

Collusion through Common Leadership*

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Abstract

This paper studies whether common leadership, defined as two firms sharing executives or board directors, contributes to collusion. Using an explicit measure of labor market collusion from unsealed court evidence, we find that the probability of collusion between two firms increases by 11 percentage points after the onset of common leadership, a ninefold increase over the baseline rate. These results are not driven by closeness of product or labor market competition. Our findings are consistent with the increasing attention toward common leadership under Clayton Act Section 8.

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One third of public companies share a high-level leader with another firm, disproportionately firms in the same industry. In principle, US antitrust law prohibits competing firms from sharing leaders because of concerns that leadership overlap facilitates collusion. Yet until very recently, enforcement of this prohibition was dormant. In 2022, the Department of Justice (DOJ) signaled a change in policy, stating that it had historically underutilized the relevant law—Clayton Act Section 8—and was “ramping up efforts to identify violations” (DOJ 2022).

Despite the renewed scrutiny, there is little evidence on whether common leadership increases collusion in practice.¹ The answer is theoretically ambiguous. On one hand, common leaders may provide firms with the means to communicate, align incentives, or enforce collusive agreements (United States v. Sears 1953). On the other hand, these forces may not be sufficient to overcome barriers to collusion (Stigler 1964; Ivaldi et al. 2003; Levenstein and Suslow 2006), and firms have other means for colluding (Harrington 2006; Clark and Houde 2014; Brown and MacKay 2023; Starc and Wollmann 2023).

This paper therefore studies empirically whether common leadership contributes to collusion. The answer matters because common leadership has potential benefits. Well-functioning markets rely on information, and common leaders improve information diffusion. For example, information diffusion through common leaders improves governance practices (Bouwman 2011; Oh and Barker III 2018) and value creation in mergers and acquisitions (Cai and Sevilir 2012; Renneboog and Zhao 2014). For the firms themselves, common leaders can bring additional resources in the form of expertise or access to contacts (Dass et al. 2014; Nicholson et al. 2004). Larger pools of potential leaders improve productivity (Knyazeva et al. 2013), and allowing common leadership expands the available pool. Existing work also documents a positive relationship between a firm’s connectedness and performance (Fracassi 2017; Larcker et al. 2013; Horton et al. 2012; Poberejsky 2024). In short, common leadership may be welfare-enhancing along some dimensions. The value of enforcing Clayton Act Section 8 therefore hinges on whether common leadership also imposes costs.

We focus on a key potential cost of common leadership: whether it contributes to collusion. To do so, we leverage an explicit measure of collusion from unsealed court evidence. We find that entry into collusive agreements is indeed more likely among pairs of firms that share common leaders.

¹One exception is Gopalan et al. (2024), whose appendix documents a correlation between cartel convictions and degrees of separation of boards.

Our empirical context is the largest known case of modern US labor market collusion. Starting in the early 2000s, several dozen Silicon Valley firms entered into agreements not to recruit one another’s employees. A series of lawsuits ultimately revealed detailed evidence about these illegal “no-poaching” agreements. The unsealed information includes email trails and human resources policy documents that explicitly list partner firms with agreements not to recruit.

We take advantage of the unusual richness of the unsealed court evidence to construct a direct measure of collusion at the firm pair level. This direct measure means we do not need to indirectly infer collusion from observed prices (Porter 1983; Byrne and De Roos 2019) or auction behavior (Porter and Zona 1993; Bajari and Ye 2003; Kawai et al. 2023). Moreover, it allows us to construct a sample that minimizes the rate of false negatives, that is, true collusive agreements that are missed by the econometrician. The sample consists of all possible pairwise combinations of firms that had collusive agreements with at least one other firm. Discussions with enforcers indicate that if two firms were each identified as colluding with others, then any collusion between the two firms themselves was also likely to be uncovered.

To measure common leadership, we use data on professional histories from BoardEx, which contain detailed information on senior personnel at publicly traded companies and significant private entities. We focus on individuals in leadership roles, such as board directors and senior executives. For each firm pair in a given year, we measure whether any individual has held leadership positions at both firms simultaneously. For instance, in 2005, Arthur Levinson served as CEO of Genentech and board director at Apple and Google. We consider Genentech, Apple, and Google connected through common leadership at that time. These three firms all entered into no-poaching agreements with each other.

In the sample of known colluders from the Silicon Valley case, 63 percent of firms share common leaders with at least one other firm in the sample during our main sample period of 2000–2009. Five percent of firm pairs that never share leaders eventually collude. By contrast, 32 percent of firm pairs that ever share leaders eventually collude. To contextualize the incidence of common leadership, we repeat our calculations for all publicly-held US companies. During the same period, 38 percent of public firms share a leader with at least one other public firm. Eight percent share a leader with at least one other firm in the same 3-digit NAICS industry.

Using difference-in-differences regressions estimated on the Silicon Valley no-poaching case sam-

ple, we find that the probability of a collusive agreement between a pair of firms rises by 11 percentage points following the onset of common leadership. This effect is nine times the 1.2 percent baseline rate of collusion among firm pair-years that lack common leaders. In event studies, we find that the effect is largest about two years after the onset of common leadership. Our preferred specification includes fixed effects at the firm pair level, so that the coefficient on common leaders is identified from changes within a pair of firms over time. This specification minimizes bias from collusion and common leaders both being caused by an omitted variable at the firm pair level, such as close competition between the two firms.

Nevertheless, our estimates will not have a causal interpretation if firms appoint common leaders for the purpose of facilitating previously planned collusion. While our data do not allow us to rule out such reverse causality, we present several arguments against it. Court testimony explicitly invokes common leaders as a motive for collusion, even among firm pairs with no meaningful competitive overlap. In addition, court documents suggest that the incentives for collusion also existed among other firm pairs, but entry into collusion was more successful among pairs with common leaders. Finally, if the collusive intent predated the appointment of a common leader, we would expect faster implementation of collusion than we find in event studies.

Common leadership is a stronger predictor for collusion in our sample than other measures of firm overlap. Firms that share the same owners or compete more closely may have greater incentives to collude. We therefore check whether collusion is more likely among firm pairs with greater common ownership, or greater product or labor market overlap. Common ownership predicts collusion, but the implied relationship is an order of magnitude smaller than the relationship between common leadership and collusion. We propose a novel measure of labor market overlap based on vector similarity of other past and future employers of a firm’s employees, calculated from LinkedIn profiles. This measure also predicts collusion, but again less strongly than does common leadership. Moreover, the coefficient on common leadership is virtually unchanged when we control for common ownership and labor market overlap. We also test the predictive power of product market overlap using standard definitions of industry (NAICS codes) and product similarity (Hoberg and Phillips 2016). We find no incremental predictive power of product market overlap. This suggests that Clayton Act Section 8, which only prohibits common leadership among competitors in the product market, may not be suited to enforcing against collusion in input markets.

Economy-wide effects may be smaller than the ones we estimate within our sample. Our estimates are specific to a particular set of firms and time period in which the conditions may have been especially conducive to collusion. The explosive growth of the tech industry in Silicon Valley in the mid- to late 2000s created fierce competition for the best talent, and enforcement of antitrust laws in labor market contexts and against common leadership was weak. Our sample comprises firms involved in at least one no-poaching agreement, resulting in a sample selected on revealed willingness to collude. Consequently, we interpret our results as supporting closer scrutiny of common leadership, without taking a stand on the magnitude of its effects.

This paper provides the “first stage” for a recent body of evidence documenting apparent anticompetitive outcomes among companies with board overlap, including in financing (Barone et al. 2022; Eldar et al. 2023), product markets (Gopalan et al. 2024; Geng et al. 2021; Colombo 2022), innovation (Cabezón and Hoberg 2024), and, closest to our setting, labor markets (Begley et al. 2023). Our findings provide the first link in a potential causal chain from common leadership to collusion to observed anticompetitive outcomes. We also depart from prior work by including firm executives in our definition of common leadership. We find suggestive evidence that common leadership involving executives, rather than independent board members only, is at least equally predictive of collusion.

The rationale for prohibiting common leaders is that they may provide firms with the means to communicate, align incentives, or enforce collusive agreements. These mechanisms are qualitatively similar to common ownership—the same investors owning shares in two ostensibly competing firms—which has been found by some researchers to lead to coordination among the co-owned firms (Azar et al. 2018; Boller and Morton 2020; Anton et al. 2023) and has attracted substantial regulatory attention (FTC 2018; DOJ and FTC 2023; FTC and DOJ 2024). Although common leaders provide an even more direct link between firms than common owners, common leadership has received comparatively little regulatory attention.

Turning to our empirical context, two other recent papers examine the Silicon Valley no-poaching case, focusing on the eight firms targeted by the DOJ in a 2010 case and the presumed end of collusion at that time. Gibson (2024) finds evidence of lower salaries and other benefits prior to the DOJ’s lawsuit, and Ferrés et al. (2024) find that colluding firms posted jobs at higher rates, with lower benefits, and spent less on R&D while producing more innovation. This paper focuses

on the origins of the collusion and expands the sample to the dozens of other firms implicated in collusive agreements across the multiple lawsuits that followed the DOJ’s investigation.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 describes our empirical setting and data, and summarizes the prevalence of common leadership. Section 2 describes our sample construction and regression specification. Section 3 presents the results.

1 Background and Data

This section describes the legal context, our data sources, construction of the key variables, and prevalence of common leadership in both the analysis sample and a reference sample of public firms.

1.1 Institutional Background

US antitrust law prohibits certain competing firms from sharing high-level leaders under Section 8 of the Clayton Act. The prohibition applies to firms that are sufficiently large and above a *de minimis* threshold of competitive overlap in product markets.² Notably, the prohibition does not apply to firms that compete solely in input markets, such as the market for labor.

