

NETWORK SECURITY PRACTICES – ATTACK AND DEFENSE


Cryptographic Primitives

Cryptography

- Cryptosystem components
 - Plaintext
 - Ciphertext
 - Encryption
 - Decryption
 - Key

Symmetric Key Cryptosystem

- Use the same secret key
- DES, RC4, AES...etc
- Block / Stream



What is cipher text ?

- Has to conceal information of plaintext
 - => confidentiality
- Indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attack (IND-CPA)
 - An adversary presents two plaintext M_0 and M_1
 - The challenger picks either M_0 and M_1 at random and encrypt it into ciphertext C
 - The adversary performs a polynomial time algorithm (including encryption through an oracle) on C , M_0 , and M_1 to decide if
 - $C = \text{Encrypt}(M_0)$
 - If any such adversary can only decide with probability $\frac{1}{2} + e(k)$, the cryptosystem is said to be IND-CPA


What is cipher text?

- Indistinguishability under chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA1)
 - Similar to IND-CPA, but the adversary is given a decryption oracle
 - Advasary can query the decryption oracle until challenger sends ciphertext C
- Indistinguishability under adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2)
 - Similar to IND-CCA1, but the adversary can keep query the decryption oracle with any ciphertext other than C

Block Cipher

- An n -bit plaintext is encrypted to an n -bit ciphertext
 - $P : \{0,1\}^n$
 - $C : \{0,1\}^n$
 - $K : \{0,1\}^s$
 - $E: K \times P \rightarrow C$: E_k : a permutation on $\{0,1\}^n$
 - $D: K \times C \rightarrow P$: D_k is E_k^{-1}
 - Block size: n
 - Key size: s

Block Cipher



$$\text{Dim}(C) \leq s$$

Ideal Block Cipher

- An ideal block cipher is a substitution cipher from $\{0,1\}^n$ to $\{0,1\}^n$
- Total number of keys: 2^n
 - insecure when n is small
 - impractical when n is large
- Solution: approximation of the ideal block cipher for large n
 - Use a subset of the 2^n possible mappings

Ideal Block Cipher – One-Time Padding


- Use key size at least as long as the plaintext and ciphertext ($s \geq n$)
 - $P : \{0,1\}^n, C : \{0,1\}^n, K : \{0,1\}^n$

$$C = P \oplus K$$

$$P = C \oplus K$$

- Attain all 2^n possible mappings
- K has to be unpredictable
- Shannon security $H(P) = H(P | C)$

Feistel Network



Encryption:

$$L_1 = R_0 \quad R_1 = L_0 \oplus f_1(R_0)$$

$$L_2 = R_1 \quad R_2 = L_1 \oplus f_2(R_1)$$

...

$$L_d = R_{d-1} \quad R_d = L_{d-1} \oplus f_d(R_{d-1})$$

Decryption:

$$R_{d-1} = L_d \quad L_{d-1} = R_d \oplus f_d(L_d)$$

...

$$R_0 = L_1 \quad L_0 = R_1 \oplus f_1(L_1)$$

Data Encryption Standard (DES)


- Designed by IBM, with modification proposed by NSA
- US national standard from 1977 to 2001
- Block size 64 bits;
- Key size 56 bits
- 16-round Feistel network
- Designed mostly for hardware implementations
- Insecure to use now because the key space is too small
 - Takes 6.4 days with <USD\$10,000 machine in 2008

Attacking Block Ciphers

- Types of attacks to consider
 - known plaintext: given several pairs of plaintexts and ciphertexts, recover the key (or decrypt another block encrypted under the same key)
 - how would chosen plaintext and chosen ciphertext work?
- Standard attacks
 - exhaustive key search
 - dictionary attack
 - differential cryptanalysis, linear cryptanalysis
- Side-channel attacks

Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)

- AES, also known Rijndael, is adopted as an encryption standard by the U.S. government in the year 2000 and now used widely.
- Designed to be efficient in both hardware and software across a variety of platforms.
- Not a Feistel Network
- Block size: 128 bits
- Variable key size: **128, 192, or 256 bits.**
- Variable number of rounds (10, 12, 14):
 - 10 if $K = 128$ bits
 - 12 if $K = 192$ bits
 - 14 if $K = 256$ bits
- No known weaknesses




AES

- AES operates on a 4 by 4 byte array, which is called the “state”, in several rounds(10, 12, or 14)
- In each round, 4 steps are taken
 - Adding round keys
 - Bytes Substitution
 - Row Shifting
 - Column Mixing


AES – Adding Round Key

- AES uses an elaborated key schedule algorithm to generate round keys from the secret key
- Each round key is also a 4 by 4 byte array
- The state will be XORed with the round key




AES – Bytes Substitution

- * Every bytes is then replaced by a S-box
- * This step makes sure of the non-linear property in AES




AES Row Shifting



AES Column Mixing

- * Every bytes in the new column depends on every bytes in the original column.




- * Row shifting and column mixing provide diffusion in the ciphertext.

Each column is treated as a polynomial over $\mathbf{GF}(2^8)$ and is then multiplied modulo x^4+1 with a fixed polynomial $c(x) = 0x03 \cdot x^3 + x^2 + x + 0x02$

Block Cipher Encryption Modes

- Block Cipher works on fixed n-bit length block
 - n=64 for DES; n=128 for AES
- What if we need to encrypt data of some arbitrary length?



Sounds like an idea?

