

National Transportation Networks, Market Access, and Regional Economic Growth

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Abstract

I estimate interregional transportation's effect on local economic activity by studying the Interstate Highway System. To estimate transportation's effects on county employment and wages, I develop a new instrumental variables strategy: isolating market access growth caused by incidental connections to rural counties. I find that through market access highways increased employment, had small and delayed wage effects, and that instruments correct for downward bias. A structural model interprets reduced-form results as agglomeration and congestion forces strengthening after 1980. Counterfactual simulations suggest that Interstates' effects were highly heterogeneous and that additions to early Interstate plans were less valuable than the system's core. JEL codes: R1, R4, R12, F14

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1 Introduction

Does improving a region’s market access improve its local economy, and at what cost? This question underlies some of the world’s most ambitious public works projects. Highway networks such as India’s Golden Quadrilateral, China’s National Highways, and America’s Interstate Highway System all aim to promote national growth, but can concentrate these gains in a handful of cities. To better understand if, when, and how transportation affects regional economic development, I estimate the Interstate Highway System’s (IHS) effects on U.S. counties’ market access and economic activity.

The Interstate Highway System is an ideal test case for studying transportation infrastructure’s long-run effects. It is a comprehensive highway network that greatly improved upon existing roads to reduce both commuting and shipping costs. Both of these channels can benefit regional economies directly and by fostering agglomeration economies, but endogeneity concerns and measurement issues have made separating these channels difficult.

I overcome these challenges using panel data on U.S. county incomes and employment, the national highway network, and a measure of market access. Guided by a general equilibrium trade model, I measure each county’s market access as a travel time discounted sum of other counties’ incomes. In theory, market access captures transportation’s equilibrium effects, and I find that its empirical counterpart varies independently of local road density. I use this variation to distinguish the effects of commuter highways and market access on county employment and wages. To identify market access’ causal effects, I develop a new instrumental variables strategy that uses its weighted average structure to exploit details of early IHS plans. Finally, I calibrate a structural model to investigate changing patterns of agglomeration over time and to assess the value of recent additions to the IHS.

My empirical analysis identifies inter-city highways’ local effects using previously unexploited details of early IHS plans.¹ In particular, I use the fact that early IHS plans explicitly prioritize

¹Baum-Snow (2007) and Duranton and Turner (2012) use planned Interstate mileage within major metropolitan areas to isolate their role as commuting infrastructure. Michaels (2008) uses highway plans to estimate trade’s impact on incidentally connected rural counties. In a broader sample of U.S. counties, Frye (2014) uses Interstate plans to isolate plausibly exogenous variation in which counties access the IHS, but most prominent metropolitan areas have at least one highway running through them.

a number of cities. Prioritized cities were disproportionately prosperous and endogenously became Interstate hubs, but their market access varies exogenously with travel times to whichever counties were en-route between them.

To identify causal effects, I control for priority city status and instrument market access with planned access to incidentally connected counties. I exclude connections between priority cities to adapt the inconsequential units approach described by Redding and Turner (2015). I extend upon prior applications of the inconsequential units approach, which can only identify causal effects for rural counties, by isolating exogenous variation in market access of both rural counties and major cities. For rural counties, instruments vary with planned highway construction rather than endogenous post-hoc extensions. For major cities, they vary with incidental connections to rural counties. Conditional on observables mentioned in early IHS proposals, I identify market access' effect on economic activity in both rural counties and major cities to form a basis for comparing local benefits of targeting lagging regions with national costs of diverting focus from commercial and industrial hubs.

Econometric estimates generate three main conclusions. First, I find that improving a county's market access increases their long run income, mostly by increasing employment. Second, comparing alternative instrumental variables strategies suggests that highways improved market access in counties that would have otherwise grown less than average. Third, I find evidence for changing mechanisms over time and argue that local productivity spillovers and housing costs became more important determinants of economic outcomes after 1980.

From 1953 to 1980, when most IHS expansion occurred, market access increases employment with no effect on wages. Most of the associated wage effects materialize after 1980. Combining these periods, I find that market access had large effects on county employment and modest effects on wages in the long run. From 1953 to 2010, a standard deviation increase in an average county's market access growth increased their employment growth by a quarter of a standard deviation and increased their wage growth by just one seventh of a standard deviation.

I interpret these results in a Ricardian trade model featuring mobile labour, agglomeration economies, and endogenous housing costs. In the model, counties produce differentiated goods

and draw good-specific productivities from a single distribution as in Eaton and Kortum (2002). Counties differ in which goods they produce most productively and each have a distinct comparative advantage, encouraging trade, but trade is costly. Highways enter the model by reducing trade costs, which depend on inter-county travel times. To consider the role of local externalities, I assume that both housing costs and firm productivity increase with city size.

The model interprets market access' large long run effects on employment and wages as evidence that agglomeration spillovers strengthened and housing supply tightened over time. In this static model, market access' short run effects (from 1953 to 1980) map to structural parameters that are consistent with existing literature (Eaton and Kortum, 2002; Combes and Gobillon, 2015; Donaldson and Hornbeck, 2016) but the model requires large agglomeration and congestion elasticities to rationalize market access' larger long run effects on employment and wages.

The model also reveals substantial geographic heterogeneity in the market access and employment counties owe to Interstate Highways. A counterfactual that closes Interstates to inter-city travel dramatically changes equilibrium market access and suggests that the interquartile range of counties' employment attributable to the IHS is 16 percent of 2010's median county employment.

Finally, I ask whether extensions to the 1947 highway plan benefited households as much as the Interstate Highway System's key routes. These additional highways sometimes cross sparsely populated areas or abruptly become slower secondary roads; studying them gives insight into the value of continued highway expansion and trade-offs inherent in targeting lagging regions' market access. Counterfactual welfare simulations suggest that, on a per kilometre basis, extensions to the 1947 highway plan are worth approximately one fifth of their planned counterparts. Further, I find that states' counterfactual employment losses from removing unplanned highways are imperfectly correlated with unplanned highway density and are attenuated in states whose neighbours built unplanned roads. This raises the possibility that building highways to improve lagging regions' market access benefits them at other places' expense.

These findings contribute to the literature studying transportation's role in promoting regional integration and economic activity. In particular, I complement reduced form evidence from Chandra and Thompson (2000), Michaels (2008), and Frye (2014) in the United States, Ghani et al. (2016)

in India, and Faber (2014) in China. These studies have mixed findings, but often suggest that highways redirect economic activity.

I also bring a new identification strategy to the literature studying market access' effect on regional economic activity. Previous studies in this vein include Donaldson and Hornbeck's (2016) analysis of American railroads, Alder et al. (2017) in India, Jaworski and Kitchens (2016) in Appalachia, Jedwab et al. (2017) in Africa, and Baum-Snow et al. (2017) in China. In contrast to the Chinese experience of highways and market access hurting peripheral areas, I find that market access helped America's hinterlands and find no evidence that access to hinterlands and major hubs has different effects on average county outcomes.

Finally, I add to the literature on Interstate Highways' economic effects. Early studies restricted attention to rural counties to identify highways' effect on employment, finding some evidence of spillovers between neighbours (Chandra and Thompson, 2000) and increasing trade related activities (Michaels, 2008). I find that market access increases employment more than wages which is consistent with Chandra and Thompson's (2000) conclusions and in contrast to Michaels' (2008) model with immobile labour. Others find that by improving metropolitan commuting, Interstates caused suburbanization (Baum-Snow, 2007) and employment growth (Duranton and Turner, 2012). This paper complements Duranton et al. (2014), who find that highways affect both the level and composition of trade, and Allen and Arkolakis (2014) whose calibrated model associates large welfare gains with the IHS's construction.

The political economy of Interstate construction is scarcely addressed in economic literature. Redding and Turner (2015) note that studies often find that Interstates were allocated to places that would otherwise grow less than average and Knight (2002) finds evidence that powerful senate representatives bring states federal highway funds that crowd out their own highway spending. I shed light on the value and politics of Interstate expansion by finding negative selection on market access and attributing relatively small national gains to additions to early federal highway plans.

I proceed by discussing relevant details of IHS planning and construction and my data in section 2. Then, section 3 outlines the structural model grounding empirical work. Section 4 describes my econometric approach and section 5 presents results. Finally, section 6 combines empirical results

with the structural model to estimate welfare effects.

2 Background and data

2.1 The 1947 Interstate Highway Plan

In the early 20th century, America’s highways were mostly independent auto trails. These auto trails varied in quality and were gradually improved and organized into the US numbered highways in the 1920s. In 1922, General John J. Pershing submitted the first detailed proposal for a national network of limited access highways. The so-called Pershing plan proposed over 30,000 kilometres of highways that the army considered necessary for national defence. The Federal Aid Highway Act initiated the federal government’s official role in planning an interregional road network in 1944 and congress published its official plan for the Interstate Highway System in 1947. Interstate Highways were promised federal funding in 1956 and most of the network was built by the early 1980s.

Congress’ 1947 highway plan contains a detailed map covering much of the modern Interstate Highway network. The plan describes 41,000 highway miles meant to support America’s growing transportation demand and facilitate evacuations and military mobilization “in case of an atomic attack” (Eisenhower, 1955). The 1947 plan also labels a number of priority cities. It is unclear exactly how these priority points were chosen, but the plan resembles a 1944 proposal to congress recommending a network with direct connections to as many large cities as possible (National Interregional Highway Committee, 1944).

Figure 1 plots the 1947 highway plan, which identifies 211 priority cities (shown as points) and proposes routes between them. Lightly shaded lines show today’s Interstate Highway System, which follows the plan with additions throughout the country. Redding and Turner’s (2015) assessment that unplanned highways went to support economic development in negatively selected places suggests that contemporary highways’ deviations from initial plans represent local assessments of potential growth. Further, priority points labelled on the plan were all connected to actual Interstates and often had unplanned highways built nearby.

2.2 Measuring roads and travel times

Market access, my main explanatory variable, depends on inter-county travel times. I capture variation over time by calculating driving times along America’s highways before and after IHS construction. I also calculate hypothetical driving times along 1947’s planned IHS.

I compute baseline travel times using a 1956 Shell Oil Company road map identifying all major auto-routes in the continental United States. I assume a constant speed of 35 mph along auto-routes and connect county centroids by straight lines at 10 mph. My baseline inter-county travel times data are a symmetric matrix of fastest possible driving times between county centroids along this road network.²

Data describing Interstate Highways come from the USGS’s National Atlas. To model the post Interstate Highway network, I add the IHS to the baseline network and recalculate fastest driving times assuming 65 mph travel along Interstates. Empirical analysis uses these travel times to describe both 1980 and 2010 roads.

Finally, the 1947 highway plan re-routes current Interstate Highways to compute travel times for transportation measures’ instruments. Market access instruments replace actual travel times with those computed as if Interstate Highways exactly follow the 1947 plan.