Section 8 was designed by lawmakers to reduce the “opportunity or temptation” for collusion (United States v. Sears 1953). The concern was that common leaders may raise the probability of collusion by, for example, providing incentive alignment and a discreet communication channel. Nevertheless, Section 8 was rarely enforced in the century after the 1914 passage of the Clayton Act (FTC 2023), despite the presence of common leadership in the market. As we document in Section 1.4, one third of public firms have shared a common leader with another public firm in recent decades. This includes firms that compete in the same product markets, such as Dell and Hewlett-Packard, which compete in the market for computers; or Akamai and Oracle, which compete in the market for cloud computing.

One reason for the prevalence of common leadership is that qualified leaders are scarce (Knyazeva et al. 2013). Moreover, regulation requires a minimum number of directors to be independent, i.e. not already employed by the firm, further restricting the pool of available directors (Linck et al.

²The threshold is not demanding: revenues from “competitive sales” (the common product market) above 2 percent of each firm’s total revenues and above 4 percent of at least one firm’s total revenues. The determination of products that qualify as “competitive” is not always straightforward. As of the mid-2020s, the prohibition applies to firms with at least approximately \$50 million in “capital, surplus, and undivided profits,” which is commonly interpreted as net equity (LLP 2009). The dollar amount of the threshold is typically raised annually.

2009). Individuals already serving in leadership roles are therefore disproportionately likely to be appointed to board seats, resulting in many leaders holding concurrent leadership roles elsewhere.

The set of leaders to which Clayton Act Section 8 applies has changed over time. When it was passed in 1914, the Clayton Act only prohibited common members of the board of directors. The prohibition was expanded in 1990 to include C-suite employees and other high-level officers of the firm (Holian et al. 2023). We use the term “common leadership” to distinguish between overlapping directorates and the modern, more expansive definition.

In the past few years, federal antitrust authorities have substantially increased their Section 8 enforcement actions against common leadership (DOJ 2022; FTC 2023; DOJ 2023). This increase accompanied a broader shift toward more aggressive antitrust enforcement, including a new focus on enforcement in labor markets (Prager 2025). The Silicon Valley no-poaching case we study took place during the preceding, more permissive enforcement regime. Although there is evidence that participating firms were aware of the illegality of their agreements, they evidently found the degree of legal risk tolerable (Appendix D.4).

1.2 Measure of Collusive Agreements

The Silicon Valley no-poaching case provides an unusual level of visibility into collusive agreements among a large group of firms. Modern collusion is typically difficult to measure due to its illegality and resulting secrecy. In typical research contexts, collusion must be inferred from a combination of data and models of conduct, such as when bidding rings are inferred from observed auction bids (Porter and Zona 1993; Bajari and Ye 2003; Kawai et al. 2023). In our context, evidence emerging from multiple court cases provides a direct measure of which pairs of firms had collusive no-poaching agreements.

We measure collusion using all available evidence unsealed from the court case the DOJ brought in 2010, as well as the multiple civil lawsuits that followed. Court evidence contains lists of firm pairs with agreements, along with bounds on the timing of the agreements. Figure 1 shows excerpts from two such court exhibits, which were typically drawn from subpoenaed emails or internal company documents. Figure 1a contains a list of Google’s earliest five agreements, and Figure 1b lists Apple’s active agreements a few months before the DOJ investigation. Notably, the Apple document explains that the agreements with firms in seemingly unrelated industries, such as Nike

and J. Crew, involve common leadership. Consistent with common leadership playing a role, then-Google CEO Eric Schmidt testified in court that Google “did not want a situation where you had a sitting board member and we were cold calling into their companies” (Schmidt deposition 2013). We provide additional relevant quotes from the court documents, including ones demonstrating a more active role of common leaders in agreements, in Appendix D.2.

We use all available court evidence to construct a dataset of no-poaching agreements at the firm pair-year level. For each pair of firms, we record whether a no-poaching agreement had begun by a given year. We provide summary statistics for the resulting data in Section 1.4. Here, we describe the institutional details of the Silicon Valley no-poaching case.

In the tech sector in the 2000s, talent was scarce (Helft 2007) and cold-calling other firms’ current employees was a common recruiting tactic. Employees hired via cold-calling were perceived as higher-quality than those who independently applied for a job (Appendix D.1). When a rival firm tried to poach an employee, the poacher and the incumbent employer could enter a bidding war, which could result in losing an employee or paying higher compensation. A mutual agreement not to cold-call the employees of a close competitor could therefore benefit both firms by reducing labor costs.³ The agreements we study all contained such a no-cold-calling provision, commonly called a “no-poaching” agreement. The agreements typically applied to all the employees of the rival (Appendix D.3), but allowed hiring a rival’s employee if that employee independently initiated a job application. Some agreements went further with a provision that the firms would refuse to engage in a bidding war even if an employee independently applied to the rival’s job. However, the details of individual agreements are not always observable from the court documents.

The agreements in the case began in earnest with a wave of no-poaching arrangements in 2005. Figure D.2 shows an email exchange between Google co-founder Sergey Brin and his executive team in February 2005. Apple CEO Steve Jobs approached Brin with a request to stop recruiting Apple employees (Figure D.2a). Within two weeks, mediated by common leader Bill Campbell, Apple and Google had an agreement not to cold-call one another’s employees (Figures D.2b and D.2c). After the Apple-Google agreement, the list of no-poaching agreements grew rapidly, eventually expanding to involve 65 firms.

These agreements are illegal under antitrust law because they amount to market allocation;

³Adobe CEO Shantanu Narayen stated in an email about an Adobe agreement that “we don’t want the gloves off – it doesn’t do either company any good.”

Figure 1: No-Poaching Lists from Court Exhibits

(a) Google's October 2005 List

From: Shona Brown [mailto:shona@google.com]
Sent: Tuesday, October 04, 2005 7:58 PM
To: EMG
Cc: Judy Gilbert; Stacy Sullivan; Arnon Geshuri
Subject: Protocol for "Do Not Cold Call" and "Sensitive" Companies ---please comment to Arnon ASAP if you have any changes

[OMID -- check with Arnon before you go "live" with this] [JOAN - please confirm with Arnon that you are comfortable with this final wording]

Special Protocol for "Do Not Cold Call" and "Sensitive" Companies

The following companies are part of the "Do Not Cold Call" list:

- * Genentech
- * Intel
- * Apple
- * Paypal
- * Comcast

(b) Apple's July 2009 List

Hands Off (Do Not Call List) :

Microsoft - Mountain View (exchange group and Mac group)
Garmin
Palm
Adobe (Software partner)
Aspyr
AMD/ATI
Best Buy
CDW
Cingular
Comp USA (product re-seller)
Foxconn
Genentech (CEO sits on our board)
Google
Ingram Micro
Intel
Intuit (Common board members)
JCrew (Common board members)
Mac Zone
Nike (Common board members)
Nvidia
PC Connection
PC Mall
Pixar
Lucas
Quanta
Tech Data
Zones

Each figure is drawn from an exhibit presented as evidence in court. Exhibits such as these form the basis of our data on the pairwise existence and timing of collusive agreements.

that is, firms agreeing not to compete aggressively for certain subsets of the market, in this case the market for labor. However, antitrust law had rarely been enforced in labor markets in the decades before 2005 (Prager 2025), and company leaders appear to have concluded that the legal risk from these agreements was tolerable (Appendix D.4).

1.3 Measure of Common Leadership

We build a measure of common leadership using data from BoardEx on firms' leadership structures and their leaders' careers. BoardEx systematically collects and then sells information about the affiliations and professional histories of firms' leaders. The professional histories record the name and identifier of the firm or organization, the nature of the individual's affiliation with it (including job title), and the dates of the affiliation. Appendix B.1 describes the BoardEx data in more detail.

We use the BoardEx data to construct measures of common leadership between pairs of firms in 2000–2019. For each firm pair in each year, we measure whether any of the high-level leaders at one firm simultaneously served as a high-level leader at the other, and if so, how many.

Definition of a leader. Following Clayton Act Section 8, we define a high-level leader as either a member of the board of directors or a senior executive. Board members are straightforward to identify in the data using a BoardEx-provided indicator. However, BoardEx does not distinguish between senior executives and more junior employees such as regional managers. Perhaps for this reason, the literature on common leadership almost exclusively focuses on shared board members, also known as interlocking directorates (Azar 2022; Barone et al. 2022; Lemley et al. 2022; Begley et al. 2023). We use the term “common leadership” in part to distinguish from definitions that exclude senior executives who are not also board members.

In order to include senior executives in our definition, we classify employees’ roles within each firm as senior or other. In the senior category are C-suite executives and roles at or above the level of a senior vice president. We limit the senior VPs to roles specifically related to the technical or human resources sides of the business, as these are non-executives who may have a substantial role in hiring practices for key talent. Our classification results in a mean of 9.6 high-level leaders (including 7.4 independent board members) per firm-year among all US public firms during our primary sample period, in line with existing estimates (Tonello 2023). We repeat our analyses using both stricter and more inclusive definitions of leaders in Appendix B.2 and find similar results.

Samples. We construct two separate samples of firms. The first sample, which we call the no-poaching court case sample, consists of all firms implicated in at least one no-poaching agreement according to the unsealed documents from any of the Silicon Valley no-poaching court cases. This sample forms the basis of our regressions estimating the relationship between common leadership and collusion. We describe the sample and regression specifications in further detail in Section 2. The second sample, which we call the public firms sample, consists of all publicly traded firms in the US. We use the public firms sample to illustrate the prevalence of common leadership across a broad set of firms.

Our primary sample period is 2000–2009. Although our common leadership data cover 2000–2019, the DOJ investigation was announced in 2009, and the evidence released from the court cases is backward-looking. Systematic information on agreements after 2009 is not available. We begin the sample in 2000 because BoardEx substantially expanded its coverage of firms that year, and because the court cases did not involve investigations of collusion in prior decades.

