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**Supplementary appendix to *The Social and Institutional Contexts Underlying Landlords' Eviction Practices***

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# Cross-sectional model of filing rates

## A. Descriptive statistics of rental properties

This section shows descriptive statistics for the property-years modeled in Table 2. Most properties contain three or fewer units, are many decades old, and have comparatively few filings. Although small owners own the majority of properties, medium and small owners control a substantial minority. These statistics are not weighted by number of units. Table A2 shows descriptive statistics weighted by rental units.

**Table A1: Descriptive statistics of rental properties**

| Variable | Mean | Standard Deviation | Minimum | Maximum |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Eviction variables | | | | |
| Filings | 0.04 | 0.4 | 0 | 80 |
| Filing rate (%) | 1.36 | 11.19 | 0 | 1000 |
| Executions | 0.02 | 0.18 | 0 | 28 |
| Execution rate (%) | 0.64 | 6.93 | 0 | 700 |
| Landlord scale | | | | |
| Small | 0.73 | 0.44 | 0 | 1 |
| Medium | 0.17 | 0.37 | 0 | 1 |
| Large | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0 | 1 |
| Landlord proximity to tenants | | | | |
| Co-resident | 0.28 | 0.45 | 0 | 1 |
| Lives outside Boston | 0.35 | 0.48 | 0 | 1 |
| Landlord organizational structure | | | | |
| Property manager | | | | |
| Company | 0.05 | 0.23 | 0 | 1 |
| LLC linked to person | 0.07 | 0.26 | 0 | 1 |
| Person | 0.87 | 0.34 | 0 | 1 |
| Other landlord characteristics | | | | |
| Imputed household income | 90123.9 | 21199.17 | 9750 | 250001 |
| Inherited property | 0.04 | 0.19 | 0 | 1 |
| Changes in ownership | | | | |
| Property sold last year | 0.06 | 0.24 | 0 | 1 |
| Property sold this year | 0.07 | 0.26 | 0 | 1 |
| Property type | | | | |
| Condominium | 0.40 | 0.49 | 0 | 1 |
| Single-family | 0.07 | 0.26 | 0 | 1 |
| Two-family | 0.25 | 0.43 | 0 | 1 |
| Three-family | 0.21 | 0.41 | 0 | 1 |
| 4-6 unit | 0.04 | 0.19 | 0 | 1 |
| 7-30 unit | 0.02 | 0.14 | 0 | 1 |
| 30+ unit | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0 | 1 |
| Land and building valuation | | | | |
| Land val per sf | 33.05 | 59.45 | 0 | 400 |
| Building val per sf | 229.96 | 244.16 | 0.01 | 1200 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Building val per unit | 281297.7 | 286589.1 | 30000 | 2000000 |
| Year built and remodeled | | | | |
| Year built | 1918.85 | 33.42 | 1700 | 2016 |
| Year remodeled | 2004.22 | 15.54 | 1828 | 2017 |
| Not remodeled | 0.49 | 0.5 | 0 | 1 |
| Other property characteristics | | | | |
| Place-based subsidy | 0.01 | 0.1 | 0 | 1 |
| Rental units | 2.04 | 5.53 | 1 | 437 |

**Table A2: Descriptive statistics of rental properties (weighted by unit)**

| Variable | Mean | Standard Deviation | Minimum | Maximum |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Eviction variables | | | | |
| Filings | 0.5 | 2.98 | 0 | 80 |
| Filing rate (%) | 2.07 | 10.37 | 0 | 1000 |
| Executions | 0.19 | 1.08 | 0 | 28 |
| Execution rate (%) | 0.9 | 6.15 | 0 | 700 |
| Landlord scale | | | | |
| Small | 0.48 | 0.5 | 0 | 1 |
| Medium | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0 | 1 |
| Large | 0.32 | 0.47 | 0 | 1 |
| Landlord proximity to tenants | | | | |
| Co-resident | 0.19 | 0.4 | 0 | 1 |
| Lives outside Boston | 0.37 | 0.48 | 0 | 1 |
| Landlord organizational structure | | | | |
| Property manager | | | | |
| Company | 0.16 | 0.37 | 0 | 1 |
| LLC linked to person | 0.14 | 0.34 | 0 | 1 |
| Person | 0.7 | 0.46 | 0 | 1 |
| Other landlord characteristics | | | | |
| Imputed household income | 90221.9 | 20978.21 | 9750 | 250001 |
| Inherited property | 0.03 | 0.18 | 0 | 1 |
| Changes in ownership | | | | |
| Property sold last year | 0.05 | 0.23 | 0 | 1 |
| Property sold this year | 0.06 | 0.24 | 0 | 1 |
| Property type | | | | |
| Condominium | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0 | 1 |
| Single-family | 0.04 | 0.19 | 0 | 1 |
| Two-family | 0.16 | 0.37 | 0 | 1 |
| Three-family | 0.25 | 0.44 | 0 | 1 |
| 4-6 unit | 0.09 | 0.29 | 0 | 1 |
| 7-30 unit | 0.14 | 0.35 | 0 | 1 |
| 30+ unit | 0.12 | 0.32 | 0 | 1 |
| Land and building valuation | | | | |
| Land val per sf | 63.74 | 91.09 | 0 | 400 |
| Building val per sf | 161.22 | 192.42 | 0.01 | 1200 |
| Building val per unit | 189302.5 | 226793.7 | 30000 | 2000000 |
| Year built and remodeled | | | | |
| Year built | 1919.64 | 30.96 | 1700 | 2016 |
| Year remodeled | 2001.86 | 16.45 | 1828 | 2017 |
| Not remodeled | 0.42 | 0.49 | 0 | 1 |
| Other property characteristics | | | | |
| Place-based subsidy | 0.09 | 0.28 | 0 | 1 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rental units | 16.99 | 49.26 | 1 | 437 |

## B. Changes in filing rates over time

The event history analysis presented in Figure 2 shows that large landlords file at dramatically higher rates in the years immediately after purchasing a property. This raises the question of whether transactions are responsible for large landlords' higher filing rates in general. Put another way, do large landlords file at higher rates than small owners even at properties that they have owned for many years? To analyze this question, Tables B1 and B2 re-estimate the negative binomial models from Table 2 estimating filing and execution rates, distinguishing between landlords who have owned their properties for different amounts of time.

In Table B1, I re-estimate the models from Table 2 with only property-years in which the landlord owned the property for at least five years. As in the full sample, medium and large-scale landlords file and evict at dramatically higher rates than small-scale owners. This suggests that differences in small and large landlords' eviction rates is not driven by behavior in the first five years of ownership.

**Table B1: Cross-sectional model with only 5-year owners**

| | All properties | | Small properties (< 7 units) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Filings | Evictions | Filings | Evictions |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Landlord scale (ref. small) | | | | |
| Medium | 0.528*** | 0.449*** | 0.437*** | 0.384*** |
| | (0.0573) | (0.0654) | (0.0497) | (0.0598) |
| Large | 1.151*** | 0.947*** | 1.105*** | 0.887*** |
| | (0.0798) | (0.0887) | (0.0678) | (0.0784) |
| Changes in ownership | | | | |
| Property sold this year | 0.0933 | 0.0924 | 0.819*** | 0.854*** |
| | (0.102) | (0.143) | (0.0530) | (0.0614) |
| Property type (Ref:3-family) | | | | |
| Condominium | -1.532*** | -1.179*** | -1.545*** | -1.379*** |
| | (0.300) | (0.333) | (0.289) | (0.341) |
| Single-family | -0.404*** | -0.134 | -0.496*** | -0.202 |
| | (0.0980) | (0.103) | (0.0986) | (0.104) |
| Two-family | 0.129* | 0.0906 | 0.0674 | 0.0294 |
| | (0.0650) | (0.0707) | (0.0539) | (0.0597) |
| 4-6 unit | -0.0816 | -0.141 | -0.316*** | -0.417*** |
| | (0.101) | (0.116) | (0.0846) | (0.0957) |
| 7-30 unit | -0.0690 | -0.0917 | | |
| | (0.131) | (0.147) | | |
| 30+ unit | -0.133 | -0.115 | | |
| | (0.154) | (0.172) | | |
| Land and building valuation | | | | |
| Land val per sf (log) | -0.161* | -0.115 | -0.0918 | -0.0960 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (0.0635) | (0.0736) | (0.0566) | (0.0680) |
| Building val per sf (log) | -0.00154 | 0.0227 | 0.220* | 0.271* |
| | (0.0528) | (0.0502) | (0.107) | (0.123) |
| Building val per unit (log) | -0.0141 | -0.102 | -0.292*** | -0.384*** |
| | (0.0951) | (0.0999) | (0.0789) | (0.0890) |
| Year built (ref. pre-1900) | | | | |
| 1900-1925 | 0.101 | -0.0555 | 0.0673 | 0.0965 |
| | (0.109) | (0.123) | (0.0576) | (0.0669) |
| 1925-1950 | 0.102 | -0.0709 | 0.0536 | 0.117 |
| | (0.157) | (0.166) | (0.0909) | (0.104) |
| 1950-1975 | -0.0293 | -0.240 | -0.0845 | -0.0766 |
| | (0.137) | (0.146) | (0.146) | (0.169) |
| 1975-2000 | -0.164 | -0.404 | 0.218 | 0.0839 |
| | (0.215) | (0.239) | (0.158) | (0.156) |
| 2000+ | -0.447 | -0.952*** | -0.0271 | -0.0920 |
| | (0.277) | (0.268) | (0.180) | (0.195) |
| Year remodeled (ref. not remodeled) | | | | |
| Pre-1975 | 0.142 | -0.0704 | 0.0935 | 0.165 |
| | (0.141) | (0.167) | (0.140) | (0.154) |
| 1975-2000 | 0.173 | 0.0736 | 0.147** | 0.144* |
| | (0.0924) | (0.107) | (0.0545) | (0.0614) |
| 2000+ | 0.130 | -0.0227 | 0.204** | 0.272*** |
| | (0.104) | (0.122) | (0.0659) | (0.0704) |
| Other property characteristics | | | | |
| Place-based subsidy | 0.315** | 0.0798 | 0.711*** | 0.408*** |
| | (0.121) | (0.116) | (0.0908) | (0.107) |
| N | 936472 | 936472 | 668602 | 668602 |
| Log likelihood | -399536.8 | -248367.6 | -83868.8 | -51285.3 |
| Chi-squared | 243651.2 | 627844.7 | 18670.2 | 167808.8 |

In Table B2, I re-estimate the models from Table 1, but with an interaction between landlord scale and years of ownership, I model this interaction with a categorical term for years of ownership (0-5 years, 5-10 years, 10+). The reference group is small landlords who have owned for at least 10 years, and they file and evict the least out of all of the groups. This analysis shows an increase in filing and eviction in the first years of ownership, followed by a decline. Nevertheless, in all time periods small owners evict less than medium owners, who evict less than large owners.

**Table B2: Owner type-years as owner interaction**

| | All properties | | Small properties (< 7 units) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Filings | Evictions | Filings | Evictions |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Landlord scale X years as owner (ref. small, 10+ yrs) | | | | |
| Small landlord (0-5 yrs) | 0.447*** | 0.356*** | 0.406*** | 0.344*** |
| | (0.0583) | (0.0735) | (0.0533) | (0.0622) |
| Small landlord (5-10 yrs) | 0.0572 | -0.0336 | 0.132** | 0.108 |
| | (0.0567) | (0.0902) | (0.0468) | (0.0569) |
| Medium landlord (0-5 yrs) | 0.762*** | 0.666*** | 0.632*** | 0.539*** |
| | (0.0819) | (0.0991) | (0.0705) | (0.0801) |
| Medium landlord (5-10 yrs) | 0.508*** | 0.371*** | 0.537*** | 0.426*** |
| | (0.0744) | (0.100) | (0.0628) | (0.0741) |
| Medium landlord (10+ yrs) | 0.531*** | 0.441*** | 0.433*** | 0.376*** |
| | (0.0724) | (0.0915) | (0.0588) | (0.0732) |
| Large landlord (0-5 yrs) | 1.293*** | 0.964*** | 1.227*** | 0.988*** |
| | (0.0825) | (0.126) | (0.0603) | (0.0718) |
| Large landlord (5-10 yrs) | 1.206*** | 0.997*** | 1.255*** | 1.004*** |
| | (0.0760) | (0.0946) | (0.0688) | (0.0835) |
| Large landlord (10+ yrs) | 1.063*** | 0.843*** | 1.015*** | 0.786*** |
| | (0.0910) | (0.105) | (0.0726) | (0.0896) |
| Changes in ownership | | | | |
| Property sold this year | 0.138 | 0.158 | 0.607*** | 0.630*** |
| | (0.0839) | (0.116) | (0.0410) | (0.0475) |
| Property type (Ref:3-family) | | | | |
| Condominium | -0.936*** | -0.590* | -0.754** | -0.650* |
| | (0.262) | (0.297) | (0.233) | (0.266) |
| Single-family | -0.350*** | -0.153 | -0.415*** | -0.194* |
| | (0.0825) | (0.0805) | (0.0805) | (0.0794) |
| Two-family | 0.119* | 0.0616 | 0.0728 | 0.0103 |
| | (0.0542) | (0.0587) | (0.0447) | (0.0493) |
| 4-6 unit | -0.00450 | -0.0725 | -0.156* | -0.247** |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (0.0835) | (0.0976) | (0.0716) | (0.0813) |
| 7-30 unit | 0.0115 | -0.0606 | | |
| | (0.116) | (0.130) | | |
| 30+ unit | -0.0974 | -0.128 | | |
| | (0.132) | (0.152) | | |
| Land and building valuation | | | | |
| Land val per sf (log) | -0.0890 | -0.0332 | -0.00126 | 0.00994 |
| | (0.0640) | (0.0726) | (0.0499) | (0.0568) |
| Building val per sf (log) | -0.0382 | -0.0183 | 0.136 | 0.213* |
| | (0.0483) | (0.0478) | (0.0959) | (0.105) |
| Building val per unit (log) | 0.00706 | -0.0359 | -0.194** | -0.277*** |
| | (0.0817) | (0.0848) | (0.0682) | (0.0744) |
| Year built (ref. pre-1900) | | | | |
| 1900-1925 | 0.176 | 0.00965 | 0.0364 | 0.0573 |
| | (0.0974) | (0.116) | (0.0487) | (0.0545) |
| 1925-1950 | 0.170 | -0.0402 | 0.00662 | 0.0453 |
| | (0.134) | (0.150) | (0.0759) | (0.0855) |
| 1950-1975 | 0.0770 | -0.133 | -0.0788 | -0.0522 |
| | (0.150) | (0.166) | (0.114) | (0.129) |
| 1975-2000 | -0.163 | -0.349 | 0.118 | 0.0361 |
| | (0.184) | (0.215) | (0.136) | (0.134) |
| 2000+ | -0.259 | -0.698** | -0.174 | -0.241 |
| | (0.242) | (0.245) | (0.123) | (0.139) |
| Year remodeled (ref. not remodeled) | | | | |
| Pre-1975 | 0.109 | -0.0316 | 0.0621 | 0.102 |
| | (0.117) | (0.144) | (0.119) | (0.126) |
| 1975-2000 | 0.164* | 0.127 | 0.0936* | 0.102* |
| | (0.0825) | (0.100) | (0.0468) | (0.0516) |
| 2000+ | 0.0515 | -0.0185 | 0.0921 | 0.128* |
| | (0.0990) | (0.116) | (0.0506) | (0.0553) |
| Other property characteristics | | | | |
| Place-based subsidy | 0.293* | 0.0820 | 0.800*** | 0.455*** |
| | (0.142) | (0.137) | (0.0827) | (0.0943) |
| N | 1218072 | 1218072 | 893711 | 893711 |
| Log likelihood | -521095.4 | -324605.8 | -119058.3 | -73550.0 |
| Chi-squared | 22933.0 | 37770.1 | 37624.0 | 43295.3 |

## C. Robustness checks

To ensure that findings from Table 1 are robust to alternate modeling strategies, are controlling for what they purport to be controlling for, and are not the result of statistical artifacts, I undertook a number of robustness checks.

### i. Different operationalizations of building control variables

First, I examine whether the variables describing property characteristics, specifically the valuation and year built and remodeled variables, are operationalized correctly, Tables C1 and C2 pertain to all and small properties, respectively, and vary the operationalizations in the following ways. In Model 1 the valuation variables are not transformed and the year variables are included as linear terms. In Model 2 the year variables are operationalized as factor variables. This improves the model fit, as indicated by the log-likelihood, in the all buildings model, but only slightly in the small buildings model. In Model 3 the three valuation variables are logged, which improves the model fit in the all buildings model, but not in the small buildings model. In Model 4 the valuation variables are operationalized as their percentiles, calculated among properties with the same land usage and in the same year. In Model 5 (only in Table C1) the logged valuations are included, with an interaction term between each and a factor variable indicating whether the property has more than six units. This provides the best model fit. In all of the models, medium and large landlords filed evictions at higher rates than small landlords, and changing the building control variables did not change the estimated coefficients substantially.

**Table C1: Different operationalizations of building control variables**

| | Linear years (1) | Factor years (2) | Logged valuations (3) | Percentile valuations (4) | Small-building interaction (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Landlord scale (ref. small) | | | | | |
| Medium | 0.437*** | 0.453*** | 0.467*** | 0.480*** | 0.466*** |
| | (0.0486) | (0.0483) | (0.0482) | (0.0489) | (0.0484) |
| Large | 1.051*** | 1.060*** | 1.078*** | 1.095*** | 1.060*** |
| | (0.0604) | (0.0614) | (0.0610) | (0.0615) | (0.0651) |
| Changes in ownership | | | | | |
| Property sold last year | 0.105 | 0.114 | 0.115 | 0.116 | 0.123 |
| | (0.0984) | (0.0965) | (0.0974) | (0.0971) | (0.0987) |
| Property sold this year | 0.148 | 0.156 | 0.154 | 0.154 | 0.153 |
| | (0.0865) | (0.0854) | (0.0847) | (0.0845) | (0.0846) |
| Property type (Ref:3-family) | | | | | |
| Condominium | -0.492*** | -0.523*** | -0.955*** | -0.629*** | -1.073*** |
| | (0.124) | (0.128) | (0.255) | (0.0852) | (0.313) |
| Single-family | -0.337*** | -0.326*** | -0.330*** | -0.324*** | -0.311*** |
| | (0.0821) | (0.0833) | (0.0824) | (0.0847) | (0.0831) |
| Two-family | 0.0783 | 0.0811 | 0.111* | 0.0827 | 0.105 |
| | (0.0556) | (0.0558) | (0.0542) | (0.0514) | (0.0566) |
| 4-6 unit | -0.0382 | -0.0534 | -0.0241 | -0.115 | -0.0415 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (0.0883) | (0.0858) | (0.0835) | (0.0844) | (0.0893) |
| 7-30 unit | -0.0202 | -0.0567 | -0.00933 | -0.119 | -0.0283 |
| | (0.118) | (0.116) | (0.116) | (0.104) | (0.127) |
| 30+ unit | -0.120 | -0.153 | -0.111 | -0.161 | -2.656 |
| | (0.132) | (0.131) | (0.132) | (0.125) | (1.494) |
| Land and building valuation | | | | | |
| Land val per sf (100s) | -0.0588 | -0.0584 | | | |
| | (0.0787) | (0.0782) | | | |
| Building val per sf (100s) | -0.0371 | -0.0269 | | | |
| | (0.0288) | (0.0298) | | | |
| Building val per unit (100,000s) | -0.0532 | -0.0479 | | | |
| | (0.0747) | (0.0723) | | | |
| Land val per sf (log) | | | -0.103 | | -0.176* |
| | | | (0.0614) | | (0.0697) |
| Building val per sf (log) | | | -0.0248 | | -0.102 |
| | | | (0.0481) | | (0.0696) |
| Building val per unit (log) | | | -0.00251 | | -0.0648 |
| | | | (0.0807) | | (0.0928) |
| Land val per sf (pctl) | | | | -0.362* | |
| | | | | (0.164) | |
| Building val per sf (pctl) | | | | 0.0258 | |
| | | | | (0.151) | |
| Building val per unit (pctl) | | | | -0.115 | |
| | | | | (0.141) | |
| Year built and remodeled (linear) | | | | | |
| Year built (decades before 2018) | 0.0209 | | | | |
| | (0.0149) | | | | |
| Year remodeled (decades before 2018) | -0.00717 | | | | |
| | (0.0267) | | | | |
| Not remodeled | -0.185 | | | | |
| | (0.115) | | | | |
| Year built (ref. pre-1900) | | | | | |
| 1900-1925 | | 0.157 | 0.169 | 0.164 | 0.161 |
| | | (0.0949) | (0.0970) | (0.0977) | (0.0967) |
| 1925-1950 | | 0.149 | 0.153 | 0.150 | 0.138 |
| | | (0.134) | (0.135) | (0.135) | (0.133) |
| 1950-1975 | | 0.0561 | 0.0489 | 0.0469 | 0.0585 |
| | | (0.143) | (0.144) | (0.143) | (0.148) |
| 1975-2000 | | -0.155 | -0.163 | -0.167 | -0.176 |
| | | (0.184) | (0.184) | (0.184) | (0.184) |
| 2000+ | | -0.204 | -0.259 | -0.252 | -0.261 |
| | | (0.245) | (0.244) | (0.244) | (0.245) |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year remodeled (ref. not remodeled) | | | | | |
| Pre-1975 | | 0.122 | 0.123 | 0.129 | 0.120 |
| | | (0.117) | (0.117) | (0.117) | (0.117) |
| 1975-2000 | | 0.149 | 0.162* | 0.167* | 0.168* |
| | | (0.0833) | (0.0826) | (0.0827) | (0.0840) |
| 2000+ | | 0.0645 | 0.0642 | 0.0677 | 0.0781 |
| | | (0.0994) | (0.0985) | (0.0984) | (0.101) |
| Other property characteristics | | | | | |
| Place-based subsidy | 0.245* | 0.288* | 0.274* | 0.282* | 0.295* |
| | (0.120) | (0.128) | (0.138) | (0.135) | (0.142) |
| N | 1218072 | 1218072 | 1218072 | 1218072 | 1218072 |
| Log likelihood | -522083.1 | -521664.0 | -521634.3 | -521568.7 | -520873.4 |
| Chi-squared | 21519.7 | 24325.7 | 22456.8 | 22518.3 | 22626.7 |

**Table C2: Different operationalizations of building control variables (small properties)**

| | Linear years (1) | Factor years (2) | Logged valuations (3) | Percentile valuations (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Landlord scale (ref. small) | | | | |
| Medium | 0.395*** | 0.396*** | 0.379*** | 0.387*** |
| | (0.0401) | (0.0401) | (0.0415) | (0.0414) |
| Large | 1.049*** | 1.051*** | 1.034*** | 1.039*** |
| | (0.0464) | (0.0465) | (0.0478) | (0.0474) |
| Changes in ownership | | | | |
| Property sold last year | 0.204*** | 0.206*** | 0.202*** | 0.204*** |
| | (0.0453) | (0.0453) | (0.0453) | (0.0454) |
| Property sold this year | 0.628*** | 0.629*** | 0.624*** | 0.624*** |
| | (0.0413) | (0.0413) | (0.0414) | (0.0415) |
| Property type (Ref:3-family) | | | | |
| Condominium | -0.557** | -0.567** | -0.754*** | -0.640*** |
| | (0.195) | (0.188) | (0.229) | (0.0862) |
| Single-family | -0.399*** | -0.396*** | -0.409*** | -0.487*** |
| | (0.0793) | (0.0803) | (0.0806) | (0.0814) |
| Two-family | 0.0995* | 0.0972* | 0.0694 | 0.163*** |
| | (0.0434) | (0.0431) | (0.0446) | (0.0413) |
| 4-6 unit | -0.0775 | -0.0878 | -0.165* | 0.00855 |
| | (0.0662) | (0.0653) | (0.0714) | (0.0713) |
| Land and building valuation | | | | |
| Land val per sf (100s) | -0.190** | -0.187** | | |
| | (0.0724) | (0.0715) | | |
| Building val per sf (100s) | -0.0465 | -0.0438 | | |
| | (0.109) | (0.106) | | |
| Building val per unit (100,000s) | -0.102* | -0.100* | | |
| | (0.0403) | (0.0399) | | |
| Land val per sf (log) | | | -0.00579 | |
| | | | (0.0492) | |
| Building val per sf (log) | | | 0.153 | |
| | | | (0.0941) | |
| Building val per unit (log) | | | -0.204** | |
| | | | (0.0674) | |
| Land val per sf (pctl) | | | | 0.114 |
| | | | | (0.100) |
| Building val per sf (pctl) | | | | -0.269* |
| | | | | (0.106) |
| Building val per unit (pctl) | | | | 0.0457 |
| | | | | (0.141) |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year built and remodeled (linear) | | | | |
| Year built (decades before 2018) | 0.00554 | | | |
| | (0.00789) | | | |
| Year remodeled (decades before 2018) | -0.0199 | | | |
| | (0.0205) | | | |
| Not remodeled | -0.162** | | | |
| | (0.0595) | | | |
| Year built (ref. pre-1900) | | | | |
| 1900-1925 | | 0.0120 | 0.0347 | 0.0266 |
| | | (0.0489) | (0.0487) | (0.0499) |
| 1925-1950 | | -0.0149 | 0.000745 | 0.000501 |
| | | (0.0764) | (0.0757) | (0.0767) |
| 1950-1975 | | -0.0706 | -0.0836 | -0.0491 |
| | | (0.112) | (0.113) | (0.113) |
| 1975-2000 | | 0.108 | 0.107 | 0.128 |
| | | (0.135) | (0.136) | (0.135) |
| 2000+ | | -0.0975 | -0.135 | -0.109 |
| | | (0.128) | (0.121) | (0.125) |
| Year remodeled (ref. not remodeled) | | | | |
| Pre-1975 | | 0.0902 | 0.0638 | 0.0763 |
| | | (0.124) | (0.118) | (0.127) |
| 1975-2000 | | 0.105* | 0.0968* | 0.102* |
| | | (0.0464) | (0.0467) | (0.0467) |
| 2000+ | | 0.136** | 0.124* | 0.131** |
| | | (0.0482) | (0.0491) | (0.0497) |
| Other property characteristics | | | | |
| Place-based subsidy | 0.761*** | 0.757*** | 0.785*** | 0.791*** |
| | (0.0764) | (0.0768) | (0.0798) | (0.0789) |
| N | 893711 | 893711 | 893711 | 893711 |
| Log likelihood | -119134.9 | -119131.8 | -119164.6 | -119181.0 |
| Chi-squared | 33688.8 | 34283.3 | 36805.1 | 35690.0 |

### ii. Different geographic fixed effects

As a further test of whether there are uncontrolled differences between the properties of large- and small-scale landlords, in Table C3 I re-estimated the original model, but with Census block-level fixed effects rather than Census tract-level, for all properties and small properties. Since Census blocks are smaller and more homogenous aggregates, any within-block uncontrolled differences should be smaller in magnitude, and if they are driving the results then the differences between small and large landlords should shrink. Models 2 and 4 show the results of the models with block fixed-effects, and although the coefficients are smaller than in the original model, the difference are slight and not statistically significant. This provides evidence suggesting that the census tract-level fixed effects, combined with the other property characteristic variables, are adequately controlling for between-property differences.

**Table C3: Different geographic fixed effects**

| | Original model | Block fixed-effects | Original model (small buildings) | Block fixed-effects (small buildings) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Landlord scale (ref. small) | | | | |
| Medium | 0.467*** | 0.428*** | 0.379*** | 0.351*** |
| | (0.0482) | (0.0473) | (0.0415) | (0.0432) |
| Large | 1.078*** | 1.064*** | 1.034*** | 1.000*** |
| | (0.0610) | (0.0571) | (0.0478) | (0.0511) |
| Changes in ownership | | | | |
| Property sold last year | 0.115 | 0.108 | 0.202*** | 0.234*** |
| | (0.0974) | (0.0865) | (0.0453) | (0.0458) |
| Property sold this year | 0.154 | 0.0305 | 0.624*** | 0.631*** |
| | (0.0847) | (0.0821) | (0.0414) | (0.0417) |
| Property type (Ref:3-family) | | | | |
| Condominium | -0.955*** | -0.673* | -0.754*** | -1.415*** |
| | (0.255) | (0.280) | (0.229) | (0.270) |
| Single-family | -0.330*** | -0.308*** | -0.409*** | -0.343*** |
| | (0.0824) | (0.0853) | (0.0806) | (0.0802) |
| Two-family | 0.111* | 0.113* | 0.0694 | 0.0854 |
| | (0.0542) | (0.0500) | (0.0446) | (0.0469) |
| 4-6 unit | -0.0241 | 0.0373 | -0.165* | -0.142 |
| | (0.0835) | (0.0825) | (0.0714) | (0.0771) |
| 7-30 unit | -0.00933 | 0.201 | | |
| | (0.116) | (0.113) | | |
| 30+ unit | -0.111 | 0.299 | | |
| | (0.132) | (0.164) | | |
| Land and building valuation | | | | |
| Land val per sf (log) | -0.103 | -0.0132 | -0.00579 | -0.241*** |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (0.0614) | (0.0709) | (0.0492) | (0.0501) |
| Building val per sf (log) | -0.0248 | 0.0145 | 0.153 | -0.0685 |
| | (0.0481) | (0.0569) | (0.0941) | (0.120) |
| Building val per unit (log) | -0.00251 | 0.158* | -0.204** | -0.328*** |
| | (0.0807) | (0.0788) | (0.0674) | (0.0854) |
| Year built (ref. pre-1900) | | | | |
| 1900-1925 | 0.169 | 0.115 | 0.0347 | 0.0307 |
| | (0.0970) | (0.102) | (0.0487) | (0.0506) |
| 1925-1950 | 0.153 | 0.0946 | 0.000745 | -0.0846 |
| | (0.135) | (0.129) | (0.0757) | (0.0767) |
| 1950-1975 | 0.0489 | -0.311* | -0.0836 | -0.121 |
| | (0.144) | (0.157) | (0.113) | (0.120) |
| 1975-2000 | -0.163 | 0.315 | 0.107 | 0.0404 |
| | (0.184) | (0.193) | (0.136) | (0.141) |
| 2000+ | -0.259 | 0.0769 | -0.135 | -0.0665 |
| | (0.244) | (0.148) | (0.121) | (0.141) |
| Year remodeled (ref. not remodeled) | | | | |
| Pre-1975 | 0.123 | 0.0382 | 0.0638 | 0.0858 |
| | (0.117) | (0.132) | (0.118) | (0.141) |
| 1975-2000 | 0.162* | 0.0860 | 0.0968* | 0.179*** |
| | (0.0826) | (0.0795) | (0.0467) | (0.0493) |
| 2000+ | 0.0642 | 0.0486 | 0.124* | 0.187*** |
| | (0.0985) | (0.0963) | (0.0491) | (0.0520) |
| Other property characteristics | | | | |
| Place-based subsidy | 0.274* | 0.115 | 0.785*** | 0.762*** |
| | (0.138) | (0.147) | (0.0798) | (0.0803) |
| N | 1218072 | 1218072 | 893711 | 893711 |
| Log likelihood | -521634.3 | -462802.2 | -119164.6 | -121111.3 |
| Chi-squared | 22456.8 | . | 36805.1 | 7436.5 |

### iii. Controls for number of units

To ensure that the controls present in Table 2 adequately controlled for the number of units in a rental property, Table C4 presents models in which the number of rental units is used a factor variable. These models are estimated as ordinary least squares, with the number of filings per unit as the outcome, because negative binomial and Poisson models would not converge with unit fixed effects, even when the offset and land usage variables were omitted or the number of units was operationalized as small ranges of units. The number of filings per unit was used as the outcome, rather than the total number of filings, to better replicate the original negative binomial model, in which the rental units offset effectively transformed the outcome into filings per unit.