To measure counties’ local commuter highways roads, I define Interstate Highway equivalent kilometres as a weighted sum of Interstate and secondary road kilometres within each county’s boundaries where secondary road km each count for 35/65 of an Interstate km. In 1950, this is just a scaled count of auto-route mileage in each county. I assign counties highway equivalent km using post-Interstate, planned, and baseline highway configurations.

Table 1 summarises the baseline and post-Interstate road networks. Hours between counties are calculated for fastest routes between county centroids using Dijkstra’s algorithm and change in log highway equivalent kilometres is set to zero in counties without highways in the 1956 Shell road map. The IHS implied substantial road building, an average increase of 0.43 log equivalent km with substantial variation across counties. The data associate dramatic travel time reductions with IHS construction—average pairwise trip time fell by thirty eight percent. Reduced cross-trip

²I identify minimum travel times using Dijkstra’s shortest path algorithm, implemented in the ArcGIS Network Analyst toolbox.

variance occurred as the longest trips saw the largest travel time reductions.

2.3 Outcomes and controls

My main outcomes are long differences in county populations, employment, and payrolls between 1950 and 2010. I focus on counties with constant boundaries throughout the study period and merge these data with 1990 definitions of commute zones.³ I convert monetary values to 2010 United States dollars using the Bureau of Labour Statistics' Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers. Going forward, the distinction between real and nominal incomes refers to cost of living differences across counties rather than years.

Population, demographic, and housing data come from the decennial censuses⁴ while payrolls, total employment, and establishment counts come from the County Business Patterns (CBP).⁵ Since no CBP data exist for 1950, I use 1953 data in its place. Critically, census data are measured by county of residence while CBP data track workplaces.

In some cases, the 1953 CBP reported employment and payrolls for county groups rather than individual counties. To compute 1953 payrolls for each group's constituent counties, I assume per-employee payrolls are constant within a county group and assign counties employment counts in proportion to their 1950 populations.⁶

Table 2 summarises growth in key outcomes across the 2,978 counties included in CBP data. The data reflect America's rapid economic growth in the mid twentieth century. Mean county growth slowed in the later period but cross-county variance in growth persisted.

³Using county boundary shapefiles for 1940 and 2010 from NHGIS, I drop counties that experienced greater than ten percent change in area. This procedure retains 3047 of the 3109 counties and county equivalent units in the contiguous United States (excluding Hawaii and Alaska) as of the 2010 census. Boundary changes are concentrated in Virginia where county boundaries are less stable than is typical.

⁴1940 and 1950 census data and other controls (excluding population) come from county databooks. Population data and outcomes come from decennial censuses are accessed via NHGIS.

⁵1953 CBP data come from the 1956 county databook, which reports CBP data without industry breakdowns for most counties. A small number of counties are mis-coded in the county databook; I correct this using scans of the 1953 CBP source material. Recent CBP data come from NHGIS and American Fact Finder.

⁶Alternatively, distributing 1953 employment within county groups according to each county's employment in the 1967 CBP generates imputed employment counts whose correlation with my preferred measure is 0.71 among imputed counties.

3 A model of regional trade and market access

This section presents a model of trading counties following Eaton and Kortum (2002), Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016), and others. The model features land as an input to producing both traded goods and housing. I fix counties' residential land supply so that rents increase with total incomes and households trade off endogenous housing costs and wages when choosing their location.⁷ I also assume households enjoy an amenity value from local roads similar to Duranton and Turner's (2012) model of highways' commuter benefits. Finally, firms' productivity increases in local employment, a constant elasticity agglomeration benefit capturing increasing returns in local input services, thick labour markets, or knowledge spillovers (Duranton and Puga, 2004). The model delivers estimating equations where a single market access measure summarises transportation's effect on regional income, highlights identification issues, proposes mechanisms, and provides a framework for estimating transportation's aggregate effects.

3.1 Households

There are many trading counties, indexed by i when producing or sending goods and n when receiving goods. I assume the United States is populated by \bar{L} identical and mobile households, each inelastically supplying a single unit of labour and receiving w_n in income. Households have Cobb-Douglas preferences represented by $U_n = \frac{A_n}{\tau_n} C_n^\mu H_n^{1-\mu}$ where A_n is a local public good, τ_n is a representative commute's disutility, H_n is housing, and C_n is a bundle of traded goods.⁸ Households' tastes imply a constant elasticity of substitution σ across traded goods so that an ideal price index P_n summarises the traded bundle's cost in each county. Households also pay an endogenous user cost of ρ_n per unit of housing.

I assume local roads decrease commute times so that speed supply is $\tilde{\tau}^s \left(\frac{L_n}{R_n} \right)^{\delta^s}$ where L_n is total county employment and R_n is local road mileage. Assuming commuting's disutility is a constant elasticity function of travel time and abstracting from differences in distance gives $\tau_n = \tau \left(\frac{L_n}{R_n} \right)^\delta$

⁷Endogenous housing costs create a mobility friction that is isomorphic to idiosyncratic moving costs, urban crowding, or commute congestion. Allen and Arkolakis (2014) offer a formal discussion of several related models.

⁸This model is isomorphic to one in which households pay an iceberg commute cost so that their take home income is some fraction τ_n of their market income. Looking forward, the model's equilibrium is also isomorphic to local roads increasing firms' total factor productivity.

where δ combines preferences for shorter commutes with roads' marginal effect on commute times.

These assumptions culminate in county n 's residents achieving utility levels

$$u_n = \tau \mu^\mu (1 - \mu)^{(1-\mu)} A_n \left(\frac{R_n}{L_n} \right)^\delta \frac{w_n}{P_n^\mu \rho_n^{1-\mu}} \quad (1)$$

and households choose to live and work in the highest utility location.

3.2 Production, trade, and labour demand

In each county i , a continuum of perfectly competitive firms produce varieties (indexed by ν) combining labour, land, and perfectly mobile capital in a Cobb-Douglas production function with total factor productivity $\tilde{T}_i z_i(\nu)$ so that each variety's marginal cost is $\frac{q_i^\gamma w_i^\alpha r^{1-\alpha-\gamma}}{\tilde{T}_i z_i(\nu)}$. Capital rents at a constant price r and firms pay endogenous local prices w_i and q_i for labour and land respectively.⁹

Following Eaton and Kortum (2002), firms draw idiosyncratic productivity components, $z_i(\nu)$, from a common Fréchet distribution with the cumulative density $F(z) = \exp(-z^{-\theta})$. I assume that θ exceeds one and call it the trade elasticity because it is inversely proportional to the scope for comparative advantage. Firms also enjoy an agglomeration spillover so that $\tilde{T}_i = T_i L_i^\zeta$.¹⁰ Finally, goods shipped from county i to county n pay iceberg trade costs $\tau_{in} > 1$ so that p_{in} dollars spent in county n brings the county i 's seller p_{in}/τ_{in} dollars of net revenue.

This production structure implies that in zero-profit equilibrium, variety ν ships from i 's producers to n 's consumers at prices

$$p_{in}(\nu) = \alpha^\alpha \gamma^\gamma \frac{q_i^\gamma w_i^\alpha r^{1-\alpha-\gamma}}{L_i^\zeta T_i z_i(\nu)}.$$

Eaton and Kortum (2002) show that these prices imply that county n 's price index is $P_n = \kappa_1 CMA_n^{-\frac{1}{\theta}}$, where $CMA_n = \sum_j \left[\frac{q_j^\gamma w_j^\alpha}{L_j^\zeta T_j} \tau_{jn} \right]^{-\theta}$ captures each county's access to low cost producers

⁹I equate local incomes and expenditure in equilibrium; equivalent to assuming land and capital rents are spent where they are earned. I discuss rentiers in more detail when I introduce housing production.

¹⁰The model's equilibrium conditions are isomorphic to including congestible local roads as an unpriced productive input so that $\tilde{T}_i = T_i L_i^\zeta \left(\frac{R_i}{L_i} \right)^{\delta_T}$. The baseline model can accommodate this feature by reducing the agglomeration elasticity to reflect county employment's marginal external benefit net of the road crowding elasticity δ_T .

and is often called consumer market access.¹¹ Further, the value of goods i sells to n is

$$X_{in} = \left[\frac{q_i^\gamma w_i^\alpha}{L_i^\zeta T_i} \right]^{-\theta} \frac{\tau_{in}^{-\theta}}{CMA_n} Y_n. \quad (2)$$

where Y_n is county n 's total output. Summing (2) across county i 's trading partners and assuming balanced trade shows that aggregate incomes satisfy $Y_i = \left[\frac{q_i^\gamma w_i^\alpha}{L_i^\zeta T_i} \right]^{-\theta} \sum_n \frac{Y_n \tau_{in}^{-\theta}}{CMA_n}$ where $\sum_n \frac{Y_n \tau_{in}^{-\theta}}{CMA_n}$ captures firms' access to large export markets and is often called firm market access. As in Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016), symmetric trade costs imply that firm and consumer market access are equal. Therefore, I define structural market access as

$$MA_i \equiv CMA_i = \sum_n \frac{Y_n \tau_{in}^{-\theta}}{CMA_n}. \quad (3)$$

With a single market access term and Cobb-Douglas production, county income reduces to $Y_i^{1+\theta(\alpha+\gamma)} = T_i^\theta L_i^{\theta(\zeta+\alpha)} S_i^{\theta\gamma} MA_i$ where S_i is a county's productive land endowment. Substituting $Y_i = \frac{w_i L_i}{\gamma}$ gives local labour demand as a constant elasticity function of wages, fundamental productivity, land area, and market access:¹²

$$L_i = \kappa_2 T_i^{\frac{\theta}{1+\theta(\gamma-\zeta)}} S_i^{\frac{\gamma\theta}{1+\theta(\gamma-\zeta)}} MA_i^{\frac{1}{1+\theta(\gamma-\zeta)}} w_i^{-\frac{\theta(\alpha+\gamma)+1}{1+\theta(\gamma-\zeta)}}. \quad (4)$$

Growing market access shifts local labour demand upwards and this effect is strongest when land is a small share of costs or the scope for comparative advantage is large.

