Coq, Chapar, and Coq Again

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The Coq Proof Assistant





"Software Foundations"

Chapar: Certified Causally Consistent Distributed Key-Value Stores

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


Chapar@POPL'2016

"A framework for modular verification of causal consistency for replicated key-value store implementations and their client programs."


Definition (Causally Content)

A client program is causally content if it avoids assertion failures when executed with COS_A .




Definition (Causally Consistent)

A KV store impl. is causally consistent if it satisfies COS_A .



P: Client Program



Program 1 (p_1) : Uploading a photo and posting a status

 $assert(post \neq \bot \implies photo \neq \bot)$

P: Client Program

 $COS_{\mathcal{A}} \colon$ Abstract Causal Operational Semantics

Abstract:

without referring to the details of specific implementations; do not involving message passing.

Operational:

labelled transition system
executable (like TLA+)

Causal:

explicitly track happens-before dependencies

$$W_{\mathcal{A}}: N \to (S \times D \times U \times A \times M)$$

$$c:C$$
 Clock

$$d: D = \mathcal{P}(N \times C)$$
 Dependencies

$$u: U = (K \times V \times D)^*$$
 Updates

$$a: A = N \rightarrow C$$
 Applied

$$m: M = K \to (V \times N \times C \times D)$$
 Store

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{PUT} \\ & u' = u + + [(k, v, d)] \quad a' = a[n \mapsto a(n) + 1] \\ & \underline{m' = m[k \mapsto (v, n, |u'|, \emptyset)]} \quad d' = d \cup \{(n, |u'|)\} \\ & \overline{W_A[n \mapsto (put(k, v); s, d, u, a, m)]} \\ & \underline{N_A[n \mapsto (put(k, v); s, d, u, a, m)]} \\ & \underline{N_A[n \mapsto (s, d', u', a', m')]} \\ & \\ & \underline{W_A[n \mapsto (s, d', u', a', m')]} \\ & \underline{d' = \begin{cases} d \cup \{(n'', c'')\} \cup d'' & \text{if } n'' \neq n_0 \\ d & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}} \\ & \underline{W_A[n \mapsto (x \leftarrow get(k); s, d, u, a, m)]} \\ & \underline{n'', c'', n \triangleright get(k) : v} \\ & \underline{W_A[n \mapsto (s[x := v], d', u, a, m)]} \\ & \underline{N_A[n \mapsto (s[x := v], d', u, a, m)]} \\ & \underline{N_A[n \mapsto (s[x := v], d', u, a, m)]} \\ & \underline{N_A[n \mapsto (s[x := v], d', u, a, m)]} \\ & \underline{N_A[n \mapsto (s[x := v], d', u, a, m)]} \\ & \underline{N_A[n \mapsto (s[x := v], d', u, a, m]]} \\ & \underline{N_A[n \mapsto (s[x := v], d[x], u]} \\ & \underline{N_A[n] \mapsto (s[x := v], u]} \\ & \underline{N_A[n] \mapsto (s[x := v],$$

ASSERTFAIL

$$C[n \mapsto (\mathit{assertfail}, d, u, a, m)] \xrightarrow{\mathit{assertfail}} \mathcal{A} \ C[n \mapsto (\mathit{skip}, d, u, a, m)]$$

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{Get} \\ & m(k) = (v, n'', c'', d'') \\ & d' = \begin{cases} d \cup \{(n'', c'')\} \cup d'' & \text{if } n'' \neq n_0 \\ d & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \\ & W_{\mathcal{A}}[n \mapsto (x \leftarrow get(k); s, d, u, a, m)] \\ & \frac{n'', c'', n \triangleright get(k) : v}{W_{\mathcal{A}}[n \mapsto (s[x := v], d', u, a, m)]} \end{aligned}$$

$$W_{\mathcal{A}}[n \mapsto (x \leftarrow get(k); s, d, u, a, m)]$$

$$m(k) = (v, n'', c'', \mathbf{d''})$$

$$\xrightarrow{n'',c'',n\rhd get(k):v}_{\mathcal{A}}$$

$$d' = \begin{cases} d \cup \{(n'', c'')\} \cup d'' & \text{if } n'' \neq n_0 \\ d & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$W_{\mathcal{A}}[n \mapsto (s[x := v], \mathbf{d}', u, a, m)]$$

