to better present information, lead discussions, and facilitate the problem-centered exercises. The instruction will be augmented by professional reading requirements, self-paced technology delivered instruction, and research outside the classroom.
- ***Web-enabled instruction, simulations, and gaming.*** The U.S. Army Intelligence CoE, Marine Corps University, DLIFLC, and Near East and South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, and others all have a variety of online instructional material that is available for instructor use. As other culture and foreign language AVATAR and interactive simulation programs become available, they will be evaluated and leveraged as educational tools to augment classroom, independent study instruction, and self-development opportunities.
- ***Role-playing and key leader engagement scenarios.*** Instructors will leverage the knowledge gained by challenging students to employ their interpersonal skills as part of in-class role-playing practical exercises and formal key leader engagement (KLE) scenarios. The scenarios will require an individual(s) to use an interpreter to engage other coalition military/police members and host country leaders in order to address a particular problem. Ideally, this engagement should use mock-up facilities and capstone field exercises to reinforce the learning objectives and provide each student with feedback through an after action review. Both role-playing exercises and the KLEs will result in constructive feedback to the individual.
- ***Academic lectures and seminar panels.*** Outside speakers and panels bring broader perspectives and expertise into the institution. They are crucial to a balanced education and training approach to expand on concepts and provide an alternative to institutional instruction and facilitation.
- ***Leveraging international student populations***. Where appropriate, students will receive country and cultural briefs from international students and assigned liaison officers during the resident courses. Programs, such as "*Know Your World*" assist students in better understanding the culture

and geopolitical significance of the country from where their classmates come from and further expand the student's awareness of other cultures.

- ***Analytical writing.*** To develop critical thinking and improve written communication capabilities in our leaders analytical papers should be required as part of the assessment of students. Papers should address a cultural or geopolitical topic of military operational significance to the U.S.
- ***Professional reading program.*** A critical component of our leadership development and cultural awareness efforts includes a professional reading program. All students are encouraged to read one of three books based on their follow-on assignments: *The History of the Modern Middle East* by William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton; *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia* by Ahmed Rashid; or *China, Japan, Korea: Culture and Customs* by Ju Brown and John Brown.
- ***Foreign language.*** The goal of the culture and foreign language program is to introduce culture and foreign language to students attending PME instruction and to give them the opportunity to achieve an elemental language proficiency (Level 0+, memorized proficiency) in a language of military operational significance. All PME students are issued and/or provided basic instruction on the use of *Headstart2* or multi-platform tactical language software programs. DLIFLC also provides a website to facilitate the language training and sustainment proficiency at www.dlifc.edu/index.html.

Culture and Foreign Language Resource Centers are established in some CoE Libraries. Students are provided access to computers, cultural resources, and professional reading material to facilitate research, learning, and language proficiency.

The CFLP website (currently in development) will contain cultural awareness and foreign language resources, DLIFLC resources, information on past lectures, foreign languages guides, and other significant links. The website is available for viewing at http://www.culturalknowledge.org/acfl/.

Cultural Training, Stages 1 through 3

This section links training methods to learning objectives (Character, Presence, and Intellect) and associated tasks as taught in institutional courses at the Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. The learning objectives and tasks with linked training methods were developed by Dr. Mahir Ibrahimov, then Fires CoE CFLA (2009-2011) and now serving as the Army Senior CFLA at Fort Leavenworth.

Branch Captains Career Course. The desired outcome is for branch captains to demonstrate an understanding of culture, how to leverage that knowledge in a JIIM environment, and with a level of competence necessary to serve as staff officers and leaders within a complex environment.

Learning Objective 1 - Character	Learning Objective 2 - Presence	Learning Objective 3 - Intellect
Field Artillery Captains Career Course		
Assess cultural perspectives and values different from one's own; compare differences and sensitivities in order to modify one's behavior, practices and language, and operate in a multi-cultural environment • Cross-cultural skills building (P) • Cultural influence and military operations (P) • International Student Division briefs "Know Your World" (2 hours) (P) **Apply cross-cultural communication skills** • Army 360 Cultural Trainer (SP) (R)	**Develop communication skills that enable effective cross-cultural persuasion, negotiation, conflict resolution or influence** • Oklahoma University media training (P) • Cross-cultural negotiations (P) **Apply communications skills during cross-cultural negotiations** • Role-playing exercises (P) • Key leader engagement exercise (1 hour) (P) **Develop confidence in learning and applying language skills** • Introduction to a language through HEADSTART2 software (SP) (R) • Additional language training (optional) (PD)	**Apply culturally relevant terms, factors, concepts and regional information in the development of mission plans and orders** • Insurgency overview and theory (I) • Pattern and social network analysis and practical exercise (8 hours) (I) • Counterinsurgency intelligence preparation of the battlefield and planning (I) **Assess and describe the effect that culture has on military operations specific to countries or regions of operational significance to the United States** • Strength, weakness, opportunities and threat analysis country brief (P) • Writing requirement: Analytical paper of 3-5 pages (Approximately 10 hours of research) (R) • Analytical paper presentation/discussion (2 hours per section) (P) • FCoE CFLP lecture series (P) • Professional reading program (One book from recommended reading list – optional) (PD)
Legend: (P) programmed, (R/I) reinforced/integrated, (PD) professional development, (SP) self paced		

Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC-B). The desired outcome is for lieutenants to demonstrate a basic awareness of culture, how to leverage that knowledge in a JIIM environment, and with a level of competence necessary to serve as company fire support officers and leaders within a complex environment.

Learning Objective 1 - Character	Learning Objective 2 - Presence	Learning Objective 3 - Intellect
Basic Officer Leader Course B		
Assess cultural perspectives and values different from one's own; compare differences and sensitivities in order to modify one's behavior, practices and language, and operate in a multi-cultural environment • Operate in a multi-cultural environment (P) • International Student Division briefs "Know Your World" (P) **Apply cross-cultural communication skills** • Army 360 Cultural Trainer (SP) (R)	**Develop communication skills that enable effective cross-cultural persuasion, negotiation, conflict resolution or influence** • Operate in a multi-cultural environment (P) **Apply communications skills during cross-cultural negotiations** • Key leader engagement during BOLC B fire support/maneuver lanes (R) **Develop confidence in learning and applying language skills** • Introduction to a language through HEADTSTART2 software (SP) (R) • Additional language training (optional) (PD)	**Apply culturally relevant terms, factors, concepts and regional information in the development of mission plans and orders** • Information Operations instruction (I) • Company Intelligence Support Team training (I) **Assess and describe the effect that culture has on military operations specific to countries or regions of operational significance to the United States** • Writing requirement: Analytical paper of 3-5 pages (Approximately 10 hours of research) (R) • Analytical paper presentation/discussion (P) • FCoE CFLP lecture series (P) • Professional reading program (One book from recommended reading list – optional) (PD)
Legend: (P) programmed, (R/I) reinforced/integrated, (PD) professional development, (SP) self paced		

Warrant Officer Advanced Course (WOAC). The desired outcome is for junior warrant officers to demonstrate a basic awareness of culture, and how to leverage that knowledge as brigade combat team/division targeting officer.

Learning Objective 1 - Character	Learning Objective 2 - Presence	Learning Objective 3 - Intellect
Field Artillery Warrant Officer Advanced Course		
Assess cultural perspectives and values different from one's own; compare differences and sensitivities in order to modify one's behavior, practices and language, and operate in a multi-cultural environment • Cultural awareness (P) • Cross-cultural factors and considerations (P) • Cultural influence and military operations (P) **Apply cross-cultural communication skills** • Army 360 Cultural Trainer (SP) (R)	**Develop communication skills that enable effective cross-cultural persuasion, negotiation, conflict resolution or influence** • Cross-cultural factors and considerations during negotiations (P) **Apply communications skills during cross-cultural negotiations** • Role-playing exercises (P)	**Apply culturally relevant terms, factors, concepts and regional information in the development of mission plans and orders** • Intelligence preparation of the battlefield and indirect Fires threat intelligence (I) • Counterinsurgency seminar (I) **Assess and describe the effect that culture has on military operations specific to countries or regions of operational significance to the United States** • Writing requirement: Analytical paper of 3-5 pages (Approximately 10 hours of research) (R) • Analytical paper presentation/discussion (P) • FCoE CFLP lecture series (P) • Professional reading program (One book from recommended reading list – optional) (PD)
Legend: (P) programmed, (R/I) reinforced/integrated, (PD) professional development, (SP) self paced		

Warrant Officer Basic Course (WOBC). The desired outcome is for senior warrant officers to demonstrate a basic understanding of foreign culture, and how to leverage that knowledge as a Corps/Theater targeting officer.

Learning Objective 1 - Character	Learning Objective 2 - Presence	Learning Objective 3 - Intellect
Field Artillery Warrant Officer Basic Course		
Assess cultural perspectives and values different from one's own; compare differences and sensitivities in order to modify one's behavior, practices and language, and operate in a multi-cultural environment • Cultural awareness (P) • Cross-cultural factors and considerations (P) • Cultural influence and military operations (P) **Apply cross-cultural communication skills** • Army 360 Cultural Trainer (SP) (R)	**Develop communication skills that enable effective cross-cultural persuasion, negotiation, conflict resolution or influence** • Cross-cultural factors and considerations during negotiations (P) **Develop confidence in learning and applying language skills** • Introduction to a language through HEADSTART2 software (SP) (R) • Additional language training (optional) (PD)	**Apply culturally relevant terms, factors, concepts and regional information in the development of mission plans and orders** • Intelligence preparation of the battlefield and indirect Fires threat intelligence (I) • Pattern analysis and simulation exercise (I) • Counterinsurgency seminar (I) **Assess and describe the effect that culture has on military operations specific to countries or regions of operational significance to the United States** • Writing requirement: Analytical paper of 3-5 pages (Approximately 10 hours of research) (R) • Analytical paper presentation/discussion (2 hours per section) (P) • FCoE CFLP lecture series (P) • Professional reading program (One book from recommended reading list – optional) (PD)
Legend: (P) programmed, (R/I) reinforced/integrated, (PD) professional development, (SP) self paced		

Noncommissioned Officer Academy. The desired outcome for senior NCOs attending the Senior Leader Course (SLC) is to demonstrate a basic understanding of foreign culture and how to leverage that knowledge as a platoon sergeant and/or first sergeant. The desired outcome for mid-grade NCOs attending the Advanced Leader Course (ALC) is to demonstrate a basic understanding of culture and how to leverage that knowledge as a senior section sergeant and/or platoon sergeant. The instruction is offered through a blended learning approach (programmed instruction, seminars, and independent study).

Learning Objective 1 - Character	Learning Objective 2 - Presence	Learning Objective 3 - Intellect
13B, 13D, 13F, 13M, 13P, 13R, 13T Senior Leader's Course and Advanced Leader's Course		
Assess cultural perspectives and values different from one's own; compare differences and sensitivities in order to modify one's behavior, practices and language, and operate in a multi-cultural environment • Cross-cultural factors and considerations (P) **Apply cross-cultural communication skills** • Army 360 Cultural Trainer (SP) (R)	**Develop communication skills that enable effective cross-cultural persuasion, negotiation, conflict resolution or influence** • Demonstration on use of tactical language software (Two phrases weekly) (P)	**Assess and describe the effect that culture has on military operations specific to countries or regions of operational significance to the United States** • Writing requirement: Analytical paper of 3-5 pages (Approximately 10 hours of research) (R) • FCoE CFLP lecture series (P)
Legend: (P) programmed, (R/I) reinforced/integrated, (PD) professional development, (SP) self paced		

Advanced Individual Training (AIT). The desired outcome is for Soldiers to internalize the Army Values and Warrior Ethos, live by our Professional Military Ethic and display empathy towards others.

Learning Objective 1 - Character	Learning Objective 2 - Presence	Learning Objective 3 - Intellect
13B, 13D, 13F, 13M, 13P, 13R, 13T Advanced Individual Training		
Understand one's self; internalize the Army Values, our professional military ethic and Warrior Ethos • Army Core Values (P) • U.S. Army Field Artillery history and museum tour (R) • Command team in-brief (1 hour) (I) • Initial, mid-course and final counselling (I)		
Legend: (P) programmed, (R/I) reinforced/integrated, (PD) professional development, (SP) self paced		

Intermediate Level Education (ILE)

DLIFLC will continue to support the Army's Command and General Staff School (CGSS) with both predeployment language familiarization training and professional development language education.

Operational language training: All U.S. Army officers whose assignments following graduation result in deployment in support of OIF/OND/OEF have been required since 2006 to take language electives in either Iraqi Dialect or Dari, as appropriate. Enrollment is open to all other students on a space available basis, with priority for spaces to deploying U.S. Army officers. These are 48 hour courses, taught by DLIFLC instructors during the normal CGSS elective terms.

Strategic language training: In support of the ACFLS, U.S. officers interested in building a foundation for lifelong learning of selected languages may take 48 or 72 hours of beginning instruction in Chinese, French, Modern Standard Arabic, or Spanish. These courses are taught by DLIFLC instructors, they begin during AOC and continue through the elective terms. Additionally, students who already possess proficiency in one of these languages may take directed study electives, earning up to three elective credits. Students with existing proficiency in a language not taught in CGSS may be able to earn elective credit for directed study via distance learning, using DLIFLC instructors located in Monterey, California, or elsewhere.

Self-Study: Officers desiring to pursue self-study of a foreign language may receive one elective credit by utilizing DLI's Headstart2 online language programs, currently available in 16 languages with more added annually.

DLIFLC continues to develop options for CGSS students (as well as faculty) to maintain and improve their existing capabilities, whether through advanced level resident instruction in the above-mentioned languages or through web-based and distance learning means such as the Global Language Online Support System (GLOSS) learning objects and the Broadband Language Training System (BLTS) for other languages which are not offered in residence.

ILE courseware for all venues will ensure that they contain, at minimum, learning objectives that support the following proficiency matrix:

	Major	Lieutenant Colonel
Training	Competent coordinator and collaborator across JIIM organizations. Elementary language proficiency; can initiate and maintain conversation.	Competent in coordinating across JIIM entities at the national strategic level. Elementary language proficiency; can initiate and maintain conversation.
Education	Displays judgment and agility in planning tactical operations in JIIM context.	Displays judgment and innovation in application of design principles to operational art in JIIM context Develops and maintains insight regarding geo-political environment.
Experience	Demonstrates mastery of FSO and ability to leverage JIIM capabilities to achieve operational objectives	Confident operating in a JIIM environment.
Desired End-state	Confident of cultural, language and information skills. Competent coordinator and collaborator across JIIM organizations. Elementary language proficiency; can initiate and maintain conversation.	Expert at applying culture, language and information. Capable to serve in a JIIM capacity on a TT, S-TT, IA, Joint or Multi-National Staff. Competent in coordinating across JIIM entities at the national strategic level. Elementary language proficiency; can initiate and maintain conversation.

USAWC and Culture: PME and JPME II Implementation, Stage 4

The U.S. Army War College (USAWC) defines cultural competency as the ability to understand culture as an analytical framework to facilitate strategic thinking, policy formation, and decision making. As such, it goes beyond a combination of country, region, or language specific knowledge.

The College is governed by the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP). The curriculum contains over 130 Joint PME II core contact hours that address cultural topics. Over 93 hours of material pertaining to culture are contained in both the core curriculum and the Strategic Decision Making Exercise. The USAWC also provides over 30 hours of cultural material in the Regional Studies Electives and more than 600 curricular elective hours contain cultural content.

The USAWC created the Analytical Cultural Framework for Strategy and Policy to fulfill OPMEP requirements and deliberately designed it for the strategic level. It addresses those questions (of culture) that policy and strategy makers need to wrestle with. It is, however, adaptable to the operational and tactical levels, which allows a seamless conceptual understanding of culture as a concept across all four stages of development. USAWC will assist CAC by guiding development of this approach across the ACFL Enterprise to support training of cultural competence and the development of cultural abilities.

Pre-deployment Training

CFL standards for pre-deployment training (PDT) have been delineated for both Iraq and Afghanistan. CFL PDT resourcing has been provided to DLIFLC and executed through its MTTs, LTDs, and via online CFL training programs (Rapport, Headstart2). Additional training to provide cultural enhancement to deploying units is also provided by Cultural MTTs through the TCC.



In the face of future Army wide resourcing challenges starting in fiscal year (FY) 2012 (and beyond), PDT efforts will be focused on providing the most efficient and cost effective means to meet DA directed PDT standards and to assist FORSCOM in the identification and resourcing of PDT for future Regionally Aligned Brigades (RABs). These are U.S. Army units tasked to train and mentor partner nation security forces in support of U.S. National Security Strategy.

The first RAB is scheduled for alignment to AFRICOM in FY 2013. The CAC CFLMO is assisting in determining the required language proficiency requirements for the RAB Soldiers/leaders to function within their cultural operational environment and for the RAB to attain full spectrum operations competency. The resources required will also be coordinated with DLIFLC and TCC to provide RAB PDT via their MTT/LTD capabilities and through the online Rapport/Headstart2 training programs.

"What is culture? Soviet culture, Western culture, Iraqi culture, Afghan culture, military culture, corporate culture, generational culture... Becoming aware of cultural dynamics is a difficult task because culture is based on experiences, values, behaviors, beliefs and norms, as well as collective memories and history".
–Mahir Ibrahimov

No culture can live if it attempts to be exclusive.
–Mahatma Gandhi

Endnotes

1. *The U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2015*, 20 January 2011, 8.

2. Ibid., 11.

3. *Army Posture Statement*, 2011.

4. *U.S. Army Leader development Strategy*, 25 November 2011, 8.

5. For definitions of the sequential and progressive cultural competency levels see the *Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy*, 1 December 2009.

Cultural Relativism and the Convergence of Ethnography and 3C

by Robert Greene Sands, PhD

The opinions and beliefs expressed in this essay are solely those of the author and do not reflect those of the DoD.

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Introduction

One of the primary components of culture learning in the Department of Defense (DoD) has been identified as cross-cultural competence (3C). 3C is the ability "…to adapt effectively in cross-cultural environments," which includes the ability to express or interpret ideas/concepts across cultures, and make sense of foreign culture behavior.[1] The concept and application of 3C was embraced by DoD expeditionary organizations and became part of the Services' training programs. Professional military education programs are initiating a sequenced approach to developing 3C over the educational lifecycles of military personnel.[2] 3C has also been promoted as critical to DoD civilians who deploy in support of military operations, but who as yet do not have an institutionalized educational/training program integrating 3C.

3C is an anchor for initiating and sustaining cross-cultural relationships and promoting enduring partnerships from the individual to organizations benefiting a wide array of DoD populations such as General Purpose Forces, Special Operations Forces, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and more. Through research, education and training programs and development of policy, defining the foundational competencies of 3C has become an important part of a larger solution for developing cultural capabilities in our deploying forces whose destinations today, and in the future, are unpredictable. A set of baseline competencies forms the foundation of 3C to be engaged through cognitive understanding of their utility and application of these competencies through continual modeling and experience.[3] Competencies making up this baseline are acquiring and applying cultural knowledge, cultural self-awareness, alternative perspective taking, and learning to observe.

Ethnography and Cultural Relativism

Here, I argue that *ethnography*, the anthropological (and other social sciences) research method, as a process, offers a model for the establishment of a 3C baseline as an important component for successful cross-cultural interactions inherent in Irregular Warfare (IW) Counterinsurgency (COIN), Building Partnership (BP) and those missions that support each, such as the Security Force Assistance (SFA). Ethnography, literally a description of a people, involves long term in-depth fieldwork among a population and features a variety of sociocultural research methods.[4] Recently, many in anthropology and the social sciences have engaged ethnography as giving "voice" to those marginalized by global economic and political forces and in lands caught up in insurgency and terrorism. Ethnography has also been engaged as a tool to help rapidly assess environmental and human-made crises through data collection utilizing observation of cultural behavior, interviews, identification and use of appropriate data gathering technologies.

It is these elements of ethnography: experientially-based data collection, the ability to decipher "voice" in a culturally-complex environment, and the contemporary use of rapid assessment capability that have similar utility to military and civilian populations engaged in the array of missions consistent with stability operations. Social science research methods, many of which are part of ethnography, have been incorporated in the DoD Human Terrain System program, as social scientists utilize qualitative field methods to elicit relevant sociocultural information to aid on-the-ground leaders in their tactical and operational decision making.

Here, ethnography will be viewed through its historical and contemporary expression of *cultural relativism*, to objectively understand others' behavior in terms of their own cultural framework. Comparisons will be drawn between baseline competencies in what is proposed as 3C and those sociocultural behaviors employed in ethnography. The interpersonal competencies that are critical for the development of 3C are equally important in establishing and sustaining those interpersonal relationships that form the social network that provides data to ethnographers. I propose that an operationally focused *methodological cultural relativism* (MCR) provides necessary skills that lay the framework for successful cross-cultural interactions in stability operations and promotes the ability to discern meaning from socially distinct behavior.[5]

It may be that in developing baseline competencies in a coordinated fashion, MCR will develop as a consequence. However, as will be discussed later, stability operations, to include pressures and risk inherent in conflict and peace-keeping missions depart from ethnography conducted outside the scope of military activity. I suggest that introducing a 3C baseline (as it is both a foundation for 3C and ethnography) will be useful to military and civilian personnel who deploy downrange in stability operations. I take a brief look at how MCR can be developed in education and training programs and how the development of MCR and 3C can continue in an uncertain future of budgetary restrictions and a loss of a sustained need of "immediate" support to recent (Iraq) and current military operations (Afghanistan).

3C and the Baseline

In 2007, the concept of 3C was introduced into DoD research, education and training as a capability that facilitated successful cross-cultural interactions in a variety of unfamiliar and often times complicated social situations and settings.[6] Over the last three years several researchers have investigated the concept and application of 3C to the military and DoD mission. These efforts included further conceptualization of 3C, identification of competencies and knowledge, skills, abilities, and attitudes (KSAAs) important to the development of 3C and promotion of 3C through learning programs.

Symposia were organized that addressed culture in the military. One of the primary goals of these events was identifying 3C's importance in facilitating cross-cultural interactions.[7] The then Defense Language Office (DLO) (now the Defense Language and National Security Education Office (DLNSEO)) convened working groups to examine 3C in definition, properties and components, and application to the readiness of the Total Force and the development of 3C learning goals. Education programs that promoted 3C were developed through U.S. Air Force (USAF) Air University, USAF Special Operations School, Joint Special Operations University, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School while the DLNSEO has and continues to sponsor 3C training through Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI) and a cross-cultural trainer 3CTrainer hosted on Joint Knowledge Online (JKO).

Research certainly has identified sets of competencies that seem to be critical and necessary for 3C development, yet a definitive set of competencies that can be utilized to construct goals and objectives for learning programs are still nascent or lack consensus of the research, education and training DoD culture community.[8] An initial set of baseline competencies is both critical to the development of 3C and important to insert into ongoing learning programs while research defines a more robust model of 3C development for education.

Recent research has identified a number of competencies that promote 3C (Army Research Institute (ARI), DLNSEO). Ongoing research continues in the conceptualization and identification of 3C (DEOMI) as does research into the application of 3C in leadership development (ARI, DEOMI), promoting influence (ARI), potential function/MOS selection (suggested application), mission performance modeling (DLNSEO), and application to diversity (DEOMI) . Commonalities across the research and from efforts of working groups convened by DLNSEO have produced a smaller number of competencies and enablers that seem to lay a foundation of 3C. There are four "baseline" competencies that resonate across research to form the foundation for the successful development of 3C:

- The acquisition and application of general cultural knowledge that promotes enhancement of existing cultural schemas (generalized representations of our existing knowledge) that direct our information processing and includes general principles and concepts of culture.[9]

- ✦ The ability to be culturally self aware of one's own worldview, including beliefs/values and possible biases and behaviors, as well as how these will impact understanding of intercultural situations.
- ✦ The ability to take alternative perspectives based on information about other cultures to aid in understanding others' motivation and feelings, as a part of their environment and culture. This competency, coupled with an enabling attribute, suspension of judgment, is critical to developing an operational cultural relativism.
- ✦ The use of elementary observation skills that will allow understanding and validation of cultural knowledge. These skills can be very beneficial in providing means to update cultural schemas, promoting a more nuanced comprehension necessary for alternative perspective taking, and augmenting the development of interpersonal skills, such as intercultural communication, that will further promote 3C.

