

Cantor-Bernstein for Theories

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December 19, 2020

The purpose of this note is to ask: under what conditions could a pair of theories (T_1, T_2) fail to have the Cantor-Bernstein or co-Cantor-Bernstein property?

Definition. We say that the pair (T_1, T_2) has the Cantor-Bernstein property just in case: if T_1 and T_2 are mutually faithfully interpretable, then T_1 and T_2 are bi-interpretable. In other words: if (T_1, T_2) does not have the Cantor-Bernstein property then (a) T_1 and T_2 are mutually faithfully interpretable, and (b) T_1 and T_2 are not bi-interpretable.

Here “mutually faithfully interpretable” means that there are conservative (strong, equality preserving) translations $F : T_1 \rightarrow T_2$ and $G : T_2 \rightarrow T_1$. It would also be interesting to look at this question for the case of more general translations, with and without equality preservation. Could we end up getting different kinds of answers in the two cases? Or is the latter case reducible, in some sense, to the former?

Definition. We say that the pair (T_1, T_2) has the co-Cantor-Bernstein property just in case: if there are essentially surjective translations $F : T_1 \rightarrow T_2$ and $G : T_2 \rightarrow T_1$, then T_1 and T_2 are bi-interpretable.

1 Factorization of translations

For strong translations, we have the following factorization theorem:

A translation F is an equivalence iff F is conservative and essentially surjective (Halvorsen 2019, Props. 4.5.26, 4.5.27).

This fact is useful for reasoning about relations between theories: if T_1 can be embedded into T_2 such that every Σ_2 -formula is equivalent to a formula in the image, then T_1 and T_2 are equivalent. It suggests the validity of the following mode of reasoning about the relationship between theories:

If T_1 can be interpreted into T_2 in such a way that (a) any inference licensed by T_2 was already licensed by T_1 , and (b) any concept expressible by T_2 is already expressible by T_1 , then T_1 and T_2 are equivalent.

The purpose of this section is to investigate the extent to which this kind of reasoning works for translations in general (and not just strong translations). In fact, there is a wide-open field of investigation here, which should hold much interest for talk about “relations between theories.” In particular, with the generalized notion of translations, first-order theories form not just a category but a 2-category. In a category C , the interesting properties of morphisms include: iso, monic, epi, regular monic, split monic, etc. Furthermore, the interesting technical questions include: if a morphism $f : a \rightarrow b$ is both epi and monic, then is it is? Hence, if theories formed only a 1-category, then we might try to cache out notions like “equivalence” and “reduction” in terms of notions like “isomorphism” and “monomorphism.”

But theories form a 2-category, and so different features of morphisms become relevant. Think, for example, of the paradigm case of a 2-category, viz. the category **Cat** of all (small) categories. Here the interesting properties of morphisms (functors) are not “is a monomorphism” and “is an epimorphism” etc., but “is full” and “is faithful” and “is essentially surjective” etc. (For a general 2-category D , the corresponding properties of morphisms have slightly more complicated definitions.) Similarly, the interesting notion of “sameness of objects” in **Cat** is not isomorphism, but equivalence of categories — which can be thought of as “isomorphism up to isomorphism.” Finally, for the 2-category of theories, the interesting question is not whether f is an isomorphism iff f is a monomorphism and epimorphism, but whether f is an equivalence iff f is [some other kind of thing]. See <https://ncatlab.org/nlab/show/%28eso%2C+fully+faithful%29+factorization+system> for more on factorization of morphisms in 2-categories.

In short: if relations between theories are to be explicated in terms of properties of translations, then these explications should make use of 2-categorical concepts.

Note that there are actually two distinct 2-categories at play here: the “syntactic” 2-category \mathbf{Th} of theories and translations, and the “semantic” 2-category \mathbf{Mod} of categories of models of theories. The interesting properties of morphisms will be different in the two cases, but of course, also related to — in fact, dual to — each other, since there is a contravariant 2-functor $M : \mathbf{Th} \rightarrow \mathbf{Cat}$ that takes a theory T to its category $M(T)$ of models, a translation $F : T_1 \rightarrow T_2$ to the dual functor $M(F) : M(T_2) \rightarrow M(T_1)$, and a t-map $\chi : F \Rightarrow G$ to a natural transformation $M(\chi) : M(F) \Rightarrow M(G)$.