Additional firm characteristics. For publicly traded firms, we merge in firm characteristics from several sources. We use a commonly used proxy for the closeness of product market competition between two firms developed by Hoberg and Phillips (2016). Hoberg-Phillips similarity measures the similarity of text descriptions of publicly traded firms’ product portfolios from their 10K reports. We proxy for industry overlap using NAICS codes from Compustat. We measure overlap in firm ownership using pairwise profit weights from Backus et al. (2021). For firms implicated in the no-poaching case, we also construct a novel measure of the closeness of labor market competition, described below in Section 1.5.

Aggregation to firm level. We aggregate entities from our various data sources to the level of the ultimate owner of the firm. For the public firms sample, we consider Compustat’s Global Company Key to represent the appropriate level of aggregation. In the no-poaching court case sample, some firms are privately owned and therefore do not appear in Compustat. For this sample, we manually find all entities owned by the key owner of the firm, excluding ownership “in name only” via financial holding companies, and aggregate them into a single firm.

1.4 Prevalence of Common Leadership

We first provide summary statistics for common leadership and collusive agreements in the court case sample, then provide context for the prevalence of common leadership using the sample of all US public firms.

No-poaching court case sample. Table 1 summarizes key statistics for the court case sample. After aggregating co-owned firms and merging with BoardEx, the sample consists of 43 firms, 62.8 percent of which share a common leader with at least one other firm in the sample. By construction, all of these firms eventually have an agreement with at least one other firm in the sample.

We identify an average of 12.6 high-level leaders per firm. This is composed of an average of 8.8 independent directors, i.e. board members who hold no employment relationship with the firm; and 3.8 executives, i.e. leaders who hold an executive position in the firm, some of whom also hold a seat on the board. As discussed in Section 3.4, executives may have greater ability and incentives to collude than independent board directors. An average of 6.8 individuals per firm serve in leadership roles at more than one firm in the sample. Firm pairs very rarely share more than

Table 1: Summary Statistics for No-Poaching Court Case Sample

<i>Panel A. Firm-level summary statistics</i>	
Firms	43
Firm-years	407
Fraction of firms with...	
At least one common leader shared with another firm in the sample	0.628
At least one agreement with another firm in the sample (by construction)	1.000
Mean number of leaders per firm-year	12.592
Independent directors	8.801
Executives and interested directors	3.791
Mean number of common leaders per firm-year	6.840
Mean number of known collusive agreements per firm	2.651
<i>Panel B. Firm pair-level summary statistics</i>	
Firm pairs	902
Firm pair-years	8,086
Fraction of pairs ever having common leadership	0.052
Fraction ever having an agreement among pairs...	
Ever having common leadership	0.319
Never having common leadership	0.049

Sample is all possible pairs consisting of firms $i \neq j$ where each firm is implicated in at least one no-poaching agreement in the Silicon Valley case during 2000–2009. After accounting for periods of time overlap in BoardEx, there are 902 possible pairwise combinations of firms. Agreements drawn from court evidence as described in Section 1.2. Common leadership calculated from BoardEx as described in Section 1.3. Firm pairs are undirected: i, j and j, i are counted as one pair.

one common leader at a time.

A minority of firm pairs, 5.2 percent, are connected by common leadership at some point during 2000–2009. Among these firm pairs with common leaders, 31.9 percent eventually also had collusive agreements, compared to only 4.9 percent of firm pairs that never had common leaders. Firms are involved in an average of 2.7 collusive agreements per firm.

Public company sample. Table A.1 summarizes key statistics for the public firm sample, separately for our primary 2000–2009 sample period and a more recent 2010–2019 period for comparison. During our primary sample period, 37.5 percent of firms share a common leader with at least one

other public firm, compared to a common leadership rate of 62.7 percent among the court case sample. Firm pairs in the same industry or location are disproportionately likely to share common leaders. Among all firm pairs, 0.03 percent are connected by common leadership. Being in the same 3-digit NAICS industry or having headquarters in the same state raises firm pairs' rate of common leadership by a factor of three to four.

1.5 Measure of Labor Market Competition

We construct a measure of how closely two firms compete for labor using LinkedIn data. As with product market collusion, the incentive to collude in the labor market is greater when two firms compete more closely in the relevant market. If firms with a preexisting incentive to collude are also more likely to appoint common leaders, then the coefficient on common leadership will be biased.

We therefore propose and use a novel measure of the closeness of labor market competition: the similarity between the worker pools from which two firms draw their workers. Our goal is to measure whether firms compete for the same set of workers, and therefore have an incentive to allocate the market for workers by colluding. The exercise is similar in spirit to the use of customer overlap as a proxy for the strength of product market competition (Einav et al. 2025). Our firm pair-level measure checks for high overlap between the sets of *other* firms where their workers have worked in the past or will work in the future. For example, if many of both Google's and Microsoft's workers subsequently leave for Facebook, then Google and Microsoft will be coded as having high overlap.

Formally, we take the cosine distance between firm i 's and firm j 's worker histories:

$$\text{overlap}_{ij} = 1 - \frac{\sum_{k \notin \{i,j\}} s_{i \rightarrow k} s_{j \rightarrow k} + s_{i \leftarrow k} s_{j \leftarrow k}}{\|\vec{s}_i\| \|\vec{s}_j\|}$$

With some abuse of notation, $s_{i \rightarrow k}$ is the share of i 's workers subsequently working at k , and $s_{i \leftarrow k}$ is the share of i 's workers who formerly worked at k . We exclude direct flows of workers between i and j from the calculation in order to avoid downward bias resulting from flows being artificially suppressed by a no-poaching agreement between i and j .⁴ We compute this measure using data

⁴Any bias resulting from reallocation to other firms of workers who would have switched between i and j but for a no-poaching agreement will be minimal. The agreements, though numerous, still applied to a small share of the firms that compete for the relevant workers. Our cosine similarity measure uses all firms that exchange workers with firms in the Silicon Valley court case sample, not just firms that are themselves in the sample.

on worker histories in 2000–2010 from LinkedIn. Appendix B.3 describes the data and the labor market overlap measure in more detail.

As we will show below, this measure better explains collusive no-poaching agreements than standard product market-focused measures of competitive overlap such as NAICS industry codes or Hoberg-Phillips product similarity. For example, our measure implies that Apple’s two closest competitors for labor were Intuit and Genentech. Despite Genentech being in an entirely different industry (biotech), Apple had agreements with both firms. Our measure also has the advantage of being computable using data and variation typically available to researchers, including for non-publicly traded companies.

2 Empirical Strategy

We use difference-in-differences and event study regressions on the court case sample to answer our primary research question, whether common leadership contributes to collusion.

2.1 Regression Sample

Our regression sample is designed to minimize the risk of measurement error in the outcome variable: the presence of a collusive agreement between a pair of firms. The regression sample consists of all possible pairwise combinations of firms in the court case sample. That is, we first select all firms known to have colluded with at least one other firm, then construct all pairwise combinations of these known colluders. The rationale is that if each firm in the pair was found to have any collusive agreements, then the existence of a collusive agreement between the two firms was also likely to be detected. Discussions with enforcers suggest that such detection was indeed likely, especially considering the multiple civil lawsuits that came after the DOJ’s investigation and revealed additional evidence. The sample thus includes 57 colluding pairs (an agreement existed between the two firms) and 845 non-colluding pairs (each firm colluded with other firms, but not with the paired firm).

Of course, it is possible that some agreements between firms in the court cases did not come to light despite the investigations, leading to false negatives. In most other research contexts, however, the risk of false negatives in measures of collusion is greater still: the researcher may have to assume that observations lacking information on collusion—such as pairs consisting of firms not investigated

in these court cases—have no collusion. To further reduce concerns about measurement error, we also show estimates identified only from timing among pairs that are known to have colluded. By construction, this subsample cannot have false negatives in the outcome variable.

An implication of this sample construction is that we estimate the relationship between common leadership and collusion in a selected market using selected firms. The competition for talent in Silicon Valley in the 2000s was particularly acute. The agreements were entered into during a period of low antitrust enforcement in labor markets, when the risk of discovery and punishment for labor market collusion was likely perceived to be smaller than today. The firms in the sample, which are all known colluders, may be less risk-averse than the average firm. In the modern economy as a whole, therefore, effects may be smaller. This limitation of external validity is a cost of constructing our sample for the greatest possible internal validity.

2.2 Regression Specification

We estimate difference-in-differences and event study regressions at the level of a firm pair-year. For a pair of firms i and j in year t , we regress

$$\text{Agreement}_{ijt} = \beta \text{CommonLeader}_{ijt} + \gamma X_{ij} + \zeta_{it} + \eta_{jt} + \varepsilon_{ijt} \quad (1)$$

where Agreement_{ijt} is an indicator that is equal to one if i and j have entered into an agreement by year t . Similarly, $\text{CommonLeader}_{ijt}$ is an indicator for whether they have experienced the onset of common leadership.⁵ Once turned on, the indicators remain equal to one for the remainder of the sample period.⁶ Figure A.1 plots the evolution of $\text{CommonLeader}_{ijt}$ over time. By the end of the sample period, 5.3 percent of firm pairs have $\text{CommonLeader}_{ijt} = 1$.

The level of observation is a directed firm pair in a given year; that is, we include separate observations for pair i, j and pair j, i . Although the agreements themselves are not directed, we adopt this structure in order to allow multi-way clustering of standard errors at the levels of firm i and firm j , without arbitrarily assigning which firm is i and which is j in a given pair. To avoid double-counting pairs when performing inference, standard errors are also clustered at the level of

⁵There are very few cases of firm pairs sharing more than one common leader at a time (six firm pairs), limiting our ability to estimate the marginal effect of additional common leaders.

⁶The court documents do not allow us to observe the end of collusive agreements; only the start of the agreements is reliably observed. It is therefore not possible to estimate the effect of dissolving a common leadership link on the discontinuation of collusion.

the *undirected* pair (treating i, j and j, i as a single cluster level), resulting in three-way clustered standard errors.

