
Examining pseudo opinions and fictitious issues in online surveys

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H. K. Andersen^{*1}, J. Mayerl¹, F. Wolter², J. Junkermann³

Abstract

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Keywords

survey methodology; online surveys; pseudo opinions; fictitious issues; response latencies

Introduction

Online surveys have grown increasingly popular in academic contexts in the social sciences (Bandilla 2016; Silber et al. 2013). The reasons why are clear: they are comparatively cheap, can be conducted quickly and they make it possible to skip the data entry phase. Furthermore, there are a number of studies that propose that the quality of data collected in online surveys is actually better than in other modes like telephone and mail surveys. This proposition is often based on the argument that online surveys lessen social desirability pressures, and the observation that online surveys tend to produce lower item nonresponse rates and less dropouts (Shin et al. 2011).

On the other hand, there are issues of coverage and representativeness associated with typically non-probability sampled online surveys. Furthermore, are lower item nonresponse rates necessarily an indicator of higher quality data? If the answers are being supplied carelessly and lack validity, are they really preferable to missing values?

¹Institute of Sociology, Chemnitz University of Technology, Chemnitz, Germany

²Department of Sociology, Universität Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany

³Institute of Sociology, Johannes Gutenberg Universität Mainz, Mainz, Germany

Corresponding author:

Henrik Kenneth Andersen, Institute of Sociology, Chair for Sociology with a Focus on Empirical Social Research, Chemnitz University of Technology, Thüringer Weg 9, 09126 Chemnitz.

Email: henrik.andersen@soziologie.tu-chemnitz.de

Exactly this is the concern some have with online surveys (Leiner 2019; Kaminska et al. 2010; Vannette and Krosnick 2014). Namely, online surveys often employ ‘professional’ panelists who receive incentives for taking part (Stocké 2006). They are motivated by monetary concerns or a ‘work-like’ desire to fulfill their obligations (Silber et al. 2013). Simple quality control measures are typically used by panel operators to filter out respondents that provide obviously poor-quality data, meaning panelists are incentivized to make it to the end of the survey without skipping too many questions, answering too quickly (‘clicking through’, Leiner 2019) or giving non-substantive (“don’t know”) responses.

These issues are made even more prickly by the fact that online surveys provide less control over the ‘interview’ situation and it is more difficult to tell whether a respondent is distracted, has understood the question properly, or is giving misleading or meaningless data purposefully (Leiner 2019; Wolter and Junkermann 2019). This means that some methods of assessing the quality of data are unavailable for online surveys, i.e., interviewer recorded impressions (“Did the respondent understand the question?”). Others, like post hoc data cleaning methods, i.e., removing fast respondents or individual responses, identifying and removing straight-liners, etc., are available, but can inadvertently introduce new biases to the data (Leiner 2019). One promising approach is to assess the degree of mental elaboration expended for a response, which can be done non-reactively with the use of response latencies (reactive methods may try to directly assess the respondent’s motivation and opportunity by asking directly about them, Mayerl and Urban 2008; Stocké 2006). Namely, if we can assess the effort the respondent is willing to expend to answer a survey question, we can begin to get an idea of the quality of their answer (Lenzner 2011, p. 9).

What make response latencies difficult to interpret is that they can indicate both the degree of mental elaboration, or the accessibility of the attitude object (Stocké 2004; Andersen and Mayerl 2017, 2019; Mayerl et al. 2019). I.e., if we observe a fast response, we cannot be sure whether it was because the respondent had a salient attitude ready to express spontaneously, or whether the respondent was lacking either motivation or opportunity and turned to some response set to avoid putting in the effort to properly answer the question (e.g., satisficing). This is particularly troubling because they suggest two completely different conclusions. Namely, accessible attitudes are typically strong ones, so fast responses motivated by an accessible attitude will likely possess high validity. On the other hand, fast responses due to satisficing can be completely independent of the question content, indicating poor validity.

In this article, we propose using *fictitious issues* together with response latencies to assess the quality of the data generated in our online survey. Fictitious issues refer to survey questions about nonexistent or highly obscure topics; things that essentially no one should have a pre-conceived opinion on (Sturgis and Smith 2010; Wolter and Junkermann 2019). In fact, it has been demonstrated repeatedly that some respondents will give so-called ‘pseudo opinions’ on topics with which they are completely unfamiliar (Sturgis and Smith 2010; Payne 1951; Bishop et al. 1980; Schuman and Presser 1980). In the context of our study, we can rule out the possibility that fast responses were caused by accessible attitudes: how could they have an accessible attitude when the attitude

object does not exist? Therefore, fast or slow responses can logically only be a sign of the cognitive effort a respondent is willing to exert (Stocké 2004; Andersen and Mayerl 2017), either to generate an ad hoc attitude or come to the honest conclusion that they “don’t know”.

In this context, the question of whether missing values are preferable to deliberate responses to fictitious issues is open. The imputed meaning hypothesis states that, when faced with unfamiliar or obscure topics, survey respondents attempt to generate an ad hoc opinion by searching for cues and abstracting the question to a more general level (Sturgis and Smith 2010). If this is the case, then these ‘pseudo opinions’ can be seen as valid measures of generalized attitudes with which the respondent connects the survey item. If this is seen as desirable by the researcher, pseudo opinions may be preferable to missing values. If, on the other hand, the primary interest is the specific attitude object, perhaps because generalized attitudes are not expected to possess predictive validity, then pseudo opinions should be avoided. To investigate this issue, we perform two split ballot experiments: one in which we vary the presence of an explicit “don’t know” category, and another in which we instruct the respondents to either answer spontaneously or deliberately.