Definition. Let $F : T_1 \rightarrow T_2$ be a translation. We say that $F : T_1 \rightarrow T_2$ is *conservative* just in case if $T_2 \vdash F\phi$ then $T_1 \vdash \phi$, for any Σ_1 -sentence ϕ .

Question. Is the above a good definition for coherent theories? Recall that the implications of a coherent theory cannot be captured by sentences, but need (open) sequents. So should the definition of “conservative” involve sequents?

In terms of syntactic categories: the above definition only involves subobjects of 1. However, the notion of conservativity should involve all subobject lattices.

The following example shows that in the 2-category of theories, a translation’s being conservative and essentially surjective does not imply that it is an equivalence.

Example 1. We describe a translation $F : (T \cup T') \rightarrow T$ that is conservative and essentially surjective, but not an equivalence. Let Σ be a signature with a single sort σ , and let T be an arbitrary complete theory in Σ . (For example, we could take T to be the theory that says that there are infinitely many things. Or we could take T to be the theory that says that there are exactly two things.) Let T' be a primed copy of T , and let $T \cup T'$ be the coproduct of T and T' . That is, the signature of $T \cup T'$ is the disjoint union $\Sigma \cup \Sigma'$, and the axioms of $T \cup T'$ consist of the original axioms of T along with a primed copy of those axioms. Note that any $\Sigma \cup \Sigma'$ -formula is provably equivalent to either a conjunction or a disjunction of two formulas ϕ, ϕ' , the first a Σ -formula and the second a Σ' -formula. What’s more, if $(T \cup T') \vdash \phi \vee \phi'$ then either $(T \cup T') \vdash \phi$ or $(T \cup T') \vdash \phi'$, since any pair of models of T canonically defines a model of $T \cup T'$.

Now define an equality-preserving reconstrual F from $\Sigma \cup \Sigma'$ to Σ by removing the primes from symbols in Σ' . We observe:

- F is a translation from $T \cup T'$ to T . In the case of a Σ -formula ϕ , it is obvious that if $T \cup T' \vdash \phi$ then $T \vdash \phi$. For the more general case, any $\Sigma \cup \Sigma'$ -formula ψ is provably equivalent either to $\phi \vee \phi'$ or to $\phi \wedge \phi'$, where ϕ is a Σ -formula and ϕ' is a Σ' -formula. In the former case, if $T \cup T' \vdash \phi \vee \phi'$, then either $T \cup T' \vdash \phi$ or $T \cup T' \vdash \phi'$, and hence either $T \vdash F\phi$ or $T \vdash F\phi'$.
- F is essentially surjective.
- F is conservative. This follows immediately from the fact that $T \cup T'$ is complete.
- F is not part of an equivalence. If F had a 1-dimensional inverse $G : T \rightarrow (T \cup T')$, then GF would map both sorts σ and σ' to the same sort. Suppose for simplicity that $GF(\sigma) = GF(\sigma') = \sigma$. If there were a t-map $\chi : GF \Rightarrow 1$, then $\chi_{\sigma'}$ would be a definable bijection of arity $\sigma \rightarrow \sigma'$, in contradiction with the fact that $\Sigma \cup \Sigma'$ has no such functional relations.

The reason why F is not an equivalence is because neither conservativity nor essential surjectivity require that the domain theory has a sufficient number of functional relations between sorts. In this case, T describes a functional relation (namely the identity) between sorts $F(\sigma)$ and $F(\sigma)$, whereas $T \cup T'$ does not describe a functional relation between σ and σ' . The issue then seems to be that F does not resemble a full functor. Intuitively, a full functor would have the feature that for any functional relation $\chi : F(\sigma) \rightarrow F(\sigma')$, there is a functional relation $\theta : \sigma \rightarrow \sigma'$ such that $F(\theta) \simeq \chi$. While there is indeed a $\Sigma \cup \Sigma'$ -formula η such that $F(\eta)$ is provably equivalent to $\chi(x, y) \equiv (x =_{\sigma} y)$, any such η has the wrong arity.

In terms of the syntactic categories $C_{T \cup T'}$ and C_T , we can see that the functor corresponding to F is not full. In particular, if x is a variable of sort σ and x' is a variable of sort σ' , then there is an arrow from $[\top.Fx]$ to $[\top.Fx']$ in C_T , but no arrow from $[\top.x]$ to $[\top.x']$ in $C_{T \cup T'}$.