3.3 Housing

I capture endogenous housing costs with a stylized housing supply model. Competitive housing producers combine land and traded capital with a Cobb Douglas production function, and marginal cost pricing gives housing costs $\rho_i = (q_i^R)^\eta r^{1-\eta}$ where η is land's share in housing production and q_i^R is residential land rent. For simplicity, I assume developers use different land than traded good

¹¹ $\kappa_1 = \alpha^\alpha \gamma^\gamma r^{1-\alpha-\gamma} \left[\int_0^\infty x^{\frac{1-\sigma}{\theta}} e^{-x} dx \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}.$

¹² $\kappa_2 = \alpha^{\frac{1}{1+\theta(\gamma-\zeta)}}$

producers but pay proportional rents $q_i^R = \phi q_i$. Cobb-Douglas traded good production then implies $q_i^R = \phi q_i = \phi \gamma \frac{Y_i}{S_i} = \phi \frac{\gamma w_i L_i}{\alpha S_i}$ and the (inverse) housing supply function is

$$\rho_i = \left(\phi \frac{\gamma w_i L_i}{\alpha S_i} \right)^\eta r^{1-\eta}. \quad (5)$$

In equilibrium, land rents are bundled with capital rents and distributed to absentee landlords. Landlords live where they own land, receive income in proportion to their county's output, and spend all of this income on traded goods. This simplification accommodates my lack of rent data and makes housing costs one interpretation of a generic local congestion externality as in Allen and Arkolakis (2014).

3.4 Labour supply

Goods and housing market equilibria admit substituting $P_i = \kappa_1 M A_i^{-\frac{1}{\theta}}$ and $\rho_i = \phi \left(\frac{\gamma w_i L_i}{\alpha S_i} \right)^\eta r^{1-\eta}$ into (1) to get local utility in terms of market access and population. In spatial equilibrium, mobile households arbitrage away utility differences across counties so that $\bar{u} = u_i \forall i$ and (inverse) local labour supply is¹³

$$w_i = (\bar{u} \kappa_3)^{\frac{1}{1-\eta(1-\mu)}} A_i^{-\frac{1}{1-\eta(1-\mu)}} S_i^{-\frac{\eta}{1-\eta(1-\mu)}} R_i^{-\frac{\delta}{1-\eta(1-\mu)}} M A_i^{-\frac{\mu}{\theta} \frac{1}{1-\eta(1-\mu)}} L_i^{\frac{\eta(1-\mu)+\delta}{1-\eta(1-\mu)}}. \quad (6)$$

Since market access reduces the price index, it shifts labour supply towards lower wages. So if θ is small, market access acts as a local amenity, as do commuter roads if δ is large.

¹³ $\kappa_3 = \kappa_1 \tau \mu^\mu (1-\mu)^{(1-\mu)} \left(\left(\frac{\phi \gamma}{\alpha} \right)^\eta r^{1-\eta} \right)^{1-\mu}$

3.5 Equilibrium

Combining labour demand (equation (4)) and supply (equation (6)) gives equilibrium wages and labour allocations as log-linear functions of local fundamentals, road allocations, and market access:

$$\ln w_i = \ln \kappa^w + \delta_u^w \ln \bar{u} + \beta^w \ln MA_i + \delta_R^w \ln R_i + \ln \chi_i^w \quad (7)$$

$$\ln L_i = \ln \kappa^L + \delta_u^L \ln \bar{u} + \beta^L \ln MA_i + \delta_R^L \ln R_i + \ln \chi_i^L \quad (8)$$

$$MA_i = \frac{1}{\alpha} \sum_j \frac{w_j L_j \tau_{ij}^{-\theta}}{MA_j} \quad (9)$$

$$\bar{L} = \sum_i L_i \quad (10)$$

where χ_i^w and χ_i^L are functions of exogenous local productivity, amenities, and land endowments; κ^w and κ^L depend on the interest rate; and elasticities $\beta^w, \beta^L, \delta_u^w, \delta_u^L, \delta_R^w, \delta_R^L$ are functions of exogenous parameters specified in appendix table A.1. Given parameters $\{\alpha, \gamma, \mu, \zeta, \eta, \delta, \theta\}$, capital's rental rate (r), total national employment (\bar{L}), local fundamentals (χ_i^w, χ_i^L), and bilateral trade costs (τ_{in}), an equilibrium is county employment, wages, market access, and national utility (\bar{u}) so that (7), (8), (9), and (10) hold. Arguments developed by Bartelme (2018) imply that a unique equilibrium exists whenever $\beta^w + \beta^L \leq 2$. Crucially, market access summarises inter-city transportation's effects on equilibrium wages and employment.

The equilibrium conditions (7) and (8) form the basis for my empirical task of identifying market access elasticities β^w and β^L . These elasticities reflect preference and production parameters and summarise inter-city transportation's effect on county incomes.

I differentiate local labour supply and demand to map reduced form elasticities to structural parameters and develop intuition. Taking logarithms of (4) and (6) and differentiating with respect to market access yields

$$\beta^L = \frac{1}{1 + \theta(\gamma - \zeta)} - \beta^w \frac{\theta(\alpha + \gamma) + 1}{1 + \theta(\gamma - \zeta)} \text{ and} \quad (11)$$

$$\beta^w = \beta^L \frac{\eta(1 - \mu) + \delta}{1 - \eta(1 - \mu)} - \frac{\mu}{\theta} \frac{1}{1 - \eta(1 - \mu)}. \quad (12)$$

The demand shift, equation (11), increases the equilibrium employment elasticity when agglomeration forces offset firms' local input costs. The supply shift, equation (12), can cause a negative equilibrium wage elasticity if gains from trade (which grow as θ shrinks) offset housing costs and road congestion (captured by η and δ). Finally, given assumptions about the agglomeration elasticity (ζ) and production shares (γ and α) local wage and employment elasticities identify the trade elasticity. Then, adding estimates of housing's expenditure share ($1 - \mu$) and local roads' reduced form elasticities (δ_R^w and δ_R^L) identifies the congestion parameters (η and δ) and differences in household welfare across equilibria.

Equations (7) and (8) also show how unobserved local fundamentals complicate econometric estimates. Local productivity, amenities, and land endowments are exogenous but jointly determine market access and labour market outcomes.¹⁴ And since a county's market access also reflects their neighbours' productivity and amenities, spatially clustered shocks such as southern states' post-war growth are particularly problematic.

4 Empirical strategy

4.1 Measuring market access

My econometric analysis measures market access by omitting recursive terms following Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016). This approximation is less model dependent than equation (9) and summarises each county's economic centrality as a travel time discounted sum of other counties' incomes. To focus on inter-city roads, I assume trade costs are a constant elasticity function of driving times $\tau_{ijt} = \tau_0 time_{ijt}^{\tau_1}$. Then, county i 's market access in year t is

$$MA_{it} = \tilde{\tau} \sum_{j \neq i} w_{jt} L_{jt} time_{ijt}^{-\tilde{\theta}} \quad (13)$$

where $w_{jt} L_{jt}$ are county j 's total payrolls, $\tilde{\theta} = \tau_1 \theta$ is the decay parameter, and $\tilde{\tau} = \frac{\tau_0^{-\theta}}{\alpha}$ is a scale parameter I normalize to one since it does not affect growth rates. I set the decay parameter to

¹⁴To see this, note that $MA_i = \frac{1}{\alpha} \sum_n \frac{w_n L_n \tau_{in}^{-\theta}}{MA_n} = \frac{1}{\alpha} \kappa^w \kappa^L \bar{u}^{\delta_u^w + \delta_u^L} \sum_n \tau_{in}^{-\theta} MA_n^{\beta^w + \beta^L - 1} \chi_n^w \chi_n^L$.

1.5 to match estimates of regional trade flows' elasticity of highway distance as suggested by the model's gravity equation. Specifically, equation (2) can be written as

$$\begin{aligned}\ln X_{ij} &= \alpha_i + \alpha_j - \theta\tau_{ij} \\ &= \alpha_i + \alpha_j - \theta\tau_1 \ln time_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}\end{aligned}$$

where X_{ij} is value shipped from region i to j, α_i and α_j are origin and destination fixed effects, and ε_{ij} captures approximation error arising from measuring trade costs as a constant elasticity function travel times.

Duranton et al. (2014) estimate inter-city trade's elasticity with respect to highway distance using 2007 Commodity Flow Survey (CFS) data describing bilateral trade flows between 66 American regions. Their elasticity estimates range from -1.63 to -1.91 for weight traded and -1.17 to -1.41 for value traded. I aggregate my county level travel times to payroll weighted average travel times between CFS region pairs and find 2007 inter-regional trade value's elasticity of bilateral driving times is -1.57.¹⁵

Table 3 summarises market access growth using total county payrolls in 2010 and 1953 as weights and $\tilde{\theta} = 1.5$. The data imply substantial market access growth, but it is not all the direct result of new highways. The following decomposition apportions market access growth between direct effects of road improvements and income growth:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta \ln MA_{it} &= \underbrace{\left(\ln \sum_{j \neq i} w_{jt} L_{jt} time_{ijt}^{-\tilde{\theta}} - \ln \sum_{j \neq i} w_{j0} L_{j0} time_{ijt}^{-\tilde{\theta}} \right)}_{\text{income growth}} \\ &\quad + \underbrace{\left(\ln \sum_{j \neq i} w_{j0} L_{j0} time_{ijt}^{-\tilde{\theta}} - \ln \sum_{j \neq i} w_{j0} L_{j0} time_{ij0}^{-\tilde{\theta}} \right)}_{\text{road improvements}}.\end{aligned}$$

The final column of table 3 shows that both factors were important. Computing market access

¹⁵I define a CFS region pair's weighted average travel time as the sum of travel times between county pairs weighted by each county pair's share of all county pairs' payrolls. Regressing log bilateral trade values on origin and destination fixed effects and weighted average travel times yields an elasticity of -1.574 by OLS and -1.573 instrumenting travel times with planned counterparts. IV estimates using a cubic specification of log travel times give a mean elasticity of -1.45, bolstering the assumption of log-linear trade costs.

growth with payrolls held at baseline levels suggests that income growth accounts for about 60 percent of the mean and half of the variance of market access growth in my data.

Figure 2 plots changes in log market access across U.S. counties. Solid lines indicate existing Interstates, dotted lines indicate secondary roads (built before 1956), and darker colours indicate more growth. Figure 2 reveals that Interstates caused market access growth in many counties that were not directly connected to the IHS and were particularly important for many western and southern hubs.

4.2 Econometric model

I estimate Interstate Highways' effect on local economic outcomes through their effects on market access and commuter roads. The main estimating equation is an empirical counterpart to the structural model's equilibrium conditions that normalizes utility to one, absorbs national effects in a year specific intercept, decomposes local fundamentals' effect on outcome y in year t into $\chi_{it}^y = X_i' \Gamma_t + \gamma_i + \epsilon_{it}$, and takes first differences to estimate:

$$\Delta \ln y_i = \kappa + \beta_1 \Delta \ln MA_i + \beta_2 \Delta \ln R_i + X_i' \Gamma + \epsilon_i \quad (14)$$

where $\Delta \ln y_i$ is a county's change in log total employment or payroll per employee from 1953 to 2010 in the main specification. Regressions using outcomes from decennial censuses use 1950 as the base year and some regressions separately consider changes from 1950 to 1980 and 1980 to 2010. Market access growth varies alongside falling driving times and growing market sizes between 1953 and 1980 or 2010 depending on the relevant time horizon.¹⁶ The parameter of interest is market access' elasticity β_1 , which summarises the Interstate Highway Network's local effects.