In Table C4, Model 1 estimates an OLS model with the same controls as in Table 2, while Model 2 adds fixed effects specifying the number of rental units. Models 3 and 4 repeat this analysis but for small properties only. Although the inclusion of unit fixed effects slightly reduces the size of the coefficients associated with large and medium-scale landlords, they remain large and highly significant. For example, even in the unit fixed effects model, having a large landlord is associated with a 2.10 percentage point increase in eviction rate, which is a 176% increase over the average eviction rate in the sample of 1.19.

I also control for number of units in section C.vi, Table C7, by separately modeling different subsamples, some of which are homogenous in their numbers of units.

**Table C4: Controls for number of units**

| | OLS without unit fixed effects | OLS with unit fixed effects | OLS without unit fixed effects (small properties) | OLS with unit fixed effects (small properties) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Landlord scale (ref. small) | | | | |
| Medium | 0.00679*** | 0.00504*** | 0.00538*** | 0.00458*** |
| | (0.000639) | (0.000270) | (0.000617) | (0.000304) |
| Large | 0.0233*** | 0.0210*** | 0.0214*** | 0.0202*** |
| | (0.00104) | (0.000334) | (0.00109) | (0.000394) |
| Changes in ownership | | | | |
| Property sold last year | 0.00431*** | 0.00401*** | 0.00449*** | 0.00426*** |
| | (0.000865) | (0.000378) | (0.000803) | (0.000460) |
| Property sold this year | 0.0101*** | 0.00966*** | 0.0121*** | 0.0119*** |
| | (0.000828) | (0.000352) | (0.000840) | (0.000422) |
| Property type (Ref:3-family) | | | | |
| Condominium | -0.0129* | -0.0176*** | -0.0102** | -0.00836*** |
| | (0.00517) | (0.00102) | (0.00353) | (0.00147) |
| Single-family | -0.00513*** | -0.00497*** | -0.00523*** | -0.00527*** |
| | (0.000972) | (0.000551) | (0.000924) | (0.000617) |
| Two-family | 0.00370*** | -0.000992* | 0.00222** | -0.000599 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (0.000825) | (0.000403) | (0.000699) | (0.000450) |
| 4-6 unit | 0.00158 | -0.0108*** | -0.00339** | -0.0104*** |
| | (0.00145) | (0.00120) | (0.00130) | (0.00133) |
| 7-30 unit | -0.00121 | -0.0191*** | | |
| | (0.00218) | (0.00399) | | |
| 30+ unit | -0.0107*** | | | |
| | (0.00234) | | | |
| Land and building valuation | | | | |
| Land val per sf (log) | -0.00263** | -0.00310*** | -0.000626 | -0.000523 |
| | (0.000953) | (0.000197) | (0.000577) | (0.000280) |
| Building val per sf (log) | 0.000671 | 0.00327*** | 0.00413* | 0.00291*** |
| | (0.00155) | (0.000282) | (0.00162) | (0.000464) |
| Building val per unit (log) | 0.00189 | 0.00172*** | -0.00186** | -0.000232 |
| | (0.00123) | (0.000284) | (0.000690) | (0.000382) |
| Year built (ref. pre-1900) | | | | |
| 1900-1925 | 0.000588 | -0.000298 | -0.0000485 | -0.0000635 |
| | (0.000706) | (0.000252) | (0.000603) | (0.000309) |
| 1925-1950 | 0.00105 | -0.000408 | -0.00103 | -0.000993* |
| | (0.00110) | (0.000360) | (0.000898) | (0.000451) |
| 1950-1975 | 0.00162 | 0.00292*** | -0.00197* | -0.00163** |
| | (0.00203) | (0.000443) | (0.000990) | (0.000607) |
| 1975-2000 | -0.00112 | -0.00289*** | 0.00124 | 0.000903 |
| | (0.00209) | (0.000565) | (0.00127) | (0.000717) |
| 2000+ | -0.00282 | -0.00285*** | -0.00291* | -0.00348*** |
| | (0.00213) | (0.000574) | (0.00125) | (0.000696) |
| Year remodeled (ref. not remodeled) | | | | |
| Pre-1975 | 0.00401* | 0.00275*** | 0.00296 | 0.00305*** |
| | (0.00176) | (0.000503) | (0.00165) | (0.000675) |
| 1975-2000 | 0.00410*** | 0.00323*** | 0.00287*** | 0.00278*** |
| | (0.000832) | (0.000249) | (0.000707) | (0.000308) |
| 2000+ | 0.00170 | 0.00211*** | 0.00246** | 0.00218*** |
| | (0.000900) | (0.000267) | (0.000751) | (0.000325) |
| Other property characteristics | | | | |
| Place-based subsidy | 0.0321*** | 0.0443*** | 0.0774*** | 0.0773*** |
| | (0.00304) | (0.000498) | (0.00635) | (0.00117) |
| N | 1218072 | 1218072 | 893711 | 893711 |
| Log likelihood | 1169036.0 | 1173211.0 | 774680.8 | 774818.4 |

### iv. Different distributional assumptions

In the models presented in Table 2, I assume a negative binomial distribution since the number of filings is a count variable with considerable overdispersion. To ensure that my results are not driven by this modeling choice, below I replicate Table 2 Model 1, but using poisson, OLS, and logit models. For the poisson model, the outcome is again the number of filings, with the logged number of rental units as an offset. In the OLS model, the outcome is the number of filings per unit at the property, and in the logit model, the outcome is merely whether there was a filing at the property. In the logit model, the logged number of rental units is included as a predictor, as this provided the best model fit after also including multiple transformations of the rental units. In each model, medium and large landlords still evict at much higher rates than small landlords. The logit model also serves as a check of whether the results are driven by properties with an extreme number of evictions, which they do not appear to be.

**Table C5: Different distributional assumptions**

| | Negative binomial | Poisson | OLS (filing rate) | Logit (any filing) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Landlord scale (ref. small) | | | | |
| Medium | 0.467*** | 0.476*** | 0.00679*** | 0.460*** |
| | (0.0482) | (0.0524) | (0.000639) | (0.0464) |
| Large | 1.078*** | 1.124*** | 0.0233*** | 1.232*** |
| | (0.0610) | (0.0626) | (0.00104) | (0.0807) |
| Changes in ownership | | | | |
| Property sold last year | 0.115 | -0.0304 | 0.00431*** | 0.0112 |
| | (0.0974) | (0.0889) | (0.000865) | (0.122) |
| Property sold this year | 0.154 | -0.0712 | 0.0101*** | 0.252* |
| | (0.0847) | (0.0799) | (0.000828) | (0.107) |
| Property type (Ref:3-family) | | | | |
| Condominium | -0.955*** | -1.000*** | -0.0129* | -0.762* |
| | (0.255) | (0.262) | (0.00517) | (0.368) |
| Single-family | -0.330*** | -0.306*** | -0.00513*** | -0.507*** |
| | (0.0824) | (0.0818) | (0.000972) | (0.107) |
| Two-family | 0.111* | 0.0795 | 0.00370*** | 0.195* |
| | (0.0542) | (0.0569) | (0.000825) | (0.0872) |
| 4-6 unit | -0.0241 | -0.0195 | 0.00158 | 0.212 |
| | (0.0835) | (0.0919) | (0.00145) | (0.182) |
| 7-30 unit | -0.00933 | 0.0346 | -0.00121 | 0.653 |
| | (0.116) | (0.122) | (0.00218) | (0.363) |
| 30+ unit | -0.111 | -0.0396 | -0.0107*** | 1.014* |
| | (0.132) | (0.136) | (0.00234) | (0.516) |
| Land and building valuation | | | | |
| Land val per sf (log) | -0.103 | -0.129* | -0.00263** | -0.0403 |
| | (0.0614) | (0.0623) | (0.000953) | (0.0866) |
| Building val per sf (log) | -0.0248 | -0.0220 | 0.000671 | 0.0730 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (0.0481) | (0.0452) | (0.00155) | (0.0852) |
| Building val per unit (log) | -0.00251 | -0.0278 | 0.00189 | -0.143 |
| | (0.0807) | (0.0886) | (0.00123) | (0.115) |
| Year built (ref. pre-1900) | | | | |
| 1900-1925 | 0.169 | 0.119 | 0.000588 | 0.194* |
| | (0.0970) | (0.113) | (0.000706) | (0.0958) |
| 1925-1950 | 0.153 | 0.0615 | 0.00105 | 0.267 |
| | (0.135) | (0.140) | (0.00110) | (0.148) |
| 1950-1975 | 0.0489 | -0.0165 | 0.00162 | 0.131 |
| | (0.144) | (0.143) | (0.00203) | (0.190) |
| 1975-2000 | -0.163 | -0.142 | -0.00112 | -0.151 |
| | (0.184) | (0.207) | (0.00209) | (0.267) |
| 2000+ | -0.259 | -0.483* | -0.00282 | -0.543 |
| | (0.244) | (0.197) | (0.00213) | (0.367) |
| Year remodeled (ref. not remodeled) | | | | |
| Pre-1975 | 0.123 | 0.0891 | 0.00401* | 0.238 |
| | (0.117) | (0.124) | (0.00176) | (0.150) |
| 1975-2000 | 0.162* | 0.0928 | 0.00410*** | 0.141 |
| | (0.0826) | (0.0992) | (0.000832) | (0.0857) |
| 2000+ | 0.0642 | -0.0733 | 0.00170 | 0.135 |
| | (0.0985) | (0.118) | (0.000900) | (0.112) |
| Other property characteristics | | | | |
| Place-based subsidy | 0.274* | 0.0664 | 0.0321*** | 0.545** |
| | (0.138) | (0.137) | (0.00304) | (0.192) |
| Rental units (log) | | | | 0.686*** |
| | | | | (0.165) |
| N | 1218072 | 1218072 | 1218072 | 1218072 |

### v. Different weightings

In Table 2, the models are estimated with a frequency weight specifying the number of rental units at the property. This, combined with the logged offset for number of rental units, means that a 100 unit property with ten evictions is treated as 100 observations of properties with a .1 eviction rate, which is appropriate given the outcome is at the unit level. However, to ensure that this weighting scheme was not affecting my results, I re-estimated Table 1, Model 1 with and without frequency weights. As can be seen, the unweighted results are substantively the same.

**Table C6: Different weighting**

| | Weighted (1) | Unweighted (2) |
|---|---|---|
| Landlord scale (ref. small) | | |
| Medium | 0.467*** | 0.403*** |
| | (0.0482) | (0.0380) |
| Large | 1.078*** | 1.105*** |
| | (0.0610) | (0.0417) |
| Changes in ownership | | |
| Property sold last year | 0.115 | 0.208*** |
| | (0.0974) | (0.0384) |
| Property sold this year | 0.154 | 0.647*** |
| | (0.0847) | (0.0361) |
| Property type (Ref:3-family) | | |
| Condominium | -0.955*** | -0.695*** |
| | (0.255) | (0.176) |
| Single-family | -0.330*** | -0.403*** |
| | (0.0824) | (0.0817) |
| Two-family | 0.111* | 0.0826 |
| | (0.0542) | (0.0426) |
| 4-6 unit | -0.0241 | -0.133* |
| | (0.0835) | (0.0647) |
| 7-30 unit | -0.00933 | -0.218** |
| | (0.116) | (0.0775) |
| 30+ unit | -0.111 | -0.179 |
| | (0.132) | (0.0970) |
| Land and building valuation | | |
| Land val per sf (log) | -0.103 | -0.0361 |
| | (0.0614) | (0.0389) |
| Building val per sf (log) | -0.0248 | -0.0142 |
| | (0.0481) | (0.0497) |
| Building val per unit (log) | -0.00251 | -0.112* |
| | (0.0807) | (0.0468) |
| Year built (ref. pre-1900) | | |
| 1900-1925 | 0.169 | 0.0371 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | (0.0970) | (0.0408) |
| 1925-1950 | 0.153 | -0.0374 |
| | (0.135) | (0.0569) |
| 1950-1975 | 0.0489 | -0.0402 |
| | (0.144) | (0.0758) |
| 1975-2000 | -0.163 | 0.0238 |
| | (0.184) | (0.0940) |
| 2000+ | -0.259 | -0.0725 |
| | (0.244) | (0.0954) |
| Year remodeled (ref. not remodeled) | | |
| Pre-1975 | 0.123 | 0.0976 |
| | (0.117) | (0.0899) |
| 1975-2000 | 0.162* | 0.145*** |
| | (0.0826) | (0.0382) |
| 2000+ | 0.0642 | 0.151*** |
| | (0.0985) | (0.0405) |
| Other property characteristics | | |
| Place-based subsidy | 0.274* | 0.617*** |
| | (0.138) | (0.0680) |
| N | 1218072 | 591365 |
| Log likelihood | -521634.3 | -61993.9 |
| Chi-squared | 22456.8 | 27032.0 |

### vi. Different subsamples

The full sample of all private rental properties in Boston is very heterogeneous, containing single-family properties as well as large apartment buildings. To ensure that this heterogeneity is not being improperly modeled, thus biasing results, and to test for certain specific possible confounding explanations, Table C7 re-estimates Table 2 Model 1 for specific subsamples of the properties. Models 1 through 6 restrict the sample to single-family properties, two-unit properties, non-owner-occupied two-unit properties, three-unit properties, non-owner-occupied three unit properties, and four-to-six-unit properties, respectively. I did not separate non-owner-occupied properties for single-family and four-to-six unit properties, because all single-family properties in the sample are non-owner-occupied (or else they have no rental units) and non-owner-occupied four-to-six unit properties cannot be owned by small owners (or else they would be medium owners).

In nearly all of the subsamples, the disparities in eviction rate between small and medium and between small and large landlords are statistically significant and similar in size to those in the full sample. This suggests that uncontrolled differences between properties are not driving the landlord differences we see. There are two exceptions, however: the differences between small and medium landlords at single-family properties and at four-to-six unit properties are not statistically significant. At four-to-six-unit properties this lack of significance is due to a large standard error rather than a small estimated coefficient, which makes sense since there are few small owners with four-to-six-unit properties. The lack of significance in the single-family analysis is due to a small coefficient, and may reflect that small landlords who are not owner-occupiers resemble medium-sized landlords. Nevertheless, the differences between small and medium landlords remains significant in most of the specifications, and the difference between small and large landlords is significant in all.

**Table C7: Different subsamples**

| | R1 (all) | R2 (all) | R2 (not OO) | R3 (all) | R3 (not OO) | R4 (all) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Landlord scale (ref. small) | | | | | | |
| Medium | 0.0650 | 0.337*** | 0.358*** | 0.326*** | 0.233*** | 0.267 |
| | (0.199) | (0.0794) | (0.0844) | (0.0536) | (0.0563) | (0.211) |
| Large | 1.240*** | 1.063*** | 1.062*** | 1.053*** | 0.963*** | 0.784*** |
| | (0.193) | (0.0912) | (0.0917) | (0.0601) | (0.0616) | (0.212) |
| Changes in ownership | | | | | | |
| Property sold last year | 0.0630 | 0.121 | 0.00712 | 0.172** | 0.138* | 0.324** |
| | (0.179) | (0.0933) | (0.0984) | (0.0603) | (0.0617) | (0.112) |
| Property sold this year | 1.348*** | 0.873*** | 0.837*** | 0.565*** | 0.475*** | 0.462*** |
| | (0.126) | (0.0748) | (0.0822) | (0.0594) | (0.0619) | (0.108) |
| Land and building valuation | | | | | | |
| Land val per sf (log) | -0.253 | 0.0375 | 0.00991 | -0.0100 | -0.0174 | -0.109 |
| | (0.219) | (0.136) | (0.140) | (0.0872) | (0.0987) | (0.0840) |
| Building val per sf (log) | -0.138 | -0.114 | -0.100 | 0.150 | -0.144 | 0.204 |
| | (0.249) | (0.120) | (0.148) | (0.0935) | (0.116) | (0.145) |
| Building val per unit (log) | 0.302 | -0.0457 | -0.0390 | -0.159 | 0.243* | -0.0597 |
| | (0.240) | (0.0815) | (0.143) | (0.0846) | (0.118) | (0.152) |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year built (ref. pre-1900) | | | | | | |
| 1900-1925 | -0.108 | -0.0339 | -0.0900 | 0.0360 | -0.00608 | 0.106 |
| | (0.195) | (0.0859) | (0.104) | (0.0670) | (0.0765) | (0.104) |
| 1925-1950 | -0.261 | -0.242* | -0.197 | 0.148 | 0.151 | 0.132 |
| | (0.252) | (0.117) | (0.130) | (0.104) | (0.114) | (0.157) |
| 1950-1975 | -0.0792 | -0.294 | -0.247 | -0.881 | -0.861 | 0.247 |
| | (0.232) | (0.167) | (0.187) | (0.589) | (0.657) | (0.209) |
| 1975-2000 | -0.769* | 0.392 | 0.273 | 0.211 | 0.188 | 0.0514 |
| | (0.385) | (0.242) | (0.278) | (0.193) | (0.214) | (0.335) |
| 2000+ | -0.556 | -0.157 | -0.329 | -0.262 | -0.460 | -0.153 |
| | (0.346) | (0.161) | (0.189) | (0.292) | (0.286) | (0.301) |
| Year remodeled (ref. not remodeled) | | | | | | |
| Pre-1975 | 0.0932 | -0.236 | -0.332 | 0.101 | -0.0291 | 0.130 |
| | (0.353) | (0.188) | (0.216) | (0.170) | (0.221) | (0.203) |
| 1975-2000 | 0.224 | -0.0426 | -0.113 | 0.203*** | 0.130* | 0.0471 |
| | (0.190) | (0.106) | (0.110) | (0.0543) | (0.0622) | (0.156) |
| 2000+ | -0.140 | 0.0169 | -0.0176 | 0.0626 | 0.00332 | 0.166 |
| | (0.196) | (0.0810) | (0.0896) | (0.0584) | (0.0638) | (0.168) |
| Other property characteristics | | | | | | |
| Place-based subsidy | 2.292*** | 1.680*** | 1.774*** | 0.894*** | 0.984*** | 0.736*** |
| | (0.622) | (0.326) | (0.350) | (0.125) | (0.129) | (0.119) |
| N | 43077 | 195075 | 103846 | 305431 | 197097 | 110544 |
| Log likelihood | -2009.1 | -18198.0 | -12795.1 | -59352.8 | -47177.4 | -32126.9 |

# Change-in-ownership analysis

Sections D through L of the appendix show supplementary analyses relating to the change in ownership analysis presented in Figure 2. The goals of these analyses are to show: that the analysis is not invalidated by tenants changing during the change in ownership; that the change in ownership analysis is robust to other reasonable modeling strategies; that the large increase in filing rates is unique to transfers from small to large owners and not a result of changes in ownership per se; that large landlords who buy from small landlords file at higher rates indefinitely; and that there are not pre trends, or meaningful differences in filing rates between properties that were sold to small and large owners, before the sale happens.

## D. Descriptive statistics of properties that changed ownership

Table D1 shows descriptive statistics of properties that were modeled in the change-in-ownership analysis. The descriptive statistics are at the property, rather than property-year, level, and reflect values from the first year of observation for each property.

**Table D1: Descriptive statistics of properties that changed ownership**

| Variable | Mean | Standard deviation | Minimum | Maximum |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Transfer type | | | | |
| Small to small | 0.55 | 0.5 | 0 | 1 |
| Small to medium | 0.1 | 0.29 | 0 | 1 |
| Small to large | 0.07 | 0.26 | 0 | 1 |
| Medium to small | 0.07 | 0.26 | 0 | 1 |
| Medium to medium | 0.08 | 0.27 | 0 | 1 |
| Medium to large | 0.03 | 0.17 | 0 | 1 |
| Large to small | 0.02 | 0.14 | 0 | 1 |
| Large to medium | 0.02 | 0.15 | 0 | 1 |
| Large to large | 0.06 | 0.24 | 0 | 1 |
| Transfer characteristics | | | | |
| First year | 2008 | 0 | 2008 | 2008 |
| Number of years | 8.78 | 0.74 | 5 | 9 |
| Property type | | | | |
| Condominium | 0.39 | 0.49 | 0 | 1 |
| Single-family | 0.03 | 0.18 | 0 | 1 |
| Two-family | 0.26 | 0.44 | 0 | 1 |
| Three-family | 0.24 | 0.42 | 0 | 1 |
| 4-6 unit | 0.05 | 0.22 | 0 | 1 |
| 7-30 unit | 0.02 | 0.15 | 0 | 1 |
| 30+ unit | 0 | 0.07 | 0 | 1 |
| Land and building valuation | | | | |
| Land val per sf | 32.8 | 56.04 | 0 | 400 |
| Building val per sf | 211.49 | 215.26 | 3.42 | 1200 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Building val per unit | 246831.2 | 258358.5 | 30000 | 2000000 |
| Year built and remodeled | | | | |
| Year built | 1918.5 | 32.51 | 1800 | 2008 |
| Year remodeled | 2003.14 | 16.49 | 1900 | 2017 |
| Not remodeled | 0.51 | 0.5 | 0 | 1 |
| Other property characteristics | | | | |
| Place-based subsidy | 0.01 | 0.09 | 0 | 1 |
| Rental units | 2.27 | 6.15 | 1 | 370 |
| N | 7,119 | | | |

## E. Argument that there is not significant tenant turnover when landlords change

The change-in-ownership analysis is meant to examine how large and small landlords differ in their uses of eviction filings when renting to the same tenants, by observing how filing rates change when rental properties change ownership. Accordingly, it relies on the assumption that the tenants that the new landlord rents to are the same as those that the old landlord rented to. I argue that this is a defensible assumption for the following reasons.

The analysis shows a large increase in filing rates when small landlords sell to large landlords, and it is hard to explain this finding if tenants were changing in that year. First, an analysis of the names of plaintiffs (discussed in the main text) shows that the new landlords are filing the vast majority of the evictions in the transfer year. This means that the new, large landlords are either filing against the old tenants or against new tenants that they had selected. If they were filing against new tenants they had selected, there is no reason why the filing rate would be particularly high in that transfer year. We would expect the filing rate to be similar to the rate in the forthcoming years since the next crop of tenants should be no different, on average, than the ones just filed against. In contrast, if the large landlords were renting to the old tenants it would make sense that the filing rate would be higher in the transfer year compared to subsequent ones because these tenants are different than those that the landlord would select. The new owners are interacting with tenants they did not select and who may not meet their criteria. They then evict those tenants at a particularly high rate, before falling to the more stable rate that they have when renting to tenants that they have selected. Also, if the new owners were filing against new tenants, they would have to have bought the property, found tenants, and filed against them all in the same year, or in the same six months if they bought the property mid-year. While that is not impossible, it is a very short timeline. Given this, I think the most likely explanation is that the new landlords are buying the properties with tenants living there and then evicting those existing tenants.

## F. Unconditional filing fees by year for main sample

Section F shows unconditional plots of filing rate by year relative to property transfer for properties that changed ownership. These unconditional plots demonstrate that the trends shown in the main results (Figure 2) are present in the unconditional data. F1 shows the filing rates for properties that were originally owned by a small landlord, F2 shows the rates for those originally owned by a medium landlord and F3 shows those for properties owned by a large landlord. In the first two plots, the filing rate rises dramatically at properties that sold to large landlords. In the third plot, there is no noticeable change in filing rates except a general downward trend.

**Figure F1: Unconditional filing fees by year for main sample (originally small landlord)**




**Figure F2: Unconditional filing fees by year for main sample (originally medium landlord)**



**Figure F3: Unconditional filing fees by year for main sample (originally large landlord)**



## G. Unconditional plots of balanced 3-year sample

As a further check that the trends seen in Figure 2 are not the result of modeling artifacts, G1, G2, and G3 show the unconditional mean eviction filing rates for properties that changed owners, in the years surrounding the ownership transfer. As opposed to the figures F1, F2, and F3, which describe the main sample, the figures G1, G2, and G3 pertain to a balanced sample of properties such that we have 3 year of data before and after the transfer year. G1 shows the filing rates of properties that were originally owned by small landlords, but were sold to either small, medium, or large landlords. G2 shows the filing rates of properties that were originally owned by medium landlords, and G3 shows the filing rates of properties that were originally owned by large landlords. These unconditional plots show trends very similar to those shown in the predicted values after modeling – namely an increase in eviction rates when small and medium landlords sell to large landlords – which suggests that these trends are not model artifacts.

**Figure G1: Unconditional filing rate by year for balanced sample (originally small landlord)**




**Figure G2: Unconditional filing rate by year for balanced sample (originally medium landlord)**




**Figure G3: Unconditional filing rate by year for balanced sample (originally large landlord)**



## H. Modeling the balanced 3-year sample

Figure H1 shows the predicted filing rates for properties that were originally owned by small landlords but changed ownership, modeled using the same OLS fixed effects regression as used in Figure 2. As when modeling the unbalanced sample, these results show a steep increase in filing rates in the year that properties transfer to large landlords but only a small increase, or no increase, when they sell to medium and small-scale owners.

**Figure H1: Predicted filing rate before and after change in ownership (3-year balanced sample)**



## I. Filing rates at properties originally owned by medium and large landlords (placebo test)

In the change-in-ownership history analysis presented in Figure 2 of the paper, there is a large increase in eviction rate associated with a sale from a small owner to a large owner. To examine whether this spike in filing is a result of the new owner, or simply of a sale, I undertook two placebo tests. Figures I1 and I2 show the predicted filing rates for properties that were originally owned by medium-scale and large-scale owners, respectively, but were later sold. In Figure I1, properties originally owned by medium-scale owners that sold to medium and small-scale owners see no statistically-significant increase in filing rate during or after the transaction. Those that sold to large-scale owners, however, show a statistically significant increase filing rate in the transaction year and the subsequent year. Figure I2 shows the same predicted filing rates, but for properties originally owned by large owners. In this case, we see no statistically significant or substantively large change in filing rate when the property is sold. In summary, there is an increase in filing rate only when small and medium owners sell to large owners, suggesting the increase is a product of the new owner rather than of the sale itself. The analyses and figures in this section are based on the full, unbalanced sample.

**Figure I1: Plot of predicted filing rate at properties originally owned by medium owner**




**Figure I2: Plot of predicted filing rate at properties originally owned by large owner**


Predicted eviction filing rate
0.03
0.00
-0.03
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
Years before or after start of property transfer year
Transfer types
Large to Large
Large to Medium
Large to Small

## J. Matching properties that sold to different types of owners

To ensure that the properties that sold from small to small, small to medium, and small to large owners are really comparable, I conducted covariate-balanced propensity score matching between the groups and compared the weighted control and treatment samples (Imai and Ratkovic 2014). This analysis was conducted with the balanced 3-year sample, to ensure the matched samples had the same numbers of years of observations.

First, I matched properties that sold from small to large owners to those that sold from small to small owners. Figure J1 shows a density plot of the estimated propensity scores for each sample. The plot shows substantial overlap, with a similar range of propensity score values, suggesting that matching through reweighting is appropriate. Figure J2 shows the unconditional filing rates for these two samples in the years before and after the sale, reweighted by propensity scores. Again, we see similar filing rates before the sale followed by a dramatic increase in filing rates for those that sold to large owners.

Next, I matched properties that sold from small to medium owners to those that sold from small to medium, using the same procedure. Figure J3 shows that there is considerable overlap in the propensity scores, and Figure J4 shows the unconditional filing rates in each year. In the years leading up to the sale, those properties that would sell to medium landlord show somewhat higher filing rates, but the two groups then overlap in the year before the sale. Following the sale, the properties that sold to medium landlords show higher filing rates. In summary, matching properties that sold to different owners reinforces the findings from the event history analysis, that selling to large landlords increases filing rates at a property, and to a lesser extent selling to medium landlords does the same.

**Figure J1: Density plot of propensity scores (matching large to small)**




**Figure J2: Unconditional plot of weighted samples (matching large to small)**




**Figure J3: Density plot of propensity scores (matching medium to small)**




**Figure J4: Unconditional plot of weighted samples (matching medium to small)**


0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01
Average eviction filing rate
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
Years before or after start of property transfer year
Transfer types
Small ---> Medium
Small ---> Small

## K. Unconditional plots to examine pre- and post-trends

Next I examine the trends in eviction filings in the years before and after a property sale to determine whether there are meaningful trends before the sale and whether large landlords' elevated filing rates decrease over time or continue indefinitely. The results from Figure 2 in the main text show trends only for the four years before and after a sale, whereas I am interested in a longer time period. In order to observe unconditional trends for these longer time periods, I construct two balanced samples of properties with six years of data before and after the sale, respectively. I prefer unconditional filing rates from balanced samples, rather than predicted values from models of unbalanced samples, because the former offer a more unmediated view of the data. When constructing a balanced sample with limited years of data, there are tradeoffs in which years are shown. For example, in order to have a balanced sample with six years of data before the year of transfer and at least one during and one after, the transfer must occur in either 2014 or 2015, since I have eviction data for only 2008 to 2016. Accordingly, the samples observing the pre and post trends must contain different properties. Below, I present the unconditional filing rates at these properties, in order to analyze the long-term pre and post-trends associated with a property transfer.

Figure K1 shows the filing rates for the "pre-trend" sample. There is considerable overlap in the eviction filing rates before the transfer, with all showing rates between 0 and 1.5%. There is a slight uptick in filing before the transfer for those properties that sold to medium owners, but there is no such uptick at properties that sold to large owners. This pre-trend in the small-to-medium properties is likely a random facet of this particular sample, since no such trend appears in the main sample (shown in Figure F1) or the three-year balanced sample (shown in Figure G1). Altogether, these unconditional rates suggest that the properties are very similar in their eviction rates before they are sold to new owners and have minimal pre-trends.

Figure K2 shows the filing rates for the "post-trend" sample. Interestingly, the heightened eviction filing rate at large owners' properties does not appear to decline substantially with time. Even six years after the transfer, the filing rate at those properties is dramatically higher than at those properties that sold to small and medium landlords. This is in contrast to the trend in Figure 2, which shows a decline after the initial transfer spike, back toward the pre-transfer filing rate. However, Figure K2 matches the trend in Figure I1, in which properties that sold from medium to large owners had heightened filing rates four years after the transfer. These findings suggest that when large landlords buy properties, even after the one or two-year period of very high eviction activity there is a new status quo rate that is lower than the transfer years but still substantially higher than the pre-transfer average.

