

See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/335857423>

# ONTOLOGY (Heidegger Lexicon)

Chapter · December 2019

CITATIONS

0

READS

5

1 author:



[Jan Slaby](#)

Freie Universität Berlin

75 PUBLICATIONS 782 CITATIONS

[SEE PROFILE](#)

Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:



Animal Emotionale I [View project](#)



Emotional Experience in Depression: a Philosophical Study [View project](#)

## 148.

### ONTOLOGY (ONTOLOGIE)

ONTOLOGY, FOR THE Heidegger of *Being and Time*, is the study of BEING (*Sein*), where being is necessarily the being of *entities* (*Seiendes*), but not itself an entity. This all-important difference between being and entities, is what Heidegger (shortly after the publication of *Being and Time*) will call the *ontological* DIFFERENCE (e.g., GA24:22, 454; GA27:210). The adjective “ontological” accordingly refers to what concerns being – i.e., what it is for a given entity or class of entities *to be* – in sharp distinction to the adjective “ONTIC”, which applies to entities as such, i.e., their properties, their various arrangements and behaviors, whatever can be known *empirically* about them. While it is pretty straightforward what entities are – simply “everything there is” – getting to terms with *being* can seem quite elusive. But, according to Heidegger, we *need* to get to terms with it – because being, and nothing but being, is the exclusive – and only – topic of philosophy. Thus, for Heidegger in this crucial phase of his work, philosophy and ontology come to the same thing.

But while “ontology” – and its various cognates – carve out a central conceptual field in Heidegger’s philosophy, strictly and literally, that is true only for one circumscribed period of his work. Since this particular phase is commonly considered to be the most relevant, it is adequate to foreground it in the present entry. Only in closing will this entry also address the fact that Heidegger in later phases of his work mostly ceased to employ the terms “ontology” and “ontological difference” and how this relates to his so-called “TURN” (*Kebre*).

“Ontology” and “ontological difference” are among the focal concepts of Heidegger’s philosophy in the *Being and Time* phase, which comprises most of his work in the 1920s up into the early 1930s. Heidegger calls his endeavor of reawakening and elaborating the question of being “*fundamental ontology*,” that is, a project that – by delineating the contours of the “SENSE of being” (*Sinn von Sein*) – is supposed to provide the indispensable orientation for all conventional ontologies, for example the various *regional* ontologies of the special sciences. This is the forgotten task of philosophy. Besides *Being and Time*, a good source for coming to terms with this basic design of Heidegger’s ontological philosophy of this phase are his writings on Kant. In the typically forceful manner of his historical interpretations, Heidegger enrolls Kant – and the *Critique of Pure Reason* in particular – unabashedly within the trajectory that leads up to his own fundamental ontology (see GA3 and GA25). Thus, he writes about Kant’s endeavor in the first *Critique*: “transcendental inquiry is a type of inquiry which investigates the possibility of an understanding of being, a pre-ontological understanding of being; and such an investigation is the task of ontology. *Transcendental knowledge is ontological knowledge*” (GA25:186/127).

Grasping what is meant by “ontological difference” is a good starting point for finding one’s way into Heidegger’s ontological philosophy (see especially GA24:452–69). Put bluntly, part of the problem Heidegger sees with traditional philosophy is that, for all its dealings with entities (*Seiendes*), it has failed to appreciate being (*Sein*). Just as the forest can evade the beholder of trees, being – and especially the “sense of being” – can elude the analyst of entities. But what *is* being, if not itself an entity? The easiest way into this is by what initially looks like an indirect

route, which is the one that Heidegger takes in *Being and Time*, namely, approaching being via the way it presumably figures in an “understanding of being” (*Seinsverständnis*) – something that Heidegger thinks is rampant in all our lives, albeit for the most part in a tacit, pre-theoretical, unacknowledged form (i.e., “pre-ontological”).

Tying being back to an understanding of being gives us a FORMAL INDICATION of what being is: namely, that in terms of which entities are *intelligible* as entities (cf. Haugeland 2013). The being of an entity is whatever one must have grasped if it can be rightly said of one that one has *understood* the entity in question. John Haugeland provides a good initial gloss on this by noting that *knowing* an entity means being able to deal with it in its *actuality*, while *understanding* an entity means being able to deal with it in terms of its *possibilities*. So when one (truly) understands a thing, one possesses more than a present acquaintance with it or command of it. Over and above that, one possesses a command of how the entity in question *will* – or, at any rate, *should* – behave under varying circumstances, including in hypothetical scenarios. Understanding, in this sense, is essentially *modal* – it concerns what is possible and impossible for a given type of entity.

Take the case of EQUIPMENT, as an example for a significant domain of inner-worldly entities – tools such as hammers, razors, brooms, screwdrivers, drycleaners, and so on. We have understood such equipment when we know how to use it in present and also in hypothetical further circumstances. In Heidegger’s framework, what we have tacitly grasped when having mastered equipment (*Zeug*) is its “equipmentality” (*Zeughaftigkeit*) – i.e., what equipment’s functionality and practical usability-in-context consists in. Now, returning to the ontological difference, it is clear that equipmentality is not itself a piece of equipment. Instead, equipmentality pertains to all the various ways that pieces of equipment *could possibly be* just insofar as these items, indeed, *are* equipment and not something else. This is the ontological difference in action: the being of equipment is not itself a piece of equipment – being in this mode is not itself an entity.

