

# The Gender Gap in Housing Returns


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# Housing wealth is the dominant form of savings for US households

- Housing is ...
  - Illiquid
  - Heterogeneous
  - Priced through bilateral negotiation
- Research showing gender differences in ...
  - Financial sophistication
  - Preferences for e.g. risk, competition, and agreeability
  - Negotiation
- Do men and women differ in their financial returns on housing?



Source: Survey of Consumer Finances

# Data on 53M US housing transactions reveals ...

1. Women earn **1 pp lower annualized unlevered returns than men**
  - Gender gap in returns increases to **5.7 pp** after accounting for **leverage**
  - Couples also earn lower returns, but outperform women after adjusting for timing
2. Using repeat sales, women buy for 2% more and sell for 2% less
  - Prices and discounts vary with the gender match between buyers and sellers
3. Gender gap in returns arises primarily from gap in **execution prices**
  - Location and timing
  - Choice of list price
  - Negotiated discount relative to the list price
4. Less important: what happens in between purchase and sale
  - Property risk or characteristics associated with higher returns
  - Maintenance investment

# Measurement and data

# Data

## Corelogic county deed records (53M obs)

- Restrict to arms-length transactions, exclude refinancings
- Sale price, property address, names on both sides of transaction
- Most US states, 1991-2017

## Linked to MLS property listings (20M obs)

- Listing date, list price, close date, sale price
- Property features, e.g. number bedrooms, upgrades, age of house

## Supplement with data from Census and American Housing Survey

- Demographics

# Identification of gender and relationships

Deed records contain full names of buyers and sellers

- Identify number of parties on each side of the transaction
- Measure probability that first name is male or female
  - Following Chari and Goldsmith-Pinkham 2019; Tang et al. 2011
- Assign gender for names with probability  $\geq 95\%$ , else treat as unidentified gender

Categorization

- Single female: one person, identified female
- Single male: one person, identified male
- Couple: two people with identified gender
- Other: everybody else (including unidentified gender and institutions)

## Measuring housing returns

Property  $i$  bought in year  $b$  for  $P_{ib}$  and sold in year  $s$  for  $P_{is}$

- Restrict to identified female, male, and couples
- Name, gender, and family structure of buyer in  $b$  must match seller in  $s$
- 9.4M obs after these filters

Annualized unlevered return

$$r_{is} = \left( \frac{P_{is} - P_{ib}}{P_{ib}} \right)^{\frac{1}{(s-b)}} - 1$$

### Real return on housing is typically a levered return

- Majority of US homeowners buy homes using debt, with  $LTV \geq 80\%$
- Initial leverage persists because amortization schedules mainly pay interest upfront

# Baseline empirical results



# Estimation approach

## Baseline return regression

$$r_{is} = \text{Female}_{is}\beta_1 + \text{Couple}_{is}\beta_2 + X_{is}\tau + \epsilon_{is}$$

- $\beta_1$  and  $\beta_2$  capture difference in returns compared to  $\text{Male}_{is}$
- $X_{is}$  are controls such as five-digit zipcode  $\times$  sale-year-month FE

## Examine other outcomes such as transaction price


$$Y_{it} = \text{Female}_{it}\beta_1 + \text{Couple}_{it}\beta_2 + \text{Other}_{it}\beta_3 + X_{it}\tau + \epsilon_{it}$$

- Exploit repeat sales:  $X_{it}$  includes property FE
- Include other transactions outside the returns sample to better estimate property FE

## Housing returns: unlevered

	Unlevered Ann Return		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Single Female	-0.016*** (0.000)	-0.013*** (0.000)	-0.011*** (0.000)
Couple	-0.020*** (0.000)	-0.012*** (0.000)	-0.007*** (0.000)
Holding Length			-0.006*** (0.000)
Zip-Year-Month FE	No	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.005	0.354	0.379
Observations	9,351,419	9,351,419	9,351,419

# Annualized unlevered returns by gender



# Real return is likely to be levered return


## LTV conditional on mortgage



## Fraction missing mortgage data




# Annualized levered returns by gender, assuming LTV of 80




# Heterogeneity and timing

## Gender gap by zip-level demographics: quartile averages




# Unlevered annualized returns over time



- Mean return by *sale* year varies with the business cycle
- Large gender gap even in recent years