Remark. Here's a little puzzle: $T \cup T'$ is Morita equivalent to a single-sorted theory T_1 . Since $T \cup T'$ is proper (or may be assumed so), there is a translation $G : T_1 \rightarrow T \cup T'$ that is one-half of an equivalence. Why is the composite $F \circ G$ not an equivalence? Isn't it a strong translation that is conservative and essentially surjective?

Example 2. Let $\Sigma_1 = \{\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \chi_1, \chi_2\}$, where $\chi_i : \sigma_1 \rightarrow \sigma_2$. Let T_1 be the theory in Σ_1 that says that χ_1 and χ_2 are functional relationships. Let $\Sigma_2 = \{\sigma'_1, \sigma'_2, \theta\}$, and let T_2 be the theory in Σ_2 that says that θ is a functional relationship. Let $F : \Sigma_1 \rightarrow \Sigma_2$ be the reconstrual that takes both χ_1 and χ_2 to θ . Then $F : T_1 \rightarrow T_2$ is a translation, and as in the previous example, F is essentially surjective. However, F is not conservative. Indeed, we have $T_2 \vdash F[\forall x \forall y (\chi_1 \leftrightarrow \chi_2)]$ but $T_1 \not\vdash \forall x \forall y (\chi_1 \leftrightarrow \chi_2)$.

Now here is my intuition: for a (weak) translation $F : T_1 \rightarrow T_2$, the notion of being conservative still makes sense — although it may not be a very powerful or useful notion. Indeed, to say that F is conservative basically says that if $F\phi(x) \vdash F\psi(x)$ then $\phi(x) \vdash \psi(x)$, and that only tells us something about the subobject lattices of the syntactic categories C_{T_1} and C_{T_2} . In contrast, to say that a logical functor from C_{T_1} to C_{T_2} is fully faithful means that for any fixed objects $[\phi.X]$ and $[\psi.Y]$ of C_{T_1} , the map

$$\text{hom}([\phi.X], [\psi.Y]) \rightarrow \text{hom}([F\phi.X], [F\psi.Y]),$$

is a bijection. The fullness condition implies that the translation is conservative: if $F(\phi) \vdash F(\psi)$ in T_2 , then $[X = X]$ is an arrow from $F(\phi)$ to $F(\psi)$ in C_{T_2} . By the fullness of F , there is a corresponding arrow from ϕ to ψ in C_{T_1} . Hence, $\phi \vdash \psi$ in T_1 .

The next example shows that $F : T_1 \rightarrow T_2$ being an equivalence does not imply that F is essentially surjective.

Example 3. Let T_1 be the theory that says “there are exactly two things,” and let T_2 be the Morita extension of T_1 by the addition of a product sort. We know that the obvious embedding $F : T_1 \rightarrow T_2$ is one-half of an equivalence. However, there are clearly formulas ϕ in the language of T_2 that are not provably equivalent to formulas in the target of the translation F . For example, let ψ be the sentence that says there are four things of the product sort.

Nonetheless, there is an extended sense in which this formula ψ is in the image of F . Indeed, if χ is the “code” for the product sort σ' , then for any Σ_2 -formula $\psi(x)$ with x of type σ' , there is a Σ_1 formula $\phi(y)$ such that

$$T_2 \vdash \chi(x, y) \rightarrow (\psi(x) \leftrightarrow \phi(y)).$$

Notice that a code is really just another name for a t-map. I conjecture then that the correct formulation of “essential surjectivity” will necessarily involve t-maps.

Let’s now try to work at this in the other direction by looking at abstract 2-categoric notions of “eso” and “fully faithful” morphisms. See <https://ncatlab.org/nlab/show/fully+faithful+morphism>

If K is a 2-category, then for any objects a, b of K , we let $K(a, b)$ denote the category whose objects are 1-cells (i.e. arrows) from a to b , and whose arrows are 2-cells. Thus, in the particular case of \mathbf{Th} , if T_1 and T_2 are theories, then $\mathbf{Th}(T_1, T_2)$ is the category whose objects are translations, and whose arrows are t-maps.

Definition. In a 2-category K , a 1-cell $f : A \rightarrow B$ is said to be *fully faithful* just in case for all objects $X \in K$, the induced functor $K(X, A) \rightarrow K(X, B)$ is full and faithful.