Development of baseline competencies provides capability to engage cultural difference and minimize dissonance and bias while building an understanding of that difference through discovery. Creating channels for accessing cultural knowledge, through observation and other ethnographic methods and then being able to apply that knowledge to discern understanding to better help interactions and motivations for behavior is paramount to mission success. The ability to understand one's own cultural beliefs/values and possible biases, as well as how these will impact understanding of intercultural situations is a critical competence. Adopting a willingness and ability to utilize alternative perspectives or frames by using information about other cultures to understand others' motivation for certain behaviors, and others' feelings as a part of their environment and culture can reveal a more nuanced and intimate understanding of those in other cultures. Finally, engaging suspension of judgment that can minimize cognitive biases facilitates alternative perspective taking.

3C, Ethnography, and Cultural Relativism

3C is not a novel or unique set of competencies to past or contemporary military operations. Looking to international business, diplomacy, even academic research reveals the importance of interpersonal skills in promoting success in cross-cultural interactions and relationship building. Pertinent examples include international business, specifically marketing, and working collaborations of non-profits and nongovernmental agencies in the international arena. For academic purposes, 3C was and still is necessary for ethnography. For over 150 years, anthropologists have put themselves in position to learn about different cultures mostly from considering the perspectives of those in that culture. Understanding the cultural calculus of a group of people, their behavior, and how elements of the culture worked in an integrated fashion were and still are the primary goals of the anthropologist.

Putting the anthropologist in a position to succeed in retrieving the necessary knowledge and applying it from the perspective of cultural members as part of the research experience was, in part, the goal of anthropological inquiry first advanced by Franz Boas and Bronislaw Malinowski. Ethnography included several qualitative methods still advanced today, such as participation and observation, informal and formal interviews, surveys, kinship charts, and photographs. Each of those methods required an interactive competence that facilitated a partnership between the anthropologist/ethnographer not only with individuals, but with entire cultural groups, to elicit and interpret gleaned cultural data. This approach to studying human cultures included cultural relativism; the underlying goal was to faithfully and objectively recreate the cultural reality of group members. Early ethnographers saw their approach as a path to understanding behavior; the cultures they studied existed in a natural laboratory of human interactions. Field methods replicated the scientific method and field work, data collection and analysis were seemingly bereft of the influence of the researchers' own cultural lens and subsequent reactions to behavior contrary to their own belief and values system.

Anthropology, like many of the social sciences, has undergone a revolution in the research enterprise over the last half century as cultures have been influenced by a more interconnected global economy and increased need for natural resources. Much contemporary ethnography done in foreign cultural settings seems to focus on the marginalization of indigenous populations as a result of external forces, such as globalization, conflict, or environmental/climate change. Ethnography works to document the interface between global change

and those cultures mostly in marginal or developing regions or countries that are in danger of losing their traditions, customs and livelihood due to instability. Ethnography has also become a tool for rapid response to more urgent humanitarian needs, such as health care and subsistence crises in indigenous or minority groups, usually in conflict-torn or developing countries.[10]

Part of this revolution is also the consideration of the role and impact of the ethnographer in fieldwork, collection and interpretation of the data, and the overall goal of the study. As much as classical ethnographers attempted to portray a cultural reality devoid of interpretation, emotional and personal bias, in the end, it was analysis that was contextualized to fit the colonial-era endeavor of "explore, explain and demystify cultures" foreign to the western world. Contemporary ethnography exists in a social science world bent toward explaining the inequities fostered by globalization, where cultural realities are many and shifting and interpretation of data is based on layers of cultural filters. Social context belies the impact of the global condition on groups marginalized by radical change and prone to reactions of extreme radicalism and insurgency.

Into the interconnected global cultural landscape, the application of 21st century cultural relativism extends to both method and perspective of the *cultural other* ranging from the extremes of adhering to universal human rights to existing behavior as a product of fit and tradition in that cultural system. In this sense, many engage cultural relativism beyond the original utility of straining away the tendencies of humans to apply their own worldviews to dissimilar behavior in order to understand meaning to those that practice that behavior. However, relativism when viewed as a process can reveal much about motivation for behavior and cultural coherency of behavioral patterns.

The tension that exists in ethnography over the use of the ethnographic process and product is of value to understanding and utilizing the competencies essential to promoting effective and meaningful cross-cultural interactions in stability operations. The context of stability operations, from operations to intelligence gathering, demands a competence that can facilitate successful cross-cultural interactions as well as begin to offer insights into understanding patterns of behavior of those involved in interactions. The value of both cross-cultural facilitation and discovery is critical to exploring meaning of behavior which can help to explain motivation.

Making sense of multi-layered and complex social environments in order to understand the swirling patterns of behavior that represent worldviews and belief systems face both ethnographers and deployed military and civilian personnel, especially those populations that interact with other cultures frequently and in meaningful situations with hidden or overt consequences. In other words, the intent of Boas, Malinowski, Margaret Mead, E.E. Evans-Pritchard, and other classical anthropologists who were describing a culture to produce meaning through the frame of that culture is still critical to this competence. What has been advanced through the last century of social science fieldwork as cultural relativism can be a foundation for developing 3C critical for promoting successful navigation of socially complex environments.

Methodological Cultural Relativism

The historical trajectory of ethnography highlights a process that certainly relied on the development of a set of interactional skills that acted to facilitate successful relationships necessary for collecting data while also aiding in understanding behavior through observation and interviewing. The very complex social environment seen in many of the developing regions and countries today includes conflict, post-conflict and stability operations and is very different from the lands and cultures studied by the colonial-era anthropologists. The goal of reconstructing cultural reality has not really changed in ethnography.

However, external and internal forces have created contested spaces both in the physical and cultural landscape and feature contrasting cultural realities of ethnic, tribal and cultural groups with different traditions, customs and heritage. Needing to deconstruct a diverse social landscape featuring marginalized cultural groups; dominant governments who may be incapable or not wanting to meet human security of all its populations; and external forces of change through terrorism, insurgency or economic repression while interacting with all of these groups confronts both ethnographers and military organizations alike. Facilitating successful relationships to extract data that can provide keys to understanding meaningful behavior is the means to get at the many differing cultural realities where stability operations occur.

MCR as a process reflects the articulation and integration of the four baseline competencies and the enabler suspension of judgment. There has been some research done on the sequencing of overall 3C competencies or the development of curricular stages that lead to competency within DoD military and civilian populations, however, recent work has started to explore what 3C should look like in an individual.[11]

Currently, the DLNSEO is sponsoring a study on determining competencies beyond the baseline and sequence of development of 3C competencies that would be useful for 3C learning development.[12] However, it is suggested here that a culture-general approach holds the key to development of MCR including its *baseline* competencies and that introducing cultural knowledge and promoting a cultural self-awareness are critical as an introductory framework.

Alternative perspective taking and learning to observe are then later used to expand the focus of the individual from self to the cultural and social environment that is engaged in during cross-cultural interactions. Bundling up the baseline into a meta competency, or MCR, provides the individual with a learning "gestalt" that can focus on a singular event or interaction, or guide the individual through a series of interactions or over an extended stay in a socially diverse environment or culture. It must be understood that like 3C, MCR represents a capability that can promote successful cross-cultural interactions, and more complex cross-cultural competencies and behavior; it is not the actual performance within these events.

Ethnographers and military personnel engage similar competencies in their respective endeavors, although the intent, roles, and ultimate goals of ethnography often diverge. Ethnography serves to reconstruct the cultural reality of those caught in the middle of change, often through forces beyond their control, and then to help assess and catalog assistance and changes. The adoption of the same baseline competencies aids the military working in similar environments. The ultimate goal of protecting our national security can certainly contrast with intent of anthropology and other social sciences. However, stability operations, and those missions that support success, such as COIN, SFA, BPs, and humanitarian relief are often in support of those same or similar cultural groups studied by anthropologists.

Interacting across cultures is made more difficult due to behavior of that cultural group that contrasts or counters one's set of beliefs and values. Judgments of observed behavior create cognitive and affective barriers to successful cross-cultural interactions, from understanding and engaging in acceptable behavior to the process of deriving meaning from others' behavior within that interaction. For practicing anthropologists in foreign cultures and engaged military members, the importance of detailing an ethnic or social group's cultural reality that is faithful to their collective perspective is critical to deriving meaning from their behavior as well as forecasting future behavior. Engaging the baseline steers clear of making value judgments of cultural behavior based on adherence to a universal set of human rights or from the other extreme, an acceptance of cultural behavior based on its efficacy of contemporary cultural expression.

Rosado (2000) writes of engaging the disparity and extreme differences through inquiry while working toward a common or necessary goal. Kottack (2008) alludes to an MCR that does not preclude making moral judgments while searching for understanding and reason for behavior. Relativism can help discern the origins of behaviors which seem contrary and mediate value conflict through understanding. It can operate to promote further interactions with the culture and its members while seeking understanding that is instrumental in allowing discovery of origins and sustainment of cultural behaviors. Borrowing from both Rosado and Kottak, I suggest that the baseline competencies when engaged as a foundation of 3C represent an MCR. To this end, the baseline represents an approach to cross-cultural interactions that is more process and operational and less a means of passing judgment on cultural behaviors.

Discussion

Operational challenges within conflict and post-conflict environments make application of the baseline (and individual competencies), and by virtue MCR, much more difficult in the warfighting context than in the research context. With regard to the development of alternative perspective taking, research has implicated the benefits of alternative

perspective taking (and its related cognitive processes) to foster and sustain social bonds between "self" and "other" by breaking down stereotypes and minimizing prejudice. In this respect perspective taking as part of MCR can facilitate the development and expression of 3C. However, there is an "ironic darkside" to engaging perspective taking; it must be deep, reflective and focused to provide benefit beyond the construction of social bonds.[13]

When interactions occur, perspective taking can provide a means to "get at" the meaning of others' behavior, but the act of perspective taking may inhibit introspection and create artificial stereotypes of self. In other words, perspective taking can work to create enduring cross-cultural relationships with cultural other, but it may impact self's behavior by leaning too much on facilitating other. Other problems may arise when both self and other take each other's perspective, thereby promoting contrary behavior as a result of exchanged perspectives.

Initiating and sustaining relationships with data providers in the cross-cultural environment found in stability operations are often based on perspectives that include political agendas, cross-cutting social identities and alliances that may not be overt to the military individual and thus, incomplete perspectives may be problematic. Add to this suspected ties to insurgents of those involved in relationships may also create/add a layer of risk and operational complexity to managing the data collection process not experienced in ethnography. Bluntly, sometimes those you interact with or elicit data from may in the near future try to kill you, or more commonly are trying to use your relationship to their advantage.

How does one know when to trust the outcome of an analysis of another person's or group's cultural reality versus one's own perspective strained through worldview, and perhaps cynical interpretation? How does one manage those two perspectives, while really trying to objectively understand the individual or group's reality–and know which one to act on? If one adheres to the scientific context that a perspective and interactions derived through MCR should always be based on an objective understanding as the end state, perhaps in the warfighting context, with shifting and dynamic identities, teasing out that objective perspective is not always as clear, and this ambiguity or uncertainty can put in jeopardy the development of necessary interpersonal relationships that easily could be critical for achieving mission success.[14]

The baseline competencies provide capability to enhance cross-cultural interactions and help discern meaningful behavior. Developing the baseline as a collection of skills and abilities can promote MCR as a method that can be developed through learning and experience. This development does not rest on the fact that American or any other military service men and women are anthropologists by any stretch of the imagination. The intent of comparing behavior and goals of ethnography and MCR is that each, the anthropologist and military personnel and civilians who support stability operations in foreign cultures, encounter similar socially complex situations that require building and sustaining relationships and discern meaning of behavior. However, for military and civilians deployed into situations where traditional belief systems and behaviors that may present situations which test military and civilian personnel along with conflict and attendant violence and suffering, MCR is a necessary approach.

To deployed service members going into harm's way, holding onto a set of core beliefs and values is necessary to navigate through the complexity and risk inherent in conflict and potential conflict situations. The far greater danger for the DoD military and civilian members that do not engage a methodological relativism is to cast those in other cultures in distinctly unfavorable light and this perception can unduly influence interactions with those foreign cultural members and ultimately could lead to mission failure. MCR becomes a critical "tool" to ground perception and action in comprehension.

Research into identifying competencies that extend beyond the baseline are ongoing. Rasmussen et al (2009) explores the competency of "cultural sensemaking, "…making sense of cultural behaviors" as critical to successful 3C. They suggest that competencies such as observation are important to "sensemaking," a more complex behavior that allows rapid and effective adaptation to and learning about a new cultural environment, and it seems a critical behavioral dimension that promotes cross-cultural expertise. Necessary for sensemaking are some of the baseline competencies, such as perspective taking. Rasmussen and Sieck (2012) offer a model for 3C derived from a collection of critical

incidents that applies to enhancing leadership in cross-cultural environments. It is suggested here that the baseline, advanced as MCR, provides the foundation for developing and exercising more complex competencies such as cultural sensemaking.

Developing MCR and a Note on the Future of 3C

With the more immediate need of pre-deployment training waning as Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom wind down, there remains the development of 3C and the need to institutionalize and synchronize it across military learning programs. The application of 3C to the Total Force will require "customization" of learning to fit a variety of factors: service/agency/organization utility; service and organizational-specific learning opportunities; level of 3C necessary for enlisted/officer and civilians; immediate versus career long learning; maturity of 3C learning instruction; and the fit of traditional and non-traditional instruction methods, among others. The value of 3C for future learning is in complementing specific DoD programs, departments, and centers that specifically instruct on culture with the integration of 3C into existing military education and training curriculum and those traditional areas of study, such as leadership, strategy, regional studies, etc. Developing the baseline competencies as a foundation for 3C and fitting that development to the continuum of missions across those variables identified above is a bridge to that long term goal.

The development of sound and meaningful 3C assessment programs is integral to the future of 3C learning. There are assessment instruments developed to support cross-cultural training in varied civilian foreign enterprises to generally facilitate the increased cross-cultural interactions that characterize the increased relations brought about by globalization. However, as suggested here, the conditions of stability operations and the DoD mission and the structure, organization, and function of DoD education and training programs require a unique and applied assessment program to gauge the effectiveness of 3C learning in the DoD, and to do the same for MCR is equally important. ARI is currently sponsoring a study to develop such a robust tool.[15]

Currently, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is in the process of developing a policy that will establish the requirement that all military personnel and select DoD civilian personnel will be provided foundational instruction on 3C (to ensure personnel have the ability to interact effectively with those from other cultures). Including the development of the baseline set of competencies (and MCR) in this foundational instruction would work to provide a set of KSAAs that span the variety of missions engaged through stability operations.[16] Many of the service culture learning programs include instruction and curriculum on some or many of the baseline competencies. Yet MCR and its utility is not conceptually presented as a process that can facilitate successful cross-cultural interactions and promote a means to derive meaning of cultural behavior for general awareness as well as elucidating meaning to understand future motivation.

There are recently developed 3C products that begin to promote the baseline and the process of MCR, such as the 3C Trainer, while service specific products such as VCAT, the Army 360, and the USAF VEST video series provide instruction on various baseline competencies. ARI is now developing instruction on perspective taking and non-verbal communication as important in promoting cultural influence. Organizations such as DIA are in the process of developing 3C learning programs that build on the baseline and identify the utility of MCR.

Conclusion

In the last five years, the development of culture programs across the DoD, driven by urgency of conflict and with some discontinuity and redundancy of effort, managed to provide a critical component for successful non-traditional military operations. Looking to the future will require a change in focus, effort and delivery of culture programs; institutionalization of culture into existing education and training channels that will provide sustainable and career long learning and development is perhaps the most critical. 3C has already been identified as one of the critical components in this institutionalization. I suggest that starting with instruction on baseline competencies and developing MCR to the Total Force will provide an important first step toward the success of future culture learning. Promoting application and utility of baseline/MCR to 3C and mission success will in part guarantee this future.

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More than Good Intentions: AFRICOM, between American Ambition and African Suspicion

by El-Rayah A. Osman, PhD

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Introduction

The February 2007 decision by the Department of Defense (DOD) to establish a new Unified Command for Africa (AFRICOM) was met with stiff resistance and controversy both in the U.S. and Africa. AFRICOM's supporters, on the one hand, maintained that the new command correctly represented Africa's growing importance and a refocus of U.S. policy on aiding "African solutions to African problems." AFRICOM's critics, on the other hand, charged that the new command was a textbook example of how the U.S. self-interest is promoted at the expense of others, through focusing on fighting terrorism, securing Africa's energy resources, and stemming Chinese and other countries' influence in Africa.

Given the context and the time the command was announced, AFRICOM's dedicated leadership was able to work with African governments despite the initial suspicion, which is a success; however, it too early to judge the success of the new command.

In May 2000, The Economist published a cover article dubbing Africa *"The Hopeless Continent."* However, in 2010 a key article asked if several African nations could be named economic "lions".[1] While it is too early to count any countries in Africa as economic "lions," in 2010, Africa's economic growth rate was estimated at over 4 percent, thanks to an increase in commodity prices and investment in energy resources, especially oil.[2] Africa is the second largest continent in area, and the second most populous (2010 population of one billion people).[3] From Cape Town to Cairo, Africa has always been diverse in its people, places, and natural resources and it is also a complex environment.

Despite the abundance and variety of Africa's natural resources, most African nations have the lowest per capita income in the world. Competition for resources, low levels of economic performance, poverty, coupled with weak and failed states have made Africa the home of international crises and violent conflicts. The protracted conflicts in countries such as the Sudan, the Congo, as well as recent conflicts in Ivory Coast and Libya, have caused the loss of many lives, wasted significant resources, and impeded development in neighboring countries.[4]

Recently, the strategic importance of Africa to the U.S. and other countries has grown for two main reasons: its disproportionate number of weak and failed states and the increase in the continent's importance as a source for energy supplies. The precarious security situation in most African nations and the competition for natural resources has led to a new scramble for Africa in the 21st century. Many analysts argued that the creation of a U.S. African Command in 2007 signaled the rise of the strategic value of the African continent to the U.S. interests.[5]

No single issue has generated heated debate among policy makers, the media, and the public in both the U.S. and Africa than the announcement by the Bush administration of the creation of AFRICOM. The African unity in opposition and the scale of resistance to AFRICOM took American pol-

icy makers by surprise, and many analysts in the U.S. and Africa asked the question: Why is there such a united hostility and opposition to AFRICOM's benevolent intentions and nonmilitary nature? In other words, why was the road to the new African command initially littered with landmines on one side (African) and littered with good intentions on the other side (American)? [6]

This article explores the inception and the troubled rise of AFRICOM and evaluates the debate that it has generated about the U.S. strategy and security in Africa. Specifically, is the reaction to its mission justified and what are the specific concerns voiced by African governments against the location of the command on their soil? Are the intentions and the mission misunderstood by both African governments and regional organizations as its architects and supporters claimed? What explains the intensity and diversity in opposition (if any) to this most recently established military command? How has it progressed in accomplishing its goals since it began operations in 2008? What are the achievements, the lessons learned, and the challenges of AFRICOM, and what are the prospects for its future operations and success?

The Birth of a New Command: Why AFRICOM?

In the words of Moeller and Yates, the U.S. African Command was established to "strengthen our security cooperation efforts with the nations of Africa and to bolster the capabilities of our African partners. Through persistent, sustained engagement focused on building partner security capacity, supporting humanitarian assistance efforts, and providing crises response, USAFRICOM will promote a stable and secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy." [7]

AFRICOM was the result of combined operations formally shared by three regional commands: the European Command, which had overseen operations in 42 African countries, as well as the Pacific and the Central Commands who took responsibility over the rest of Africa. This split in responsibility was a remnant of the Cold War when Africa was not viewed as strategically important to U.S. interests.

By assigning AFRICOM the responsibility for operations in all African countries, the DOD ended the division and confusion that arose in the area of responsibility.[8] The creation of AFRICOM also eased the coordination problems that arose when commanders had to coordinate to contain conflicts and their spillovers. For example, in pre-AFRICOM, when action was needed to intervene under the NATO umbrella in the Darfur crisis, Sudan was under the Central Command and Chad was under the European Command. The split command did not support an effective approach to prevent and respond in an effective and timely manner to the humanitarian crisis.

Second, Africa was given less attention (if any) as the focus was always on Europe by the Central Command. Third, DOD had not trained and assigned an African staff and experts dedicated to African issues. Finally, Africa's voice was absent among U.S. policy makers who needed an advocate to understand the needs of Africa and thus develop a sound African security and policy strategy.[9]

The creation of AFRICOM, however, was not just an internal reorganization within DOD. As one expert on African security policy wrote "it involves more than just redrawing maps inside the Pentagon and changing nameplates on office doors. AFRICOM is a response to the growing strategic importance of Africa within the U.S. spectrum of vital interests."[10]

There are at least six major areas in which Africa's importance to the U.S. has been identified in recent years – counterterrorism; securing natural resources; containing armed conflicts and responding to humanitarian crises; retarding the spread of HIV/AIDS; reducing international crime, and responding to growing Chinese influence.[11]

It is critical to mention here that prior to AFRICOM the U.S. pursued several security initiatives in Africa. The Pan-Sahel Initiative in 2002, provided security assistance to Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. This program was extended in 2005 to include five additional African nations. Also in 2002, the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa engaged in fighting terrorism in Djibouti as the only permanent U.S. base on the African continent. Finally, in late 2007, U.S. Navy forces were deployed to provide maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. AFRICOM inherited these security activities.[12] American military involvement in Africa is not new and took different forms, however, it is mostly dominated by bilateral security relationships.

AFRICOM: A New Security Paradigm?

Unlike other commands that focus on fighting and winning wars, AFRICOM was given a nonmilitary mandate by President Bush "to enhance our efforts to bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa."[13] These goals will be achieved through engaging in bilateral and multilateral security cooperation with African nations and creating new means to improve their military capabilities. Furthermore, AFRICOM uses an integrated approach to security in which diplomacy, development and defense (three Ds) are equal pillars of American foreign policy. It fuses the capabilities of the DOD, the Department of State, and the U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives.

AFRICOM was born out of a new security paradigm that reflects an evolution in U.S. military policy, doctrine, and strategy influenced by the lessons learned from the U.S. engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan.[14] Four salient features of the new military security strategy that guide and are at the core of AFRICOM's mission are increasing focus on "soft power" and focus less on "hard power." That is, security does not come out of the barrel of the gun. Second, preventing conflict is a more effective way to achieve national security objectives than fighting wars.[15] AFRICOM shifts its focus from combat operations to conflict prevention by "taking actions that will prevent problems from becoming crises, and crises from becoming conflicts."[16] Third, victory will be judged by stability operations and not by combat operations. That is, stability operations are given equal priority to combat operations. Finally, linking security and development together and making them enable each other. Security is seen as a prerequisite for development and development is viewed as an antidote for insecurity or violent conflict. AFRICOM's role is to narrow the security-development gap.

Reactions to AFRICOM: What Went Wrong?

Between 2007 and 2008, AFRICOM and its mission elicited strong opposition from various groups in Africa. Skepticism and reluctance to the new command were expressed by African media sources, governments, the African Union, and regional organizations. However, this sentiment was not voiced by African groups alone. Some within the U.S. government and American allies have questioned the goals and motives of the AFRICOM operation as well.

Commentaries and editorials of governments and independent media sources in Kenya, South Africa, Botswana, and other countries stated that an American military presence would amplify, not reduce, the security risks to Africans. They lamented that AFRICOM would potentially cause more harm to the African security rather than benefit.[17] A researcher looking at AFRICOM from a South African perspective, wrote that "there is fear in some circles on the continent that Africa will be Iraqed; that is, that U.S. efforts to protect itself against terrorism from the African continent will, in fact, exacerbate the problem. Africa will draw the attention of its enemies and that, as in the Cold War, Africa will once again become the battlefield for the power and military struggles of the great powers—the United States and China, for instance, and particularly the U.S. military and its international terrorist enemies."[18] The South African government has not only turned its back to AFRICOM, but used its influence as a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to encourage other countries not to host AFRICOM.