We include firm-by-year fixed effects for both firms, ζ_{it} and η_{jt} . These fixed effects allow us to control for changes within a firm that may drive common leadership and collusion across the pairs involving this firm, such as entry into new product markets or the arrival of an aggressive CEO like Steve Jobs.

In all but our most parsimonious specifications, we include measures of the closeness of product market and labor market competition at the firm pair level in X_{ij} . If close competition drives firm pairs to collude and to appoint common leaders, then omitting it from the regression will bias the main coefficient of interest on common leadership. In our preferred specification, observables in X_{ij} are replaced with firm pair fixed effects.

Staggered treatment timing. In the presence of staggered treatment timing and heterogeneous or dynamic treatment effects, the two-way fixed effects estimator for Equation 1 is biased. We therefore use the Sun and Abraham (2021) estimator to aggregate cohort-specific estimates into a single average treatment on the treated (ATT) coefficient estimate. We also show the event study analog to Equation 1. The Sun and Abraham (2021) estimator is particularly useful in our setting because, unlike some alternative estimators, it allows for treatment to affect outcomes with a lag.⁷ We discuss other threats to identification, such as reverse causality, in Section 3.2.

ATT vs. ATE. Our regressions yield an estimate of the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) rather than an average treatment effect (ATE), as is typical in difference-in-differences designs without a randomized treatment. The ATT measures the effect of common leadership on collusion among firm pairs that select into common leadership rather than for a randomly selected firm pair. For enforcement purposes, the ATT is the policy parameter of interest. Enforcers need to understand the efficacy of enforcing against precisely those firms that choose to appoint common leaders, not firms that are already in compliance with Clayton Act Section 8.

⁷It is also less demanding of the data than de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille (2020), which is useful in our small, short sample. In principle, a sensible alternative is Callaway and Sant’Anna (2021), which more explicitly allows for the inclusion of covariates than Sun and Abraham (2021). However, their estimator is not suited to settings where the level of the unit fixed effects does not correspond to the level of observation. Our preferred specification uses firm pair fixed effects rather than other observables, making it explicitly suitable for the Sun and Abraham (2021) estimator.

3 Results

This section first presents the results of our main regressions studying collusive agreements in our no-poaching court case sample, then discusses threats to interpretation and additional tests.

3.1 Main Results

Table 2 reports estimates of Equation 1. The first row reports the coefficient of interest on common leadership. In specifications with firm-by-year fixed effects, we find that the probability of a collusive agreement rises by 10 to 11 percentage points after the onset of common leadership. This is relative to a mean of 1.2 percent among firm pair-years without common leaders, or 1.6 percent among all firm pair-years.

The magnitude of the coefficient estimate is stable as we add controls, up to and including fixed effects at the firm pair level in Column 5. The coefficient of interest remains stable even as the R-squared nearly doubles relative to Column 2 (Oster 2019).⁸ The coefficient is slightly larger in Column 1, which uses separate firm fixed effects and year fixed effects, and therefore does not control for time-varying factors at the firm level. Starting in Column 2, we add firm-by-year fixed effects and then successively more detailed controls. Columns 3 and 4 check whether collusion and common leadership are both explained by closeness of competition or other overlap. Column 3 uses three measures of overlap between a pair of firms. The first measures their common ownership using the weight one firm’s objective function places on the other’s profits (κ values), as implied by their common ownership structure and calculated by Backus et al. (2021). The second measures how closely they compete in the labor market according to our worker flows measure from Section 1.5. The third measures whether they are in the same industry, as categorized by BoardEx. BoardEx uses the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB), which is used widely in financial markets but rarely in research (Liu 2024). Column 4 replaces the industry categorization from BoardEx with more conventional measures of product market overlap: same NAICS industry code and Hoberg-Phillips similarity.⁹

If collusion and the appointment of common leaders were both driven by closeness of competition

⁸Table B.1 shows that the results are also stable across the alternate definitions of a leader described in Appendix B.2.

⁹The NAICS and Hoberg-Phillips measures are only available for the subset of firm pairs consisting of two publicly traded firms. The ICB classification is available for all firms. The coarseness of ICB sectors falls between those of 2-digit and 3-digit NAICS codes.

Table 2: Difference-in-Differences Regressions for Pr(Agreement): Main Sample

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Common leadership	0.122*** (0.043)	0.102** (0.042)	0.099** (0.041)	0.099** (0.041)	0.107** (0.043)
Common ownership weight			0.012** (0.006)	0.012** (0.006)	
Missing common ownership			-0.002 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.010)	
Labor market overlap			0.046** (0.023)	0.048** (0.024)	
Missing lab. mkt. overlap			0.015 (0.010)	0.017 (0.011)	
Same BoardEx industry			0.003 (0.006)		
Same 2-digit NAICS				-0.011 (0.016)	
Missing NAICS				-0.002 (0.014)	
Hoberg-Phillips similarity				0.259 (0.459)	
Missing HP similarity				7.18×10^{-5} (0.023)	
Separate firm FEs, year FEs	Yes				
Firm \times year FEs		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm pair FEs					Yes
Observations	16,171	16,171	16,171	16,171	16,171
R ²	0.18965	0.30452	0.30695	0.30743	0.57482
Within R ²	0.08919	0.07500	0.07823	0.07887	0.07130

Standard errors in parentheses, multi-way clustered on firm i , firm j , and firm pair $(i, j$ or $j, i)$. ATT summarized using Sun and Abraham (2021) to account for staggered treatment timing. Baseline mean of dependent variable in main sample = 0.016. Significance codes: *: 0.1; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01.

or common ownership, then including these measures should reduce the magnitude of the coefficient on common leadership. Instead, the coefficient estimate is almost unchanged from Column 2 to Columns 3–4. Anecdotally, some of the agreements in the data are between pairs of firms that have negligible competitive overlap, but do share common leaders (e.g., Apple and Nike; see Figure 1b).

Closeness of product market competition is not predictive of collusive no-poaching agreements. Closeness of labor market competition is predictive of agreements, as is common ownership. However, the magnitude of these relationships is small compared to the relationship between common leadership and collusive agreements. The increase in the probability of collusion associated with a one-standard deviation increase in common leadership ($SD = 0.158$) is twice the increase associated with a one-standard deviation increase in labor market overlap ($SD = 0.167$) or three times the

increase associated with a one-standard deviation increase in common ownership ($SD = 0.434$).¹⁰

In additional analyses, we find that the coefficient on common ownership increases by one third when common leadership is dropped from the regressions (results available upon request). This points to the possibility that the literature’s estimated effects of common ownership are partially explained by common leadership.

Column 5 presents our preferred specification, with a coefficient on common leadership of 0.107. We also find similar results (0.103 to 0.107) in robustness checks using both more and less restrictive definitions of a leader (Appendix B.2). This preferred specification replaces observables at the firm-pair level with firm-pair fixed effects. If our measures of overlap in Columns 3–4 do not fully capture factors at the firm pair level that drive both common leadership and collusion, then the firm-pair fixed effects should mitigate those concerns. The coefficient on common leadership is estimated solely using variation over time within a pair of firms. The coefficient may still be biased if the factors driving collusion are changing simultaneously with the onset of common leadership. However, the change would need to happen quickly and would need to be after the onset of common leadership in order for this alternative explanation to be consistent with our event studies in Figure 2.

Figure 2 presents the event study version of our preferred specification from Table 2. The pre-trends leading up to the onset of common leadership are reasonably flat. Differential pre-trends would raise concerns about the required identifying assumption for the regression: that collusive agreements among the firm pairs with and without common leadership would have evolved similarly if not for the onset of common leadership. The probability of a collusive agreement peaks two years after common leadership onset. Figure A.2 plots the coefficients for more leads and lags around the event. It shows a large but imprecisely estimated increase in the point estimates in years seven and eight. We caution against taking those point estimates seriously because there are few treated firm pairs contributing data there due to the short sample period.

¹⁰Equivalently, to increase the predicted probability of collusion by the same magnitude as the onset of common leadership (by 0.099), labor market overlap must increase by more than 12 standard deviations or the common ownership weight must increase by 19 standard deviations.

Figure 2: Event Study Estimates: Agreements as a Function of Common Leadership




Figure plots event study coefficients from Equation 1 using the Sun and Abraham (2021) estimator to account for staggered treatment timing. Regression includes firm-by-year fixed effects and firm pair fixed effects. The sample is defined as described in Section 2.1.

3.2 Interpretation

We interpret the results in Section 3.1 as evidence that common leadership raises the probability of collusion. There are two main threats to this interpretation: firms appointing common leaders as a result of collusion or collusive intent (reverse causality), or an unobserved factor simultaneously driving common leadership and collusion (omitted variable bias).

The reverse causality threat encompasses two distinct scenarios. First, common leadership could itself be a consequence of existing but unobserved collusion. Our empirical setting is an advantage for addressing this concern, as we explicitly observe the timing of both entry into collusion and common leadership onset. Figure 2 shows that realized collusion follows after the onset of common leadership, rather than the reverse.

Second, firms could strategically appoint common leaders as a mechanism for implementing intended, but not yet realized, collusion. In this case, stopping common leadership should still reduce collusion by removing a tool that facilitates it. Firms would be unable to collude or be forced to resort to mechanisms that are, by revealed preference, more costly or less effective than common leadership. We discuss how increased enforcement against common leadership would affect

our estimated magnitudes later in this section.

Our setting lacks exogenous variation to rule out this form of reverse causality.¹¹ Nonetheless, several factors support interpreting the direction of causality as pointing from common leadership to collusion. First, court testimony and subpoenaed documents explicitly invoke common leaders as motivation for entering into agreements (Appendix D.2 and Figure 1b). This includes agreements between firms lacking the competitive overlap that ordinarily motivates collusion, such as Apple and J. Crew. The negligible competition between these colluders makes it less plausible that appointing common leaders was a strategy for implementing collusion, and more likely that these were “collusions of convenience” resulting from existing common leadership.