We proceed as follows: First, in the Background section, we give a brief overview of the issue of assessing the quality of survey data and discuss poor quality data in the context of satisficing and optimizing. We discuss how these two ‘modes’ of information processing relate to the dominant hypotheses concerning pseudo opinions, i.e., the mental coin flip and imputed meaning hypotheses. In the Analysis section, introduce the data and examine the prevalence of pseudo opinions in our survey, as well as the distribution of the response latencies. We choose a hierarchical probit regression model to examine the effect of response latencies (as well as other experimental and underlying respondent-related characteristics) on the propensity to give a pseudo opinion. Our model controls for unobserved respondent-related confounders in a type of fixed effects probit model. We discuss the models in the Results section before summarizing the findings and providing an outlook for future work in the Conclusion and Discussion section.

Background

There is debate surrounding the quality of online surveys compared to more traditional personal interviews and mail-in surveys. On the one hand, it has been observed that online surveys tend to lessen the impact of social desirability bias due to the anonymity the mode affords (Silber et al. 2013; Chang and Krosnick 2009; Kreuter et al. 2008; de Leeuw 2005). Likely for the same reason, online surveys also tend to produce lower item nonresponse rates than traditional surveys (Shin et al. 2011); the increased anonymity may make respondents more open to revealing sensitive information like their income. On the other hand, web surveys employing ‘professional’¹ panelists are thought to lead to other response effects, notably satisficing. Namely, panelists are motivated primarily

¹ Here ‘professional’ refers to the pool of reoccurring participants in surveys who take part in exchange for money or other incentives, whether or not is the person’s main source of income.


by monetary incentives; they are less likely to be intrinsically motivated out of interest for the survey topic (Silber et al. 2013), or due to their positive attitude towards surveys in general (Stocké and Langfeldt 2004; Stocké 2004; Dingelstedt 2015).

Satisficing (Krosnick 1991; Roberts et al. 2019) in the context of surveys refers to a set of strategies employed by respondents who are *weakly motivated*, *lacking opportunity* (i.e., time pressure), or both, to get through the survey with as little effort as necessary (Krosnick 1991; Roberts et al. 2019). That is, a popular model of response behaviour encompasses four stages: (1) reading and understanding the question, (2) retrieving relevant information from memory, (3) forming a judgment and (4) translating the judgment to fit one of the available response categories (Roberts et al. 2019; Tourangeau et al. 2000). So-called “weak” satisficing refers to responses that result when a respondent goes through all four of the stages but in a cursory manner, leaving room for cognitive biases (such as acquiescence, primacy, etc.). The respondent may begin to search their memory for salient attitudes or relevant information in order to form an ad hoc judgment, but they end the process once a “first-best” or satisfactory result is reached. In other words, instead of optimizing their responses by attempting to consider all relevant information and perspectives, they gather some salient impulses and cut the process off. So-called “strong” satisficing, on the other hand, refers to responses in which the respondent skips either the information retrieval or judgment formation stages (Vannette and Krosnick 2014). That is, the respondent reads and comprehends the question and forms an immediate response without attempting to form a connection between the question and stored information and memories. If the respondent is unable to intuit any easy cues for an “effortless” response (Roberts et al. 2019; Leiner 2019), they may either select a response at random (“mental coin flip”) or skip the question or provide another form of nonsubstantive response (e.g., “don’t know”, Vannette and Krosnick 2014). Thus, the *difficulty of the task* is often mentioned as the third component that is said to determine the likelihood of satisficing, or rather the extent to which a respondent moves from optimizing to weak to even strong satisficing. I.e., $P(\text{satisficing}) = \text{task difficulty} / (\text{motivation} \times \text{opportunity})$ (Roberts et al. 2019). Still another form of response behaviour can be distinguished from strong satisficing in which the respondent does not even attempt to comprehend the question, thereby skipping even the first stage. This is sometimes referred to as “mindless” (Vannette and Krosnick 2014) or “careless” (Leiner 2019) responding in that the respondent’s attention is not focused on the survey questions.

As such, we can think of the quality of a response on a continuum from optimizing to mindless responding, with weak and strong satisficing somewhere in the middle, see Figure 1. Where a respondent finds themselves on this continuum is determined to a large extent by their motivation and opportunity, as well as the difficulty or burden of the task.

Expected behavioural outcomes

We are primarily interested in two behavioural outcomes when it comes to responses to fictitious issues: (1) substantive “pseudo opinions” and (2) nonsubstantive responses, which are given by the respondent selecting “don’t know” or skipping the question.




Professional panelists, especially those who habitually give poor quality answers, are disincentivized to give nonsubstantive responses, because an over-reliance on them could trigger the panel operator's quality control mechanisms and have them removed from the panel for future surveys (thereby cutting them off from the monetary benefits). For this reason, even very weakly motivated panelists will likely turn to other satisficing strategies besides nonresponses in the form of "don't know". If satisficing respondents² encounter a question with which they are unfamiliar, they may look to contextual hints to give a spontaneous cue-driven response. However, this process will necessarily be a form of satisficing, because (a) strictly speaking previous memories and information concerning the attitude object cannot exist³ and (b) a drawn-out futile memory search defeats the purpose of satisficing as a way to avoid effort. Carelessly responding-respondents who do not wish to trigger quality control mechanisms will respond quasi-randomly using effortless patterns and heuristics, but will tend not to rely overly on the "don't know" category. For these reasons, we believe that satisficing respondents will tend towards substantive answers to unfamiliar or wholly fictitious topics out of fear of triggering quality control mechanisms.

On the other hand we have optimizing respondents. These will tend to be respondents that are (currently) motivated and have sufficient opportunity for deliberate thought. One characteristic that is tied to motivation is often cited as the respondent's attitudes towards surveys (Stocké and Langfeldt 2004; Stocké 2004). Respondents that find surveys generally useful and accurate tend to be motivated to provide high quality responses. Ability is often tied to cognitive abilities (e.g., understanding the question, although this is presumably less of an issue for professional panelists) or time pressure. Respondents that lack time pressure have the luxury of deliberating on a question before providing an answer. It is unclear how optimizing respondents behave towards fictitious or obscure topics. Sturgis and Smith (2010) suggests that respondents attempt to impute a meaning when faced with an unfamiliar topic, by looking for clues in the question and extrapolating to some seemingly related attitude object. On the other hand, optimizing respondents driven by a belief that surveys are useful and helpful in guiding policy may try to avoid reporting an opinion on something they do not feel sufficiently familiar with.

