

The Untenability of the Euclidean Brain

Fantastic Four

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Team Information

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Note to the Reader

The code that generated these results can be found at [this github repository](#). The data is available upon request to the corresponding author at mkfinne2@illinois.edu

Abstract

Mind wandering (a type of task unconstrained thought) is an important phenomenon that is presumed to occur during resting state imaging paradigms. Little is known about the temporal dynamics of these thoughts during the resting state, however the dynamics of brain connectivity which presumably represent such thoughts are beginning to be explored with dynamic connectivity in fMRI. Current techniques for classifying similarities of brain connectivity in this approach have not been evaluated for the meaningfulness of their classifications. This proposed study uses inferred cognitive states as the “true classification” of

a given brain state allowing for testing of classification accuracy. Under the principled presumption that classification accuracy during task paradigms can provide an estimate of accuracy during rest paradigms we use two emotional processing tasks to evaluate these methods. Cognitive states are inferred by the stimuli being presented during two different block design tasks and metrics of psychopathology such as depression and anxiety. Modern clustering algorithms are tested as to whether they provide clusters that accurately overlap stimuli presentation during two block design tasks subject to potential covariance with measures of psychopathology symptoms.

Introduction

There is a wealth of evidence that when humans aren't engaged in any externally oriented task, they are consistently immersed in a phenomenon called mind-wandering (1,2,3,4,5). This is a type of unconstrained thought that may facilitate creativity and problem solving (6), but in more maladaptive forms, may be responsible for the recurrence and maintenance of both depressive and anxious disorders (7,8,9,10).

Dynamic connectivity is comparatively recent development in functional neuroimaging analysis that shows immense promise towards understanding the role of mind-wandering in health and disease (11). For the interested reader, please refer to the original study proposal for a more comprehensive overview of the concepts involved in dynamic connectivity. Briefly, by calculating brain connectivity (*a.k.a* correlations of hemodynamic fluctuations across brain regions) on short time windows (on the order of seconds to minutes) rather than across an entire scan (which is typically on the order of 10 to 20 minutes), we can capture the temporal fluctuations of brain activity across a scan (12). These fluctuations presumably reflect, in part, the fluctuations of the internal contents of thought.

A current common practice to label similar connectivity matrices produced by this approach is k-means clustering using either the L1 (Manhattan distance) or L2 (Euclidean distance) norms (12,13). Typically, the k-means derived clusters are assumed to represent either unitary cognitive states or transitions between two unitary states. The differences of members across cluster are then either qualitatively or quantitatively analyzed (such as noting the degree of connectivity between executive and emotional systems) to make inferences about the nature of thought across time. In fact, this approach has been used to argue that short term meditation training decreases the mind's propensity to wander (???) and that people who are more likely to be creative possess unique types mindwandering (???)

K-means clustering however, will always produce clusters regardless of how well those clusters represent the underlying distribution of the data. Under certain distributions, k-means clusters have little if any relation to the regularities inherent in the data. The algorithm underlying k-means seeks to minimize the within-cluster distance objective function. For the case of the commonly used Euclidean distance:

$$\sum_{i=0}^n \min_{\mu_j \in C} (\|x_i - \mu_j\|^2)$$

This makes the implicit assumption that the true clusters are both convex and isotropic (*i.e.* their boundaries can be defined by circles drawn around them). This means the k-means will not perform well when the data is non-convex, has anisotropic covariance, has spatially overlapping memberships, or contains outliers which artificially skew cluster means. There is no known evidence that that brain connectivity as represented in \mathbb{R}^n meets any of these assumptions.

The purpose of this study is to examine the suitability of k-means in real data. In order to test the accuracy of the clustering results, two task-based paradigms are used in which the "true" classification of a brain state is assumed to be the stimuli presented at that time. See Appendix A (material originally introduced in the project proposal but for convenience to the reader, included here) for a detailed exposition of the philosophical assumptions justifying this approach. This allows us to test the derived classification against the "true" labels. Two tasks within the same subject cohort are employed as a means to assess the robustness of k-means clustering across paradigms while controlling for subject demographics. Each task

was repeated across two scans within each subject (for a total of 4 scans per subject), which is leveraged to ensure algorithms are not fitting technological sources of variance such as magnetic gradient nonlinearities or subject head position induced distortions (14) which may vary across scans. As an extension of this work, alternate classification approaches are explored for potential improvements to current dynamic connectivity analysis practice.