**Figure K1: Unconditional filings rates of pre-trend sample**




**Figure K2: Unconditional filing rates of post-trend sample**



## L. Robustness checks

In Section L I conduct two final robustness checks of the change-in-ownership analysis presented in Figure 2. First, in L.i, I examine whether the inclusion of additional control variables changes the results. Next, in L.ii, I examine whether modeling different subsamples of properties changes the results. In both analyses, the primary finding of a steep increase in filing rates when properties are sold to large owners remains.

I did not test different distributional assumptions because estimating using alternative distributions, e.g. poisson and negative binomial, would omit important information. When estimating these models, the algorithm omits properties in which there is no variation in the outcome. However, I consider a transfer with no filings to be an important piece of information that should be incorporated into the coefficient estimates.

### i. Different controls

Figure L1 shows predicted values of eviction filing rates for properties that transferred from small to large, small to medium, and small to small owners, with controls for the logged building valuation per square foot, logged building valuation per unit, and logged land valuation per square foot, plus indicator variables specifying whether the observation is the first or last observation for that property. The results are largely the same as those from the model that does not control for these characteristics. I considered adding other controls, such as remodeling or new construction. However, these types of changes are under the control of landlords, and if including them in the analysis reduced the association between large-scale landlords and eviction filings, I would consider it as elucidating the mechanism through which large landlords lead to higher rates of eviction rather than controlling for a confounding third variable. Since I am interested in ensuring the robustness of this analysis to omitted confounding variables, rather than conducting a mediation analysis, I did not include those variables.

**Figure L1: Predicted filing rates with additional controls**



## ii. Different subsamples

As a further robustness check, figures L2 through L5 replicate Figure 2, but modeling separately single-family, two-family, three-family, and condominium rental properties. In each model, in the transfer year there is a steep and persistent increase in filing rates for those properties that sold to large owners. The estimates have larger standard deviations, reflecting the smaller sample sizes for these analyses, but the changes in filing rates are similar in scale to those in the full sample. The largest increase is at single-family properties and the smallest at condominiums.

**Figure L2: Single-family properties**




**Figure L3: Two-family properties**



**Figure L4: Three-family properties**




**Figure L5: Condominiums**



# Eviction filing analysis

Sections M through O show additional analyses related to the modeling of filing characteristics in Table 3. First, I present descriptive statistics of all filings. Next, I demonstrate that the higher rate of landlord-conflict calls during filings by small landlords is not simply a result of higher rates of landlord-tenant conflict at all times, but instead reflects a particular facet of the filing process. Finally, I conduct robustness checks for each analysis, altering control variables, distributional assumptions, and analytic samples.

## M. Descriptive statistics of filings

Table M1 shows descriptive statistics for the filings analyzed. The sample omits any filings that were transferred from other court systems or due to foreclosure, were filed by a non-profit or Boston Housing Authority, or were geocoded to non-residential properties.

**Table M1: Descriptive statistics of eviction filings**

| Variable | Mean | Standard deviation | Minimum | Maximum |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Initiating action | | | | |
| Non-payment of rent | 0.81 | 0.39 | 0 | 1 |
| Cause | 0.19 | 0.39 | 0 | 1 |
| Other filing outcomes | | | | |
| Has judgment money | 0.35 | 0.48 | 0 | 1 |
| Judgment money | 3003.15 | 3089.95 | 175 | 16837.55 |
| Executed | 0.45 | 0.5 | 0 | 1 |
| Serial | 0.16 | 0.37 | 0 | 1 |
| Landlord-tenant conflict | 0.03 | 0.17 | 0 | 1 |
| Landlord scale | | | | |
| Small | 0.22 | 0.42 | 0 | 1 |
| Medium | 0.15 | 0.35 | 0 | 1 |
| Large | 0.63 | 0.48 | 0 | 1 |
| Landlord proximity to tenants | | | | |
| Co-resident | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0 | 1 |
| Lives outside Boston | 0.33 | 0.47 | 0 | 1 |
| Landlord organizational structure | | | | |
| Property manager | 0.29 | 0.45 | 0 | 1 |
| Company | 0.4 | 0.49 | 0 | 1 |
| LLC linked to person | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0 | 1 |
| Person | 0.4 | 0.49 | 0 | 1 |
| Other landlord characteristics | | | | |
| Imputed household income | 90413.97 | 19328.69 | 9750 | 250001 |
| Inherited property | 0.01 | 0.11 | 0 | 1 |
| Changes in ownership | | | | |
| Property sold last year | 0.06 | 0.24 | 0 | 1 |
| Property sold this year | 0.08 | 0.27 | 0 | 1 |
| Property type | | | | |
| Condominium | 0.04 | 0.21 | 0 | 1 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Single-family | 0.02 | 0.14 | 0 | 1 |
| Two-family | 0.1 | 0.31 | 0 | 1 |
| Three-family | 0.25 | 0.43 | 0 | 1 |
| 4-6 unit | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0 | 1 |
| 7-30 unit | 0.26 | 0.44 | 0 | 1 |
| 30+ unit | 0.22 | 0.41 | 0 | 1 |
| Land and building valuation | | | | |
| Land val per sf | 42.07 | 54.6 | 0 | 400 |
| Building val per sf | 82.84 | 100.72 | 0.53 | 1200 |
| Building val per unit | 87759.71 | 81570.8 | 30000 | 2000000 |
| Year built and remodeled | | | | |
| Year built | 1924.71 | 30.83 | 1800 | 2013 |
| Year remodeled | 2000.98 | 16.38 | 1900 | 2017 |
| Not remodeled | 0.4 | 0.49 | 0 | 1 |
| Other property characteristics | | | | |
| Place-based subsidy | 0.36 | 0.48 | 0 | 1 |
| Rental units | 29.16 | 65.44 | 1 | 1407 |
| N | 17,877 | | | |

## N. Conflict interaction model

Table 3 Model 5 predicts, for each eviction filing, the number of 911 calls about landlord-tenant conflict that were placed at that property and year. The findings shows that small-scale owners are much more likely than medium and large-scale owners to have these landlord-tenant conflict calls. However, it is unclear from this analysis whether the trends arise simply because small landlords have more conflict with tenants in all years and thus do not reflect anything particular to their filing years. To test whether small landlords have more conflict in general or particularly during eviction filings, Table N1 estimates landlord-tenant conflict calls in all years, with an interaction between landlord scale and whether there was a filing at that property in that year. This allows us to disentangle the association between scale and conflict in general from the association between scale and conflict during evictions. Model 1 analyzes the associatiosn with landlord scale, while Model 2 includes a broader array of landlord characteristics (discussed in Online Appendix Section R).

Model 1 shows that there is no statistically significant association between landlord-tenant conflict and landlord scale in general. However, landlord-tenant conflict is strongly associated with the interaction between eviction filings and landlord scale. In years in which there was an eviction filing, the rate of landlord-tenant conflict calls increases by .0948 at properties owned by small landlords, by .0282 (.0948-.0666) at properties owned by medium landlords, and only .0002 (.0948-.0946) at properties owned by large landlords. This suggests that although there is little difference between landlords in the degree of landlord-tenant conflict when not going through eviction, during eviction filings small landlords have much more conflict with tenants. Model 2 includes a wider range of landlord characteristics and is discussed in Section R.

**Table N1: Conflict interaction model**

| | Landlord scale (1) | Multiple landlord characteristics (2) |
|---|---|---|
| Landlord scale (ref. small) | | |
| Medium | -0.0000156 | 0.000642 |
| | (0.000429) | (0.000449) |
| Large | 0.000353 | 0.00115* |
| | (0.000477) | (0.000505) |
| Landlord proximity to tenants | | |
| Co-resident | | 0.00205*** |
| | | (0.000434) |
| Lives outside Boston | | 0.00000596 |
| | | (0.000306) |
| Landlord organizational structure | | |
| Property manager | | 0.000330 |
| | | (0.000349) |
| Company | | 0.000319 |
| | | (0.000453) |
| LLC linked to person | | -0.000521* |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | | (0.000261) |
| Other landlord characteristics | | |
| Imputed household income (100,000s) | | -0.000564 |
| | | (0.000479) |
| Inherited property | | 0.00102 |
| | | (0.000960) |
| Filing variables | | |
| Filing | 0.0948*** | 0.0708*** |
| | (0.00770) | (0.00847) |
| Filing X medium | -0.0666*** | -0.0406*** |
| | (0.00874) | (0.00847) |
| Filing X large | -0.0946*** | -0.0580*** |
| | (0.00771) | (0.00733) |
| Filing X co-resident | | 0.0711*** |
| | | (0.0167) |
| Filing X outside Boston | | -0.0157*** |
| | | (0.00340) |
| Filing X property manager | | -0.000332 |
| | | (0.000860) |
| Filing X company | | -0.0201*** |
| | | (0.00357) |
| Filing X LLC | | -0.00465** |
| | | (0.00179) |
| Filing X HH income | | 0.00522* |
| | | (0.00263) |
| Filing X inherited | | -0.000500 |
| | | (0.0110) |
| Changes in ownership | | |
| Property sold last year | -0.000697 | 0.000102 |
| | (0.000642) | (0.000634) |
| Property sold this year | -0.00130 | -0.000338 |
| | (0.000675) | (0.000663) |
| Property type (Ref:3-family) | | |
| Single-family | -0.00315*** | -0.00191** |
| | (0.000691) | (0.000705) |
| Two-family | -0.00241*** | -0.00249*** |
| | (0.000642) | (0.000645) |
| 4-6 unit | -0.00312*** | -0.00370*** |
| | (0.000789) | (0.000783) |
| Land and building valuation | | |
| Land val per sf (100s) | -0.000730** | -0.000621* |
| | (0.000224) | (0.000254) |
| Building val per sf (100s) | -0.000737*** | 0.000114 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | (0.000210) | (0.000269) |
| Building val per unit (100,000s) | 0.000311*** | -0.000154 |
| | (0.0000914) | (0.0000922) |
| Year built and remodeled (linear) | | |
| Year built (decades before 2018) | 0.000225*** | 0.000211** |
| | (0.0000638) | (0.0000662) |
| Year remodeled (decades before 2018) | -0.000139 | -0.000146 |
| | (0.000123) | (0.000127) |
| Not remodeled | 0.000304 | -0.0000147 |
| | (0.000514) | (0.000537) |
| Other property characteristics | | |
| Place-based subsidy | -0.00386*** | -0.00347*** |
| | (0.000544) | (0.000569) |
| Intercept | 0.00114 | 0.00175 |
| | (0.00147) | (0.00152) |
| N | 543042 | 542308 |
| Log likelihood | 650003.2 | 650394.2 |

## O. Robustness checks

Section O presents robustness checks that examine the results from using different distributions, control variables, and subsamples for the analyses presented in Table 3. Each model from Table 3 is checked separately, beginning with judgment money.

### i. Judgment money

Table O1 shows the results of estimating judgment money using models with different distributions and including different control variables. Model 1 shows the original model presented in Table 3, Model 1. Model 2 uses the same variables, but re-estimates the outcome according to a poisson distribution. Model 3 returns to the OLS distribution, but logs the building valuation variables and operationalizes the year built and remodeled variables as factors. Model 4 includes filings that were initiated as cause rather than non-payment of rent and includes a variables that specifies the initiating action. Model 5 caps the outcome at the 95$^{th}$ percentile, whereas past analyses were capped at the 99$^{th}$ percentile. In all of these models, large landlords have filing that are significantly smaller than those of small landlords, on average about $325 to $390 lower. These alternate models show that this finding is robust and not an artifact of modeling decisions.

**Table O1: Judgment money: different distributions and control variables**

| | Original (1) | Poisson (2) | New building control variables (3) | Including cause filings (4) | Limiting top values (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Landlord scale (ref. small) | | | | | |
| Medium | 30.87 | -.005*** | -8.47 | 41.58 | 17.48 |
| | (134.12) | (.0007) | (134.94) | (120.56) | (105.63) |
| Large | -377.4** | -.100*** | -383.4** | -325.12** | -386.68*** |
| | (139.12) | (.0007) | (140.35) | (125.61) | (109.57) |
| Changes in ownership | | | | | |
| Property sold last year | 297.43 | .092 *** | 290.29 | 229.3 | 283.49* |
| | (167.97) | (.0009) | (168) | (149.43) | (132.28) |
| Property sold this year | 252.22 | .065*** | 244.11 | -38.95 | 122.43 |
| | (173.39) | (.0010) | (173.48) | (145.42) | (136.55) |
| Property type (Ref:3-family) | | | | | |
| Condominium | 235.87 | .147*** | -315.13 | 278.82 | 208.02 |
| | (267.85) | (.0016) | (496.63) | (242.8) | (210.94) |
| Single-family | 348.89 | .130*** | 443.21 | -56.18 | 211.31 |
| | (370.7) | (.0019) | (370.01) | (316.44) | (291.94) |
| Two-family | -230.38 | -.030*** | -191.59 | -177.48 | -194.32 |
| | (153.41) | (.0008) | (154.59) | (135.43) | (120.81) |
| 4-6 unit | 99.18 | .027*** | 135.79 | 172.86 | 102.3 |
| | (168.52) | (.0010) | (167.22) | (155.56) | (132.72) |
| 7-30 unit | 23.55 | .006*** | 198.72 | 43.84 | 2.53 |
| | (180.7) | (.0010) | (181.92) | (165.95) | (142.31) |
| 30+ unit | 322.81 | .135*** | 556.43* | 318.93 | 325.38 |
| | (240.26) | (.0015) | (243.08) | (222.18) | (189.21) |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Land and building valuation | | | | | |
| Land val per sf (100s) | 175.62 | .079*** | | 138.43 | 80.24 |
| | (156.01) | (.0009) | | (142.42) | (122.86) |
| Building val per sf (100s) | 20.75 | -.008*** | | 16.4 | -29.54 |
| | (80.12) | (.0005) | | (75.24) | (63.1) |
| Building val per unit (100,000s) | 258.48** | .021*** | | 254.23** | 165.72* |
| | (87.52) | (.0004) | | (77.8) | (68.93) |
| Land val per sf (log) | | | -139.8 | | |
| | | | (109.69) | | |
| Building val per sf (log) | | | 85.05 | | |
| | | | (120.23) | | |
| Building val per unit (log) | | | 155.25 | | |
| | | | (116.35) | | |
| Year built and remodeled (linear) | | | | | |
| Year built (decades before 2018) | -75.11*** | -.021*** | | -57.06** | -64.15*** |
| | (20.21) | (.0001) | | (18.2) | (15.91) |
| Year remodeled (decades before 2018) | 23.7 | .007*** | | 24.3 | 10.86 |
| | (43.45) | (.0002) | | (40.1) | (34.22) |
| Not remodeled | 331.25* | .096*** | | 388.62** | 215.02 |
| | (141.43) | (.0008) | | (129.07) | (111.38) |
| Year built (ref. pre-1900) | | | | | |
| Built 1900-1925 | | | 201.79 | | |
| | | | (130.56) | | |
| Built 1925-1950 | | | 161.89 | | |
| | | | (173.09) | | |
| Built 1950-1975 | | | 181.83 | | |
| | | | (200.76) | | |
| Built 1975-2000 | | | 1085.36*** | | |
| | | | (307.25) | | |
| Built 2000+ | | | 1234.04** | | |
| | | | (384.28) | | |
| Year remodeled (ref. not remodeled) | | | | | |
| Remodeled pre 1975 | | | -16.85 | | |
| | | | (247.4) | | |
| Remodeled 1975-2000 | | | -232.85* | | |
| | | | (106.05) | | |
| Remodeled 2000+ | | | -2731.49 | | |
| | | | (1552.24) | | |
| Other property characteristics | | | | | |
| Place-based subsidy | -1181.42*** | -.472*** | -1218.41*** | -1071.54*** | -1129.28*** |
| | (142.03) | (.0009) | (152.62) | (131.77) | (111.86) |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rental units | -7.53*** | -.003*** | -7.96*** | -6.98*** | -6*** |
| | (1.95) | (.0000) | (1.99) | (1.78) | (1.53) |
| Initiating action | | | | | |
| Cause | | | | -1755.62*** | |
| Intercept | 5652.4*** | 8.722*** | 3660.57* | 5224.5*** | 4937.97*** |
| | (953.54) | (.0049) | (1490.01) | (908.02) | (750.96) |
| | | | | (105.82) | |
| N | 5628 | 5628 | 5628 | 6619 | 5628 |
| Log likelihood | -52884.2 | -5648252 | -52882.2 | -62181.9 | -515340 |

Table O2 shows the results of modeling the judgment for filings at different types of properties separately. Model 1 includes only one and two-family properties, Model 2 only three-family properties, Model 3 only four-to-six-unit properties, and Model 4 only condominiums. Interestingly, the association appears to be driven by lower judgment amounts only at three-family properties, whereas at four-to-six unit properties and condominiums there is no significant difference and large landlords appear to have higher judgment amounts at single-family properties. However, there are more filings at three-family properties than at the other types of properties combined, which explains why the overall association between scale and judgment money is negative.

**Table O2: Different subsamples**

| | One and two-family properties (1) | Three-family properties (2) | Four-to-six-unit properties (3) | Condominiums (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Landlord scale (ref. small) | | | | |
| Medium | 22.26 | -156.65 | 314.06 | 46.55 |
| | (417.14) | (192.28) | (1359.96) | (698.62) |
| Large | 1225.88* | -898.08*** | 85.57 | 19.26 |
| | (482.76) | (212.17) | (1377.63) | (628.81) |
| Changes in ownership | | | | |
| Property sold last year | -637.07 | 666.25* | -279.11 | 537.92 |
| | (486.34) | (281.92) | (625.88) | (685.78) |
| Property sold this year | -705.71 | 449.92 | -101.42 | -149.72 |
| | (602.51) | (299.57) | (536.01) | (828.37) |
| Land and building valuation | | | | |
| Land val per sf (100s) | -2647.75 | 726.97 | 386.64 | |
| | (1650.61) | (795.64) | (956.6) | |
| Building val per sf (100s) | 563.99 | 244.18 | -362.53 | 104.8 |
| | (1290.66) | (834.16) | (293.2) | (309.94) |
| Building val per unit (100,000s) | 102.99 | 377.1 | 619.75 | 681.07* |
| | (375.6) | (363.42) | (583.63) | (299.55) |
| Year built and remodeled (linear) | | | | |
| Year built (decades before 2018) | -84.07 | -55.38 | -71.53 | -158.72 |
| | (63.53) | (54.35) | (82.12) | (97.99) |
| Year remodeled (decades before 2018) | 287.77 | 290.33** | -97.31 | 688.77* |
| | (202.46) | (110.33) | (119.61) | (332.37) |
| Not remodeled | 527.31 | 728.81** | 207.71 | 1838.43 |
| | (535.31) | (272.57) | (615.1) | (951.97) |
| Other property characteristics | | | | |
| Place-based subsidy | -4292.27** | -1712.51*** | -1106.29* | |
| | (1398.38) | (407.31) | (443.08) | |
| Rental units | 388.73 | 234.54 | 50.41 | |
| | (490.35) | (254.72) | (217.89) | |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Single-family | 1026.07 | | | |
| | (537.89) | | | |
| Intercept | 5515.09 | 4549.47* | 2259.11 | 2733.28 |
| | (3131.93) | (2245.73) | (3023.17) | (3631.34) |
| N | 746 | 1886 | 618 | 285 |
| Log likelihood | -7040.1 | -17772.9 | -5781.8 | -2642.3 |

## ii. Initiating action

Table O3 shows the results of estimating initiating actions using models with different distributions and including different control variables. Model 1 shows the original model presented in Table 3, Model 2. Model 2 uses the same variables, but re-estimates the outcome according to a normal distribution, making it a linear probability model. Model 3 returns to the logistic distribution, but logs the building valuation variables and operationalizes the year built and remodeled variables as factors. In all of these models, large landlords have filing that are much more likely to be over non-payment of rent compared to those of small landlords. These alternate models show that this finding is robust and not an artifact of modeling decisions.

**Table O3: Initiating action: different distributions and control variables**

| | Original<br>(1) | Linear probability models<br>(2) | New building control variables<br>(3) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Landlord scale (ref. small) | | | |
| Medium | 0.39*** | 0.07*** | 0.38*** |
| | (0.06) | (0.01) | (0.06) |
| Large | 0.66*** | 0.11*** | 0.64*** |
| | (0.07) | (0.01) | (0.07) |
| Changes in ownership | | | |
| Property sold last year | -0.48*** | -0.08*** | -0.48*** |
| | (0.07) | (0.01) | (0.07) |
| Property sold this year | -1.28*** | -0.26*** | -1.28*** |
| | (0.06) | (0.01) | (0.06) |
| Property type (Ref:3-family) | | | |
| Condominium | -0.32* | -0.05* | -0.46 |
| | (0.13) | (0.02) | (0.24) |
| Single-family | -0.55*** | -0.11*** | -0.58*** |
| | (0.13) | (0.02) | (0.13) |
| Two-family | -0.3*** | -0.05*** | -0.31*** |
| | (0.07) | (0.01) | (0.07) |
| 4-6 unit | 0.15 | 0.01 | 0.13 |
| | (0.09) | (0.01) | (0.09) |
| 7-30 unit | 0.39*** | 0.03** | 0.33*** |
| | (0.09) | (0.01) | (0.1) |
| 30+ unit | 0.67*** | 0.06*** | 0.59*** |
| | (0.13) | (0.02) | (0.13) |
| Land and building valuation | | | |
| Land val per sf (100s) | 0.01 | 0.00 | |
| | (0.08) | (0.01) | |
| Building val per sf (100s) | 0.13** | 0.02** | |
| | (0.05) | (0.01) | |
| Building val per unit (100,000s) | -0.05 | -0.01 | |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | (0.04) | (0.01) | |
| Land val per sf (log) | | | -0.07 |
| | | | (0.05) |
| Building val per sf (log) | | | 0.07 |
| | | | (0.06) |
| Building val per unit (log) | | | -0.09 |
| | | | (0.06) |
| Year built and remodeled (linear) | | | |
| Year built (decades before 2018) | 0.02* | 0.00 | |
| | (0.01) | (0.00) | |
| Year remodeled (decades before 2018) | 0.00 | 0.00 | |
| | (0.02) | (0.00) | |
| Not remodeled | -0.10 | -0.02 | |
| | (0.07) | (0.01) | |
| Year built (ref. pre-1900) | | | |
| Built 1900-1925 | | | -0.08 |
| | | | (0.07) |
| Built 1925-1950 | | | -0.09 |
| | | | (0.09) |
| Built 1950-1975 | | | 0.06 |
| | | | (0.11) |
| Built 1975-2000 | | | -0.48*** |
| | | | (0.14) |
| Built 2000+ | | | -0.13 |
| | | | (0.16) |
| Year remodeled (ref. not remodeled) | | | |
| Remodeled pre 1975 | | | -0.09 |
| | | | (0.12) |
| Remodeled 1975-2000 | | | 0.1* |
| | | | (0.05) |
| Remodeled 2000+ | | | -0.43 |
| | | | (0.75) |
| Other property characteristics | | | |
| Place-based subsidy | -0.17* | -0.02* | -0.21* |
| | (0.08) | (0.01) | (0.08) |
| Rental units | 0.00** | 0.00* | 0.00* |
| | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Intercept | 1.1*** | 0.75*** | 2.25*** |
| | (0.21) | (0.03) | (0.62) |
| N | 18049 | 18049 | 18049 |
| Log likelihood | -7861. 9 | -7715.5 | -7855.9 |

Table O4 shows the results of modeling the initiating action for filings at different types of properties separately. Model 1 includes only one and two-family properties, Model 2 only three-family properties, Model 3 only four-to-six-unit properties, and Model 4 only condominiums. In all models large landlords are more likely to file over non-payment of rent, although at one and two-family properties and four-to-six unit properties the coefficient is not statistically significant because of the size of the standard error. Nevertheless, the coefficient is large. Likewise, medium landlords are more likely to file over non-payment of rent at one and two-family properties, three-family properties, and condominiums, although in the latter case the standard error is too large to achieve significance.

**Table O4: Initiating action: different subsamples**

| | One and two-family properties (1) | Three-family properties (2) | Four-to-six-unit properties (3) | Condominiums (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Landlord scale (ref. small) | | | | |
| Medium | 0.32* | 0.40*** | -0.09 | 0.39 |
| | (0.15) | (0.09) | (0.55) | (0.3) |
| Large | 0.33 | 0.54*** | 0.34 | 0.86** |
| | (0.17) | (0.1) | (0.57) | (0.27) |
| Changes in ownership | | | | |
| Property sold last year | -0.47** | -0.51*** | -0.70* | -0.32 |
| | (0.17) | (0.12) | (0.27) | (0.3) |
| Property sold this year | -1.69*** | -1.27*** | -0.71** | -2.06*** |
| | (0.13) | (0.1) | (0.24) | (0.25) |
| Land and building valuation | | | | |
| Land val per sf (100s) | 1.04 | 0.00 | -0.06 | |
| | (0.63) | (0.35) | (0.29) | |
| Building val per sf (100s) | 0.34 | -0.12 | -0.10 | 0.40** |
| | (0.42) | (0.29) | (0.20) | (0.15) |
| Building val per unit (100,000s) | -0.16 | -0.38** | 0.01 | 0.08 |
| | (0.12) | (0.14) | (0.25) | (0.1) |
| Year built and remodeled (linear) | | | | |
| Year built (decades before 2018) | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.11** |
| | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Year remodeled (decades before 2018) | -0.06 | -0.14** | -0.07 | 0.32* |
| | (0.07) | (0.05) | (0.07) | (0.15) |
| Not remodeled | -0.3 | -0.47*** | 0.00 | 0.86* |
| | (0.19) | (0.13) | (0.33) | (0.4) |
| Other property characteristics | | | | |
| Place-based subsidy | 0.58 | 0.44 | 0.1 | |
| | (0.52) | (0.24) | (0.23) | |
| Rental units | -0.19 | -0.1 | 0.02 | |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (0.17) | (0.11) | (0.11) | |
| Single-family | -0.26 | | | |
| | (0.17) | | | |
| Intercept | 1.83** | 2.41*** | 1.83 | 13.81 |
| | (0.69) | (0.56) | (0.95) | (4593.08) |
| N | 2661 | 5654 | 1980 | 950 |
| Log likelihood | -1443.5 | -2705.3 | -683.1 | -374.2 |

### iii. Execution

Table O5 shows the results of estimating whether filings reached exeuction using models with different distributions and including different control variables. Model 1 shows the original model presented in Table 3, Model 3. Model 2 uses the same variables, but re-estimates the outcome according to a normal distribution, making it a linear probability model. Model 3 returns to the logistic distribution, but logs the building valuation variables and operationalizes the year built and remodeled variables as factors. Model 4 includes a control variable indicating whether filings were initiated as cause rather than non-payment of rent, to check whether execution differences between small and large landlords are just a result of their different reasons for filing. Model 5 re-estimates the original model, but only for filings whose initiating actions were non-payment of rent. In all of these models, large landlords are less likely to carry the filing through to execution, and in most of the models medium landlords are as well. These alternate models show that this finding is robust and not an artifact of modeling decisions.

**Table O5: Execution: different distributions and controls**

| | Original (1) | Linear probability model (2) | New building control variables (3) | Initiating action control (4) | Only non-payment of rent (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Landlord scale (ref. small) | | | | | |
| Medium | -0.10 | -0.02 | -0.12* | -0.11* | -0.13* |
| | (0.05) | (0.01) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.06) |
| Large | -0.38*** | -0.09*** | -0.41*** | -0.4*** | -0.49*** |
| | (0.05) | (0.01) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.06) |
| Changes in ownership | | | | | |
| Property sold last year | -0.10 | -0.02 | -0.09 | -0.09 | -0.08 |
| | (0.06) | (0.02) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.07) |
| Property sold this year | -0.29*** | -0.07*** | -0.29*** | -0.24*** | -0.14 |
| | (0.06) | (0.01) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.08) |
| Property type (Ref:3-family) | | | | | |
| Condominium | 0.05 | 0.01 | -0.04 | 0.06 | 0.07 |
| | (0.1) | (0.02) | (0.18) | (0.1) | (0.12) |
| Single-family | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.05 | 0.03 | 0.06 |
| | (0.12) | (0.03) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.15) |
| Two-family | -0.03 | -0.01 | 0.01 | -0.02 | -0.01 |
| | (0.06) | (0.01) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.07) |
| 4-6 unit | -0.02 | -0.01 | -0.07 | -0.02 | -0.02 |
| | (0.06) | (0.02) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.07) |
| 7-30 unit | 0.07 | 0.02 | -0.02 | 0.06 | 0.11 |
| | (0.07) | (0.02) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.08) |
| 30+ unit | 0.13 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.12 | 0.21* |
| | (0.09) | (0.02) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.1) |
| Land and building valuation | | | | | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Land val per sf (100s) | -0.11 | -0.03 | | -0.11 | -0.08 |
| | (0.06) | (0.01) | | (0.06) | (0.07) |
| Building val per sf (100s) | -0.01 | 0.00 | | -0.01 | 0.02 |
| | (0.03) | (0.01) | | (0.03) | (0.04) |
| Building val per unit (100,000s) | -0.09** | -0.02** | | -0.09** | -0.1** |
| | (0.03) | (0.01) | | (0.03) | (0.04) |
| Land val per sf (log) | | | -0.02 | | |
| | | | (0.04) | | |
| Building val per sf (log) | | | 0.09* | | |
| | | | (0.05) | | |
| Building val per unit (log) | | | -0.22*** | | |
| | | | (0.04) | | |
| Year built and remodeled (linear) | | | | | |
| Year built (decades before 2018) | 0.01 | 0.00 | | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| | (0.01) | (0.00) | | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Year remodeled (decades before 2018) | -0.02 | 0.00 | | -0.02 | -0.01 |
| | (0.02) | (0.00) | | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Not remodeled | -0.09 | -0.02 | | -0.09 | -0.09 |
| | (0.05) | (0.01) | | (0.06) | (0.06) |
| Year built (ref. pre-1900) | | | | | |
| Built 1900-1925 | | | -0.04 | | |
| | | | (0.05) | | |
| Built 1925-1950 | | | -0.06 | | |
| | | | (0.07) | | |
| Built 1950-1975 | | | -0.04 | | |
| | | | (0.08) | | |
| Built 1975-2000 | | | 0.02 | | |
| | | | (0.11) | | |
| Built 2000+ | | | -0.3* | | |
| | | | (0.13) | | |
| Year remodeled (ref. not remodeled) | | | | | |
| Remodeled pre 1975 | | | -0.14 | | |
| | | | (0.09) | | |
| Remodeled 1975-2000 | | | 0.05 | | |
| | | | (0.04) | | |
| Remodeled 2000+ | | | 0.46 | | |
| | | | (0.65) | | |
| Other property characteristics | | | | | |
| Place-based subsidy | -0.41*** | -0.1*** | -0.46*** | -0.41*** | -0.42*** |
| | (0.05) | (0.01) | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.06) |
| Rental units | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Initiating action | | | | | |
| Cause | | | | -0.16*** | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | (0.04) | |
| Intercept | 0.62*** | 0.65*** | 2.79*** | 0.66*** | 0.69*** |
| | (0.16) | (0.04) | (0.46) | (0.16) | (0.18) |
| N | 18049 | 18049 | 18049 | 18049 | 14503 |
| Log likelihood | -12107 | -12699.2 | -12093.9 | -12099.3 | -9653.1 |

Table O6 shows the results of modeling execution for filings at different types of properties separately. Model 1 includes only one and two-family properties, Model 2 only three-family properties, Model 3 only four-to-six-unit properties, and Model 4 only condominiums. In all models except those at four-to-six-unit properties and condominiums, large landlords are less likely to reach execution, and at condominiums the coefficient is negative though not statistically significant. Medium landlords are less likely to reach execution only at one and two-family properties.