²For the sake of expediency, we may sometimes refer to ‘satisficers’ and ‘optimizers’. This should be taken as shorthand for “a respondent that is currently, specific to one single survey item, satisficing/optimizing”.

³It is conceivable that the respondent could mistake the fictitious content for some existent one, but we assume this will happen infrequently, and that the likelihood of this mistake is not related to any of the other predictors of interest, so that they should be ignorable.

Figure 2. Path diagram, (lack of) motivation and opportunity leads to satisficing, satisficing leads to pseudo opinions?



M: Motivation, O: Opportunity, S: Satisficing, P: Pseudo opinion

Based on these points, it is unclear whether optimizing respondents will tend towards imputed-meaning driven pseudo-opinions or nonsubstantive ‘don’t know’ avoidance. The imputed meaning hypothesis is persuasive, but there is a surprising lack of empirical evidence for it. In fact, very few works that even mention the “imputed meaning” or “imputed understanding” hypothesis, let alone provide empirical evidence for it (Schuman and Presser 1980, p. 1219; Bishop et al. 1980, p. 208; Morin 1995; Bishop and Jabbari 2001; Sturgis and Smith 2010, p. 79 reference their own empirical findings, while Smith (1981), p. 14, 26; Bishop 2005, p. 26–33; Kreuter 2002, p. 62; Noack 2015, p. 61; Wolter and Junkermann 2019, p. 344 discuss the hypothesis but do not investigate it empirically.) In online surveys employing professional panelists, the idea that many or even most respondents consider their responses carefully is implausible. Without taking the motivation and opportunity of a respondent into account, the simple fact that a respondent gave a substantive response to a fictitious issue could just as well be evidence of satisficing behaviour ranging from simple heuristics to a mental coin flip.

We include two experiments in our study to more closely examine some boundary conditions. First, it has been shown repeatedly that the inclusion of an explicit ‘don’t know’ category signals to the respondent that it is okay to not have an opinion. Schuman and Presser (1980), for example, found that the inclusion of an explicit ‘don’t know’ category reduced substantive responses to the fictitious ‘Agricultural Trade Act of 1978’ by around 20 percent points (implicit ‘don’t know’: 30.8%, explicit ‘don’t know’: 10%). Similarly, Bishop et al. (1983) found that substantive responses to the fictitious ‘Public Affairs Act’ dropped from 51.6% in the group with an implicit ‘don’t know’ category, vs. only 41.2% in the group with an explicit ‘don’t know’.

On the other hand, we believe that satisficing could lead to more substantive responses to fictitious issues since online panel participants are disincentivized to skip questions and rely too heavily on the ‘don’t know’ category. So, we wanted to see whether we could discourage satisficing by simply asking the respondents to think carefully about their responses before plugging them in. Such speed vs. accuracy instructions have been used before (Fazio 1990; Mayerl 2009) to attempt to induce either an automatic or deliberate mode of information processing in respondents.

Indicators of satisficing and optimizing

It is very easy to record passive response times in online surveys. Online survey software often automatically records the response time per page or the whole survey completion time. There are, however, drawbacks to these passive measures. For example, if less motivated respondents tend to be more distracted, and more distracted respondents answer more slowly, then the effect of response latencies as a measure of effort on responses could be suppressed. Thus, passively collected completion times may not be an accurate indicator of effort. Furthermore, while per-page responses and completion times can reveal a tendency, they assume the motivation and opportunity of the respondent is constant throughout the survey (or within one survey page). Surely the contents of the item can have an effect on the motivation and/or opportunity. Therefore, we turn to per-item response latencies in the hopes of getting a more precise measure of the effort put in by the respondent, thereby also allowing us to better assess the relationship between effort and responses.

Per-item response latencies (i.e., for each individual question a response time is recorded) have the benefit of being specific to a clearly defined question content. If the content of the question has an impact on the motivation and/or opportunity, we can hold this constant by use of various methods (e.g., item dummies). Further, for each respondent, we have multiple per-item response latency measurements. This means we can examine the effect of the latencies on survey behaviour in a multilevel framework. This gives us the added opportunity to hold respondent-level characteristics (personality, reading speed, internet connection, etc.) constant as well.

Both forms of satisficing, as well as careless responding represent strategies to reduce effort. As such, they should be associated with faster response latencies, otherwise they lose their appeal: careful or deliberate satisficing is an oxymoron. Normally, fast responses can be a sign of either satisficing or highly salient attitudes, but with fictitious issues, fast response latencies can only signal satisficing. Because the attitude object does not exist, there cannot exist salient attitudes towards it. Based on the contextual clues surrounding the fictitious issue, the respondent may be able to quickly impute a meaning and give a response based on that understanding, but this is not a characteristic of a high-quality answer. Fast substantive responses to fictitious issues are either a sign that the respondent did not properly read the question (and the answer is therefore independent of the question contents), read it but then chose a response randomly (mental coin flip), or the respondent read the question, quickly imputed a meaning and gave an answer based on that understanding. But this is practically the definition of satisficing; to come to the first-best plausible response and move on. If the respondent was optimizing, they would be tempted to verify if their gut-response is appropriate: e.g., “Do I really know what the ‘Coastal Aid Agency’ does, and whether I support those goals?”.

Optimizers, on the other hand, are characterized by a willingness to cooperate with what they perceive as the survey researcher’s goals (Stocké and Langfeldt 2004). In the context of fictitious issues, this could express itself in at least two ways: (1) the respondent recognizes that the question contents are unfamiliar and answer truthfully with “I don’t know”. Unlike habitual satisficers, they have nothing to fear about giving




Figure 3. Response latencies, outliers removed

nonsubstantive responses. (2) The respondent attempts to “impute a meaning” and offers a response in line with what they perceive the question contents concern. The behaviour of the respondent may be misguided, but it is still a sign of a high quality response in the sense that the respondent had ample opportunity to give up and give either a non-substantive or meaningless response but they did not. Because of this ambiguity, we investigate in an exploratory fashion whether optimizers tend to give substantive or nonsubstantive responses when faced with unfamiliar topics by default.