## Unlevered returns: market timing



Gender gap in execution prices

# Transaction price




# Transaction price by buyer-seller gender




- Base group:  
male buyer - male seller
- Female sellers sell for less  
→ More so to men
- Male sellers sell for more  
→ More so to women

## List price



## Discount relative to listing price




- Discount =


$$\frac{(\text{list price} - \text{transaction price})}{\text{list price}} \times 100$$

- Larger discount benefits the buyer and hurts the seller

# Discount by buyer-seller gender



# Distribution of sale days on market



- Female sellers list lower and offer bigger discounts
- Sell approximately 3% faster



Other potential channels

## Other potential channels

- 1. Men buy riskier homes or homes with characteristics associated with higher returns?**  
→ Listings data: controlling for property characteristics does not affect gap
- 2. Men invest more in upgrades or maintenance?**  
→ Listings data: similar gap for homes that have not been upgraded  
→ American Housing Survey: no gap in maintenance *amounts*
- 3. Women may be older, have more children, be less educated, etc.?**  
→ American Housing Survey: Similar gender gap after controlling for demographics  
→ Having children predicts lower returns, but being female  $\approx$  3 children

(1) and (2) are also inconsistent with variation by **holding length** and **market tightness** ...

## Execution prices and holding length

So far, we've shown that women buy the same property for  $\approx 2\%$  more and sell for 2% less


- Equivalent to women getting worse **execution prices** on real estate investment
- Differences in execution prices matter less for returns of “long term” investors

### Simple framework

- Let  $\delta$  be the female fractional disadvantage in execution prices
- Let  $\gamma$  be the gender gap in returns due to men investing more in maintenance or preferring properties with naturally higher returns


$$r^{\text{female}}(t) \approx r^{\text{male}}(t) - \left( \frac{2\delta}{t} + \gamma \right)$$

## Gender gap in unlevered returns by holding period



- Gender gap =  $\left(\frac{2\delta}{t} + \gamma\right)$
- Gender gap asymptotes toward 0, implying  $\delta > 0$  and  $\gamma \approx 0$
- Suggests gender gap arises primarily from differences in execution prices, not maintenance or preferences for properties with naturally higher returns

# Gender gap in sale price by holding length



- Gender gap in sale price does not asymptote toward 0
- But the impact of the gender gap in sale price on annualized returns decreases with holding length
- Same for purchase price

## Variation by market tightness

**Market tightness  $\equiv$  fraction of listings sold within each county-month**

In tight markets, multiple buyers compete in auctions

- Bilateral negotiation should matter less

As the market tightens, gender gap in returns, prices, and discounts shrink toward zero

- Inconsistent with men buying riskier properties or investing more in maintenance/upgrades
- Inconsistent with women getting more utility from housing (as the only explanation), because they would bid higher

# Magnitudes in returns and in dollars

## Large gap in **returns**

- Women earn 1pp lower unlevered, and 6pp lower levered returns
- For the typical levered homeowner, that is like missing out on the **equity premium**

## Large gender gap in **dollars**

- For the median house price of \$140K in 2016, and median holding period of 4.6 years, women lose \$1,370 per year relative to men
- Half the size of the **gender wage gap** of \$2800 per year (Blau and Kahn 2017)

# Conclusion

## Large gender gap in housing returns

- Women buy the same property to 2% more and sell for 2% less

## Implications


- Gender gap in housing returns will contribute to the gender wealth gap
- Negotiated discount, choice of listing price, and timing all matter
- Women may be better off holding for longer or sorting toward tighter markets
- We show that women have worse negotiated outcomes in housing, but...
  - Does not necessarily imply women are doing anything wrong (Exley et al. 2018)
  - *Women don't ask* or *Women don't get?* (Ayres and Siegelman 1995)