Highways also improve counties' local roads, increasing R_i , which I include as a control to separate highways' commuting and market access effects. Identifying β_1 using market access growth unrelated to local roads suits the relevant counterfactual of re-configuring roads to alter trade costs

¹⁶Market access growth from 1953 to 2010 is only considered for long-run outcomes (growing from 1950 to 2010). Otherwise, I consider growth until 1980 to ease interpretation of results. Market access growth from 1980 to 2010 is not of direct interest since the IHS was largely complete by 1980 and I cannot identify subsequent market access growth's causal effects.

without affecting other local factors.

The vector of baseline controls, X_i , are 1940 and 1950 log manufacturing and agricultural employment shares, 1940 and 1950 log sales per farm, log dollar values of wartime industrial and military facilities financed between 1940 and 1945, dummies for positive wartime investment, a third order polynomial in 1940 and 1950 log population, census division fixed effects, log land area, longitude and latitude, and dummies indicating counties within 50 km of a coast, all interacted with dummies for commute zones identified as prioritized by the 1947 plan.¹⁷ Residuals capture measurement error and time varying unobservables including local productivity and amenities, and all inference uses 1990 commute zone clustered covariance matrices.¹⁸

Since market access can increase both labour supply and labour demand, I expect it to increase employment but effects on per-employee payroll are ex-ante ambiguous. Market access increases wages if it improves local labour demand and households receive compensation for moving. On the other hand, market access can improve local amenities and provide a variety of low cost consumption goods, increasing labour supply and reducing wages.

4.3 Identification strategy

Deliberate highway planning and general equilibrium feedbacks make highway and market access variables endogenous. Further, the model in section 3 suggests that unobserved productivity and quality of life trends will bias estimates of equation (14) if they are correlated with market access. Baseline controls partially alleviate this concern, but are not sufficient to credibly identify transportation's effects. So I build instruments for market access and local roads based on the 1947 highway plan and knowledge that many counties were incidentally connected to the IHS.

Following Duranton and Turner (2012), I use planned road building to instrument local road growth. Specifically, local roads' instruments are the growth in highway equivalent km each county would have seen if the IHS followed the 1947 plan. I also use planned travel times between counties

¹⁷I add one to employment shares, farm sales, and war facility investments before taking logarithms.

¹⁸The spatial autocorrelation consistent variance-covariance matrix suggested by Kelejian and Prucha (2007) produces similar results.

to build instruments for market access. The simplest instrument for market access growth is

$$\Delta \ln \widetilde{MA}_i = \ln \sum_j D_{ij}^{far} w_{j0} L_{j0} time_{ijplan}^{-1.5} - \ln \sum_j D_{ij}^{far} w_{j0} L_{j0} time_{ij0}^{-1.5}$$

where $time_{ijplan}^{-1.5}$ are planned travel times and $D_{ij}^{far} = 1$ if counties i and j are at least 100 km apart.

I exploit incidental connections by introducing the indicator D_i^{inc} for plausibly incidentally connected counties and defining market access growth caused by incidental connections

$$\Delta \ln \widetilde{MA}_i^{inc} = \ln \sum_j D_j^{inc} D_{ij}^{far} w_{j0} L_{j0} time_{ijplan}^{-1.5} - \ln \sum_j D_j^{inc} D_{ij}^{far} w_{j0} L_{j0} time_{ij0}^{-1.5}.$$

If the set of incidentally connected counties is properly defined, it is reasonable to expect that $\text{Cov}\left(\Delta \ln \widetilde{MA}_i^{inc}, \epsilon_i\right) = 0$ given controls for priority city status.¹⁹

Early highway plans detail federal priorities and provide insight into which counties were incidentally included. Federal plans drew a highway system to support national defence, population centres, agricultural hubs, and manufacturing clusters (National Interregional Highway Committee, 1944). I capture direct effects of these factors with controls for baseline employment mixes, farm sales, wartime investment, and population. I also observe the set of cities the 1947 plan prioritized and define incidentally connected counties as those not sharing commute zones with any of the 211 cities named in the 1947 plan and control for an indicator of counties sharing a commute zone with any prioritized city.

I exploit access to incidentally connected markets because differences in planned market access growth among prioritized cities might reflect differences in potential productivity or amenity growth. Figure 3 depicts a stylized example of this issue. Initial plans gave Dallas a direct connection to Memphis but nearby Shreveport's planned Interstate connection to Memphis routes through

¹⁹This approach can be motivated by decomposing planned market access into $\widetilde{MA}_{it} = \widetilde{MA}_{it}^{inc} + \widetilde{MA}_{it}^{hub}$ where $\widetilde{MA}_{it}^{hub} = \sum_j (1 - D_j^{inc}) D_{ij}^{far} w_{j0} L_{j0} time_{ijplan}^{-1.5}$ in the post-construction period. Perturbing \widetilde{MA}_{it} then yields $d \ln \widetilde{MA}_{it} = \frac{\widetilde{MA}_{it}^{inc}}{\widetilde{MA}_{it}} d \ln \widetilde{MA}_{it}^{inc} + \frac{\widetilde{MA}_{it}^{hub}}{\widetilde{MA}_{it}} d \ln \widetilde{MA}_{it}^{hub}$. Treating $\widetilde{MA}_{it}^{hub}$ as endogenous suggests that $d \ln \widetilde{MA}_{it}^{inc}$ is the only exogenous component of the market access shock.

Jackson, Mississippi, in a right angle.²⁰ All three of these cities are labelled as priorities in the 1947 plan, but Dallas' market access grew more than Shreveport's. This difference mechanically reflects Dallas' significance as an Interstate hub, which was likely encouraged by its own potential productivity growth. To avoid inducing correlation between priority cities' market access and unobserved fundamental growth, I explicitly eliminate variation in market access instruments driven by connections between counties in priority commute zones.

I implement this approach by specifying the first stage equations

$$\Delta \ln MA_i = \alpha^{MA} + \beta_1^{MA} \Delta \ln \widetilde{MA}_i^{inc} + \beta_2^{MA} D_i^{inc} \Delta \ln \widetilde{MA}_i^{hub} + \beta_3^{MA} \Delta \ln \tilde{R}_i + X_i' \Gamma^{MA} + \nu_i^{MA} \quad (15)$$

$$\Delta \ln R_i = \alpha^R + \beta_1^R \Delta \ln \widetilde{MA}_i^{inc} + \beta_2^R D_i^{inc} \Delta \ln \widetilde{MA}_i^{hub} + \beta_3^R \Delta \ln \tilde{R}_i + X_i' \Gamma^R + \nu_i^R$$

where $\Delta \ln \widetilde{MA}_i^{inc}$ is planned market access to counties not in a priority city's commute zone, $\Delta \ln \widetilde{MA}_i^{hub}$ is planned access to priority cities, and $\Delta \ln \tilde{R}_i$ is planned local highway efficiency km growth.²¹ Over-identifying the market access elasticity in this way creates an opportunity to test for heterogeneous local average treatment effects.

I consistently estimate market access and local road elasticities given three orthogonality conditions. First, access to incidentally connected markets must be unrelated to residual determinants of wages and employment so that $E[\epsilon_i \Delta \ln \widetilde{MA}_i^{inc} | X_i] = 0$. Controls include a priority city indicator so that this condition does not require valid comparisons between major hubs and incidentally connected counties. Second, access to major hubs must be exogenously distributed among incidentally connected counties so that $E[\epsilon_i \Delta \ln \widetilde{MA}_i^{hub} | X_i, D_i^{inc} = 1] = 0$. This assumption must only hold conditional on baseline observables known to influence IHS plans since I interact all controls with a priority city indicator. Finally, I require that planned local road density is conditionally exogenous so that $E[\epsilon_i \Delta \ln \tilde{R}_i | X_i] = 0$. Section 5 presents first stage estimates and robustness tests showing

²⁰As of March 2019, the fastest route from Shreveport to Memphis takes an unplanned portion of I-49 conceived in the late 90s that gradually opened to traffic over the 2000s and 2010s. However, the Shreveport-Memphis drive remains less direct than the Dallas-Memphis drive.

²¹Footnote 19 defines $\widetilde{MA}_{it}^{hub}$ and decomposes market access into access to incidentally connected and major counties.

that covariance between market access and local roads does not drive results.

5 Effects on local economic activity

5.1 First stage results

Table 4 presents first stage estimates associated with alternative instrument sets. Column 1 presents each instrument’s standard deviation and the remaining columns present ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of infrastructure measures on instruments and controls. The dependent variable in columns 2 through 5 is market access growth from 1953 to 2010 and column 6 presents estimates for local road density. The candidate instrument in the first row is market access growth with observed highways and baseline income, instruments in the second through fourth rows use planned Interstates, baseline incomes, a 100 km donut around each county, and distinguish between access to incidentally connected counties and major hubs.

All instrument sets have intuitive coefficient estimates and produce strong first stages with large Angrist and Pischke (2008) partial F-statistics. Reassuringly, market access’ instruments consistently predict its growth better than planned local roads. For example, column 4 associates a standard deviation increase in planned access to incidentally connected counties with over 10 times more market access growth than a standard deviation increase in planned local road density. Further, incidental market access growth is negatively correlated with local road growth conditional on controls and planned local road building.

5.2 Long run effects

Table 5 presents long-run elasticities of employment and payroll per employee with respect to market access and local roads. Growth is measured from 1953 to 2010 and all regressions include a full set of controls. Column 1 presents OLS estimates and columns 2 through 5 present TSLS estimates with alternative instruments. Market access instruments based on the 1947 plan exclude counties within a 100 km buffer and each TSLS regression corresponds to a first stage presented in table 4.

Least squares estimates in column 1 overstate market access' importance since market access both causes and is caused by regional incomes. Column 2 shows that fixing instruments' weights at 1953 payrolls attenuates market access elasticities and attributes larger effects to local road building. Column 3 shows that using plan-based instruments for market access and local roads attenuates local road elasticities and increases market access elasticities for both outcomes. Column 4 presents just-identified estimates using market access' incidental connections instruments, further increasing employment elasticities. Column 5 presents the preferred specification, which is over-identified as specified in equation 15. These estimates resemble just-identified estimates in column 4, which are identified solely by variation in access to incidentally connected markets.²²

Preferred estimates suggest that a ten percent increase in market access causes an 8.4 percent increase in employment. This means that moving one standard deviation up in market access growth delivers 24 extra percentage points of employment, about one quarter of the standard deviation of counties' long-run employment growth. Average payrolls also respond to market access, but less than employment. A standard deviation market access growth causes a 4 percentage point increase in per employee payrolls, just over one seventh a standard deviation of its long-run growth.