Analysis

Data and variables

We conducted an online survey using an online access panel provided by an online panel provider from 16th to 25th August 2019. The target population was defined as adults between the age of 18 and 69 years residing in Germany with quotas for age and sex in place to ensure the sample was representative of the target population on those characteristics. The respondents were recruited from the provider’s pool of ‘professional’ respondents.

The pseudo opinions portion of the study consisted of a question battery in which the respondents were asked using a binary scale to give us their opinion (mostly positive vs. mostly negative) on 14 different organizations and institutions. Eight of these truly existed: The German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr), Doctors without Borders, The United Nations, Greenpeace, The German Federal Criminal Police (Bundeskriminalamt), The Rosa-Luxemburg-Foundation (associated with the German left-wing political party, Die Linke), The Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation (associated with German Christian Democratic party) and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Six of these were fabricated by us: the “Environmental Court” (EC), the “Coastal Aid Agency” (CAA), the “Prague Energy Transition Initiative” (PETI), the “German Nuclear Forum” (GNF), the “Herbert-Schmaar-Foundation” (HSF) and the “World Space Agency” (WSA).

This part of the study encompassed a split of 1288 randomly chosen respondents out of the full sample of 3,044. Within the group of these 1288 respondents, two randomized experiments were conducted in which, firstly, 645 respondents were presented with an explicit “don’t know” category throughout, while for the remaining 643 there was no explicit “don’t know” category available. For these respondents, the option was available for them to simply click on “continue” to skip the question. Secondly, within the implicit “don’t know” group, 322 were given the instructions to think carefully and provide the most accurate answers possible, and 321 were given the instructions not to think too long, and to provide spontaneous answers. In the explicit “don’t know” group, 322 were given the accuracy instructions and 323 the speed instructions.

Operationalization

The main independent variable in the study are the recorded response latencies. These needed to be treated for outliers before running the models as some measurements stood out for being extremely long. The longest response latency was nearly 20,000 seconds or 5.6 hours. Still others were upwards of 2,000 seconds or 33.3 minutes. These cannot possibly be thought of as valid responses (in the sense that they would tell us anything about underlying cognitive processes); very likely the respondent interrupted the survey and came back to it much later. So, we proceed in two steps. First, we removed individual responses with latencies longer than 2,000 seconds as obviously invalid. The cutoff of 2,000 seconds or about 33 minutes was chosen rather arbitrarily, but it is not overly restrictive. Second, we further removed those latencies that were two standard deviations above the mean (i.e. less than $3.46 + 2 \cdot 16.18 = 35.82$ seconds), as suggested by [Mayerl and Urban \(2008\)](#), p. 59f. The distribution of the outlier-treated latencies is shown in Figure 3a.

As will be discussed below in the [Method](#) section, in order to ensure the effects of the response latencies are not confounded by respondent-related stable characteristics (e.g., age, sex, education, reading speed, native language, etc.), we will employ the average response latencies per respondent in the models. These can be interesting in their own right, however, and represent the average speed with which a respondent answered over the six fictitious issues. So, we call the response latencies per item, per respondent the level-one response latencies, rl_{ij} , $i = 1, \dots, N$, $j = 1, \dots, 6$, and the response latencies per respondent across all items the level-two response latencies, \bar{rl}_i .

Method

We are interested in the probability of someone giving a substantive response to a fictitious issue given the response latency (a measure of one’s current motivation and opportunity), and the experimental conditions (speed vs. accuracy and implicit vs. explicit “don’t know”). For the response latencies, we also include a squared term which, in the case of a linear model, allows for nonlinear effects. In the nonlinear probit model we use here, it allows for effects that are not monotonic (they do not have to either increase or decrease over all values of the independent variable, but can change direction).

The dependent variable is a binary outcome (0: nonsubstantive, 1: substantive), so we turn to a probit regression model. The level-one response latencies are continuous and vary across both individuals and items, while the level-two average response latencies per respondent vary only across individuals but not items. Likewise, the experimental conditions vary between individuals but do not change within individuals. With a manageable number of items, we can include dummy variables to control for the item-specific effects, i.e., characteristics of particular items that influence the way in which all respondents approach the question.

We want to investigate the effect of the level-one response latencies (per item, per respondent) on the propensity for a substantive response. To ensure that these effects are unbiased by unobserved individual-specific characteristics (reading speed and comprehension, internet connection, distractedness, etc.), we employ a correlated random effects model, which can be seen as a kind of *fixed effects* probit regression model (Mundlak 1978; Wooldridge 2002). This works by including each respondent's average response latency in the model. This accounts for any covariance between the level-one response latencies and any unobserved individual-specific effects. We furthermore demean the level-one response latencies by subtracting the level-two response latency (the individual's average response latency) from each. This gives the effects of the level-one response latencies their interpretation as 'within-effects', i.e., the effect of a response latency that deviates from the person's usual speed on the propensity for a substantive response (Rüttenauer and Ludwig 2019; Hamaker 2019; Wooldridge 2002). The effects of the level-two response latencies can be interpreted as 'between-effects', i.e., the effect of a person that answers more or less quickly *compared to other respondents* on the propensity for a substantive response (Bell and Jones 2015; Schunck and Perales 2017).

The speed vs. accuracy and implicit vs. explicit 'don't know' experimental variables vary between individuals but not items. The experimental conditions were assigned randomly. We also include $J - 1$ item dummies (with the 'Environmental Court' as the reference category) to control for the situation in which unobserved characteristics of the items themselves (e.g., wording, length, contents) are correlated with the response latencies.

