

# Assignment #1

Game Theory and Its Applications

Requirement 1-1 & 1-2

# Contents

- Simulating the execution of graph games based on your student ID

Student ID mod 6	Game to simulate
0	Multi-Domination Game
1	$k$ -Domination Game
2	Maximal Independent Set (MIS) Game (Symmetric)
3	Asymmetric MIS Game
4	Weighted MIS Game
5	MIS-based IDS Game

Student ID mod 2	Game to simulate
0	Symmetric MDS-based IDS Game
1	Asymmetric MDS-based IDS Game

# Multi-Domination Game [YC14]

- Players: node set  $\{p_1, p_2, \dots, p_n\}$
- Strategies:  $c_i \in \{0 \text{ (OUT)}, 1 \text{ (IN)}\}$  for all  $p_i$
- Utility functions ( $C$ : strategy profile)

$$u_i(C) = \begin{cases} (\sum_{p_j \in M_i} g_j(C)) - \beta & \text{if } c_i = 1 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

$\beta > 0$ : constant  
 $M_i$ : closed neighbors of  $p_i$

where

$$g_j(C) = \begin{cases} \alpha, & \text{if } v_j(C) \leq k_j \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$\alpha > \beta$ : constant

where

$$v_j(C) = \sum_{p_k \in M_j} c_k$$

The number of nodes that dominate  $p_j$

# $k$ -Domination Game [YC14]

- Players: node set  $\{p_1, p_2, \dots, p_n\}$
- Strategies:  $\{0 \text{ (OUT)}, 1 \text{ (IN)}\}$

$$u_i(C) = \begin{cases} \alpha & \text{if } |N_i| < k \text{ and } c_i = 1 \\ \sum_{p_j \in N_i} g_j(C) - \beta & \text{if } |N_i| \geq k \text{ and } c_i = 1 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

If  $|N_i| < k$ ,  $c_i$  must be 1

where


$$g_i(C) = \begin{cases} \alpha, & \text{if } c_i = 1 \text{ and } v_i(C) \leq k \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$\alpha > \beta > 0$

where

$$v_i(C) = \sum_{p_j \in N_i} c_j$$

$N_i$  (not  $M_i$ ):  $p_i$ 's open neighbors ( $p_i$  excluded)



不含P

# Maximal Independent Set (MIS) Game (Symmetric) [YHT16]

- Players: nodes  $p_i$ 's
- Strategies:  $c_i \in \{1 \text{ (IN)}, 0 \text{ (OUT)}\}$
- Utility functions:

$$u_i(C) = \sum_{p_j \in N_i} \omega(c_i, c_j) + c_i$$

where  $N_i$ :  $p_i$ 's open neighbors

$$\omega(c_i, c_j) = -\alpha c_i c_j \quad \alpha > 1: \text{constant}$$

$$BR_i(c_{-i}) = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } \exists p_j \in N_i, c_j = 1 \\ 1, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

# Asymmetric MIS Game [YHT16]

- Player's utility

$$u_i(C) = \sum_{p_j \in L_i} \omega(c_i, c_j) + c_i$$

where  $L_i$ :  $p_i$ 's neighbors that have equal or higher priority

$$\omega(c_i, c_j) = -\alpha c_i c_j \quad \alpha > 1: \text{constant}$$

$$BR_i(c_{-i}) = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } \exists p_j \in L_i, c_j = 1 \\ 1, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Players only care neighbors that have priority equal to or higher than theirs

# Weighted MIS Game [YHT16]

- Each node has a weight and we want to maximize the total weight in the MIS
- One approach: using priority
- Possible priority functions:


$$\frac{W(p_i)}{\deg(p_i) + 1}$$

$$\frac{W(p_i)}{W(p_i) + \sum_{p_j \in N_i} W(p_j)}$$



# MIS-based IDS Game [YS18]

- $p_i$ 's utility:

$$u_i(C) = c_i \left( 1 - \alpha \sum_{p_j \in L_i} c_j \right)$$


$\alpha > 1$

$L_i$ : set of  $p_i$ 's neighboring node  $p_j$  with  $\deg(p_j) \geq \deg(p_i)$ .

prefer nodes with higher node degrees

- Best response of  $p_i$

$$BR_i(c_{-i}) = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } \exists p_j \in L_i, c_j = 1 \\ 1, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

# Symmetric MDS-based IDS Game [YS18]

- Let  $M_i = N_i \cup \{p_i\}$ . Define  $v_i(C) = \sum_{p_j \in M_i} c_j$

- Let  $\alpha > 1$  be a constant. Define  $g_i(C)$  as

$$g_i(C) = \begin{cases} \alpha & \text{if } v_i(C) = 1 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

- Let  $\gamma > n\alpha$  be a constant. Define

$$w_i(C) = \sum_{p_j \in N_i} c_i c_j \gamma,$$

- Let  $0 < \beta < \alpha$ .  $p_i$ 's **utility**:

$$u_i(C) = \begin{cases} \left( \sum_{p_j \in M_i} g_j(C) \right) - \beta - w_i(C) & \text{if } c_i = 1 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

gain of  
dominance



penalty of violating  
independence



# Asymmetric MDS-based IDS Game [YS18]

- Let  $M_i = N_i \cup \{p_i\}$ . Define

$$v_i(C) = \sum_{p_j \in M_i} c_j$$


- Let  $\alpha > 1$  be a constant. Define  $g_i(C)$  as

$$g_i(C) = \begin{cases} \alpha & \text{if } v_i(C) = 1 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