Conjecture 4. *Let $F : T_1 \rightarrow T_2$ be a translation. Then F is fully faithful iff F is conservative.*

NOTE: I now think this conjecture is false. I think that F being fully faithful is stronger than F being conservative.

TO DO: relate features of arrows in \mathbf{Th} to the Baez classification of “forgetting” (Baez, Bartel, and Dolan 2004; Weatherall 2016; Barrett 2020). Pay attention to the ambiguity between syntactic and semantic arrows.

2 Examples of theory pairs that are not CB

1. T_1 is the empty theory on a countably infinite propositional signature. T_2 is the “fan theory” with axioms $p_0 \vdash p_i$, for $i \geq 0$. These theories are counterexamples both to the CB and the co-CB properties.

But are these theories “pathological” in some sense? The fact that these theories are propositional should not (I think) be seen as a pathology. However, these theories are incomplete, and the second of them is not finitely axiomatizable.

2. ZF and ZFC. See <https://cs.nyu.edu/pipermail/fom/2010-January/014325.html>
3. The many examples of pairs of set theories described in (Freire and Hamkins 2020, p 8).
4. The pair of theories described in (Andréka, Madarász, and Németi 2005).

3 Cantor-Bernstein

The first thing I would like to show: for theories T_1 and T_2 to violate Cantor-Bernstein, both have to have infinitely many non-isomorphic models. (This fact is trivial in the case that T_1 and T_2 have models of infinite cardinality.)

Remark. Let $F : T_1 \rightarrow T_2$ be a translation, and let $F^* : M(T_2) \rightarrow M(T_1)$ be the dual functor. Recall that:

- $F^*(M) \models \phi$ iff $M \models F(\phi)$, for any Σ_1 -sentence ϕ .
- F^* is faithful by definition.
- F^* reflects isomorphisms in the sense that if $F^*(j) : F^*(M) \rightarrow F^*(N)$ is an isomorphism, then $j : M \rightarrow N$ is an isomorphism. This follows from the fact that an elementary embedding is an isomorphism iff it is surjective, and from the fact that the underlying function of $F^*(j)$ is none other than the underlying function of j .

Note however: F^* can still map non-isomorphic models to isomorphic models. For example: let T_1 be the theory that says that there are two things (in empty signature), let T_2 be the theory that says that there are two things (in signature with a unary predicate symbol P), and let $F : T_1 \rightarrow T_2$ be the inclusion. Let M be a model in which the extension of P is empty, and let N be a model in which the extension of P is non-empty. Then $F^*(M)$ is isomorphic to $F^*(N)$ although M is not isomorphic to N .

Definition. We say that a category C is *object-finite* just in case it has only finitely many objects up to isomorphism.

Let T be a theory. If $M(T)$ is object-finite then the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem implies that every model of T has finite cardinality. From this it follows that every hom set in $M(T)$ is finite. Furthermore, since for finite structures, elementary equivalence implies isomorphism, it follows that for any non-isomorphic M, N in $M(T)$, there is a sentence ϕ such that $M \models \phi$ and $N \models \neg\phi$.

Proposition 5. *Let T_1 be a theory such that $M(T_1)$ is object-finite, and let $F : T_1 \rightarrow T_2$ be a translation. If F is conservative then $F^* : M(T_2) \rightarrow M(T_1)$ is essentially surjective.*

Proof. We prove the contrapositive. If $F^* : M(T_2) \rightarrow M(T_1)$ is not eso, then there is a model M of T_1 that is not isomorphic to any model of the form $F^*(N)$, with N a model of T_2 . By the preceding discussion, there is a sentence ϕ such that $M \models \phi$ but $F^*(N) \models \neg\phi$, for all models N of T_2 . Hence $N \models F(\neg\phi)$ for all models N of T_2 , and by completeness, $T_2 \vdash F(\neg\phi)$. Therefore F is not conservative. \square

Remark. Let C and D be categories with respective object sets C_0 and D_0 . Let $[C_0]$ and $[D_0]$ be the corresponding sets of equivalence classes of isomorphic objects. Each functor $F : C \rightarrow D$ induces a function $F_0 : [C_0] \rightarrow [D_0]$, and F_0 is surjective iff F is eso. If $F : C \rightarrow D$ and $G : D \rightarrow C$ are both eso, then Cantor-Bernstein for finite sets implies that F_0 is a bijection.