Second, court documents indicate that while incentives for collusion were present among various firm pairs, collusion was more likely to be realized among those connected by common leaders. For example, Google attempted unsuccessfully to initiate collusion with Facebook, with which it did not share common leaders at the time. Third, if collusive intent preceded the appointment of a common leader, we would expect a rapid initiation of collusion following the onset of common leadership. Our event study estimates do not support this expectation: the effect peaks two years after the onset of common leadership. Lastly, we do not observe obvious systematic differences between new leaders whose appointment creates a common link and new leaders whose appointment does not; nor does it appear that new common leaders are more likely to be appointed off-cycle (Appendix C.1).

Turning to the omitted-variable concern, the threat is that a time-varying factor within firm pairs drives both the appointment of common leaders and collusion. As Figure 2 shows, such a factor would need to drive collusion at a one- to three-year lag following the onset of common leadership. One plausible candidate is time-varying competitive overlap, which could influence both leader appointments and, with some delay, collusion. To reduce this concern, we examine the sensitivity of our coefficient estimate to the introduction of increasingly predictive controls (Table 2). Of course, these controls are incomplete. Nevertheless, we find some reassurance from the stability of our coefficient estimate across specifications, even as the R-squared doubles. We would expect greater instability if an unobserved factor were the key driver of the result (Oster 2019).

Beyond these threats to identification, there is the question of the overall welfare effects of

¹¹For example, a natural source of variation is the deaths of leaders (Poberejsky 2024), which can provide a plausibly exogenously timed arrival of a (potentially) common leader. In our small, short sample, we observe only seven “on the job” deaths and 123 retirements, but both are weak instruments for common leadership.

enforcing against common leadership. We show that common leadership facilitated collusion, and others have documented both costs to workers (Gibson 2024) and benefits to innovation (Ferrés et al. 2024) from this collusive episode. We do not take a stance on the net welfare effect. However, if we take at face value the illegality of collusion, our results establish common leadership as a relevant and economically meaningful statistic for detecting illegal actions.

Finally, an important question is whether our findings extend to the current regulatory context. We study a period of low antitrust enforcement against both common leadership and labor market collusion (Section 1.1). The recent increase in enforcement of Clayton Act Section 8 does not necessarily affect common leadership among labor market competitors, since the statute only applies to product market competitors. By contrast, increased enforcement against labor market collusion likely amounts to a larger change—although even during our sample’s more permissive regime, firms knew that no-poaching agreements could be costly if detected (Appendix D.4). With greater scrutiny, firms may reduce common leadership, labor market collusion, or both. The net effect of these responses on the relationship we study is theoretically ambiguous.¹² Nevertheless, our findings establish benefits from enforcement. In a low-enforcement equilibrium, common leadership-related collusion could rise.

3.3 Results with Alternate Sample Definitions

The unsealed evidence from the court documents varies in the degree of detail revealed about each agreement. For many firm pairs, the start date of the agreement is bounded within a range rather than pegged to a specific year. In the main results, we assign the start date for such pairs to the maximum of the bounds in order to avoid counting an agreement that does not yet exist. This may result in some measurement error. An agreement that actually began prior to the onset of common leadership could be miscoded as beginning after common leadership, inflating our coefficient estimate. Table 3 Column 2 therefore repeats the regression for just the subset of firm pairs where precise agreement start dates are known. The estimated coefficient is slightly larger in magnitude than its full-sample analog (displayed in Column 1). This is the opposite of what would be expected if the potentially mismeasured agreements started prior to the onset of common

¹²If firms reduced labor market collusion but did not reduce common leadership, the relationship would be weakened. Conversely, the relationship could become stronger if only the firms that benefit most from collusion continued to engage in both common leadership and collusion.

leadership. Figure A.3 shows the corresponding event study estimates. There is a slight differential pre-trend that flattens out starting four years prior to event time.

As discussed in Section 2.1, our main regression sample is designed to minimize the risk of false negatives in the agreement variable. Despite the DOJ’s investigation and additional evidence uncovered in follow-on litigation, there is a risk that we fail to detect some true agreements. If any such false negatives are disproportionately among firm pair-years that lack common leadership, then our main estimate will be biased upward. Table 3 Column 3 therefore repeats the regression using only the subsample of the 57 firm pairs that are known to reach eventual agreement. Within this subsample, false negatives are fully eliminated by construction. The resulting point estimate in Column 3 is triple the magnitude of our preferred specification, but is not statistically distinguishable from zero. Figure A.4 shows the corresponding event study estimates, which have a similar time pattern to our main event study but are noisy. However, other analyses using this same subsample provide reassurance that our preferred specification finding is not merely driven by false negatives. When we further decompose common leadership in this subsample in Section 3.4, the point estimates for common leadership originating from firm executives are large and statistically significant (Table A.2 Columns 7 and 9).

Finally, we examine one other subsample. Column 4 subsets to the 47 firm pairs that experience common leadership during the sample period. This regression is identified off of treatment timing among ever-treated firm pairs, whereas Column 3 is identified off of the timing of agreements among firm pairs that eventually reach agreements. The point estimate is close to the midpoint between the full sample (Column 1) and the agreeing pairs (Column 3), but is not statistically distinguishable from zero. Figure A.5 shows the corresponding event study estimates. As in other samples, the point estimates peak at two years after the onset of common leadership. The inability to reject a null hypothesis of no effect of common leadership in this small subsample of firm pairs is a limitation of analyzing a single (even if large) episode of collusion.

3.4 Results on Source of Common Leadership

Two firms may share a common leader through an independent board member or an executive. Executives participate more directly in the day-to-day operations of a firm than independent board

Table 3: Difference-in-Differences Regressions for Pr(Agreement): Additional Samples

	Main Sample (1)	Certain Dates (2)	Agreeing Pairs (3)	Com. Lead. Pairs (4)
Common leadership	0.107** (0.043)	0.123* (0.064)	0.315 (0.276)	0.226 (0.140)
Firm pair FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Separate firm FEs, year FEs				
Firm \times year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	16,171	2,795	1,083	897
R ²	0.57482	0.72239	0.93777	0.87614
Within R ²	0.07130	0.09711	0.18316	0.52404

Standard errors in parentheses, multi-way clustered on firm i , firm j , and firm pair $(i, j \text{ or } j, i)$. ATT summarized using Sun and Abraham (2021) to account for staggered treatment timing. Baseline mean of dependent variable in main sample = 0.016. Significance codes: *: 0.1; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01.

members and typically have compensation tied to the performance of the firm.¹³ It is therefore possible that a common leader who has an executive role at one of the firms in a pair would be better positioned or incentivized to collude.

Table A.2 tests this hypothesis and finds suggestive evidence in favor. Column 1 repeats our preferred specification with the pooled measure of common leadership. Columns 2–9 report separate estimates for common leadership through a shared independent board director (a board member who is not an executive at either firm in a pair), versus through a common leader who is an executive at one or both firms. The unusual structure of the table is due to the fact that, to our knowledge, no consistent estimator has yet been found for estimating treatment effects of two separate treatments in settings like ours.¹⁴ We therefore use the Sun and Abraham (2021) estimator in separate regressions defining each of the two treatments as the primary treatment, in which we include the other treatment as a binary control variable.

In Table A.2, the coefficients on executive-involved common leadership are more often statis-

¹³We distinguish between an independent director, i.e. a board member who holds no employment relationship with the firm; and an interested director, who is both a board member and an executive within the same firm. For example, CEOs often have a seat on the board. We pool interested directors and executives together, contrasting them as a group against independent directors.

¹⁴De Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille (2023) propose a method for estimating the effects of multiple treatments in a staggered-treatment setting, but their method requires that the treatments always occur in the same order. In our setting, arrivals of board-only common leaders occur both before and after arrivals of executive common leaders. To our knowledge, no method has yet been developed for estimating difference-in-differences with multiple, non-ordered treatments and lagged treatment effects.

tically significant than the coefficients on board-only common leadership. Among firm pairs that eventually reach an agreement, coefficient magnitudes for executive-involved common leadership are larger than for the board-only common leadership (Columns 6–9). In the full sample, however, the magnitudes are comparable (Columns 2–5).

When board-only common leadership is the primary treatment, neither estimate is statistically significant (Column 3), but when executive-involved common leadership is the primary treatment, its estimate is statistically significant (Column 5). This discrepancy underscores the need for new estimators adapted to multiple non-sequential treatments. When the sample is instead restricted to firm pairs that never experience the non-primary treatment, the coefficient magnitude for executive-involved is one third larger than that for board-only common leadership (Columns 2 and 4).

Using a stricter definition of firm executives, we also find patterns consistent with executive-involved common leaders being more instrumental to entry into collusive agreements than board-only common leaders (Appendix B.2).

Due to the econometric limitations just discussed, we view these results as merely suggestive. Taken at face value, they would imply that enforcement of Clayton Act Section 8 may be more efficient if it targeted common leadership involving executives in addition to shared board members. They also highlight the importance of expanding studies of common leadership beyond the shared board member definition used in the interlocking directorates literature.

4 Conclusion

In the largest modern case of US labor market collusion, collusion occurred disproportionately after firms began sharing common leaders. Collusive agreements typically began two years after the onset of common leadership, and the probability of collusion increased an average of 11 percentage points. This is a large effect, nine times the mean of 1.2 percent among firm pair-years without a common leader. Combined with the ease of detecting common leadership, this may make investigation of firm pairs with common leaders a useful tool for antitrust enforcers.

Our results are estimated in a context with a particularly dynamic labor market and weak enforcement of relevant antitrust laws, so the effect may be smaller in today’s economy. Nevertheless, our results dovetail with recent work documenting apparent anticompetitive outcomes for other types of firms with common board members. We provide evidence for one possible mechanism

driving such outcomes, namely explicit, illegal collusion.