Regional organizations such as SADC, which represents 14 member countries, questioned the legitimacy of AFRICOM. SADC stated that acceptance of AFRICOM would lead to conflict within the Community and possible retaliation against those sister countries who support AFRICOM. It is true that the African Union (AU) is weak and unable to intervene to prevent conflicts and fight terrorism to protect member states. Concerned about the erosion of its power, the AU issued a non-binding resolution asking member states not to host AFRICOM in the continent. South Africa, Libya, Nigeria, Morocco, and Algeria refused to grant the U.S. permission to station the Command on their soil. One reason that AFRICOM was not welcome is that countries such as South Africa and Nigeria saw it as a threat to their regional power. Therefore, the involvement of and consultation with "regional powers" is key to AFRICOM's success.[19]

Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria (Western allies) refused to host AFRICOM for fear of attracting Al-Qaeda. Another reason for states taking varied positions on AFRICOM is the extent of commitment to the non-alignment ideology adopted by the regimes. Those states that embrace non-alignment failed to embrace AFRICOM. Initially, in 2007, Liberia was the only African country willing to host the headquarters of AFRICOM on its land. States such as Liberia, Mali, Rwanda, and Botswana were more supportive of AFRICOM because their leaders were either pragmatists or were 'new and enlightened' leaders who are more open to reasons for a new initiative such as AFRICOM.[20]

U.S. Navy photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Brian A. Goyak

President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf of Liberia speaks during a ceremony in 2008, at in Monrovia, Liberia, to celebrate the donation of medical supplies being delivered by Africa Partnership Station (APS) and Project Hope.

Within the U.S., some analysts also questioned the strategy and organization of AFRICOM. For example, one security analyst asked the question "Why is the military leading an organization whose stated mission is, by definition, largely the responsibility of State?"[21] A former ambassador wrote, "it [AFRICOM] is an idea deformed at birth, as it cannot produce the results desired but instead will only exacerbate the problem of over-militarization of U.S. policy and programs. It is a case of the cure being worse than the disease."[22] In addition, in both Africa and the U.S., non-governmental organizations (NGOs) argued that AFRICOM would militarize foreign aid and thus would compromise their neutral position in delivering aid. To build partnership and leverage NGO's development expertise, AFRICOM must respond to their concerns.

An American ally during the Cold War, France saw AFRICOM as both about exporting the war on terror to Africa and securing oil resources. France actively lobbied its Western and Central African allies not to host AFRICOM headquarters and coordinated its efforts with the European Union to counterbalance the American incursion in its area of influence (francophone Africa). When Djibouti, an historical French ally, allowed the U.S. to establish a permanent base, the French viewed this decision in particular and AFRICOM in general as the "new Fashoda."[23]

U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist David Holmes

A volunteer with APS and representatives from the Maps Education Group load supplies donated on behalf of Project Handclasp. APS is an international initiative under the auspices of U.S. Naval Forces Africa which aims to work cooperatively with U.S., European and African partners to enhance maritime safety and security in Africa.

Supporters of AFRICOM and the Bush administration attributed the initial resistance to AFRICOM to insufficient consultation with African nations and to a public relations blunder. For example, McFate argued that despite its consultative approach, the negative reaction was due to "AFRICOM's inability to articulate its message to Africans."[24] Several supporters of AFRICOM are optimistic that a better communication strategy could improve AFRICOM's image and overtime it will be accepted. They also claimed that AFRICOM gives Africa a much needed voice within the U.S. government to advance Africa's interests.[25] The military is well funded by Congress compared to the State Department and the USAID who are both underfunded and understaffed.

Critics of AFRICOM claim that the lack of consultation was deliberate on the part of the Bush administration, and reflects the former Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld's authoritarian style. They argue that the U.S. already had several security initiatives with African partners and DOD officials did not bother to consult with African leaders

or even saw the need for a new approval to set up the new command.[26] Some critics claim that the DOD, by not openly making its goals of seeking American interests, has mischaracterized African concerns.[27] One critic called AFRICOM a false start and states that it will take more than better public relations to assume a pivotal role in Africa. To him, the problem with AFRICOM is not the message, but the mission.[28]

U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sergeant Robert Barnett

The Honorable John McHugh, Secretary of the U.S. Army (center), discusses life on camp with soldiers on Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, July 2010, during a luncheon. McHugh visited the camp to discuss living conditions and life on camp.

Carl LeVan developed an alternative explanation for the African responses to AFRICOM using a political economy perspective, premised on two factors: the amount of foreign aid and the rate of economic growth for each African country in the study. He analyzed the content of 506 African news reports in twenty-eight countries covering eighteen months after AFRICOM was announced. His results show that "the most aid-dependent countries that received U.S. foreign assistance were likelier to support AFRICOM, and countries enjoying high levels of growth with low levels of foreign aid tended to criticize it."[29] The findings from this study point to the effectiveness of aid as a means of political leverage and suggest that the best policy for African countries looking to pursue their own national interests is to grow a sound national economy.

Forward in Africa: An American Response?

To win over African leaders and media in 2007, American policy makers developed a new strategic communications campaign, which emphasized the non-kinetic mission and inter-agency structure of AFRICOM. To sell and repackage AFRICOM, DOD officials met with many African leaders, military personnel, and regional organizations to discuss the new message and allay their fears about the mission of AFRICOM. Specifically, American officials emphasized that AFRICOM would help states improve security, provide training and coordinate activities in counterterrorism, peace building, and disaster relief.

The outreach by the Bush administration officials, however, failed to articulate a clear and consistent message for AFRICOM, in part, because of the initial suspicion. As a result, AFRICOM's mission remained elusive to both Americans and Africans. In 2007, Burgess outlined a number of conflicting statements made by the Bush administration officials on AFRICOM's revised mission. These statements made in the U.S. and Africa added fuel to fire.[30]

In October 2007, AFRICOM operated as a sub-unified command under the European Command and in October 2008 it began working as a separate and independent command. Short in staff, in 2008, the inter-agency goal had not been met. Contrary to its primary non-combatant mission, AFRICOM was granted the status of a combatant command with the potential to use lethal force.[31]

African Acceptance of AFRICOM: Finally?

American adjustments to the AFRICOM's mission and outreach by American officials led to increased support from select African states. AFRICOM's leadership has worked assiduously to overcome the initial suspicion to the command. The many discussions and meetings by AFRICOM's Commander and his staff, over cups of tea and under tree shades in Africa, have finally paid dividends in persuading African leaders to work with AFRICOM. More importantly, the decision in May 2008 by the Bush administration not to station AFRICOM in Africa resulted in more states willing to work with the new command. For example, Nigeria accepted AFRICOM upon the announcement of the May 2008 decision. In addition, Botswana and other SADC states, with the exception of South Africa, have agreed to work with AFRICOM. By October 2008, AFRICOM was embraced by the majority of African states.

U.S. Africa Command Photo

General William "Kip" Ward, former commander of United States Africa Command, outlines his vision for AFRICOM and international partnerships during a keynote address February 2008 in London.

Endnotes

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4. See Major General William B. Garrett III, Colonel Stephen J. Mariano, and Major Adam Sanderson, "Forward in Africa: USAFRICOM and U.S. Army in Africa," *Military Review*, (January-February 2010), 16-25.

5. See Isaac Kfir, "The Challenge that is: USAFRICOM," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Issue 49, (2nd Quarter 2008), 110-113.

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15. U.S. military strategists added the "Phase Zero" campaign to the four military campaign phases: I Deter/Engage, II Seize Initiative, III Decisive Operations, and IV Transition. See Garrett, W., S. Mariano, A. Sanderson, Figure 2, 19.

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17. Le Van, 9.

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19. Stephen Burgess, "In the National Interest? Authoritarian Decision-making and the Problematic Creation of US African Command," *Contemporary Security Policy*, 30 (1) (April 2009), 79-99.

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21. Penn, 77.

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28. Ken Menkhaus, "False Start in AFRICOM," Contemporary Security Policy, 30 (1) (2009),53-57.

29. LeVan, 2-3.

30. Burgess, 92.

31. Ibid., 93.

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

Beyond the Tribe: Patron-Client Relations, Neopatrimonialism in Afghanistan

by Ron Holt, PhD

Introduction

This article attempts to bridge the gap between tribal and non-tribal approaches to the American efforts in Afghanistan. An alternative to seeing Afghan society through a tribal or non-tribal lens is patron-client relationships. This concept appears to be equally valid in tribal Pushtun areas and non-tribal Tajik areas and one could argue for much of the Islamic culture. Patron-client relations provide a simple heuristic that illuminates Afghan society for the policy-makers, soldiers, and civilians engaged in policy and operations.

> ***Patron-client networks are "a central mode of regulating socio-political order in many developing societies." [1]***

In order to describe the social organization of much of the Middle East and Central Asia the broad term *tribe* has been widely used as an analytical tool. The term is often carelessly used and misapplied to situations where it is not applicable. While tribal social organization is important in some areas of Afghanistan and some have argued that our major focus in Afghanistan should be the tribe, in many cases this approach is difficult or impossible to operationalize.[2] Even the concept of tribe has its critics and does not have a universally accepted definition amongst scholars.[3] For example, while the Pushtun areas of Afghanistan are often "tribally-organized" most of the rest of the country is not. And, in many Pushtun-dominated areas "tribes" have lost much of their power and meaning during the war with the Soviet Union, the Civil War, and the era of Taliban rule. Tribal social organization is just one factor, albeit important, amongst many. Yet, despite many pressures, millions of people along the Afghan-Pakistan (AFPAK) border remain tribally organized and membership in lineages and clans remain important sources of identity, privileges, and constraints.

Qawm

> ***Qawm is based on kinship and patron-client relationships; before being an ethnic of tribal group, it is a solidarity group, which protects its members from the encroachments of the state and other qawm, but it is also the scene of internal competition between contenders for local supremacy. [4]***

Tribes are generally assumed to be groups organized by kinship such as lineages and clans and other descent groups. But tribes are often used as a generic for any pre-state social organization whether they are segmentary lineages, political units, linguistic units, or geographic units. In Afghanistan the word *qawm* is often translated as tribe but qawm also means any communal group including clans, lineages, city guilds, networks grounded in the *tanzims*, and patronage networks. Of course the tanzims (Afghan resistance parties) of the Soviet War were closely associated with various ethnic groups as well. Richard Tapper notes the ambiguity of the qawm:

> ***It is therefore a highly ambiguous and flexible concept allowing for strategic manipulations of identity. [5]***

The very plasticity of this form of mutating social organization allows for functions and structures to vary in the face of changing circumstances and challenges from the outside and inside the qawm. The fluidity of qawm goes hand in hand with the term *khan* which can mean an affluent land-owner or leader of a tribal group, khans dispense loans

and resources to their clients. Nazif Shahrani describes the importance of qawm in the mobilization process. Note the different linguistic terms used to describe a similar concept:

> ***Ethnicity and kinship, which are expressed linguistically through the same terms, qawm (people, tribe, group), wulus (nation, tribe, relatives), and tyfah (clan, tribe, group), represent the same or similar ideological frameworks in Afghanistan. Together with Islam, they provide the most fundamental bases for individuals and collective identities and loyalties, and they are the most persistent and pervasive potential bases for the organization of social formations, for the mobilization of social action, and for the regulation of social interaction among individuals and between social groups [...]". [6]***

The strongest ties within the Qawm are those of kinship. Brothers, cousins, and other relatives are one's strongest potential supporters. To survive and grow in power and influence, a leader/big man needs those he can trust, with that trust being cemented by what westerners see as nepotism. Special attention is paid to relatives, and the relatives return with support and loyalty. The Pushtun tribes are proudly independent with every man being seen as equal to any other; however, leaders do emerge based on wealth, education, connections to the state and use of Islam as ideological glue. While beliefs and motivations are shaped by Islam they are also shaped by the kinship networks, villages, districts (woleswali) and even whole cities that are outside effective governmental control.[7]

Patron-Client Networks

Leaders within an Afghan tribal qawm traditionally extracted wealth from brigandage, road taxes and protection rackets and distributed these subsidies to their supporters. By controlling the flow of wealth and sometimes pasture allocation, they were able to influence their fellow tribesmen and increase their power and prestige. Today the richer tribal leaders serve as a nexus for many networks as they juggle inputs and resources from the Americans, non-governmental agencies, Afghan bureaucracies, the various Talibans and their clients. Tribal elders (masharon, rish sefid, spin-zhirey, ag-sagal) may have some power as a council and some influence as individuals but they are often a product of the khan's success–emerging from the unity provided by successful leaders. Anderson presented a positive picture of the Pushtun khan:

> ***...a khan is a self-financed public servant, expending his own wealth for the aggregate, good of a community...."[8]***

The generic tribe is an alternative to the State, it is a method of maintaining membership, order and meaning in the absence of effective states. In the AFPAK situation we see that their political autonomy is encapsulated within the economic and cultural domination of state. Yet the stronger tribes also act as proto-states. This makes our efforts to build effective states, governance and legal systems over night seem hopeless and misdirected.[9]

An alternative way to see the reality on the ground in the Middle East and in Afghanistan is through the model of enduring dyadic "patron-client" relations or patrimonialism. Max Weber argued that as countries modernized their traditional patrimonial political organization would give way to bureaucratic rationalism. In the Islamic world we tend to see a hybrid of state bureaucracy and authoritarian paternalistic rule that Eisenstadt refers to as "neopatrimonialism." Neopatrimonialism means that patrons use state resources to secure the loyalty of clients. Tribal khans in Afghanistan and Iran were often the conduit for state resources and used those resources for personal family gain but also extended the state's control and reach into areas that the weak central government. Networks and connections matter more than higher official positions in these situations. Neopatrimonialism certainly undermines the official bureaucratic structures and the rule of law, but may be quite effective in the absence of either.

Arguments for a strong central government note the problems but seem unrealistic as far as offering solutions:

> ***...pervasive patron-client networks have developed at all levels of government. Federalism has permitted entitlements to be spread more widely across society but it has in turn fuelled a proliferation of state and local institutions that have made governance fragmentary and unwieldy. Unable to obtain their fair share of the country's wealth, most citizens have been left with two choices: fatalistic resignation or greater identification with alternative hierarchies based on ethnicity, religion or other factional identities. [10]***

Patrons may act as cultural brokers dispensing political patronage that creates moral obligations. Thus they are often greatly respected and/or feared

in local public opinion. Sometimes this is simply using connections to bypass regulations and bureaucracies; in Arab countries they call this system *wasta* and it is endemic in the Islamic world. In these shame-based cultures honor and respectability come from the group's opinion, public and private knowledge are two different entities. By skimming an economic surplus from raiding, road taxes, or the Americans and re-distributing part of the loot, the wealth becomes a political capital and personal power.

Creating an effective central government and rule of law sounds good to bureaucrats in Western cultures but will fail without understanding the actual situation on the ground and molding efforts to local culture. Afghanistan is a large country with little infrastructure where many people live an almost Neolithic lifestyle with the culture heavily influenced by Salifist/Wahhabi/Deobandi versions of Islam that oppress women and discourage social innovation.

One of the many problems of building a civil society in Afghanistan is the traditional dialectic between the new state apparatus and the traditional logic of local tribal or non-tribal warlords groups' networks. Unlike empires that flourish by aggregating tribes and states, the state demands a monopoly on the use of force and seeks to mold all functions to its hierarchical bureaucracy.

Similar situations exist in the Latin American systems of compradrazgo and in many organized crime families in the U.S.[11] In countries where the relations of production favor kinship and patron-client relations over market forces, a form of patrimonialism is common. Authority in these societies is based on prestige and access to various physical and political resources. Traditionally, the Shaykh, Khan, or Malik are often landowners that are economically and politically powerful and they may have private armed retainers or access to a state's military power. The patron is expected to act as a conduit of largesse and as a negotiator for his client group. They have social status whereas their clients are generally of humble origins and weak politically and economically. These relationships are often informal and flexible but sometimes they are contractual.

Loyalties and responsibilities move with shifting boundaries and allegiances. Competition amongst brothers and cousins sometimes trumps kinship. Positive and negative reciprocal relationships are fundamental to the traditional fabric of Afghan social organization and Islamic societies in general. Ethnicity is clearly an important variable, I have observed Pushtuns refuse to acknowledge that they speak Dari in the presence of government officials who speak only Dari. Robert Canfield claims that people are aware of their broader macro-ethnic identity but it is the kin networks and patron-client networks that are more important to the people and which form cleavages within and across the ethnic group identities.

In recent years the most successful of the patrons been referred to as "warlords." But in the history of the Middle East and Central Asia this is nothing new. Individuals, such as Tamerlane (Timur-i-leng) have used their lineage, military skills, claims of Islamic piety and patron-client links to rise into power and prestige throughout the area's recorded history. Afghans have traditionally charged outsiders protection money to use the roads in their tribal lands. Dexter Filkins writes about one individual who has gone from an illiterate highway patrol commander to "stronger than the government in Oruzgan Province" in two years. He controls a 1,500 man militia that guards convoys of trucks between Tirin Kot and Kandahar:

> ***"He estimates his salaries support 15,000 people in this impoverished province. He has built 70 mosques with his own money, endowed scholarships in Kabul and begun holding weekly meetings with area tribal leaders. His latest venture is a rock-crushing company that sells gravel to NATO bases."*** [12]

While some Westerners may see this as blatant corruption, many Afghans may perceive this as a "Horatio Alger" success story that fits the classic central Asian model of a man rising to become a patron, key leader and power broker.

President Karzai appoints all thirty-three provincial governors and all 324 sub-governors and district police chiefs. This serious flaw in the Afghan constitution empowers Karzai to act according to the culture in rewarding his family, friends and supporters while undermining his potential competitors. In the recent presidential elections areas with hundreds of voters appear to have produced thousands of votes for Karzai. Between election fraud and his late brother's alleged connections with the

opium trade, the current Afghan government is a prime example of how tribal loyalties (Karzai is a Popalzai Pushtun of the Durrani branch, the richer branch with more lowland agriculture), patron-client relations, and corruption all come together to stymie the development of law and civil society. Yet this system has such strong historical roots that it is seen as "the way things are" and not to play the game seems foolish and dangerous.

Indeed this muddle between *qanun*, or areas of national government control, and *yaghestan*, the areas where central governments do not rule, was noted in Ibn Khaldun's 1377 Muqaddimah. In Afghanistan the vertical ties revolving around the distribution of booty has been ongoing since well before Ahmad Shah Durrani's creation of the Afghan empire in the 1747 (which was perhaps based on stealing the booty from the Persian Nadir Shah's treasure caravan). One might trace it all the way back to pre-Islamic intertribal raiding and the redistribution of booty by a local chief/shaykh to rewards his followers and ensure their continued loyalty.

Certainly this redistribution is part of the traditional culture and ways of surviving; but with the influx of huge amounts of U.S. military and donor money the arena for bribery, extortion, and protection rackets is on a whole new level, dwarfing traditional bribes for using a road, driver's licenses or building permits. Today, much of the loot that is funneled to supporters comes from U.S. development funds and international aid organizations. Sometimes it is stolen from jingle trucks but often it comes from salaries paid to governors, contracts for security guards, privatizing state-run companies, gravel or other contractual arrangements.

Karzai's Vice-President Ahmed Zia Massoud was allowed to take $52 million in cash without accounting for its origins to the United Arab Emirates (UAE).[13] President Karzai has blocked corruption investigations of his political allies and released many Taliban from prison. He is simply taking care of his allies in the finest tradition of the qawm and the patron's responsibilities and assumed rights. It is said the between 1 and 2.5 billion dollars was flown to the UAE in 2009. Since the gross domestic product (GDP) of Afghanistan is about $16.63 billion (2009), the amount of cash leaving the country is a significant indicator!

In the presence of weak, non-existent or corrupt governments the average Afghan, Pushtun or not, turns to patrons or tribal Khans for representation and mediation or sometimes to the Taliban to settle problems and legal cases. Patrons have networks and connections that allow them to draw on resources unimaginable to the average rural Afghan.

So it would seem that what westerners perceive as corruption is simply an age-old cultural adaptation on steroids as billions of U.S. and opium dollars enter the Afghan economy. As Ben Heineman notes, it is not just American money in play, millions of dollars from Iran were given to Karzai's chief of staff and "Karzai and his allies have used this money to bribe officials and tribal leaders and some Taliban commanders in exchange for fealty."[14]

Conclusion

The Afghans have used their particular hybrid system of Qawn/Patron-Client redistribution as a survival machine in the face of invasion and limited resources since the time of Alexander and it does not appear that first world systems or transparency are going to become the norm in the near future. The Karzai government is seen as fragile and corrupt and the Afghan police are often hated more than the Taliban. One truck driver told me that "the Taliban can only kill us once where the police bleed us at every checkpoint."[15]

Since we do not understand the true nature of the conflict (Afghan history and culture, the overly corrupt Karzai government, Salafist/Wahhabi/neo-Deobandi Islam, Pakistan as a safe haven, etc.), we cannot turn our tactical wins into strategic victory. Given President Obama's timetable for withdrawal of U.S. forces beginning this coming July until the end of 2014, the street smart Afghan will cement his local ties making as wide a network as possible, make money from the American presence until the U.S. leaves, and then welcome the returning Taliban or whoever can actually deliver on security and economic stability in an Islamic context.[16] Currently foreign aid for Afghanistan is equal to the GDP and almost certainly the aid will rapidly decline after 2014 giving the Karzai government less resources.[17] The new "national" patron that emerges will construct a network of client relations that will funnel power and prestige upward as it trickles down patronage and payoffs to the regional and district lev-

els. A new Islamist government will focus attention on foreign and domestic friends and enemies as it ignores education and development. A new cycle of patron-client relations will have been born.

Endnotes

1. Shmuel N. Eisenstadt and Luis Roniger, *Patrons, Clients and Friends: Interpersonal Relations and the Structure of Trust in Society* (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1984), 42.

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6. Nazif M. Shahrani, "War, Factionalism, and the State in Afghanistan," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 104, Issue 3, September 2002, 717.

7. Afghanistan is about 70 percent rural with a village economy based on subsistence farming. See Brian Petit, "The Fight for the Village," in *Military Review*, May-June 2011.

8. Andersen in Tapper, 1983, 138.

9. Indeed the U.S. has repeatedly misread the AFPAK situation by refusing to see it in local terms and as a result we have no effective strategy for dealing with opium, weak and corrupt governance or the military aspects of the conflict including border sanctuaries in Pakistan.

10. Crisis Group, 1996, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4274&l=1.

11. Perhaps the recent history of Colombia may provide some optimistic insight to the future of Afghanistan. However, I find it hard to be optimistic given events on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line.

12. Dexter Filkins, "Rule of the Gun: With U.S. Aid, Warlord Builds Afghan Empire," *The New York Times*, June, 2010.

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16. " David Katz in "Reforming the Village War," in *The Middle East Quarterly*, Spring, 2011 notes that demographically the Pushtun population "doubles every eleven to fourteen years, providing some eight to nine million additional males for jihad."

17. See World Bank power point, "Transition in Afghanistan: Looking Beyond 2014," Nov. 21, 2011.

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Working With a Local Patronage System in Stability and COIN Operations

by Thomas Blau, PhD and Daryl K. Liskey, PhD

This paper represents the authors' personal views only, and not those of any agency of the U.S. Government.

Introduction

Patron-client ties often dominate the social, political, and economic life of non-Western countries where real power does not rest in visible institutional positions, but in patrons who control powerful networks. In such societies, knowledge of patron-client networks is essential to gain support of the population and increase stability. Failure to identify and understand such patron-client networks have frustrated attempts by U.S. Soldiers to effectively engage the population in Afghanistan and elsewhere, and particularly among populations that are neutral or hostile.

While the importance of patron-client ties is widely recognized, how it should guide security operations is unclear.[1] Views of patron-client ties are often biased by ethnocentricity (judging others by our standards) or "mirror imaging." Many in Western societies view patron-client practices as corrupt and unfair.

We propose that adopting local practices like patronage can complement modern economic and informational instruments of influence. While the effectiveness of these modern methods is debated, social science has well established that patronage is an effective practice for gaining the support of the population in societies where patron-client ties prevail. Patronage was an important tactic to centralize power in 17th century France, to consolidate British parliamentary politics up to the 20th century, and to attach immigrant citizens to the political process in America through the turn of the 20th century. Patronage today remains a pervasive practice that binds political, economic, and social loyalties throughout much of the world.