Electronic Code Book (ECB)

- Message is broken into independent block;
- **Electronic Code Book (ECB)**: each block encrypted separately.
- **Encryption: $c_i = E_k(m_i)$**
- **Decryption: $m_i = D_k(c_i)$**

Properties of ECB


- Deterministic:
 - the same data block gets encrypted the same way,
 - reveals patterns of data when a data block repeats
 - when the same key is used, the same message is encrypted the same way
- Usage: not recommended to encrypt more than one block of data

Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)

- * **Cipher Block Chaining (CBC):** next input depends upon previous output

Encryption: $C_i = E_k(M_i \oplus C_{i-1})$, with $C_0 = IV$

Decryption: $M_i = C_{i-1} \oplus D_k(C_i)$, with $C_0 = IV$



Properties of CBC

- Randomized encryption: repeated text gets mapped to different encrypted data.
 - can be proven to be “secure” assuming that the block cipher has desirable properties and that random IV’s are used
- A ciphertext block depends on all preceding plaintext blocks; reorder affects decryption
- Usage: chooses random IV and protects the integrity of IV

Counter Mode (CTR)

- * Counter Mode (CTR): A way to construct PRNG using DES
 - * $y_i = E_k[\text{counter} + i]$
 - * Sender and receiver share: counter (does not need to be secret) and the secret key.

Properties of CTR

- Gives a stream cipher from a block cipher
 - subject to limitations of stream ciphers (what are they?)
- Randomized encryption:
 - when starting counter is chosen randomly
- Random Access: decryption of a block can be done in random order, very useful for hard-disk encryption.

Galois Counter Mode


- Provides authenticated encryption (AE)

Stream Cipher

- Both plaintext (m_0, m_1, m_2, \dots) and ciphertext (c_0, c_1, c_2, \dots) are viewed as bit streams
- Synchronized input / output bitstreams
 - Encryption: $m_p \rightarrow c_q, m_{p+1} \rightarrow c_{q+1}, \dots$
 - Decryption: $c_i \rightarrow m_j, c_{i+1} \rightarrow m_{j+1}, \dots$
- Typically very fast
- In practice, streams can be of arbitrary length
- Useful for real-time streaming

Stream Cipher

- Intuition from One-Time Padding



Use a pseudo random number generator (PRNG) seeded by secret key to generate the key stream

Stream Cipher – RC4

- Key Scheduling (Seeding the PRNG)

```
for i from 0 to 255
    S[i] := i
endfor
j := 0
for i from 0 to 255
    j := (j + S[i] + key[i mod keylength]) mod 256
    swap(&S[i], &S[j])
endfor
```

$1 \leq \text{keylength} \leq 256$, typically between 5 and 16, corresponding to a key length of 40 – 128 bits

Stream Cipher – RC4

* PRNG Generation and XORing

```
i := 0
j := 0
while GeneratingOutput:
    i := (i + 1) mod 256
    j := (j + S[i]) mod 256
    swap(&S[i], &S[j])
    byte_cipher := S[(S[i] + S[j]) mod 256]
    result_ciphred := byte_cipher XOR byte_message
endwhile
```

Stream Cipher – RC4

- By Ron Rivest in 1987
- Used in SSL, TLS, WEP, WPA, BitTorrent PE, MS RDP, PDF, ...
 - Due to its simplicity and impressive speed
- Weakness in key scheduling
 - Need to pick keys carefully
 - Discard the first few bytes of the keystream ("RC4-drop[n]")

Stream Cipher vs. Block Cipher

- One can use block cipher in (EBC/CBC/CTR) modes to simulate stream cipher
 - Use ciphertext stealing to fill the remaining space (padding is not a good idea)
- Stream cipher can be applied to a block of data
- The distinction between the two are not always clear due to more powerful hardware
 - TLS and WPA2 support AES (counter mode)

Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement

- g = public (prime) base, known to Alice, Bob, and Eve. $g = 5$
- p = public (prime) number, known to Alice, Bob, and Eve. $p = 23$
- a = Alice's private key, known only to Alice. $a = 6$
- b = Bob's private key known only to Bob. $b = 15$
- A = Alice's public key, known to Alice, Bob, and Eve. $A = g^a \bmod p = 8$
- B = Bob's public key, known to Alice, Bob, and Eve. $B = g^b \bmod p = 19$

Alice		Bob		Eve	
knows	doesn't know	knows	doesn't know	knows	doesn't know
$p = 23$	$b = ?$	$p = 23$	$a = ?$	$p = 23$	$a = ?$
base $g = 5$		base $g = 5$		base $g = 5$	$b = ?$
$a = 6$		$b = 15$			$s = ?$
$A = 5^a \bmod 23$		$B = 5^b \bmod 23$		$A = 8$	
$A = 5^6 \bmod 23 = 8$		$B = 5^{15} \bmod 23 = 19$		$B = 19$	
$B = 19$		$A = 8$		$s = 19^a \bmod 23 = 8^b \bmod 23$	
$s = B^a \bmod 23$		$s = A^b \bmod 23$			
$s = 19^6 \bmod 23 = 2$		$s = 8^{15} \bmod 23 = 2$			
$s = 2$		$s = 2$			

Blue:non-secret
Red:secret

- Now s = the shared secret key and it is known to both Alice and Bob, but *not* to Eve. $s = 2$

Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement

- Based on hardness of the discrete logarithm problem
- Can be used to establish a secret encryption key **s** over a **authenticated** but not **private** channel
 - Subject to man-in-the-middle attacks
- Can be used to establish a public key cryptosystem
 - Alice's private key as **a**
 - Alice's public key as $(g^a \bmod p, g, p)$
 - Bob chooses a random **b** and sends $(g^b \bmod p)$ to Alice
 - Bob encrypts message to Alice with symmetric key $(g^a)^b \bmod p$
 - A preshared public key can prevent man-in-the-middle attacks