Distribution of the raw data imaging data is restricted due to HIPPA considerations, thus is not included in this report however all derived data, including timecourses used to produce the correlation matrices can be found in the link to the team's Box account submitted with this report.

Detailed Description of Data Set

Participants

The results reported here are based on a subset of women from a larger study examining the role of stress physiology in mother-infant interactions. They were primarily recruited from community agencies serving low-income women in a mid-size city of the Pacific Northwest. Twenty-five mothers agreed to participate in additional neuroimaging. A demographic summary of this subset is included in Table *include table here*. Mothers were selected for inclusion if *list inclusion criteria* were excluded from the larger study if *list exclusion criteria*. Inclusion in the neuroimaging portion was based on *how was this subset selected*. The study was a longitudinal design with mothers scanned at their first assessment 3-months postnatal, but returning for follow up assessments at 6, 12, and 18-months postnatal. Of the 25 original mothers, *num* returned for the 6-month assessment, *num* at 12-months, and *num* at 18-months. This dataset is also described in *cite all other papers for Levin data* 15. Ethical approval for the study was obtained from *Oregon IRB* under approval number *num* and all participants gave written informed consent for themselves and their infants.

1. Describe the data set
2. Describe the preprocessing
3. Describe the connectivity matrix creation
4. Describe the analysis

Summary Statistics

TBD

Discussion?

Appendix A.

Philosophical Assumptions

It is imperative to establish the core philosophical understanding from which this data is being approached from. The core tenants to follow are neither radical nor unreasonable, but are too often left implicit in discussions of brain science. If however we accept these tenants to be true, then the analysis we present will follow quite naturally.

Assumption #1 – Brain states represent cognitive states

This is the idea that when we discuss a particular configuration of correlation among brain regions, it reflects a particular internal representation experienced by the individual. Although the correctness of this assumption may be challenged in some extreme cases (*e.g.* persistent vegetative states), this is the driving ontological stance of neuroscience for typically functioning human beings. If we did not believe the brain was representative of the mind, there would be little point to studying its function. This is not to say that all brain function maps well onto mind function and in fact there is evidence that much of it may be attributable to basal metabolic functions (16). Yet despite this significant confound, it is assumed that as long as a human is functioning in a state that we would reasonably believe they possess a mind, the network configuration of their brain represents some element of the brain-to-mind mapping.

Assumption #2 – Different brain states represent different cognitive states (and same represents same)

Again this is an assumption that cuts to the core of neuroscience but an essential one to articulate. It perhaps can best be summarized by the statement that if we observe “Brain Connectivity A” at time 1 then (according to Assumption 1) we can ascribe to it the “Mental Contents A”. If we then later observe “Brain Connectivity A” at time 2, then we can also ascribe “Mental Contents A” to the individual at this later time. The converse is also assumed true that if two brain states differ then so do their mental contents. This is not to say that there is absolutely no overlap in either brain states or cognitive states, but that if we can ascribe different mental states to individuals then we can naturally expect their brain connectivity to differ across these mental states. We cannot neglect some of the differences to be attributable to differences in the metabolic considerations mentioned above. But for the relatively homogenous environment of an fMRI scanner, this will be, rightly or wrongly, assumed negligible in comparison to cognition induced shifts.

Assumption #3 – Different environmental inputs induce different brain states

This is the idea that the brain must act adaptively to its environment such that if two environmental stimuli are sufficiently divergent on some salient property, then they will induce different configurations in the brain (and hence different mental contents by way of assumption 2). This assumption is left deliberately vague on what constitute different stimuli, but given the abundance of neuroimaging literature observing different activity patterns in brain states across different tasks, this is no stretch of the imagination.

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