

On Cover-Free Family

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
KEY PREDISTRIBUTION SCHEME

Definition


A **Key Predistribution Scheme** is a mechanism of distributing information among a set of users in such away that **every user** in a group in some specified family is able to compute **individually** a **common key** associated with that group.




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
WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORK



- Sensor network can measure various physical characteristic, such as **sound**, **temperature**, **pressure**, etc. They **monitor** and **collect** various information.
- The sensor nodes in DSNs should be able to communicate with each other in order to relay or accumulate **secret information**.



WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORK



Properties


- Unpredictable topology.
- Limited battery power.
- Limited memory.
- Limited computational and communication capability.
- Large number of sensor.
- Wireless sensors are not tamper resistant.




BLOM SCHEME




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
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
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
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- 4 The **common key** of Alice and Bob is: $W^t DV = (V^t DW)^t = V^t DW$.



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$$M = \begin{array}{ccccc} & u_1 & u_2 & u_j & u_v \\ k_1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ k_2 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ k_i & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ k_n & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 \end{array}$$



Key Distribution Pattern

- ① For a key distribution pattern M and a subset of users $P \subseteq \mathcal{U}$, define

$$\text{keys}(P) = \{k_i : M(i, j) = 1, \forall U_j \in P\}, \text{ i.e., } \text{keys}(P) = \bigcap_{U_i \in P} \text{keys}(U_i).$$



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- ③ The coalition F can compute k_P if the following condition holds:

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- ④ **Unconditional Security:** There is an element i where

$$k_i \in \text{Keys}(P) \setminus \bigcup_{U_j \in F} \text{Keys}(U_j).$$



Mitchell-Piper Key Distribution Patterns

A Mitchell-Piper (r, w) -KDP (or more briefly, an (r, w) -KDP) is a KDP in which there is a **key for every group of r users**, and each such key is **secure** against any disjoint **coalition of at most w users**.



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
k_1 u_1 u_{i_1} u_{i_2} u_{i_r} u_t

k_n



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	u_1	u_{i_1}	u_{j_1}	u_{i_2}	u_{j_2}	u_{j_w}	u_{i_r}	u_t
k_1								
k_i		1	0	1	0	0	1	
k_n								



Definition

A **set system** is a pair (X, \mathcal{B}) , where X is a finite set of elements called points and \mathcal{B} is a set of subsets of X called blocks.



Cover-Free Family

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Definition

Let w and r be positive integers, a set system (X, \mathcal{B}) where $|X| = n$ and $\mathcal{B} = \{B_1, \dots, B_t\}$ is called an **(r, w) -CFF(n, t)** if for any two sets of indices $L, M \subseteq [t]$ such that $L \cap M = \emptyset$, $|L| = r$, and $|M| = w$, we have

$$\bigcap_{l \in L} B_l \not\subseteq \bigcup_{m \in M} B_m.$$



Incidence matrix of an (r, w) -cover free family

$$\begin{array}{ccccccc} & x_1 & x_2 & & & & x_n \\ B_1 & & & & & & \end{array}$$

$$B_t$$



Incidence matrix of an (r, w) -cover free family

	x_1	x_2		x_n
B_1				
B_{i_1}				
B_{i_2}				
B_{i_r}				
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Cover-Free Family

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	x_1	x_2	x_i	x_n
B_1				
B_{i_1}			1	
B_{j_1}				
B_{i_2}			1	
B_{j_w}				
B_{i_r}			1	
B_t				



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	x_1	x_2	x_i	x_n
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B_{i_1}			1	
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B_t				



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u_1	B_1				
u_{i_1}	B_{i_1}			1	
u_{j_1}	B_{j_1}			0	
u_{i_2}	B_{i_2}			1	
u_{j_w}	B_{j_w}			0	
u_{i_r}	B_{i_r}			1	
u_{i_t}	B_t				



Generalized Cover-Free Family

Definition

Let w and r be positive integers, a set system (X, \mathcal{B}) where $|X| = n$ and $\mathcal{B} = \{B_1, \dots, B_t\}$ is called an $(r, w; d) - CFF(n, t)$ if for any two sets of indices $L, M \subseteq [t]$ such that $L \cap M = \emptyset$, $|L| = r$, and $|M| = w$, we have

$$\left| \bigcap_{l \in L} B_l \setminus \bigcup_{m \in M} B_m \right| \geq d.$$



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2004 **Stinson** and **Wei** generalized the definition of cover-free family.



Group Testing



In combinatorial mathematics, **group testing** is a set of problems with the objective of reducing **the cost** of identifying certain elements of a set. In fact, we like to find **a small number** of **defective/interesting** items from **a large set**.



Group Testing



- 1 Given v items with at most d positive ones.



Group Testing



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- 2 Identify **all positive** ones by the **minimum number** of tests.



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
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- 6 Non-adaptive group testing needs more tests, but shorter time.
- 7 In molecular biology, non-adaptive group testing is usually taken.



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Let X be a set of v samples that are to be tested. Also, let each B_i represents a subset of samples (called a group) that are to be combined and tested together.



