



The Circle Of Life: A Large-Scale Study of The IoT Malware Lifecycle

Omar Alrawi, Charles Lever, Kevin Valakuzhy, Ryan Court, Kevin Snow, Fabian Monroe, Manos Antonakakis

Motivation and Goals




Motivation and Goals




Motivation and Goals

1. Is IoT malware any different?



Motivation and Goals

1. Is IoT malware any different?
2. Are we prepared for another Mirai-like attack?



Motivation and Goals

1. Is IoT malware any different?
2. Are we prepared for another Mirai-like attack?



Prior Studies

Family Specific

Understanding the Mirai Botnet

Manos Antonakakis[◊] Tim April[‡] Michael Bailey[†] Matthew Bernhard[◊] Elie Bursztein[◊]
Jaime Cochran[▷] Zakir Durumeric[◊] J. Alex Halderman[◊] Luca Invernizzi[◊]
Michalis Kallitsis[§] Deepak Kumar[†] Chaz Lever[◊] Zane Ma^{†*} Joshua Mason[†]
Damian Menscher[◊] Chad Seaman[‡] Nick Sullivan[▷] Kurt Thomas[◊] Yi Zhou[†]

[‡]Akamai Technologies [▷]Cloudflare [◊]Georgia Institute of Technology [◊]Google

Measurement and Analysis of Hajime, a Peer-to-peer IoT Botnet

Stephen Herwig¹ Katura Harvey^{1,2} George Hughey¹ Richard Roberts^{1,2} Dave Levin¹
¹University of Maryland ²Max Planck Institute for Software Systems (MPI-SWS)
{smherwig, katura}@cs.umd.edu, ghughey@terpmail.umd.edu, {ricro, dml}@cs.umd.edu

Abstract—The Internet of Things (IoT) introduces an unpre- While there have been in-depth studies into the kind-

Small Scale or Short Periods

IoT Malware Ecosystem in the Wild: A Glimpse into Analysis and Exposures

Jinchun Choi [*] jc.choi@knights.ucf.edu University of Central Florida	Afsah Anwar [*] afsahanwar@knights.ucf.edu University of Central Florida	Hisham Alasmay [*] hisham@knights.ucf.edu University of Central Florida
Jeffrey Spaulding spauldi6@canisius.edu Canisius College	DaeHun Nyang nyang@inha.ac.kr Inha University	Aziz Mohaisen mohaisen@ucf.edu University of Central Florida

DDoS-Capable IoT Malwares: Comparative Analysis and Mirai Investigation

De Donno, Michele; Dragoni, Nicola; Giaretta, Alberto; Spognardi, Angelo

Published in:
Security and Communication Networks

Before Toasters Rise Up: A View Into the Emerging IoT Threat Landscape

Pierre-Antoine Vervier and Yun Shen

General Linux/Specific Phase

Understanding Linux Malware

Emanuele Cozzi Eurecom	Mariano Graziano Cisco Systems, Inc.	Yanick Fratantonio Eurecom	Davide Balzarotti Eurecom
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Understanding Fileless Attacks on Linux-based IoT Devices with HoneyCloud

Fan Dang¹, Zhenhua Li^{1*}, Yunhao Liu^{1,2}, Ennan Zhai³
Qi Alfred Chen⁴, Tianyin Xu⁵, Yan Chen⁶, Jingyu Yang⁷
¹Tsinghua University ²Michigan State University ³Alibaba Group ⁴University of California, Irvine
⁵University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign ⁶Northwestern University ⁷Tencent Anti-Virus Lab

ABSTRACT
With the widespread adoption, Linux-based IoT devices have emerged as a new target for attackers. Many of these devices have employed Linux (e.g., OpenWrt and Raspbian) for its prevalence and programmability, and such a trend has been growing

Many Challenges to Study IoT Ecosystem



Representative Data

Data sources for the IoT malware must be representative. Require large collaboration.

Many Challenges to Study IoT Ecosystem



Representative Data

Data sources for the IoT malware must be representative. Require large collaboration.



Large-Scale Dataset

Large-scale data provides a better perspective on malware in-the-wild

Many Challenges to Study IoT Ecosystem



Representative Data

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Large-Scale Dataset

Large-scale data provides a better perspective on malware in-the-wild



Lack of Analysis Tools

IoT malware targets many system arch.,
Including ARM, MIPS, PPC, and others.
Tools need to be tailored.