**Table O6: Executions: different subsamples**

| | One and two-family properties (1) | Three-family properties (2) | Four-to-six-unit properties (3) | Condominiums (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Landlord scale (ref. small) | | | | |
| Medium | -0.3* | -0.06 | 0.76 | -0.12 |
| | (0.13) | (0.07) | (0.45) | (0.24) |
| Large | -0.6*** | -0.4*** | 0.49 | -0.19 |
| | (0.15) | (0.08) | (0.46) | (0.21) |
| Changes in ownership | | | | |
| Property sold last year | -0.05 | -0.10 | 0.11 | -0.3 |
| | (0.15) | (0.1) | (0.22) | (0.23) |
| Property sold this year | -0.46*** | -0.35*** | 0.13 | -0.29 |
| | (0.12) | (0.09) | (0.2) | (0.2) |
| Land and building valuation | | | | |
| Land val per sf (100s) | 0.55 | 0.61* | 0.23 | |
| | (0.54) | (0.28) | (0.24) | |
| Building val per sf (100s) | -0.33 | -0.12 | -0.07 | 0.03 |
| | (0.37) | (0.25) | (0.12) | (0.11) |
| Building val per unit (100,000s) | 0.08 | -0.11 | -0.11 | -0.15 |
| | (0.11) | (0.12) | (0.18) | (0.08) |
| Year built and remodeled (linear) | | | | |
| Year built (decades before 2018) | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.00 | -0.05 |
| | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Year remodeled (decades before 2018) | 0.02 | -0.02 | -0.07 | -0.03 |
| | (0.06) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.11) |
| Not remodeled | -0.01 | -0.01 | -0.47* | -0.46 |
| | (0.17) | (0.1) | (0.22) | (0.3) |
| Other property characteristics | | | | |
| Place-based subsidy | -0.50 | -0.53*** | -0.41** | |
| | (0.39) | (0.15) | (0.16) | |
| Rental units | 0.04 | -0.03 | -0.08 | |
| | (0.15) | (0.09) | (0.08) | |
| Single-family | 0.11 | | | |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (0.15) | | | |
| Intercept | 0.22 | 0.38 | 0.55 | 19.04 |
| | (0.59) | (0.44) | (0.71) | (2791.18) |
| N | 2661 | 5654 | 1980 | 950 |
| Log likelihood | -1734.5 | -3755.7 | -1253.5 | -569.2 |

## iv. Serial filing

Table O7 shows the results of estimating whether filings were serial using models with different distributions and including different control variables. Model 1 shows the original model presented in Table 3, Model 4. Model 2 uses the same variables, but re-estimates the outcome according to a normal distribution, making it a linear probability model. Model 3 returns to the logistic distribution, but logs the building valuation variables and operationalizes the year built and remodeled variables as factors. Model 4 includes a control variable indicating whether filings were initiated as cause rather than non-payment of rent, to check whether execution differences between small and large landlords are just a result of their different reasons for filing. Model 5 re-estimates the original model, but only for filings whose initiating actions were non-payment of rent. In all of these models, large landlords and medium landlords are more likely to carry the filing through to execution than are small landlords. These alternate models show that this finding is robust and not an artifact of modeling decisions.

**Table O7: Serial filing: different control variables and distributions**

| | Original (1) | Linear probability model (2) | New building control variables (3) | Initiating action control (4) | Only non-payment of rent (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Landlord scale (ref. small) | | | | | |
| Medium | 0.44*** | 0.03*** | 0.46*** | 0.42*** | 0.5*** |
| | (0.09) | (0.01) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.1) |
| Large | 0.96*** | 0.1*** | 0.98*** | 0.94*** | 1.03*** |
| | (0.08) | (0.01) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.1) |
| Changes in ownership | | | | | |
| Property sold last year | -0.21* | -0.03* | -0.2* | -0.2* | -0.24* |
| | (0.09) | (0.01) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.11) |
| Property sold this year | -0.19* | -0.01 | -0.19* | -0.15 | -0.32** |
| | (0.09) | (0.01) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.12) |
| Property type (Ref:3-family) | | | | | |
| Condominium | -0.06 | 0.01 | 0.07 | -0.06 | -0.17 |
| | (0.16) | (0.02) | (0.25) | (0.16) | (0.18) |
| Single-family | 0.13 | 0.02 | 0.09 | 0.16 | 0.38 |
| | (0.19) | (0.02) | (0.19) | (0.19) | (0.23) |
| Two-family | -0.01 | 0.00 | -0.05 | 0.00 | -0.08 |
| | (0.09) | (0.01) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.11) |
| 4-6 unit | -0.14 | -0.01 | -0.12 | -0.14 | -0.07 |
| | (0.09) | (0.01) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.1) |
| 7-30 unit | -0.07 | -0.01 | -0.09 | -0.08 | -0.05 |
| | (0.09) | (0.01) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.1) |
| 30+ unit | -0.21 | -0.04* | -0.21 | -0.22 | -0.18 |
| | (0.12) | (0.02) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.13) |
| Land and building valuation | | | | | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Land val per sf (100s) | -0.05 | 0.01 | | -0.05 | -0.07 |
| | (0.08) | (0.01) | | (0.08) | (0.09) |
| Building val per sf (100s) | -0.07 | -0.01 | | -0.08 | -0.09 |
| | (0.05) | (0.01) | | (0.05) | (0.05) |
| Building val per unit (100,000s) | -0.01 | 0 | | -0.01 | 0.03 |
| | (0.05) | (0.01) | | (0.05) | (0.06) |
| Land val per sf (log) | | | 0.01 | | |
| | | | (0.05) | | |
| Building val per sf (log) | | | -0.21*** | | |
| | | | (0.06) | | |
| Building val per unit (log) | | | 0.08 | | |
| | | | (0.06) | | |
| Year built and remodeled (linear) | | | | | |
| Year built (decades before 2018) | 0.01 | 0 | | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| | (0.01) | (0) | | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Year remodeled (decades before 2018) | 0 | 0 | | 0 | 0.01 |
| | (0.02) | (0) | | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Not remodeled | -0.1 | -0.01 | | -0.1 | -0.09 |
| | (0.08) | (0.01) | | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Year built (ref. pre-1900) | | | | | |
| Built 1900-1925 | | | 0.04 | | |
| | | | (0.07) | | |
| Built 1925-1950 | | | 0.09 | | |
| | | | (0.09) | | |
| Built 1950-1975 | | | 0.12 | | |
| | | | (0.11) | | |
| Built 1975-2000 | | | -0.29 | | |
| | | | (0.16) | | |
| Built 2000+ | | | 0.11 | | |
| | | | (0.19) | | |
| Year remodeled (ref. not remodeled) | | | | | |
| Remodeled pre 1975 | | | 0.22 | | |
| | | | (0.12) | | |
| Remodeled 1975-2000 | | | 0.1 | | |
| | | | (0.06) | | |
| Remodeled 2000+ | | | 1.44* | | |
| | | | (0.73) | | |
| Other property characteristics | | | | | |
| Place-based subsidy | 0.86*** | 0.16*** | 0.85*** | 0.87*** | 0.82*** |
| | (0.07) | (0.01) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| Rental units | 0** | 0** | 0** | 0** | 0** |
| | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) |
| Intercept | -3.33*** | 0.04 | -3.55*** | -3.28*** | -3.49*** |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (0.22) | (0.03) | (0.61) | (0.22) | (0.25) |
| Initiating action | | | | | |
| Cause | | | | -0.25*** | |
| | | | | (0.06) | |
| N | 18049 | 18049 | 18049 | 18049 | 14503 |
| Log likelihood | -7451.9 | -7308.4 | -7442.8 | -7443.3 | -6201 |

Table O8 shows the results of modeling whether filings were serial for filings at different types of properties separately. Model 1 includes only one and two-family properties, Model 2 only three-family properties, Model 3 only four-to-six-unit properties, and Model 4 only condominiums. In all models except those at four-to-six-unit properties, large landlords' filings are more likely to be serial, and at four-to-six-unit properties the coefficient is large and positive though not statistically significant. Medium landlords' filings are more likely to be serial at all properties except four-to-six-unit ones.

**Table O8: Serial filings: different subsamples**

| | One and two-family properties (1) | Three-family properties (2) | Four-to-six-unit properties (3) | Condominiums (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Landlord scale (ref. small) | | | | |
| Medium | 0.66** | 0.38** | -0.13 | 0.48 |
| | (0.22) | (0.13) | (0.87) | (0.46) |
| Large | 0.95*** | 1.04*** | 0.42 | 0.9* |
| | (0.24) | (0.12) | (0.88) | (0.38) |
| Changes in ownership | | | | |
| Property sold last year | -0.39 | -0.25 | -0.22 | -0.11 |
| | (0.29) | (0.16) | (0.35) | (0.36) |
| Property sold this year | -0.12 | 0.07 | -0.57 | 0.47 |
| | (0.24) | (0.16) | (0.33) | (0.36) |
| Land and building valuation | | | | |
| Land val per sf (100s) | 1.51 | -0.46 | -0.23 | |
| | (0.91) | (0.41) | (0.36) | |
| Building val per sf (100s) | -1.16 | 0.1 | 0.05 | 0.06 |
| | (0.68) | (0.3) | (0.17) | (0.19) |
| Building val per unit (100,000s) | -0.13 | 0.05 | 0.15 | 0.13 |
| | (0.21) | (0.17) | (0.24) | (0.17) |
| Year built and remodeled (linear) | | | | |
| Year built (decades before 2018) | -0.02 | -0.01 | 0.09* | -0.03 |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.05) |
| Year remodeled (decades before 2018) | -0.18 | -0.02 | 0.03 | 0.15 |
| | (0.11) | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.22) |
| Not remodeled | -0.68* | -0.27 | 0.43 | 0.71 |
| | (0.28) | (0.15) | (0.34) | (0.54) |
| Other property characteristics | | | | |
| Place-based subsidy | 1.5** | 0.93*** | 1.13*** | |
| | (0.55) | (0.18) | (0.2) | |
| Rental units | -0.06 | 0.06 | -0.01 | |
| | (0.28) | (0.14) | (0.11) | |
| Single-family | 0.21 | | | |
| | (0.28) | | | |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Intercept | -3.38* | -2.81*** | -4.12*** | -23.18 |
| | (1.31) | (0.67) | (1.17) | (7602.39) |
| N | 2661 | 5654 | 1980 | 950 |
| Log likelihood | -694 | -1888.7 | -748.9 | -230.2 |

## v. Landlord-tenant conflict

Table O9 shows the results of estimating whether there were landlord-tenant conflict 911 calls using models with different distributions and including different control variables. Model 1 shows the original model presented in Table 3, Model 5. Model 2 uses the same variables, but re-estimates the outcome according to a normal distribution, making it a linear probability model. Model 3 returns to the logistic distribution, but logs the building valuation variables and operationalizes the year built and remodeled variables as factors. Model 4 includes a control variable indicating whether filings were initiated as cause rather than non-payment of rent, to check whether execution differences between small and large landlords are just a result of their different reasons for filing. Model 5 re-estimates the original model, but only for filings whose initiating actions were non-payment of rent. In all of these models, large and medium landlords are less likely to have conflict with their tenants. These alternate models show that this finding is robust and not an artifact of modeling decisions.

**Table O9: Landlord-tenant conflict: different control variables and distributions**

| | Original (1) | Linear probability model (2) | New building control variables (3) | Initiating action control (4) | Only non-payment of rent (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Landlord scale (ref. small) | | | | | |
| Medium | -0.56*** | -0.03*** | -0.59*** | -0.55*** | -0.62*** |
| | (0.12) | (0.00) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.15) |
| Large | -1.84*** | -0.06*** | -1.85*** | -1.81*** | -1.95*** |
| | (0.18) | (0.00) | (0.18) | (0.18) | (0.22) |
| Changes in ownership | | | | | |
| Property sold last year | 0.21 | 0.00 | 0.18 | 0.16 | 0.24 |
| | (0.16) | (0.01) | (0.16) | (0.16) | (0.2) |
| Property sold this year | -0.65*** | -0.02*** | -0.7*** | -0.74*** | -0.51* |
| | (0.18) | (0.00) | (0.18) | (0.19) | (0.24) |
| Property type (Ref:3-family) | | | | | |
| Condominium | -18.96 | -0.05*** | -19.3 | -18.78 | -18.15 |
| | (819.89) | (0.01) | (784.93) | (770.12) | (912.59) |
| Single-family | -0.29 | -0.01 | -0.29 | -0.35 | -0.16 |
| | (0.33) | (0.01) | (0.33) | (0.33) | (0.43) |
| Two-family | 0.2 | 0.02*** | 0.26* | 0.2 | 0.34* |
| | (0.13) | (0.00) | (0.13) | (0.13) | (0.15) |
| 4-6 unit | 0.5** | 0.02** | 0.38* | 0.53** | 0.51* |
| | (0.19) | (0.01) | (0.19) | (0.19) | (0.22) |
| 7-30 unit | -0.06 | 0.01 | -0.24 | -0.02 | 0.1 |
| | (0.29) | (0.01) | (0.29) | (0.28) | (0.33) |
| 30+ unit | -0.34 | 0.01 | -0.43 | -0.24 | -0.07 |
| | (0.44) | (0.01) | (0.44) | (0.43) | (0.49) |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Land and building valuation | | | | | |
| Land val per sf (100s) | -0.5 | -0.01 | | -0.36 | -0.25 |
| | (0.4) | (0) | | (0.4) | (0.54) |
| Building val per sf (100s) | 0.43*** | 0.01*** | | 0.43*** | 0.46*** |
| | (0.1) | (0.00) | | (0.1) | (0.11) |
| Building val per unit (100,000s) | 0.14 | 0.00 | | 0.11 | 0.06 |
| | (0.1) | (0.00) | | (0.1) | (0.13) |
| Land val per sf (log) | | | -0.23 | | |
| | | | (0.16) | | |
| Building val per sf (log) | | | 0.51*** | | |
| | | | (0.15) | | |
| Building val per unit (log) | | | 0.06 | | |
| | | | (0.13) | | |
| Year built and remodeled (linear) | | | | | |
| Year built (decades before 2018) | 0.11*** | 0.00*** | | 0.11*** | 0.13*** |
| | (0.03) | (0.00) | | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Year remodeled (decades before 2018) | -0.11 | 0.00 | | -0.11 | -0.11 |
| | (0.06) | (0.00) | | (0.06) | (0.07) |
| Not remodeled | -0.15 | 0.00 | | -0.15 | -0.08 |
| | (0.16) | (0.00) | | (0.16) | (0.19) |
| Year built (ref. pre-1900) | | | | | |
| Built 1900-1925 | | | -0.01 | | |
| | | | (0.14) | | |
| Built 1925-1950 | | | -0.34 | | |
| | | | (0.21) | | |
| Built 1950-1975 | | | -0.33 | | |
| | | | (0.3) | | |
| Built 1975-2000 | | | -1.4* | | |
| | | | (0.58) | | |
| Built 2000+ | | | -1.53** | | |
| | | | (0.56) | | |
| Year remodeled (ref. not remodeled) | | | | | |
| Remodeled pre 1975 | | | -0.14 | | |
| | | | (0.3) | | |
| Remodeled 1975-2000 | | | -0.11 | | |
| | | | (0.11) | | |
| Remodeled 2000+ | | | -16.94 | | |
| | | | (7210.57) | | |
| Other property characteristics | | | | | |
| Place-based subsidy | -0.41 | -0.01 | -0.37 | -0.46 | -0.22 |
| | (0.26) | (0) | (0.27) | (0.25) | (0.28) |
| Rental units | 0.00* | 0.00* | 0.01* | 0.00* | 0.01* |
| | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Initiating action | | | | | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cause | | | | 0.36*** | |
| | | | | (0.11) | |
| Intercept | -21.98 | 0.01 | -22.53 | -22.14 | -22.44 |
| | (573.2) | (0.01) | (569.58) | (568.39) | (649.63) |
| N | 17864 | 18049 | 18049 | 18049 | 14503 |
| Log likelihood | -1805.2 | 6119.3 | -1820.6 | -1810.8 | -1315.4 |

Table O10 shows the results of modeling landlord-tenant conflict for filings at different types of properties separately. Model 1 includes only one and two-family properties, Model 2 only three-family properties, and Model 3 only four-to-six-unit properties. Condominiums are not modeled separately because the identifiers in the 911 data made it impossible to geocode them to specific condominium units rather than the entire condominium complex. In all models except those at four-to-six-unit properties, large landlords and medium landlords are less likely to have conflict with their tenants.

**Table O10: Landlord-tenant conflict: different control variables and distributions**

| | One and two-family properties (1) | Three-family properties (2) | Four-to-six-unit properties (3) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Landlord scale (ref. small) | | | |
| Medium | -0.48 | -0.34* | 0.57 |
| | (0.29) | (0.16) | (1.49) |
| Large | -2.19*** | -1.47*** | -0.35 |
| | (0.55) | (0.24) | (1.62) |
| Changes in ownership | | | |
| Property sold last year | -0.11 | 0.17 | -1.27 |
| | (0.38) | (0.24) | (0.83) |
| Property sold this year | -0.63 | -0.74* | -1.17 |
| | (0.32) | (0.29) | (0.73) |
| Land and building valuation | | | |
| Land val per sf (100s) | 0.57 | -1.11 | -0.03 |
| | (1.53) | (0.87) | (1.06) |
| Building val per sf (100s) | 1.41 | 0.4 | 1.24 |
| | (1.05) | (0.79) | (0.72) |
| Building val per unit (100,000s) | 0.5 | -0.34 | -2.85** |
| | (0.28) | (0.33) | (1) |
| Year built and remodeled (linear) | | | |
| Year built (decades before 2018) | 0.09* | 0.19** | 0.04 |
| | (0.04) | (0.06) | (0.12) |
| Year remodeled (decades before 2018) | -0.32* | 0.1 | -0.21 |
| | (0.16) | (0.1) | (0.18) |
| Not remodeled | -0.69 | 0.39 | -0.36 |
| | (0.36) | (0.25) | (0.67) |
| Other property characteristics | | | |
| Place-based subsidy | -14.76 | -1.31 | -1.22 |
| | (2048.77) | (1.04) | (0.75) |
| Rental units | 0.04 | -0.41 | -0.7* |
| | (0.34) | (0.21) | (0.29) |
| Single-family | -0.63 | | |
| | (0.39) | | |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Intercept | -20.96 | -22.28 | -30.26 |
| | (874.08) | (668.31) | (3333.65) |
| N | 2661 | 5654 | 1980 |
| Log likelihood | -455.2 | -830.1 | -153.1 |

**Table 11: Five-year-plus owners**

To ensure that differences in eviction filing characteristics between small and large-scale landlords are not driven just by differences in their behavior immediately after purchasing properties, in Table O11 I re-estimate Table 3, but only for landlords who have owned their properties for at least five years. The results are substantively the same and in some cases more extreme than those from the full sample.

**Table O11: Eviction filing analysis for five-year-plus owners**

| | Judgment amount (1) | Rent filing (2) | Execution (3) | Serial filing (4) | Conflict (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Landlord scale (ref. small) | | | | | |
| Medium | 61.76 | 0.39*** | -0.05 | 0.43*** | -0.42** |
| | (159.13) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.11) | (0.15) |
| Large | -400.67* | 0.7*** | -0.35*** | 1.07*** | -1.67*** |
| | (187.83) | (0.09) | (0.07) | (0.11) | (0.27) |
| Changes in ownership | | | | | |
| Property sold this year | 433.03* | -1.26*** | -0.21** | -0.49*** | -0.95*** |
| | (218.01) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.13) | (0.26) |
| Property type (Ref:3-family) | | | | | |
| Condominium | 666.08 | -0.02 | 0.37* | -0.41 | |
| | (421.15) | (0.22) | (0.18) | (0.29) | |
| Single-family | 101.76 | -0.62*** | 0.22 | 0.02 | 0.26 |
| | (459.62) | (0.17) | (0.15) | (0.27) | (0.37) |
| Two-family | -114.37 | -0.19* | 0.01 | -0.01 | 0.14 |
| | (183.85) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.12) | (0.15) |
| 4-6 unit | 75.36 | 0.05 | -0.08 | -0.16 | 0.47* |
| | (202.21) | (0.11) | (0.08) | (0.11) | (0.23) |
| 7-30 unit | 25.6 | 0.34** | 0.09 | -0.15 | 0.62 |
| | (217.7) | (0.12) | (0.08) | (0.11) | (0.44) |
| 30+ unit | 166.51 | 0.68*** | 0.19 | -0.27* | 2.39* |
| | (291.21) | (0.16) | (0.11) | (0.14) | (0.98) |
| Land and building valuation | | | | | |
| Land val per sf (100s) | 387.97* | 0.06 | -0.1 | -0.22* | -0.48 |
| | (187.52) | (0.1) | (0.07) | (0.11) | (0.44) |
| Building val per sf (100s) | 3.03 | 0.14* | -0.03 | -0.11 | 0.73*** |
| | (98.35) | (0.06) | (0.04) | (0.06) | (0.13) |
| Building val per unit (100,000s) | 215.84* | -0.06 | -0.13*** | 0.01 | 0.05 |
| | (107.18) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.06) | (0.13) |
| Year built and remodeled (linear) | | | | | |
| Year built (decades before 2018) | -68.8** | 0.02 | 0.02* | -0.01 | 0.11*** |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (24.96) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.03) |
| Year remodeled (decades before 2018) | -1.7 | 0.03 | -0.02 | 0.01 | -0.14 |
| | (53.78) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.08) |
| Not remodeled | 298.29 | -0.03 | -0.07 | -0.09 | -0.27 |
| | (180.23) | (0.1) | (0.07) | (0.1) | (0.21) |
| Other property characteristics | | | | | |
| Place-based subsidy | -1247.88*** | -0.16 | -0.48*** | 0.86*** | -0.94** |
| | (164.83) | (0.09) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.32) |
| Rental units | -3.13 | 0*** | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.05 |
| | (2.61) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.02) |
| Intercept | 5752.23*** | 1.3*** | 0.48* | -3.29*** | -4.46*** |
| | (1064.99) | (0.26) | (0.19) | (0.27) | (0.62) |
| N | 4187 | 13065 | 13065 | 13065 | 8274 |
| Log likelihood | -39313.1 | -5430.8 | -8680.0 | -5475.9 | -1293.0 |

# Landlord characteristics analysis

In this section, I present supplementary analyses pertaining to my analysis of the organizational features that are associated with different eviction behaviors (Table 4). In section P, I present analyses that aim to demonstrate the validity of my imputed landlord household income and home value measures. Next, in section Q, I conduct several robustness checks. First, to further ensure the validity of the landlord variables, I operationalize each in multiple ways and estimate the model from Table 4 separately for each operationalization. For example, I operationalize inheritance as only occurring if the first family member owned the property for 1, 5, or 10 years. I also re-estimate the model, varying the control variables and estimating over particular subsamples of properties. Finally, in section R, I present a more thorough discussion of what the associations between organizational characteristics and eviction practices can tell us about the reasons for differences in eviction behaviors. In large part this consists of arguing against possible counter-explanations for which there was not space in the body of the paper.

## P. Showing validity of landlord household income variable

In this step of the analysis, I introduce several variables describing landlord characteristics. Many are straightforward – e.g. the type of legal entity through which the landlord owns rental property or whether they live in the same building as their tenants – but the imputed income measure is not as clearly legitimate. I operationalized this measure by finding the most common contact address associated with each landlord (among those landlords that could be traced back to a person), geocoding it, and finding the household income of its census tract. I only included addresses outside Boston in order to ensure that the contact address was not associated with the rental property and to avoid a spurious association between imputed income and eviction outcomes due to landlord-tenant geographic proximity. For example, for properties in poor areas, having a landlord whose home address is in a poor neighborhood might affect eviction outcomes because that means the landlord and tenant live in the same neighborhood, not because the landlord is poor. By only including landlords who live outside of Boston, this limits the degree of

geographic proximity. I calculated the most common contact address in two ways – first by finding the modal address and second prioritizing addresses outside of Boston. I test the validity of the first below and test whether the second predicts eviction behavior more effectively than the first in Section Q.i.

To ensure that the imputed measure of landlord household income is legitimate, below I predict the value of landlords' rental holdings and the socioeconomic status of the areas in which they own rental properties. The assumption behind this test is that wealthier landlords will tend to own more expensive properties and properties in wealthier areas. This is particularly likely to be true if they are small-scale owners, who often originally purchase rental properties for their own uses. In Table P1, Models 1 and 2 estimate the total valuation for each rental property, controlling for landlord characteristics. Models 3 and 4 estimate the median household income of the neighborhood in which the property is located. Small and large buildings are modeled separately, since small buildings are much more likely to have been originally purchased for home use and thus to have valuations and neighborhood incomes that are associated with landlord household income.

In Table P1, landlords' imputed household incomes are strong predictors of the values of their rental properties and the median household incomes of the neighborhoods in which they own rental properties. However, this is only true for small buildings. This association does not reflect a mechanical association because the property being modeled is never the property that was assumed to be the landlord's home. By definition, the properties used to impute income are outside of Boston, while those being modeled are inside Boston. Accordingly, the fact that a landlord's imputed household income predicts the economic qualities of their rental properties, even conditional on other landlord characteristics, suggests that the measure is legitimate. Table P2 replicates this analysis, adding controls for property type, and the results remain the same.

Tables P3 and P4 replicate Tables P1 and P2, but using the owner-occupancy based landlord income and landlord home value measures used in Appendix Q.i. Both measures are positively and significantly associated with the property values and the neighborhood median incomes of the rental properties that the landlords own, even when we include controls for the type of rental property. However, again, this is only true for small buildings. As in Tables P1 and P2, this does not reflect a mechanical association because properties that landlords own as rental properties cannot be considered as their home properties. This provides evidence that our measures of landlord imputed household income and home values are legitimate.