Finally, in the third model, we investigate the effects of some respondent characteristics, like sex, age, political interest, education, etc. This is an exploratory step and the inclusion of these characteristics should not impact the effects of the response latencies (slight deviations are to be expected due to missing values on these variables reducing the overall sample size) as they should already be controlled for in the fixed effects setup. For a more detailed explanation of the regression models, see the Appendix.

Procedure

We proceed in a stepwise fashion. First (Model 1), we look at the effects of the response latencies on the probability of a substantive response, taking item- and individual-characteristics into account as discussed above. Then we introduce the squared response latency term to assess whether the effect changes direction over the values of rl_{ij} . This we would expect if both satisficers (faster) and optimizers (slower) tended

towards substantive responses (albeit for, we hypothesize, wholly different reasons). The correlated random effects probit model described above involves including cluster means for the item- and individual varying (sometimes called level-one) predictors.

For the model with the quadratic response latency term (Model 2), we therefore also include the squared within-individual response latency (as per [Schunck and Perales 2017](#), p. 97).

Finally (Model 3), we introduce respondent-related characteristics to examine their effects on the probability of a substantive response to a fictitious issue. This is an exploratory step, as we do not have concrete hypotheses regarding the respondent characteristics, and furthermore it is unlikely that the effects can be given a causal interpretation due to the potential confounding by other unobserved respondent-related characteristics contained in α_i . The respondent-level predictors are: sex (female, male), age (in years, grand mean centered, range: (-26.742, 29.258), mean: 0, sd: 14.285), need for social approval (three-item grand mean centered additive index⁴, range: (-6.371, 5.629), mean: 0, sd: 2.598), political interest (grand mean centered, range: (-2.49, 1.51), mean: 0, sd: 1.102), political orientation (0: very left, 10: very right; grand mean centered) attitude towards surveys (indicator of general motivation, three-item grand mean centered additive index⁵, range: (-9.196, 2.804), mean: 0, sd: 2.169), time-pressure (indicator of general opportunity, grand mean centered⁶, range: (-3.108, 0.892), mean: 0, sd: 0.926), education (low, high),⁷ lied (yes, no)⁸, and finished (yes, no; automatically generated variable: did the respondent reach the end of the survey?).

The regression models are estimated using the multilevel `lme4` ([Bates et al. 2015](#)) package in R ([R Core Team 2017](#)).

Results

Before examining the results of the multivariate models, let us look descriptively at the distributions and overall prevalence of substantive responses to the fictitious organization questions.

Table 1 shows the responses to the existent institutions and organization, while Table 2 shows the responses to the fictitious ones. The “don’t know” category was available only to those respondents in the “explicit don’t know” experimental group. The percentages

⁴Items: “My decisions are sometimes unwise”, “I sometimes tell lies if I have to”, “There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone” ([Paulhus 1984, 1988](#); [Hart et al. 2015](#); [Blasberg et al. 2013](#)). Cronbach’s $\alpha = 0.59$.

⁵Items: “Surveys are very important for science, politics and the economy”, “I always find the results of surveys interesting”, “Most of the time the results of surveys are correct” ([Stocké 2006](#); [Stocké 2014](#)). Cronbach’s $\alpha = 0.74$.

⁶“I would have liked to have had more time to fill out this questionnaire”, recoded so higher values mean more opportunity (or less time pressure).

⁷For the sake of simplicity, we compare those with university entrance degrees (German: “Abitur”) to all other degrees.

⁸“We realize we asked you some personal questions in this survey. To ensure the quality of the data, we would like to ask you directly: Did you provide false information on one or more of the questions?”

Table 1. Responses to existent institutions in percent

	BW	DWB	UN	GP	BJA	RLF	KAF	IPCC
negative	36.80	9.55	21.43	22.59	19.10	15.76	12.73	24.22
positive	56.37	86.10	71.43	71.20	72.13	42.62	62.73	44.18
continue	5.20	1.79	4.50	4.43	5.43	15.45	10.95	10.40
don't know	1.63	2.56	2.64	1.79	3.34	26.16	13.59	21.20

N = 1288. BW: German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr), DWB: Doctors without Borders, UN: United Nations, GP: Greenpeace, BJA: German Federal Criminal Police (Bundeskriminalamt), RLF: Rosa-Luxemburg-Foundation, KAF: Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation, IPCC: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

shown in the Table are over over all the experimental conditions. From this, we see that for the majority of the existent organizations (especially the first five in Table 1), over 90% of the 1288 respondents answered substantively. The two political foundations, as well as the IPCC, elicited far fewer substantial responses (up to 40% nonsubstantive in the case of the Rosa-Luxemburg-Foundation). This can likely bee seen as a function of the visibility of these organizations in day-to-day life. The first five organizations arguably come up much more often in the news and current events than the last three, which are somewhat more obscure. Interesting as well is the fact that the the ‘don’t know’ category was typically used more often than just ignoring the question and clicking on ‘continue’. This may be a first indication that the inclusion of an explicit ‘don’t know’ category increases the likelihood of nonsubstantive responses.

Compared to the existent organizations, typically a larger proportion of the respondents answered ‘don’t know’ or skipped the question for the fictitious ones, see Table 2. However, up to around 75% of respondents claimed to have an opinion on the fictitious ‘Environmental Court’, with just under 60% apparently holding a favourable opinion of it. Just under 60% claimed to have an opinion on the ‘Coastal Aid Agency’. Around 40–45% of respondents claimed to have an opinion of the ‘Prague Energy Transition Initiative’, ‘German Nuclear Forum’ and ‘World Space Agency’. The Herbert-Schmaar-Foundation was intended to sound like an obscure policial foundation, similar to the existent Rosa-Luxemburg and Konrad-Adenauer foundations. Indeed, like those existent political foundations, respondents considered the ‘Herbert-Schmaar-Foundation’ to be the most obscure of the made-up organizations; only around 23% of respondents gave a substantive response to it.