 $\mathbb{P} \text{: } \text{Client Program}$



Verified Model Checker


 $COS_{\mathcal{A}}$: Abstract Causal Operational Semantics


Program 1 (p₁): Uploading a photo and posting a status

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rogram 1 (7f): Uploading a photo and posting a status

\begin{array}{ll} \text{Ol} & \rightarrow & \text{Alice} \\ put(Pie, \textcircled{\textcircled{o}}); & \triangleright & \text{uploads a new photo} \\ put(Post, \textcircled{\textcircled{o}}) & \triangleright & \text{announces it to her friends} \\ 1 \rightarrow & \text{post} \leftarrow & \text{get}(Post); & \triangleright & \text{checks Alice's Boot} \\ photo \leftarrow & \text{get}(Pie); & \triangleright & \text{then loads her photo} \\ \text{assert floots} & \textcircled{\textcircled{o}} \rightarrow & \text{photo} \neq \bot \\ \end{array}
 \Rightarrow \text{the loads her photo}
```

```
\begin{aligned} & \text{PUT} \\ & u' = u + + [(k, v, d)] \quad a' = a[n \mapsto a(n) + 1] \\ & m' = m[k \mapsto \underbrace{(v, n, |u'|, \emptyset)]}_{} \quad d' = d \cup \underbrace{\{(n, |u'|)\}}_{} \end{aligned}
                          W_A[n \mapsto (put(k, v); s, d, u, a, m)]
                                      n, |u'| \triangleright put(k,v)
                               W_A[n \mapsto (s, d', u', a', m')]
                                   m(k) = (v, n'', c'', d'')
                       W_A[n \mapsto (x \leftarrow get(k); s, d, u, a, m)]
                           W_A[n \mapsto (s[x := v], d', u, a, m)]
       UPDATE
                    a_1(n_2) < |u_2| u_2[a_1(n_2)] = (k, v, d)
            \bigwedge_{(n,c)\in d} c \le a_1(n)  a'_1 = a_1[n_2 \mapsto a_1(n_2) + 1]
                          m'_1 = m_1[k \mapsto (v, n_2, a'_1(n_2), d)]
        W_A[n_1 \mapsto (s_1, d_1, u_1, a_1, m_1)][n_2 \mapsto (s_2, d_2, u_2, a_2, m_2)]
                             n_2, a_1'(n_2), n_1 \triangleright update(k,v)
        W_A[n_1 \mapsto (s_1, d_1, u_1, a'_1, m'_1)][n_2 \mapsto (s_2, d_2, u_2, a_2, m_2)]
ASSERTFAIL
C[n \mapsto (assertfail, d, u, a, m)] \xrightarrow{assertfail} A C[n \mapsto (skin, d, u, a, m)]
```





Concrete Operational Semantics

 $\mathbb{I} {:}\ \mathrm{KV}\ \mathrm{Store}\ \mathrm{Implementation}$

$W_{\mathcal{C}} : H \times T$

$$h: H = N \to (S \times \text{State}(V))$$
 Hosts

$$t: T = \mathcal{P}(M)$$
 Transit

$$m: M = N \times K \times V \times \text{Update}(V)$$
 Message

$$\sigma: \operatorname{State}(V)$$
 Alg State

$$u: \mathrm{Update}(V)$$
 Alg Update

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{PUT} \\ & \text{put}(V, n, \sigma, k, v) \leadsto^* (\sigma', u) \\ & \underline{t' = t \cup \{(n', k, v, u) \mid n' \in N \setminus \{n\}\}}} \\ & \underline{(h[n \mapsto (put(k, v); s, \sigma)], t)} \\ & \xrightarrow{n \vdash put(k, v)} C(\mathbb{I}) \\ & \underbrace{(h[n \mapsto (s, \sigma')], t')} \end{aligned}$$