**Table P1: Predicting rental property characteristics using landlord household income**

| | Property value | | Neighborhood income | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Small buildings | Large buildings | Small buildings | Large buildings |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Landlord scale (ref. small) | | | | |
| Medium | 110653.0*** | 388717.5 | -4437.5*** | 9240.5 |
| | (5161.3) | (280471.1) | (289.3) | (7345.4) |
| Large | 34877.6*** | 1622459.4*** | -8700.9*** | -4379.9 |
| | (8871.9) | (286091.4) | (460.8) | (7256.3) |
| Landlord proximity to tenants | | | | |
| Co-resident | 30703.7*** | -227132.8 | -3542.5*** | -3418.4 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (3411.0) | (456739.9) | (216.2) | (3428.3) |
| Lives outside Boston | 26491.9*** | -277947.4 | 3553.9*** | -930.8 |
| | (3836.7) | (151323.6) | (244.7) | (2168.8) |
| Landlord organizational structure | | | | |
| | | | | - |
| Property manager | -9874.2 | 123888.9 | -4010.9*** | 10737.3*** |
| | (23829.8) | (172717.3) | (1147.6) | (2105.5) |
| Company | 99295.7*** | 363453.1* | -2024.4*** | -6596.9** |
| | (12949.2) | (166279.3) | (506.7) | (2218.5) |
| LLC linked to person | 107144.8*** | 239491.0 | 368.3 | -4771.8* |
| | (8860.8) | (140084.8) | (459.2) | (2178.7) |
| Other landlord characteristics | | | | |
| Imputed household income (100,000s) | 66661.2*** | 240952.6 | 7231.6*** | -1905.8 |
| | (8968.4) | (251270.0) | (535.5) | (3626.5) |
| Inherited property | -8202.4 | 109977.8 | -178.0 | -3644.8 |
| | (5529.8) | (297499.8) | (450.3) | (5267.9) |
| Intercept | 331855.3*** | 707961.1 | 51552.2*** | 60957.4*** |
| | (8415.1) | (402919.7) | (507.4) | (8102.4) |
| N | 892113 | 322908 | 778806 | 253429 |
| Log likelihood | -12748312.5 | -5052820.6 | -8902422.0 | -2897207.3 |

**Table P2: Predicting rental property characteristics using landlord household income (controlling for property type)**

| | Property value | | Neighborhood income | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Small buildings | Large buildings | Small buildings | Large buildings |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Landlord scale (ref. small) | | | | |
| Medium | -29295.0*** | 177882.8 | -1833.0*** | 9744.4 |
| | (3995.4) | (232750.6) | (279.3) | (7482.8) |
| Large | -108805.7*** | 533953.5* | -5894.2*** | -1845.4 |
| | (7499.7) | (230720.2) | (459.4) | (7395.6) |
| Landlord proximity to tenants | | | | |
| Co-resident | 5464.0 | -399501.6 | 423.8 | -2925.8 |
| | (3389.0) | (297001.4) | (237.7) | (3176.4) |
| Lives outside Boston | 33558.3*** | -411588.5*** | 2856.4*** | -642.6 |
| | (3487.8) | (84152.4) | (241.9) | (2065.9) |
| Landlord organizational structure | | | | |
| Property manager | -38147.6 | -84481.1 | -5014.2*** | -10257.7*** |
| | (21662.9) | (110634.9) | (1143.3) | (2113.3) |
| Company | 90596.7*** | -377347.1*** | -3176.9*** | -4870.3* |
| | (12189.7) | (99430.5) | (500.7) | (2121.3) |
| LLC linked to person | 111749.9*** | 21947.7 | 64.54 | -4238.9* |
| | (7804.1) | (84908.2) | (456.7) | (2112.8) |
| Other landlord characteristics | | | | |
| Imputed household income (100,000s) | 70919.8*** | 285423.8 | 6145.0*** | -1756.9 |
| | (7941.3) | (151633.0) | (528.9) | (3437.1) |
| Inherited property | -7802.0 | -146139.6 | 483.0 | -2781.4 |
| | (5319.8) | (176025.1) | (443.3) | (5566.6) |
| Property type (Ref:3-family) | | | | |
| Condominium | -8003.0* | | 6791.9*** | |
| | (3544.3) | | (279.1) | |
| Single-family | 9206.5 | | 5763.0*** | |
| | (7685.5) | | (379.8) | |
| Two-family | 34931.9*** | | -6638.3*** | |
| | (2618.7) | | (245.9) | |
| 4-6 unit | 412472.4*** | | 757.1 | |
| | (9530.3) | | (528.5) | |
| 7-30 unit | 701937.4*** | | 6104.7 | |
| | (91839.1) | | (4115.0) | |
| 30+ unit | | 2227379.0*** | | -5083.4** |
| | | (85437.4) | | (1855.7) |
| Intercept | 319535.4*** | 1200618.9*** | 51244.8*** | 59526.9*** |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (7717.7) | (282745.5) | (525.9) | (8133.5) |
| N | 892113 | 322908 | 778806 | 253429 |
| Log likelihood | -12705900.1 | -4953480.0 | -8881975.3 | -2895830.7 |

**Table P3: Predicting rental property characteristics using landlord household income and home value (ownership-based measures)**

| | Property value | | Neighborhood income | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Small buildings | Large buildings | Small buildings | Large buildings |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Landlord scale (ref. small) | | | | |
| Medium | 118530.6*** | 292513.2 | -4022.9*** | 11859.9 |
| | (5190.9) | (312387.8) | (287.3) | (7114.4) |
| Large | 47867.8*** | 1555532.2*** | -8025.5*** | -2083.1 |
| | (8718.7) | (316581.1) | (467.1) | (7019.8) |
| Landlord proximity to tenants | | | | |
| Co-resident | 47111.4*** | 131598.7 | -4078.7*** | -3819.2 |
| | (3534.9) | (354065.5) | (248.8) | (3442.6) |
| Lives outside Boston | 50381.4*** | 393481.9 | 97.16 | -1300.8 |
| | (4181.1) | (240737.7) | (271.0) | (2534.6) |
| Distance from home | -360107.3** | 1541492.3 | -32718.0*** | -190036.5*** |
| | (110214.3) | (3163414.3) | (8179.7) | (55098.0) |
| Landlord organizational structure | | | | |
| Property manager | -44630.5 | 66529.4 | -5555.6*** | -10098.9*** |
| | (23570.6) | (167765.0) | (1136.4) | (2080.9) |
| Company | 73547.7*** | 400353.7** | -2984.4*** | -5054.6* |
| | (12989.5) | (148036.0) | (507.0) | (2148.9) |
| LLC linked to person | 96894.9*** | 252585.1 | 852.5 | -4435.2* |
| | (8753.3) | (142740.0) | (458.7) | (2062.7) |
| Other landlord characteristics | | | | |
| Has home data | -132494.5*** | -534226.2 | 2249.3*** | 2270.6 |
| | (8430.0) | (299632.0) | (548.4) | (5050.2) |
| Imputed household income (100,000s) | 60366.3*** | -172192.8 | 27599.4*** | -5812.3 |
| | (17936.6) | (375527.8) | (1325.8) | (12549.7) |
| Inherited property | 3839.8 | 632201.7* | 149.6 | -4355.8 |
| | (5936.4) | (255236.1) | (468.0) | (4409.8) |
| Home value | 223205.9*** | -52346.0 | 3580.0*** | 7806.7 |
| | (10522.5) | (91378.5) | (481.6) | (4152.0) |
| Intercept | -2465385.9*** | 1364939.4 | -5623.2 | -37221.0 |
| | (129157.5) | (1151943.1) | (5811.9) | (47290.5) |
| N | 891617 | 323255 | 778234 | 253371 |
| Log likelihood | -12732928.2 | -5053037.6 | -8891571.7 | -2893177.1 |

**Table P4: Predicting rental property characteristics using landlord household income and home value (ownership-based measures, controlling for property type)**

| | Property value | | Neighborhood income | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Small buildings | Large buildings | Small buildings | Large buildings |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Landlord scale (ref. small) | | | | |
| Medium | -21021.2*** | 126767.7 | -1506.5*** | 12198.6 |
| | (3962.8) | (246477.8) | (275.8) | (7260.9) |
| Large | -99320.8*** | 502095.0* | -5379.1*** | 215.9 |
| | (7494.5) | (244314.7) | (465.0) | (7158.2) |
| Landlord proximity to tenants | | | | |
| Co-resident | 15185.7*** | -11662.1 | -353.2 | -3467.1 |
| | (3507.8) | (214181.0) | (264.7) | (3303.9) |
| Lives outside Boston | 37298.1*** | 367876.5* | -676.5* | -1271.5 |
| | (3851.0) | (143331.4) | (264.5) | (2412.5) |
| Distance from home | -275530.8** | -2774024.7 | -25980.9** | -182166.0** |
| | (95730.9) | (2261433.4) | (8053.2) | (56929.9) |
| Landlord organizational structure | | | | |
| Property manager | -65788.2** | -117190.9 | -6152.4*** | -9718.0*** |
| | (21569.2) | (109221.2) | (1133.8) | (2083.9) |
| Company | 70698.1*** | -197135.6* | -3622.9*** | -3737.8 |
| | (12278.4) | (90387.0) | (500.2) | (2104.6) |
| LLC linked to person | 105830.0*** | 19121.8 | 557.4 | -3889.9 |
| | (7804.3) | (82115.2) | (456.3) | (1994.0) |
| Other landlord characteristics | | | | |
| Has home data | -95500.3*** | -128425.7 | 2440.2*** | 1223.9 |
| | (7770.5) | (227930.9) | (543.2) | (5135.6) |
| Imputed household income (100,000s) | 43734.7** | 496011.7 | 26522.2*** | -7003.3 |
| | (16380.0) | (668845.9) | (1315.5) | (12390.6) |
| Inherited property | -3851.2 | 452095.7*** | 760.1 | -3448.0 |
| | (5536.3) | (110943.4) | (462.6) | (4519.0) |
| Home value | 199083.4*** | -77856.3 | 2094.4*** | 7864.9 |
| | (9691.3) | (146100.1) | (477.6) | (4401.3) |
| Property type (Ref:3-family) | | | | |
| Condominium | -14927.8*** | | 6992.0*** | |
| | (3497.5) | | (277.2) | |
| Single-family | 6822.9 | | 5518.4*** | |
| | (7626.1) | | (375.2) | |
| Two-family | 34251.8*** | | -6435.0*** | |
| | (2624.5) | | (245.3) | |
| 4-6 unit | 397472.7*** | | 729.5 | |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (9465.7) | | (529.9) | |
| 7-30 unit | 697945.5*** | | 6284.5 | |
| | (92380.0) | | (4062.8) | |
| 30+ unit | | 2188245.7*** | | -4731.7* |
| | | (84470.3) | | (1840.9) |
| Intercept | -2150265.2*** | 1606203.8 | 12577.4* | -37962.2 |
| | (118954.0) | (1647743.2) | (5743.6) | (50147.1) |
| N | 891617 | 323255 | 778234 | 253371 |
| Log likelihood | -12693015.7 | -4954896.9 | -8871347.0 | -2891969.9 |

## Q. Robustness checks

In Section Q, I present robustness checks to ensure that the analyses from Table 4 are not the results of theoretically unimportant modeling decisions. First, I test different operationalizations of the variables describing landlord characteristics. Second, I re-estimate the modesl from Table 4 with different operationalizations of control variables. Third, I re-estimate the models with different subsamples.

### *i.* Different operationalizations of landlord variables

In the following tables, I re-estimate the models from Table 4 with different operationalizations of the property inheritance and household income variables. The original versions of these variables showed no association with eviction outcomes in Table 4, and these analyses aim to ensure that this is a robust finding. First, Table Q1 re-estimates the models with a measure that only counts a property as being inherited if the first owner owned it for at least five years. This is to ensure that the original owner was not merely holding it for the second one, and because someone who owns a property for five years is likely to have paid off more of the mortgage than one who has owned a property for only one year. Table Q2 replicates this analysis with an analogous 10-year measure. In both cases, there is no association between property inheritance and eviction behavior (although the number of 10-year inheritors with an eviction is quite low, reducing statistical power).

Next, I operationalize inheritance in order to omit cases in which properties were transferred only to obtain homeownership tax abatements. For example, since an individual cannot claim multiple homeownership abatements at one time, a landlord might transfer ownership of a property to a sibling for the tax benefits, although the real ownership has not changed. Q3 uses a measure of inheritance in which the receiving owner did not receive a homeownership abatement, and again inheritance is not significantly associated with any of the outcomes. Table Q4 again uses homeownership tax exemptions, but in this case to identify transfers that are the most likely to represent inheritance. In this model, only those cases where a homeowner transferred property to a non-homeowner (with the same last name) were counted as inheritance. Again, inheritance is not statistically significant, but this appears to be due to a lack of statistical power rather than the small magnitude of the estimated coefficients. Nevertheless, the coefficients are in the opposite direction of those associated with large landlords. Specifically, inheritors in this model appear less likely to file over missed rent, more likely to pursue filings to execution, and less likely to file serially. Although this may represent statistical noise, these associations are the opposite of what we would expect based on the economic precarity hypothesis, which would predict inheriting landlords to behave like large-scale owners. If these associations are true, it would reinforce Shiffer-Sebba's (2020) argument that inheriting shapes the frames through which landlords view renting out property. Any effect inheritance has on landlord behavior via economic position appears to be dwarfed by this framing effect, leading inheriting landlords to behave more similarly to small-scale owners.

Table Q5 re-estimates these models but with an alternate household income measure. In this case, each landlord's home address was imputed as the modal address among all affiliated contact addresses (rather than only including contact addresses outside of Boston). After the modal address was calculated, addresses in Boston were excluded and the addresses were geocoded as before. As with the first measure, the alternate measure in Table Q5 shows no association with eviction behavior.

Table Q6 re-estimates these models with another household income measure, in this case derived from landlords' homeowner occupancy flags. For landlords who own a single-family property or

condominium, the value of that "home" is included in the model, as is the median household income of the tract in which it is located. In order to not control for proximity between the landlord's home and the tenant's home, I include the distance between them in the model. Landlord home value is not strongly associated with any of the outcomes except for probability of filing over non-payment of rent, with which it is positively associated. This is in agreement with predictions from the economic positions hypothesis, since we would expect cash on hand to allow landlords to evict based on economic considerations. However, the household income measure shows strong associations in the opposite direction, with landlords who live in richer neighborhoods less likely to evict, less likely to evict serially, and more likely to pursue eviction to execution, all of which are hallmarks of small-scale landlords' eviction practices. It is hard to interpret these associations without further analysis. In conclusion, these new operationalizations of landlord economic position do little to explain the differences between large and small landlords.

**Table Q1: Replication with 5-year inheritance measure**

| | Filings | Non-payment | Execution | Serial | Conflict |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Landlord scale (ref. small) | | | | | |
| Medium | 0.312*** | 0.33*** | -0.04 | 0.3** | -0.24 |
| | (0.0634) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.14) |
| Large | 0.834*** | 0.47*** | -0.24*** | 0.69*** | -0.99*** |
| | (0.0961) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.1) | (0.22) |
| Landlord proximity to tenants | | | | | |
| Co-resident | -0.258 | -0.14 | 0.13* | -0.32** | 0.53*** |
| | (0.135) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.11) | (0.14) |
| Lives outside Boston | 0.0378 | -0.01 | 0.05 | -0.1 | -0.47*** |
| | (0.113) | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.07) | (0.13) |
| Landlord organizational structure | | | | | |
| Property manager | 0.197* | 0.19** | 0.05 | 0.09 | -1.11*** |
| | (0.0853) | (0.06) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.26) |
| Company | 0.348* | 0.07 | -0.25*** | 0.36*** | -0.44* |
| | (0.145) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.21) |
| LLC linked to person | 0.160 | 0.27*** | -0.19*** | 0.21** | -0.58* |
| | (0.101) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.24) |
| Other landlord characteristics | | | | | |
| Imputed household income (100,000s) | 0.142 | 0.14 | -0.02 | 0.21 | 0.29 |
| | (0.102) | (0.11) | (0.08) | (0.11) | (0.29) |
| Inherited property (5 year) | -0.0978 | 0.11 | 0.38 | -0.62 | -0.33 |
| | (0.358) | (0.24) | (0.2) | (0.4) | (0.5) |
| Changes in ownership | | | | | |
| Property sold last year | 0.0680 | -0.53*** | -0.04 | -0.29** | 0.36* |
| | (0.0795) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.1) | (0.17) |
| Property sold this year | 0.131 | -1.3*** | -0.26*** | -0.24** | -0.51** |
| | (0.0743) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.19) |
| Property type (Ref:3-family) | | | | | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Condominium | -0.536*** | -0.36** | 0.09 | -0.14 | |
| | (0.136) | (0.13) | (0.1) | (0.16) | |
| Single-family | -0.436*** | -0.62*** | 0.09 | 0 | 0.12 |
| | (0.0942) | (0.13) | (0.12) | (0.2) | (0.35) |
| Two-family | 0.0941 | -0.3*** | -0.02 | -0.02 | 0.28* |
| | (0.0536) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.13) |
| 4-6 unit | -0.0314 | 0.14 | -0.02 | -0.14 | 0.48* |
| | (0.0899) | (0.09) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.19) |
| 7-30 unit | -0.0445 | 0.37*** | 0.08 | -0.09 | -0.02 |
| | (0.115) | (0.1) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.3) |
| 30+ unit | -0.124 | 0.72*** | 0.12 | -0.2 | -0.58 |
| | (0.132) | (0.13) | (0.09) | (0.12) | (0.45) |
| Land and building valuation | | | | | |
| Land val per sf (100s) | -0.0505 | -0.02 | -0.08 | -0.08 | -0.31 |
| | (0.0811) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.39) |
| Building val per sf (100s) | -0.0410 | 0.1* | 0.01 | -0.09* | 0.47*** |
| | (0.0278) | (0.05) | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.1) |
| Building val per unit (100,000s) | -0.0186 | -0.02 | -0.11*** | 0.03 | -0.14 |
| | (0.0762) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.13) |
| Year built and remodeled (linear) | | | | | |
| Year built (decades before 2018) | 0.0263 | 0.02* | 0 | 0.01 | 0.1*** |
| | (0.0135) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.03) |
| Year remodeled (decades before 2018) | 0.00412 | 0 | -0.02 | 0.01 | -0.13* |
| | (0.0236) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.06) |
| Not remodeled | -0.155 | -0.08 | -0.11 | -0.08 | -0.22 |
| | (0.0965) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.17) |
| Other property characteristics | | | | | |
| Place-based subsidy | 0.105 | -0.19* | -0.33*** | 0.7*** | -0.25 |
| | (0.103) | (0.09) | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.29) |
| Rental units | | 0** | 0 | 0** | 0.01** |
| | | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) |
| Intercept | -5.471*** | 1.04*** | 0.66*** | -3.53*** | -22.3 |
| | (.312) | (0.23) | (0.17) | (0.25) | (596.9) |
| N | 1215021 | 18044 | 18044 | 18044 | 17097 |
| Log likelihood | -515878.1 | -7843.2 | -12083.2 | -7421.4 | -1779.0 |

**Table Q2: Replication with 10-year inheritance measure**

| | Eviction filings (1) | Non-payment (2) | Execution (3) | Serial (4) | Conflict (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Landlord scale (ref. small) | | | | | |
| Medium | 0.312*** | 0.33*** | -0.04 | 0.3** | -0.24 |
| | (0.0635) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.14) |
| Large | 0.833*** | 0.47*** | -0.24*** | 0.69*** | -0.99*** |
| | (0.0963) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.1) | (0.22) |
| Landlord proximity to tenants | | | | | |
| Co-resident | -0.257 | -0.14 | 0.13* | -0.32** | 0.53*** |
| | (0.135) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.11) | (0.14) |
| Lives outside Boston | 0.0391 | -0.01 | 0.05 | -0.1 | -0.47*** |
| | (0.113) | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.07) | (0.13) |
| Landlord organizational structure | | | | | |
| Property manager | 0.198* | 0.19** | 0.05 | 0.09 | -1.11*** |
| | (0.0855) | (0.06) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.26) |
| Company | 0.356* | 0.06 | -0.25*** | 0.36*** | -0.44* |
| | (0.145) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.21) |
| LLC linked to person | 0.168 | 0.27*** | -0.19*** | 0.22** | -0.58* |
| | (0.101) | (0.08) | (0.05) | (0.08) | (0.24) |
| Other landlord characteristics | | | | | |
| Imputed household income (100,000s) | 0.142 | 0.14 | -0.02 | 0.21 | 0.29 |
| | (0.103) | (0.11) | (0.08) | (0.11) | (0.29) |
| Inherited property (10-year) | 0.587 | 0.26 | 0.35 | -0.61 | -0.47 |
| | (0.407) | (0.42) | (0.38) | (0.75) | (1.08) |
| Changes in ownership | | | | | |
| Property sold last year | 0.0687 | -0.53*** | -0.04 | -0.29** | 0.36* |
| | (0.0795) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.1) | (0.17) |
| Property sold this year | 0.131 | -1.31*** | -0.26*** | -0.24** | -0.51** |
| | (0.0742) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.19) |
| Property type (Ref:3-family) | | | | | |
| Condominium | -0.535*** | -0.36** | 0.09 | -0.14 | |
| | (0.136) | (0.13) | (0.1) | (0.16) | |
| Single-family | -0.438*** | -0.62*** | 0.09 | 0 | 0.12 |
| | (0.0942) | (0.13) | (0.12) | (0.2) | (0.35) |
| Two-family | 0.0950 | -0.31*** | -0.02 | -0.02 | 0.28* |
| | (0.0537) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.13) |
| 4-6 unit | -0.0309 | 0.14 | -0.02 | -0.14 | 0.48* |
| | (0.0900) | (0.09) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.19) |
| 7-30 unit | -0.0439 | 0.37*** | 0.08 | -0.09 | -0.03 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (0.115) | (0.1) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.3) |
| 30+ unit | -0.125 | 0.72*** | 0.12 | -0.2 | -0.58 |
| | (0.132) | (0.13) | (0.09) | (0.12) | (0.45) |
| Land and building valuation | | | | | |
| Land val per sf (100s) | -0.0520 | -0.02 | -0.08 | -0.08 | -0.31 |
| | (0.0812) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.39) |
| Building val per sf (100s) | -0.0407 | 0.1* | 0.01 | -0.09 | 0.47*** |
| | (0.0279) | (0.05) | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.1) |
| Building val per unit (100,000s) | -0.0186 | -0.02 | -0.11*** | 0.03 | -0.14 |
| | (0.0762) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.13) |
| Year built and remodeled (linear) | | | | | |
| Year built (decades before 2018) | 0.0263 | 0.02* | 0 | 0.01 | 0.1*** |
| | (0.0135) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.03) |
| Year remodeled (decades before 2018) | 0.00473 | 0 | -0.02 | 0.01 | -0.13* |
| | (0.0235) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.06) |
| Not remodeled | -0.153 | -0.08 | -0.11 | -0.08 | -0.22 |
| | (0.0965) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.17) |
| Other property characteristics | | | | | |
| Place-based subsidy | 0.105 | -0.19* | -0.33*** | 0.7*** | -0.25 |
| | (0.104) | (0.09) | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.29) |
| Rental units | | 0** | 0 | 0** | 0.01** |
| | | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) |
| Intercept | -5.478*** | 1.04*** | 0.67*** | -3.54*** | -22.3 |
| | (.312) | (0.23) | (0.17) | (0.25) | (597.01) |
| N | 1215021 | 18044 | 18044 | 18044 | 17097 |
| Log likelihood | -515812.1 | -7843.1 | -12084.6 | -7422.5 | -1779.2 |

**Table Q3: Replication with non-owner-occupied inheritance transfers**

| | Eviction filings (1) | Non-payment (2) | Execution (3) | Serial (4) | Conflict (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Landlord scale (ref. small) | | | | | |
| Medium | 0.306*** | 0.3*** | -0.02 | 0.31*** | -0.23 |
| | (0.0597) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.14) |
| Large | 0.827*** | 0.35*** | -0.22*** | 0.69*** | -0.99*** |
| | (0.0837) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.1) | (0.23) |
| Landlord proximity to tenants | | | | | |
| Co-resident | -0.248 | -0.16* | 0.14* | -0.31** | 0.54*** |
| | (0.133) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.11) | (0.14) |
| Lives outside Boston | 0.107 | 0.02 | 0.04 | -0.08 | -0.47*** |
| | (0.0786) | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.07) | (0.13) |
| Landlord organizational structure | | | | | |
| Property manager | 0.190* | 0.2** | 0.05 | 0.09 | -1.09*** |
| | (0.0856) | (0.06) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.27) |
| Company | 0.377*** | 0.1 | -0.27*** | 0.41*** | -0.48* |
| | (0.112) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.22) |
| LLC linked to person | 0.191 | 0.3*** | -0.2*** | 0.23** | -0.58* |
| | (0.0978) | (0.08) | (0.05) | (0.07) | (0.24) |
| Other landlord characteristics | | | | | |
| Imputed household income (100,000s) | 0.315 | 0.15 | -0.03 | 0.21 | 0.3 |
| | (0.168) | (0.11) | (0.08) | (0.11) | (0.29) |
| Inherited property (Non-owner-occupied) | -0.0906 | -0.01 | -0.11 | -0.01 | -0.06 |
| | (0.257) | (0.16) | (0.12) | (0.18) | (0.35) |
| Changes in ownership | | | | | |
| Property sold last year | 0.0625 | -0.53*** | -0.03 | -0.3** | 0.39* |
| | (0.0804) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.1) | (0.17) |
| Property sold this year | 0.131 | -1.31*** | -0.25*** | -0.25** | -0.5** |
| | (0.0744) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.19) |
| Property type (Ref:3-family) | | | | | |
| Condominium | -0.535*** | -0.42*** | 0.09 | -0.2 | |
| | (0.136) | (0.13) | (0.1) | (0.16) | |
| Single-family | -0.430*** | -0.64*** | 0.1 | -0.01 | 0.16 |
| | (0.0942) | (0.13) | (0.12) | (0.2) | (0.35) |
| Two-family | 0.0912 | -0.31*** | -0.02 | -0.01 | 0.27* |
| | (0.0536) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.13) |
| 4-6 unit | -0.0365 | 0.16 | -0.02 | -0.14 | 0.46* |
| | (0.0892) | (0.09) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.19) |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7-30 unit | -0.0543 | 0.37*** | 0.09 | -0.1 | -0.03 |
| | (0.113) | (0.1) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.3) |
| 30+ unit | -0.146 | 0.71*** | 0.12 | -0.21 | -0.63 |
| | (0.129) | (0.14) | (0.09) | (0.12) | (0.47) |
| Land and building valuation | | | | | |
| Land val per sf (100s) | -0.0434 | -0.04 | -0.1 | -0.08 | -0.37 |
| | (0.0803) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.4) |
| Building val per sf (100s) | -0.0384 | 0.1* | 0.01 | -0.09 | 0.48*** |
| | (0.0281) | (0.05) | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.1) |
| Building val per unit (100,000s) | -0.0191 | -0.01 | -0.11** | 0.03 | -0.15 |
| | (0.0760) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.13) |
| Year built and remodeled (linear) | | | | | |
| Year built (decades before 2018) | 0.0291* | 0.02 | 0 | 0.01 | 0.1*** |
| | (0.0133) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.03) |
| Year remodeled (decades before 2018) | 0.00477 | 0 | -0.02 | 0.01 | -0.14* |
| | (0.0235) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.06) |
| Not remodeled | -0.152 | -0.08 | -0.12* | -0.08 | -0.23 |
| | (0.0972) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.17) |
| Other property characteristics | | | | | |
| Place-based subsidy | 0.118 | -0.16 | -0.34*** | 0.68*** | -0.18 |
| | (0.102) | (0.09) | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.29) |
| Rental units | | 0** | 0 | 0** | 0.01** |
| | | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) |
| Intercept | -5.659*** | 1.13*** | 0.67*** | -3.57*** | -22.17 |
| | (0.341) | (0.23) | (0.17) | (0.25) | (594.86) |
| N | 1215021 | 18072 | 18072 | 18072 | 17101 |
| Log likelihood | -515683.1 | -7853.76 | -12094.42 | -7410.32 | -1769.03 |

**Table Q4: Replication with owner-occupied-to-non-owner-occupied transfers**

| | Filings (1) | Non-payment (2) | Execution (3) | Serial (4) | Conflict (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Landlord scale (ref. small) | | | | | |
| Medium | 0.306*** | 0.3*** | -0.02 | 0.31*** | -0.23 |
| | (0.0597) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.14) |
| Large | 0.828*** | 0.35*** | -0.21** | 0.68*** | -1*** |
| | (0.0836) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.1) | (0.23) |
| Landlord proximity to tenants | | | | | |
| Co-resident | -0.248 | -0.17* | 0.14* | -0.32** | 0.53*** |
| | (0.133) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.11) | (0.14) |
| Lives outside Boston | 0.104 | 0.02 | 0.03 | -0.08 | -0.47*** |
| | (0.0774) | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.07) | (0.13) |
| Landlord organizational structure | | | | | |
| Property manager | 0.190* | 0.2** | 0.05 | 0.09 | -1.09*** |
| | (0.0855) | (0.06) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.27) |
| Company | 0.376*** | 0.1 | -0.27*** | 0.4*** | -0.48* |
| | (0.112) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.22) |
| LLC linked to person | 0.188 | 0.3*** | -0.2*** | 0.23** | -0.58* |
| | (0.0987) | (0.08) | (0.05) | (0.07) | (0.24) |
| Other landlord characteristics | | | | | |
| Imputed household income (100,000s) | 0.306 | 0.15 | -0.03 | 0.21 | 0.3 |
| | (0.159) | (0.11) | (0.08) | (0.11) | (0.29) |
| Inherited property (OO to NOO) | -0.215 | -0.52 | 0.59 | -0.69 | -18.88 |
| | (0.204) | (0.37) | (0.37) | (0.75) | (4568.86) |
| Changes in ownership | | | | | |
| Property sold last year | 0.0623 | -0.53*** | -0.03 | -0.31** | 0.38* |
| | (0.0805) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.1) | (0.17) |
| Property sold this year | 0.133 | -1.31*** | -0.25*** | -0.25** | -0.5** |
| | (0.0738) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.19) |
| Property type (Ref:3-family) | | | | | |
| Condominium | -0.536*** | -0.42*** | 0.09 | -0.2 | |
| | (0.136) | (0.13) | (0.1) | (0.16) | |
| Single-family | -0.429*** | -0.64*** | 0.1 | -0.01 | 0.15 |
| | (0.0942) | (0.13) | (0.12) | (0.2) | (0.35) |
| Two-family | 0.0907 | -0.31*** | -0.02 | -0.01 | 0.27* |
| | (0.0536) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.13) |
| 4-6 unit | -0.0380 | 0.16 | -0.03 | -0.14 | 0.46* |
| | (0.0895) | (0.09) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.19) |
| 7-30 unit | -0.0560 | 0.37*** | 0.09 | -0.1 | -0.03 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (0.114) | (0.1) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.3) |
| 30+ unit | -0.149 | 0.71*** | 0.12 | -0.21 | -0.63 |
| | (0.131) | (0.13) | (0.09) | (0.12) | (0.47) |
| Land and building valuation | | | | | |
| Land val per sf (100s) | -0.0442 | -0.04 | -0.1 | -0.08 | -0.38 |
| | (0.0803) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.4) |
| Building val per sf (100s) | -0.0383 | 0.1* | 0.01 | -0.09 | 0.48*** |
| | (0.0281) | (0.05) | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.1) |
| Building val per unit (100,000s) | -0.0193 | -0.01 | -0.11*** | 0.03 | -0.15 |
| | (0.0760) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.13) |
| Year built and remodeled (linear) | | | | | |
| Year built (decades before 2018) | 0.0289* | 0.02 | 0 | 0.01 | 0.1*** |
| | (0.0135) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.03) |
| Year remodeled (decades before 2018) | 0.00462 | 0 | -0.02 | 0.01 | -0.14* |
| | (0.0234) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.06) |
| Not remodeled | -0.154 | -0.08 | -0.12* | -0.08 | -0.23 |
| | | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.17) |
| Other property characteristics | | | | | |
| Place-based subsidy | 0.121 | -0.16 | -0.33*** | 0.68*** | -0.18 |
| | (0.103) | (0.09) | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.29) |
| Rental units | | 0** | 0 | 0** | 0.01** |
| | | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) |
| Intercept | -5.644*** | 1.13*** | 0.67*** | -3.57*** | -22.16 |
| | (0.337) | (0.23) | (0.17) | (0.25) | (594.83) |
| N | 1215021 | 18072 | 18072 | 18072 | 17101 |
| Log likelihood | -515694.9 | -7852.81 | -12093.46 | -7409.81 | -1766.53 |

**Table Q5: Replication with alternate household income measure (contact address based)**

| | Filings (1) | Non-payment (2) | Execution (3) | Serial (4) | Conflict (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Landlord scale (ref. small) | | | | | |
| Medium | 0.306*** | 0.32*** | -0.03 | 0.28** | -0.3* |
| | (0.0596) | (0.07) | (0.05) | (0.09) | (0.13) |
| Large | 0.828*** | 0.46*** | -0.22*** | 0.65*** | -1.12*** |
| | (0.0835) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.1) | (0.22) |
| Landlord proximity to tenants | | | | | |
| Co-resident | -0.246 | -0.12 | 0.13* | -0.28** | 0.58*** |
| | (0.133) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.11) | (0.14) |
| Lives outside Boston | 0.105 | 0.1 | 0.04 | 0.09 | -0.28 |
| | (0.0772) | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.07) | (0.16) |
| Landlord organizational structure | | | | | |
| Property manager | 0.190* | 0.19** | 0.05 | 0.09 | -1.13*** |
| | (0.0854) | (0.06) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.26) |
| Company | 0.367** | 0.1 | -0.27*** | 0.45*** | -0.25 |
| | (0.112) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.2) |
| LLC linked to person | 0.179 | 0.27*** | -0.19*** | 0.21** | -0.66** |
| | (0.0990) | (0.08) | (0.05) | (0.07) | (0.24) |
| Other landlord characteristics | | | | | |
| Imputed household income (100,000s) (Modal) | 0.299 | 0.1 | 0.04 | -0.06 | 0.84* |
| | (0.157) | (0.16) | (0.12) | (0.17) | (0.39) |
| Inherited property | -0.282 | 0.05 | 0.13 | -0.41 | 0.07 |
| | (0.239) | (0.15) | (0.12) | (0.24) | (0.26) |
| Changes in ownership | | | | | |
| Property sold last year | 0.0606 | -0.54*** | -0.04 | -0.29** | 0.34* |
| | (0.0805) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.1) | (0.17) |
| Property sold this year | 0.132 | -1.31*** | -0.26*** | -0.25** | -0.54** |
| | (0.0739) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.19) |
| Property type (Ref:3-family) | | | | | |
| Condominium | -0.539*** | -0.36** | 0.1 | -0.15 | |
| | (0.136) | (0.13) | (0.1) | (0.16) | |
| Single-family | -0.429*** | -0.62*** | 0.09 | -0.01 | 0.13 |
| | (0.0942) | (0.13) | (0.12) | (0.2) | (0.35) |
| Two-family | 0.0897 | -0.3*** | -0.02 | -0.01 | 0.3* |
| | (0.0536) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.13) |
| 4-6 unit | -0.0396 | 0.14 | -0.02 | -0.15 | 0.47* |
| | (0.0895) | (0.09) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.19) |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7-30 unit | -0.0601 | 0.36*** | 0.07 | -0.1 | -0.04 |
| | (0.114) | (0.1) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.3) |
| 30+ unit | -0.153 | 0.68*** | 0.12 | -0.23* | -0.57 |
| | (0.131) | (0.13) | (0.09) | (0.12) | (0.45) |
| Land and building valuation | | | | | |
| Land val per sf (100s) | -0.0425 | -0.02 | -0.09 | -0.08 | -0.28 |
| | (0.0803) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.39) |
| Building val per sf (100s) | -0.0384 | 0.1* | 0.01 | -0.09 | 0.48*** |
| | (0.0281) | (0.05) | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.1) |
| Building val per unit (100,000s) | -0.0201 | -0.02 | -0.12*** | 0.03 | -0.15 |
| | (0.0761) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.13) |
| Year built and remodeled (linear) | | | | | |
| Year built (decades before 2018) | 0.0286* | 0.02* | 0 | 0.01 | 0.1*** |
| | (0.0135) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.03) |
| Year remodeled (decades before 2018) | 0.00479 | 0 | -0.02 | 0.01 | -0.14* |
| | (0.0234) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.06) |
| Not remodeled | -0.155 | -0.08 | -0.11 | -0.08 | -0.24 |
| | (0.0965) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.17) |
| Place-based subsidy | 0.121 | -0.18* | -0.33*** | 0.7*** | -0.22 |
| | (0.103) | (0.09) | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.29) |
| Rental units | | 0** | 0 | 0** | 0.01** |
| | | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) |
| Intercept | -5.624*** | 1.04*** | 0.62** | -3.35*** | -22.85 |
| | (0.335) | (0.26) | (0.19) | (0.27) | (597.23) |
| N | 1215021 | 18044 | 18044 | 18044 | 17097 |
| Log likelihood | -515638.5 | -7842.7 | -12084.7 | -7423.2 | -1783.3 |