# Summary statistics

Panel A: Full Sample	Gender Group				Overall
	Single Male	Single Female	Couple	Other	
Log(Sale Price)	11.9473	11.9125	12.1383	12.1104	12.0704
Sample Size	7,721,833	5,751,347	10,127,535	29,283,151	52,883,866
Panel B: Listing Sample					
Log(Sale Price)	12.0798	12.0292	12.2709	12.0597	12.1095
Log(List Price)	12.0677	12.0236	12.2689	11.9539	12.0547
Sale Discount (p.p.)	2.8908	3.0368	2.5413	3.0954	2.9261
Log(Days on Market)	3.7339	3.7052	3.7016	3.7851	3.7467
Sample Size	3,100,949	2,728,421	4,689,273	9,524,421	20,043,064
Panel C: Returns Sample					
Log(Sale Price)	12.1429	12.0692	12.3342	-	12.2138
Annualized Unlevered Returns	0.0847	0.0692	0.0647	-	0.0720
Holding Length (Years)	5.2816	5.7174	5.9840	-	5.7029
Log(Purchase Price)	11.8990	11.8313	12.0793	-	11.9663
Purchase Discount (p.p.)	2.8150	2.5388	2.5629	-	2.6379
Sample Size	2,935,077	2,128,157	4,288,185	-	9,351,419


# Variation across states




# Composition of transactions




# Sale transactions over time



# Transaction share by holding length




# Median annualized unlevered returns over time




- Annualized return by *sale* year
- Strong variation over time
- Large gap in mean returns
- Smaller gap in *median* returns

## Variation in unlevered returns by holding period




- Annualized return varies with holding length, possibly due to selection
- Will see later that gender gap also varies with holding length

# Distribution of purchase discount







## Distribution of purchase discount: zoomed



# Distribution of sale discount



## Distribution of sale discount: zoomed



# Days on market

	Sale Log(Days on Mkt)	Purchase Log(Days on Mkt)	Unlevered Ann Return
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Single Female	-0.031*** (0.003)	-0.034*** (0.003)	-0.013*** (0.000)
Couple	-0.041*** (0.003)	0.008*** (0.003)	-0.016*** (0.000)
Sale Log(Days on Mkt)			-0.003*** (0.000)
Purchase Log(Days on Mkt)			-0.003*** (0.000)
Zip-Year-Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.415	0.309	0.398
Observations	2,024,580	2,024,580	2,024,580

# Selection of Property Characteristics

	Upgraded	New Construction	Log(House Age)	Log(Sq Ft)	Log(Agent Popularity)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Single Female	-0.009*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.000)	-0.020*** (0.003)	-0.066*** (0.001)	-0.019*** (0.002)
Couple	0.000 (0.001)	0.033*** (0.001)	-0.137*** (0.004)	0.143*** (0.002)	0.148*** (0.003)
Zip-Year-Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.299	0.274	0.515	0.448	0.255
Observations	3,542,111	9,351,419	2,211,953	2,007,061	4,000,582

## Unlevered returns: weighted by holding length

	Unlevered Ann Return		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Single Female	-0.006*** (0.000)	-0.005*** (0.000)	-0.004*** (0.000)
Couple	-0.005*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
Holding Length			-0.002*** (0.000)
Zip-Year-Month FE	No	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.001	0.384	0.389
Observations	9,351,419	9,351,419	9,351,419

## Levered returns: weighted by holding length


	Lev Ann Ret (missing=0%)	Lev Ann Ret (missing=80%)	Lev Ann Ret (LTV=80%)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Single Female	-0.009*** (0.000)	-0.014*** (0.000)	-0.014*** (0.000)
Couple	0.002*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	0.004*** (0.000)
Holding Length	-0.011*** (0.000)	-0.013*** (0.000)	-0.007*** (0.000)
Zip-Year-Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.337	0.329	0.328
Observations	9,351,419	9,351,419	9,351,419

## Match rates

Seller Gender	Buyer Gender			Overall
	Single Male	Single Female	Couple	
Single Male	0.1385 [0.1207]	0.0868 [0.0830]	0.1010 [0.1225]	0.3262
Single Female	0.0936 [0.0901]	0.0748 [0.0620]	0.0752 [0.0915]	0.2437
Couple	0.1378 [0.1591]	0.0930 [0.1095]	0.1993 [0.1615]	0.4301
Overall	0.3700	0.2546	0.3755	1



## Purchase price by holding length: Couples – Single Male



# Sale price by holding length: Couples – Single Male