Lemma 6. *Let F be a finite set, let $f : F \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ be a function, and let $\phi : F \rightarrow F$ be a bijection such that $f(x) \leq f(\phi(x))$ for all $x \in F$. Then $f(x) = f(\phi(x))$ for all $x \in F$.*

Sketch of proof. The function f corresponds to a fibration of F over \mathbb{N} . Since ϕ is a bijection, the size of the fibers remain constant, i.e., $|f^{-1}(n)| = |(f \circ \phi)^{-1}(n)|$. Since ϕ is monotonic, it cannot move an element to a lower fiber. Thus no element can be moved out of the highest fiber, nor the next highest fiber, etc. \square

Proposition 7. *Let C and D be totally-finite categories. If there are faithful, eso functors $F : C \rightarrow D$ and $G : D \rightarrow C$, then C and D are equivalent categories. In fact, F itself is one half of an equivalence.*

Proof. By the above remark, $F_0 : [C_0] \rightarrow [D_0]$ is a bijection. Since F is automatically faithful, it will suffice to show that F is full. For simplicity, we may henceforth replace C and D with the corresponding skeletal categories.

Consider the (finite) set $C_0 \times C_0$ and the function $f : C_0 \times C_0 \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ that assigns the cardinality of the corresponding hom set. That is, $f(a, b) = |\text{hom}(a, b)|$. Let $g : D_0 \times D_0 \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ be the corresponding function for D . Since F is faithful, it induces a bijection $\eta : C_0 \rightarrow D_0$ such that

$$f(a, b) \leq g(\eta(a), \eta(b)).$$

And since G is faithful, it induces a bijection $\theta : D_0 \rightarrow C_0$ such that

$$g(a, b) \leq f(\theta(a), \theta(b)).$$

If we let $\phi = \theta \circ \eta$ then

$$f(a, b) \leq f(\phi(a), \phi(b)),$$

for all $a, b \in C_0$. By the above lemma, $f(a, b) = f(\phi(a), \phi(b))$, and it follows that F is full. \square

Conjecture 8. *Suppose that $F : T_1 \rightarrow T_2$ is a strong translation, i.e. one-dimensional, equality preserving, and with trivial domain formula. If F is one-half of a weak equivalence, then F is one-half of a strong equivalence.*

Sketch of proof. We show that F is conservative and essentially surjective. Let $G : T_2 \rightarrow T_1$ be a translation such that $GF \simeq 1_{T_1}$ and $FG \simeq 1_{T_2}$. Let ϕ be a Σ_1 -sentence such that $T_2 \vdash F(\phi)$. Then $T_1 \vdash GF(\phi)$, and (since the relevant t-map is trivial) $T_1 \vdash \phi$. Therefore F is conservative. Now let $\psi(x)$ be a Σ_2 -formula, for simplicity with one free variable. Then there a t-map $\chi(x, y)$ such that

$$T_2 \vdash \chi(x, y) \rightarrow (\psi(x) \leftrightarrow (FG\psi)(y)),$$

and T_2 implies that χ is a bijection on the domain. TO BE CONTINUED \square

Proposition 9. *Let T_1 and T_2 be proper theories such that $M(T_1)$ and $M(T_2)$ are object-finite. Then (T_1, T_2) has the Cantor-Bernstein property.*

Proof. Let $F : T_1 \rightarrow T_2$ and $G : T_2 \rightarrow T_1$ be conservative translations. By the previous results, $F^* : M(T_2) \rightarrow M(T_1)$ is part of an equivalence of categories. By Theorem 7.1 of (D'Arienzo, Pagano, and Johnson 2020), F is part of a homotopy equivalence. \square

Remark. TO DO: I need to check the previous result. The problem is that the conclusion of Theorem 7.1 shows that F is part of a weak equivalence. Does that automatically show that F is part of a strong equivalence? Note that the dimension of F is 1, and the domain formula is trivial/universal.