Figure 4 shows the effects of the experiments on the percentage of substantive responses, per item. The fictitious organizations are shown in order of appearance in the survey (e.g., the “European Court” was the first fictitious organization). First, the barchart shows that sizable percentages of respondents gave substantive responses to our fictitious issues. For the first item,⁹ the percentages of substantive responses were the

⁹The order of the items was not randomized. This was an unfortunate decision in retrospect. Randomization has already been included in the follow-up study.

Table 2. Responses to fictitious institutions in percent

	EC	CAA	PETI	GNF	HSF	WSA
negative	15.92	10.95	15.37	22.28	10.48	13.59
positive	58.54	48.06	28.34	22.59	12.97	26.48
continue	8.54	11.72	18.48	17.86	30.90	21.35
don't know	17.00	29.27	37.81	37.27	45.65	38.59

N = 1288. EC: Environmental Court, CAA: Coastal Aid Agency, PETI: Prague Energy Transition Initiative, GNF: German Nuclear Forum, HSF: Herbert-Schmaar-Foundation, WSA: World Space Agency



EC: Environmental Court, CAA: Coastal Aid Agency, PETI: Prague Energy Transition Initiative, GNF: German Nuclear Forum, HSF: Herbert-Schmaar-Foundation, WSA: World Space Agency.

Figure 4. Substantive answers to fictitious organizations

highest, with over 80% substantive responses in the implicit “don’t know” treatment. The effect of an explicit “don’t know” category, however, is striking: it often more than halved the percentages of substantive responses to fictitious issues. At the same time, even in the explicit “don’t know” group, often upwards of 20% of respondents still gave substantive responses. Interestingly, the speed vs. accuracy instructions seem to have little effect on the percentages of substantive responses. If we follow the logic layed out above, that satisficers tend towards quick, heuristic-led substantive responses, then we would expect the speed condition to increase substantive responses. This is in fact what




Figure 5. Predicted probability of substantive response over response latencies (Model 1)

we observe, with slightly higher percentages of substantive answers on most items in the “speed” treatment. However, the differences are small and the multivariate regressions suggest they are on the edge of statistic significance, see Table 3.

Moving on to the regression models, we see in Model 1, which includes the response latencies as well as group or cluster means for them, along with the experimental conditions and item dummies, that the effect of the response latency variable is negative but not significant. Remember, the specification of the models means we can look at these like item-specific deviations from the respondent’s overall response latency, which, for their part, are reflected in the group or “cluster” means. The coefficient for the cluster means is negative and in fact significant at the 5% level. This tells us that respondents that tend to answer more slowly on average (larger response latency), tend to give less substantive responses. The effect is summarized in Figure 5b,¹⁰ which displays the predicted probabilities of a substantive response over the (cluster) mean response latency in seconds. The effect is a first indication in support of the idea that substantive responses are linked to satisficing (fast responses). However, the results suggests these are between-respondent effects: respondents that respond slower on average tend to also give less substantive answers to fictitious issues. The same cannot be said about the per-item deviations from these overall speeds, shown in Figure 5a. While the basic trend is the same, the standard errors are too large to classify the effect as significant. What this means is that faster responses *relative to one’s own typical speed* do not significantly predict responses in this model.

The implicit “don’t know” category has a strong, highly significant effect on the probability of giving a substantive response. This confirms the findings in Figure 4: the

¹⁰The plots show the predicted probability of a substantive response when the experiment and item dummies are set to their reference level while the other continuous variables are set to their mean, see Lüdtke (2021). For this reason, the intercepts displayed in the plots do not represent the intercepts implied in the regression output (which set the continuous variables to zero).

Table 3. Correlated random effects probit regression models. DV: substantive responses.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
(Intercept)	0.56 (0.13)***	1.24 (0.20)***	1.52 (1.04)
Response latencies (RL)			
RL (demeaned)	−0.01 (0.01)	−0.03 (0.01) [◦]	−0.02 (0.02)
Group (id) mean RL	−0.08 (0.03)*	−0.52 (0.11)***	−0.48 (0.14)***
Experiments			
Implicit don’t know	1.45 (0.08)***	1.44 (0.08)***	1.54 (0.09)***
Speed instructions	0.17 (0.08)*	0.18 (0.08)*	0.14 (0.09)
Items (Ref.: EC)			
CAA	−0.69 (0.06)***	−0.69 (0.06)***	−0.76 (0.08)***
PETI	−1.34 (0.07)***	−1.34 (0.07)***	−1.44 (0.08)***
GNF	−1.30 (0.07)***	−1.31 (0.07)***	−1.40 (0.08)***
HSF	−2.35 (0.07)***	−2.36 (0.07)***	−2.53 (0.09)***
WSA	−1.51 (0.07)***	−1.51 (0.07)***	−1.59 (0.08)***
Squared RL			
RL ² (demeaned)		0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Group (id) mean RL ²		0.06 (0.01)***	0.05 (0.02)**
Respondent-related variables			
Male			0.18 (0.09)*
Age			0.01 (0.00) [◦]
Need for social approval			−0.00 (0.02)
Political interest			0.21 (0.05)***
Political orientation			0.01 (0.02)
Motivation			0.03 (0.02)
Opportunity			−0.05 (0.05)
Education low			0.01 (0.10)
Lied			0.01 (0.22)
Finished			−0.29 (1.01)
AIC	7251.61	7230.00	5056.28
BIC	7328.00	7320.29	5208.14
Log Likelihood	−3614.80	−3602.00	−2505.14
Num. obs.	7671	7671	5448
Num. groups: id	1286	1286	913
Var: id (Intercept)	1.56	1.52	1.27

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; [◦] $p < 0.1$. Two-tailed test.
EC: Environmental Court, CAA: Coastal Aid Agency, PETI: Prague Energy Transition Initiative, GNF: German Nuclear Forum, HSF: Herbert-Schmaar-Foundation, WSA: World Space Agency.

lack of a “don’t know” category leads to substantially more substantive responses. The speed instructions are significant, but only at the 5% level. The effect is positive and it thus confirms the impression from Figure 4: asking respondents to answer quickly, without much thought, increased substantive responses and supports our hypothesis that satisficing leads to more pseudo opinions.




