

**ONLINE APPENDIX FOR
ENEMY AT THE GATES: VARIATION IN ECONOMIC GROWTH
FROM CIVIL CONFLICT**

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ONLINE APPENDIX

1. ILLUSTRATIVE MAPS

FARC advocates a number of political and economic reforms and chooses targets strategically related to these objectives. Figure 1 shows the spatial distribution of violence in Colombia from 1989 to 2008, where Bogotá is designated by a black diamond and major cities by black triangles. To determine the centroid locations of conflict we use the PRIO conflict site database developed by Hallberg (2012).




Figure 1. This map illustrates the geographic distribution of all conflict centroids in Colombia, according to the PRIO Conflict Site Dataset, and major cities from 1989 to 2008.

In figure 2, we show the geographic distribution of conflict in India from 1989 to 2007 again using the PRIO conflict site database. The story from this map is clearly quite stark from that of Colombia. Whereas in Colombia conflict had come right to the gates of major cities, in India conflict has been primarily confined to the periphery.




Figure 2. This map illustrates the geographic distribution of all conflict centroids in India, according to the PRIO Conflict Site Dataset, and major cities from 1989 to 2007.

2. CONFLICT DISTANCE MODELS IN TABULAR FORMAT

Results of our models measuring the effect of conflict distance in a tabular format.

Table 1. Tabular representation of coefficient plots shown in Figures 4a and 4b.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	$\% \Delta GDP_t$	
	(1)	(2)
$\text{Ln}(\text{Min. Cap. Dist.})_{t-1}$	0.994** (0.394)	
$\text{Ln}(\text{Min. City Dist.})_{t-1}$		1.174*** (0.410)
Intensity_{t-1}	-1.146 (0.971)	-1.190 (0.970)
Duration_{t-1}	0.144*** (0.037)	0.143*** (0.037)
Area_{t-1}	-4.704*** (1.295)	-4.853*** (1.283)
$\text{Number of conflicts}_{t-1}$	1.431** (0.617)	1.444** (0.620)
Upper Income	0.696 (2.691)	1.051 (2.720)
$\text{Ln}(\text{Inflation})_{t-1}$	-2.639*** (0.469)	-2.564*** (0.471)
Democracy_{t-1}	-0.024 (0.090)	-0.003 (0.091)
$\text{Resource Rents/GDP}_{t-1}$	0.072** (0.036)	0.072** (0.036)
$\text{World GDP Growth}_t$	0.543** (0.272)	0.554** (0.271)
Constant	2.453 (3.349)	1.360 (3.438)
Countries	69	69
Observations	505	505
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

3. ACLED ANALYSIS

The Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset provides an alternative source of information on the subnational spatial distribution of armed conflict (Raleigh et al., 2010). This dataset is, at the time of writing, limited to Africa and therefore was not selected for the primary analysis presented in the text. It does, however, offer us a valuable opportunity to validate our results. We aggregate the ACLED data to the country-year level by first subsetting ACLED to the years 1989-2008 and then selecting only conflict sites with at least 25 fatalities in each given year. Covariates created with PRIO but unavailable in ACLED are omitted. The analysis procedure then continues as described in Section 4.2. The results are presented in Table 2 below. When utilizing this alternative dataset we again find significant support for our argument.

Table 2. Random effects regression using ACLED.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	$\% \Delta GDP_t$	
	(1)	(2)
$\text{Ln}(\text{Min. City Dist.})_{t-1}$	0.585** (0.254)	
$\text{Ln}(\text{Min. Cap. Dist.})_{t-1}$		0.660** (0.259)
Number of conflicts $_{t-1}$	9.091*** (1.834)	9.291*** (1.832)
$\text{Ln}(\text{Inflation})_{t-1}$	1.167 (0.851)	0.921 (0.815)
Democracy $_{t-1}$	0.147 (0.217)	0.116 (0.217)
Resource Rents/GDP $_{t-1}$	-0.0001 (0.048)	0.004 (0.048)
World GDP Growth $_t$	1.034** (0.442)	0.877** (0.439)
Intercept	-19.308*** (5.477)	-18.398*** (5.252)
Countries	22	22
Observations	101	101

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

4. ESTIMATING MODELS SEPARATELY FOR HIGH AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICTS

Here instead of treating conflict intensity as a control, we re-do our primary random effect regression models estimating the effect of distance on growth, but restricting to the civil conflicts coded as wars, and then separately for low intensity events.

Table 3. Random effects regressions by PRIO intensity.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	$\% \Delta GDP_t$			
	(Low Intensity)	(High Intensity)	(Low Intensity)	(High Intensity)
$\text{Ln}(\text{Min. City Dist.})_{t-1}$	1.163*** (0.409)	2.281** (1.130)		
$\text{Ln}(\text{Min. Cap. Dist.})_{t-1}$			1.009*** (0.385)	2.884*** (1.104)
Duration_{t-1}	0.151*** (0.035)	0.227** (0.091)	0.153*** (0.035)	0.204** (0.090)
Area_{t-1}	-3.794*** (1.345)	-8.995*** (2.636)	-3.603*** (1.366)	-7.606*** (2.703)
$\text{Number of conflicts}_{t-1}$	1.367** (0.573)	1.262 (3.599)	1.332** (0.573)	1.406 (3.556)
Upper Income	2.176 (2.342)	-1.637 (9.430)	1.741 (2.300)	-0.390 (9.316)
$\text{Ln}(\text{Inflation})_{t-1}$	-2.020*** (0.499)	-2.984*** (0.727)	-2.087*** (0.497)	-3.030*** (0.713)
Democracy_{t-1}	-0.051 (0.089)	0.117 (0.214)	-0.073 (0.089)	0.118 (0.211)
$\text{Resource Rents/GDP}_{t-1}$	0.106*** (0.036)	-0.034 (0.067)	0.107*** (0.036)	-0.052 (0.067)
$\text{World GDP Growth}_t$	0.560* (0.299)	0.461 (0.482)	0.546* (0.300)	0.422 (0.476)
Intercept	-1.315 (3.504)	-3.701 (9.592)	-0.387 (3.395)	-7.567 (9.453)
Countries	66	30	66	30
Observations	403	131	403	131

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

REFERENCES

- Beck, Nathaniel (2008) Time-series-cross-section methods. *Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*: 475–93.
- Hallberg, Johan D (2012) Prio conflict site 1989-2008: A geo-referenced dataset on armed conflicts. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 29: 219–232.
- Raleigh, Clionadh; Andrew Linke; Håvard Hegre & Joakim Karlsen (2010) Introducing ACLED - Armed Conflict Location and Event Data. *Journal of Peace Research*. Forthcoming.

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