> A complicated factor in the study of political alignments in Afghanistan is that loyalty networks are not clear-cut...."four ties that do not always bind": kinship [like tribes], residence, class and religion...."In the absence of institutions that specify authority, this critical element is vested instead in individuals who cast themselves as leaders and bolster their claims by the acquisition of followers....who perceive such a patron-client relation to be to their best advantage." (van Bijlert, 2009: 15)

In this paper, we first briefly summarize what we know of patron-client ties. We then propose ways for U.S. soldiers to use these informal patterns of power to increase stability and gain the support of a population.

Patron-Client Relations: What We Know

Patron-client ties are personal relations based on reciprocal obligations that consistently produce loyalty in exchange for support. A patron-client relation is based on *instrumental friendship between two individuals of unequal power where obligations of loyalty and support are reciprocal: the client pledges loyalty to the patron in return for the patron's obligation to support the client.*[2]

The key elements are:

- ***Dyadic*:** The relation is between two individuals or between an individual and a group.
- ***Instrumental Friendship:*** The relation contains elements of both personal solidarity (friendship) and instrumental (self-interested) ends-means calculation.
- ***Unequal Power:*** The relation is between two actors of unequal power. The patron always being the more powerful actor.
- ***Reciprocal Obligation:*** The role of patron and client are defined by reciprocal obligations, the patron supports the client in return for the client's loyalty.
- ***Private:*** Obligations are personal and therefore largely invisible to outsiders.
- ***Indefinite Future:*** Obligations extend into an indefinite future.

Unlike pure market or formal institutional relations, patron-client ties always have elements of solidarity or affect (emotional attachment). However, unlike corporate solidarity groups–like kinship, ethnic, or religious groups–a patron-client relation is defined by reciprocal obligations between two individuals with unequal power, the patron and client.

> ...a common saying among Ghilzai Pashtuns is that khans "feed the people." Patronage establishes networks of reciprocal obligations that, as Ghilzai say, "tie the knot of the tribe." (Rubin 2002: 41-42, citing Jon W. Anderson)

Patronage: Patrons support clients through "gifts of authority," such as insurance against risks (drought, etc.); advice on matters beyond the client's competence (intercession with government officials); providing jobs, special favors and material benefits; prestige that strengthens the client's local influence, or a commitment to provide security.

Clientage: Clients in return provide "gifts of obedience" that include: loyalty; public demonstrations of esteem that increases the patron's general influence; providing "private" information; select gifts; voting as directed; or providing assistance in times of patron need.

Often, multiple types of obligations are part of a *package deal*. A patron may provide advice as well as favors while the client provides the patron support, such as information, votes, or gifts. The full package is essential to the relation.

Factors in Determining Strength of Patron-Client Relations

A key concern for U.S. personnel working in societies where patron-client relations are prevalent is, How strong are they? Important characteristics to consider are:

Instrumental-affective tie: "Instrumental friendships" vary from mostly instrumental (based on calculations of rational self-interest) to mostly affective (based on mutual affection). Affective ties are more those typical of friendship, whereas instrumental ties are more businesslike. Both elements are always present in a patron-client relation.

Scope of the package deal: The number of obligations can vary; however, the various obligations are a package deal–they all are seen as part of the relationship. Generally, when ties are primarily affective, the package of obligations is broad and diffuse. When ties are mostly instrumental, the package deal is more specific and limited and follows a more exacting tit-for-tat pattern of fulfillment.

Bargaining advantage: While the patron is always more powerful, the relative advantage between the patron and client depends on available alternatives. Where clients have the opportunity to choose from many patrons, the package deal is likely to improve for the client. But if the patron has many prospective clients, then the converse will be the case. Finally, when there are alternatives to patronage (which often occurs with the advance of market economies), then the bargaining position of the patron weakens.

Duration: A patron-client relation can be very short or last an entire lifetime. The duration is likely to be long when clients and patrons have few alternatives, and when patrons are local and have a stable resource base. The duration is likely to be short where alternatives are abundant, the patron is not local or the patron's resources are unstable.

Where affective ties are strong, obligations are wider in scope, ties are stronger and the relationship is longer in duration. More diffuse and stronger patron-client ties tend to be found in isolated rural areas, where the patron often has the advantage. In more urban areas, ties tend to be more instrumental, weaker and of shorter duration, and clients have relatively greater advantage.[3]

Patron-client ties overlap other social patterns and are *in addition to* those other social patterns.

A patron-client relation may occur within, but is in addition to, obligations of a solidarity group or institution. Patron-client ties may arise, for example, within kinship or tribal relations.

Determinants of Relations

Patron-client relations exist the world over with the possible exception of the Scandinavian countries.[4] Efforts to eliminate patron-client relations, where determinants of these relations prevail, are likely to be costly and difficult. Determinants of the strength of patron-client relations are:

Disruption of corporate solidarity groups: Individuals seek outside patron-client relations when group solidarity in corporate groups like tribes becomes disrupted, perhaps due to the growth of the state, the market economy, migration, or insurgency. When corporate groups can no longer provide for the important needs of their members, individuals seek new ties outside the group.

Personalistic orientation: A strongly personalistic orientation is widespread in traditional societies characterized by corporate solidarity groups like tribes. Relations outside the group are based on instrumental intent; however, behavior continues to be governed by a personalistic orientation involving special favors and signs of friendship.

> Indeed, the wars in Afghanistan had a great impact.... The heightened insecurity emphasized the need to stick together.... Clearly it was easier to trust a small set of known people than larger society in general, especially with the general experience that state institutions did not provide for the people, and with inter-communal feuds. The necessity for "survival networks" grew stronger as the war began to polarize Afghans due to ethnicity-driven recruitment by warlords. Networks grew to an extent that clientelism spread into almost every sphere of Afghan society: politics, economy, education and even the formation of so-called civil society organizations such as NGOs, social and cultural associations and interest groups....society would have been unlikely to survive the many years of war if it had not been for these extant clientelistic networks. (Schmeidl 2007, 105-106)

Societal collapse: In extremely unstable societies, patrons and clients may not be able to meet their obligations to each other. Authority becomes based almost solely on coercive force and immediate economic transactions. For example, consider how patron-client relations in some African countries collapsed and were replaced by coercive warlordism.[5]

In societies where the patron-client relations are prevalent, effective engagement may be more effective leveraging these ties. Operations that work against these relationships or without awareness of these ties may lead to unwanted and unintended consequences. In such societies, elimination of patron-client relations can lead to a weakened social fabric where only coercive relationships prevail.

Types of Patron-Client Networks

In societies where patron-client relations are pervasive, power is largely structured in terms of patron-client networks. Patron-client relations naturally chain together to form patron-client networks. These networks differ according to their resource base:

Social: A relation based on ties where the patron provides insurance guarantees or prestige in return for personal assistance and support from clients. Examples of social networks include landlord-tenant, sheikh-tribal member or relations between distant relatives of unequal status.

Feudal: A relation where patronage is granted in terms of a fief or landed estate while clients pledged their armed support in turn. Warlordism is a present day feudal type network (e.g., Dostum in Afghanistan).

> (T)he importance of patron-client relations in creation of personal armies should never be underestimated....The deep roots of warlordism in Afghan society are first and foremost explained by the strong demand of security by the population, especially in the village. (Giustozzi, 2003)

> Power in [Afghan] villages or tribes does not reside in any one person or structure but in fluidly structured networks of influence....Both jirga and the village council may be the scene of political maneuvering among khans [leaders] that also occur constantly in less formal settings. Khans compete with each other for clienteles and state patronage. Especially in eastern Pashtun areas the competition can be extremely intense and can be expressed in vendettas that continue for generations between families, clans, and tribes. (Ruben 2002, 41-42)

Patrimonial: A relation where administrative officialdom provides patronage as jobs and preferential treatment in return for cash and loyalty. Typically, factions within a bureaucracy are formed, in part, by networks based on awarding jobs and preferment in return for loyalty.

Political: A relation where political aspirants provide political offices and benefits in return for loyal political operators and voters. Political patron-client networks are also referred to as a "political machine."[6]

Criminal: A relation where patrons that are criminals provide bribes and material benefits in return for loyalty and protection (such as a mafia).

Societal Effects

Patron-client networks affect society for good and bad. These networks can contribute to stability if the good aspects can be leveraged and the bad mitigated.

Safety net: Patron-client ties provide a form of traditional welfare that enables those with little to get by.

> Reciprocity is one of two ways social relations form safety nets. Patron-client relationships are another means. These may exist between relatives of unequal wealth....,input suppliers and farmers, shopkeepers and customers, or between sharecroppers and landlords. Such relationships are characterized by inequality–in wealth, social status or authority....these unequal relationships may be a major, if not the only, way of achieving some form of livelihood.... However, it may be the best form of security in highly uncertain contexts....Until the local economy or state can provide alternative means of security, these continue to form the backbone of a social protection system. (Kantor, 2009)

Stability: Patron-client networks tie together individuals, connecting those at the lowest rungs of society to regional or national leaders. These linkages mitigate horizontal class or even ethnic conflicts.

Vertical competition: Networks tend to compete for resources. Patrons, interested in power and influence, extend their networks in competition with other powerful patrons. Where patron-client networks are geographically aligned, competitions between regions often emerge. Similarly, when patron-client networks are limited exclusively to an ethnic or religious group, within-group solidarity increases while competition between groups intensifies.

Polarization: Transitional societies are typically polarized between Westernized civil society, clientalist patron-client sectors and ascriptive corporate groups. Private patron-client deals are contrary to collectivist norms of ascriptive corporate solidarity groups, as well as achievement values championed by Westernized civil society.[7]

Patronage politics: When near-universal suffrage is introduced in societies where patron-client ties are pervasive, political parties made up of patron-client networks become established as political machines. These political machines often result in nationwide patron-client networks that link a country together and to the government. Opposing parties establish their own national networks, leading to network competition that extends regionally or nationally and down to the local level. Additionally,



Social Polarization In Transitioning Societies

old networks become politicized and new sub-networks are established where there had been none.

These political machines tend to be pragmatic, rather than strongly driven by policy or ideology. Since private deals must be renegotiated throughout the network, support for major policy changes tends to be incremental and achieved slowly. The primary focus of patronage-based parties is access to state resources.

Reduced state capacity: If patron-client networks are present in the state bureaucracy, then state capacity is reduced. Clients working in state agencies may not be qualified. They are there to support their patrons rather than agency missions. Policy formulation and implementation loses to the interests of powerful patrons. Resources may go to favored private consumption and state power, misallocated in return for bribes.

Development obstruction: Reduced state capacity often is a major barrier to economic development. However, some states where patron-client networks are pervasive have achieved high economic growth rates (e.g., Japan, South Korea or Thailand). States that have insulated strategic policy making from patron-client networks have been successful in economic development.

In summary, patron-client networks can be a source of social resilience and stability, as well as a source of social polarization and reduced state capacity. Weakening patron-client relations can weaken the social fabric and create openings for our adversaries. However, some of the bad effects must be mitigated to assure prospects for longer term growth and stability.

Engagement as a Patron

Populations are often neutral or hostile to U.S. military presence, and modern information and economic instruments of influence are often not sufficient to gain the support of the local population. Leveraging patron-client relations can enable commanders in the field to establish local networks of influence to strengthen support and stability. Based on our understanding of patron-client relations, we propose several ways to manage these relationships to further U.S. military mission objectives.

When to Engage

When the presence of U.S. military forces is considered illegitimate and the host national government is unpopular, the commander may have few good options other than to gain the support of the population through loyalty to himself as a patron. Not all situations require the commander acting as a patron. A client may find it in his self-interest to provide the support needed, perhaps because the client feels threatened by a common enemy.

When: • Patron-client relations are prevalent • Populations are neutral or hostile • Need their voluntary cooperation	***Ends***: • Support our friends • Establish alternatives to unpopular officials • Secure loyalty of parochial groups • Targeted security objectives
Ways (tactic): • Face-to-Face: Engage at appropriate rank levels • Establish personal Instrumental-Friendship relations (not contractual) • Reciprocal obligations – benefits for loyalty	***Means (into indefinite future):*** • Security • Prestige and Advice • Civil Projects • Humanitarian Assistance

Engaging as a Patron

Engagement only in terms of official roles limits the relationship to an impersonal one. Voluntary support and information, beyond the letter of official relations, is unlikely. Unfortunately, because our knowledge of the local situation is often very limited, we need more than adherence to what is formally asked. We need loyal friends to provide information for that which we did not know enough to ask. Establishing patron-client relations can provide friendship relations needed.

Where engagement is based on personal friendship and patron-client ties prevail, commanders are likely to be viewed as patrons. As a patron, commanders may receive loyalty in return for patronage. Yet in this culture, a patron that is not seen as a "friend" may be misunderstood to be mercenary or even hostile.

> Although some interviewees understood that PRTs are responsive to those they perceive as 'supplying good information,' they also mentioned many reasons why the military cannot access such information easily. These included....fear that it may be a one-sided exploitive relationship where people take risks, provide information and do not necessarily get any results in return. Such obstacles distort information provision to the military, and mean that any attempts by Afghans to follow common cultural practice and establish networks of influence and information exchange with PRTs are limited....(Azarbaijani-Mohaddam et al, 2008:72)

Ends

The purpose of employing patronage is to increase stability and gain operationally relevant support from the population. The objectives for patronage operations may include:

Supporting favorable networks. Patronage can strengthen patron-client networks that support us and oppose our mutual adversaries. Patronage can secure "cleared" areas and be a force multiplier.

When field commanders try to build projects in exchange for local support, the projects often do the opposite, because the effort is often focused on purchasing support in contested areas and pacifying a population after military operations. Such efforts look like the U.S. unfairly rewards enemies and ignores friends. This makes our friends less friendly and increases opportunities for insurgents to swim within their midst.

An alternative strategy is to encourage our friends to expand their patronage networks into more contested areas, effectively spreading support for the U.S. via informal indigenous means. Such a strategy might slow the movement of projects to more contested areas, but such efforts will be established on a more secure foundation. Additionally, projects sponsored by our friends are likely to strengthen friendly forces and send a clear message to those on the fence about our constancy and motivations.

Establishing alternative spheres of influence. At times, local government officeholders are unpopular and their actions increase instability and discontent. Local loyalties to us can be gained through channeling development projects and humanitarian assistance through local leaderships, not government sub-governors or governors.

Patronage provided directly to local legitimate authorities strengthens alternative networks to gain the support of the population, increases local stability, and acts to counterbalance unpopular government authorities.

Securing loyalty of isolated parochial groups. Conflict between local and national authorities is greatest in isolated, parochial areas where the national government has little presence. Unfortunately, extending government authority to them often drives these parochial authorities to side with our enemies in an attempt to retain their local autonomy and authority.

An alternative strategy is to gain the support of these parochial groups against adversary groups through patronage, and avoid being seen as turning over their authority to the capital. Longer term, we can expect that the benefits of effective government, a prosperous economy and modern life attract youth to urban centers where national authority is entrenched, tying parochial communities with the national society.

Seizing key terrain. There are at times key populations from which we need information or terrain for which we seek to deny to enemy transit. Targeting patronage operations can be an important tool for achieving these objectives.

Ways

The ways to engage as a patron varies across cultures. Given this understanding, there are a few general guidelines that apply across cultural contexts:

Whom to engage: A commander must enter into patron-client relations appropriate to his rank. Entering into a patron-client relation with a local village headman devalues relations with those of higher status and opens up perceived opportunities for patronage among a large array of prospective clients, which will be impossible to manage.

Relationship: Establishing a patron-client relation requires person-to-person interactions that create friendly ties and a sense of mutual obligation. This means periodic face-to-face meetings.

	Current Civil-Military	As Patron
Authority	Impersonal/Official	Personal/Status
Intent	Impartial	Partial/Favor
Terms	Explicit	Implicit and Explicit
Obligation	Grant	Reciprocal
Duration	Fixed Period	Undefined

Typically, a prelude to establishing a patron-client relation is hospitality that signifies willingness to form a personal relation. Meetings should appropriately acknowledge the participants' status and ongoing obligations. Exchanges may not be equal to assure that the reciprocal obligations continue. Indeed, a patron-client relation may end when it is made clear that the exchanges have been equalized.

> Favors must be given back and forth at intervals that are sufficiently short to prevent either ally from beginning to fear that the alliance has lapsed and sufficiently long to prevent him from thinking that the other ally is eager to rid himself of the obligation. Indeed, because the purpose of the exchange is to keep the alliance alive, the balancing out of favors at any one point in time is avoided....typically each tries to overrepay the previous....At another level of interaction, a major function of dyadic [between two people] alliance is to provide each ally assurance of future aid in time of need. (Lande 1977: xxvi-xxvii)

Establishing a patronage relationship means limiting the attitude of impersonal (professional) and impartial dealings. Patronage is a private and not a public means of gaining support. Publicity may violate implied obligations and discredit a client. Patronage obligations of personal friendship are "in addition to" official relations. The personal nature of the relations should be kept private.

Reciprocal Obligations: Obligations in patron-client relations are diffuse and implicit, as in a friendship. The commander should be careful to tactfully exclude what may be implicit, but is unwanted, in such a package deal.

The scope of the package deal depends on the nature of the patron-client tie. A relationship that is highly personal–perhaps involving the patron establishing a relation with the client's family–entails implicit obligations that are of wide scope, are more diffuse and take on the quality of a moral obligation. To treat such a highly personal relationship as a contingent, economic-type transaction is likely to result in resentment. Obligations where relations are more businesslike–arranged in more official settings without exchanging more intimate details–yet conform to friendship forms are likely to produce more specific and limited expectations. If, however, they are too businesslike, they may be easily abandoned for better alternatives.

While obligations are personal, they also are instrumental. Prospective clients will seek the best bargain they can achieve. If the patron seems to have limited options and the client has many, the cost of patronage may be very high. But where clients have limited options and the patron many, the cost to the patron may be relatively low. In a counterinsurgency environment, clients may feel that they have many options and the patron few (even if

that's untrue). Clients may assume, unless shown proof to the contrary, that the patron is not aware of alternative options. The client then may demand a high price for his loyalty.

In general, establishing wide-ranging patronage networks is best left to local nationals. Attempts by U.S. forces to do this are likely to bring U.S. favorites into competition with a wide array of patron-client networks (including those of host government actors). Such an approach will probably be costly because of the large number of likely unintended consequences (second- and third-order effects) and because the cost of clientage will be bid upwards. The goal of U.S. military efforts should be narrowly focused to establishing conditions that improve stability and deny insurgents the support of the population. Such a goal may be achieved by creating narrowly focused patronage operations for targeted security objectives.

Patronage operations in general should be integrated with the general security efforts and be deconflicted with information operation and national development efforts. Ideally, patronage operations also contribute to and should be synchronized with longer-term development led by the U.S. Agency for International Development. Often what gains immediate support from locals differs from what is needed for long-term development.

Development assistance is frequently framed as a unilateral, benevolent gift that gains the giver little or no loyalty or support from the local population. On the other hand, the priority for patronage operations is to achieve immediate increases in local support and security in order to buy time to establish conditions for longer-term development efforts. Commanders' use of patronage should be "in addition to" developmental assistance and should further immediate security objectives first.

Means

Commanders in the field can provide several kinds of patronage, such as security, prestige, and assistance projects. Patronage differs from general development assistance in that instrumental friendship is first established, a package deal is agreed upon, including the obligation of support in return, and the parties agree that the exchange of benefits is reciprocal, iterative, and extends into an undefined future.

Security: An obligation to provide security in return for support may be powerful, but is costly and normally impractical when boots-on-the-ground presence is thin. Where local militias are present, patronage obligations for providing security support to assist the local militia in return for their and the population's loyalty may be possible. Such obligations personally made by the commander are likely to be more binding.

Prestige and advice: In many societies like Afghanistan, soldiers and holders of power are held in high regard. Those who claim a "friendship" relation with the commander gain prestige, which increases their local influence. Prestige is an important resource that can be dispensed through engagements with local nationals. Further, commanders are often in a position to provide advice–a primary role of patrons–to local patrons. Such advice often elicits loyalty over a longer time period than the granting of material benefits. However, engagements should be crafted to communicate friendship ties and not contractual ones.

Projects: Patronage is the fulfillment of reciprocal obligations, rather than simply the delivery of projects. The building of a local government center undertaken by outside contractors or a one-time make-work project is unlikely to establish ongoing obligations. Further, such projects may look like they are demonstrating the central government's power over local authorities, thus they also will be more subject to pilferage by locals. A stream of smaller projects that involve local labor and that will be a source of future local employment can create more lasting ties.

Humanitarian Assistance (HA): HA (including MEDCAPs and VETCAPs) may be a useful means for providing patronage, since it involves a stream of resources that intermediate-patrons can distribute to their clients and it closely resembles traditional patronage practices. It is noteworthy that, currently, HA is often distributed through local patronage channels but without an obligation for loyalty to U.S. forces or the host government, and is done so sporadically.

In sum, we are not advocating a strategy but a tactic of patronage. Patronage should be avoided where possible, not least because such relations require intensive focus and thought to be successful.

However, patronage selectively used as a tactic can increase support and stability in the short to intermediate term. Such an approach buys time for longer term nation building measures to have effect.

Conclusion

In societies where patron-client ties prevail, failure to understand these ties increases the risk for instability and that may strengthen insurgents, and failure to leverage patron-client ties increases the costs of gaining popular support.

But, patron-client relations conflict with our vision of a just society. Imposing our vision on other societies is often resisted and can turn a population against us and against the institutions we seek to build. The cost of intolerance of patron-client ties may be greater than we can afford.

This creates a dilemma we may be facing in Afghanistan. Any transformational efforts that seek to mitigate the root drivers of conflict is a long-term one, stretching over generations and in our view best led by host governments assisted by our civilian U.S. Government agencies. The basic "modernizing" premises on which we have based our efforts are far from proven, and our limited local knowledge makes implementation harder, especially when we resist using local means of political organization.[8]

In Afghanistan, the decline in support for us and the Karzai government and the spread of insecurity may be driven not just by our adversaries, but also by our own good, but misdirected intentions. We propose a resolution to this dilemma by selectively adopting local practices of patronage as a tactic and suspending our ethnocentric biases against these practice s.

Endnotes

1. For examples of limited treatment of patron-client ties see FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, 2007, 96 and Small-Unit Leader's Guide to Counterinsurgency (USMC 2006: 34).

2. There are many definitions of patron-client relations. We adapted the above from James C. Scott, "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," *The American Political Science Review* (1972), 66:1, 91-113.

3. John Duncan, "Peasant Society in Clientelist Politics," *In Friends, Followers, and Factions* by Steffen W. Schmidt, Luara Guasti, Carl H. Lande and James C. Scott, (Berkely: University of California Press, 1977) 148.

4. Simona Piattoni, ed., *"Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic Representation"* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

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Cultural IQ: Constructing Cross-Cultural Frames of Reference and Inference

by Hugh M. Lewis, PhD

Introduction

In the operational environment, cultural IQ is the measure of the capacity to respond appropriately to culturally related problems in situations as they arise in a manner that consistently avoids mistakes leading to unfortunate consequences and contributes positively to overall mission success. A relatively high cultural IQ, in terms of high levels of effective cultural operational function and performance, is seen as evidence of acquired cultural expertise and cross-cultural competence. The operator has a clear grasp and implicit understanding of the cultural models and rule systems that guide behavior in cross-cultural settings, many of which may be generalized across different cultural contexts and settings. The effective military culture operator functions as a kind of cultural or cross-cultural system in a holistic and self-conscious manner guided by the following traits:

1. Comprehends an operating environment as representing a complex web of relationships and is capable of responding appropriately to cues in that environment.
2. Is consistently capable of engaging holistically with the entire environment and understands the environment as a system.
3. Is consistently able to understand feedback from the environment and responds appropriately and in a timely, intelligent, and rational manner to that feedback.
4. Is capable of making minor corrections or adjustments in relationships with the environment that generate large effects as a consequence of the complex nonlinear dynamics of the system.