**Table Q6: Replication with alternate household income measure (owner-occupancy based)**

| | Eviction filings (1) | Non-payment (2) | Execution (3) | Serial (4) | Conflict (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Landlord scale (ref. small) | | | | | |
| Medium | 0.316*** | 0.29*** | -0.03 | 0.34*** | -0.27* |
| | (0.0588) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.14) |
| Large | 0.864*** | 0.36*** | -0.22*** | 0.72*** | -1.13*** |
| | (0.0848) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.1) | (0.22) |
| Landlord proximity to tenants | | | | | |
| Co-resident | -0.168 | -0.06 | 0.12 | -0.21 | 0.43** |
| | (0.141) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.12) | (0.16) |
| Lives outside Boston | 0.173* | 0.15* | -0.04 | 0.2** | -0.32* |
| | (0.0760) | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.08) | (0.14) |
| Distance from home | 4.348* | -2.11 | -1.39 | -1.37 | -8.75 |
| | (1.849) | (1.92) | (1.46) | (2.29) | (5.3) |
| Landlord organizational structure | | | | | |
| Property manager | 0.160 | 0.19** | 0.05 | 0.08 | -1.07*** |
| | (0.0849) | (0.06) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.27) |
| Company | 0.261* | 0.06 | -0.26*** | 0.36*** | -0.12 |
| | (0.109) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.21) |
| LLC linked to person | 0.198 | 0.29*** | -0.2*** | 0.24** | -0.56* |
| | (0.102) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.24) |
| Other landlord characteristics | | | | | |
| Has home data | -0.214 | 0.12 | 0.23* | -0.2 | -0.23 |
| | (0.130) | (0.14) | (0.11) | (0.17) | (0.35) |
| Imputed household income (100,000s) | -1.159*** | -0.34 | 0.63** | -0.94** | -0.12 |
| | (0.289) | (0.31) | (0.23) | (0.37) | (0.83) |
| Inherited property | -0.0838 | 0 | 0 | -0.02 | 0.03 |
| | (0.236) | (0.13) | (0.11) | (0.16) | (0.27) |
| Logged home value | -0.0891 | 0.27* | -0.09 | 0.02 | 0.14 |
| | (0.0809) | (0.12) | (0.08) | (0.12) | (0.29) |
| Changes in ownership | | | | | |
| Property sold last year | 0.0588 | -0.54*** | -0.02 | -0.31** | 0.43* |
| | (0.0793) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.1) | (0.17) |
| Property sold this year | 0.108 | -1.32*** | -0.25*** | -0.25** | -0.52** |
| | (0.0752) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.19) |
| Property type (Ref:3-family) | | | | | |
| Condominium | -0.550*** | -0.4** | 0.08 | -0.21 | |
| | (0.136) | (0.13) | (0.1) | (0.16) | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Single-family | -0.442*** | -0.64*** | 0.1 | 0.02 | 0.21 |
| | (0.0934) | (0.13) | (0.12) | (0.2) | (0.35) |
| Two-family | 0.0903 | -0.3*** | -0.03 | 0.02 | 0.3* |
| | (0.0538) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.13) |
| 4-6 unit | -0.0391 | 0.15 | -0.02 | -0.16 | 0.44* |
| | (0.0895) | (0.09) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.19) |
| 7-30 unit | -0.0606 | 0.36*** | 0.1 | -0.12 | -0.08 |
| | (0.112) | (0.1) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.31) |
| 30+ unit | -0.161 | 0.69*** | 0.14 | -0.24* | -0.74 |
| | (0.126) | (0.14) | (0.09) | (0.12) | (0.47) |
| Land and building valuation | | | | | |
| Land val per sf (100s) | -0.0621 | -0.04 | -0.11 | -0.08 | -0.37 |
| | (0.0799) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.4) |
| Building val per sf (100s) | -0.0406 | 0.09* | 0.01 | -0.08 | 0.55*** |
| | (0.0287) | (0.05) | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.11) |
| Building val per unit (100,000s) | -0.0178 | -0.02 | -0.1** | 0.03 | -0.18 |
| | (0.0753) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.13) |
| Year built and remodeled (linear) | | | | | |
| Year built (decades before 2018) | 0.0271* | 0.02 | 0 | 0.01 | 0.1*** |
| | (0.0135) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.03) |
| Year remodeled (decades before 2018) | -0.000814 | 0 | -0.02 | 0.01 | -0.14* |
| | (0.0235) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.06) |
| Not remodeled | -0.181 | -0.08 | -0.12* | -0.07 | -0.25 |
| | (0.0973) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.17) |
| Other property characteristics | | | | | |
| Place-based subsidy | 0.112 | -0.17 | -0.33*** | 0.65*** | -0.15 |
| | (0.103) | (0.09) | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.29) |
| Rental units | | 0** | 0 | 0** | 0.01** |
| | | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) |
| Intercept | -3.461** | -2 | 1.39 | -3.15* | -23.55 |
| | (1.046) | (1.44) | (0.95) | (1.45) | (594.88) |
| N | 1214872 | 18065 | 18065 | 18065 | 17092 |
| Log likelihood | -514913.1 | -7846.08 | -12084.27 | -7392.75 | -1770.14 |

**ii. Testing different controls**

In Table Q7, I replicate the analyses in Table 4 but with logged building valuation variables and factor variables for year remodeled and year built. The associations between landlord characteristics and evictions practices are robust to the inclusion of these control variables.

**Table Q7: Different building control variables**

| | Filings (1) | Non-payment (2) | Execution (3) | Serial (4) | Conflict (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Landlord scale (ref. small) | | | | | |
| Medium | 0.336*** | 0.32*** | -0.04 | 0.32*** | -0.25 |
| | (0.0637) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.14) |
| Large | 0.851*** | 0.44*** | -0.25*** | 0.69*** | -1.02*** |
| | (0.0961) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.1) | (0.22) |
| Landlord proximity to tenants | | | | | |
| Co-resident | -0.274* | -0.15* | 0.2** | -0.36*** | 0.69*** |
| | (0.138) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.11) | (0.14) |
| Lives outside Boston | 0.0453 | -0.01 | 0.05 | -0.09 | -0.47*** |
| | (0.110) | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.07) | (0.13) |
| Landlord organizational structure | | | | | |
| Property manager | 0.231** | 0.2** | 0.03 | 0.11* | -1.08*** |
| | (0.0834) | (0.06) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.27) |
| Company | 0.318* | 0.08 | -0.25*** | 0.34*** | -0.35 |
| | (0.146) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.21) |
| LLC linked to person | 0.145 | 0.28*** | -0.18** | 0.2** | -0.52* |
| | (0.105) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.24) |
| Other landlord characteristics | | | | | |
| Imputed household income (100,000s) | 0.136 | 0.16 | -0.02 | 0.22* | 0.29 |
| | (0.100) | (0.11) | (0.08) | (0.11) | (0.29) |
| Inherited property | -0.297 | 0.05 | 0.13 | -0.4 | 0.11 |
| | (0.248) | (0.15) | (0.12) | (0.24) | (0.26) |
| Changes in ownership | | | | | |
| Property sold last year | 0.0826 | -0.54*** | -0.03 | -0.29** | 0.36* |
| | (0.0776) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.1) | (0.17) |
| Property sold this year | 0.143 | -1.3*** | -0.25*** | -0.24** | -0.54** |
| | (0.0738) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.19) |
| Property type (Ref:3-family) | | | | | |
| Condominium | -0.936*** | -0.48* | 0.03 | 0.01 | |
| | (0.252) | (0.24) | (0.18) | (0.25) | |
| Single-family | -0.442*** | -0.65*** | 0.15 | -0.05 | 0.25 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (0.0923) | (0.13) | (0.12) | (0.19) | (0.35) |
| Two-family | 0.129* | -0.32*** | 0.02 | -0.05 | 0.38** |
| | (0.0531) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.14) |
| 4-6 unit | -0.0112 | 0.14 | -0.07 | -0.12 | 0.2 |
| | (0.0863) | (0.09) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.19) |
| 7-30 unit | -0.0256 | 0.32*** | -0.01 | -0.11 | -0.35 |
| | (0.114) | (0.1) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.3) |
| 30+ unit | -0.108 | 0.64*** | 0.01 | -0.21 | -0.82 |
| | (0.131) | (0.14) | (0.09) | (0.12) | (0.46) |
| Land and building valuation | | | | | |
| Land val per sf (log) | -0.0834 | -0.07 | -0.02 | 0.01 | -0.23 |
| | (0.0587) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.17) |
| Building val per sf (log) | -0.0189 | 0.01 | 0.12* | -0.22*** | 0.76*** |
| | (0.0479) | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.16) |
| Building val per unit (log) | 0.0487 | -0.03 | -0.28*** | 0.13* | -0.46** |
| | (0.0826) | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.17) |
| Year built (ref. pre-1900) | | | | | |
| Built 1900-1925 | 0.117 | -0.07 | -0.04 | 0.03 | -0.03 |
| | (0.0991) | (0.07) | (0.05) | (0.07) | (0.15) |
| Built 1925-1950 | 0.129 | -0.08 | -0.06 | 0.08 | -0.35 |
| | (0.127) | (0.09) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.21) |
| Built 1950-1975 | -0.0190 | 0.1 | -0.05 | 0.14 | -0.46 |
| | (0.132) | (0.11) | (0.08) | (0.11) | (0.31) |
| Built 1975-2000 | -0.215 | -0.52*** | 0.05 | -0.37* | -1.12* |
| | (0.192) | (0.14) | (0.11) | (0.16) | (0.57) |
| Built 2000+ | -0.386 | -0.17 | -0.25 | 0.05 | -1.16* |
| | (0.213) | (0.16) | (0.13) | (0.19) | (0.56) |
| Year remodeled (ref. not remodeled) | | | | | |
| Remodeled pre 1975 | 0.163 | -0.1 | -0.12 | 0.18 | -0.17 |
| | (0.120) | (0.12) | (0.09) | (0.12) | (0.31) |
| Remodeled 1975-2000 | 0.157 | 0.09 | 0.06 | 0.08 | -0.08 |
| | (0.0837) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.06) | (0.11) |
| Remodeled 2000+ | 0.0507 | -0.25 | 0.36 | 1.51* | -18.31 |
| | (0.0916) | (0.75) | (0.65) | (0.75) | (10508.66) |
| Other property characteristics | | | | | |
| Place-based subsidy | 0.148 | -0.21* | -0.38*** | 0.72*** | -0.36 |
| | (0.116) | (0.09) | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.3) |
| Rental units | | 0** | 0 | 0** | 0.01* |
| | | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) |
| Intercept | -5.740*** | 1.75** | 3.25*** | -4.2*** | -18.12 |
| | (0.898) | (0.65) | (0.48) | (0.62) | (597.44) |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| N | 1215021 | 18044 | 18044 | 18044 | 17097 |
| Log likelihood | -515363.1 | -7836 | -12068.9 | -7412 | -1780.1 |

### iii. Testing different subsample

As a final robustness check, I examine whether the associations between landlord characteristics and eviction practices remain when I reduce the model to specific subsamples. First, I examine the model estimated only over small buildings. I do this both to ensure that there are not uncontrolled differences between small and large buildings biasing results and to examine whether particular landlord characteristics are more predictive at these properties. I do this because in other analyses, such as Table 2, small buildings have shown idiosyncratic associations compared to the full sample. In this case, most findings are robust to reducing the sample to small properties. However, landlord household income is associated with more eviction filings and higher odds of filing over non-payment of rent. This supports the economic positions explanation for small and large landlord behavior. Furthermore, landlords who inherited properties are less likely to file evictions, suggesting support for the social-institutional contexts explanation. Next, I reduce the sample to only properties owned by small owners. Again, most associations remain the same, although in this case inheritors again show lower filing rates.

**Table Q8: Small buildings only**

| | Eviction filings (1) | Non-payment (2) | Execution (3) | Serial (4) | Conflict (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Landlord scale (ref. small) | | | | | |
| Medium | 0.267*** | 0.33*** | -0.06 | 0.31** | -0.25 |
| | (0.0422) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.1) | (0.14) |
| Large | 0.749*** | 0.33*** | -0.2** | 0.65*** | -0.91*** |
| | (0.0551) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.12) | (0.24) |
| Landlord proximity to tenants | | | | | |
| Co-resident | -0.318*** | -0.17 | 0.15 | -0.36** | 0.63*** |
| | (0.0496) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.13) | (0.18) |
| Lives outside Boston | 0.0732 | -0.06 | 0.00 | -0.07 | -0.47*** |
| | (0.0435) | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.08) | (0.13) |
| Landlord organizational structure | | | | | |
| Property manager | 0.396*** | 0.4*** | 0.01 | 0.1 | -0.9* |
| | (0.102) | (0.1) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.36) |
| Company | 0.495*** | -0.04 | -0.41*** | 0.42*** | -0.39 |
| | (0.0750) | (0.1) | (0.08) | (0.12) | (0.24) |
| LLC linked to person | 0.168** | 0.3** | -0.26*** | 0.31** | -0.55* |
| | (0.0528) | (0.1) | (0.07) | (0.11) | (0.27) |
| Other landlord characteristics | | | | | |
| Imputed household income (100,000s) | 0.265*** | 0.24* | 0.06 | 0.27 | 0.13 |
| | (0.0714) | (0.12) | (0.1) | (0.14) | (0.31) |
| Inherited property | -0.266** | 0.04 | 0.11 | -0.27 | 0.1 |
| | (0.0814) | (0.15) | (0.13) | (0.25) | (0.26) |
| Changes in ownership | | | | | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Property sold last year | 0.0813 | -0.54*** | -0.02 | -0.35** | 0.1 |
| | (0.0463) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.12) | (0.19) |
| Property sold this year | 0.554*** | -1.42*** | -0.3*** | -0.15 | -0.62** |
| | (0.0421) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.11) | (0.2) |
| Property type (Ref:3-family) | | | | | |
| Condominium | -0.566** | -0.4* | 0.21 | -0.19 | |
| | (0.182) | (0.19) | (0.15) | (0.23) | |
| Single-family | -0.517*** | -0.59*** | 0.25 | -0.24 | 0.32 |
| | (0.0802) | (0.17) | (0.15) | (0.23) | (0.43) |
| Two-family | 0.135** | -0.3*** | 0.07 | -0.17 | 0.36 |
| | (0.0428) | (0.09) | (0.07) | (0.12) | (0.18) |
| 4-6 unit | -0.0216 | 0.11 | -0.16 | 0.04 | -0.07 |
| | (0.0659) | (0.18) | (0.14) | (0.2) | (0.41) |
| Land and building valuation | | | | | |
| Land val per sf (100s) | -0.231*** | 0 | -0.08 | 0.16 | -1.16* |
| | (0.0679) | (0.12) | (0.1) | (0.16) | (0.51) |
| Building val per sf (100s) | -0.119 | 0.16* | 0.02 | -0.1 | 0.62*** |
| | (0.108) | (0.07) | (0.05) | (0.09) | (0.16) |
| Building val per unit (100,000s) | -0.0167 | -0.05 | -0.08* | -0.02 | 0 |
| | (0.0386) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.07) | (0.15) |
| Year built and remodeled (linear) | | | | | |
| Year built (decades before 2018) | 0.00946 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0 | 0.09** |
| | (0.00771) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.03) |
| Year remodeled (decades before 2018) | -0.00582 | -0.07* | -0.02 | -0.04 | -0.1 |
| | (0.0196) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.04) | (0.07) |
| Not remodeled | -0.112 | -0.27** | -0.07 | -0.23* | -0.12 |
| | (0.0584) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.1) | (0.18) |
| Other property characteristics | | | | | |
| Place-based subsidy | 0.405*** | 0.3* | -0.32** | 0.81*** | -1.02 |
| | (0.0925) | (0.15) | (0.1) | (0.12) | (0.53) |
| Rental units | | -0.01 | 0.08 | -0.12 | 0.2 |
| | | (0.07) | (0.05) | (0.07) | (0.15) |
| Intercept | -5.590*** | 1.14*** | 0.32 | -2.7*** | -21.96 |
| | (0.274) | (0.33) | (0.25) | (0.38) | (483.31) |
| N | 892113 | 11241 | 11241 | 11241 | 10294 |
| Log likelihood | -118364.8 | -5490.8 | -7520.4 | -3780.7 | -1538 |

**Table Q9: Small owners only**

| | Filings (1) | Non-payment (2) | Execution (3) | Serial (4) | Conflict (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Landlord proximity to tenants | | | | | |
| Co-resident | -0.182*** | 0.1 | 0.12 | -0.45* | 1** |
| | (0.0475) | (0.14) | (0.12) | (0.22) | (0.33) |
| Lives outside Boston | 0.238*** | 0.07 | 0.03 | 0.66*** | -0.58 |
| | (0.0552) | (0.13) | (0.11) | (0.19) | (0.3) |
| Landlord organizational structure | | | | | |
| Property manager | 0.787 | 0.94*** | 0.04 | 0.34 | -1.95 |
| | (0.450) | (0.24) | (0.18) | (0.29) | (1.04) |
| Company | 0.260* | 0.23 | -0.54** | 0.58 | -0.73 |
| | (0.114) | (0.2) | (0.17) | (0.3) | (0.5) |
| LLC linked to person | -0.147 | 1.09** | -0.4 | 0.46 | 0.73 |
| | (0.177) | (0.34) | (0.26) | (0.39) | (0.59) |
| Other landlord characteristics | | | | | |
| Imputed household income (100,000s) | 0.0300 | 0.65 | -0.09 | 0.23 | 0.07 |
| | (0.148) | (0.36) | (0.31) | (0.48) | (0.91) |
| Inherited property | -0.262** | -0.14 | 0.24 | -0.26 | 0 |
| | (0.0992) | (0.19) | (0.17) | (0.35) | (0.33) |
| Changes in ownership | | | | | |
| Property sold last year | 0.301*** | -0.57*** | 0.06 | -0.15 | 0.34 |
| | (0.0679) | (0.14) | (0.13) | (0.24) | (0.26) |
| Property sold this year | 1.065*** | -1.75*** | -0.34*** | 0.12 | -0.82** |
| | (0.0504) | (0.1) | (0.09) | (0.17) | (0.28) |
| Property type (Ref:3-family) | | | | | |
| Condominium | -0.355** | -0.07 | -0.03 | 0.36 | |
| | (0.109) | (0.35) | (0.3) | (0.59) | |
| Single-family | -0.594*** | -0.22 | 0.23 | -0.98* | 1.41* |
| | (0.0919) | (0.28) | (0.25) | (0.45) | (0.7) |
| Two-family | 0.161*** | -0.03 | 0.07 | -0.41 | 0.9** |
| | (0.0489) | (0.14) | (0.13) | (0.23) | (0.33) |
| 4-6 unit | -0.0236 | 0.36 | -0.11 | 0.18 | -1.06 |
| | (0.202) | (0.53) | (0.43) | (0.88) | (1.21) |
| Land and building valuation | | | | | |
| Land val per sf (100s) | 0.161 | 0.3 | -0.02 | -0.08 | 0.9 |
| | (0.0876) | (0.21) | (0.18) | (0.36) | (0.98) |
| Building val per sf (100s) | -0.154** | 0.27* | 0.13 | -0.86** | 0.42 |
| | (0.0560) | (0.13) | (0.11) | (0.31) | (0.71) |
| Building val per unit (100,000s) | 0.0171 | -0.1 | -0.18** | -0.02 | 0.38 |
| | (0.0255) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.14) | (0.21) |
| Year built and remodeled (linear) | | | | | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year built (decades before 2018) | 0.00395 | 0.01 | 0.02 | -0.02 | 0.1* |
| | (0.00953) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.03) | (0.04) |
| Year remodeled (decades before 2018) | -0.00475 | 0.01 | 0.01 | -0.07 | -0.15 |
| | (0.0247) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.08) | (0.11) |
| Not remodeled | -0.0982 | 0.08 | 0.03 | -0.43* | -0.29 |
| | (0.0726) | (0.13) | (0.12) | (0.22) | (0.25) |
| Year built (ref. pre-1900) | | | | | |
| Year remodeled (ref. not remodeled) | | | | | |
| Other property characteristics | | | | | |
| Place-based subsidy | 2.438* | 13.51 | 0.18 | 0.57 | -16.99 |
| | (1.133) | (408.38) | (0.65) | (0.93) | (4533.65) |
| Rental units | | 0.19 | -0.03 | -0.43* | 0.86* |
| | | (0.13) | (0.12) | (0.21) | (0.34) |
| Intercept | -5.356*** | -0.07 | 0.25 | -2.07 | -24.47 |
| | (0.348) | (0.65) | (0.55) | (1.11) | (668.55) |
| N | 571095 | 4921 | 4921 | 4921 | 4494 |
| Log likelihood | -45545.0 | -2615 | -3250.5 | -1158.8 | -878.1 |

## R. **Adjudicating between different explanations for eviction differences between large and small landlords**

In the main text of the paper, I consider three categories of explanations for small and large landlords' different eviction behaviors. Below, I discuss the plausibility of several explanations that do not fit into those groups.

### i. **Differences in experience and familiarity with the eviction process.**

The differences in small and large landlords' eviction practices may not reflect differences in their organizational logics and understandings of the rental relationship so much as different levels of familiarity with the eviction process. Large landlords, having filed before, may be more knowledgeable about how to file evictions and how to ensure that the process works to their advantage. They may also have pre-existing relationships with eviction lawyers that make hiring them simpler and easier. This difference in familiarity and experience could then lead them to file more often and more often as a rent collection tactic.

To examine the plausibility of this explanation, Table R1 compares the eviction behavior of small landlords who have filed in the past to those that have not. These "previous filer" landlords, although small-scale and not formally organized, have greater experience with the eviction process and are more likely to have the familiarity with eviction that large landlords have. Although one eviction filing is not a particularly large number, the average large landlord does not file any evictions during the study period. This suggests that small-scale landlords who have filed in the past are more likely to have the same knowledge and experience regarding eviction that large-scale landlords have, and if experience and familiarity are driving small and large-scale tenants' differences, then these previous filers should resemble large-scale landlords in their eviction behaviors. To examine whether this is true, Table R1 estimates filing rates, judgment amounts, reasons for filing, executions, serial filings, and interpersonal conflict, distinguishing between these and other small landlords.

The first model in Table R1, analyzing whether previous filers file evictions more often than others, functions more as a validation of the previous filing measure than as a test of experience is driving large landlords' eviction practices. This is because by choosing landlords that have filed in the past, I am selecting for landlords who have a higher propensity to file and have tenants that are delinquent on rent. Accordingly, almost by definition they are likely to file more often than their small-scale counterparts. However, if they also file in the same manner as large-scale owners – over lower amounts of missed rent, more often over rent, less often reaching execution, more often serially, and with less interpersonal conflict, it would suggest that experience with the eviction process is driving large landlords' practices.

Table R1 shows that these small landlords who have filed in the past do not use eviction in any different way than small landlords who have not. Although they file more often, they do not file over less back rent, are not more likely to file over missed rent or file serially, and they are not less likely to reach execution or have interpersonal conflict. This suggests that these differences in eviction behavior between small and large landlords are not driven by greater familiarity with the eviction on the part of large landlords.

As a second examination of the plausibility of experience driving differences in eviction practices, I examine how landlords' eviction behaviors change as they spend more time in the rental market. Table R2 estimates differences in eviction behaviors for small, medium, and large landlords, distinguishing between those with less than 5, 5 to 10, and 10 or more years in the rental market. If large landlords' greater levels of experience are responsible for their eviction practices, we would expect to see

all types of landlords, but particularly small ones, behave more like large landlords as they spend more time in the rental market.

However, Table R2 shows that with greater time in the market, landlords do not evict more like large landlords. First, with greater time in the market, small and medium landlords file evictions less often. This is driven, in part, by elevated rates of filing in the initial years of owning a property. However, there is also a substantial drop in filings between landlords who have owned for 5-10 years compared to those who have owned for 10+. Secondly, there are few systematic differences in the characteristics of the eviction process. Although there is some evidence that with experience landlords are more likely to file over missed rent, but the models predicting other outcomes often show contradictory results. For example, medium landlords with greater time in the market have more conflict with tenants than their newly arriving counterparts.

**Table R1: Previous filers' eviction behaviors**

| | Filings (1) | Judgment amount (2) | Rent filing (3) | Execution (4) | Serial filing (5) | Conflict (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Landlord scale (ref. small) | | | | | | |
| Medium | 0.508*** | 27.57 | 0.42*** | -0.09 | 0.47*** | -0.56*** |
| | (0.0497) | (138.37) | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.09) | (0.13) |
| Large | 1.123*** | -380.65** | 0.69*** | -0.37*** | 0.99*** | -1.83*** |
| | (0.0572) | (143.09) | (0.07) | (0.05) | (0.09) | (0.18) |
| Small with previous filing | 0.856*** | -21.76 | 0.22 | 0.05 | 0.24 | 0.08 |
| | (0.0607) | (223.78) | (0.11) | (0.1) | (0.16) | (0.17) |
| Changes in ownership | | | | | | |
| Property sold last year | 0.107 | 296.7 | -0.47*** | -0.1 | -0.21* | 0.19 |
| | (0.0806) | (168.15) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.16) |
| Property sold this year | 0.123 | 252.61 | -1.28*** | -0.28*** | -0.19* | -0.66*** |
| | (0.0773) | (173.45) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.18) |
| Property type (Ref:3-family) | | | | | | |
| Condominium | -0.465*** | 235.53 | -0.31* | 0.05 | -0.06 | -18.8 |
| | (0.125) | (267.9) | (0.13) | (0.1) | (0.16) | (769.05) |
| Single-family | -0.320*** | 348.38 | -0.55*** | 0.01 | 0.14 | -0.31 |
| | (0.0822) | (370.77) | (0.13) | (0.12) | (0.19) | (0.33) |
| Two-family | 0.0626 | -230.63 | -0.3*** | -0.03 | -0.01 | 0.22 |
| | (0.0537) | (153.44) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.13) |
| 4-6 unit | -0.0482 | 98.96 | 0.15 | -0.02 | -0.14 | 0.53** |
| | (0.0881) | (168.55) | (0.09) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.19) |
| 7-30 unit | -0.0191 | 23.39 | 0.39*** | 0.07 | -0.07 | -0.02 |
| | (0.114) | (180.73) | (0.09) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.28) |
| 30+ unit | -0.103 | 322.32 | 0.68*** | 0.13 | -0.21 | -0.25 |
| | (0.129) | (240.33) | (0.13) | (0.09) | (0.12) | (0.43) |
| Land and building valuation | | | | | | |
| Land val per sf (100s) | -0.0597 | 175.68 | 0.01 | -0.11 | -0.05 | -0.36 |
| | (0.0786) | (156.03) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.4) |
| Building val per sf (100s) | -0.0407 | 20.69 | 0.13** | -0.01 | -0.07 | 0.41*** |
| | (0.0276) | (80.13) | (0.05) | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.1) |
| Building val per unit (100,000s) | -0.0342 | 258.3** | -0.04 | -0.09** | -0.01 | 0.13 |
| | (0.0753) | (87.55) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.1) |
| Year built and remodeled (linear) | | | | | | |
| Year built (decades before 2018) | 0.0200 | -75.13*** | 0.02* | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.11*** |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (0.0134) | (20.21) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.03) |
| Year remodeled (decades before 2018) | -0.00235 | 23.67 | 0.00 | -0.02 | 0.00 | -0.10 |
| | (0.0230) | (43.45) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.06) |
| Not remodeled | -0.181 | 331.38* | -0.1 | -0.09 | -0.11 | -0.14 |
| | (0.0958) | (141.45) | (0.07) | (0.05) | (0.08) | (0.16) |
| Other property characteristics | | | | | | |
| Place-based subsidy | 0.225* | -1181.5*** | -0.17* | -0.41*** | 0.86*** | -0.46 |
| | (0.0989) | (142.05) | (0.08) | (0.05) | (0.07) | (0.25) |
| Rental units | | -7.53*** | 0** | 0 | 0** | 0* |
| | | (1.95) | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) |
| Intercept | -5.289*** | 5655.55*** | 1.08*** | 0.61*** | -3.37*** | -22.1 |
| | (0.310) | (954.18) | (0.21) | (0.16) | (0.23) | (568.61) |
| N | 1217830 | 5628 | 18049 | 18049 | 18049 | 18049 |
| Log likelihood | -517264.8 | -52884.2 | -7859.9 | -12107.0 | -7450.9 | -1816.3 |