$$& \text{GET} \\ & \text{get}(V, n, \sigma, k) \leadsto^* (v, \sigma') \\ & \underbrace{(h[n \mapsto (x \leftarrow get(k); s, \sigma)], t)}_{n \vdash get(k) : v} \underbrace{(h[n \mapsto (x \leftarrow get(k); s, \sigma)], t)}_{n \vdash get(k) : v} \underbrace{(h[n \mapsto (s[x : = v], \sigma')], t)} \end{aligned}$$

$$& \text{UPDATE} \\ & \text{guard}(V, n, \sigma, k, v, u) \leadsto^* true \\ & \text{update}(V, n, \sigma, k, v, u) \leadsto^* \sigma' \underbrace{(h[n \mapsto (s, \sigma)], t \cup \{(n, k, v, u)\})}_{n \vdash update(k, v)} \underbrace{(h[n \mapsto (s, \sigma')], t)}_{C(1)} \end{aligned}$$

ASSERTFAIL

$$(h[n \mapsto (\mathit{assertfail}, \sigma)], t) \xrightarrow{\mathit{assertfail}}_{\mathcal{C}(\mathbb{I})} (h[n \mapsto (\mathit{skip}, \sigma)], t)$$

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{\text{GET}}{\text{get}(V, n, \sigma, k)} \leadsto^* (v, \sigma') \\ & \overline{(h[n \mapsto (x \leftarrow get(k); s, \sigma)], t)} \\ & \frac{n \bowtie get(k) : v}{(h[n \mapsto (s[x := v], \sigma')], t)} \end{aligned}$$

Parametric on the implementation \mathbb{I}

$$\gcd(V, n, \sigma, k) \leadsto^* (v, \sigma)$$

$$\xrightarrow{n \rhd get(k):v} C(\mathbb{I})$$

Operational: Model the executions of the implementation \mathbb{I}

 $COS_{\mathcal{A}} :$ Abstract Causal Operational Semantics

 ${\bf Instrumented\ Concrete\ Operational\ Semantics}$

Concrete Operational Semantics

Parametric on the implementation \mathbb{I}

 $\to_{\mathcal{I}(\mathbb{I})}$ is similar to non-instrumented $\to_{\mathcal{C}(\mathbb{I})}$

"Uniquely identify put operations to track causal dependencies between them."

 $COS_{\mathcal{A}} :$ Abstract Causal Operational Semantics

Well-Reception

Refine

Instrumented Concrete Operational Semantics

Concrete Operational Semantics

Theorem (Sufficiency of Well-Reception)

Every well-receptive implementation is causally consistent.

Definition (Well-Reception)

An implementation is *well-receptive* iff there exists a *function* Rec for the implementation such that the four conditions InitCond, StepCond, CauseCond, and SeqCond are satisfied.

```
WellRec(I) \triangleq
    \exists Rec : (State(IV), N) \rightarrow C :
    let \operatorname{Rec}'(W, n', n) =
          let (H[n' \mapsto (\neg, \sigma, \neg)], \neg) = W in
           Rec(\sigma, n) in
    InitCond(I, Rec') \land StepCond(I, Rec') \land CauseCond(I, Rec')
      ∧ SeqCond(I)
 InitCond(I, Rec') \triangleq \forall p, n, n':
    Rec'(W_{\tau_0}(p), n, n') = 0
 StepCond(I, Rec') \triangleq \forall p, h_T, W_T, l_T, W'_T:
    (W_{I0}(p) \xrightarrow{h_{I}}^{*} W_{I} \land W_{I} \xrightarrow{l_{I}} U_{I}) \xrightarrow{W_{I}'} \Rightarrow
       f \text{ CASE } l_{\mathcal{I}} = n, \neg \triangleright put(\neg, \neg, \neg) : \neg, \neg
              Rec'(W_T', n, n) = Rec'(W_T, n, n) + 1 \wedge
              \forall n' : n' \neq n \Rightarrow \text{Rec}'(W'_{\tau}, n, n') = \text{Rec}'(W_{\tau}, n, n')
          Case l_{\mathcal{I}} = n, \neg \triangleright get(\neg, \neg): \neg, \neg