Comparing just- and over-identified elasticities suggests that access to incidentally connected and priority markets has similar effects on wages and employment. Formally, the over-identified regressions in column 5 produce commute zone clustered Hansen (1982) J-statistics of $\chi^2=1.131$ (p-value = 0.28) for employment and $\chi^2=1.037$ (p-value = 0.30) for per employee payrolls. This suggests that access to incidentally connected markets and major hubs has similar effects on long run incomes of a given county.

Table 6 reports TSLS estimates of equation (14) interacting market access growth with indicators of counties above or below median on measures of 1950 city status. Non-priority counties and those starting less-dense exhibit the largest employment responses to improved market access. However, heterogeneity of wage elasticities presents a less clear pattern across these dimensions. Therefore, focusing on a sample of incidentally connected counties as in Chandra and Thompson (2000), Michaels (2008), and Faber (2014) would overstate employment elasticities.

²²Unreported estimates confirm that using the structural model's market access terms, which iteratively solve equation 9, yield similar elasticity estimates.

Appendix table A.2 considers change in log median dwelling values, detached home shares, and log establishment counts as additional outcomes. Results suggest that market access growth pushed households into pricier and smaller dwellings on average, but lack of quality adjusted house price data makes these results difficult to interpret. I also find that market access increases establishment counts with a smaller elasticity than employment, evidence that market access increases establishment size.

Overall, results suggest that market access caused by highways increases local incomes and that this effect is driven primarily by employment. Wages also grow in response to market access, but this effect is quantitatively less important. In addition, given a county’s place in the national highway network, local road density has little effect on long-run employment and incomes. Finally, applying increasingly stringent identification assumptions suggests that unplanned highways gave additional market access growth to places that would otherwise have grown less—additions to early IHS plans generally favoured lagging regions.

5.3 Effects over time

Table 7 presents highways’ effects on county employment, average payrolls, and population changes from 1950 to 1980 in panel A, the period of active road building, and from 1980 to 2010 in panel B. Regardless of outcome year, the main explanatory variable is market access growth from 1953 to 1980 and each column presents TSLS estimates using incidental connection instruments.

In early decades, market access increases population and employment with no discernible effect on average payrolls. In later decades, market access increases average payrolls and causes additional employment gains. Consistent with Duranton and Turner (2012), table 7 shows that local roads also increase employment in the later period.

These results have two key implications. First, in the short run, Interstate Highways had little effect on average incomes but were an important determinant of employment and population. This suggests labour was mobile across counties during IHS construction, and the changing distribution of market access guided local economic development without closing regional wage gaps. Second, IHS construction triggered continued increases employment and wages after 1980 when Interstate

expansion slowed dramatically. Wage gains in later years may have been offset by increased housing costs, but nevertheless could reflect dynamic agglomeration externalities, path dependence, or endogenous complementary investments such as local collector roads, housing, or warehouses.

5.4 Robustness tests

I begin assessing the validity of my identification strategy by testing whether my market access instruments are correlated with population growth before the IHS was built. Specifically, I draw on a limited sample of counties where historic population data are available and run TSLS regressions of the form

$$\ln pop_{it} - \ln pop_{i1880} = \beta_t \Delta \ln MA_i + (X_i^{geo} \gamma_t + \alpha_{d(i)t}) \cdot (1 + D_i^{hub}) + e_{it}$$

where ΔMA_i is market access growth from 1950 to 2010, $\alpha_{d(i)t}$ are census division by year fixed effects, and X_i^{geo} is a vector of pre-determined geographic controls.²³ Consistent with my identification strategy, I interact controls with a major hub dummy D_i^{hub} .

Figure 4 presents TSLS estimates of β_t using incidental connections instruments. While confidence intervals are wide, figure 4 brings some concerns that the instruments endow more market access to counties that suffered in the early 1900s and began rebounding early in the IHS planning process. This highlights the importance of economic and demographic controls included in all regressions discussed so far.

Appendix table A.3 presents results of TSLS regressions of baseline covariates on market access growth. Market access growth is associated with higher baseline manufacturing share, high school graduate share, and population. In addition, there is a positive but imperfect relationship between market access and local road growth. Fortunately, appendix table A.4 shows that results are generally robust to altering the control vector and that removing local roads and their instruments from estimations has little effect on market access elasticities.

Table 8 presents long-run market access elasticities estimated using variations on market access' incidental connections instruments. Columns 1 and 2 use instruments that exploit incidental con-

²³Geographic controls or longitude, latitude, a coastal dummy, and log land area.

nections along the observed IHS alignment rather than the 1947 plan. Both just- and over-identified regressions yield slightly smaller wage effects and similar employment effects to the preferred estimates. Columns 3 and 4 use instruments based on travel times along a minimum spanning tree (MST) network connecting all major hubs to upgraded highways with the smallest possible mileage as described in appendix A.1. MST instruments yield larger employment elasticities than preferred estimates but the relatively small wage effects remain.²⁴ Columns 5 and 6 return to using planned travel time declines and explicitly control for major hubs' planned access to each-other. Surprisingly, I estimate negative coefficients on major counties' planned access to major markets and this additional control has does not significantly affect market access elasticities.

Appendix table A.5 shows that varying market access' decay parameter preserves my finding of large long-run employment elasticities relative to wage elasticities. However, elasticity estimates decrease and market access' variance increases in the decay parameter. These patterns occur because travel times' effect on market access increases in the decay parameter.²⁵ Quantitatively, increasing the decay parameter from 1.5 to 3 inflates market access' standard deviation 2.4 fold and reduces long-run employment and wage elasticities to 0.24 and 0.04 respectively. Combined, this fast decay implies that a standard deviation increase in market access increases employment by 16 percent (compared to the preferred estimate of 24 percent) and increases wages by 2.7 percent (compared to 3.9 percent).

6 Model calibration and counterfactuals

This section interprets and extends reduced form results using the structural model. First, I estimate structural parameters that rationalize market access elasticities and assess local externalities' role in long-run outcomes. Second, I calibrate the model and simulate the IHS's effect on America's employment distribution. Third, I build on the reduced form finding that unplanned highways went

²⁴The minimum spanning tree estimates use Kruskal's algorithm to minimize total highway mileage that connects all major hubs to the network as in Faber (2014). Appendix A.1 discusses this approach and its implications in detail.

²⁵Ignoring year subscripts, the marginal effect of a given bilateral travel time on market access can summarised as $\frac{dM_{A_i}}{d \ln time_{ij}} = -\tilde{\theta} w_j time_{ij}^{-\tilde{\theta}} < 0$. So the decay parameter's effect on travel time based market access variation is $\frac{dM_{A_i}}{d\tilde{\theta} d \ln time_{ij}} = -(1 + \tilde{\theta} \ln time_{ij}) w_j time_{ij}^{-\tilde{\theta}} < 0$.

to negatively selected places by comparing the utility of the complete IHS to a smaller system that exactly follows the 1947 plan.

6.1 Identifying model parameters

Reduced form results are consistent with market access improving shipping opportunities initially and causing additional gains as agglomeration forces strengthen over time. I quantitatively assess this claim by mapping market access elasticities onto structural parameters in two steps. The first step estimates the trade elasticity and an initial housing supply elasticity given a conventional agglomeration elasticity and short-run market access elasticities of employment and wages. The second step takes this trade elasticity and estimates new agglomeration and housing supply elasticities that rationalize market access' long run effects.

6.1.1 Trade and the short run

I estimate the trade elasticity (θ) using the market access and local road elasticities of employment and wages until 1980 presented in panel A of table 7. Throughout, I assume housing is 25 percent of spending and labour and land shares in production are 0.65 and 0.15. I estimate the model for a range of initial agglomeration elasticities taking a baseline value of 0.05 from relevant empirical estimates (Combes and Gobillon, 2015).

Combining the baseline agglomeration elasticity with short-run wage and employment elasticities and re-arranging equation (11) delivers an estimate of the trade elasticity (θ). Then, combining the trade elasticity with equation (12) delivers estimates of the inverse housing supply elasticity (η) and local roads' marginal utility (δ), which is near zero due to local roads' null effects on outcomes until 1980.²⁶ Intuitively, this procedure uses the firm's problem to estimate the trade elasticity and then uses the household's problem to identify congestion effects. Finally, wage and employment responses to local road mileage separate congestion between housing costs and traffic.

²⁶Combining labour supply and demand give solutions for reduced form wage and employment responses to local roads, which must satisfy $\delta_R^L = \varepsilon^{LD} \delta_R^w$ and $\delta_R^w = -\frac{\delta}{1-(1-\mu)\eta} + \frac{\delta+(1-\mu)\eta}{1-(1-\mu)\eta} \delta_R^L$. Re-arranging the second equation yields $\delta = \frac{(1-\mu)\eta \delta_R^L - (1-(1-\mu)\eta) \delta_R^w}{\delta_R^L - 1}$, which I solve jointly with equation (12) to isolate δ and η as functions of housing's expenditure share, the trade elasticity, and the reduced form elasticities β^w , β^L , δ_R^L , and δ_R^w .

Table 9 presents structural parameter estimates for a range of initial agglomeration elasticities. A baseline agglomeration elasticity of 0.05 suggests the trade elasticity is approximately 8.1, in line with conventional estimates (Eaton and Kortum, 2002; Donaldson and Hornbeck, 2016). Trade elasticity estimates fall alongside the starting agglomeration elasticity because increases in hiring reflect a combination of gains from trade and agglomeration. Strong agglomeration forces imply that small gains from trade can rationalize large increases in hiring at given wages. Given the trade elasticity, I estimate a short run inverse housing supply elasticity between 0.24 and 0.68. Inverse housing supply elasticities grow as the trade elasticity falls because housing costs are a compensating differential for improved access to traded goods. A small trade elasticity implies that market access brings large consumption gains that require large offsetting increases in housing costs to rationalize observed wage and employment responses.

6.1.2 Agglomeration and the long run

To explain wage and employment gains Interstates caused after 1980, I take the initial trade elasticity as given and estimate long run agglomeration and housing supply elasticities based on long run market access elasticities defined as sum of elasticities in panels A and B of table 7.

This step maintains the intuition of sequentially estimating production parameters from the firm’s problem and congestion parameters from the household’s problem. Specifically, I re-arrange equation (11) to compute the long run agglomeration elasticity as a function of the trade elasticity and long run market access elasticities. I then use long run elasticities and equation (12) to calculate a new housing supply elasticity.

The results, presented in the final two rows of table 9, suggest that agglomeration and congestion forces both strengthened over time. Specifically, I find that an agglomeration elasticity of about 0.29 rationalizes market access’ long run effects on wages and employment. This is large relative to empirical estimates (Combes and Gobillon, 2015) but the model requires strong agglomeration forces to rationalize long run market access elasticities. Taking a long run agglomeration elasticity of 0.10, on the high end of empirical estimates, is consistent with a negative trade elasticity, equivalent

to rejecting the model’s production function.²⁷

The model also suggests that the long-run inverse housing supply elasticity increased to somewhere between 0.54 and 0.77. As in the first step, variation across estimates comes from baseline agglomeration’s effect on trade elasticity estimates. This tightening housing supply represents substantial growth in the elasticity of housing costs with respect to local population.