Culture notoriously resists analytical definition. We suspect that cross-cultural competence positively correlates with cultural intelligence, but don't know exactly how to measure or develop this relationship, or even how to clearly and unequivocally define our key terms. And if we lack cultural literacy in our own world, or the capacity or motivation to gain such literacy, then how should we expect to acquire it in any other world? This becomes the ultimate anthropological horizon of all humankind—not knowing what we don't know, or the difference between what we simply don't know and what we can never know. We might like to think of cross-cultural competence as applied cultural awareness. If we don't apply what we know what use is our knowledge? This has been the central dilemma of becoming basic anthropologists in a rapidly changing world, of achieving some agreeable measure of cross-cultural competence.

When we are in foreign lands, we risk a kind of alienation of our being and a sense of dislocation and disorientation in our interaction with strangers. This disorientation affects all that we may do, and usually interferes with our capacity to adjust successfully to our new environment. As we struggle to adapt and learn new ways, we experience overtime a kind of transformation of personality and identity that involves making the strange familiar and the familiar strange.[1] Indeed, the achievement of cultural intelligence does not come without cost, and culture shock, if not preordained as an illness not unlike other stress-related "illnesses," can become quite productive and necessary in gaining cultural understanding.

Anthropological Relativity and Cultural Worldview

Culture is paradigmatic in the Kuhnian sense that our worldview is shaped in basic ways, even our perception of the world, by the subjective cultures we share.[2] This paradigmatic horizon of culture entails that we cannot easily step beyond its boundaries, but that we carry it with us wherever we may travel, in our heads and in our sense of well being. Cross-cultural experiences relativize and marginalize our sense of cultural integrity and completeness of world order, allowing a sense, however relative, of completeness about our world.

The anthropological relativity of knowledge entails that we depend upon complex cognitive maps in our minds to navigate and survive in our world, to negotiate and coordinate with others, and to modify our behavior to match social expectations and constraints. (These maps provide reference points by which we can orient ourselves in relation to our surroundings.)

We depend upon these maps in many different ways, and cannot function in the world without them. These maps are internally embedded and embodied within our experience, and connect symbolic concepts and linguistic encodings with emotional and behavioral patterns of response. These connections anchor our symbolizations to concrete experiences in everyday life, through the articulation of plausibility structures rooted in symbolic analogy and abductive reasoning. All of this knowledge is culturally conditioned through the process of sharing and transference, and our experience of culture is primarily subjective (emic) via this means of sharing. As children we are largely shaped by participation and immersion in our home culture. We model the behavior of others in representational interaction and observation (etic) and we use this modeling as the basis for our own cultural development.

These cognitive maps are symbolically structured as the basic structure and instrumentality of all human knowledge and intuition is fundamentally symbolic. Symbolisms, conventionally defined, shape our view of the world and even pre-structure our perceptions of that world. Symbolic structure serves certain functions of integration of our world upon multiple levels and across many different alternative event structures and sets of circumstances. Symbolic structure, is in an empirical sense, the subjective-objective glue by which cultural integration is maintained in an ongoing manner.

These cultural maps come in the form of multiple overlapping frames of reference and inference by which we construct noetic, normative, and behavioral models of our world upon multiple levels. Frames of reference and inference provide us with a handle by which we can empirically measure and analyze human cultural differentials.

Cross-Cultural Research and Social Comparison

All cultural research is implicitly comparative. We compare ourselves, our own beliefs and way of doing things against the life ways of others. In social life, we continuously compare ourselves with others important in our world, whether deliberately or inadvertently as an unintended consequence of our own actions and value judgments.

We cannot help but compare one another in many different, often subtle ways, and upon multiple levels, as both an individual against other individuals, and as a member of a group or subgroup as against members of other groups or subgroups. Invariably, in our social knowledge, we adopt labels (terms of reference) that foster stereotypes and that tend to reify the constructed realities of difference that may in fact be nothing more or less than our own imaginary projections and preferences.

Thus we continuously construct upon our social identity, and the identities of others around us, by means of the construction of relative symbolic frames of reference that allow us to make inferences about our social world. As we test our knowledge against our experiences socially in different behavioral settings and social arenas, we daily modify, evaluate, and reconstruct these identities, and the frames of reference and inference upon which they are founded.

This process of social and cultural comparison depends upon symbolic frames of reference and inference that we are normally quite familiar with, developed and inculcated within since childhood. Frames of reference that are normalized and internalized allow us to make intuitive judgments on the fly, to deal with rapidly changing situations on a daily basis, and to make inferences more or less accurately and reliably in our dealing with others in complex situations. Formalized symbolic frameworks allow us to legitimize and rationalize our beliefs and behaviors in socially acceptable terms, and to adjust our behaviors according to social norms and constraints. Such frames of reference and inference work socially because they provide equivalence structures of mutual expectation in social contexts.

Knowing the rules of the road in an American city helps us to negotiate and navigate with other drivers, to avoid collision and potential conflict. When we cross cultural boundaries and deal with others of considerably different and foreign backgrounds from ourselves, such as those who drive on the left hand side of the road instead of the right, our frames

of reference and inference are no longer as effective as before, inviting collision and conflict. This is symbolic frame disruption.

Symbolic Transformation, Transculturative Processes, and Ethno-cultural Development

Human beings are social creatures, and are dependent critically for their survival and sense of well being upon their social identity and their capacity to interact socially with others. We change and develop in large part as a result of our daily social interactions and the consequences of these interactions. We constantly experience the shifting of our symbolic frames of reference and inference.

Cross-cultural contacts or transculturative experiences tend to bring to consciousness those facets of our own identity and worldview that remain normally unconscious and embodied in our everyday behavior. To the extent that we do not understand these critical junctures or objectify these processes in our understanding, we become the victims who remain subjectively vulnerable to the unintended consequences of its interference upon our lives.

When these developmental changes occur across broad streams of cultural differences, they become known as transculturational processes that are primarily face-to-face, involve the interaction of different people from different cultural backgrounds upon many different levels, as well as the resulting processes of social change. The continuous and cumulative effect and outcomes of these processes lead to larger scale social development, reflected in language changes as well as in changes to socio-cultural patterns, human behaviors, and the artifacts of the reproduction of ethno-cultural identity. This larger scale historical process can be referred to overall as ethno-cultural development.

The Role of Comparative Frameworks of Reference/Inference in Military Anthropology

How to make objective what is otherwise humanly subjective? How to make explicit what is usually implicit? Participant-observation, the core method of traditional ethnographic research, embodies an inherent contradiction and is somewhat of a methodological oxymoron. A point is soon reached in ethnographic research that further participation may preclude critical observation, or vice versa, studied observation may interfere with participatory involvement. This ties to central theoretical, methodological and ethical dilemmas of conducting such field work, and constitutes an inherent ambiguity of cross-cultural research. How native should we become in order to remain effective and objective as observers, without compromising in some manner our own identities?

Participant-observation by itself appears to be a method developed in traditional community settings, increasingly inadequate to the challenges of effective cross-cultural research in contemporary and urbanized settings that may involve complex patterns of stratification and social differentiation defying easy description.

Fortunately, the human capacity for culture permits enough latitude for individuals to navigate and shift cultural orientations over the course of a lifetime. When we experience people of other cultures, we become transformed, and this process of transformation, akin to conversion, is the basis of our cultural acquisition. The process of symbolic transformation happens analytically upon two general levels, the group or subgroup ("etic") level, and the individual ("emic") level.

Several things are known about this process:

1. It is critically tied to language as a central mechanism of symbolic mediation and communication, albeit in complex, underdetermined and indirect ways.
2. Cultural acquisition is greatest and most natural in childhood, and the capacity for acquisition decreases with adult age.
3. It is critically mediated and brokered by significant others within an environment that consists of a relatively organized system of behavioral settings and processes.
4. It is symbolically organized, expressed and integrated, linking subjective, psychological realities to objective, social states of being and identities and containing cognitive and emotive as well as behavioral components of expression.
5. Strong ethnocentric and egotistical attachments (narcissism) tend to inhibit the processes of cross-cultural acquisition after adolescence

6. Levels of cross-cultural competency, flexibility and adaptive capacities are linked in a direct correlation to previous cross-cultural experiences. The greater the cross-cultural interaction on a daily basis, the lower the levels of ethnocentric bias that tend to inhibit or interfere with such interaction.

7. Secondary gain (labeling, learned helplessness, dependency) may interfere with such processes of capacity development (for instance, labeling culture shock as a "disease" to be cured.)

8. Acquisition of culture, or culturation, is a gradual process that extends developmentally throughout a person's lifetime.

9. Cultural acquisition depends upon processes of cultural transmission, or transculturation, which may be analytically understood as vertical (intergenerational), diagonal (institutional) or horizontal (media) in their primary directions of transmission through time, and as one-to-one, one-to-a-few, one-to-many or many-to-one or a few-to-one.

The systematic development of encompassing, comprehensive and stratified frames of reference is an essential part of the cross-cultural research and development process. Frames of reference can be considered "background knowledge" that is mostly tacit and that serves to contextualize "foreground" or focal knowledge which is mostly explicit and rendered meaningful through its reference frames. By the invocation and contextualization of frames of reference, fore-grounded knowledge is made significant and understandable. Inference involves the reduction of ambiguity of relation between foreground and background. Foreign or alternative frames of reference are rarely clear or readily available, and the perceived lack of relation between background and foreground relativizes (decontextualizes) our knowledge and leads to misconception and misinterpretation (contextual ambiguity) of the foreign fieldwork context.

In the construction of such formal frames of reference and inference to help us objectify our understanding of cross-cultural differentials, we must take into account several facets of the ethnographic research process that constitute cornerstones of the central methodology of participant-observation.

Ethnocentric Bias: This is a subjective, subconscious attachment to primary cultural orientations. Our attachment to deep-seated, normally unconscious and subsurface cultural norms and values may interfere with and filter our cross-cultural experiences.

Culture Shock and Transcultural Shift: There are different facets of the cross-cultural experience, but culture shock becomes, especially during the intermediate phases, a defining facet of all such experiences, leading normally into what can be called normal frame disruption and psychological-behavioral reactions to such disruption. Our normal frames of cultural reference and inference become dysfunctional and maladaptive in the cross-cultural contact situation, and constantly require frame repair and remediation. Culture shock, if handled appropriately, is a constructive process in the acquisition of new cultural knowledge and competency

Critical Inter-Cultural Mediation: Cultural mediation involves a significant reference other with whom one identifies and achieves some sense of symbolic transference, and develops a sense of deep rapport and trust upon an interpersonal level. These individuals serve as a bridge and a role-model and informal teacher in the processes of cultural acquisition. From the standpoint of trans-cultural processes, the central role of the cultural mediator is the process of remediation and repair of disrupted frames of reference and inference primarily through the use of the conversational apparatus. Face-to-face, interpersonal interactions involving increasing rapport and trust with significant others becomes critical to the transference processes that are central to symbolic transformation of identity and one's sense of subjective reality.

Tolerance Training and Hermeneutic-Critical Appreciation of Cultural Differences: The cultivation of a sense of openness to new experiences and a curiosity about differences and details of other people combines to foster attitudes of universal respect and a sense of tolerance for even extreme forms of cultural variation. Such tolerance comes through time and previous experience involving the studied development of a hermeneutic-critical attitude of universal appreciation that is developed primarily in face-to-face and small group behavioral settings. Such tolerance allows us to understand

and be understood by others in a relatively non-threatening manner.

Methodologies for Reference/ Inference Frame Construction

While it is possible to pursue the development of formal methodological frames of reference and inference, which can be quite useful in symbolic profiling of cultural differentials and social groupings and sub-groupings, the long-run aim of cross-cultural competency development runs counter to the final aims of the conduct of cross-cultural research for either research or development purposes. The difference is between formally understanding the informal rules of the game, and becoming an actual player who can win the game by applying the rules, however informally.

A specific set of ethnographic and "ethno-semantic" research methodologies have emerged in field applications of military anthropology as pertinent and appropriate to the task of constructing cross-cultural frames of reference and inference in a consistent and empirically objective manner.[3] These extend beyond the basic methods of participant observation, statistical surveys and counts, behavioral scans and time-allocation studies, to embrace in a systematic manner symbolic knowledge and associated behavior associated with such knowledge. One of the most basic methods is the non-biased elicitation of key terms of reference and relational inferences associated with these terms. Such elicitation is normally accomplished through free listings or through unstructured interviews upon key topics.

Listing such key terms on cards allows the informant to organize the cards according to saliencies and biases which become apparent in the course of the interview and permit hidden relationships between terms to emerge from the interview. These pile-sorts can be easily recorded and kept as a permanent record, and can be easily translated into a matrix and a graph representation. Pile sorts can be extended and elaborated over multiple interviews, and the sorts obtained from one individual or set of individuals may be compared and contrasted to those of other sets of individuals obtained independently.

Pile sorts represent only one of many kinds of structured tasks that may be effectively utilized in the systematic acquisition of data for construction of empirically valid frames of reference and inference. Many such tasks were traditionally employed in the comparative analysis of subjective culture, including different forms of psychological projection tasks.[4] All such tasks provide some kind of method of measuring performance against a normative and explicitly defined standard, and constitute a method of nomothetic comparison across individuals and different sets of individuals, as well as potential idiographic description of both individuals and groups through time.[5]

Focus groups and group interviews and meetings have emerged in the course of research as important and productive knowledge elicitation devices, particularly when such group settings involve people brought together on the basis of shared attributes or common expertise or experience upon a given topic of interest. Individuals in the company of related or similar individuals may serve to stimulate the elicitation of data that may otherwise not be made available, and such settings provide contexts for interaction and observation, if appropriately structured or left relatively unstructured, in order for people to behave and interact in relatively unconstrained and spontaneous ways.[6]

Further Considerations of Cross-Cultural Competency Development

Frames of reference and inference do not have to be formal affairs based upon months or years of research and thousands of pages of data. We might measure the success of effective frames of reference and inference by their ability to provide coordinates for the successful navigation of a foreign culture or cultural setting, as well as for effective instruction in such competency development. In other words, we construct frames of reference and inference on an everyday informal basis as a matter of applied social interaction in a range of alternative behavioral settings, at work, in school, at home, on the road or in the marketplace. The success of these frameworks, and our capacity to amend and adjust them to accommodate changing social circumstances, is measured in a tacit manner by the way that they facilitate our adaptation to these settings, particularly in relation to others in our social environment.

We conclude by asking some fundamental questions regarding the possible predisposition of people to cross-cultural competency and acquisition.

In short, some people, by virtue of their personalities and cognitive styles, may be more adept at facilitation of the cross-cultural experience than other people. It is difficult to generalize across the board on this issue, except that substantial empirical evidence suggests an association between relative field or frame dependence/independence, possibly linked to relative contextuality and contextual dependency of a culture, and ethnocentric/closed minded orientation that precludes successful cross-cultural competency building, but this evidence also suggests an indirect and complex interdependent relationship.

Experience in education demonstrates that role play and performance in contextually defined settings provides the best educational vehicle for the teaching of cross-cultural competencies, particularly if these educational experiences are mediated by significant reference and counter-reference others. It is clear, like language, if one does not practice one's skills, one cannot build and improve upon them, and this is doubly the case for those who tend to be less talkative and less social. Beyond this, teaching contexts promoting social tolerance of differences, and the critical, hermeneutical appreciation of these differences, particularly as mediated through face-to-face interactions with significant counter-reference others, helps to foster the openness of attitude that is conducive to cross-cultural acquisition and competency-skill building.

Such educational alternatives tend to be high end in terms of cost and comparatively intensive in terms of instructional alternatives, beyond the means of most instructional contexts, and may include any of the following:

1. *A Universal Kahn*, a prototypical "high-context" cultural informant and representative who interacts with students in structured scenarios.
2. Contextual based language training/cultural immersion training.
3. Guest speakers in semi-structured cross-cultural activities.
4. The foreign make-shift village/living history scenarios.
5. Field training schools, engaging local host families and participants.

In fact all of these alternatives can be most effectively combined into a single critical and integrated teaching context, with the caveat that cross-cultural competency development is a life-long journey, and not a three day training mission.

Finally, when we consider the actual application of military anthropology and cultural competency training in field settings, we must pay critical heed to the built-in trade-offs in any potentially violent situation between the maintenance, enhancement or preservation of security and the risks taken in participatory involvement and interaction with native informants for the sake of gaining critical knowledge. This is especially so in highly stressful situations involving life or death decisions that may interfere with our capacity or motivation to "go native."

Military presence tends to work in the long run against anthropological efforts. Where alternative sources of intelligence may become available, the tendency appears to be to opt for the source that is perceived as more credible, with credibility being determined by reference to one's own relative situation and one's own cultural frames of reference/inference. It appears that the bias with military operations will be to opt for security over opportunity for gaining new intelligence, even if trading-off intelligence for security actually jeopardizes both security as well as intelligence opportunities. A sense of security may be as perceived as it is real, just as a sense of threat may be more a matter of perception than reality. As a consequence, the overriding tendency would be to listen to and seek out the advice of a higher ranking government official versus the counsel of a local elder or headman, and to ignore counter-evidence that might contradict one's own cultural predilections.

Such bias may result in compromising both security and intelligence, whereas cultural intelligence seeking behavior that is construed as risky might result serendipitously in both enhanced security and intelligence. Anthropologists in fieldwork are normally expected to and often must run risks to gain knowledge that military personnel normally cannot afford to take. Perhaps it is wise that an anthropologist not lead a military brigade to the field, and that a military brigade in the field not attempt too much anthropological research, but where do we finally draw the line in the course of cross-cultural competency development?

Endnotes

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Why is Culture Important?

Cross-cultural competency (3C) is a critical combat multiplier for commanders at all levels that enables successful mission accomplishment. Possessing cultural understanding is one of the critical components for Soldiers who interface with the local population. At a minimum, soldiers must possess cultural awareness. Leaders must demonstrate cultural understanding and be proficient in applying cultural knowledge effectively to achieve mission objectives. The TCC can help Soldiers gain this mission essential proficiency. Lessons learned from 10 years of operational deployments clearly indicate that 3C is a huge and indispensible combat multiplier.

OVER 160,000 SERVICE MEMBERS TRAINED

The TCC supports Soldiers and leaders throughout the Army and other services in numerous ways. It conducts ARFORGEN/predeployment training for any contingency; trains culture trainers; and produces professional military education (over 160,000 military personnel trained since 2004). The TCC will create or tailor any products deploying units require.

The TCC has developed several distance learning products available for facilatated instruction or individual student use. As an example, two seasons of "Army 360" that the TCC produced contain 19 episodes of missions run in six countries. "Army 360" is an interactive media instruction (IMI) training product which meets the Army Learning Concept 2015 learner-centric requirements. The TCC is in the process of turning the "Army 360" IMI into digital apps which will be easily accessible for all Soldiers. The TCC produced an Initial Military Trainee (IMT) training product for the initial entry level Soldier called "IMT-BCT What is Culture?" We are also producing a BOLC IMI product. Both products are or will be available via the TCC website. The TCC is expanding other products into the apps arena as well as developing additional distance learning products to provide new 3C training and sustainment.

The TCC produces cargo pocket-sized training products to include smart books and smart cards, as well as digital downloads for smart devices. Areas covered include Iraq, Afghanistan, North Korea, Democratic Republic of Congo, and more. Let us know what we can produce for you. For a complete list of materials, see: **https://ikn.army.mil/apps/tccv2/**.

The Role of the Military Attaché as Cultural Advisor in Cross-Cultural Issues: China 1998



by Jim Schnell (Colonel, USAF Reserve, Ret.), PhD

Introduction

President Bill Clinton visited China in the summer of 1998 for a ten day tour with stops starting in Xian, Beijing, Guilin, Shanghai, and ending in Hong Kong. His trip included meetings with Chinese President Jiang Zemin and other Chinese leaders. Key issues intended for discussion during his trip included the opening of Chinese markets for U.S. trade, human rights abuses, Taiwan independence, and weapons proliferation. Clinton's trip received wide coverage in world media. There was significant diplomatic context for his trip and the backdrop for his visit had impact, directly and indirectly, on the messages exchanged during his stay in China. This article examines some of the many macro and micro level matters that were addressed during his visit and the role of the military attaché as cultural advisor with such cross-cultural issues.

I was in China during the period leading up to Clinton's arrival, throughout his stay in China, and after his departure in my capacity as Assistant Air Attaché to the U.S. Defense Attaché Office in Beijing. Four months later I served as the Defense Attaché Office's Deputy Mission Commander for President Clinton's visit to Malaysia for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation conference in Kuala Lumpur.

The military attaché serves a number of functions in such scenarios. He/she is often the "mortar between the bricks" that keeps events on track and serves as a buffer for issues that can arise involving cross-cultural understanding. The attaché is a cultural advisor and provides guidance for all aspects of planning and execution with regard to such high level delegations. The military attaché builds upon these experiences insofar as each experience provides increased awareness regarding what the attaché should be doing to assist and how that can be accomplished.

The issues addressed by Clinton during his visit were varied. Regarding the trade imbalance, there was a 49.7 billion dollar trade deficit between China and the U.S. during the 12 months leading up to the summit.[1] The U.S. wanted China to open its markets

to more U.S. goods. Human rights were an issue in two main areas: the suppression of Tibet and religious and political freedoms throughout China. The U.S. was also opposed to weapon sales by China to Pakistan and Iraq. Probably the main long standing issue dealt with the independence of Taiwan.

These issues stressed at the summit had complexities inherent in the varied objectives of the parties concerned and were even more complex than an initial reading might convey due to the differing cultural backgrounds in which they were rooted. China has a significantly different culture than the U.S. and the summit issues must be understood in light of this difference.

Cultural Differences

China has a huge population of 1.3 billion people, roughly one-fourth of the world's population and over four times that of the U.S., occupying a land mass similar to the U.S. Most live in the eastern region of the country, particularly the urban areas. In short, it is very crowded. Population size is an issue in and of itself (i.e., the one-child per family policy) and it is a factor that seeps into many other issues regarding life in China. The reader should consider how different life would be in his/her city or town if the number of inhabitants was multiplied by four but the land mass remained the same. Friday afternoon rush hour would no doubt extend into Saturday morning.

China has been engaged in significant continual change for the past thirty-five years as it re-opens to the outside world. Although it has been a large-scale modernization process, Chinese culture has ancient roots and the modernization rests on that foundation. In many respects adoption of western technological innovations make them seem similar to the U.S. but the context within which these changes occur is distinctly Chinese.

Their governance system is different than that of the U.S. We usually think of this difference being expressed in terms of the Chinese embracing socialism and communism and the U.S. capitalism and democracy. Equally important is that the Chinese do not stress rule of law as much as we do. Decision making at all levels is very much affected by the political climate at that particular time. There is a paradox inherent in this relationship. "Polling in America and Europe shows a favorable view of China's people (which probably has been heightened by the politeness and respect to all athletes shown by the Chinese Olympic audiences) and a negative view of its government."[2]

This phenomenon is commensurate with the perspective of China as a high context culture and the U.S. as a low context culture. That is, decision making (or having a sense of policy) in China requires a sense of context within which one exists, whereas in the U.S., which operates more in a low context system, one can seek explicitly stated laws, guidelines or policies that do not necessitate a grasp of prevailing political sensitivities. Awareness of such sensitivities can help promote a cause in the U.S. but, overall, the rule of law is primary.

High context relations rely heavily on circumstances and low context relations are more directly linked to what is said.[3] One can recognize the relevance of a long term orientation via the high context Chinese perspective. "China ranks highest, by far, of seven nations compared on long-term orientation. The United States and Great Britain, in contrast, rate low here within a separate batch of 29 countries."[4] These are typical of the concerns that must be considered when focusing on the dynamics impacting U.S.-China relations.

Diplomacy tends to be a high context phenomenon. Often symbolic means or gestures are used to express intention or point of view. This is done to avoid armed conflict, which is far more direct and representative of low context actions, and to avoid long term protracted disagreements. U.S. diplomacy in China has unique complexities because we are a low context culture practicing in a high context environment with (and in) a high context culture. This creates a situation where there is increased room for misunderstanding.

Summit Issues

I will address some of the major issues of the summit and some of the very minor issues I observed related to President Clinton's visit to Xian. These representative issues are noteworthy because they exemplify high context diplomacy that occurred along with low context issues, both expressed through high context channels. The more minor behind-the-scenes issues provided a backdrop for what transpired on the macro level and best exemplify the role of the military attaché as cultural advisor with cross-cultural issues.