Many Challenges to Study IoT Ecosystem



Representative Data

Data sources for the IoT malware must be representative. Require large collaboration.




Large-Scale Dataset

Large-scale data provides a better perspective on malware in-the-wild




Lack of Analysis Tools

IoT malware targets many system arch.,
Including ARM, MIPS, PPC, and others.
Tools need to be tailored.



Many Phases and Different Tactics

Key Idea: Study *IoT Malware* Through The Lens of *Traditional Malware*



Key Idea: Study *IoT Malware* Through The Lens of *Traditional Malware*

Initial Access 10 Items	Execution 31 Items	Persistence 56 Items	Privilege Escalation 28 Items	Defense Evasion 59 Items	Credential Access 20 Items	Discovery 19 Items	Lateral Movement 17 Items	Collection 13 Items	Exfiltration 9 Items	Command And Control 21 Items
Drive-by Compromise	AppleScript	.bash_profile and .bashrc	Access Token Manipulation	Access Token Manipulation	Account Manipulation	Account Discovery	AppleScript	Audio Capture	Automated Exfiltration	Commonly Used Port
Exploit Public-Facing Application	CMSTP	Accessibility Features	Binary Padding	Binary Padding	Bash History	Application Window Discovery	Application Deployment Software	Automated Collection	Data Compressed	Communication Through Removable Media
Hardware Additions	Command-Line Interface	AppCert DLLs	BITS Jobs	BITS Jobs	Brute Force	Browser Bookmark Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Clipboard Data	Data Encrypted	Connection Proxy
Replication Through Removable Media	Control Panel Items	Appinit DLLs	Bypass User Account Control	Bypass User Account Control	Credential Dumping	File and Directory	Exploitation of Remote Services	Data from Information Repositories	Data Transfer Size Limits	Custom Command and Control Protocol
Spearphishing Attachment	Dynamic Data Exchange	Authentication Shimming	Clear Command History	Clear Command History	Credentials In Files		Logon Scripts	Data from Local System	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Custom Cryptographic Protocol
Spearphishing Link	Execution through API	AUTHENTICATION PACKAGE	Covert Channel	Covert Channel			Pass the Hash	Data from Network Shared Drive	Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel	Data Encoding
Spearphishing via Service	Execution through Module Load	Bootkit	DLL Search Order Hijacking	DLL Search Order Hijacking			Pass the Ticket	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Domain Fronting
Supply Chain Compromise	Graphical User Interface	Browser Extensions	Dylib Hijacking	Dylib Hijacking			Remote Desktop Protocol	Data Staged	Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	Fallback Channels
Trusted Relationship	InstallUtil	Change Default File Association	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation			Remote File Copy	Email Collection	Scheduled Transfer	Multi-hop Proxy
Valid Accounts	Launchctl	Component Firmware	Extra Window Memory Injection	Extra Window Memory Injection			Remote Services	Input Capture		Multi-Stage Channels
	Local Job Scheduling	Component Object Model Hijacking	File System Permissions Weakness	File System Permissions Weakness			Replication Through Removable Media	Man in the Browser		Multiband Communication
	LSASS Driver	Create Account	Hooking	Hooking			Shared Webroot	Screen Capture		Multilayer Encryption
	Mshina	DLL Search Order Hijacking	Image File Execution Options Injection	Image File Execution Options Injection			SSH Hijacking	Video Capture		Port Knocking
	PowerShell	Dylib Hijacking	Launch Daemon	Launch Daemon			Taint Shared Content			Remote Access Tools
	Regsvcs/Regasm	External Remote Services	New Service	New Service			Third-party Software			Remote File Copy
	Regsvr32	File System Permissions Weakness	Path Interception	Path Interception			Windows Admin Shares			Standard Application Layer Protocol
	Rundll32	Hidden Files and Directories	Plist Modification	Plist Modification			Windows Remote Management			Standard Cryptographic Protocol
	Scheduled Task Scripting	Hooking	Process Injection	Process Injection						Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol
	Signed Binary Proxy Execution	Hypervisor	Scheduled Task	Scheduled Task						Uncommonly Used Port
	Signed Script Proxy Execution	Image File Execution Options Injection	Service Registry	Service Registry						Web Service
	Source	Kernel Modules and Extensions	Permissions Weakness	Permissions Weakness						
	Space after Filename	Launch Agent	Setuid and Setgid	Setuid and Setgid						