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$$x_1 \quad x_2 \quad x_3 \quad \cdots \quad x_{v-1} \quad x_v$$



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	x_1	x_2	x_3	\cdots	x_{v-1}	x_v
B_1	0	—	+	\cdots	0	0



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	x_1	x_2	x_3	\cdots	x_{v-1}	x_v	
B_1	0	—	+	\cdots	0	0	
				\vdots			
B_i	—	0	+	\cdots	0	—	\rightarrow +
				\vdots			
B_j	0	—	—	\cdots	0	—	\rightarrow —



Group Testing

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	x_1	x_2	x_3	\cdots	x_{v-1}	x_v		
B_1	0	—	+	\cdots	0	0		
				\vdots				
B_i	—	0	+	\cdots	0	—	\longrightarrow	+
				\vdots				
B_j	0	—	—	\cdots	0	—	\longrightarrow	—
				\vdots				
B_b	0	0	—	\cdots	—	—	\longrightarrow	—



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	k_1	k_2	k_j	k_b		x_1	x_{i_1}	x_j	x_{i_d}	x_v	
u_1						u_1	u_{i_1}	u_j	u_{i_d}	u_v	
u_{i_1}			0		B_1	k_1					
					B_2	k_2					
u_j			1								
					B_j	k_j	0	1	0		
u_{i_d}			0								\rightarrow
u_v					B_b	k_b					$-$

The incidence matrix of a
 $(1, d) - CFF(b, v)$

This is a d -NAGTA($v; b$)



FRAMEPROOF CODES



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■ = "detectable positions"

pirate #1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
#2	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1
#3	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1
#4	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1
Attacked Content	1	0/1	1	0	0/1	0	1	0/1	0/1	0	0/1	1



FRAMEPROOF CODES



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pirate #1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
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#3	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1
#4	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1
Attacked Content	1	0/1	1	0	0/1	0	1	0/1	0/1	0	0/1	1

Marking Assumption (D. Boneh and J. Shaw, 1998)

Pirates **detect** fingerprint positions by finding differences in their copies.
They make **changes only in the detectable positions**.



Suppose $C = \{w^{(u_1)}, w^{(u_2)}, \dots, w^{(u_d)}\} \subseteq \Gamma$. Let $U(C)$ be the set of **undetectable bit positions** for C . Set

$$F(C) = \{x \in \{0, 1\}^v : x|_{U(C)} = w^{(u_i)}|_{U(C)} \text{ for all } w^{(u_i)} \in C\}.$$



SECURE FRAMEPROOF CODES

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Definition

Suppose that Γ is a (v, t) -code. Γ is said to be an **r -secure frameproof** code if for any **$C_1, C_2 \subseteq \Gamma$** such that $|C_1| \leq r$, $|C_2| \leq r$ and $C_1 \cap C_2 = \emptyset$, we have that **$F(C_1) \cap F(C_2) = \emptyset$** . We will say that Γ is an r -**SFPC** (v, t) for short.



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Theorem. (D.R. Stinson, Tran van Trung, R. Wei, 2000)

If there exists an r -SFPC(v, t), then there exists an (r, r) -CFF($2v, t$).



Definition

A $t - (v, k, \lambda)$ packing design is a set system (X, \mathcal{B}) , where $|X| = v$, $|B| = k$ for every $B \in \mathcal{B}$, and every t -subset of X occurs in at most λ blocks in \mathcal{B} .



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Theorem. (Wei, 2006)

If there exists a $t - (v, k, 1)$ packing design having b blocks, then there exists a $(r, 1; d) - CFF(v, b)$, where $r = \lfloor (k - d - 2)/(t - 1) \rfloor$.



- $N((r, w; d), t)$ denote the minimum number of **points** in any $(r, w; d) - CFF$ having t blocks.



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Theorem. (D.R. Stinson and R. Wei, 2004)

Let r , w , and t be positive integers where $t \geq r + w$. Then

$$N((r, w; d), t) \geq 2c \frac{\binom{w+r}{w}}{\log(w+r)} \log t + \frac{1}{2} c \binom{w+r}{w} (d-1)$$

Theorem. (D.R. Stinson and R. Wei, 2004)

Theorem Let r , w , and t be positive integers where $t > r + w$. Then

$$N((r, w; d), t) \geq 0.7c \frac{\binom{w+r}{w} (w+r)}{\log(w+r)} \log t + \frac{1}{2}c \binom{w+r}{w} (d-1)$$



Definition

A **biclique cover** of a graph G is a collection of bicliques (**complete bipartite graphs**) of G such that each edge of G is in **at least one of the bicliques**. The number of bicliques in a minimum biclique covering of G is called the biclique covering number of G and denoted by $bc(G)$.



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Definition

A **d -biclique cover** of a graph G is a collection of bicliques of G such that each edge of G is in **at least d of the bicliques**. The number of bicliques in a minimum d -biclique covering of G is called the d -biclique covering number of G and denoted by $bc_d(G)$.



Definition

For $0 < w \leq r \leq t$, the **bi-intersection graph** $I_t(r, w)$ is a bipartite graph whose vertices are the **w -** and **r -subsets** of a **t -element set** where two vertices are adjacent if and only if their **intersection is empty**.

Theorem. (H. H. and F. Moazami, 2010)

For every positive integer r, w, d and t , where $t \geq r + w$ we have

$$N((r, w; d), t) = bc_d(I_t(r, w)).$$



LOWER BOUNDS

Theorem. (H. H. and F. Moazami, 2010)

For every positive integer r, w, d and t , where $t \geq r + w$ we have




$$N((r, w), t) \geq \binom{r+w-2}{r-1} \mathcal{R}(t-r-w+2).$$

Theorem. (H. H. and F. Moazami, 2010)

For every integer $0 \leq s < w \leq r$ and $t \geq r + w$,

$$N((r, w; d), t) \geq \sum_{i=0}^s \binom{s}{i} N((r-i, w-s+i; d), t-s).$$



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