The biggest issue addressed during Clinton's visit dealt with the independence of Taiwan. Taiwan has functioned independently of Chinese control since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949. Taiwan sees itself as a sovereign state and China sees it as a renegade province that is part of China. The U.S. affirms that Taiwan can return to Chinese control if it chooses but that Taiwan must exercise self-determination to do so and that there can be no use (or threat) of force by China to promote such an event. While in Shanghai, Clinton seemed to back off of the U.S. position by stating that the U.S. is opposed to Taiwan independence as well as Taiwan joining the United Nations and other organizations that membership in would assume Taiwan independence.[5] This statement gestured a softening of U.S. policy regarding the importance of Taiwan self-determination.

The U.S. Senate responded to Clinton's gesture with a gesture of its own. "The U.S. Senate voted 92-0 to approve a resolution. . . . that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means, with the consent of the people of Taiwan. . . . (and) also reaffirmed Washington's commitment to help Taipei (the capital) maintain enough self-defense capability."[6] The Chinese government "strongly condemned the U.S. Congress for its adoption of two resolutions that provide encouragement to the Taiwan administration. . . . reiterated Beijing's view that . . . . The reunification of China is purely China's internal affair and no foreign interference will be allowed."[7]

Another high context issue that had political ramifications dealt with President Clinton being officially welcomed to Beijing in a Tiananmen Square ceremony. In 1989, hundreds of participants in the media dubbed "pro-democracy movement" were gunned down by government troops in and around Tiananmen Square. For a U.S. president and a leader of the free world to participate in such a ceremony at that location implied U.S. support for that Chinese government action. Clinton was criticized for this, even before he left the U.S. by U.S. politicians and Chinese dissidents.

Clinton provided verbal (low context) clarification for any misinterpretations of his appearance at Tiananmen Square when, during a live televised press conference with Chinese President Jiang Zemin. Clinton stated "I believe, and the American people believe, that the use of force and the tragic loss of life (in Tiananmen Square) was wrong."[8] Thus, on this issue, Clinton conveyed a high context gesture to appease the Chinese government and followed it up with a low context gesture to appease critics in the U.S. Similarly, "Mr. Jiang's words conveyed important nuances to Chinese listeners. His characterization of Tiananmen as a 'political disturbance' departed from the official line that it was a 'counter revolutionary riot'."[9]

That the press conference occurred at all was equally important as the content that was discussed. Such a press conference is common in the U.S. but unheard of in China. "The two exchanged their opinions and answered reporters' questions in front of a TV audience of millions of startled Chinese citizens who heard for the first time a foreign leader speaking out about the Tiananmen Square crackdown. The nationally broadcast live press conference was unprecedented, frank and open."[10] The press conference, scheduled for 15 minutes, lasted 75 minutes.

Clinton scored points with U.S. religious leaders and human rights activists by worshipping in a Beijing church as an expression of freedom of religion. This action could also be construed as high context support for Tibetan autonomy due to the unique religious foundation of Tibet. "Clinton told

the audience of about 2,300 that the Christian faith calls for unity of people around the world. He also praised the growth of Christianity in China."[11] The Chinese government is usually strongly opposed to any organizations, especially those outside of China that threaten control maintained by the Communist Party. The Chinese saved face in this encounter because Clinton worshipped at Chungwenmen Church, which is a government sanctioned church and thus an extension of the government.

By the end of the summit, China and the U.S. had agreed on 47 issues that were perceived to be mutually beneficial to both countries. These agreements were in areas including: economics and commerce, energy and environment, enhancing arms control, human rights, law, military-to-military relations, people-to-people exchanges, and political and security areas. An agreement, that was conveyed to the media as primary, was that the U.S. and China agreed to de-target their nuclear warheads (that are aimed at each other), decreasing the possibility that there might be an accidental firing of deadly weapons. However, it is widely acknowledged that a de-targeted nuclear device can be re-activated within a short span of time, perhaps only ten minutes.[12] Regarding this agreement, a newspaper editorial stated "They pretended that a symbolic agreement to re-target missiles had serious implications for stability."[13]

Micro Level Issues

The issues described thus far dealt with President Clinton's visit at a macro-level and addressed the primary reasons for his visit to China. However, the role of high context communication channels illustrated in these primary issues is also illustrated in the micro-level issues that existed in relation to his trip. These minor issues and, in some cases, very minor issues consistently evidenced low context issues expressed through high context channels.

My own experiences and observations as a military attaché in Xian, primarily at the airport, serve to illustrate this phenomenon and exemplify how the military attaché serves as a cultural advisor with cross-cultural issues and the relevance of such encounters.

I arrived in Xian six days before President Clinton arrived and stayed there 11 days. Relations with our Chinese counterparts were always cordial but there was an underlying friction that existed regarding control. They perceived themselves to be in control insofar as it was their airport and city. We (U.S. representatives) perceived ourselves to be in control insofar as we had authority and responsibilities that were manifested in/conveyed through our standard operating procedures and objectives for our support of a presidential visit. At times, notions of span of control overlapped with low context issues. These low context issues were typically expressed through high context channels. The following are representative.

The Air Force One (presidential plane) advance team, consisting of two officers, arrived in Xian and went through their checklist of requirements regarding the landing of the plane landing at the Xian airport. They conveyed to the Chinese airport administration that when Air Force One landed at the airport they would handle all aspects of directing the aircraft to its resting place on the tarmac. No assistance from the Chinese was needed nor would any interference be permitted. It seemed like a relatively simple issue and there was no controversy related to this stipulation until minutes before the plane touched down at the airport.

At that time, one of the U.S. advance team officers was standing in place on the tarmac, batons in hand, to direct the Air Force One pilot to his parking place on the tarmac. The other officer was standing with the rest of us (U.S. and Chinese support organization members) and about 40 representatives from the international media. Members of the Secret Service, White House Communications, U.S. motorcade staff, etc. were strategically placed to carry out their duties. The image conveyed in this scene clearly established the U.S. support groups were in charge of the process.

Without warning, as cameras were clicking and videocams recording, one of the Chinese engineers walked out on the tarmac with his batons in hand and stood next to the advance team officer (who was directing Air Force One into place) as if he was co-directing the process. The officer became emphatically insistent that the Chinese engineer vacate the tarmac because his being there ran the risk of confusing the pilot. The Chinese engineer would not vacate the tarmac. Meanwhile, as somewhat of a side show, the media observed this issue of con-

trol. A quick compromise was achieved whereby the Chinese engineer could stand next to the Air Force One officer but not gesture in any way.

The U.S. personnel brought in to handle this operation were no doubt selected because of their high competency levels. I speculate that such high skill levels are frequently accompanied by a strong emphasis on stressing standards. It was my observation that cross-cultural understanding was secondary to mission objectives, as manifested in the behavior of both Americans and Chinese.

A few days before the President arrived, HMX-1 (the presidential helicopter) was flown in to Xian in a U.S. transport aircraft. There was much excitement when the U.S. C-5 (a very large aircraft) touched down at the Xian airport, given the friction that has occasionally existed between the U.S. and China over the years. A Chinese video cameraman taped the activity around the aircraft. There were also about 50 observers.

A security detail of U.S. Marines immediately surrounded the HMX-1 when it was unloaded. They were clearly focused on their primary objective of protecting the helicopter and they had no interest in entertaining Chinese inquisitiveness with the helicopter. The Chinese seemed mildly offended that they had to maintain at least six feet distance from the helicopter. The security guards clearly established their high context message of control over the situation.

However, within about 15 minutes, two Chinese workers came to the helicopter carrying a small spraying apparatus that resembled a fire extinguisher. Their stated directive, as immigration control officers, was to spray the tires of the helicopter with insecticide to ensure no insect life was being imported on the helicopter. It hardly seemed necessary but this was the objective.

It was drafty that day and the HMX-1 pilot was fearful the spray might mist onto the unique helicopter paint. It seemed to have become a high context contest for control. There was mild shoving going on as the intended sprayer and his aide inched closer to the helicopter. A frustrated guard summoned me. I suggested a compromise whereby the insecticide could be applied to the helicopter tires with a paint brush but not with a sprayer. Both sides went along with this.

Sometimes, issues would evolve without intention but intention would be perceived. This was a breeding ground for misunderstanding. Most of the U.S. military and Secret Service stayed in one hotel in Xian. I sensed a disgruntled attitude from some Marines one morning and quietly pursued its source. I then saw the reason for the attitude.

A worker at the hotel had been instructed to raise the U.S. flag so it flew on a flag pole adjacent to the Chinese flag (an appropriate symbolic gesture). As he walked through the lobby and out the door through the roadway and over to the flag poles, he loosely carried the U.S. flag in his left hand and it dragged along the ground. Before he raised the Chinese flag, he dropped the U.S. flag on the ground so he could use both hands to raise the Chinese flag. He then raised the U.S. flag.

Hoping to correct the situation, I approached the worker to advise him on our customs and courtesies with the U.S. flag. He conveyed, in my estimation, a lack of interest with my input and I felt I could best modify the situation by seeking an intermediary. I had a vague suspicion the Chinese flag was not treated as we treat the U.S. flag. I spoke to our hotel host, who helped us with a variety of logistical issues during our stay, and she advised the staff about our sensitivities. Our customs and courtesies with the U.S. flag were honored in coming days but it took awhile for the bad feeling to dissipate.

Another high context issue of control that occurred dealt with the periodic landings of our C-5 transport aircraft. The Chinese airport officials were mildly persistent about boarding each landing aircraft, as if they were officially sanctioned to inspect it. Our aircrew liaison staff rejected this insistence. Again, it seemed like a high context issue of clarifying who was in control between the owners of the aircraft and the owners of the tarmac.

The Chinese gave in on this issue but gestured their overall control by slowing down their processing of the C-5 flight plans in their Dispatch Office because of (what seemed to me) fictitious policy infractions by the U.S. aircrews. Over time, as relations warmed among workers on the tarmac, Chinese were invited onto some of the aircraft for tours as a goodwill gesture. The point was made that they could board the aircraft, if invited, but they could not force their way on board. Again, this seemed a high context issue of control.

I had first hand experience with the processing of U.S. aircraft flight plans. I picked up the flight plans from the pilots upon landing, took the flight plans to the Dispatch Office for processing and filing, and returned a copy of the flight plan to the aircraft. It is a fairly simple process that should not have taken more than 20 minutes.

The first time I processed a flight plan I encountered what I perceived to be a high context gesture from Dispatch Office personnel that it clearly had the upper hand in our relationship. The flight plan was rejected three times for menial reasons (flight altitude had been listed in feet instead of meters, some letters were not indicated in capital letters, and they did not want any pencil erasures or corrections on the form). It took two and one-half hours to process the flight plan.

The second time I brought in a flight plan I did not even go to the counter to submit the plan. I sat in a chair patiently until someone inquired, after about 15 minutes, what I wanted. I submitted the form and the plan was approved within 15 minutes. The third time I came in I had the flight plan approved within 20 minutes and was offered tea while I waited. I cannot say for sure but I felt a docile approach, signaling a high context acknowledgment that they were in control, helped me achieve my objectives.

Tolerance for saving face, as a high context gesture, was important. One low context issue, an apparent theft, had to be handled via high context channels to achieve resolution. The U.S. rented locked warehouse space to secure equipment during our stay in Xian. One morning crew members noticed that 12 wooden pallets that had been in the locked warehouse the night before were missing. We reported the missing pallets to our Chinese counterparts and were flatly told that they were not stolen and that perhaps we misplaced them. This was very unlikely given the size of the pallets, that we were working in a very limited area, and that crew members had just seen them the night before.

It became clear to us that, if we reported them as stolen, we probably would not be compensated for them. However, when we agreed that they were merely missing, we received a generous compensation subtracted from the expenditure total we owed them. Thus, tolerance for saving face helped us achieve our objectives.

In a more general sense, the role of context was very relevant in our day to day operations. Context provided the backdrop within which we functioned, much like weather does for a picnic. This was most noticeable when President Clinton arrived in Xian. The airport environment we worked in specifically, and the city of Xian in general seemed to be filled with good will bordering on the euphoric. Somewhat adversarial relationships melted into quasi-friendships as we scrambled to get pictures with each other in front of Air Force One. We laughed and shared the excitement of the moment. It seemed like Christmas. However, the context changed and the euphoria dissipated when Air Force One left Xian and moved on to Beijing. The party was over and it was time to clean-up. The context had changed.

Conclusion

Much of the aforementioned underscored the high context nature of diplomacy. Most of the issues had low context ramifications but these issues tended to be expressed through high context channels. This awareness can help participants better understand such events and it enhances ones ability to function in such a setting. The Clinton trip to China offers insights regarding international diplomacy. Analysis of such phenomena, over time, offers conceptual frameworks that help us better understand the more closely linked world within which we live. "We have to accept that the old world has gone. Cultural/ethnical/regional identity and globalization interface and there are political, economic, social and linguistic implications."[14] This analysis is intended as a contribution to that understanding.

There will always be varied factors that impact how well messages will be understood in cross-cultural exchanges. "Although human communication to a large extent exploits a language code. . . . people may focus on different clues when inferring meanings, and/or they may arrive at different meanings from the same clues. As a result, mismatches may occur in the messages that people think have been communicated."[15] Such factors can be recognized in a wide range of domains. "In general, people from North America, Northern and Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand tend to focus on transactions, value competition, communicate directly, emphasize content, utilize linear logic, prefer flat organizational structures, and rely on litigation. In contrast, people from Mediterranean countries,

Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Central and South America tend to focus on relationships, value collaboration, communicate indirectly, use circular reasoning, prefer hierarchical structures, trust silence, and rely on mediation."[16]

With such understanding comes an appreciation for the relevance of various participants in such scenarios. The military attaché, in his/her role as cultural advisor with cross-cultural issues, exemplifies an essential contributor in these events. Culture provides context and associated cultural variables impact the evolution of such events. Elements such as awareness and acceptance of differences, self-awareness, knowledge of the other culture, and adaptation of relational abilities affect individual cultural competence.[17] The military attaché is recognized as impacting these cultural variables illustrating the essential function of such cultural advisors in these and other cultural contexts.

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

Introduction

Language and culture are interdependent and critically essential for Soldiers and others who strategically and tactically operate within the contemporary operational environment. The U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE) has always supported language training. In 2003, USAICoE recognized the requirement to specifically train Soldiers in cultural awareness because of operational missions that demonstrated the especially wide cultural gulf between our Western world view and that of the Middle Eastern cultures. Besides cultural variances, language differences must also be concurrently addressed in basic survival level instruction often requested by deploying units and commanders.

> ***Language Training. Everyone should learn basic language skills. Every deployed person should be able to greet locals and say "thank-you." Each platoon, or like-sized organization, that will have regular contact with the population should have at least one leader that speaks Dari at least the 0+ level, with a goal of a level 1 in oral communication. These personnel will not replace interpreters, but will enhance the capabilities of the unit. This language skill is as important as your other basic combat skills.***
>
> ***You must understand your Operational Environment. Traditional Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) is insufficient and it is intimate knowledge of the Human Terrain that is paramount. Know the society's leadership systems; learn the National, Provincial, and district government structure. Understand the familial, clan and tribal cultures. What are the relationships and tensions among the separate groups? All of us must learn the ASCOPE (Area, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People and Events) methodology to refine our awareness of the operational environment. This gives us an understanding of civil considerations from the point of view of the population, insurgent, and counterinsurgent. Incorporate early into your training program so concepts can be weaved into all of your exercises, as you prepare to deploy.***
>
> ***– General Stanley McChrystal,***
> ***COIN Training Guidance Memorandum,***
> ***10 November 2009*** [1]

DOD is aware of the critical importance of culture and language training:

> ***"Although not a new problem, the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the need for operational forces to improve their foreign language and cultural awareness capabilities. The Department recognized this and its Strategic Planning Guidance for 2006-2011, issued in March 2004, one year after the commencement of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (the Second Gulf War), called for a comprehensive roadmap for "language transformation.'*** [2]
>
> ***The Strategic Planning Guidance directed that the Roadmap would:***
>
> ***1. Create foundational language and regional area expertise [culture].***
>
> ***2. Build a surge capacity for language and cultural resources.***

3. Establish a cadre of language specialists with advanced proficiency.

4. Better manage and promote military personnel with language skills and regional expertise. [3]

"It is DOD policy, that [f]oreign language and regional expertise be considered critical competencies essential to the DoD mission and shall be managed to maximize the accession, development, maintenance, enhancement, and employment of these critical skills appropriate to the Department of Defense's mission needs. [4]

The interdependence of language and culture may be expressed as "language conveys culture and culture defines language." Franz Boas, a German-American anthropologist and a pioneer of modern anthropology, realized in his study of Native American languages, *"…how greatly ways of life and grammatical categories could vary from one place to another. As a result he came to believe that the culture and lifeways of a people were reflected in the language that they spoke."*

Further, Benjamin Whorf, an American linguist widely known for his ideas about linguistic relativity, asserted that, *"we dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages. …the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds–and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds."*

The objective in presenting these ideas is to point out the inescapable connection between language and culture. Without language to transport and illustrate cultural or natural phenomena, culture would be limited or perhaps even cease to exist as we know it. Culture and our environment define our language in how we describe and express our feelings. Years ago while teaching a language survey class, I often illustrated the effect of culture and environment on language with an example of locating a group of individuals in the higher elevations of the Wasatch Front in Utah and then in about 100 years compare the language with those who remained in the valley given little or no interchange between the two groups. The two groups would use a different vocabulary, possibly even different grammar and syntax to describe their lifeways (Boas) which over time would become even more linguistically distinct.

Edward Sapir, a German-born American anthropologist-linguist and a leader in American structural linguistics, commented that, *[We] see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation."*

USAICoE Efforts

USAICoE has designed and developed cultural awareness, cultural understanding, and expertise instruction for deploying units while the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLI FLC) has provided basic, survival language training such as the "RAPPORT" online training along with other language acquisition programs.

The TRADOC Culture Center (TCC) at Fort Huachuca was established to train Soldiers primarily about culture. Its mission statement:

TCC trains and educates Soldiers, DA Civilians and the Joint Force on relevant, mission-focused, operational and PME-focused cross-cultural knowledge, skills, abilities, and attributes to produce a cross-culturally competent operational force to support full spectrum operations in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment.

Tactical	Strategic	Operational
Social/Cultural Cues	Political Environment	Religion
Communications	Key Leaders	Social Structure
History	Military	Ethnic Groups
Geography	Economic Environment	Infrastructure
Gender	Demographics	Negotiation
Rapport Building	Understanding Psyche	

In October 2010, the TCC achieved a significant milestone with the transition to permanent government positions, supplemented by contractor personnel combining military experience, cross-cultural understanding, and academic knowledge. The core mission evolved from "providing mission-focused culture education and training" to "producing a cross-culturally competent operational force" in recognition of the ever-expanding global mission of the U.S. Armed Forces. The culture curriculum addresses core culture from self-awareness to communications, rapport building, and negotiations, as well as country-specific studies on more than 50 countries.

Specialty courses continue development, including country-specific expertise for the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) Culture Understanding and Language Program. Five annual Culture Summits were held from 2006 through 2010, bringing together

a blend of experts from military, non-government organizations, and academia to discuss cutting edge issues in the field of military cross-cultural competence.

The MI Foreign Language Training Center (MIFLTC), even though not connected to nor supported by the TCC, sustains all MI linguists including those at Fort Huachuca and Goodfellow AFB with mobile training teams, video teleconference training classes, and immersion courses in Yalta, Chile, Egypt, and in the future, China. The University of Military Intelligence website provides further training through the Language Training Guide, links to language training sites such as Lingnet, Langnet, Rosetta Stone through AKO, Auralog Language Training, SCOLA and other sites as they become available.

Research and development efforts in language training products include the Iraqi Language Trainer, Korean Language Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) Enhancement Program (LMEP) for interrogators, Somali Language Training, and Project Mercury (Russian language training).

Additionally the MIFLTC implemented a community outreach program with the Huachuca Foreign Language Academy (HFLA), Buena High School, and the Department of Homeland Security. The HFLA was an intensive foreign language program for middle school students under the direction of Ms. Cecilia Gross, a gifted and talented teacher from Johnson Elementary School, Fort Huachuca. It was a ten-week Spanish and Arabic program that provided foreign language and culture training for younger (ages 12 through 14) verbally gifted students to prepare them for high school foreign language classes, eventually establishing a pipeline of foreign language students for universities and ultimately service in the DOD.

MIFLTC personnel have met with foreign language instructors and Junior ROTC students at Buena High School in Sierra Vista to explain foreign language programs and careers available through the Army and MI Foreign Language Operations. The MIFLTC has also provided two week Spanish acquisition classes for the Drug Enforcement Agency, and in the future for the Federal Bureau of Investigation and U.S. Marshals Service.

In November 2009 the MIFLTC concluded a second successful Arabic pilot course. The purpose was to provide additional information on the conduct and outcome of a DLIFLC Arabic pilot course conducted at the direction of Department of the Army (DA) G2. The course provided insights and lessons learned for future MOS 35M HUMINT Collector language enabled training courses. Course developers focused on design and development of an instructional methodology that would support a shorter Modern Standard Arabic language curriculum. Instructors and military language instructors used skills integration (speaking, listening, and reading) through role-playing, projects, and task-based activities that enhanced students' language acquisition. Balanced instruction in target language and culture using authentic materials such as print media, Internet, and Arabic satellite TV broadcasts were implemented. At the end of the course students participated in a four week immersion study program conducted by AMIDEAST in Amman, Jordan. These classes were conducted 5 to 6 hours daily by native instructors with guest lecturers correlated with integrated language and culture activities outside the classroom.

The MIFLTC fully supports language and cultural expertise, the concept of surge capability, establishing a cadre of Level 3 subject matter experts, and tracking language professionals as supported and established in the Language Transformation Roadmap prepared by the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness for the Deputy Secretary of Defense:

> ***"Conflict against enemies speaking less-commonly-taught languages and thus the need for foreign language capability will not abate. Robust foreign language and foreign area expertise [cultural awareness] are critical to sustaining coalitions, pursuing regional stability, and conducting multi-national missions, especially in post-conflict and other than combat, security, humanitarian, nation-building, and stability operations."*** [5]

Other Language and Culture Training Efforts

In February 2003, Dr. David Chu, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs, directed the Army to develop a pilot program aimed at recruiting native and heritage speakers of critical languages (including Arabic, Dari, and Pashto) into the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) primarily for their

language and cultural expertise which was sorely lacking during this time of conflict. In the summer of 2003, the Army began to access recruits into the MOS 09L Interpreter/Translator Pilot Program, which ran for two years. (In a request from OUSD (I) Personnel and Readiness MOS 09L was organized and transitioned from IRR to active component control.)

