


20. Encryption

When we send data over an untrusted network, we need to encrypt the data!

We design our system according to Kerchoff's Design Principal

~ minimize what needs to be kept secret




We denote the shared secret key with "K"

The question of security is a question of trust.

- Most programs run by the OS are not trusted (cat, grep, sh, gcc, make...)
- BUT a few are (login, sudo, su...), and can therefore call setuid()

If we are worried about security, the latter are the risk:

How do we choose who to trust?



- We call the set of all trusted programs the Trusted Computing Base
- We seek to minimize the TCB

BUT can we really trust anything?

- Take Ken Thompson, creator of Unix:
 - wrote a Turing Award winning paper *Reflections on Trusting Trust*
 - paper described a bug he built into the system

```
// in the login program, Ken added the following code
if(strcmp(user,"ken")==0) uid = 0;
// however, this would be easily found out, so in gcc, he add
s:
if(compiling(login.c)) generate strcmp
```

```
// now no one looking at the login source code can see the bug
// he also adds in gcc
if(compiling(gcc.c)) generate generate strcmp
// he compiles gcc and edits the code back -- the code is now
gone!
```

Couldn't this be found in the assembly?

NO:

- he can modify the code for objdump
- he can even make it so that using other code injects bugs!

The moral of the story is, "You need to trust your tools"

- as an aside, gcc really should be in the TCB

With this principal in mind, we model secure message passing:

$A \rightarrow B \{ "I'm Alice" \}^K$

- this is BAD; it is subject to replay attacks
 - we need a nonce ~ a nonsense string used to verify possession of a key

$A \rightarrow B "I'm Alice"$

$B \rightarrow A "<nonce>"$

$A \rightarrow B \{ "<nonce>" \}$

$B \rightarrow A "OK"$

We can now effectively verify identify, so how do we use this to send messages?

- we use a Hashed Message Authentication Code

$A \rightarrow B M || \text{HMAC}(M, K)$

- how do we find an HMAC?
 - we call our cryptographic friends for a (Cryptographically) Secure Checksum Algorithm
 - defined st if $\text{SHA}(M) = N$, it is hard to find M' st $\text{SHA}(M') = N$
 - we let $\text{HMAC}(M, K) = f(\text{SHA}(K || M))$

Now we are 100% secure, right?

- Of course not: SHA's can be broken — we are already on SHA 2.something

Distributed security can also be done with a virtual network inside of one Computer:

Typical authentication via ssh is multiphase

1. establish connection with public/private key encryption
2. use the encrypted nonce as a shared secret key

Shared secrets are the model we used above; the public/private model is as such:

- a message $A \rightarrow B$ is encrypted with B's public key
- person A can then decrypt the message with their private key

So it is better to use this first, since it is slower but more secure

- note: verifying a public key is not 100% exact

This model is utilized by the RSA encryption algorithm

- The keys for the RSA algorithm are generated in the following way:
 - Choose two distinct prime numbers p and q .
 - p & q should be chosen at random,
 - p & q should be similar in magnitude but differ in length by a few digits
 - p and q are kept secret.
 - Compute $n = pq$.
 - n is used as the modulus for both keys
 - the length of n expressed in bits, is the key length.
 - Compute $\Phi(n) = (p - 1) * (q - 1)$
 - Choose an integer e such that $1 < e < \Phi(n)$ & e and $\Phi(n)$ share no factors besides 0
 - an e with a short bit-length results in more efficiency
 - the most commonly chosen value for e is $2^{16} + 1 = 65,537$
 - the smallest (and fastest) possible value for e is 3
 - Determine $d \equiv e^{-1} \% \Phi(n)$
- The public key consists of the modulus n and the public (or encryption) exponent e .
- The private key consists of the private (or decryption) exponent d
- d , p , q , and $\lambda(n)$ must also be kept secret because they can be used to calculate d .
 - they can all (besides d) be discarded after d has been computed

Suppose $P = 53$ and $Q = 59$

$n = P * Q = 3127$

$e = 3$.

so, $\Phi(n) = 3016$

For $k = 2$, value of d is 2011.

We need to calculate $\Phi(n)$:

Such that **$\Phi(n) = (P-1)(Q-1)$**

$d = (k \cdot \Phi(n) + 1) / e$ for some integer k

For $k = 2$, value of d is 2011.