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A Additional Figures and Tables

Figure A.1: Firm Pairs with Common Leadership




Figure plots the fraction of firm pairs in the analysis sample that have experienced the onset of common leadership to date ($\text{CommonLeader}_{ijt} = 1$ in Equation 1).

Figure A.2: Event Study Estimates: Additional Leads and Lags




Figure plots additional leads and lags for event study coefficients from Figure 2. We caution that very few treated firm pairs are observed seven or more years after event time due to the short sample period.

Figure A.3: Event Study Estimates: Precise Agreement Dates




Figure plots event study coefficients from Equation 1 using the Sun and Abraham (2021) estimator to account for staggered treatment timing. Regression includes firm-by-year fixed effects and firm-pair fixed effects. The sample subsets to firms for which we observe a precise agreement start date.

Figure A.4: Event Study Estimates: Firm Pairs with Eventual Agreement




Figure plots event study coefficients from Equation 1 using the Sun and Abraham (2021) estimator to account for staggered treatment timing. Regression includes firm-by-year fixed effects and firm-pair fixed effects. The sample consists of pairs of firms that are observed to collude.

Figure A.5: Event Study Estimates: Firm Pairs with Common Leadership




Figure plots event study coefficients from Equation 1 using the Sun and Abraham (2021) estimator to account for staggered treatment timing. Regression includes firm-by-year fixed effects and firm-pair fixed effects. The sample consists of pairs of firms that experience common leadership during the sample period.

Table A.1: Summary Statistics for Public Firms Sample

	(1) 2000–2009	(2) 2010–2019
<i>Panel A. Firm-level summary statistics</i>		
Number of firm-years	36,830	34,263
Number of unique firms	4,340	5,120
Fraction of firm-years with		
At least one leader shared with another firm	0.375	0.350
At least one leader shared with firm in the same 3-digit NAICS	0.084	0.080
At least one leader shared with firm headquartered in the same state	0.144	0.132
Mean number of total leaders	9.583	7.844
Independent directors	7.404	6.035
Executives and interested directors	2.179	1.809
Mean number of common leaders	3.722	2.705
<i>Panel B. Firm pair-level summary statistics</i>		
Number of firm pair-years	68,053,457	58,720,711
Number of unique firm pairs	9,279,958	11,524,911
Fraction of firm pair-years with common leaders among		
All firm pairs	0.0003	0.0003
Firm pairs in the same 3-digit NAICS	0.0009	0.0009
Firm pairs headquartered in the same state	0.0013	0.0012

Sample is all publicly traded firms in the US from CRSP-Compustat, merged to BoardEx. Common leadership calculated from BoardEx as described in Section 1.3. Firm pairs are undirected: i, j and j, i are counted as one pair.

Table A.2: Difference-in-Differences Regressions for Pr(Agreement): By Type of Common Leader

	All Pairs			Agreeing Pairs	
	Any Leader	Brd. Only	Exec	Brd. Only	Exec
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Main coefficient: Column heading variable	0.107** (0.043)	0.088 (0.056)	0.108** (0.047)	-0.024 (0.240)	0.681** (0.271)
Control coef: Exec-involved common leader		0.078 (0.066)		0.436* (0.224)	
Control coef: Board-only common leader			0.092 (0.064)		0.258 (0.236)
Firm pair FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Separate firm FEs, year FEs					
Firm \times year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	16,171	16,171	16,171	1,083	1,083
R ²	0.57482	0.56177	0.57724	0.94552	0.94760
Within R ²	0.07130	0.04290	0.07669	0.28571	0.31302

First row reports ATT coefficient on the type of common leader in the column name. Control coefficient rows report coefficient on other type of common leader, included as a binary regressor. Standard errors in parentheses, multi-way clustered on firm i , firm j , and firm pair $(i, j$ or $j, i)$. ATT summarized using Sun and Abraham (2021) to account for staggered treatment timing. Baseline mean of dependent variable in main sample = 0.016. Significance codes: *: 0.1; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01.

B Data Appendix

In this appendix, we provide additional information on data construction and alternative samples.

B.1 BoardEx Data and Measure of Common Leadership

Our measure of common leadership is based on data from BoardEx. BoardEx is a data analytics company that systematically collects information about the affiliations and professional histories of firms’ leaders and repackages the information for sale to business clients. The BoardEx data include the professional histories of nearly all individuals who ever served on a board or in a moderately senior employee role at any publicly traded firm, or at a large or otherwise significant private entity. As a result, the data also include information on the many additional entities with which these individuals were ever affiliated, covering more than 2 million entities.

The professional histories record the name and identifier of the entity, the nature of the individual’s affiliation with it (including job title), and the dates of the affiliation. The BoardEx data are separated into membership in boards of directors versus all other types of affiliations. The “other” category does not make a usable distinction between high-level non-board leaders and other types of employees. We therefore construct our own classification into high-level leaders versus others as described in Section 1.3.

B.2 Alternate Definitions of Common Leadership

Our baseline definition of a high-level leader includes all members of the board of directors, all C-suite executives, and senior vice presidents (VPs) with technical or human resources (HR)-related roles. We test the robustness of our results to three alternate definitions. A more expansive definition adds all previously senior VPs. A stricter definition drops all senior VPs.¹⁵ Our final definition focuses more narrowly on technical and HR-related roles by dropping C-suite executives except the CEO, CFO, and technical (such as Chief Information Officer) or HR (such as Chief Human Resources Officer) executives.

The results of our main analyses with these alternate definitions are shown Table B.1. This table shows our preferred specification with firm pair fixed effects, with each column showing an

¹⁵This does not result in any changes to the common leadership variable because, in our sample, all firm pairs with a common leader (using the baseline definition) have at least one common board member or executive.

alternate definition of high-level leaders. The results are similar to the results using the baseline definition.

Table B.1: Difference-in-Differences Regressions for $\Pr(\text{Agreement})$: Alternate Definitions of Leaders

	Main Defn. (1)	More VPs (2)	Drop All VPs (3)	Subset C-Suite (4)
Common leadership	0.107** (0.043)	0.103** (0.042)	0.107** (0.043)	0.106** (0.043)
Firm pair FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Separate firm FEs, year FEs				
Firm \times year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	16,171	16,171	16,171	16,171
R ²	0.57482	0.57646	0.57482	0.57479
Within R ²	0.07130	0.07488	0.07130	0.07124

Standard errors in parentheses, multi-way clustered on firm i , firm j , and firm pair $(i, j \text{ or } j, i)$. ATT summarized using Sun and Abraham (2021) to account for staggered treatment timing. Baseline mean of dependent variable in main sample = 0.016. Significance codes: *: 0.1; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01.

The alternate definitions meaningfully change our findings only when the effects are decomposed into board-only versus executive-involved common leaders. Under the third alternate definition, some C-suite executives that also serve on the board of directors are reclassified from executive-involved to board-only common leaders. Table B.2 shows that this dilutes the coefficient estimate on executive-involved common leaders and increases the coefficient estimate on board-only common leaders.¹⁶ Compare this to the results using the baseline definition in Table A.2, where we find instead that the effects are driven by the executive-involved rather than board-only common leaders. This pattern of results suggests that the reclassified executives may be most instrumental to entry into collusive agreements.

B.3 LinkedIn Data and Measure of Labor Market Overlap

Source of LinkedIn data. The measure of labor market overlap in Section 1.5 uses worker history data from LinkedIn. We obtain LinkedIn data from two sources. The first source is the Bright Initiative, a researcher-facing arm of the analytics firm BrightData. The BrightData sample

¹⁶The alternate definitions with different VP inclusion rules do not meaningfully change the analyses that decompose common leaders into board-only versus executive-involved common leaders.

Table B.2: Difference-in-Differences Regressions for Pr(Agreement): By Type of Common Leader (Subsetting C-Suite)

	Any Leader	All Pairs		Agreeing Pairs	
	(1)	Brd. Only (2)	Exec (3)	Brd. Only (4)	Exec (5)
Main coefficient: Column heading variable	0.106** (0.043)	0.122* (0.066)	0.063 (0.050)	-0.026 (0.221)	0.169 (0.460)
Control coef: Exec-involved common leader		0.068 (0.069)		0.031 (0.351)	
Control coef: Board-only common leader			0.105 (0.071)		0.043 (0.290)
Firm pair FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Separate firm FEs, year FEs					
Firm \times year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	16,171	16,171	16,171	1,083	1,083
R ²	0.57479	0.56344	0.57626	0.94514	0.93480
Within R ²	0.07124	0.04653	0.07454	0.28078	0.14521

First row reports ATT coefficient on the type of common leader in the column name. Control coefficient rows report coefficient on other type of common leader, included as a binary regressor. Standard errors in parentheses, multi-way clustered on firm i , firm j , and firm pair $(i, j$ or $j, i)$. ATT summarized using Sun and Abraham (2021) to account for staggered treatment timing. Baseline mean of dependent variable in main sample = 0.016. Significance codes: *: 0.1; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01.

was collected in 2022. Because it consists of publicly viewable LinkedIn profiles, which only show the most recent few entries in the user’s job history, many worker histories are left-censored. We therefore supplement with a second source of LinkedIn data generously shared by Ge et al. (2016). The LinkedIn data in Ge et al. (2016) were collected in 2013 and improve our coverage of worker histories during our sample period. Because the cosine similarity measure is sensitive under small samples, we pool worker histories during 2000–2010 to compute our measure at the level of the firm i , firm j pair rather than using a time-varying version.