Before continuing, it is important to note that this static agglomeration force is only one possible explanation for the long run patterns I observe. Instead of a changing static elasticity, these patterns could reflect an unchanging dynamic agglomeration elasticity as in Kline and Moretti (2013). While this view changes conclusions about production structure, it remains consistent with the hypothesis that wage dynamics reflect strengthening congestion forces. Alternatively, a dynamic model could rationalize reduced form results with endogenous complementary investments made by firms in places with improved market access. Such an analysis could shed light on the micro-foundations of dynamic agglomeration and path dependency and is an interesting avenue for future work.

6.2 Calibrating local fundamentals

Counterfactual simulations require estimates of each county’s composite productivity and amenity fundamentals. I identify these fundamentals with a two-step procedure that rationalizes 2010 wages and employment given long run market access elasticities identified in section 5.2.

I first iteratively solve equation (3) for 2,978 structural market access terms that summarise 2010’s actual inter-city roads and payrolls.²⁸ I then identify scaled fundamentals by combining equilibrium conditions (7) and (8) with 2010 wages, employment, and market access to yield

$$\chi_i^L R_i^{\delta_L} = \frac{L_i/L_0}{(MA_i/MA_0)^{\beta_1^L}} \text{ and } \chi_i^w R_i^{\delta_w} = \frac{w_i/w_0}{(MA_i/MA_0)^{\beta_1^w}}$$

where county 0 is an arbitrary reference county with normalized fundamentals $\chi_0^L R_0^{\delta_L} = \chi_0^w R_0^{\delta_w} = 1$ and market access elasticities β_1^L and β_1^w come from column 5 of table 5.²⁹ I then normalize 2010

²⁷In gravity trade models, a negative trade elasticity generally implies that bilateral trade costs increase trade between counties. My Ricardian trade model requires $\theta > 1$ to guarantee that productivity shocks have a positive expected value.

²⁸All counterfactuals are limited to counties with no missing CBP data.

²⁹Composite fundamentals χ_i^L and χ_i^w are functions of amenities and productivities satisfying $\chi_i^L = \chi_i^w = 1 \iff$

utility to one and set exogenous scale parameters κ_L and κ_w to match 2010 average wages and total employment. This procedure expresses fundamentals relative to pre-IHS levels and maintains the orthogonality conditions $E[\chi_i^y \Delta \ln \widetilde{MA}_i^{inc} | X_i] = 0$, $E[\chi_i^y \Delta \ln \widetilde{MA}_i^{hub} | X_i, D_i^{inc} = 1] = 0$, and $E[\chi_i^y \Delta \ln \widetilde{R}_i | X_i] = 0$ for $y \in \{w, L\}$ as in section 4.3. I also combine county amenities with commuter roads which remain when I change inter-county travel times in counterfactual simulations.

6.3 Counterfactual procedure

Counterfactual simulations change inter-county travel times and jointly solve equilibrium conditions (3), (7), and (8) for new market access terms. I hold total national employment at its 2010 level so that household utility adjusts to satisfy the equilibrium migration condition. This step delivers counties' equilibrium employment shares with counterfactual highway networks.

Welfare estimates normalize 2010 utility to one, change inter-county travel times, and solve for counterfactual utility consistent with labour market clearing $\bar{u}_c = \left(\frac{\bar{L}_{2010}}{\sum_i \kappa_L MA_{i,counter}^{\beta_L} \chi_i^L} \right)^{\frac{1}{\delta_u}}$. Critically, the model's structure implies that $\delta_u^L = \frac{\varepsilon^{LD}}{1 - \eta(1 - \mu) - \varepsilon^{LD}[(1 - \mu)\eta + \delta]}$, where the labour demand elasticity $\varepsilon^{LD} = -\frac{\theta(\alpha + \gamma) + 1}{1 + \theta(\gamma - \zeta)}$ captures transportation's effect on production.

Welfare estimates exclude land rents and should be interpreted as direct gains to workers. However, the model's structure implies that aggregate land rents are proportional to labour income and total output.³⁰ I refrain from quantifying land rents because the model's congestion force can isomorphically represent other fixed factors, urban externalities, and idiosyncratic location preferences (Allen and Arkolakis, 2014).

6.4 Economic geography

Figure 5 plots percent change in counties' employment shares from removing the IHS in 2010. Darker colours indicate larger employment losses, lighter colours indicate employment gains relative to 2010,³¹ and white shaded counties are excluded from the sample due to data limitations.

$A_i = T_i = 1$.

³⁰Households' preferences and land market structure implies that $(1 - \mu) \sum_i w_i L_i$ is spent on housing, a fixed share of which is paid to land, and firms' technology implies commercial land rents equal $\frac{\alpha}{n} \sum_i w_i L_i$.

³¹The distinction between gains and below average losses depends on my assumption of exogenous equilibrium aggregate employment.

Variation in market access makes highways' effects differ dramatically across counties—employment losses' interquartile range is 16 percent of 2010's median employment share. Losses are heaviest in northern and central parts of the country and near major highways. Many counties in southern California fare particularly well without Interstate Highways, perhaps reflecting attractive amenities.

6.5 Valuing additions to initial plans

I now ask whether additions to the 1947 highway plan benefited households as much as the Interstate Highway System's key routes. Figure 1 shows that nearly every route in the initial plan was eventually built and additions sometimes cross sparsely populated areas, abruptly become slower secondary highways, or cross regions that were well served by initial plans. Further, section 5.2 presents evidence that additions to the 1947 plan increased market access in places that would otherwise grow less than randomly selected counties. Estimating the incremental value of these unplanned highways is informative about the political process that built them and the potential trade-offs associated with prioritizing inter-city roads that target lagging region's market access rather than national commerce.

To estimate unplanned highways' value, I calibrate the model to 2010 fundamentals and run two counterfactual simulations. First I estimate the utility loss from removing the entire IHS and reverting to 1956 travel times. This step delivers an estimate of the entire IHS's value $u_{ihs} = 1 - u_{56}$. Next, I return to 2010 and simulate moving to planned inter-city travel times to estimate additional highways' value $u_{unpl} = 1 - u_{plan}$. Then, unplanned highways' relative value is the benefit ratio $\frac{u_{unpl}}{u_{ihs}}$.³² Since the 1947 plan contains approximately three quarters of current IHS mileage, I focus on unplanned highways' relative value per kilometre $\frac{u_{unpl}/km_{unpl}}{u_{ihs}/km_{ihs}}$.

Table 10 presents estimates of unplanned highways' relative value. Each row assumes a different combination of long run trade and agglomeration elasticities, including my estimates of 8.11 and 0.29, and maintains the same fundamentals and counterfactual employment allocations. Results show that the utility loss associated with removing either system depends on model parameters,

³²Since the model features homothetic preferences, the benefit ratio directly maps into a monetary value.

but the distance adjusted benefit ratio remains between 0.175 and 0.195. Even after adjusting for mileage, planned highways were substantially more valuable than ensuing additions.

It is important to note two caveats to this measure of the relative values of planned and unplanned highways. First, these calculations cannot distinguish diminishing returns to new highway construction from negative selection. On the other hand, they implicitly account for complementary road investments and attribute complementarities between the planned and unplanned highways to unplanned highways.

To ascertain whether unplanned highways benefited the states that built them, I consider the distribution of employment losses associated with their removal. Figure 6 plots percent change in states' employment shares from removing unplanned highways against log unplanned highway density. The plot omits Nebraska, which lacks unplanned highways, and Georgia, a high outlier which contains several IHS hubs, including Atlanta and Savannah, and has neighbours that built a number of unplanned highways. Losses are slightly worse in states with more unplanned roads, but the relationship is far from perfect.³³

States that built unplanned highways also appear to have shifted employment away from their neighbours. Regressing standardised percent employment changes from removing unplanned highways on standardized logarithms of own and mean of neighbours' unplanned highway density yields $\frac{\% \Delta L_i}{SD(\% \Delta L_i)} = -0.53 \frac{\ln \text{unplanned density}_i}{SD(\ln \text{unplanned density}_i)} + 0.35 \frac{\ln \text{unplanned density}_{n(i)}}{SD(\ln \text{unplanned density}_{n(i)})}$ where $n(i)$ are state i 's adjacent states.³⁴ Removing all unplanned highways might decrease national employment, but the model suggests that employment losses would be smallest in states whose neighbours built the most unplanned highways.³⁵

7 Conclusion

This paper presents new estimates of national transportation's effects on regional economic activity. To produce these estimates, I develop a broadly adaptable identification strategy: isolating market

³³The correlation coefficient associated with figure 6 is -0.32.

³⁴This regression uses the same sub-sample of states shown in figure 6 and subtracts the mean of each variable so that the constant is mechanically equal to zero.

³⁵The market clearing assumption implies does not imply competition among immediate neighbours, this is a feature of the data. Market clearing only imposes that employment changes are zero sum nationally.

access growth driven by incidental connections to rural counties. I then calibrate a general equilibrium trade model to assess mechanisms underlying empirical results, simulate aggregate effects, and discuss policy implications.

Interstate highways caused differences in market access that led to substantial variation in counties' employment and had small effects on relative wages. These effects compounded over time and market access only began increasing wages years after the Interstate's construction, when commuter highway availability also began determining employment. This evolution is consistent with local agglomeration and housing costs becoming stronger forces shaping America's economic geography over time.

I study highways that were omitted from early federal plans to evaluate the costs and benefits of using Interstate expansion to support lagging regions. I find that market access caused by unplanned highways is correlated with adverse economic conditions, provides limited national value, and drew economic activity away from other places. This suggests an important trade-off policy makers face when designing national transportation networks; improving lagging regions' market access can benefit them at the national cost of allocating infrastructure away from centres of trade and production.

These results are useful for understanding national transportation networks' current and historical role in determining regional incomes. In particular, it seems that estimates of infrastructure's value could benefit from closely studying the political economy at play. Additional research could also shed light on the normative and positive implications of transportation systems aiming to balance support for lagging regions against national efficiency of commerce and trade. Finally, future work could bridge the gap between the market access approach taken here and the model based approaches of Fajgelbaum and Schaal (2017) and Allen and Arkolakis (2019) to learn more about the implications of increasing traffic congestion.