**Table R2: Eviction behaviors by years in market**

| | Filings | Judgment amount | Rent filing | Execution | Serial filing | Conflict |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Landlord scale X years in market (ref. 10+; small) | | | | | | |
| Small; <5 | 0.753*** | 61.58 | -0.37*** | -0.13 | 0.56** | 0.09 |
| | (0.0815) | (313.45) | (0.11) | (0.1) | (0.18) | (0.29) |
| Small; 5-10 | 0.277*** | -205.05 | -0.23** | 0.02 | -0.19 | 0.26 |
| | (0.0574) | (213.17) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.16) | (0.16) |
| Medium; <5 | 0.938*** | -268 | 0.28 | -0.21 | 0.64** | -0.81 |
| | (0.145) | (410.74) | (0.17) | (0.15) | (0.24) | (0.47) |
| Medium; 5-10 | 0.784*** | -161.35 | 0.08 | -0.16 | 0.8*** | -0.67* |
| | (0.103) | (302.45) | (0.14) | (0.12) | (0.18) | (0.29) |
| Medium; 10+ | 0.489*** | 48.15 | 0.33*** | -0.09 | 0.42*** | -0.46*** |
| | (0.0555) | (148.42) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.1) | (0.13) |
| Large; <5 | 1.105*** | 438.75 | 0.88*** | -0.01 | 1.21*** | 0.04 |
| | (0.138) | (378.34) | (0.21) | (0.16) | (0.19) | (0.48) |
| Large; 5-10 | 1.229*** | -325.1 | 0.38** | -0.35*** | 0.73*** | -2.7*** |
| | (0.134) | (235.78) | (0.12) | (0.09) | (0.13) | (0.47) |
| Large; 10+ | 1.146*** | -424.1** | 0.58*** | -0.4*** | 1.03*** | -1.72*** |
| | (0.0610) | (150.96) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.19) |
| Changes in ownership | | | | | | |
| Property sold last year | 0.0472 | 210.26 | -0.42*** | -0.11 | -0.3** | 0.03 |
| | (0.0794) | (183.69) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.1) | (0.2) |
| Property sold this year | 0.0830 | 261.78 | -1.21*** | -0.27*** | -0.24* | -0.66*** |
| | (0.0734) | (176.45) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.19) |
| Property type (Ref:3-family) | | | | | | |
| Condominium | -0.522*** | 261.62 | -0.25* | 0.06 | -0.07 | -18.91 |
| | (0.127) | (269.2) | (0.13) | (0.1) | (0.16) | (759.88) |
| Single-family | -0.354*** | 364.13 | -0.54*** | 0.01 | 0.16 | -0.35 |
| | (0.0829) | (371.03) | (0.13) | (0.12) | (0.19) | (0.33) |
| Two-family | 0.0743 | -222.47 | -0.3*** | -0.03 | 0 | 0.2 |
| | (0.0540) | (153.72) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.13) |
| 4-6 unit | -0.0507 | 92.6 | 0.15 | -0.02 | -0.15 | 0.52** |
| | (0.0883) | (168.82) | (0.09) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.19) |
| 7-30 unit | -0.0216 | 13.35 | 0.39*** | 0.07 | -0.1 | -0.08 |
| | (0.114) | (181.7) | (0.09) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.29) |
| 30+ unit | -0.107 | 304.16 | 0.67*** | 0.12 | -0.24* | -0.25 |
| | (0.129) | (241.33) | (0.13) | (0.09) | (0.12) | (0.42) |
| Land and building valuation | | | | | | |
| Land val per sf (100s) | -0.0603 | 182 | 0.03 | -0.1 | -0.03 | -0.33 |
| | (0.0784) | (156.44) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.4) |
| Building val per sf (100s) | -0.0429 | 15.41 | 0.13** | -0.01 | -0.06 | 0.45*** |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (0.0281) | (80.56) | (0.05) | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.1) |
| Building val per unit (100,000s) | -0.0398 | 259.98** | -0.05 | -0.09** | -0.01 | 0.15 |
| | (0.0747) | (87.59) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.1) |
| Year built and remodeled (linear) | | | | | | |
| Year built (decades before 2018) | 0.0204 | -75.98*** | 0.02* | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.11*** |
| | (0.0135) | (20.23) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.03) |
| Year remodeled (decades before 2018) | -0.000742 | 22.92 | -0.01 | -0.02 | 0 | -0.12 |
| | (0.0232) | (43.55) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.06) |
| Not remodeled | -0.175 | 324.99* | -0.11 | -0.09 | -0.09 | -0.16 |
| | (0.0969) | (141.87) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.16) |
| Other property characteristics | | | | | | |
| Place-based subsidy | 0.227* | -1189.24*** | -0.17* | -0.42*** | 0.85*** | -0.54* |
| | (0.0981) | (142.22) | (0.08) | (0.05) | (0.07) | (0.25) |
| Rental units | | -7.83*** | 0** | 0 | 0** | 0.01* |
| | | (1.95) | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) |
| Intercept | -5.326*** | 5750.5*** | 1.19*** | 0.64*** | -3.39*** | -22.2 |
| | (0.310) | (956) | (0.22) | (0.16) | (0.23) | (567.36) |
| N | 1217830 | 5628 | 18049 | 18049 | 18049 | 18049 |
| Log likelihood | -517206.1 | -52879.6 | -7849.7 | -12101.8 | -7438.6 | -1802.5 |

**ii. Plans to bring in higher-paying tenants.**

Small and large landlords may also differ in eviction behaviors because large landlords use eviction filings to gentrify their properties, removing poorer tenants and replacing them with richer ones. This is not implausible, since Boston is a city undergoing substantial gentrification, and studies suggest that large-scale corporate owners are more likely to participate in and accelerate gentrification (Smith 1996). If this were the case, we would expect two findings. First, we would expect properties purchased by large landlords to have higher filing rates initially, but eventually to show lower filing rates once gentrified, since the properties would then be inhabited by richer tenants and large landlords have no greater propensity to evict in general. To examine whether this is the case, Figure K2 shows the unconditional filing rates from a balanced sample of properties that were originally owned by small landlords but sold to large landlords. Although the filing rate is highest in the year of transfer, it remains substantially higher than those owned by small landlords even six years after purchasing and there is little sign of it decreasing. Table R3 offers a second test of this implication, estimating eviction practices for small, medium, and large landlords, distinguishing between those that have owned their properties for zero to five, five to ten, or more than ten years. The table shows no evidence that large landlords' filing practices decrease in rate or change qualitatively with time.

A second implication of large landlords using eviction filings to gentrify their properties would be that disparities in eviction behaviors between large and small landlords should be particularly large in gentrifying neighborhoods. Such neighborhoods would offer greater potential for large landlords to gentrify their individual properties, and so large landlords should engage in this behavior to a greater degree in these areas. Tables R4, R5, and R6 estimates key outcomes in this study, with properties in tracts that gentrified, did not gentrify, and were not eligible to gentrify modeled separately. In all three subsamples, large landlords file more often than small owners and file for different reasons and with different outcomes. There are no substantial differences in the size of coefficients between models pertaining to tracts that did and did not gentrify. There is a slightly weaker association between landlord scale and particular aspects of the filing process, such as reaching execution, in tracts that were ineligible to gentrify. However, large landlords still showed dramatically higher filing rates at those properties.

**Table R3: Eviction behaviors by years owning property**

| | Eviction filings (1) | Judgment amount (2) | Rent filing (3) | Execution (4) | Serial filing (5) | Conflict (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Landlord scale (ref. 10+; small) | | | | | | |
| Small; <5 | 0.411*** | -445.14 | -0.14 | -0.08 | 0.25 | 0.4* |
| | (0.0635) | (240.2) | (0.1) | (0.09) | (0.16) | (0.2) |
| Small; 5-10 | 0.0258 | -344.78 | 0.18 | 0.01 | -0.11 | 0.17 |
| | (0.0558) | (210.79) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.15) | (0.18) |
| Medium; <5 | 0.698*** | -479.33 | 0.37** | -0.25* | 0.68*** | -0.68** |
| | (0.0860) | (259.63) | (0.12) | (0.1) | (0.16) | (0.26) |
| Medium; 5-10 | 0.449*** | -348.34 | 0.55*** | -0.03 | 0.46** | -0.27 |
| | (0.0744) | (233.1) | (0.11) | (0.09) | (0.15) | (0.21) |
| Medium; 10+ | 0.498*** | 155.91 | 0.27* | -0.14 | 0.24 | -0.41 |
| | (0.0733) | (240.58) | (0.11) | (0.1) | (0.16) | (0.22) |
| Large; <5 | 1.228*** | -677.24** | 0.69*** | -0.38*** | 0.98*** | -1.47*** |
| | (0.0789) | (214) | (0.1) | (0.09) | (0.13) | (0.24) |
| Large; 5-10 | 1.159*** | -710.09** | 0.69*** | -0.42*** | 0.94*** | -2.11*** |
| | (0.0736) | (227.54) | (0.11) | (0.09) | (0.14) | (0.31) |
| Large; 10+ | 1.039*** | -509.02* | 0.65*** | -0.43*** | 1.08*** | -1.68*** |
| | (0.0764) | (221.61) | (0.11) | (0.09) | (0.13) | (0.32) |
| Changes in ownership | | | | | | |
| Property sold last year | -0.0214 | 421.06* | -0.41*** | -0.06 | -0.28** | 0.07 |
| | (0.0798) | (185.75) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.1) | (0.19) |
| Property sold this year | 0.110 | 273.72 | -1.26*** | -0.27*** | -0.22* | -0.66*** |
| | (0.0773) | (173.67) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.19) |
| Property type (Ref:3-family) | | | | | | |
| Condominium | -0.508*** | 272.23 | -0.27* | 0.07 | -0.12 | -18.84 |
| | (0.125) | (269.37) | (0.13) | (0.1) | (0.16) | (766.37) |
| Single-family | -0.358*** | 341.45 | -0.55*** | 0.01 | 0.13 | -0.36 |
| | (0.0828) | (370.86) | (0.13) | (0.12) | (0.19) | (0.33) |
| Two-family | 0.0838 | -224.84 | -0.3*** | -0.03 | -0.02 | 0.2 |
| | (0.0539) | (153.58) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.13) |
| 4-6 unit | -0.0277 | 108.99 | 0.15 | -0.02 | -0.14 | 0.55** |
| | (0.0880) | (169.09) | (0.09) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.19) |
| 7-30 unit | 0.00263 | 24.89 | 0.4*** | 0.08 | -0.08 | 0.12 |
| | (0.114) | (181.82) | (0.1) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.29) |
| 30+ unit | -0.0908 | 322.91 | 0.69*** | 0.14 | -0.22 | -0.13 |
| | (0.129) | (241.24) | (0.13) | (0.09) | (0.12) | (0.44) |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Land and building valuation | | | | | | |
| Land val per sf (100s) | -0.0553 | 182.5 | 0.02 | -0.11 | -0.07 | -0.37 |
| | (0.0786) | (156.68) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.4) |
| Building val per sf (100s) | -0.0479 | 31.04 | 0.13** | -0.01 | -0.07 | 0.39*** |
| | (0.0277) | (80.39) | (0.05) | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.1) |
| Building val per unit (100,000s) | -0.0353 | 258.02** | -0.05 | -0.09** | 0 | 0.15 |
| | (0.0743) | (87.76) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.1) |
| Year built and remodeled (linear) | | | | | | |
| Year built (decades before 2018) | 0.0184 | -75.77*** | 0.02* | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.11*** |
| | (0.0134) | (20.23) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.03) |
| Year remodeled (decades before 2018) | 0.000489 | 12.64 | 0 | -0.02 | 0.01 | -0.1 |
| | (0.0229) | (43.82) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.06) |
| Not remodeled | -0.177 | 282.91* | -0.11 | -0.1 | -0.09 | -0.12 |
| | (0.0970) | (142.8) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.16) |
| Other property characteristics | | | | | | |
| Place-based subsidy | 0.231* | -1197.79*** | -0.16* | -0.41*** | 0.86*** | -0.37 |
| | (0.0995) | (144.28) | (0.08) | (0.05) | (0.07) | (0.26) |
| Rental units | | -7.6*** | 0** | 0 | 0** | 0* |
| | | (1.95) | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) |
| Intercept | -5.387*** | 6033.65*** | 1.07*** | 0.64*** | -3.36*** | -22.31 |
| | (0.313) | (970.46) | (0.23) | (0.17) | (0.25) | (565.32) |
| N | 1217830 | 5628 | 18049 | 18049 | 18049 | 18049 |
| Log likelihood | -517174.7 | -52879.3 | -7851.9 | -121023.0 | -7443.0 | -1809.7 |

**Table R4: Eviction behaviors in tracts that did not gentrify**

| | Filing rate (1) | Non-payment (2) | Execution (3) | Serial (4) | Conflict (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Landlord scale (ref. small) | | | | | |
| Medium | 0.450*** | 0.36** | 0.00 | 0.34* | -0.45* |
| | (0.0911) | (0.11) | (0.09) | (0.15) | (0.22) |
| Large | 0.839*** | 0.45** | -0.15 | 0.67*** | -0.99* |
| | (0.166) | (0.14) | (0.11) | (0.16) | (0.39) |
| Landlord proximity to tenants | | | | | |
| Co-resident | -0.493*** | -0.18 | 0.11 | -0.49** | 0.53* |
| | (0.104) | (0.12) | (0.1) | (0.18) | (0.23) |
| Lives outside Boston | -0.0814 | -0.05 | 0.11 | -0.22* | -0.7** |
| | (0.191) | (0.1) | (0.07) | (0.1) | (0.23) |
| Landlord organizational structure | | | | | |
| Property manager | 0.0565 | -0.09 | 0.06 | 0.01 | -0.77* |
| | (0.106) | (0.09) | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.37) |
| Company | 0.156 | -0.03 | -0.27** | 0.23 | -0.14 |
| | (0.255) | (0.13) | (0.1) | (0.13) | (0.38) |
| LLC linked to person | 0.135 | 0.45*** | -0.29*** | 0.34** | -1.13* |
| | (0.190) | (0.13) | (0.09) | (0.11) | (0.44) |
| Other landlord characteristics | | | | | |
| Imputed household income (100,000s) | -0.171 | 0.02 | -0.15 | -0.1 | 0.29 |
| | (0.145) | (0.18) | (0.13) | (0.18) | (0.54) |
| Inherited property | -1.091*** | -0.37 | 0.43 | -0.23 | -0.26 |
| | (0.326) | (0.28) | (0.26) | (0.48) | (0.53) |
| Changes in ownership | | | | | |
| Property sold last year | 0.0527 | -0.55*** | 0.01 | -0.38* | 0.74** |
| | (0.0810) | (0.12) | (0.1) | (0.15) | (0.26) |
| Property sold this year | 0.0951 | -1.05*** | -0.09 | -0.39* | -0.31 |
| | (0.0804) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.15) | (0.3) |
| Property type (Ref:3-family) | | | | | |
| Condominium | -0.648** | -0.39 | 0.28 | -0.24 | |
| | (0.209) | (0.25) | (0.19) | (0.27) | |
| Single-family | -0.438** | -0.73** | 0.07 | -0.35 | -0.13 |
| | (0.167) | (0.24) | (0.22) | (0.35) | (0.67) |
| Two-family | 0.173* | -0.43*** | -0.03 | -0.23 | 0.37 |
| | (0.0832) | (0.11) | (0.1) | (0.15) | (0.23) |
| 4-6 unit | -0.0539 | -0.04 | -0.01 | -0.25 | 0.8* |
| | (0.122) | (0.14) | (0.1) | (0.13) | (0.33) |
| 7-30 unit | -0.0525 | 0.2 | 0.04 | -0.27* | 0.34 |
| | (0.158) | (0.14) | (0.1) | (0.12) | (0.51) |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 30+ unit | -0.0294 | 0.67*** | 0.07 | -0.26 | -0.17 |
| | (0.175) | (0.2) | (0.13) | (0.16) | (0.76) |
| Land and building valuation | | | | | |
| Land val per sf (100s) | -0.0592 | -0.11 | 0.01 | -0.15 | 0.1 |
| | (0.127) | (0.13) | (0.09) | (0.11) | (0.81) |
| Building val per sf (100s) | -0.0457 | 0.1 | -0.04 | -0.06 | 0.34 |
| | (0.0410) | (0.09) | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.41) |
| Building val per unit (100,000s) | 0.128 | 0.05 | -0.16* | 0.14 | -0.11 |
| | (0.123) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.26) |
| Year built and remodeled (linear) | | | | | |
| Year built (decades before 2018) | 0.0264 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0 | 0.07 |
| | (0.0179) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.05) |
| Year remodeled (decades before 2018) | 0.0186 | -0.03 | -0.03 | -0.03 | -0.32** |
| | (0.0392) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.12) |
| Not remodeled | -0.147 | -0.16 | -0.07 | -0.17 | -0.46 |
| | (0.153) | (0.12) | (0.09) | (0.11) | (0.29) |
| Year built (ref. pre-1900) | | | | | |
| Year remodeled (ref. not remodeled) | | | | | |
| Other property characteristics | | | | | |
| Place-based subsidy | 0.217 | -0.1 | -0.24** | 0.77*** | -1.42** |
| | (0.138) | (0.12) | (0.08) | (0.1) | (0.48) |
| Rental units | | 0* | 0 | 0 | 0.02*** |
| | | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0.01) |
| Intercept | -3.753*** | 1.73*** | 0.6* | -2.97*** | -21.48 |
| | (0.427) | (0.33) | (0.24) | (0.34) | (853.52) |
| N | 293391 | 8070 | 8070 | 8070 | 7825 |
| Log likelihood | -237897.6 | -3312.1 | -5391.1 | -3712 | -651.9 |

**Table R5: Eviction behaviors in tracts that gentrified**

| | Filing rate | Non-payment | Execution | Serial | Conflict |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Landlord scale (ref. small) | | | | | |
| Medium | 0.211 | 0.32* | -0.07 | 0.15 | -0.1 |
| | (0.125) | (0.13) | (0.11) | (0.18) | (0.25) |
| Large | 0.796*** | 0.53** | -0.44*** | 0.71*** | -1.36** |
| | (0.170) | (0.16) | (0.13) | (0.2) | (0.47) |
| Landlord proximity to tenants | | | | | |
| Co-resident | -0.109 | -0.17 | 0.11 | -0.53* | 0.25 |
| | (0.353) | (0.14) | (0.12) | (0.23) | (0.26) |
| Lives outside Boston | 0.205 | -0.03 | 0.01 | -0.14 | -0.09 |
| | (0.196) | (0.11) | (0.09) | (0.14) | (0.24) |
| Landlord organizational structure | | | | | |
| Property manager | 0.570** | 0.58*** | 0.2* | 0.15 | -2.57*** |
| | (0.193) | (0.15) | (0.1) | (0.12) | (0.76) |
| Company | 0.321 | 0.16 | -0.28* | 0.41* | -1.51** |
| | (0.225) | (0.17) | (0.12) | (0.17) | (0.48) |
| LLC linked to person | 0.146 | 0.11 | -0.01 | 0.15 | -0.91* |
| | (0.172) | (0.15) | (0.11) | (0.16) | (0.44) |
| Other landlord characteristics | | | | | |
| Imputed household income (100,000s) | 0.738*** | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.15 | 1.49** |
| | (0.194) | (0.22) | (0.17) | (0.25) | (0.52) |
| Inherited property | 0.420 | 0.55 | 0.17 | -1.19* | -0.92 |
| | (0.409) | (0.29) | (0.23) | (0.6) | (0.57) |
| Changes in ownership | | | | | |
| Property sold last year | -0.113 | -0.43** | 0.22 | -0.37 | 0.35 |
| | (0.165) | (0.15) | (0.13) | (0.2) | (0.35) |
| Property sold this year | 0.356** | -1.41*** | -0.36** | -0.31 | 0.06 |
| | (0.117) | (0.12) | (0.11) | (0.18) | (0.29) |
| Property type (Ref:3-family) | | | | | |
| Condominium | -0.474 | -0.77** | 0.17 | 0.4 | |
| | (0.260) | (0.29) | (0.23) | (0.35) | |
| Single-family | -0.325 | 0.11 | 0.05 | 0.41 | -0.57 |
| | (0.217) | (0.29) | (0.24) | (0.36) | (0.83) |
| Two-family | 0.169 | -0.28* | -0.13 | 0.04 | 0.2 |
| | (0.0907) | (0.14) | (0.12) | (0.2) | (0.26) |
| 4-6 unit | 0.0828 | 0.2 | 0 | -0.09 | -0.05 |
| | (0.185) | (0.18) | (0.13) | (0.19) | (0.35) |
| 7-30 unit | -0.00178 | 0.44* | 0.19 | 0.09 | 0.51 |
| | (0.257) | (0.22) | (0.15) | (0.19) | (0.71) |
| 30+ unit | -0.360 | 0.57 | 0.34 | -0.05 | 0.52 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (0.330) | (0.31) | (0.21) | (0.27) | (0.98) |
| Land and building valuation | | | | | |
| Land val per sf (100s) | 0.129 | -0.2 | -0.32 | -0.21 | -1 |
| | (0.140) | (0.24) | (0.17) | (0.24) | (0.83) |
| Building val per sf (100s) | 0.0445 | 0.26* | 0.03 | -0.14 | 0.83*** |
| | (0.0682) | (0.1) | (0.06) | (0.11) | (0.15) |
| Building val per unit (100,000s) | 0.0157 | 0.08 | -0.13 | -0.13 | -0.09 |
| | (0.0998) | (0.1) | (0.08) | (0.14) | (0.26) |
| Year built and remodeled (linear) | | | | | |
| Year built (decades before 2018) | 0.0293 | 0.04* | 0 | 0.06* | 0.22** |
| | (0.0360) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.07) |
| Year remodeled (decades before 2018) | 0.0896 | 0.07 | -0.05 | 0.05 | 0.05 |
| | (0.0575) | (0.05) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.1) |
| Not remodeled | 0.0718 | 0.01 | -0.1 | 0.11 | -0.18 |
| | (0.213) | (0.15) | (0.11) | (0.16) | (0.29) |
| Year built (ref. pre-1900) | | | | | |
| Year remodeled (ref. not remodeled) | | | | | |
| Other property characteristics | | | | | |
| Place-based subsidy | 0.208 | 0.06 | -0.44*** | 0.57*** | 1.3 |
| | (0.215) | (0.19) | (0.12) | (0.15) | (0.68) |
| Rental units | | 0* | 0 | 0** | 0 |
| | | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0.01) |
| Intercept | -7.444*** | 0.29 | 0.52 | -4.35*** | -24.23 |
| | (1.005) | (0.41) | (0.31) | (0.48) | (1225.49) |
| N | 295391 | 4376 | 4376 | 4376 | 4169 |
| Log likelihood | -109361.8 | -1837.7 | -2905.7 | -1720.2 | -488.9 |

**Table R6: Eviction behaviors in tracts ineligible for eviction**

| | Filing rate (1) | Non-payment (2) | Execution (3) | Serial (4) | Conflict (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Landlord scale (ref. small) | | | | | |
| Medium | 0.158 | 0.3* | -0.02 | 0.36* | -0.1 |
| | (0.0833) | (0.12) | (0.1) | (0.18) | (0.26) |
| Large | 0.820*** | 0.27 | -0.18 | 0.54** | -0.38 |
| | (0.116) | (0.14) | (0.12) | (0.19) | (0.39) |
| Landlord proximity to tenants | | | | | |
| Co-resident | -0.115 | -0.16 | 0.18 | 0.03 | 0.66* |
| | (0.117) | (0.12) | (0.1) | (0.18) | (0.27) |
| Lives outside Boston | 0.0710 | -0.01 | 0 | 0.25 | -0.81*** |
| | (0.109) | (0.1) | (0.08) | (0.14) | (0.24) |
| Landlord organizational structure | | | | | |
| Property manager | 0.502** | 0.42** | -0.13 | 0.08 | -0.54 |
| | (0.172) | (0.14) | (0.1) | (0.13) | (0.59) |
| Company | 0.567*** | -0.1 | -0.15 | 0.65*** | -0.08 |
| | (0.159) | (0.15) | (0.12) | (0.18) | (0.37) |
| LLC linked to person | 0.171 | 0.17 | -0.19 | -0.02 | -0.09 |
| | (0.118) | (0.14) | (0.1) | (0.15) | (0.42) |
| Other landlord characteristics | | | | | |
| Imputed household income (100,000s) | 0.166 | 0.19 | -0.05 | 0.58** | -0.66 |
| | (0.188) | (0.18) | (0.13) | (0.19) | (0.53) |
| Inherited property | -0.384 | -0.05 | -0.03 | -0.17 | 0.97* |
| | (0.211) | (0.22) | (0.19) | (0.33) | (0.38) |
| Changes in ownership | | | | | |
| Property sold last year | 0.247 | -0.66*** | -0.32** | -0.03 | -0.36 |
| | (0.155) | (0.13) | (0.12) | (0.17) | (0.35) |
| Property sold this year | 0.0678 | -1.48*** | -0.36*** | 0.04 | -1.93*** |
| | (0.161) | (0.11) | (0.1) | (0.17) | (0.54) |
| Property type (Ref:3-family) | | | | | |
| Condominium | -0.372* | 0.04 | -0.16 | -0.45 | |
| | (0.168) | (0.22) | (0.18) | (0.34) | |
| Single-family | -0.463*** | -0.92*** | 0.22 | 0.01 | 0.69 |
| | (0.120) | (0.2) | (0.18) | (0.33) | (0.53) |
| Two-family | -0.0132 | -0.32** | 0.05 | 0.17 | 0.07 |
| | (0.0824) | (0.11) | (0.09) | (0.16) | (0.23) |
| 4-6 unit | -0.0251 | 0.38* | -0.06 | 0.11 | 0.59 |
| | (0.161) | (0.16) | (0.12) | (0.19) | (0.4) |
| 7-30 unit | -0.00163 | 0.53** | 0.2 | 0.13 | 0.24 |
| | (0.189) | (0.18) | (0.14) | (0.21) | (0.81) |
| 30+ unit | -0.202 | 0.63* | 0.1 | -0.1 | 1 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (0.227) | (0.26) | (0.18) | (0.26) | (2.05) |
| Land and building valuation | | | | | |
| Land val per sf (100s) | -0.0755 | 0.04 | -0.11 | 0.08 | -0.81 |
| | (0.0947) | (0.12) | (0.09) | (0.16) | (0.66) |
| Building val per sf (100s) | -0.101* | 0.03 | 0.02 | -0.05 | -0.34 |
| | (0.0406) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.52) |
| Building val per unit (100,000s) | -0.108 | -0.04 | -0.08 | 0.01 | -0.14 |
| | (0.118) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.09) | (0.22) |
| Year built and remodeled (linear) | | | | | |
| Year built (decades before 2018) | 0.0289 | 0.01 | -0.01 | 0 | 0 |
| | (0.0262) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.05) |
| Year remodeled (decades before 2018) | -0.0314 | -0.04 | 0.01 | 0 | -0.27* |
| | (0.0272) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.13) |
| Not remodeled | -0.223 | -0.12 | -0.19 | -0.19 | -0.2 |
| | (0.154) | (0.13) | (0.1) | (0.16) | (0.32) |
| Year built (ref. pre-1900) | | | | | |
| Year remodeled (ref. not remodeled) | 0.0112 | | | | |
| Other property characteristics | (0.222) | | | | |
| Place-based subsidy | -5.576*** | -0.22 | -0.44** | 0.65*** | -3.46* |
| | (0.494) | (0.19) | (0.14) | (0.19) | (1.44) |
| Rental units | 626239 | 0 | 0 | 0 | -0.05 |
| | -165447.8 | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0.05) |
| Intercept | | 0.98** | 0.56* | -4.31*** | -19.86 |
| | | (0.35) | (0.28) | (0.47) | (1077.02) |
| N | | 5413 | 5413 | 5413 | 5062 |
| Log likelihood | | -2518 | -3613.1 | -1853.4 | -554 |

iii. Differences in landlords' abilities to monitor tenants and ensure rent payments

Another reason for small and large landlords' different eviction behaviors may be that small landlords, perhaps due to their closer relationships with tenants, are better able to ensure that their tenants make regular rent payments. The main evidence presented against this explanation is that large landlords file over smaller amounts of missed rent. If their higher rates of filing were simply driven by their tenants being more likely to miss rent payments, we would not expect them to show lower thresholds after which they evict. Secondly, such an explanation cannot account for the higher rates of interpersonal conflict that characterize small landlords' eviction filings.

iv. Differences in landlords' abilities to work out rent repayment schemes

Small landlords may evict less because their interpersonal relationships with tenants enable them to work out rent repayment schemes that are beneficial to both parties rather than evicting. This explanation is relatively similar to the one put forward in this paper, that small-scale landlords consider evictions through a social lens that leads them to file less often, with greater chance of execution, and with more interpersonal conflict. In both explanations, small landlords' relationships with tenants shape their eviction patters, and I would expect that small landlords, according to my explanation, would also engage in rent repayment schemes when dealing with tenants. The difference between these explanations is precisely what that closer landlord-tenant relationship entails and whether it involves less of a focus on profit. The counter-narrative discussed here suggests that small landlords may be just as profit-oriented as large landlords, but their relationships with give them managerial capabilities that large landlords do not have.

While I agree that small landlords are more likely to work out informal rent repayment schemes with their tenants (Balzarini and Boyd 2020), I also think it is very likely that they will be less profit-seeking. First, past literature on landlords routinely describes small-scale owners as incorporating logics other than profit-seeking into their management behavior (Shiffer-Sebba 2020; Gilderbloom 1987). For example, Mallach (2007) describes how a small landlord eventually had to leave the industry because he found that his actions as a landlord felt inappropriate given his role in the larger community as a deacon. Second, qualitative descriptions of landlords working with tenants to avoid eviction suggest that these actions are motivated by sympathy for the tenants as much as they are by economic reasoning. For example, Balzarini and Boyd (2020:14) write that "the ability to empathize with tenants was, for many landlords, a reason to work with tenants first to find ways to avoid filing." Likewise, Desmond (2012) describes how landlords decide whether to work with tenants based on subjective and often affective impressions of the tenants. This is not to say that economic rationality did not enter these decisions or that the landlords did not see an economic upside to working with tenants. Indeed, Balzarini and Boyd (2020:14) write that "For many landlords, it was simply a rational business decision to work with tenants rather than file an eviction." This is merely to say that even in cases where the small landlords are economically motivated, they also appear to be motivated by sympathy for their tenants. This is in contrast to the practices of large-scale landlords, who often do not know their tenants and feel incapable of acting on such interpersonal feelings even when they do (Leung et al. 2020) Accordingly, I would argue that the broad social-institutional contexts explanation presented in this paper, which allows for rationally-motivated as well as socially-motivated behavior on the parts of small landlords, describes landlord behavior more effectively than the narrative of rent repayment schemes.

More generally, these instances of social logics interfering with profit-seeking fit a much larger theme in the social embeddedness of economic behavior, that instrumental profit-seeking is an orientation

that many norms in our society conflict with and that accordingly must be supported by particular social and institutional contexts (Uzzi 1997). Given this long history of sociological analysis showing the conflict between social closeness and profit-seeking, it appears particularly unlikely that more intense relationships between landlords and tenants would change eviction behavior not because landlords feel more uncomfortable pursuing profit, but instead because they have found more successful ways of doing so.

v. Summary

The argument of this piece is neither that social-institutional contexts are the sole difference between small and large landlords, nor that other explanations are entirely unimportant. Instead, I seek merely to show that social-institutional contexts plausibly explains a wide range of findings, which no other explanation does, and that the evidence in support of the others is relatively weak. Therefore, I argue that social relationships and institutional contexts are primarily responsible for small and large landlords' eviction behaviors.