The program began at Fort Jackson, South Carolina under a contract with Camber Inc., to develop the program of instruction and lesson plans. Eventually it migrated under the control of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca with DLIFLC developing and designing the instruction. Under supervision of the OUSD Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA) directed the recruitment of Arabic and dialect native speakers to be trained as translators and interpreters. The 09L program recruited native and heritage speakers of Arabic, Dari, Farsi, Kurdish, and Pashto directly into the IRR. After Basic Training and Advanced Individual Training these Soldiers became interpreters in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. Over 200 soldiers have graduated and deployed to Iraq, Afghanistan, South Africa, Kenya, and the Sudan. Some examples of 09L soldiers in action from Commanders' comments (after-action review by OUSD M&RA) on the performance and heroism of their 09Ls in theater:

- **During fights, (he) was critical helping me get info quick from captured insurgents. In fact, his work helped us find a huge cache and an insurgent cell, emplaced by the insurgents to break up the elections in JAN 05.**
- **I had a $500,000 bounty on my head so if nothing else, (09L) working next to me for months validated his bravery.**
- **He'll always be that goofy 18-year-old with my CSM yelling at him and he'll also be that soldier who 'terped for me and jumped in front of me when a sniper tried to drill me JAN 29, 2005 the day before we made history with the first election.**
- **While SGT Chailem and his team were on missions in Kenya, they traveled through a small town and were planning to spend the night. Using his knowledge of animal tracking that he had learned hunting warthogs and African buffalo in Ethiopia, he knew by footprints on the ground that something was amiss. He saw fresh footprints of a group of 30 people and could tell by the impressions in the grass they had rested for a moment and recently dispersed. He knew these were not locals and told his team it was not safe to stay there and that they needed to immediately push ahead to the next town. A report came the next morning that a massacre had occurred that very same night.**

Cultural awareness and foreign language training are force multipliers in the contemporary operational environment that must also include learning about our coalition partners. The two disciplines are intertwined and inseparable; one cannot exist or be instructed without the other. Successful language and culture programs and centers are already organized to accomplish this critical language and cultural mission. The Air Force Culture and Language Center (AFCLC) trains culturally, regionally, and linguistically competent Airmen who exert positive influence in support of Air Force expeditionary operations and institutional requirements. AFCLC essential tasks include, *"synchronization of cross-cultural competence across the continuum of learning for the Total Force by defining, implementing and coordinating cultural, regional and foreign language education for officers, enlisted and civilian."* [6]

The Marines' Center For Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL) promotes *"…a grasp of culture and language as regular, mainstream components of the operating environment–the human terrain–throughout the full spectrum of military operations; it is the Corps' "one-stop" clearing house for operational culture and language training."* [7]

Fort Drum has a complete language and culture training program *"developing language skills while simultaneously gaining an appreciation for societal and cultural norms will help our Soldiers and leaders effectively communicate with local populations,*

This will result in building trust, gaining valuable insights, resolving conflicts and ultimately changing perceptions." [8]

At the Fort Lewis Foreign Language Training Center, under the direction of Ms. Yvonne Pawelek (twice selected by DA as having the Language Program of the Year), selected soldiers are offered the opportunity to participate in a 41 week Arabic language and culture course. At the conclusion of the course the Army students experience a day of "Arabic in Action" that includes all stages in their language instruction. The Arabic-trained language-enabled Soldiers move among seven stations–typical shops, offices, clinics and restaurants–designed to test their knowledge of language and culture, and to challenge their ability to think on their feet. Under the language-enabled program, Soldiers from a variety of MOSs are trained in language and culture and then return to their units to perform their normal duties. They become trusted advisors down to platoon level, better able to understand day-to-day cultural cues, customs and basic language encountered by small unit leaders.

Conclusion

At the outset of the Iraq conflict, a comment was made that, "We are a nation at war and I do not have time to send my linguists to do language training." Allow me to submit that is precisely why we are at war because we did not have the required language and cultural knowledge to prevent attacks on our country from those whose desire it was, and is, to destroy our way of life.

One of the conclusions drawn from the November 2005 Military Language Conference was that it is imperative to establish a pipeline of language students who are ready to support and fulfill our nation's language and culture requirements. We must start in the public school system now and provide incentives to colleges and universities to establish additional foreign language and cultural programs. General John Abizaid asserted, *"... [We need to] drive the importance of language and regional expertise from the top. Tell the Services to place greater value on such skills."* Our collective task is for all of us to go forward with urgency to ensure that "no foreign language or cultural training is left unlearned." This challenge must also include the languages and cultures of our globally represented coalition partners. In conclusion, a statement from the Language Transformation Roadmap:

> ***Establishing a new "global footprint" for DOD, and transitioning to a more expeditionary force, will bring increased requirements for language and regional knowledge [cultural awareness] to work with new coalition partners in a wide variety of activities, often with little or no notice. This new approach to warfighting in the 21st century will require forces that have foreign language capabilities beyond those generally available in today's force.*** [9]

Editor's Note: The U.S. Army has chosen Headstart2, a DOD developed program, to replace Rosetta Stone as its distributed learning language tool. Headstart2 is a self-paced culturally based program consisting of two units with ten modules each, covering topics of general nature including modules with over 1,000 key military related terms and phrases. Seventeen languages are currently available. Soldiers will receive credit via the Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS) and promotion points. Dependants may also utilize Headstart2. Headstart2 can be used on a home computer; soldiers in remote areas can request CDs from DLIFLC. Additionally, the DLIFLC website will allow downloads to iTouch, iPhone, or iPad. For more information go to http://hs2.lingnet.org/.

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

Culture as a Basis for New Intelligence Practices

by Boshra El-Guindy, PhD

Introduction

Since 9/11, socio-cultural awareness is receiving increased attention within government circles. This awareness has been applied to many dimensions of national security, including threats, capabilities, intentions, preventive, protective, and predictive strategies. This article explores reasons for this increased attention as well as the ethical considerations and concerns as the significance of socio-cultural analysis increases among the Intelligence Community (IC).

Background

Throughout history, cultural knowledge and language capabilities, along with deception and disguise, have provided outsiders with the ability to interact with, and even blend into, local populations in order to gain crucial knowledge of the thoughts, intentions, and capabilities of others.[1] In more recent times, the British use of these techniques, as played in "the Great Game" across Central Asia, became legendary and was immortalized in fiction such as Kipling's novel, *Kim*.[2,3]

During the Cold War, socio-cultural awareness was overshadowed by concerns about economic power, political and military dominance, and technological superiority.[4] This by no means meant that socio-cultural perspectives were entirely ignored. The development of Soviet studies, and other areas of study and specialties, increased the capacity to analyze and interpret the multiple cultures of the Communist Bloc and provide context for interpreting ideological, political, and strategic precepts and actions.[5,6] The concept of "strategic culture" also developed through strategic studies and gained currency in foreign policy and international relations.

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the Soviet collapse in 1991, and the end of the Cold War to a large degree eliminated the political threat posed by the Soviet Union. While the emergence of China as a "new" peer competitor continues, the Chinese strategic threat remains far below that of the Soviet Union in its heyday.

Socio-cultural analyses also took a back seat post-1991 with emphasis on technical developments within the IC, both in terms of visibility and resource allocation. But with the end of the Cold War and the rise of asymmetric terrorist threats in the late twentieth century, the need for socio-cultural awareness increased.[7] Absent this singular (Soviet) focus, in the post-Cold War environment the IC struggled to reestablish its identity and purpose in what had become a world of multiple crises and transient threats.[8]

These new threats and crises were rising from regions and cultures around the world less familiar to Western analysts. Emerging terrorist ideologies were generally less transparent than the well-documented and established philosophies that made up Communism. Moreover, as retrospective analyses of the intelligence failures leading to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 have shown, there was an overreliance on "technical collection systems with little acknowledgement of the political/cultural context."[9]

The need for socio-cultural analysis also became a major theme in comments from military personnel returning from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Officers cited their practical experience on the ground dealing with nontraditional warfare, local populations, and inadequate cultural and linguistic knowledge.[10] A growing body of testimonials and studies citing lessons learned and recommendations for change, provided additional validation of the need for socio-cultural awareness.[11] Discussions produced ways in which intelligence support for operations (and analysis) could be improved and also generated a proof-of-concept program to place teams of cultural and "human terrain" specialists in theater to provide direct support to brigade commanders.[12, 13]

Author's Note: In this article, the phrase "socio-cultural data, analysis, and approaches" is intended to encompass both the analysis of socio-cultural data or scenarios and the employment of socio-cultural perspectives in the analysis of any type of data or scenario to gain intelligence.

The Significance of Culture in Intelligence

The term "cultural intelligence" is used frequently in the IC. Included in the meaning are three underlying tenets:

- Includes, or is informed by, socio-cultural data and their analysis.
- Must be actionable in the sense that it can be used in decisionmaking.
- Includes perspective, theory, and method derived from the social and/or behavioral sciences.

Culture as a Framework for Understanding

Many in the IC now recognize that understanding culture helps establish a context for human activity and provides key insights into the potential meaning and significance of actions. It helps analysts understand the "Why" and the "So What" of behavior. In this way, applying a socio-cultural perspective provides a framework for understanding. The ability of social and behavioral sciences to contribute to the predictive capabilities of intelligence is related to the critical factors shaping how leaders make decisions in different contexts, and which criteria should be used to select methods and circumstances for inter-group negotiations.

Understanding Intent

It is, perhaps, not the notion of cultural intelligence that is new, but its relative emphasis. It isn't al-Qa'ida itself that's the problem, it's the ideology. It seems that the threats in today's world can be defined more by intention than by capability. The difficulties in countering improvised explosive devices which are relatively crude technologically, and suicide bombers, whose lethality stems not from the sophistication of the weapon but the intensity of the bombers' commitment and our lack of understanding of the dimensions of that commitment, strongly illustrate this point. Highly motivated and focused individuals can be a significant threat without sophisticated technology. Even sophisticated technology has a social dimension. In either case, technology is knowledge put to use, and there can be no technology without technologists (people). Thus, we must turn our focus back to socio-cultural factors. During the Cold War, our adversaries' motivation and intention were well-studied and well-understood. A comparable understanding of the socio-cultural context of current national security threats is just as critical to decisionmaking today.

Data

This new focus on socio-cultural perspectives requires a different kind of data than that of interest during the Cold War. Socio-cultural data can be significantly different in kind than data collected about capabilities, technologies, or artifacts. This clearly falls into the realm of human intelligence. Some of this discipline's most valuable assets are individuals who can visually and behaviorally blend into that neighborhood.

The emphasis on human intelligence raises interesting questions about the data and associated analytic tools. Cultural data most often collected are narrative and qualitative in nature.[14] If analytic tools are computational, data may need to be trans-

lated into a form that can be processed. While this is often possible, analysts need to be aware of the limitations and constraints of such translations and understand the costs and benefits of these types of approaches.

The question arises as to whether data must be quantifiable. Computational models, because they must use quantified data, often use surrogates for qualitative data. However, surrogates may have varying levels of validity according to the standards of different social science disciplines (for example, the number of times one goes to the mosque is not necessarily a valid measure of intensity of religious belief) and users of these models and their outputs must consider these issues and their potential impact on analyses. The growing interest in cultural intelligence highlights the need to examine underlying assumptions about the value, utility, and interpretation of both qualitative and quantitative data.

It is clear that collection of qualitative data is labor intensive. This methodological issue is a challenge that should be addressed by training and the development of collection protocols, such as interview guidelines.

Cultural data also have a temporal dimension. Collectors spend a great deal of time establishing socio-cultural baselines in communities. Establishing these baselines allows collectors and analysts to recognize significant change over time. Understanding the cultural context of these changes is what allows them to grasp the significance of the change.

There is also a spatial dimension. Socio-cultural data collection and analysis should be driven not only by intelligence requirements, but also by an assessment of local contextual factors. Communities do not live in isolation and individuals can move in and out of communities. Moreover, social structures, such as kinship relations or tribal identity, can have significance across community and geographical boundaries. Once again, a holistic systems view must encompass both these socio-cultural dimensions.

The Path Forward

In its 2003 report, the Defense Science Board *Task Force on Discriminate Use of Force* concluded that we need a "comprehensive, long-term, and coherent effort to understand adversaries in a systemic way," and that this would require models that account for not only physical dimensions, but "softer" social and cultural dimensions as well. The Task Force also noted that our capabilities in this area are immature.[15] The Defense Science Board's *2006 Summer Study on 21st Century Science and Technology Vectors* places social science foremost among the four operational capabilities and enabling technologies needed to support future military missions, and emphasizes that:

> ***Perhaps most central is to gain deeper understanding of how individuals, groups, societies and nations behave and then use this information to (1) improve the performance of U.S. forces through continuous education and training and (2) shape behaviors of others in pre-, intra- and post-conflict situations. Key enablers include immersive gaming environments, automated language processing and human, social, cultural and behavior modeling.[16]***

Ethical Considerations

Several social science disciplines have raised ethical concerns about the collection and use of socio-cultural knowledge in the national security environment.[17] The American Psychological Association, for example, has issued a formal statement on the ethics of the use of psychology and psychologists in interrogations.[18] The American Anthropological Association has established an ad-hoc commission to investigate the implications of its members' participation in national security activities, and a heated internal debate is underway. Members of business and non-governmental organization communities, as well as private citizens, have also raised concerns regarding ethical issues resulting from policies and activities affecting local populations.[19] The IC needs a more sophisticated understanding of the history and context of ethical issues as they apply to national security, and to remain informed about new and evolving developments in this arena.

Conclusion

There is keen interest in,and need for socio-cultural data, analysis, and approaches in a wide range of critical national security endeavors. This need is increasingly recognized in many government circles. However, issues that need to be resolved are those regarding tools, including the development and use of computational models; methods, including issues relating to data collection, analysis, and dissemination; ethics; and the development of cross-community and interdisciplinary ties. Methodological

rigor, development of best practices, engagement of a wide variety of disciplines, and interaction with open-source communities are also essential issues to pursue.

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

COMPLEX OPERATIONS IN AFRICA

Operational Culture Training in the French Military

Colonel Henri Boré, French Army, Retired

FRANCE HAS DEPLOYED some 8,000 French troops around the world, and the way they interact with foreign populations and military organizations overseas is the direct result of a successful, 100-year-old marriage between ethno-anthropology and the French military experience in the 19th and 20th centuries in Africa, Asia, and Europe.

The French military definition of operational culture takes note of this alliance: "Operational culture is the understanding of foreign cultural norms, beliefs and attitudes: it is an operationally relevant field guide used by general officers as well as infantry squad leaders to navigate a complex human terrain."[1]

Deployed French Army units learn about a foreign country's culture by studying its customs, history, economic issues, social norms, and traditions. This anthropology angle became part of the military learning process as a result of lessons learned in two centuries of counterguerrilla wars, or what we today refer to as irregular war or "hybrid war."[2] The French military experience led to two counterintuitive principles:

- Effective leaders of small combat arms units must think like human intelligence collectors, counterpropaganda operators, nongovernmental organization workers, and negotiators.
- The combat arms battalion is the nexus of operational cultural training and education for complex military and nonmilitary tasks.

French Operational Culture Concept

The colonial era influenced the development of operational culture concepts throughout the 19th and 20th century. The colonial campaigns from 1862 to 1962 linked anthropological studies with strategic and tactical military courses of action.

Marriage of anthropological studies and irregular war. During the colonial expansion in Africa and Indochina in the second half of the 19th century, French military officers returning from campaigns in Asia and Africa

Colonel Henri Boré served 28 years in the French Army, participating in numerous counterinsurgency and stability operations. After retiring in 2003, he facilitated seminars for the National Defense University in Washington D.C. He also trained and advised African battalion commanders in Mali and Senegal with the Department of State African Contingency Operations Training Assistance program. COL Boré currently lives in Washington D.C. and is the program manager for the USMC Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning.

MAP: "Afrique Centrale" from Annales de Geographie Tome IV, Paris 1895. (University of Texas Libraries)



Scenes from China and Hanoi during the second French colonial empire as published in *Le Monde Illustré* in 1891.

travelled to Paris to share their observations and lessons learned with a large audience of politicians, journalists, geographers, and ethno-anthropologists.[3] A common interest in unknown populations led these military thinkers to share their cultural awareness with these groups. Colonial officers hosted anthropologists overseas who assisted them in the study of violence among nonstate groups.[4] This laid the foundation for the strong influence of ethno-anthropological studies on the colonial Army throughout the 19th and 20th century. Officers compared written reports with ethno-anthropologists' observations on lifestyle, customs, social structures, and tribal governments in the unexplored territories of Africa and Asia. In 1885, for instance, Captain Savorgnan de Brazza returned to Paris with ethno-anthropological information gathered during his exploration of the Ogoue, Congo, and Kouilou-Nari basins in Central Africa.[5]

Anthropologists also became more familiar with the planning and execution of military campaigns. Two French colonial military figures enforced this process: Marshals Joseph Gallieni and Hubert Lyautey. In 1899, building on 20 years of colonial campaign experiences, they established the first principles of expeditionary operations later integrated into operational culture.[6] In his *The Colonial Role of the Army*, Lyautey, then a colonel, called for permanently stationing a reservoir of units overseas to develop staff and small-unit leaders with expertise in foreign cultures and languages, and in mediation and negotiation techniques. Lyautey set the conditions for integrating operational culture into irregular-warfare concepts.

Expeditionary campaigns in Upper Tonkin (1885-1897) and Madagascar (1896-1900) served as on-the-ground laboratories to develop this approach. Company- to platoon-sized units operated independently to gain control of wide areas of operations. Captains, lieutenants, and sergeants learned that collecting the right intelligence at the right time was the key to mission success.[7]

Superior in their knowledge of the terrain but inferior in their equipment, organization, and firepower, the French Army's adversaries often waged guerrilla warfare.[8] French colonial campaigns were first and foremost expeditionary operations whose success depended on the support of the local population and the intelligence-gathering skills of infantry platoon commanders. Commanders discovered that an ethno-anthropological lens was an effective tool to develop situational awareness. It remains at the core of the French operational culture domain.

In *The Colonial Role of the Army,* Lyautey noted that "captains, lieutenants and sergeants must perform with excellence in areas such as local politics, as well as social, education and economic development of the population."[9] Gallieni's "instructions" during the campaign of Madagascar in May 1898 stressed what is now a paramount principle in modern irregular war: "We must bear in mind that in colonial conflicts, which are unfortunately forced on us by the unruliness of rebellions, we must never destroy except in the last extremity. Every time that warlike incident obliges one of our colonial officers to proceed against a village and occupy it, he must never lose sight of the fact that his first responsibility is to reconstruct the village, set up a market, and build a school."[10]

...we must never destroy except in the last extremity.

The success or failure of expeditionary campaigns depended on two factors about small-unit leaders:

- Their knowledge of the local population regarding cultures, traditions, customs, and languages.
- Their ability to conduct CMO and information operations.

By the end of the 19th century, operational culture was part of every layer of the military planning process, from the strategic to the tactical. Commanders integrated CMO and information operations into small-infantry-unit operational orders.

Lyautey and Gallieni's influence led to the creation of a military center for foreign cultures in 1906 that integrated anthropological studies into expeditionary or irregular war practices to prepare deployed officers and NCOs at the farthest reaches of the empire "to command inaccessible outposts, live with the indigenous population, [and] work as combat leaders, diplomats, and political administrators of areas of responsibility as vast as half the size of France."[11] In such environments, cultural knowledge of tribal and clan lifestyles, social organizations, and family and kinship lineage served one paramount objective: to successfully navigate and control complex human terrain.

Joseph Simon Gallieni
(1849–1916)

Louis Hubert Gonzalve Lyautey
(1854–1934)

The 102-year-old center, Ecole Militaire Spécialisée dans l'Outre-Mer et l'Etranger (EMSOME), located in Paris' western suburbs, maintains and continues to develop the anthropological knowledge to help officers and leaders understand the complexity of cultural interactions in foreign countries and regions. For instance, 1908 reports on the Tuareg, Bambara, and Dogon ethnic groups in the French Sudan provide insight into 2008 Mali sociocultural parameters.

Operational culture, HUMINT, PSYOP, and CMO. Gallieni and Lyautey's concepts influenced many officers during the first half of the 20th century, including Colonel Roger Trinquier and Lieutenant Colonel David Galula. The American military has studied their writing extensively since 2004.[12]

Over the years, operational culture became the cement holding together many tasks across the irregular war spectrum. As Trinquier and Galula note, the tasks include—

- Assessing the political effect of any military action.
- Supporting the population.
- Mapping the insurgency.
- Clearing and holding areas of operations to "box" the insurgent influence.
- Relying on a web of mobile- and light-infantry units.
- Performing a variety of nonmilitary tasks that benefit the local population.

Trinquier and Galula echoed principles already outlined by Gallieni and Lyautey a century earlier. For Trinquier, "the sine qua non of victory in modern warfare is the unconditional support of the population," because "the inhabitant in his home is the center of the conflict."[13] Control of this center of gravity is "as necessary for the counterinsurgent as for the insurgent," Galula says, and requires small-unit leaders to train in a broad variety of tasks ranging from human intelligence (HUMINT) collection to psychological operations (PSYOP) as counterpropaganda and CMO.[14]

French combat arms platoon and squad leaders have used their

knowledge of local cultures to carry out these tasks. For instance, in Algeria, they spent a great deal of time trying to convince potential insurgents that politics could be a substitute for guns in the ongoing battle to control resources and power. In the countryside, commanders received substantial support from chiefs of villages with whom they were on excellent terms. (They shared common interest to keep the National Liberation Front at large.) As a result, operational culture in France acquired a strong political and ideological component, combined with anthropology studies. Some regimental and company commanders integrated this model into their combat training to prepare infantry squad leaders to become as skilled in PSYOP and HUMINT as they were in marksmanship.

In 1962, the French military began to keep a low profile in the aftermath of France's bitter Indochina and Algerian wars, and such counterinsurgency concepts as psychological and counterpropaganda operations vanished from official terminology and curricula. After 9/11, the timeless principles of irregular warfare were back in the limelight. Today, PSYOP, HUMINT, CMO, and information operations once again define the content of operational culture curricula.

The French military's operational culture syllabus examines foreign societies' cultural habits, traditional customs, social and political constructs, moral ideas, codes of honor, and ways of thinking. Such knowledge helps commanders quickly identify and take advantage of psychological points of weakness and strength of the insurgent they are—or will be—fighting, as well as the local force they are—or will be—training. Furthermore, understanding what drives local authority and identifying who is really in charge helps commanders establish and enforce lines of communication with local political, religious, and military leaders, thus working "with the mandarin, not against him," as Lyautey advised in 1899.[15]

Recent counterinsurgency, stability and support, and peacekeeping operations in Africa, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan have reinforced the French model of integrating anthropology into irregular warfare planning and execution and helped battalion commanders develop operational culture programs of instruction for small-unit leaders.

After 9/11, the timeless principles of irregular warfare were back in the limelight.

Operational Culture for Small-Unit Leaders: Win the People First

Nineteenth and 20th century counterguerrilla operations laid the foundations for modern counterinsurgency doctrine by integrating HUMINT, PSYOP, and CMO into a common warfighting continuum. As Galula demonstrated, success often comes from combined-arms battalions whose squad leaders are savvy operators in all these fields.

History teaches us that destroying the enemy is not the strategic goal of counterinsurgency operations. As Lyautey states, "The raison d'être of our colonial military operations is always and foremost economic." A colonial commander's role was to gain control of a territory and its population to integrate the region into the French empire ideologically, politically, and economically. In this respect, the population was the center of gravity, even at the sergeant level. Knowledge about the culture of the people was paramount.

At the operational level, colonial commanders applied the now famous methodology of the spreading "ink blots" or "oil stains." From secure bases, small light and mobile units gradually spread out over the theater of operations from one base to another until they covered the region with interconnected bases and outposts, progressively controlling each area. Gaining the trust of tribes and villages depended on proper cultural behavior by the troops.

Maneuver was the decisive tactical element at company level and below. Isolated company commanders and platoon and squad leaders had to take crucial, timely initiatives to obtain strategic goals. To control wide areas of operations, they sought to impose a stable and secure environment by interacting with villagers, training local militias, and containing hostile enemy forces by either the use of force, the threat of it, or negotiation. "Win the people first," Lyautey ordered in 1901 in Madagascar. "Each time we find ethnic groups that are politically structured within organized institutions, we must rely on them and work with them."[16] Again, the general principle of colonial expansion in Asia

was to "work with the mandarin, not against him."[17] This policy required an in-depth knowledge of local and regional alliances and powers. Operational culture training and education programs address these irregular warfare principles.

The battalion as nexus of operational culture training. The French Army's operational culture domain relies mainly on the combination of anthropological-centered EMSOME teaching and the combat arms battalion's mission-oriented application of it. Although EMSOME offers a central repository for cultural knowledge, the knowledge spreads at the combat arms battalion level, the cradle of the expeditionary culture. From 1882 to 2007, more than 120 years of expeditionary campaigns have driven the operational culture training and education at the 2d Infantry Marine Regiment and provided it with unique cultural expertise.

EMSOME emphasizes the "so what" of operational culture in its seminars, while small-unit leaders convey their experiences to each other at the battalion level. The knowledge acquired does not depend on rank but on mission, task, and military-occupational specialty.

As mentioned earlier, anthropology drives predeployment operational culture programs to explore the dynamics of tribes, clans, traditional beliefs, and religion. Understanding local moral values and codes of honor helps officers and soldiers negotiate with powerful local religious, political, tribal, and administrative authorities.

What makes this program so unique is that it does not use a template approach. Each combat arms battalion has the autonomy to tailor the training to its own level of experience. The program's purpose is to help company commanders train their platoon and squad leaders. In addition, studying a country's culture, history, economic issues, social norms, and traditions addresses one key question: Who are the people in our area of operations? Infantry company commanders, platoon leaders, and squad leaders learn the answer during predeployment training that covers:

- Human terrain.
- Counterinsurgency operations.
- Training and advising national forces.
- Operating civil-military operations.