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8 Tables

Table 1: Summary of the roads data by county

| | Travel time (hours) | | Change in log |
|-----------|---------------------|------------|---------------|
| | Pre | Post | highway |
| | interstate | interstate | equivalent km |
| Mean | 32.1 | 19.8 | 0.43 |
| Std. Dev. | 17.3 | 9.9 | 0.62 |

Table 2: Cross-county economic growth

| Log change in | Payroll per Employee | Employment | Population |
|--------------------------|-------------------------|------------|------------|
| Panel A: 1950/53 to 1980 | | | |
| Mean | 0.320 | 0.617 | 0.213 |
| Std. Dev. | 0.208 | 0.755 | 0.437 |
| Panel B: 1980 to 2010 | | | |
| Mean | 0.040 | 0.349 | 0.174 |
| Std. Dev. | 0.203 | 0.464 | 0.351 |
| Panel C: 1950/53 to 2010 | | | |
| Mean | 0.359 | 0.965 | 0.386 |
| Std. Dev. | 0.259 | 0.979 | 0.722 |

Employment and payrolls come from county business patterns databases in 1953, 1980, and 2010. County populations come from 1950, 1980, and 2010 decennial censuses.

Table 3: Summary of market access measures

| | $\Delta \ln(MA)$ | $\ln(MA, 1953 \text{ payrolls})$ |
|-----------|------------------|----------------------------------|
| Mean | 1.87 | 0.721 |
| Std. Dev. | 0.284 | 0.139 |

Market access growth from 1953 to 2010 is weighted by each year's payrolls (from County Business Patterns) in column 1 and only 1953 payrolls in column 2.

Table 4: First stage results

| | Std.Dev. | $\Delta \ln MA$ | | | | $\Delta \ln Roads$ |
|---|----------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|--------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| $\Delta \ln MA$ (fixed income) | 0.14 | 1.090 (0.027) | | | | |
| $\Delta \ln \widetilde{MA}^{inc}$ | 0.13 | | 0.358 (0.076) | 0.848 (0.039) | 0.750 (0.066) | -0.286 (0.110) |
| $\Delta \ln \widetilde{MA}^{hub}$ | 0.14 | | 0.500 (0.076) | | | |
| $D^{inc} \Delta \ln \widetilde{MA}^{hub}$ | 0.36 | | | | 0.142 (0.073) | 0.174 (0.111) |
| $\Delta \ln Roads$ | 0.62 | 0.012 (0.005) | | | | |
| $\Delta \ln \widetilde{Roads}$ | 0.52 | | 0.013 (0.007) | 0.018 (0.008) | 0.018 (0.008) | 0.877 (0.023) |
| Observations | 2,978 | 2,978 | 2,978 | 2,978 | 2,978 | 2,978 |
| Dep.Var. St.Dev. | — | 0.28 | 0.28 | 0.28 | 0.28 | 0.62 |
| R ² | — | 0.898 | 0.773 | 0.764 | 0.765 | 0.650 |
| A-P F-Stat | — | 1156.27 | 351.92 | 399.91 | 308.37 | 325.59 |

Commute zone clustered standard errors in parenthesis, A-P F-statistics are partial first stage F-statistics for market access computed following Angrist and Pischke (2008) using clustered variance matrices, and all regressions include a full set of controls. Column 1 presents each instrument's standard deviation and the remaining columns present OLS regressions of infrastructure measures on instruments and controls.

Table 5: Long run effects on county outcomes

| | OLS (1) | Fixed income (2) | Plan (3) | Inc. Connect (4) | Inc. Connect (5) |
|-------------------------------|------------------|---------------------|--|---|--|
| Panel A: Employment | | | | | |
| $\Delta \ln MA$ | 0.737 (0.136) | 0.413 (0.140) | 0.695 (0.197) | 0.849 (0.218) | 0.843 (0.213) |
| $\Delta \ln Roads$ | 0.073 (0.030) | 0.116 (0.032) | 0.035 (0.043) | 0.014 (0.043) | 0.015 (0.043) |
| Panel B: Payroll per employee | | | | | |
| $\Delta \ln MA$ | 0.104 (0.031) | 0.086 (0.034) | 0.135 (0.048) | 0.138 (0.054) | 0.137 (0.053) |
| $\Delta \ln Roads$ | 0.010 (0.008) | 0.013 (0.008) | 0.011 (0.011) | 0.011 (0.012) | 0.011 (0.012) |
| Observations | 2,978 | 2,978 | 2,978 | 2,978 | 2,978 |
| Excluded instruments | None | $\Delta \ln MA_i$ | $\Delta \ln \widetilde{MA}_i^{inc}$ $\Delta \ln \widetilde{MA}_i^{hub}$ | $\Delta \ln \widetilde{MA}_i^{inc}$ $\Delta \ln \widetilde{R}_i$ | $\Delta \ln \widetilde{MA}_i^{inc}$ $D_i^{inc} \Delta \ln \widetilde{MA}_i^{hub}$ $\Delta \ln \widetilde{R}_i$ |
| Instrument payrolls | Changing | Fixed | Fixed | Fixed | Fixed |
| Instrument travel times | Actual | Actual | Plan | Plan | Plan |

Commute zone clustered standard errors in parenthesis. Each column corresponds to an OLS or TSLS regression of 1953 to 2010 log change employment and payroll per-employee growth on market access, local road density, and controls.

Table 6: Long run heterogeneous effects

| | 1950 interaction variable: | | | |
|-------------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | Priority city | Population density | High school share | Market access |
| Panel A: Employment | | | | |
| Above median | 0.577 (0.386) | 0.491 (0.21) | 0.86 (0.278) | 0.79 (0.225) |
| Below median | 0.844 (0.224) | 1.31 (0.349) | 0.813 (0.288) | 1.037 (0.315) |
| Difference | -0.287 (0.416) | -0.819 (0.369) | 0.047 (0.373) | -0.247 (0.338) |
| Panel B: Payroll per employee | | | | |
| Above median | 0.166 (0.084) | 0.091 (0.057) | 0.198 (0.068) | 0.141 (0.061) |
| Below median | 0.132 (0.057) | 0.194 (0.083) | 0.074 (0.072) | 0.123 (0.073) |
| Difference | 0.034 (0.095) | -0.103 (0.09) | 0.125 (0.09) | 0.018 (0.077) |
| Observations | 2,978 | 2,978 | 2,978 | 2,978 |

Commute zone clustered standard errors in parenthesis. Each column corresponds to an interacted TSLS regression using full set of controls plus the interaction variable of interest, over-identifying incidental connections instruments for market access, and the 1947 plan local road instruments. All regressions include interactions with the baseline variable of interest and incidental connections instruments to the first stage. The dependent variable is change in log employment in panel A and change in log payroll per-employee in panel B.

Table 7: Short run and continued effects

| | Payroll per Employee (1) | Employment (2) | Population (3) |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Panel A: 1950/53 to 1980 | | | |
| $\Delta \ln MA$ | 0.001 (0.046) | 0.548 (0.180) | 0.274 (0.084) |
| $\Delta \ln Roads$ | 0.0003 (0.009) | -0.036 (0.034) | 0.001 (0.015) |
| Panel B: 1980 to 2010 | | | |
| $\Delta \ln MA$ | 0.145 (0.047) | 0.346 (0.107) | 0.237 (0.074) |
| $\Delta \ln Roads$ | 0.010 (0.010) | 0.050 (0.026) | 0.015 (0.016) |
| Observations | 2,978 | 2,978 | 2,978 |

Commute zone clustered standard errors in parenthesis. Each column corresponds to an TSLS regression using full set of controls, incidental connections instruments for market access, and the 1947 plan local road instruments. Panel A differences in log outcomes from 1950 (or 1953 for employment and payrolls) to 1980, and panel B differences them from 1980 to 2010.

Table 8: Long run effects on county outcomes with alternate instruments

| | Observed times Just-identified (1) | Observed times Over-identified (2) | MST Just-identified (3) | MST Over-identified (4) | Inc. Connect Just-identified (5) | Inc. Connect Over-identified (6) |
|---|--|--|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|--|--|
| Panel A: Employment | | | | | | |
| $\Delta \ln MA$ | 0.915*** (0.176) | 0.883*** (0.173) | 1.965*** (0.450) | 2.048*** (0.421) | 1.016*** (0.245) | 0.862*** (0.223) |
| $\Delta \ln Roads$ | 0.005 (0.047) | 0.011 (0.047) | -0.271** (0.108) | -0.262** (0.109) | 0.016 (0.043) | 0.030 (0.043) |
| $D_i^{hub} \Delta \ln \widetilde{MA}_i^{hub}$ | | | | | -0.483* (0.265) | -0.384 (0.263) |
| Panel B: Payroll per employee | | | | | | |
| $\Delta \ln MA$ | 0.078* (0.043) | 0.079* (0.043) | 0.099 (0.099) | 0.123 (0.097) | 0.139** (0.064) | 0.135** (0.057) |
| $\Delta \ln Roads$ | 0.019 (0.013) | 0.019 (0.013) | 0.009 (0.027) | 0.012 (0.027) | 0.011 (0.012) | 0.011 (0.012) |
| $D_i^{hub} \Delta \ln \widetilde{MA}_i^{hub}$ | | | | | -0.004 (0.070) | -0.001 (0.068) |
| Observations | 2,978 | 2,978 | 2,978 | 2,978 | 2,978 | 2,978 |
| Instrument travel times | Actual | Actual | Min. Span Tree | Min. Span Tree | Plan | Plan |

Commute zone clustered standard errors in parenthesis. Each column corresponds to a TSLS regression of 1953 to 2010 log change employment and payroll per-employee growth on market access, local road density, and controls. All instruments follow the incidental connections approach and fix payrolls at 1953 levels for weights.