\forall n' : Rec'(W'_{\mathcal{I}}, n, n') = Rec'(W_{\mathcal{I}}, n, n')
          Case l_T = n', c', n \triangleright update(\_, \_, \_, \_):
              \begin{array}{l} \operatorname{Rec}'(W_{\mathcal{I}}, n, n') + 1 = c' \land \\ \operatorname{Rec}'(W_{\mathcal{I}}, n, n') = \operatorname{Rec}'(W_{\mathcal{I}}, n, n') + 1 \land \\ \forall n'' : n'' \neq n' \Rightarrow \operatorname{Rec}'(W_{\mathcal{I}}, n, n'') = \operatorname{Rec}'(W_{\mathcal{I}}, n, n'') \end{array}
 CauseCond(I, Rec') \triangleq \forall p, h_T, W_T, l_T, W_T', l_T''
         (W_{\mathcal{I}0}(p) \xrightarrow{h_{\mathcal{I}}}^* W_{\mathcal{I}} \wedge W_{\mathcal{I}} \wedge W_{\mathcal{I}} \xrightarrow{l_{\mathcal{I}}} W_{\mathcal{I}}')
            \land LlsUpdate(l_T) \land
             let \_, \_, n \triangleright update(\_, \_, \_, m) : \_ = l_T
            let n'', c'' \triangleright put(\underline{\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ )} : \underline{\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ } = l''_{\tau} in
         Rec'(W_{\mathcal{I}}, n, n'') > c''
 SeqCond(I) \triangleq \forall p, h_C, W_C:
    W_{\mathcal{C}0}(p) \xrightarrow{h_{\mathcal{C}}}^* \underset{\mathcal{C}(\mathbb{I})}{\overset{*}{\longrightarrow}} W_{\mathcal{C}} \Rightarrow \exists W_{\mathcal{S}}' \colon W_{\mathcal{S}0} \xrightarrow{\mathsf{Eff}(h_{\mathcal{C}})}^* \underset{\mathcal{C}}{\overset{*}{\longrightarrow}} W_{\mathcal{C}}'
```

Causal memory: definitions, implementation, and programming

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DC'1995

Stronger Semantics for Low-Latency Geo-Replicated Storage


Wyatt Lloyd*, Michael J. Freedman*, Michael Kaminsky[†], and David G. Andersen[‡]
*Princeton University, [†]Intel Labs, [‡]Carnegie Mellon University

NSDI'2013

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Chapar: Certified Causally Consistent Distributed Key-Value Stores

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Chapar@POPL'2016

Chapar for CC variants

Causal Consistency: Beyond Memory

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PPoPP'2016

Chapar for Op-based CRDT

Verifying Strong Eventual Consistency in Distributed Systems

VICTOR B. F. GOMES, University of Cambridge, UK MARTIN KLEPPMANN, University of Cambridge, UK DOMINIC P. MULLIGAN, University of Cambridge, UK ALASTAIR R. BERESFORD, University of Cambridge, UK

OOPSLA'2017

Chapar for State-based CRDT

Formal Specification and Verification of CRDTs

Peter Zeller, Annette Bieniusa, and Arnd Poetzsch-Heffter

University of Kaiserslautern, Germany {p_zeller,bieniusa,poetzsch}@cs.uni-kl.de

FORTE'2014

Coq for the equivalence between Op-based CRDT and State-based CRDT

A comprehensive study of Convergent and Commutative Replicated Data Types

Marc Shapiro, Nuno Preguiça, Carlos Baquero, Marek Zawirski

TR'2011

Coq for the "vis + ar" framework

syncope: Automatic Enforcement of Distributed Consistency Guarantees

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Gowtham Kaki Purdue

Suresh Jagannathan Purdue University

TR'2017