- Let  $\gamma > n\alpha$  be a constant. Define

$$w_i(C) = \sum_{p_j \in L_i} c_i c_j \gamma.$$

only care neighbors  
with higher degrees



- Let  $0 < \beta < \alpha$ .  $p_i$ 's utility:

$$u_i(C) = \begin{cases} \left( \sum_{p_j \in M_i} g_j(C) \right) - \beta - w_i(C) & \text{if } c_i = 1 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

# Requirement 2



# Contents

- In this assignment, you could reuse your codes for homework#1
- You have to define a utility function by yourself for the maximal matching problem

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matching\\_\(graph\\_theory\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matching_(graph_theory))

# Maximal Matching

- Both are maximal matching (one with 2 matched pairs and the other with 3 matched pairs)



# Matching Game

- Given a graph  $G = (P, E)$ , where  $P$  is the vertex set (with  $n$  vertices) while  $E$  is the edge set
- Each player  $p_i$  is a node in  $P$
- Strategy set of each player  $p_i \in P$ :  $N_i \cup \{null\}$ , where  $N_i$  is  $p_i$ 's open neighbors and  $null$  indicates unmatched
- Let  $c_i$  be  $p_i$ 's strategy and  $C = (c_1, c_2, \dots, c_n)$  be a strategy profile.  $(p_i, p_j)$  is a *matched pair* if and only if  $c_i = p_j$  and  $c_j = p_i$ .
- $p_i$  is *unmatched* if  $c_i = null$


# Design Goal

- Define a utility function  $u_i(C)$  for each player  $p_i \in P$  such that
  - Starting from any strategy profile, ensure that any player's strategy change as his best response eventually ends up with a NE
  - Ensure that every NE is a maximal matching
    - It's a matching because ①  $c_i = p_j$  whenever  $c_j = p_i$  ②  $c_i = null$  otherwise
    - It's maximal because there exists no two players that are unmatched but could match with each other



# Design Goal (Optional)

- A heuristic to increase the number of matched pairs is to give high priority to nodes with few neighbors in matching
- Example



- Try to integrate this concept into utility definition
- This part is not mandatory (only for those who are interested)

# Pseudo Code for Game Simulation

```
randomize initial game state
move_count = 0
while the game does not reach NE
    randomly pick up one player who can improve its utility
    change this player's strategy to its best response
    move_count++
end while
verify that the game state is a valid solution
output game state and move_count
```

# Performance Measurements of The Result

- Except weighted MIS game, the quality of the result can be measured by the number of elements in the set
  - We want to minimize the number of elements in a dominating set
  - We want to maximize the number of elements in an independent set
- We want to maximize the total weight in the weighted MIS game
- Besides, we want to minimize the number of player's movements (i.e., `move_count`)

# Pseudo Code for Performance Evaluation

Topology: the WS model ( $n = 30, k = 4$ )

Adjustable parameter:  $p_r$  (0 to 0.8 step 0.2)

```
repeat every adjustable topology parameter  
  repeat 100 times
```

**Code for Game Simulation**



```
  calculate the averaged set cardinality and move_count  
  plot the results using x-y figures
```

# Simulation Environment


# The WS Model [WS98]

- an  $n$ -node **regular graph** is first formed
  - each node has  $k$  edges connecting to its  $k$  nearest neighbors
- **rewire** every edge to a randomly selected node with probability  $p_r$


$$n = 16$$
$$k = 4$$



# Sample Result (for Requirement 1-1 & 1-2)



Link rewiring prob.



Link rewiring prob.

$$n = 30, k = 4$$


# References (Requirement 1-1 & 1-2)

- [YC14] L.-H. Yen and Z.-L. Chen, “Game-theoretic approach to self-stabilizing distributed formation of minimal multi-dominating sets,” *IEEE Trans. on Parallel and Distributed Systems*, 25(12): 3201-3210, Dec. 2014.
- [YHT16] L.-H. Yen, J.-Y. Huang, and V. Turau, “Designing self-stabilizing systems using game theory,” *ACM Trans. on Autonomous and Adaptive Systems*, 11(3), Sept. 2016.
- [YS18] L.-H. Yen and G.-H. Sun, “Game-theoretic approach to self-stabilizing minimal independent dominating sets,” *The 11th Int'l Conf. on Internet and Distributed Computing Systems* (IDCS 2018), Tokyo, Japan, Oct. 2018.
- [WS98] D.J. Watts and S.H. Strogatz, “Collective Dynamics of ‘Small-World’ Networks,” *Nature*, vol. 393, pp. 440-442, June 1998.




# Sample Result (for Requirement 2)

Avg. number of matched pairs



Link rewiring prob.

Avg. #moves per node



Link rewiring prob.

$$n = 30, k = 4$$

# References (Requirement 2)

- Maximal Matching: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matching\\_\(graph\\_theory\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matching_(graph_theory))
- [WS98] D.J. Watts and S.H. Strogatz, “Collective Dynamics of ‘Small-World’ Networks,” *Nature*, vol. 393, pp. 440-442, June 1998.