Table 9: Structural parameter estimates

| ζ_{SR} | 0.10 | 0.05 | 0 |
|--------------------|-------|------|------|
| $\hat{\theta}$ | 15.99 | 8.11 | 5.43 |
| $\hat{\eta}_{SR}$ | 0.24 | 0.46 | 0.68 |
| $\hat{\eta}_{LR}$ | 0.54 | 0.66 | 0.77 |
| $\hat{\zeta}_{LR}$ | 0.28 | 0.29 | 0.29 |

Table 10: Welfare effects of removing unplanned highways

| θ | ζ | u_{ihs} | u_{unpl} | $\frac{u_{unpl}}{u_{ihs}}$ | $\frac{u_{unpl}/km_{unpl}}{u_{ihs}/km_{ihs}}$ |
|----------|---------|-----------|------------|----------------------------|---|
| 10 | 0.29 | 0.132 | 0.017 | 0.129 | 0.176 |
| 10 | 0.1 | 0.232 | 0.031 | 0.136 | 0.186 |
| 10 | 0.05 | 0.257 | 0.035 | 0.137 | 0.188 |
| 10 | 0 | 0.281 | 0.039 | 0.139 | 0.191 |
| 8.11 | 0.29 | 0.145 | 0.019 | 0.130 | 0.177 |
| 8.11 | 0.1 | 0.241 | 0.033 | 0.136 | 0.187 |
| 8.11 | 0.05 | 0.265 | 0.037 | 0.138 | 0.189 |
| 8.11 | 0 | 0.289 | 0.040 | 0.140 | 0.192 |
| 6 | 0.29 | 0.168 | 0.022 | 0.131 | 0.179 |
| 6 | 0.1 | 0.258 | 0.035 | 0.138 | 0.188 |
| 6 | 0.05 | 0.280 | 0.039 | 0.139 | 0.191 |
| 6 | 0 | 0.302 | 0.043 | 0.141 | 0.193 |
| 4 | 0.29 | 0.206 | 0.028 | 0.134 | 0.183 |
| 4 | 0.1 | 0.285 | 0.040 | 0.140 | 0.191 |
| 4 | 0.05 | 0.305 | 0.043 | 0.141 | 0.193 |
| 4 | 0 | 0.324 | 0.046 | 0.143 | 0.196 |

9 Figures





Figure 1: The 1947 Interstate plan (dark lines) and modern Interstate Highways (light lines)

Figure 3: A stylized example of the priority hierarchy






Figure 2: Change in log market access for U.S. counties




Figure 4: Market access, incidental connections, and population growth from 1880 (error bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals based on commute zone-clustered standard errors)




Figure 5: Lost employment from removing the IHS




Figure 6: State employment change from removing unplanned highways

A Appendices

A.1 Minimum spanning tree instrument

This appendix constructs a minimum spanning tree (MST) highway network to assess the main text’s robustness to alternative identifying assumptions. This approach follows Faber (2014) who assumes that construction costs are unrelated to factors guiding local growth. This is in contrast to preferred estimates that identify market access elasticities assuming baseline observables capture non-random factors guiding planned connections between major hubs and incidentally connected counties. I compare these assumptions by building instruments based on a highway network that connects all major hubs with the smallest possible national highway system.

I build a Euclidean MST network using Kruskal’s algorithm to minimize total highway mileage subject to the constraint that all major hubs are connected to the network. As in Faber (2014), I create this network in two steps. The first step uses Haversine’s formula to calculate the mileage of every pairwise straight-line connection between major hubs on the 1947 plan and the second step uses Kruskal’s algorithm to select a subset connecting all major hubs at the minimum total mileage. I then add the MST to network to the baseline system of auto-routes to calculate county-to-county driving times and incidental connections instruments as in the main text. I prefer this approach to minimizing physical construction costs which can correlate with geographic features that can double as natural amenities or predict long-run growth through a combination of historical importance and path dependence (Bleakley and Lin, 2012). In practice, Faber (2014) finds that these approaches yield similar reduced form treatment effects of highways on rural Chinese prefectures.

Figure A.1 plots the Euclidean MST network against the 1947 plan. The MST network is smaller and includes fewer North-South routes in the Midwest and fewer routes traversing middle America. Notably, the MST network only includes one stretch of highway crossing the Great Plains and routes all coast-to-coast traffic through Lincoln, Nebraska.

Table A.6 presents the correlation coefficients between market access instruments computed using 1947 plan and MST based counterfactual highway networks. The correlation coefficient between predicted growth in access to incidentally connected markets is 0.55 while growth in access

to major hubs is highly correlated across networks. Building instruments based on the MST network and running the first stage regression presented in equation 15 of the main text shows that MST instruments are highly relevant, with Angrist and Pischke (2008) partial F-statistics of 77.97 and 31.67 for market access and local roads respectively.

Table A.7 presents short-run and continuing effects of market access estimated using MST-based instruments. Estimates add up to long-run patterns similar to the main text but with larger employment elasticities and different patterns over time. In particular, MST instruments attribute positive effects to payroll per employee to the early period.

Minimum spanning tree instruments are informative, but I prefer plan-based instruments for this analysis because of the clear institutional distinction between planned and unplanned highways. As discussed in the main text, deviations and additions to the 1947 plans appear to represent local place-based policy. Meanwhile, MST instruments can induce positive selection by improving market access most along the Great Lakes and coasts while removing roads in the South and the Great Plains.

A.2 Appendix tables

Table A.1: Structural parameters underlying reduced form elasticities

| | |
|----------------------|--|
| $\beta^w =$ | $\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon^{LD}\varepsilon^{LS}} \left[\frac{\varepsilon^{LS}}{1+\theta(\gamma-\zeta)} - \frac{\mu}{\theta} \frac{1}{1-\eta(1-\mu)} \right]$ |
| $\beta^L =$ | $\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon^{LD}\varepsilon^{LS}} \left[\frac{1}{1+\theta(\gamma-\zeta)} - \frac{\mu}{\theta} \frac{\varepsilon^{LD}}{1-\eta(1-\mu)} \right]$ |
| $\delta_u^L =$ | $\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon^{LD}\varepsilon^{LS}} \left[\frac{\varepsilon^{LD}}{1-\eta(1-\mu)} \right]$ |
| $\delta_u^w =$ | $\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon^{LD}\varepsilon^{LS}} \left[\frac{1}{1-\eta(1-\mu)} \right]$ |
| $\delta_R^L =$ | $-\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon^{LD}\varepsilon^{LS}} \left[\frac{\varepsilon^{LD}\delta}{1-\eta(1-\mu)} \right]$ |
| $\delta_R^w =$ | $-\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon^{LD}\varepsilon^{LS}} \left[\frac{\delta}{1-\eta(1-\mu)} \right]$ |
| $\varepsilon^{LD} =$ | $-\frac{\theta(\alpha+\gamma)+1}{1+\theta(\gamma-\zeta)}$ (labour demand elasticity) |
| $\varepsilon^{LS} =$ | $\frac{\eta(1-\mu)+\delta}{1-\eta(1-\mu)}$ (inverse labour supply elasticity) |

Table A.2: Additional outcomes

| 1950 to 2010 change in | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | |
|---------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------------------|
| | Log median dwelling value | Detached homes' share | Log establishment count | Log employees per establishment |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| $\Delta \ln(MA)$ | 0.147 (0.100) | -5.701 (2.002) | 0.702 (0.186) | 0.141 (0.081) |
| $\Delta \ln(Roads)$ | 0.001 (0.018) | 0.227 (0.451) | -0.007 (0.036) | 0.022 (0.020) |
| Observations | 2,963 | 2,978 | 2,978 | 2,978 |

All regressions include a full set of controls, are fit by TSLS using incidental connections instruments for market access and the 1947 plan for local roads, and commute-zone clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. Median dwelling values and detached home shares are as reported to 1950 and 1980 decennial censuses, establishment counts and employees per establishment come from the CBP.

Table A.3: Market access, incidental connections, and covariates

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | |
|------------------|----------------------------|--|---------------------------|-------------------|
| | $\Delta \ln(Roads)$ | 1950 manufacturing employment share | 1950 high school share | $\ln(pop_{1940})$ |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| $\Delta \ln(MA)$ | 2.325 (0.236) | 0.101 (0.045) | 0.117 (0.344) | 0.864 (0.311) |
| Observations | 2,978 | 2,978 | 2,978 | 2,978 |

Commute zone clustered standard errors in parenthesis. Each column is a TSLS regression of a covariate on market access growth and a constant using the incidental connections instruments. $\Delta \ln(Roads)$ is change in efficiency road km within each county. Manufacturing employment share, high school graduate share, and population come from the decennial census.

Table A.4: Market access elasticities from 1950 to 2010 with alternative controls

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|----------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Employment | 0.843 (0.213) | 0.759 (0.337) | 0.654 (0.247) | 1.055 (0.234) | 1.412 (0.292) | 0.745 (0.212) | 1.019 (0.185) | 0.874 (0.177) |
| Payroll per employee | 0.137 (0.053) | 0.106 (0.084) | 0.103 (0.054) | 0.157 (0.056) | 0.152 (0.063) | 0.142 (0.045) | 0.158 (0.044) | 0.16 (0.044) |
| $\Delta \ln(Roads)$ | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | N | N | N |
| Geog. ctrls. | Y | N | N | Y | N | N | Y | Y |
| Demog. ctrls. | Y | N | Y | N | N | Y | N | Y |

Commute zone clustered standard errors are in parenthesis and each cell presents a coefficient on market access from a different TSLS regression using incidental connections instruments and including local roads instruments in columns 1 through 4. Remaining columns omit local roads and their instruments. Rows denote outcome variables and columns denote combinations of control variables. Geographic controls are longitude, latitude, log land area, coastal, and census division all interacted with a major city dummy.

Demographic controls are county manufacturing and agriculture shares in 1950, population controls, military facilities, log sales per farm, and interactions with major city.

Table A.5: Market access elasticities from 1950 to 2010 with alternative decay parameters

| Decay: | 0.5 | 1 | 1.5 | 2 | 2.5 | 3 |
|----------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Employment | 3.292 (0.946) | 1.450 (0.389) | 0.843 (0.213) | 0.534 (0.133) | 0.350 (0.090) | 0.239 (0.066) |
| Payroll per employee | 0.617 (0.240) | 0.255 (0.098) | 0.137 (0.053) | 0.083 (0.033) | 0.055 (0.023) | 0.040 (0.017) |
| $SD(\Delta \ln MA)$ | 0.095 | 0.189 | 0.284 | 0.393 | 0.525 | 0.679 |

Commute zone clustered standard errors are in parenthesis and each cell presents a coefficient on market access from a different TSLS regression using incidental connections instruments and full set of controls, including instrumented local roads.

Rows denote outcome variables and columns market access' decay parameter.

Table A.6: Correlations between spanning tree and plan instruments.

| | |
|---|------|
| $\Delta \ln \widetilde{MA}^{inc}$ | 0.55 |
| $D^{inc} \Delta \ln \widetilde{MA}^{hub}$ | 0.95 |

Table A.7: Short run and continued effects with MST instruments

| | Payroll per Employee (1) | Employment (2) |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------|
| Panel A: 1950/53 to 1980 | | |
| $\Delta \ln MA$ | 0.148 (0.104) | 1.453 (0.434) |
| $\Delta \ln Roads$ | -0.043 (0.025) | -0.238 (0.091) |
| Panel B: 1980 to 2010 | | |
| $\Delta \ln MA$ | -0.023 (0.100) | 0.555 (0.257) |
| $\Delta \ln Roads$ | 0.057 (0.027) | -0.039 (0.069) |
| Observations | 2,978 | 2,978 |

Commute zone clustered standard errors in parenthesis. Each column corresponds to an TSLS regression using full set of controls, MST incidental connections instruments for market access, and the MST local road instruments. Panel A differences in log outcomes from 1950 (or 1953 for employment and payrolls) to 1980, and panel B differences them from 1980 to 2010.

A.3 Appendix figures




Figure A.1: The minimum spanning tree (dark lines) and 1947 Interstate plan (light lines)