Battalion commanders can easily translate each domain into two-hour classes in their programs of instruction.

...knowledge acquired does not depend on rank but on mission, task, and military occupational specialty.

Course 1. Navigating the human terrain: a combat arms skill. Learning how to navigate complex human terrain is a combat arms skill that requires more time and energy than learning how to fire a weapon, use a compass, or drive a truck. The first course, therefore, covers the traditional domains of ethno-anthropology studies through a cultural approach. Officers and enlisted members take the same classes in human geography, history, religion, traditional beliefs, moral values, social and political organization, family structure, kinship lineages, economic challenges, customs, and individual societal abilities and habits.

The studies highlight the complexity and nuances of these human structures and warn against the oversimplifications in many Western matrix approaches. The training puts into perspective concepts of land ownership, family lineage, generation networks, and traditional clan struggles for power. Further, it highlights the political influence of ethnic groups or subgroups. Officers and enlisted men learn about subtle differences within the Northern Teda group, the Goranes, and Toubous. They study the traditional influence of the Zaghawa, Tama, and Bideyat clans in the Wadai region of eastern Chad as well as the differences between "black" Saharan nomads, "Arab" Chadians, and the Chari-Baguirmi group.

EMSOME mobile teams provide much of this teaching. However, during predeployment training, they use the expertise available within the combat arms battalion itself. Officers and soldiers who have operated in the country of deployment give additional briefs based on their own experiences.

Instructors also teach their students how to interact with street vendors, local imams, and marabouts; what greetings to use; which "codes" to apply when conducting a meeting; how to quickly identify dominant families or individuals in the neighborhood; how to understand the social value of bargaining

EMSOME

French Marines in Chad, 2006.

with vendors in a market; how to bargain; and how to follow rules of hospitality.

At this stage, small-unit leaders benefit from a two-hour basic language course providing them with about 50 key "icebreaker" sentences and numbers. Language proficiency, however, is not a priority for the battalion commander. Proficiency in a foreign language requires years of in-depth study combined with immersion in the country and is beyond the scope of predeployment training. Instead, the combat arms battalion effort focuses on teaching officers and soldiers how to use an interpreter.

Course 2. Counterinsurgency and operational culture: conducting military and nonmilitary tasks. Examining the legacy of Lyautey and Galula, this course is military-oriented, yet covers a broad variety of nonmilitary tasks. Personnel in the battalion play an important role by conveying their knowledge of a specific country. In addition to EMSOME insights, their briefs address and update the following topics:

- The military impact of geography and climate, accessibility of the roads, and the location of available airfields and reliable medical facilities in the area of operations.
- The required combat readiness level (rapid reaction force structure, etc.)
- The history of guerrilla operations in the area. (When? Which tribes and clans? Where? How?)
- The history of counterguerrilla courses of action in the area, when relevant.

Course 3. Training and advising foreign units. This course prepares infantry platoon and squad leaders to execute ad hoc training and advisory tasks with national forces and nongovernmental armed groups. The course goal is to teach officers and soldiers how to adapt to their counterparts' cultures. It usually addresses the following topics:

- History of conflicts.
- Specific military traditions.
- Civil-military relationships.
- Types of recruitment and resources available.
- The level of training and equipment available.
- Types of forces and organization.
- Uniforms and ranks.
- Morale and esprit de corps issues.
- Counterguerrilla combat skills.

Operational culture remains the core of the predeployment course.

Course 4. Civil-military operations. This course provides in-depth information on the status of CMO in the battalion area. EMSOME updates the information provided by previous rotations in the country, giving the battalion commander situational awareness of the support the local population needs in his future area of operations: schools to renovate, wells to dig, and bridges to repair. This allows the commander to include two or three CMOs in his warning order. The number varies depending on whether it is a counterinsurgency, stability and support, or peacekeeping operation.

The warning order might tell company commanders to include soldiers who are skilled as carpenters, plumbers, and electricians. A CMO project is a critical tactical course of action to "win the people" in the area of operations. After meeting with local authorities in the country, the commander integrates the CMO into the battalion's operation order. Then the company accomplishes the CMO mission under the battalion commander's watch.

Cultural Understanding as a Long-term Process

The French Army developed the operational culture concept from lessons learned during more than 100 years of colonial military campaigns. These

Operational culture is a combat skill that is critical to mission success.

courtesy of author

Training Malian forces, 2006.

expeditionary counterguerrilla operations were similar to what we now refer to as irregular warfare. Three generations of officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men learned the hard way how to interact with foreign cultures to "win the people." The experience of one generation energized the expeditionary training and education of the next.

The primary lesson learned is that operational cultural understanding is a long-term process. For over a century, the marriage of ethno-anthropological studies and military experiences have developed cultural standards small-unit leaders still follow today in operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Africa.

The history of counterinsurgency operations has taught us that winning people's hearts and minds and changing the adversary's mind-set always matter more than physical destruction of the enemy. Operational culture is a combat skill that is critical to mission success. Like many other Western armed forces, the French military views it as the core of warfighting for combat arms units conducting irregular wars. For all combat arms leaders, from commanders to squad level, operational culture training and education is paramount to achieving success in both military and nonmilitary missions within a foreign environment. This training aggregates capabilities ranging from the restrained use of force to mediation and negotiation. In short, it develops the transverse capabilities required to fight a four-block war.[18]

Ultimately, the battalion commander's operational culture training is driven by the idea that teaching leaders and soldiers how to think and operate in a foreign environment matters more than just teaching them what to think about it. ***MR***

NOTES

1. Interview with BG Philippe Roisin, former director of the Ecole Militaire Spécialisée dans l'Outre-Mer et l'Etranger (EMSOME), 12 December 2006. Located in Paris western suburbs, EMSOME is the French Army school specializing in training and education for units and individuals deploying to overseas French territories and theaters of operations.
2. LTG James N. Mattis and LTC Frank G. Hoffman, "Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars," *Proceedings* 132, May 2006. The "four-block war" is LTG Mattis's expansion of former Marine Corps Commandant General Charles Krulak's concept of "three-block war." General Krulak claimed that today's expeditionary unit must be able to fight in one city block, hand out humanitarian supplies in the next block, and then make peace between warring factions in yet another block. To this requirement, "Hybrid Wars" adds the necessity of conducting effective information operations.
3. Georges Balandier and Marc Ferro, "Au Temps des Colonies" *L'Histoire Seuil* (1984), 76.
4. André Le Révérend, *Lyautey*, (Paris: Fayard, 1983), 268.
5. Pierre Kalck, *Un explorateur au centre de l'Afrique*, (L'Harmattan, 1993), 9.
6. The "Report of General Gallieni on the situation in Madagascar," by General Joseph Gallieni and "The Colonial Role of the Army" by Lieutenant Colonel Hubert Lyautey, an enlightened plea for the creation of a colonial army, were both published in the same year, 1899.
7. General Joseph Gallieni, "Report on the situation in Madagascar," 1899.
8. Le Révérend, 228.
9. Raoul Girardet, *La Société Militaire de 1815 à nos jours*, (Perrin, 1998), 228
10. Gallieni [no page number given].
11. Le Révérend, 278.
12. David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare-Theory and Practice* (Westport, CT Praeger, 1964) and Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare, A French View of Counterinsurgency* (London and Dunow: Pall Mall Press, 1964).
13. Ibid, 8.
14. Galula, 74
15. Le Révérend, 203.
16. Ibid., 279.
17. Ibid., 278.
18. Mattis and Hoffman, *Proceedings* 132, May 2006.

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Cultural Awareness in the Army: Harnessing the Disciplines

by Tseggai Isaac, PhD

The opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not represent those of the DOD, U.S. Army, or the Maneuver and Support Center of Excellence.

Introduction

Cultural awareness is gaining attention in the Armed Services and for good reason. Cultural awareness is value added to the military by enabling the Soldier to see his area of operation from broader perspectives. Among the many efforts to enhance Soldier combat skills, the U.S. Army has recently finalized recruiting Cultural and Language Advisors (CFLAs) to serve at the Army Centers of Excellence.[1]

I am one of the first recruits. I was hired in 2009 at the Maneuver and Support Center of Excellence (MSCoE) at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. As an academic and cultural advisor, I feel it is appropriate for me to offer some thoughts with respect to my position as a CFLA. I will limit my comments to the training of cultural awareness in the Captains' Career Course–Common Core.

Coming from an academic background, I knew I had to adapt quickly to my new environment by calibrating my professional background to the fast pace and sense of urgency that was apparent as soon as I began. I prepared myself by learning about the organizations, the critical personnel, and the missions of the Center. I also determined to be always ready to provide advice when asked and initiate ideas as judiciously as I could. I proceeded cautiously so as not to interfere with the instructional schedules already in progress. At the same time, I made myself and my position visible as to what I could offer in the area of cultural awareness. As part of my initial responsibilities, I was tasked by the Director of the Maneuver and Support Center's Directorate of Training with reviewing the U. S. Army Captains Career Course on Culture (CCCoC) and provide him and his civilian deputy with summary feedback:

> ***I sense the focus of the lessons needs to be sharpened. The authors address the various elements of culture in terms of values, beliefs, behavior, and norms and then stop short of involving the soldier to his immediate and temporal challenges. Throughout the lesson commentaries, slides and illustrations, I felt the lesson needed to be brought to the military personnel and their objectives in an intimate sense. It needs to speak to them instead of meandering to the broader analysis of geographical/environmental, historical, economic, and social issues.***
>
> ***The soldier learns culture to fulfill his/her technical challenges in preparation for deployment. Culture in this sense is instrumental, equivalent to the sidearm–effective at a close and intimate range. I feel the course might be more effective if it instructs the soldier how to meet the family, the village, the township and elaborate on the myriads of issues dealing with religion, ethnicity, tribal divisions and economic and political problems. Indeed, these topics are discussed in the lesson, but they are discussed in broad geographical, historical, and environmental contexts. They needed to be factored and detailed to the specificities of military mission. The soldier, I feel, needs the tools that help him or her now and here at the front (email of June 26, 2009).***

After two years of observing and teaching the cultural blocks, my opinion has not changed. In the following pages, I expand upon my opinion and offer some suggestions.

The Challenge

The mission of the CFLA is a challenging one. The CFLA must make him/herself useful to the Center even where there is uncertainty as to whether one's efforts are bearing results or not. Coming from the academic world where formalities are nonexistent, it was a humbling experience to witness the level of seriousness, high mindedness, excellence, and dedication of the servicemen and women. They are professionals of the highest caliber. Even though there is constant rotation in and out of the Center and I have to start all over again, I find the opportunity of

working with such world class leaders a highly rewarding experience.

Initial Analysis

The lessons in the CCCoC are well written and reflect the highest quality of writing and editing. There is clarity of definition, organization, and writing style. The organization of the lessons, sequences of discussion and lecture sessions, and class exercises are exemplary. The technical approaches in creating the instructional materials are also of the highest quality.

Quite frequently, it is common for evaluative studies to differ in style, approach, and discipline; as such I am not criticizing the pedagogical or disciplinary contents of the course. What I suggest is that the qualitative excellence of the lessons may need to be balanced with more relevant and substantive material content. As an example, in *Module 1, Cultural Influences and their Impact on Military Operations*, I perceive problems of relevance and suggest utilizing anthropological, sociological, and political science perspectives to enhance this module's relevance. This module contains a most critical aspect of cultural awareness down range.

This module has four sections and a practical exercise:

1. Definition of Culture.
2. Influences on Culture.
3. Social Organization.
4. Political Structure.

Each of the lessons deals with the fundamental issues of culture. Culture is defined throughout the lessons, but the following details seem to be absent.

First, the composition of the lesson and the slide presentation is eclectic. Each has political, economic, anthropological, and sociological elements. The lesson commentaries and slides offer descriptions of political players, ethnic organizations, kinships, and tribal forms of societies. These topics, in my opinion, need to be segregated and addressed separately in their specific discipline or area of study. This does not mean taking each subject and presenting it as a separate lesson presentation. It only means identifying topics and organizing them by discipline with a short bibliographical list (five to seven authors). This will contextualize culture by functional and conceptual areas.

Second, the topics discussed are largely cast in non-military settings broadly describing cultural factors in general terms. Specificity, targeting, and applicability based on specific pedagogical disciplines seem to be lacking. The heavy emphasis on anthropology to explain political, economic, social, and historical issues weakens the lessons' impact. Balancing the discipline content of the cultural studies will enrich the experience of learning. This can be done by integrating relevant topics from the disciplines of anthropology, sociology, and political science.

Third, values, beliefs, behaviors/attitudes, and norms (VBBN) are the central focus of cultural studies. In a much larger measure their central features, such as respect, honor, dignity, fear, anger, resentment, and such attitudes as family unity, clan intensity, and tribal cohesion or schisms are psychological manifestations. They are the cultural challenges in which Soldiers will need to be well versed in order to navigate their operational environment.

It may be argued that the Soldier cannot be expected to be an authority on the peculiarities of limitless cultural topics as they apply to multiple societies. For that reason alone, I believe focusing and targeting VBBN as to their emotive effects can prepare the Soldier in what to expect from the initial contacts with others. Highlighting these factors will bring culture much closer to the Soldiers' immediate deployment circumstances.

Fourth, the definition of political structure is intrinsically linked to political functions, formulating and implementation of policies, evaluation of functions, and carrying out adjudicative functions. The structure of any political system identifies power centers in their hierarchical or symmetrical forms. Political players associated with governments, both local and national, are most relevant to political approaches. The lessons underemphasize this impact and focus on tribal, kinships, and clan formations. Randomly mixed anthropological and political concepts create duplication of the functional role of social organizations and political structure with watered down impact and less disciplinary potency.

The relevant definition of political structure is missing in the lessons and in the slides. Similarly, the block, *Forces that Shape Culture*, veers off on

topics such as geography, climate, religion, social, political, history, and economic "forces" of influence. The rational for this is that the Army has recognized these regional and socio-economic variables as useful. From this list, geography, climate, history, and economics bear marginal influence on culture. For efficiency and maximization of cultural awareness purposes, it seems they are better replaced by topics that cut directly to the immediate tasks of the Soldier. To illustrate this, geography and "physical environment" will be selected and elaborated upon to show that their relevance is only marginally essential.

All humans adapt to their physical environment in similar survival strategies. Geographical attributes such as land and water have identical cultural effects for the American Soldier who grew up in the deserts of California, Arizona, New Mexico, and northern Texas, as they do for the villager in remote Middle East, Australia, North Africa, or Africa desert environments. Physical environments are universal; they are common to all.[2] The Soldier's "physical environment," even when dramatically different in climate, possesses natural characteristics that the Soldier and his/her habitat had, over the years, adapted to. Hunters and gatherers in the jungles of Africa share identical life styles, manners of conflict resolution, and survival skills as those in the jungles of the Amazon. Farmers in Africa and Asia can predict rainfall as the pioneer American farmers used to do before the advent of weather satellites.

The survival skills of desert dwellers throughout the African, Asian, and American deserts appear to be identical without inhabitants ever meeting each other. Prior to modern times, family units, tribes, clans and kinships, possessed naturally embedded similarities that could be inferred upon from observing a few members.[3] Their manner of hunting and gathering, sense of time, adaptability to temperature, water, medical practices, and reaction to natural disasters share many similarities. Such problems as water scarcity, border conflicts, inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic conflicts resulting from the physical environment have identical aspects and approaches to conflict resolution. The American Soldier by his childhood training, observation, intuition, and by general exposure to the American terrain is cognizant of the effects of physical environment. I feel that the section is better replaced by other cultural topics that describe societies' interrelationships and human relations.

Harnessing the Disciplines

An alternative approach would be to apply the disciplines of anthropology, sociology, and political science to those cultural topics most relevant to each of the disciplines. In this author's view, the four lessons in question are better defined and articulated if the analysis and course descriptions are aligned with their most relevant discipline. Social organizations fit better when analyzed from the point of view of sociology. Political structures are amenable to political analysis. Defining culture is mostly a province of anthropology. The Soldier's mission, purpose, and training being heavily influenced by domestic politics, I argue that influences on culture are better suited when analyzed from the perspective of socialization as used in the field of political science.

The three disciplines have functional features which can be described as follows:

1. *Anthropology* defines the primordial culture of societies focusing on family units, family types, ethnics, tribal systems, cults, and fringe groups as well as others such as the homeless, gangs, and stateless groups.

2. *Sociology* defines the organizational culture of groups such as labor organizations, educational groups at elementary, secondary, and tertiary level, peasant associations, business professionals, religious groups, military clubs, and inclusive and exclusive clubs.

3. *Political Science* defines the political culture of societies beginning with beliefs, forms of governments, regime types, ideologies, political parties, bureaucracies, independent and state-linked institutions.

Application of these three areas of study offer comprehensive details that can define culture in terms of VBBN. *Forces that Influence Culture* can then be examined in its most direct and causal element–socialization.

Socialization is the process by which societies learn their VBBN. Carefully selected political and social forces can be presented in terms of their relevancy to the Soldier's area of operation. These are social and political organizations with whom the

Soldier is bound to interact on cultural grounds. Presentation and analysis of relevant political institutions introduces the Soldier to the functional role of community or state power. Institutions can also be presented in terms of their ideological bases (democratic, dictatorial, theocratic), constitutional provisions (civil rights, civil liberties, the roles of women and respect for or injustice against minority rights), and policy making and implementing. Having done so, we then would focus on the instrumental features of each of the disciplines as will be described and analyzed below.[4]

Discipline Perspectives

All three disciplines have critical elements that are essential for cultural and civic education. Allocating topical subjects to each of the three disciplines helps us identify forces that affect culture and their relevancy to the Soldiers' deployment and redeployment missions. Frontline cultures in rural areas where the Soldier is bound to be exposed to the rural culture are better defined by anthropological studies.

The Anthropological Perspective: As stated above, anthropology is at its best when it addresses the many basic features of societies. It is a pioneer discipline well suited for the purpose of looking at societies from their initial formation. Long before political scientists and sociologists began to borrow from the treasure trove of anthropologists, anthropologists themselves had operationalized values, beliefs, attitudes, and norms (VBAN). This is particularly true in the definition of culture and its influences at their generic, organic, and localized level. Anthropological methods of analysis can be employed to bring in to focus such topics as language, religion, cultural symbols, and historical and legacy features of specific societies. The rural life where the Soldier may be first deployed can be defined to equip the Soldier with information that he can use in dealing with individuals, groups of men and women, chiefs, and tribal elders, and the attendant cultural norms, habits, and religious beliefs.

Anthropology is robust in defining societies at their micro level. Societies at their most basic level of organization are defined as entities preoccupied with finding means for survival. The family in its unitary and extended features–the clan, ethnics, tribe–and higher levels of social organization regional, sub-national and national levels, become the main focus of lecture, discussion, and exercises. When anthropology reaches into the analysis of social organizations, political structures, political systems, and political ideologies, it overlaps with sociology and political science. This overlapping of disciplinary fields will cause problems.

Basic aspects of culture, mainly the VBAN when defined from the anthropological perspective will have maximized returns. Anthropology is focused on the early development of societies. It is pedagogically equipped to identify universal commonality of the human race such as family love, community solidarity, care and affection for children and transposing those cultural values to higher levels of cultural interaction. At the point where cultural differences are affected by modernization and the complexities of societies, sociological and political methodologies and concepts are better used to address cultural impacts.

The Sociological Perspective: Behaviors and attitudes as well as the ideological stand of organized groups are better defined by sociology. Group dynamics such as joining professional associations, social organizations, petitioning, demonstrations, and riots are best analyzed in the sociological realm. Social forces in this category include political movements, labor unions, syndicates, and activist, racial, gender and ethnic based groups. From this list, the relevant social forces to concentrate upon would be groups such as labor unions, religious organizations, or professional organizations such as the teaching professions at the elementary, secondary, and tertiary level, as well as members of elite clubs, and business professionals such as chambers of commerce. The values associated with these group dynamics are economic, professional, and personal recognition to include promotions, bonuses, and awards.[5] The ways and means of group interaction, conflict resolution, negotiation, and communication would fall into this category. Even shoeshiners, street peddlers, and taxi drivers have specialized cultural and survival skills that are described by sociologists which enter the cultural realm. A sociological approach to cultural studies provides a treasure trove of critical information on the behavior of organized groups in urban centers.

Political Science: Soldiers' missions, professions and whether they engage in war, are determined

mostly by politics. The political prestige of the state is reflected in the strength of its armed services and in the intensity and tenacity of their dedication. The Soldier is a defender of the state and his combat skills are enhanced if his cultural skills are also well developed. The Soldier's sense of self awareness relative to his/her own political values is critical here. Self-knowledge, self-actualization, self-assertion in manners that affirm democratic values are as essential as winning frontline battles.

The field of political science provides us with tools for defining and analyzing governing principles–constitutions, institutions (legislative, executive, judiciary), ideology (liberal/democratic, communist, authoritarian, theocratic) and the instruments of governance. A political system's maturity is measured by the absence of conflicts, by the presence of freedoms and opportunities for citizens, and public and private sectors which maintain a high level of integrity.

Political scientists see political culture as a way of explaining the political phenomena described above. Political culture in this case is the orientation of citizens relative to each other and to their political institutions. The trust, integrity, civility of citizens towards each other is a measure of the maturing of a political culture. A harmonious and participatory political culture reflects maturity of institutions. A political culture oriented by authoritarian, totalitarian, or theocratic types of leadership displays subjective behavioral attitudes. Citizens' trust is elastic, civility is contrived and harmony and consensus are forcefully imposed through tyranny. Citizens under such systems live with defeated and broken spirits. These systems have tendencies to prevail for decades until successful revolt.[6]

Cultural topics when they are addressed from the political science perspective, give a wider view into the broad reaches of VBBN. The political science perspective also brings into focus the political structure in its law making, executing, and implementation, legal adjudication, as well as policy evaluation functions. The ways and means by which citizens express their motivations, hopes, and aspirations flow from the political culture as they interact with their government and with each other. Of the three disciplines, political science brings the secular, functional, and ideological attributes of societies to the cultural studies of the Soldier.

Final Words

In my opinion, the most valuable political, social, and economic capital today is democratic freedom and liberty. It must not be taken for granted. The temptation to see democracy as just another political ideology and to assume that its key features are not transferable to other societies is overwhelming. The American Soldier, by heritage and purpose, is a vanguard of democracy.

There are frequent misgivings expressed against "pushing our own values" on societies who may not "share our democratic values." Simply because the American system in the past and occasionally today may demonstrate systemic decay and dysfunctional behavior does not mean that the democratic culture is therefore dysfunctional. What should be kept in mind is that the dysfunctions that may be seen from time to time serve to refine and elevate the system to a higher level of democracy. It attracts mass participation. People can mobilize, vote political actors out of office, launch petition drives, and participate in demonstrations.

By selectively integrating the disciplinary fields of anthropology, sociology, and politics science as well as historical perspectives, we can provide the Soldier a broader understanding of cultural studies. We can leverage values, beliefs, attitudes/behaviors and norms (VBA/BN) by anchoring our pedagogical endeavors with steadfast commitment to what are universally desirable–human rights, human dignity, justice, equality, and individual liberty. These are embedded in what is globally recognized as Natural Rights.

Endnotes

1. The guide for the implementation of cultural awareness training in the Army is the document, *Army Culture and Foreign Policy Strategy*, 2009.

2. Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson, "Beyond 'Culture': Space, Identity, and the Politics of Difference," *Cultural Anthropology*, Vol. 7, No. 1, (February 1992), 6-22. See particularly page 7.

3. See Raoul Narol, "Some Thoughts on Comparative Methods in Cultural Anthropology", *Methodology in Social Research*, Eds. Hubert M. Blalock, Jr. and Ann B. Blalock (New York: McGraw Hill, 1968), 236-277.

4. Political scientists such as Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba voice their appreciation of anthropologists for influencing them enough to have adapted anthropological methods to political

science. See Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, Eds., *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Boston: Little Brown, 1963), 13.

5. Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Volume 124* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971) and Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978).

6. Theda Skocpol, *Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

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

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

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