Key Idea: Study *IoT Malware* Through The Lens of *Traditional Malware*

Infection Payload Persistence

Capabilities


C&C

Initial Access 10 Items	Execution 31 Items	Persistence 56 Items	Privilege Escalation 28 Items	Defense Evasion 59 Items	Credential Access 20 Items	Discovery 19 Items	Lateral Movement 17 Items	Collection 13 Items	Exfiltration 9 Items	Command And Control 21 Items
Drive-by Compromise Exploit Public-Facing Application Hardware Additions Replication Through Removable Media Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Spearphishing via Service Supply Chain Compromise Trusted Relationship Valid Accounts	AppleScript CMSTP Command-Line Interface Control Panel Items Dynamic Data Exchange Execution through API Execution through Module Load Exploitation for Client Execution Graphical User Interface InstallUtil Launchctl Local Job Scheduling LSASS Driver Mshta PowerShell Regsvcs/Regasm Regsvr32 Rundll32 Scheduled Task Scripting Service Execution Signed Binary Proxy Execution Signed Script Proxy Execution Source Space after Filename	.bash_profile and .bashrc Accessibility Features AppCert DLLs Appinit DLLs Application Shimming Authentication Package BITS Jobs Bootkit Browser Extensions Change Default File Association Component Firmware Component Object Model Hijacking Create Account DLL Search Order Hijacking Dylib Hijacking External Remote Services File System Permissions Weakness Hidden Files and Directories Hooking Hypervisor Image File Execution Options Injection Kernel Modules and Extensions Launch Agent	Access Token Manipulation Binary Padding BITS Jobs Bypass User Account Control Clear Command History CMSTP Control Panel Items Dylib Hijacking Dylib Search Order Hijacking Extra Window Memory Injection File System Permissions Weakness Hooking Image File Execution Options Injection Launch Daemon New Service Path Interception Plist Modification Port Monitors Process Injection Scheduled Task Service Registry Permissions Weakness Setuid and Setgid	Access Token Manipulation Binary Padding BITS Jobs Bypass User Account Control Clear Command History CMSTP Control Panel Items Dylib Hijacking Dylib Search Order Hijacking Extra Window Memory Injection File System Permissions Weakness Hooking Image File Execution Options Injection Launch Daemon New Service Path Interception Plist Modification Port Monitors Process Injection Scheduled Task Service Registry Permissions Weakness Setuid and Setgid	Account Manipulation Bash History Brute Force Credential Dumping Credentials in Files File and Directory	Account Discovery Application Window Discovery Browser Bookmark Discovery File and Directory	AppleScript Application Deployment Software Distributed Component Object Model Exploitation of Remote Services Logon Scripts Pass the Hash Pass the Ticket Remote Desktop Protocol Remote File Copy Remote Services Replication Through Removable Media Shared Webroot SSH Hijacking Taint Shared Content Third-party Software Windows Admin Shares Windows Remote Management	Audio Capture Automated Collection Clipboard Data Data from Information Repositories Data from Local System Data from Network Shared Drive Data from Removable Media Data Staged Email Collection Input Capture Man in the Browser Screen Capture Video Capture	Automated Exfiltration Data Compressed Data Encrypted Data Transfer Size Limits Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Scheduled Transfer	Commonly Used Port Communication Through Removable Media Connection Proxy Custom Command and Control Protocol Custom Cryptographic Protocol Data Encoding Data Obfuscation Domain Fronting Fallback Channels Multi-hop Proxy Multi-Stage Channels Multiband Communication Multilayer Encryption Port Knocking Remote Access Tools Remote File Copy Standard Application Layer Protocol Standard Cryptographic Protocol Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol Uncommonly Used Port Web Service

Key Idea: Study *IoT Malware* Through The Lens of *Traditional Malware*

[illegible]

Key Idea: Study *IoT Malware* Through The Lens of *Traditional Malware*



Key Idea: Study *IoT Malware* Through
The Lens of *Traditional Malware*

Infection Payload Persistence

Capabilities

C&C

[illegible]

Empirical Approach

Data Sources



Active-DNS

Passive-DNS

Tranco: Top Sites

Empirical Approach


Data Sources



Active-DNS


Passive-DNS

Tranco: Top Sites



Empirical Approach


Data Sources



Static Binary Analysis

ELF Binary

7f	45	4c	46	01	01	01	00
00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
02	00	28	00	01	00	00	00
94	81	00	00	34	00	00	00
40	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
40	00	00	00	00	00	00	00



UPX Unpack

Target Arch.