Figure 6. Predicted probability of substantive response over response latencies (Model 2)

There is also substantial differences between the individual items, as seen in Figure 4. The arguably most obscure fictitious issue, the “Herbert-Schmaar Foundation” produced the least pseudo opinions by far. Notice the other items tend to provide some vague clues as to the goals or motivation of the supposed organization. E.g., “Environmental Court” obviously has something to do with the environment. One could plausibly assume it has something to do with environmental protection; perhaps it is a body for prosecuting those who damage the environment. The “Herbert-Schmaar Foundation” provides no such obvious clues. There may exist a number of people with the name Herbert Schmaar, but to our knowledge there is no widely known person with that name.

Moving on to model 2, where we introduce the squared response latency terms, we see the main effect of response latencies is negative and significant at the 5% level, while the squared term is positive and marginally significant. The predicted probabilities based on these effects are shown in Figure 6a. The effects of the response latency cluster means echo this in Model 2, shown in Figure 6b. Now we have a highly significant negative main effect, as well as a highly significant positive squared term. These findings provide even clearer support for the idea that satisficers (fast) tend to substantive responses, presumably in order to avoid quality-control measures, while optimizers (slow) tend to also provide substantive responses, presumably because the process of “imputing a meaning” takes time and effort. The fact that the within-effects are also approaching significance in Model 2 tells us, firstly, that faster than average responses for a given person tend to predict a substantive response to a fictitious issue. On the other hand, slower than average response also tend to predict substantive responses to fictitious issues. The effects of the other variables are largely stable compared to Model 1.

Finally, in Model 3, we introduce the respondent-level variables in an explorative step. Notice the sample size decreases dramatically from Model 2 to Model 3 because of missings on the respondent-level variables. For this reason, we prefer to interpret the response latency effects from Model 2. In Model 3, the coefficients are largely the same

(as they should be: correlations between the response latencies and the stable person-specific characteristics have already been eliminated using the correlated random effects model), but the smaller sample size causes a loss of power, and some of the effects fall out of significance. Somewhat surprisingly, very few of the respondent-level predictors have significant effects on the response behaviour. Males tend to give more substantive responses to fictitious issues than women, so too do older respondents, although these effects are significant only at the 10% level. Interestingly, political interest has a positive highly significant effect on substantive responses: the more politically interested the respondent claimed to be, the more substantive responses to our fictitious issues they tended to give. This echoes the findings of [Sturgis and Smith \(2010\)](#), who found also found a significant positive relationship between political interest and pseudo opinions. There, they speculated that those susceptible to social desirability bias tend to inflate their positive characteristics, and so self-reported political interest predicted pseudo opinions because these respondents desired to look knowledgeable in all domains, even on fictitious topics. Puzzlingly, the need for social approval item has no discernible effect on pseudo opinions. However, the need for social approval scale used here was a compromise solution to a larger 16 item scale that did not work as intended. Perhaps the measure of political interest here is a more valid measure of one's need for social approval than the index we used here.

Conclusion and discussion

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Appendix

For the regression analysis, we use an unobserved effects probit model ([Wooldridge 2002](#)). For a given respondent, i , and a given item, j , we can write the model as

$$P(y_{ij} = 1 | \mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{z}_i, \mathbf{d}_j, \alpha_i) = \Phi(\mathbf{x}_{ij}\boldsymbol{\beta} + \mathbf{z}_i\boldsymbol{\gamma} + \mathbf{d}_j\boldsymbol{\lambda} + \alpha_i), \quad i = 1, \dots, N, \quad j = 1, \dots, J \quad (1)$$

where $\Phi(\cdot)$ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. \mathbf{x}_{ij} is a $1 \times K_1$ vector of person- and item-varying covariates with associated coefficients in the $K_1 \times 1$ vector $\boldsymbol{\beta}$. \mathbf{x}_{ij} holds the response latencies and their squared term in the second model onward. \mathbf{z}_i is a $1 \times K_2$ vector of person-varying — *but not item-varying* — covariates with coefficients in the $K_2 \times 1$ vector $\boldsymbol{\gamma}$. \mathbf{z}_i holds the experimental variables (speed vs. accuracy, implicit vs. explicit “don’t know”), the response latency person-means (along with a squared term, more on that below) as well as several other item-invariant variables included in the last model like sex, age, political interest, education, etc. \mathbf{d}_j is a $1 \times (J - 1)$ vector indicating the current item with $(J - 1) \times 1$ coefficient vector $\boldsymbol{\lambda}$. α_i is a scalar representing the unobserved person-specific intercept. α_i encompasses the sum of all unobserved item-invariant characteristics influencing the propensity for a given respondent to choose a substantive response (anything that is relatively stable over

the course of answering the six questions, such as internet speed, distractedness, reading comprehension, native language, etc.).

Note that the first equality in Equation (1) is the assumption of strict exogeneity, i.e., after controlling for the stable individual differences in α_i , the item-varying predictors in \mathbf{x}_{ij} measured for other items have no effect on the current item (Wooldridge 2002, p. 483). In other words, strict exogeneity essentially means here that, after controlling for the individual's usual response behaviour and contemporaneous response latency effect, the response latency on item j has no effect on the outcome of item m , $m \neq j$. This is why \mathbf{x}_i changes to \mathbf{x}_{ij} after the equals sign in equation (1). We assume further that the only source of serial correlation is α_i , so that once we have conditioned on it, the errors are serially uncorrelated, and the likelihood function can be derived as the product of the individual probabilities for y_{ij} .