Matching no-poaching court case sample firms to LinkedIn employers. In their raw form, LinkedIn data are partially structured. Key variables such as job title, employer name, and job dates are structured as separate variables. However, employer names are a free-text field and user inputs are not necessarily harmonized. For example, Apple workers may list their employer as Apple; Apple, Inc.; Apple Computer; Apple iPhone Group; and so on. We therefore clean employer names in a multi-step process in order to match the LinkedIn data to our regression data. First, we find the most unusual word in each employer name, relative to the corpus of all employer names

in the LinkedIn data.¹⁷ This produces a set of candidate matches of varying quality. For example, “Google” is an unusual word that rarely appears in entries not related to Google or Alphabet, so this step is highly informative for Google. For firms like Apple, where we find many candidate matches related to fruit and apple cider, our next two steps are critical. In the second step, we assign a master employer name for each firm in our no-poaching case sample, and calculate string distances between the master name and candidate matches from the LinkedIn data. Finally, in the third step, we manually remove unrelated firms.

Worker sample for labor market overlap measure. Some of the firms with no-poaching agreements have substantial presence in the retail sector, such as Apple and J. Crew. The no-poaching agreements did not apply to store clerks. We therefore only use non-retail workers to calculate labor market overlap. To do this, we must first drop retail workers from the LinkedIn data. There are 24 million unique job titles in the raw LinkedIn data, so finding the retail workers manually is infeasible. We train a neural net to classify raw LinkedIn job titles into retail versus other job types. Specifically, we use a multilayer perceptron classifier with 1-grams and 2-grams (that is, one- and two-word strings) with five-fold cross-validation. The training dataset consists of 3,099 titles classified by ChatGPT 3.5 with extensive human supervision. We confirm high performance quality of the final classifier algorithm using manual checks of a random sample. Only workers classified as non-retail are kept for calculating the labor market overlap measure in Section 1.5. In practice, the list of implied closest competitors changes little regardless of whether retail workers are kept or dropped.

C Additional Descriptive Statistics

C.1 Additional Statistics on Common Leader Appointment

This appendix provides additional background on how leaders are appointed, and how (if at all) common leaders differ from other leaders. As discussed in Section 1, common leadership is widespread. This prevalence is explained in part by the limited pool of qualified leaders and regulation requiring some directors on the board to be independent (i.e., not otherwise employed at

¹⁷We drop geographic place names to avoid matching together firms such as “First Kansas Bank” and “University of Kansas”. The firms in our no-poaching court case sample all have sufficiently unusual names for our procedure to perform well.

the firm).

Timing of common leader appointments. If common directors are appointed for the purpose of implementing intended collusion, one might expect common directors to be added to boards disproportionately at “off-cycle” times, rather than at times of natural turnover. We therefore examine whether directors in our sample are appointed as part of a growing board, as replacements in a board with fixed size, or as part of a shrinking board (detailed results available upon request). If anything, common directors are more likely than other new directors to be replacements (appointed to boards whose size is not changing) than additions. This suggests that common leaders may not necessarily be actively sought out at particular times, instead often arriving in the natural course of board turnover.

Characteristics of new common leaders. Next, we check whether newly appointed common leaders differ meaningfully on observables from newly appointed other leaders. A large majority of common leadership links (78 percent in our sample) start when someone who is already an executive or director of firm i is appointed as a new independent (non-executive) director of firm j . New independent director appointments are more common both because there is less turnover in executive positions and because there are more independent directors than executives. We therefore restrict the descriptive statistics that follow to newly appointed independent directors.

Table C.1 reports observable characteristics of new independent directors whose appointment creates a common leadership link within our sample and of those whose appointment does not. Importantly, this exercise cannot rule out unobserved differences.

As shown in Table C.1, new common directors hold more board seats than other new directors. This is unsurprising, as holding more board seats makes a director mechanically more likely to be a common leader. On other observables, new directors are similar whether their appointment creates a common link within our sample or not. Both types are of similar ages, between 53 and 55 years old; about half of them hold an executive-level role elsewhere; they are typically halfway through their careers (16 years from when we first observe them in BoardEx and 15 from when we will last observe them); they typically stay at the firm for about 8 years. To get a sense of their degree of specialization, we calculate a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) using the share of a director’s roles to date in different industry sectors (see the response to R1 comment 7 for a description of

Table C.1: New independent director characteristics

	New Common Directors		Other New Directors		Difference
	Mean	Std Dev	Mean	Std Dev	t-test
Number of boards	6.22	4.75	4.50	3.27	1.9
Executive-level role (elsewhere)	0.59	0.50	0.52	-0.50	0.8
Age	52.70	8.28	55.03	8.60	-1.4
Length of career to date	16.26	7.28	15.74	9.43	0.4
Time remaining in career	15.30	5.00	14.75	6.80	0.5
Time remaining at firm	7.96	5.60	8.07	6.26	-0.1
Sector HHI to date	0.25	0.23	0.22	0.21	0.7

Sample is all newly appointed independent directors in our analysis sample, in their year of appointment. New common directors are new independent directors whose appointment at a sample firm i creates a new common link between firm i and another sample firm j . Data are from BoardEx, with variables defined as follows: Number of boards counts the total number of boards on which the director serves in the year of appointment. Executive-level role counts the number of firms at which the director is employed in an executive-level role; since we only look at independent director appointments, these roles will by definition be elsewhere. Age is calculated using the birth year reported by BoardEx. Length of career counts the elapsed years since we first observe the director in BoardEx, and time remaining in career the number of years until we last observed the director in BoardEx, capped at 2025. Time remaining at firm counts years until last observed in the firm of appointment, capped at 2025. Sector HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index calculated for each director using the share of that director's roles to date in different industry sectors.

BoardEx's sector definitions). The average sector HHI is similar for both types of new leaders, between 0.22 and 0.25, suggesting that both types have experience across multiple industries, but with some industry specialization.

We read this similarity between new common directors and new other directors as consistent with, though not dispositive of, similar objectives in the appointment process (e.g., recruiting experienced directors). That common directors are, if anything, slightly more experienced is reassuring: If common directors were appointed primarily to facilitate collusion, firms might need to trade off usefulness for collusion against other desirable traits like experience.

C.2 Additional Statistics on Firm Pairs

This appendix examines firm pair-level correlates of common leadership and agreements. Table C.2 reports observable characteristics of firm pairs in our regression sample. Panel A reports statistics for pairs that ever have an agreement, compared to pairs that never have an agreement. Ever-agreeing pairs have greater overlap in terms of common ownership, industry, and labor market overlap. Panel B shows similar patterns for pairs that ever share a common leader compared to pairs that never share a common leader.

The differences apparent in Table C.2 motivate our controls for pair-level overlap and, in our

Table C.2: Firm Pair Characteristics, By Outcome and Treatment Status

<i>Panel A: By Agreement Status</i>					
	Never have agreement		Ever have agreement		Difference
	Mean	Std Dev	Mean	Std Dev	<i>t</i> -statistic
Ever share common leader	0.04	0.20	0.26	0.44	3.8
Same 2-digit NAICS	0.07	0.25	0.13	0.34	1.4
Same BoardEx sector	0.14	0.34	0.31	0.46	2.7
Hoberg-Phillips similarity	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.03	1.1
Labor market overlap	0.61	0.17	0.70	0.14	4.2
Common ownership κ weights	0.55	0.39	0.77	0.94	3.5

<i>Panel B: By Common Leadership Status</i>					
	Never have common leader		Ever have common leader		Difference
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	<i>t</i> -statistic
Ever collude	0.05	0.22	0.31	0.46	3.8
Same 2-digit NAICS	0.06	0.24	0.21	0.41	2.8
Same BoardEx sector	0.14	0.35	0.21	0.41	1.1
Hoberg-Phillips similarity	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.5
Labor market overlap	0.62	0.17	0.69	0.13	3.3
Common ownership κ weights	0.56	0.44	0.72	0.74	3.0

preferred specification, the inclusion firm pair fixed effects. We discuss omitted variable bias and other identification concerns in Section 3.2.

D Selected Court Excerpts

This section provides additional relevant excerpts from the court documents.

D.1 Motivation for No-Poaching Agreements


Employees hired via cold-calling were perceived as higher-quality than those who actively applied for a job. However, the firms also recognized that competition over employees risked bidding up compensation.

Google Senior VP Jonathan Rosenberg testified (Rosenberg deposition 2013): “We don’t want the people who are applying, we want the best in the world [...] the people who apply, on average, aren’t as good.”

Figure D.1 shows an internal document from Intuit explaining that recruiters should use cold-calling rather than relying on candidates who actively apply for a job, because cold-called candidates perform better and have lower turnover.

Adobe CEO Shantanu Narayen stated in an email about Adobe’s agreement with Apple: “we

Figure D.1: Court Exhibit About Importance of Cold-Calling



don't want the gloves off – it doesn't do either company any good and we don't want Steve [Jobs] personally recruiting our key talent.”

Some agreeing firm pairs accompanied their no-poaching agreements with additional agreements or information exchanges that could help to restrain employee compensation. For example, it appears that Lucasfilm and Pixar had an agreement not to enter bidding wars. Lucasfilm HR Director Sharon Coker emailed her counterpart at Pixar about a (presumably non-cold-called) candidate that Pixar was considering hiring from Lucasfilm: “can I confirm your understanding that once you have extended an offer, you will not counter?” It also appears that animation firms coordinated on employee compensation. Pixar Chief HR Officer Lori McAdams emailed her counterparts at DreamWorks and other animation studios asking: “What is your salary increase budget for FY '08? Ours is [redacted] but we may manage it closer to [redacted] on average. Are you doing anything close, more, less?”

D.2 Importance of Common Leaders and Executives

The unsealed court documents show specific instances in which common leadership was instrumental to the no-poaching agreements.

Eric Schmidt, former CEO of Google, testified in court that (Schmidt deposition 2013): “I remember at some point discussing to have some of the board members not be—you know, their companies not be—not be targeted [...] Genentech, Intel, and Apple—that Genentech and Intel had board members that were board members of Google, and Genentech was—Art Levinson was the CEO of Genentech. Paul Otellini was the CEO of Intel. And Apple, of course, I eventually got on their board, and Bill Campbell was a board member of Apple. [...] I vaguely remember saying that we did not want a situation where you had a sitting board member and we were cold calling into their companies.”