## S. Additional tables

In this section, I present tables pertaining to the landlord characteristics analysis that are referenced in the main text but not included. S1 replicates the analysis from Table 4, but only for large landlords, in order to see whether corporate ownership is relevant among large-scale owners

**Table S1: Replication with only large owners**

| | Filing rate (1) | Non-payment (2) | Execution (3) | Serial (4) | Conflict (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Landlord proximity to tenants | | | | | |
| Lives outside Boston | -0.118 | 0.24** | 0.03 | -0.07 | 0.58 |
| | (0.0719) | (0.09) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.33) |
| Landlord organizational structure | | | | | |
| Property manager | 0.181* | 0.09 | 0.11* | 0.05 | -1.25*** |
| | (0.0886) | (0.08) | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.34) |
| Company/LLC | 0.160 | 0.18 | -0.14* | 0.26** | -0.24 |
| | (0.121) | (0.09) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.35) |
| Other landlord characteristics | | | | | |
| Imputed household income (100,000s) | 0.139 | -0.24 | 0.15 | -0.23 | 1.22 |
| | (0.121) | (0.26) | (0.16) | (0.22) | (0.81) |
| Inherited property | -0.302 | 0.51 | -0.25 | -0.82 | 1.4 |
| | (0.430) | (0.58) | (0.32) | (0.51) | (1.01) |
| Changes in ownership | | | | | |
| Property sold last year | 0.0101 | -0.58*** | -0.09 | -0.3* | 0.87** |
| | (0.0985) | (0.12) | (0.09) | (0.12) | (0.32) |
| Property sold this year | -0.0631 | -0.61*** | 0.06 | -0.48*** | 0.63 |
| | (0.0930) | (0.13) | (0.11) | (0.14) | (0.39) |
| Property type (Ref:3-family) | | | | | |
| Condominium | -0.343* | -0.24 | 0.3 | -0.36 | |
| | (0.161) | (0.22) | (0.16) | (0.21) | |
| Single-family | -0.196 | -0.56 | 0.06 | 0.21 | -20.07 |
| | (0.251) | (0.35) | (0.3) | (0.34) | (8581.94) |
| Two-family | 0.0224 | -0.7*** | -0.13 | -0.15 | -0.04 |
| | (0.103) | (0.17) | (0.15) | (0.18) | (0.63) |
| 4-6 unit | -0.161 | 0.16 | -0.01 | -0.13 | 0.92* |
| | (0.139) | (0.14) | (0.1) | (0.11) | (0.43) |
| 7-30 unit | -0.148 | 0.39** | 0.08 | -0.03 | 0.61 |
| | (0.162) | (0.13) | (0.09) | (0.11) | (0.52) |
| 30+ unit | -0.195 | 0.73*** | 0.16 | -0.07 | 0.55 |
| | (0.177) | (0.17) | (0.12) | (0.14) | (0.69) |
| Land and building valuation | | | | | |
| Land val per sf (100s) | -0.0350 | -0.05 | -0.04 | -0.21* | 0.34 |
| | (0.0922) | (0.11) | (0.08) | (0.1) | (0.8) |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Building val per sf (100s) | -0.0486 | 0.08 | -0.01 | -0.06 | 0.24 |
| | (0.0298) | (0.07) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.21) |
| Building val per unit (100,000s) | 0.0176 | 0.15 | -0.14* | 0.01 | -0.15 |
| | (0.120) | (0.09) | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.44) |
| Year built and remodeled (linear) | | | | | |
| Year built (decades before 2018) | 0.0310 | 0.06*** | 0.01 | 0.03* | 0.14 |
| | (0.0166) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.08) |
| Year remodeled (decades before 2018) | 0.00640 | 0.02 | -0.04* | 0.02 | -0.2 |
| | (0.0263) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.13) |
| Not remodeled | -0.141 | -0.28* | -0.18* | -0.02 | 0.23 |
| | (0.125) | (0.12) | (0.08) | (0.1) | (0.43) |
| Other property characteristics | | | | | |
| Place-based subsidy | 0.144 | -0.13 | -0.36*** | 0.71*** | -0.18 |
| | (0.120) | (0.1) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.4) |
| Rental units | | 0** | 0 | 0 | 0.01* |
| | | (0) | (0) | (0) | (0) |
| Intercept | -4.347*** | 1.34*** | 0.32 | -2.83*** | -44.12 |
| | (0.382) | (0.4) | (0.26) | (0.34) | (4720.15) |
| N | 400462 | 9937 | 9937 | 9937 | 9556 |
| Log likelihood | -416184.5 | -3542.5 | -6554.6 | -5077.7 | -341.4 |

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# Data quality checks

## T. Predicting vacancies and renter households

I had two main concerns with data quality. The first was that there might be bias in the number of occupied rental units at properties owned by small, medium, and large landlords. For example, if I systematically undercount the rental units that large landlords have, or if small landlords have higher vacancy rates, this could be producing the low filing rates among those landlords. I test for this possibility using block level data on renter households and vacancies from the Decennial Census, which I take as unbiased measures and compare to analogous measures from my own data.

In Table T1 Model 1, I estimate the number of rental units at each block in my data according to the Census using a negative binomial model. My variables of interest are the number of rental units owned by medium and large landlords. I control for the total number of rental units according to my data, as well as variables describing the types of properties at that block. By controlling for these variables, the coefficients for the units owned by medium and large landlords estimate whether ownership by medium and large landlords is associated with a larger number of rental units according to the census, compared to ownership by small landlords and conditional on the types of properties themselves. The measures of building characteristics are meant to mirror those in Table 2, since that is the analysis that would be most affected by having a biased measure of number of rental units. Model 1 shows that ownership by medium landlords is associated with more rental units in the census, suggesting that there is an undercount of units owned by medium-scale landlords compared to those by small-scale landlords. However, ownership by large landlords is not, suggesting that the measure of rental units is not inducing bias in my analysis of difference in filing rates. In Table T1 Model 2, I estimate the number of vacant units using a model analogous to Model 1. In this model, ownership by medium and large landlords is not associated with differences in vacant units. This further suggests that the number of vacant units that different types of landlords have is not driving their differences in filing rates. Furthermore, in both analyses property characteristics are much stronger predictors of the outcome. Since these property characteristics are controlled for in Table 2, it suggests that the models in Table 2 are already controlling for most sources of bias in the number of rental units.

**Table T1: Predicting total rental units**

| | Number of rental units (1) | Number of vacant units (2) |
|---|---|---|
| Landlord scale | | |
| Rental units owned by medium LL | 0.197** | 0.004 |
| | (0.066) | (0.008) |
| Rental units owned by large LL | 0.024 | 0.005 |
| | (0.058) | (0.007) |
| Rental units owned by other LL | 0.034 | 0.006 |
| | (0.062) | (0.007) |
| Property types | | |
| Proportion properties residential | -6.724** | -0.722** |
| | (2.052) | (0.235) |
| Total rental units | 0.177* | -0.004 |
| | (0.069) | (0.008) |
| Rental units in single-family | 0.327 | 0.05* |
| | (0.199) | (0.023) |
| Rental units in two-family | 0.779*** | 0.064*** |
| | (0.082) | (0.009) |
| Rental units in three-family | 0.635*** | 0.076*** |
| | (0.067) | (0.008) |
| Rental units in four-to-six-unit | 0.474*** | 0.04*** |
| | (0.068) | (0.008) |
| Rental units in 7+ unit | 0.63*** | 0.025*** |
| | (0.04) | (0.005) |
| Rental units in condominiums | 0.366*** | 0.034*** |
| | (0.062) | (0.007) |
| Rental units in exempt | 0.702*** | 0.027*** |
| | (0.019) | (0.002) |
| Rental units in exempt 121A | 0.764*** | 0.005** |
| | (0.016) | (0.002) |
| Rental units in residential/commercial | 0.588*** | 0.02*** |
| | (0.017) | (0.002) |
| Property characteristics | | |
| Rental units with subsidy | -0.106*** | -0.007** |
| | (0.023) | (0.003) |
| Median building valuation per unit (log) | -3.852*** | -0.296* |
| | (1.16) | (0.133) |
| Median building valuation per sf (log) | 3.399** | 0.162 |
| | (1.163) | (0.133) |
| Median land valuation per sf (log) | -1.607** | -0.039 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | (0.533) | (0.061) |
| Median year built | -0.026 | 0.001 |
| | (0.016) | (0.002) |
| Proportion remodeled | -2.423 | -0.172 |
| | (1.447) | (0.166) |
| Changes in ownership | | |
| Proportion with owner change in last year | -2.298 | 0.829* |
| | (3.383) | (0.387) |
| Proportion with owner change this year | -7.221* | 1.026** |
| | (3.013) | (0.345) |
| Intercept | 95.417** | 0.219 |
| | (34.895) | (3.995) |
| N | 3750 | 3750 |
| Log likelihood | -16209.7 | -8082.2 |

## U. Replicating analyses with different groups of Census blocks

As a further check that biases in the measures of the number of occupied rental units are not responsible for the differences in filing rates between different types of landlords, I re-estimated differences in filing rates separately for properties that are more and less likely to have biased rental unit measures. The logic behind this test is that if biases in my measure of rental units are responsible for the differences in filing rates between small and large landlords, then the differences in filing rates should go away for samples in which there is no bias or the bias is in the opposite direction. To test this, I split the sample into properties that are in blocks with less than 90%, 90%-110%, and more than 110% of the Census' estimate of rental units. We might expect the first group, in which my data underestimates the number of rental units, to have a disproportionate number of medium landlords with underestimated number of units. In that case, we should see particularly high rates of eviction filings for medium landlords in this sample. We might expect the third group, in which my data overestimates the number of rental units, to have a smaller number of medium landlords with underestimated units, in which case the coefficient for medium landlords should be smaller. We might expect the second group, in which my data estimates the rental units well, to be the least biased estimate of differences in eviction behavior.

The coefficients for medium landlords are largest in the under-estimated group and smallest in the over-estimated group, as we might expect. Nevertheless, even in the over-estimated group, in which biases in the rental units are least likely to be inflating results, the coefficient for medium landlords is significant and substantively large. Even in this sample, medium landlords file for eviction 46% more often and reach execution 45% more often than small landlords. The coefficient for large landlords is slightly smaller in the over-estimate sample as well, but the difference is very small. This demonstrates that if over-estimating rental units is biasing my estimates of eviction filing rate disparities then that bias is quite small, and even without the bias we would expect large differences in filing rates.

**Table U1: Filing rate in under-estimated tracts (<90%)**

| | All properties | | Small properties (< 7 units) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Filings | Evictions | Filings | Evictions |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Landlord scale (ref. small) | | | | |
| Medium | 0.578*** | 0.504*** | 0.430*** | 0.428*** |
| | (0.153) | (0.150) | (0.119) | (0.128) |
| Large | 1.118*** | 1.086*** | 1.129*** | 1.079*** |
| | (0.169) | (0.169) | (0.144) | (0.160) |
| Changes in ownership | | | | |
| Property sold last year | 0.386* | 0.322 | 0.282* | 0.0240 |
| | (0.155) | (0.191) | (0.125) | (0.188) |
| Property sold this year | -0.0329 | 0.128 | 0.493*** | 0.527*** |
| | (0.143) | (0.224) | (0.118) | (0.150) |
| Property type (Ref:3-family) | | | | |
| Condominium | -1.488*** | -1.132** | -1.703*** | -1.735*** |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (0.380) | (0.423) | (0.456) | (0.498) |
| Single-family | -0.111 | -0.109 | -0.0618 | -0.100 |
| | (0.224) | (0.215) | (0.213) | (0.203) |
| Two-family | 0.0636 | -0.00427 | 0.0218 | -0.0606 |
| | (0.137) | (0.143) | (0.136) | (0.152) |
| 4-6 unit | -0.0996 | -0.186 | -0.228 | -0.457* |
| | (0.191) | (0.227) | (0.177) | (0.205) |
| 7-30 unit | -0.122 | -0.206 | | |
| | (0.226) | (0.287) | | |
| 30+ unit | -0.181 | -0.244 | | |
| | (0.245) | (0.295) | | |
| Land and building valuation | | | | |
| Land val per sf (100s) | -0.364** | -0.305* | -0.570*** | -0.386* |
| | (0.128) | (0.151) | (0.123) | (0.151) |
| Building val per sf (100s) | 0.0331 | 0.0464 | 0.106 | 0.285* |
| | (0.0735) | (0.0893) | (0.135) | (0.140) |
| Building val per unit (100,000s) | 0.114 | 0.0915 | -0.123 | -0.148 |
| | (0.0774) | (0.0889) | (0.0815) | (0.0774) |
| Year built and remodeled (linear) | | | | |
| Year built (decades before 2018) | 0.0155 | 0.0784 | -0.00657 | -0.00862 |
| | (0.0340) | (0.0439) | (0.0210) | (0.0220) |
| Year remodeled (decades before 2018) | -0.0786 | -0.0995 | -0.0427 | -0.0212 |
| | (0.0589) | (0.0708) | (0.0620) | (0.0780) |
| Not remodeled | -0.487* | -0.493 | -0.302 | -0.182 |
| | (0.247) | (0.294) | (0.187) | (0.216) |
| Other property characteristics | | | | |
| Place-based subsidy | 0.807*** | 0.616** | 0.872*** | 0.424 |
| | (0.193) | (0.217) | (0.197) | (0.224) |
| Intercept | -6.130*** | -7.799*** | -5.174*** | -6.387*** |
| | (0.708) | (0.941) | (0.655) | (0.859) |
| N | 191058 | 191058 | 128911 | 128911 |
| Log likelihood | -84833.6 | -48450.4 | -16305.6 | -9113.5 |

**Table U2: Filing rate in well-estimated tracts (90%-110%)**

| | All properties | | Small properties (< 7 units) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Filings | Evictions | Filings | Evictions |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Landlord scale (ref. small) | | | | |
| Medium | 0.472*** | 0.396*** | 0.478*** | 0.374*** |
| | (0.0890) | (0.110) | (0.0797) | (0.0989) |
| Large | 1.124*** | 0.926*** | 1.180*** | 0.953*** |
| | (0.0983) | (0.115) | (0.0864) | (0.103) |
| Changes in ownership | | | | |
| Property sold last year | 0.238 | 0.208 | 0.296*** | 0.364*** |
| | (0.161) | (0.167) | (0.0837) | (0.0952) |
| Property sold this year | 0.367** | 0.416** | 0.828*** | 0.802*** |
| | (0.134) | (0.149) | (0.0819) | (0.0863) |
| Property type (Ref:3-family) | | | | |
| Condominium | -0.767*** | -0.907*** | -0.261 | -0.313 |
| | (0.202) | (0.219) | (0.204) | (0.249) |
| Single-family | -0.198 | -0.201 | -0.218 | -0.118 |
| | (0.188) | (0.171) | (0.179) | (0.167) |
| Two-family | -0.0831 | -0.0499 | 0.0357 | -0.0223 |
| | (0.0905) | (0.102) | (0.0790) | (0.0912) |
| 4-6 unit | -0.261 | -0.180 | -0.118 | -0.0599 |
| | (0.147) | (0.171) | (0.117) | (0.131) |
| 7-30 unit | -0.346* | -0.431* | | |
| | (0.174) | (0.206) | | |
| 30+ unit | -0.364 | -0.519* | | |
| | (0.218) | (0.221) | | |
| Land and building valuation | | | | |
| Land val per sf (100s) | -0.0339 | 0.0459 | -0.350** | -0.524*** |
| | (0.152) | (0.172) | (0.113) | (0.154) |
| Building val per sf (100s) | 0.0362 | 0.0638 | -0.398*** | -0.347** |
| | (0.0556) | (0.0558) | (0.0997) | (0.126) |
| Building val per unit (100,000s) | -0.296** | -0.187 | -0.0595 | -0.141 |
| | (0.111) | (0.112) | (0.0597) | (0.0744) |
| Year built and remodeled (linear) | | | | |
| Year built (decades before 2018) | -0.000836 | -0.0247 | 0.0230 | 0.0374* |
| | (0.0223) | (0.0197) | (0.0158) | (0.0184) |
| Year remodeled (decades before 2018) | 0.0541 | 0.0151 | -0.0695 | -0.0813 |
| | (0.0445) | (0.0506) | (0.0371) | (0.0421) |
| Not remodeled | 0.0480 | -0.182 | -0.341** | -0.412** |
| | (0.167) | (0.177) | (0.105) | (0.125) |
| Other property characteristics | | | | |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Place-based subsidy | 0.264 | 0.175 | 0.709*** | 0.389* |
| | (0.190) | (0.170) | (0.137) | (0.152) |
| Intercept | -4.977*** | -4.831*** | -5.151*** | -4.858*** |
| | (0.423) | (0.415) | (0.427) | (0.496) |
| N | 384766 | 384766 | 277217 | 277217 |
| Log likelihood | -156611.3 | -92701.9 | -33568.2 | -21039.8 |

**Table U3: Filing rate in over-estimated tracts (>110%)**

| | All properties | | Small properties (< 7 units) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Filings | Evictions | Filings | Evictions |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Landlord scale (ref. small) | | | | |
| Medium | 0.381*** | 0.370*** | 0.357*** | 0.306*** |
| | (0.0624) | (0.0635) | (0.0484) | (0.0567) |
| Large | 1.017*** | 0.791*** | 0.950*** | 0.723*** |
| | (0.0735) | (0.0770) | (0.0579) | (0.0661) |
| Changes in ownership | | | | |
| Property sold last year | -0.0855 | -0.0175 | 0.151* | 0.154* |
| | (0.0862) | (0.125) | (0.0592) | (0.0716) |
| Property sold this year | -0.0478 | -0.0165 | 0.561*** | 0.585*** |
| | (0.110) | (0.125) | (0.0507) | (0.0579) |
| Property type (Ref:3-family) | | | | |
| Condominium | 0.0698 | 0.347** | -0.186 | -0.0726 |
| | (0.118) | (0.133) | (0.110) | (0.118) |
| Single-family | -0.435*** | -0.140 | -0.507*** | -0.178 |
| | (0.0968) | (0.100) | (0.0949) | (0.0991) |
| Two-family | 0.132 | 0.0898 | 0.172*** | 0.103 |
| | (0.0696) | (0.0714) | (0.0485) | (0.0551) |
| 4-6 unit | 0.0721 | 0.0135 | -0.0264 | -0.145 |
| | (0.121) | (0.126) | (0.0799) | (0.0929) |
| 7-30 unit | 0.141 | 0.193 | | |
| | (0.152) | (0.162) | | |
| 30+ unit | 0.110 | 0.255 | | |
| | (0.172) | (0.194) | | |
| Land and building valuation | | | | |
| Land val per sf (100s) | 0.224* | 0.462** | 0.141 | 0.186 |
| | (0.105) | (0.148) | (0.114) | (0.110) |
| Building val per sf (100s) | -0.0912*** | -0.111*** | -0.0314 | -0.0366 |
| | (0.0239) | (0.0312) | (0.0482) | (0.0600) |
| Building val per unit (100,000s) | -0.0573 | -0.0417 | -0.0757** | -0.114** |
| | (0.115) | (0.108) | (0.0268) | (0.0379) |
| Year built and remodeled (linear) | | | | |
| Year built (decades before 2018) | 0.0249* | 0.0572*** | 0.00109 | -0.00130 |
| | (0.0122) | (0.0168) | (0.00869) | (0.0100) |
| Year remodeled (decades before 2018) | -0.0155 | -0.00861 | 0.0116 | 0.0223 |
| | (0.0217) | (0.0305) | (0.0229) | (0.0235) |
| Not remodeled | -0.0762 | -0.00944 | -0.0236 | -0.0419 |
| | (0.115) | (0.148) | (0.0662) | (0.0719) |
| Other property characteristics | | | | |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Place-based subsidy | 0.136 | 0.113 | 0.765*** | 0.407** |
| | (0.0929) | (0.104) | (0.104) | (0.126) |
| Intercept | -5.554*** | -6.670*** | -5.306*** | -5.833*** |
| | (0.454) | (0.626) | (0.361) | (0.474) |
| N | 642006 | 642006 | 487341 | 487341 |
| Log likelihood | -256052.8 | -168886.1 | -67564.2 | -42311.3 |

## V. Details on the validity of matches

My second concern with data quality was that the linking of property-owning entities might be faulty, meaning I was combining landlords who were not the same or failing to combine ones that were. To ensure that the matches were legitimate, I undertook the following analyses.

First, I examined the proportion of each type of landowner (as categorized based on their name) that I was able to connect to a business filing. Of the 6,706 owners for whom we would expect there to exist a business filing (corporations, LLCs, partnerships, and associations), 81.4% were connected to a business filing. (The quality of those matches will be discussed below). The remaining 18.6% either did not have a filing in the database, had a filing that was not found by my web scraper, or were not correctly matched to a filing that I had scraped. An additional 2,121 owners were categorized as "Other organizations," meaning they were not people, but they did not specify what type of legal entity they were. Among these, only 19% were connected to a business filing. This is unsurprising, however, because a large portion of these were condominium associations and trusts, which do not need to file with the Secretary of Commerce.

Second, I ensured those links to business filings were done correctly by checking a random sample by hand. Of the 50 corporations, LLCs, partnerships, and associations I randomly sampled, all 50 were matched to the correct business filing, but in four cases there were slight ambiguities, none of which would have an effect on the analysis. In two cases, a similarly-named condominium association also matched to the same business filing. Although inaccurate, this cannot affect the operationalization of landlord scale, because the condominium associations are not considered to own any units (only the communal land in the condominium property. In another case, the entity in question matched to the correct business filing, but also to a second business filing, regarding a business that had closed but had the same name. In the fourth case, the entity matched to the correct business filing, but so did another entity with a similar name, which did not appear to have a business filing in Massachusetts. This audit suggests there is a slight problem with overlinking, however, not one that appears to affect the operationalized variables.

Third, I checked how much fuzzy matching was driving the results by comparing, among those entities that matched to business filings, the entity name and the business name. In 90% of cases, the name was exactly the same. Looking by hand at the remaining 10%, the vast majority differ only by a legal signifier such as "corporation," "incorporated," "limited," etc.

Fourth, I randomly sampled 50 entities that did not match to a corporate filing but possibly could have (based on their names they were labeled as a corporation, LLC, partnership, or association). Of those 50, 22 were not matched because no corporate filing exists for a company with that or a similar name. Many of these were condominium associations and trusts. 9 did not match because their names in the tax records were substantially different from the names in the corporate filings (e.g. words omitted, rearranged, misspelled in idiosyncratic ways). The remaining 19 did not match because the web scraper I wrote to collected filing records failed to find them in the corporate database. Although this is a troublingly large proportion of the sampled entities did not match when they should have, the group being sampled from is itself relatively small, with only about 3,000 entities. Nevertheless, this indicates that the matching was quite conservative. Although it means a slight underestimate to the descriptive statistics of landlord scale, it means that there is also little overlinking.

## W. Replicating analyses with naively matched owners

Finally, to ensure that the linking between owners was not affecting the results, I reran several key analyses using a simpler matching criteria. Specifically, I matched owners just by their names in the tax records and I re-estimated the cross-sectional models from Table 2 and the measures of market concentration from Appendix W. The predictive results are substantively-identical to the results from the more complex matching technique, suggesting that any mistakes in the matching process are not driving the results. However, the measures of market concentration are much lower for the naïve matching strategy, showing that matching landlords via business filings is essential for developing accurate measures of market composition.

### i. Replicating cross-sectional filing rate analysis

To test whether the matching process was responsible for the main findings in this paper, Table W1 replicates the models in Table 2, Models 1 and 2 using naïve operationalization of landlords scale. In each of the naïve model, medium and large landlords file and evict at higher rates than small landlords, suggesting that the matching strategy is not responsible for this finding. Interestingly, the coefficients for the naïve variable are larger than those for the linked variable, but the model fit is worse when they are included.

**Table W1: Cross-sectional filing rate model with naïve matching**

| | All buildings | | Small buildings | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Linked variable | Naïve variable | Linked variable | Naïve variable |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Landlord scale (ref. small) | | | | |
| Medium (original) | 0.468*** | | 0.381*** | |
| | (0.0487) | | (0.0415) | |
| Medium (naive 1) | | 0.597*** | | 0.482*** |
| | | (0.0446) | | (0.0401) |
| Large (original) | 1.079*** | | 1.034*** | |
| | (0.0565) | | (0.0478) | |
| Large (naive 1) | | 1.137*** | | 1.157*** |
| | | (0.0666) | | (0.0582) |
| Changes in ownership | | | | |
| Property sold last year | 0.114 | 0.126 | 0.201*** | 0.250*** |
| | (0.0565) | (0.0797) | (0.0452) | (0.0444) |
| Property sold this year | 0.135 | 0.126 | 0.624*** | 0.607*** |
| | (0.0768) | (0.0766) | (0.414) | (0.0407) |
| Land and building valuation | | | | |
| Land val per sf (log) | -0.096 | -0.0960 | -0.011 | -0.00400 |
| | (0.0577) | (0.0575) | (0.0491) | (0.0486) |
| Building val per sf (log) | -0.035 | -0.0331 | 0.154 | 0.164 |
| | (0.0466) | (0.0466) | (0.0941) | (0.0910) |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Building val per unit (log) | 0.0328 | 0.0368 | -0.196** | -0.209** |
| | (0.0800) | (0.0796) | (0.0672) | (0.0648) |
| Year built (ref. pre-1900) | | | | |
| 1900-1925 | 0.128 | 0.134 | 0.0364 | 0.0393 |
| | (0.0974) | (0.0974) | (0.0486) | (0.0484) |
| 1925-1950 | 0.148 | 0.146 | 0.0215 | 0.0146 |
| | (0.1237) | (0.124) | (0.0756) | (0.0752) |
| 1950-1975 | 0.024 | 0.0223 | -0.0608 | -0.0629 |
| | (0.1308) | (0.132) | (0.1140) | (0.114) |
| 1975-2000 | -0.177 | -0.177 | 0.103 | 0.127 |
| | (0.1856) | (0.187) | (0.1324) | (0.131) |
| 2000+ | -0.297 | -0.306 | -0.138 | -0.0731 |
| | (0.2083) | (0.209) | (0.1209) | (0.124) |
| Year remodeled (ref. not remodeled) | | | | |
| Pre-1975 | 0.159 | 0.159 | 0.057 | 0.0676 |
| | (0.1216) | (0.122) | (0.1182) | (0.114) |
| 1975-2000 | 0.156 | 0.155 | 0.097* | 0.106* |
| | (0.0833) | (0.0831) | (0.0467) | (0.0460) |
| 2000+ | 0.159 | 0.0720 | 0.118* | 0.150** |
| | (0.1216) | (0.0918) | (0.0490) | (0.0474) |
| Other property characteristics | | | | |
| Place-based subsidy | 0.260* | 0.255* | 0.781*** | 0.675*** |
| | (0.1100) | (0.111) | (0.0791) | (0.0859) |
| N | 1217830 | 1217830 | 893469 | 893469 |
| Log likelihood | -517173.7 | -517435.9 | -118994.4 | -119144.8 |

### ii. Replicating measures of landlord concentration

Below, I calculate four measures of market concentration – the proportion of owners in each landlord scale category, the gini index, the proportion of units owned by the top 50 owners, and the HHI, as estimated by the naïve and more advanced ownership scale measures. Across all scales, the more complex measure shows a much higher degree of concentration. This demonstrates that accounting for landlords' corporate ownership structures is essential to ascertaining an accurate picture of rental market consolidation.

**Table W2: Measures of landlord concentration with naïve matching**

| | Complex measure | Naïve measure |
|---|---|---|
| Prop. Owned by small LL | .487 | .552 |
| Prop. Owned by medium LL | .200 | .188 |
| Prop. Owned by large LL | .313 | .260 |
| Gini index | .556 | .495 |
| HHI | 3.60 | 1.92 |
| Prop. Owned by top 50 | .099 | .067 |

# Miscellaneous

## X. Trends in landlord characteristics in Boston, Massachusetts: 2003-2017

Section X presents statistics describing market consolidation and the composition of landlords over time in Boston. For each year, I present the proportion of rental units owned by small, medium and large landlords, the Gini Index of rental unit ownership, the proportion of rental units owned by the largest 50 landlords, and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. These statistics complement one another because the composition breakdown is a fairly crude by very interpretable measure, while the other indices are less interpretable but reflect changes within groups as well. I present these statistics first for all properties and then replicate them for the different types of properties in isolation.

Overall, these analyses show a fairly decentralized market with little change over time. The proportion of units owned by large landlords stays between 31 and 34, without a clear secular trend, while the Gini Index, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, and top owners' shares decrease during this time period.

However, this lack of activity at the population level belies changes in ownership among sub-populations. All small properties (six units or fewer) except condominiums show substantial ownership consolidation. The proportion of single-family properties owned by medium and large owners increased from less than 10% to more than 15% between 2003 and 2017. The index measures do not show consolidation in the single-family market, instead showing a decrease, followed by an increase, followed by another decrease in concentration. This forms a spike during the years of the foreclosure crisis, which likely reflects increases in ownership by very large entities, such as Fannie Mae. The index measures are more sensitive to changes in ownership among these very large owners, which shows the value of multiple measures. In contrast, the two, three, and four-to-six-unit properties show clear consolidation along all measures. The proportion of two-to-three family properties owned by medium and large owners increased from about 26% to about 33%, while the share owned by the top 50 owners increased from 3 to 5%. Likewise, the top 50 owners' share of four-to-six-unit properties increased from about 13.5% to 17% and the HHI index increased from about 11 to 15.5. Although these still represent low levels of concentration, they are large proportional increases.

Seven-to-thirty-unit and thirty-plus-unit properties show little evidence of consolidation and are already owned almost exclusively by large owners. Accordingly, there is little change in the composition of owners of these properties. The index measures show more change, but the trends do not show a clear story. For example, seven-to-thirty unit properties decrease in ownership concentration dramatically after 2005 and then stay relatively stable, while thirty-plus unit properties increase in ownership concentration somewhat, with a particularly spike during the foreclosure crisis. There is also disagreement between indices for each subsample. This lack of a clear picture is likely due to changes in ownership among very large landlords. The transfer of, say, 100 units from an owner with 800 units to one with 1200 units would have large effect on these centralization measures, although the difference in management practices between the two landlords might be negligible.

Finally, condominiums show values for the indices that are similar to those for single-family rental properties, namely an overall decrease with a spike during the foreclosure crisis. However, the composition measures for condominiums show a decrease in ownership by medium and large landlords, rather than the increase seen for single-family properties.

This analysis suggests that rental property ownership can be fruitfully analyzed according to three submarkets – small multi-family properties, large multi-family properties, and condominiums and single-family homes acting sometimes as rental and sometimes as homes.

**Figure X1: All rental properties**



**Figure X2: Single-family rental properties**



**Figure X3: Two-to-three-unit rental properties**



**Figure X4: Four-to-six-unit rental properties**



**Figure X5: Seven-to-thirty-unit rental properties**



**Figure X6: Thirty-plus-unit rental properties**



**Figure X7: Condominium rental properties**