Correlations between the nonexperimental variables of interest (the response latencies) and unobserved item characteristics (e.g., difficulty of the question, wording effects, etc.) are controlled for by including the item dummies in the equation. But we want to also allow (and control) for correlations between the individual effects and the response latencies. That is, we want to avoid confounding by respondent-specific characteristics. If, say, older respondents tended to answer more slowly than younger respondents, and older respondents also tended to give more substantive responses, then without controlling for age, the effect of response latencies on substantive responses would be biased. We can often control for age and other easily observed characteristics like sex and education, but other person-specific characteristics, like reading speed and comprehension skills, survey experience, distractedness over the course of the survey, etc., are harder to measure. All these things, however, that can be considered fairly stable, at least over the course of the survey, are included in the unobserved individual effects α_i . So, in order to rule out confounding due to correlations between unobserved components in α_i and the response latencies, we want to specify a kind of binary outcome *fixed effects* model. This will let us interpret the response latency effects as within-effects, reflecting changes in behaviour *relative to one's usual behaviour* due to the response latencies alone and thus ensure that they are unbiased by between-person stable characteristics. Note, however, that for the effects to be given a causal interpretation, we need to still assume that the response latencies on each item are unrelated to the idiosyncratic error term, which encompass all unobserved influences on response behaviour particular to that specific item. By including item dummies, this assumption does not seem particularly restrictive.

The Mundlak (1978) approach to allowing for correlated individual effects involves making assumptions about the distribution of the individual effects (Wooldridge 2002, p. 487). Namely, we assume the individual effects are normally distributed as

$$\alpha_i | \mathbf{x}_i \sim \mathcal{N}(\psi + \bar{\mathbf{x}}_i \boldsymbol{\zeta}, \sigma_\alpha^2).$$

That is, we assume $\alpha_i = \psi + \bar{\mathbf{x}}_i \boldsymbol{\zeta} + v_i$. $\boldsymbol{\zeta}$ accounts for the correlations between the individual effects α_i and the between-person part of the time-varying covariates, $\bar{\mathbf{x}}_i$.

Now we substitute this back into Equation (1) for

$$P(y_{ij} = 1 | \mathbf{x}_{ij}, \mathbf{z}_i, \mathbf{d}_j) = \Phi(\psi + \mathbf{x}_{ij}\beta + \mathbf{z}_i\gamma + \mathbf{d}_j\lambda + \bar{\mathbf{x}}_i\zeta), \quad j = 1, \dots, J. \quad (2)$$

With this formulation, the effects of interest, β , represent *within-effects*, which we could clarify by writing them as β^W . In this case, it is the effect of the response latency on the probability of a substantive response *relative to the overall probability of a substantive response* (Bell and Jones 2015). Put differently, for a person who, say, tends to give substantive responses with high probability, we want to see if the response speed for a given item makes them change their usual behaviour, by reducing or increasing the probability relative to their typical behaviour.

However, we can see the model also includes the person-means for the time-varying variables with $\bar{\mathbf{x}}_i$, and these can be interesting in their own right. The effects associated with the person means, ζ , represent the *contextual effect*, i.e., the difference between the between-person and within-person effects, $\zeta = (\beta^B - \beta^W)$, where β^B are the between-effects (Bell and Jones 2015; Schunck and Perales 2017).

Here, the between-effects refer to the effect of the average speed of a respondent on the probability of giving a substantive response. We call them *between-person* or between-effects because they are interpreted as such: a person who answers more quickly than others on average tends to give more/less substantive responses (as the case may be). We would expect these to play a role if the average speed of a respondent was something that affected *all* their responses, e.g., if respondents that tended to answer faster than most others also tended to give pseudo opinions. So, we can use the definition of ζ above and rewrite Equation (2) by collecting β^W

$$\begin{aligned} P(y_{ij} = 1 | \mathbf{x}_{ij}, \mathbf{z}_i, \mathbf{d}_j) &= \Phi(\psi + \mathbf{x}_{ij}\beta^W + \mathbf{z}_i\gamma + \mathbf{d}_j\lambda + \bar{\mathbf{x}}_i(\beta^B - \beta^W)) \\ &= \Phi(\psi + (\mathbf{x}_{ij} - \bar{\mathbf{x}}_i)\beta^W + \mathbf{z}_i\gamma + \mathbf{d}_j\lambda + \bar{\mathbf{x}}_i\beta^B). \end{aligned}$$

Essentially, we specify a multilevel model with random intercepts (representing the individual effects) and include the within-individual (or ‘cluster’) means of the level-one variables as a predictor of the random intercepts α_i . The cluster means are thus correlated with both the outcome (the average outcome, so to speak) and the predictors in \mathbf{x}_i . This covariance is partialled out by including both in the regression so that β^W represent within-person effects that are unconfounded by α_i (Rüttenauer and Best 2019; Hamaker 2019; Wooldridge 2002; Mundlak 1978; Schunck and Perales 2017). In order to better interpret the between effects as such, and not as contextual effects, we use the demeaned version of the item-varying response latencies $(\mathbf{x}_{ij} - \bar{\mathbf{x}}_i)$. Again, this does not change the interpretation of the within-effects, just the between-effects (Schunck and Perales 2017; Bell and Jones 2015).

It is important to note that the item-invariant predictors (speed_i, impdk_i) could be included in \mathbf{x}_i but their effects cannot be distinguished from α_i unless we assume that they are uncorrelated with α_i (Wooldridge 2002, p. 488). In other words, in the vector ζ (the effects of the predictors on the random intercepts), the coefficients for the item-invariant predictors would have to be set to zero. This is not particularly

problematic in our case because the main item-invariant predictors were fixed as a result of the randomized experimental setting. In the final model, when we include individual-level predictors (e.g., sex, age, political orientation), we need to assume that they were uncorrelated with the individual effects (a potentially problematic assumption). This applies to the person-means of the response latencies as well: if average response speed is related to any unobserved components in α_i (anything from reading comprehension skills, to political knowledge), then the effect of the person's average response speed cannot be interpreted as being causal and is then due in part to these unobserved confounders.

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