Conjecture 10. *If $M(T_1)$ and $M(T_2)$ are object-finite then (T_1, T_2) has the Cantor-Bernstein property.*

4 Co-Cantor-Bernstein

Proposition 11. *If T_1 or T_2 is complete, then (T_1, T_2) has the co-CB property.*

Proof. If T_1 is complete, then every translation $F : T_1 \rightarrow T_2$ is conservative. So if $F : T_1 \rightarrow T_2$ is eso, then F is a strong equivalence, i.e. T_1 and T_2 are bi-interpretable. \square

Recall that $F : T_1 \rightarrow T_2$ is conservative iff $F^* : M(T_2) \rightarrow M(T_1)$ is a full functor (Barrett 2020). Recall also that if F is a strong (equality-preserving) translation, then F^* preserves cardinality of models. In particular, if T_1 and T_2 are \aleph_0 -categorical theories, then a translation $F : T_1 \rightarrow T_2$ induces a group homomorphism $F^* : \text{Aut}(M_2) \rightarrow \text{Aut}(M_1)$, and F is conservative iff F^* is surjective. (In fact, $\text{Aut}(M_i)$ is naturally a topological group, and I conjecture that F^* is a continuous group homomorphism.)

Recall that if T has countable signature, and if T is \aleph_0 -categorical, then T is complete. The following result would be interesting because an \aleph_0 -categorical theory is essentially characterized by a topological group, viz. the group of automorphisms of its unique (up to isomorphism) countable model.

Conjecture 12. *There are \aleph_0 -categorical theories T_1 and T_2 that do not have the CB property.*

Definition. Let I be the set of axioms $\{\exists_{>1}, \exists_{>2}, \dots\}$. We say that a theory T is essentially finitely axiomatizable just in case there is a finite set E of axioms such that $Cn(T) = Cn(E \cup I)$.

Conjecture 13. *There are essentially finitely axiomatizable theories T_1 and T_2 that do not have the CB property.*

5 Conjecture: co-CB fails only for theories with many models

Definition. For a theory T and a cardinal number κ , let $I(T, \kappa)$ be the number of non-isomorphic countable models of T .

Interestingly, $I(T, \aleph_0)$ can be countably infinite, or any finite cardinal besides 2 (see Marker 2006, p 155ff).

Proposition 14. *If $F : T_1 \rightarrow T_2$ is essentially surjective, then for any fixed cardinal number κ , $I(T_2, \kappa) \leq I(T_1, \kappa)$.*

Proof. Recall that the dual functor F^* is always faithful. If $F : T_1 \rightarrow T_2$ is eso, then F^* is also full (Halvorson 2019, Prop 6.6.13). In particular, for any models M, N of T_2 , if $F^*(M)$ is isomorphic to $F^*(N)$, then M is isomorphic to N . Now fix a cardinal number κ , and let $[M(T_i)]_\kappa$ be the set of isomorphism classes of models of T_i of cardinality κ . Then F^* induces a one-to-one mapping from $[M(T_2)]_\kappa$ into $[M(T_1)]_\kappa$. \square

Proposition 15. *Suppose that T_2 has finitely many non-isomorphic models of each cardinality. If $F : T_1 \rightarrow T_2$ and $G : T_2 \rightarrow T_1$ are essentially surjective, then (F^*, G^*) is an equivalence of categories. If T_1 and T_2 are proper theories then F^* is part of a homotopy equivalence.*

Proof. For the first part it will suffice to show that F^* is essentially surjective. By the previous proof, G^* induces an injection of $[M(T_1)]_\kappa$ into $[M(T_2)]_\kappa$. Since the latter is finite, so is the former. Since F^* is an injection of one finite set into a not-larger finite set, it follows that F^* is bijection. Therefore F^* is essentially surjective.

The second part follows from Theorem 7.1 of (D’Arienzo, Pagano, and Johnson 2020). \square

Corollary 16. *Let T_1 and T_2 be proper theories. If (T_1, T_2) violate the co-CB property then there is a cardinal number κ such that T_1 and T_2 have infinitely many non-isomorphic models of size κ .*

TO DO: I would like to come up with a similar necessary condition for T_1 and T_2 violating the CB property. However, we do not yet have any interesting result of the form: “if T_1 or T_2 is ... and $F : T_1 \rightarrow T_2$ is conservative then $F^* : M(T_2) \rightarrow M(T_1)$ is ...”

6 Groups that are not CB

Definition. Let $P(\mathbb{N})$ be the permutation group of the natural numbers, equipped with the topology of pointwise convergence. (TO DO: explain the sense in which this topology on $P(\mathbb{N})$ is definable from the theory of infinite sets. Explain more generally the sense in which for a Σ -structure M , $\text{Aut}(M)$ is naturally a topological group.)

