


NETWORK SECURITY PRACTICES – ATTACK AND DEFENSE

Network Security

What is Network?









Quantum Key Distribution (BB84)

Basis	0	1
+	1	→
×	7	>





Alice's random bit	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1
Alice's random sending basis	+	+	X	+	×	X	×	+
Photon polarization Alice sends	1	→	`\	1	7	7	7	→
Eve's random measuring basis	+	×	+	+	×	+	×	+
Polarization Eve measures and sends	↑	7	→	1	7	→	7	→
Bob's random measuring basis	+	×	×	×	+	×	+	+
Photon polarization Bob measures	1	7	7	>	→	7	1	→
PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF BASIS								
Shared secret key	0		0			0		1
Errors in key	✓		X			✓		√



HOME COMPANY NETWORK ENCRYPTION PHOTON COUNTING RANDOMNESS NEWS CONTACTS

PRODUCTS SOLUTIONS TECHNOLOGY SERVICES RESOURCES PARTNERS

Redefining Security!

IDQ is a leading supplier of high-performance multi-protocol NETWORK ENCRYPTION solutions and QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION equipment.

Home ▶ Network Encryption ▶ Products ▶ Cerberis Quantum Key Distribution

CERBERIS QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION (QKD) SERVER

IDQ's Cerberis solution offers a radically new approach to network security, combining the sheer power of the <u>Centauris</u> high-speed layer 2 encryption solution with the proven forward secrecy of quantum key distribution (QKD) technology. Cerberis ensures long term data protection on

point-to-point backbone and storage networks.



Tech Specs Applications Features Overview **NETWORK DIAGRAM** Location A Location B Encryptor n, Encryptor n_s Network Plane Encrypted Network Layer 2 Link Encryption Up to 12 encryptors Dark fiber or Encryptor 1, Encryptor 1, xWDM channel Secure Key Key Management QKD Server Channel QKD Server Dark fiber or DWDM channel

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

Key Management: Seamless and automated key management

Dual key agreement: conventional and quantum cryptography

Key refresh rate: 1 key/minute up to 12 encryptors

Quantum Key Distribution: BB84 and SARG, up to 100 km

Local and Network Interfaces Cerberis QKD Server: SC optical connector, WDM compatible

Random Number Generator Cerberis QKD Server: Quantis Quantum Random Number Generator

Secure Management QKD Server: SNMPv3, Ethernet 10/100 Rj45, touch panel

Indicators QKD Server: Touch panel, 240x180 pixels

Environmental Operating temperature 5° to 40° C, Non-operating temperature -10° to 60° C, Operating humidity 0 to 80% RH @ 40° C, Non-operating humidity 95% RH @ 40° C

PRODUCTS

- Centauris L2 encryption (pdf)
- Cerberis QKD Server (pdf)
- Clavis² QKD Research Platform (pdf)

QKD USER CASES

- Gigabit Ethernet Government Network
- 10G Ethernet Encryption for Disaster Recovery Center
- Colt QKD as a Service

WHITE PAPERS


- Optical Fiber Vulnerability
- Understanding QKD


VIDEOS


- How to find an optical fiber cable
- How to hack an optical fiber

RESOURCE CENTERS

- QKD Resource Center
- Network Encryption Resource Center







http://research.dyn.com/2008/02/pakistan-hijacks-youtube-1/

Pakistan hijacks YouTube













Late in the (UTC) day on 24 February 2008, Pakistan Telecom (AS 17557) began advertising a small part of YouTube's (AS 36561) assigned network. This story is almost as old as BGP. Old hands will recognize this as, fundamentally, the same problem as the infamous AS 7007 from 1997, a more recent ConEd mistake of early 2006 and even TTNet's Christmas Eve gift 2004.


Just before 18:48 UTC, Pakistan Telecom, in response to government order to block access to YouTube (see news item) started advertising a route for 208.65.153.0/24 to its provider, PCCW (AS 3491). For those unfamiliar with BGP, this is a more specific route than the ones used by YouTube (208.65.152.0/22), and therefore most routers would choose to send traffic to Pakistan Telecom for this slice of YouTube's network.

I became interested in this immediately as I was concerned that I wouldn't be able to spend my evening watching imbecilic videos of cats doing foolish things (even for a cat). Then, I started to examine our mountains of BGP data and quickly noticed that the correct AS path ("Will the real YouTube please stand up?") was getting restored to most of our peers.

The data points identified below are culled from over 250 peering sessions with 170 unique ASNs. While it is hard to describe exactly how widely this hijacked prefix was seen, we estimate that it was seen by a bit more than two-thirds of the Internet.









What is Network Security?