Library Linking

Anti-Analysis

Infection Vector

IP/Domain

binutils

Ghidra

Yara

hexdump

Dynamic Binary Analysis



Full-System

ARM

MIPS EB/EL

PPC

SPARC

SH4

Binary Emulation

ARM

MIPS

X86/x86-64

PCAP Trace

Syscall Trace

QEMU

Build Root


Zelos




EXPLOIT DATABASE

Empirical Approach


Data Sources




Static Binary Analysis




Dynamic Binary Analysis









Infection Analysis




Infection Analysis




Infection Analysis

Infection Categories	Desktop	Mobile	IoT
Remote Exploitation 	✓		✓
Repackaging 	✓	✓	
Drive-By Download 	✓	✓	
Phishing 	✓	✓	
Default Credentials 	✓		✓
Removable Media 	✓	✓	




Payload Analysis



IoT Malware



Traditional Malware




Payload Analysis



Payload Analysis


IoT Malware




Polymorphic Malware



Traditional Malware




Payload Analysis







Polymorphic Malware



Traditional Malware



Payload Categories		Desktop	Mobile	IoT
Packing		✓	✓	✓
Environment Keying		✓	✓	✓
Scripting		✓		✓
Cross-arch./plat.		✓	✓	✓

Persistence and Capability Analysis

Persistence



Read-Only File Systems

Capabilities

Persistence and Capability Analysis

Persistence



Read-Only File Systems



Vendor-Specific Tools


Capabilities

Persistence and Capability Analysis


Persistence



Read-Only File Systems



Vendor-Specific Tools



Remount File Systems


Capabilities

Persistence and Capability Analysis

Persistence



Read-Only File Systems




Vendor-Specific Tools



Remount File Systems

Capabilities




DDoS

Persistence and Capability Analysis

Persistence



Read-Only File Systems




Vendor-Specific Tools




Remount File Systems

Capabilities



DDoS



Proxy Servers

Persistence and Capability Analysis

Persistence



Read-Only File Systems




Vendor-Specific Tools




Remount File Systems

Capabilities



DDoS



Proxy Servers













Crypto Mining

Persistence and Capability Analysis

Persistence

Capabilities


Persistence Categories		Desktop	Mobile	IoT
Firmware		✓		✓
Kernel Space		✓	✓	+
User Space		✓	✓	+
Capability Categories		Desktop	Mobile	IoT
Escalation		✓	✓	✓
Evasion		✓	✓	✓
Theft		✓	✓	✓
Scanning		✓		✓
DDoS		✓		✓
Destruction		✓	✓	✓
Resource Abuse		✓	✓	✓



Read-Only File System



Vendor-Specific



Remount File System



DDoS

Proxy Servers

Crypto Mining

C&C Communication Analysis

Centralized




C&C Communication Analysis

Centralized




C&C Communication Analysis

Centralized




C&C Communication Analysis

Centralized




C&C Communication Analysis

Centralized




C&C Communication Analysis

Centralized




C&C Communication Analysis

Centralized




Peer-2-Peer




C&C Communication Analysis

Centralized

Peer-2-Peer



Is IoT malware any different?





Is IoT malware any different?

Are we prepared for another Mirai-like attack?

Is IoT malware any different?

Are we prepared for another Mirai-like attack?

THE WHITE HOUSE



(s) The Secretary of Commerce

Director of NIST, in coordination with representatives of other agencies as the Director of NIST deems appropriate, shall initiate pilot programs informed by existing consumer product labeling programs to educate the public on the security capabilities of Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices and software development practices, and shall consider ways to incentivize manufacturers and developers to participate in these programs.

Is IoT malware any different?

Are we prepared for another Mirai-like attack?

THE WHITE HOUSE



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Mirai Infected Devices		Hajime Infected Devices	
Country	Count	Country	Count
Brazil	15.0%	Iran	29.0%
Colombia	14.0%	Russia	9.6%
Vietnam	12.5%	Italy	9.3%
China	6.5%	China	6.2%
S. Korea	6.0%	Turkey	5.6%
Russia	4.7%	India	5.0%
Turkey	4.2%	Brazil	5.0%
India	4.1%	Pakistan	4.6%
Taiwan	3.5%	Australia	3.9%
Argentina	2.2%	Thailand	3.4%

Questions



Omar Alrawi


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BadThings

<https://BadThings.info>



YourThings
Scorecards

<https://YourThings.info>

contact@badthings.info