Fact 17. *Let G be a subgroup of $P(\mathbb{N})$. Then G is the automorphism group of an \aleph_0 -categorical theory iff G is a closed subset of $P(\mathbb{N})$.*

Conjecture 18. *There are closed subgroups G and H of $P(\mathbb{N})$ such that G is isomorphic to a closed subgroup of H and vice versa, but G and H are not isomorphic.*

It is not difficult at all to find groups that violate the Cantor-Bernstein condition — but I do not immediately know if any of these groups are of the form $\text{Aut}(M)$ for an \aleph_0 -categorical structure M .

1. The group S_∞ of finite permutations of \mathbb{N} and the alternating group A_∞ . See <https://math.stackexchange.com/questions/1259081/if-there-are-injecti>
2. Infinite direct sums of \mathbb{Z}_{2^i} .
3. The free group on 2 generators and the free group on 3 generators.

Proposition 19 (Ahlbrandt and Ziegler 1986). *Two countable \aleph_0 -categorical structures are bi-interpretable iff their automorphism groups are isomorphic as topological groups.*

Conjecture: the previous result can be lifted to \aleph_0 -categorical theories (with countable signature). But we need to be careful about terminology. First of all, Ahlbrandt and Ziegler are working with a notion of “interpretation” between structures of one language and structures of another language: given a Σ_1 -structure \mathcal{M}_1 and a Σ_2 -structure \mathcal{M}_2 , and interpretation $f : \mathcal{M}_1 \rightarrow \mathcal{M}_2$ consists of a surjection $f : U \rightarrow M_2$ where U is a definable subset of the domain of \mathcal{M}_1 and M_2 is the domain of \mathcal{M}_2 , etc.

Conjecture 20. *An interpretation from \mathcal{M}_1 to \mathcal{M}_2 is a translation in our sense from $\text{Th}(\mathcal{M}_1)$ to $\text{Th}(\mathcal{M}_2)$.*

The following proposition follows immediately from the fact that \aleph_0 -categorical theories are complete.

Proposition 21. *If T is \aleph_0 -categorical with unique model \mathcal{M} , then T is logically equivalent to $\text{Th}(\mathcal{M})$.*

This result would be interesting because it would show that the structure of an \aleph_0 -categorical theory is captured by its countable model. i.e., there is no need to look at the models of higher cardinality and the arrows between them.

Proposition 22 (Evans and Hewitt 1990). *There are closed subgroups G and H of $P(\mathbb{N})$ that are isomorphic qua groups but not as topological groups. Hence, the corresponding structures are not bi-interpretable.*

The former result is intriguing: there is a group isomorphism $\varphi : G \xrightarrow{\sim} H$ that does not correspond to a homotopy equivalence between the corresponding theories. In short: the symmetries of the model are not enough to capture the structure of the theories.

7 \aleph_0 -categorical theories

For this discussion, we restrict to theories with countable signatures. In this case, the downward Löwenheim-Skolem theorem shows that an \aleph_0 -categorical theory is complete.

Question: How can we characterize the syntactic categories of \aleph_0 -categorical theories? (Hint: Look at the Ryll-Nardzewski theorem https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Omega-categorical_theory and (Cameron 1990, p 30). I suspect that the characterization will have something to do with finiteness of subobject lattices.)

TO DO: Establish a correspondence between the 2-category of \aleph_0 -categorical theories and some subcategory of the 2-category of topological groups. Note 1: every group is a category, and group homomorphisms are functors. Note 2: all translations between such theories are conservative. It will be helpful to look at pages 106–107 of (Cameron 1990) where he describes conditions on a topological group G that ensure it corresponds to a categorical theory.

Definition. Given an \aleph_0 -categorical theory T , let $\mathcal{G}(T)$ be the topological group of automorphisms of its unique countable model.

Conjecture 23. *If $F : T_1 \rightarrow T_2$ is a translation then $F^*|_{\mathcal{G}(T_2)}$ is a continuous homomorphism from $\mathcal{G}(T_2)$ to $\mathcal{G}(T_1)$.*

Conjecture 24. *There is a 2-functor \mathcal{G} from the 2-category of topological groups to the 2-category of \aleph_0 -categorical theories. (This is not stated correctly yet: we should not expect all topological groups to occur in the domain. It is only the “nice” topological groups, i.e. the automorphism groups of \aleph_0 -categorical theories.)*

Conjecture 25. *There is a 2-functor \mathcal{F} from the 2-category of \aleph_0 -categorical theories and the 2-category of topological groups.*

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