Sergey Brin, co-founder of Google, similarly testified (Brin deposition 2013): “We felt that we should think, you know, are there other companies where we also don’t wish to, you know, needlessly aggravate the executives, and I believe that Genentech was an example, and Art Levinson was on our board, and so was Intel, and Paul Otellini was on our board.”

Jonathan Rosenberg, then-Senior VP at Google, testified about the importance of executives (without mentioning independent board members) (Rosenberg deposition 2013): “the escalation [to an agreement] would come through a chief executive.”

Figure D.2 shows court exhibits demonstrating that high-level leaders were involved in the establishment of the agreement between Apple and Google. Apple and Google entered into an agreement in 2005. At the time, they shared two common leaders: Genentech CEO Arthur Levinson sat on both boards, and Intuit CEO Bill Campbell was chair of Apple’s board and a Senior Advisor to Google. Sergey Brin was initially unsure how to respond to Steve Jobs’ demand that Google stop recruiting from Apple, and emailed Google’s leadership team (including Campbell) for input. The next day, Campbell wrote to Jobs with details on Campbell’s back-channel negotiations with Google CEO Eric Schmidt. Campbell evidently acted as an emissary from Apple to Google.

D.3 Enforcement of No-Poaching Agreements

The court documents show many instances in which perceived violations of the no-poaching agreements resulted in calls for enforcement. The communication often involved high-level leaders.

Figure D.2: Court Exhibits About Establishment of Apple-Google Agreement

(a) Apple CEO Steve Jobs Approaches Google Co-Founder Sergey Brin

From: Sergey Brin <sergey@google.com> on behalf of Sergey Brin
Sent: Thursday, February 17, 2005 8:20 PM
To: emg@google.com; joan@google.com; Bill Campbell
Cc: amnon@google.com
Subject: Re: FW: [Fwd: RE: irate call from steve jobs]

So I got another irate call from jobs today.
I don't think we should let that determine our hiring strategy but thought I would let you know.
Basically, he said "if you hire a single one of these people that means war".
I said I could not promise any outcome but I would discuss it with the executive team again.
I asked if he expected us to withdraw offers and he said yes.

In reviewing the data below again, I do think this could be treated as not just an employee referral since he referred essentially a whole team. So a compromise would be to continue with the offer we have made (to [Redacted]) but not to make offers to any of the others unless they get permission from Apple.

In any case, lets not make any new offers or contact new people at Apple until we have had a chance to discuss.

--Sergey

(b) Bill Campbell, Google Senior Advisor and Apple Board Chair, Mediates

Subject: google
Date: Fri, 18 Feb 2005 18:24:09 -0800
From: "Campbell, Bill" <bill_campbell@intuit.com>
To: "Steve Jobs (sjobs@apple.com)" <sjobs@apple.com>
Message-ID: <BEE0888C52AFA4A8EE285BFD2FE4C390AE762B1@mtvex02.mv.intuit.com>

Steve

I am heading out of town in the AM (off to Montana) and wanted to give you the latest of what I heard from Google after talking to Eric Schmidt.. Eric told me that he got directly involved and firmly stopped all efforts to recruit anyone from Apple. Unfortunately (and you will be rightfully pissed), they had already extended an offer to Dave. When I talked to Eric, he simply felt that he could not rescind the offer, but felt that it was doubtful that Dave would take the offer since Google stopped recruiting the other two members of his team.

I am not leaving until 11:00AM if you want to talk.

Bill

(c) Apple and Google Enter Into Agreement

Subject: Google
From: "Danielle Lambert" <lambert@apple.com>
Received(Date): Sat, 26 Feb 2005 05:28:46 +0000
To: <usrecruitingall@group.apple.com>

All,

Please add Google to your "hands-off" list. We recently agreed not to recruit from one another so if you hear of any recruiting they are doing against us, please be sure to let me know.

Please also be sure to honor our side of the deal.

Thanks,
Danielle

Figure D.3: Court Exhibit About Enforcement of Agreements

From: Eric Schmidt <eschmidt@google.com>
Date: March 9, 2007 8:21:25 AM PST
To: sjobs@apple.com
Subject: Google recruiters calling into Apple - isolated incident

Steve, as a followup we investigated the recruiter's actions and she violated our policies. Apologies again on this and I'm including a portion of the email I received from our head of recruiting. Should this ever happen again please let me know immediately and we will handle. Thanks !! Eric

From Google recruiting to me:
On this specific case, the sourcer who contacted this Apple employee should not have and will be terminated within the hour. We are scrubbing the sourcer's records to ensure she did not contact anyone else.

In general, we have a very clear 'do not call' policy (attached) that is given to every staffing professional and I reiterate this message in ongoing communications and staffing meetings. Unfortunately, every six months or so someone makes an error in judgment, and for this type of violation we terminate their relationship with Google.

Please extend my apologies as appropriate to Steve Jobs. This was an isolated incident and we will be very careful to make sure this does not happen again. ■

Intel CEO Paul Otellini, who sat on Google's board, emailed Google CEO Eric Schmidt directly with a request to enforce: "Sorry to bother you again on this topic, but my guys are very troubled by Google continuing to recruit our key players. [...] Can you please reinforce the no-recruiting agreement. I would appreciate it." Schmidt responded quickly.

Intuit CEO Bill Campbell, who was a Senior Advisor to Google, sent this pithy email to Google Senior VP Jonathan Rosenberg after learning that Google's recruiters had cold-emailed an Intuit employee: "Jonathan // Are you guys nuts? // Bill".

Figure D.3 shows an instance in which enforcement of the agreement between Apple and Google involved Google firing a recruiter who had cold-called an Apple employee. Google CEO Eric Schmidt, who by then had joined Apple's board of directors, communicated this directly to Apple CEO Steve Jobs.

Some of the court evidence suggests that the agreements were enforced more aggressively for employees in senior or technical roles. For example, Figure D.4a shows that Apple CEO Steve Jobs did not insist on enforcing Apple's agreement with Pixar in the case of a project coordinator.

However, application of the agreements was not necessarily limited to workers in senior or

technical roles. For example, Figure D.4b shows that Apple’s recruiters questioned whether they could hire a chef who was applying for a food service job while working as a sous-chef at a Google cafeteria.

D.4 Perception of Legal Risk

Some firms appear to have been unaware of the legal risk from no-poaching agreements. Others appear to have been aware that a risk existed, but some concluded that it was tolerable.

Patrick Burke, current Head of Law Enforcement Global Compliance Team at Apple, was asked in court about legal concerns about the no-poaching agreements (Burke deposition 2013). Burke responded, simply, “No” to each of the following questions: “Did you have any concern about whether or not the agreement between Apple and Motorola was legal? [...] Did you ever discuss the subject of whether or not these agreements were legal with anybody at Apple?”

Intel CEO Paul Otellini stated in an internal email about a no-poaching agreement: “We have nothing signed [...] We have a handshake ‘no recruit’ between [E]ric and myself. I would not like this broadly known.” The subject line of the email chain began with “global gentleman agreement”.

Google CEO Eric Schmidt stated in an internal email about Google’s no-poaching policy: “I don’t want to create a paper trail over which we can be sued later?”

Palm CEO Ed Colligan wrote more directly in an email to Apple CEO Steve Jobs: “Your proposal that we agree that neither company will hire the other’s employees, regardless of the individual’s desires, is not only wrong, it is likely illegal.”

Figure D.4: Court Exhibits About Enforcement for Non-Core Employees

(a) Emails About Hiring a Chef

Subject: Fwd: Sous Chef application
Date: Tue, 03 Jun 2008 08:21:39 -0700
From: Mark Bentley <mbentley@apple.com>
To: Danielle Lambert <lambert@apple.com>
Message-ID: <C85278AC-622D-4543-AD67-56F386FB2D3E@apple.com>

Heads up that we are getting a few folks from Google submitting their resumes to our website (for the Dickman openings). I spoke to Julie Gaither about the sensitivity around this a few weeks ago, and she gets it loud & clear (as does John evidently). We are not recruiting these folks, they are actively seeking us out.

Please let me know if you want recruiting to be handling this differently? Also, just as a side note, I have heard some rumblings the last couple of months that Google may not necessarily be honoring their part of the hands-off policy, although I don't have any hard evidence. I know we have lost a couple of people recently from HW to them, but I believe both were fairly unhappy folks, so it's hard to say how things actually got initiated.

Mark

Begin forwarded message:

From: Julie Gaither <julieg@apple.com>
Date: June 2, 2008 3:05:40 PM PDT
To: Mark Bentley <mbentley@apple.com>
Subject: Fwd: Sous Chef application

Mark,

Another Bon Appetit - Google applicant

(b) Emails About Hiring a Project Coordinator

From: EC
Sent: Sunday, February 8, 2004 6:46 PM
To: Rob Cook <rob@pixar.com>
Subject: [REDACTED]

The key is to stay away from the engineers.

On Feb 8, 2004, at 3:41 PM, Rob Cook wrote:

> Hooray!
>
> I know this doesn't sound like a big deal, but sometimes it can be
> surprisingly hard to find great support people, and we weren't
> cherishing the thought of having to keep looking.
>
> Rob
>
>
> Begin forwarded message:
>
>> From: Steve Jobs <sjobs@apple.com>
>> Date: February 8, 2004 3:32:21 PM PST
>> To: Rob Cook <rob@pixar.com>
>> Subject: Re: Renee Adam
>>
>> Yea, its fine.
>>
>> Steve
>>
>>
>> On Feb 8, 2004, at 3:30 PM, Rob Cook wrote:
>>
>> Steve,
>>
>> An Apple employee has applied for the job of project coordinator,
>> which is basically an administrative assistant to our project
>> managers. Since she's a support person instead of an engineer, I'm
>> hoping this won't be a problem.
>>
>> [REDACTED]
>>
>> Would it be OK for us to make her an offer?
>>
>> Rob
..