Now we can appreciate why Heidegger can claim, despite the alleged failure of the tradition to come to terms with the being question, that each of us already possesses – *lives* – an understanding of being. Day in, day out, we all *enact*, in all manners of routine comportment, a pre-ontological understanding of the being of various entities – that is, we know how to deal with physical objects, equipment, other people, plants, animals, and so on, both in their actuality and in their possibility. We comport ourselves quite differently to each of these entity types, and we anticipate their antics in future or hypothetical scenarios, regardless of whether we are in addition *also* capable of articulating this guiding understanding in explicit terms or not. We are not only able to respond to these entities’ actual manifestations, but we project these entities onto their possibilities – for example, by being competently able to reject manifest *impossibilities* in their presumed behavior as illusions, errors, or misperceptions (cf. Haugeland 2000). While this tacit everyday understanding of being is not elaborated and thus indeed *pre-ontological*, as Heidegger puts it, it is in this direction that an explicitly worked-out ontological philosophy has to seek its insights. In fact, philosophy *is* ontology, and the making-explicit of the pre-ontological understanding of being is its major task: “philosophy becomes the freely undertaken task of elucidating and unfolding the understanding of being which belongs to the essence of human existence” (GA2 5:38).

In the following, the conceptual field surrounding “ontology” and “ontological difference” will be illuminated by way of a discussion of the initial sections of *Being and Time*. It is here that

Heidegger not only gives a canonical explication of the structure and setting of the question of being, but also exposes Dasein as that entity whose ontological constitution designates it to be both, that which needs to shoulder the task of answering the being question *and* that which figures in this quest as that which has to be primarily interrogated. Accordingly, it is important to understand the basic constitution of Dasein and the special status it occupies in virtue of this status, and also get a sense for the methodological difficulties that an endeavor as peculiar as that of a “fundamental ontology” will have to deal with.

*Being and Time* begins with Heidegger’s somewhat grandiose move of exposing the “question of being” as that which has been forgotten by philosophy at least since the Greeks. The epigraph of *Being and Time* sets the tone: “Do we in our time have an answer to the question of what we really mean by the word ‘being’? Not at all. So it is fitting that we should raise anew *the question of the meaning of Being*” (SZ 1). In §1, Heidegger begins to illuminate the massive task that the “re-awakening of the question of being” entails by skimming through some of the standard moves the philosophical tradition has made concerning “being.” For instance, being cannot be explicated by attributing to it the status or property of an entity; as a concept, “being” is not definable because it can neither be deduced from superordinate concepts nor constructed out of subordinate ones. But all these familiar maneuvers show, according to Heidegger, is that being is not “something like an entity” (SZ 4). On the other hand, the concept “being” is, compared to all other concepts, the most self-evident, as it implicitly figures in all knowing, in all asserting, and in all comportment toward entities and toward oneself – one always necessarily draws on the term “being,” and this term is perfectly intelligible in its regular employment. Still, the fact that we apparently all and always enact such a pre-theoretical understanding of being does not preclude that “in any way of comporting oneself towards entities as entities ... there lies a priori an enigma” (SZ 4). This shows, Heidegger concludes, “that it is necessary in principle to raise the question [concerning the sense of “being”] again” (*ibid.*). In fact, Heidegger famously continues, it is not only unclear what the *answer* to the question of being might be, but the question itself seems as of yet “obscure and without direction.” Accordingly, there is the need to first develop and explicate the question of being so as to render it clear, before we can set out to answer it.

In §3, Heidegger focuses on what is commonly associated with the term ontology, namely the analysis of “basic concepts” (*Grundbegriffe*), either in general or in terms of the foundational study of specific domains of human knowledge. Accordingly, Heidegger turns to the sciences and, in a move that clearly anticipates (or, in any case, is later taken up by) Thomas Kuhn, distinguishes their mundane, routine practice from what he calls the “real ‘movement’ of the sciences”, which transpires when “their basic concepts undergo a more or less radical revision which is [not] transparent to it itself” (SZ 9).<sup>1</sup> The level of maturity a particular scientific discipline has reached, Heidegger thus propounds, is determined by the extent to which the field in question is able to undergo a crisis of its basic concepts (*Krisis ihrer Grundbegriffe*, SZ 9; see also GA25:34).

These very basic concepts, on whose development the fame and fortune of a scientific field depends, are the business of philosophy – this is ontology as conventionally understood, in effect, good old *prima philosophia*. Heidegger also speaks of this as a “productive logic” and

<sup>1</sup> Macquarrie and Robinson omit the “not” in this sentence, thereby corrupting the intended meaning. The original reads as follows: “Die eigentliche ‘Bewegung’ der Wissenschaften spielt sich ab in der mehr oder minder radikalen und ihr selbst nicht durchsichtigen Revision der Grundbegriffe” (SZ 9).

characterizes this endeavor vividly as a *jumping ahead* into a certain region of being in order to disclose its prevailing being-CONSTITUTION (*Seinsverfassung*). The results of such categorical analysis – the basic ontological structures of a given domain – will then be made available to the positive sciences as “transparent directives for their questioning.” Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* is the textbook reference at this point. Kant’s work is an example for such a kind of analysis, one that in this particular case takes the form of an “aprioric logic for the subject-matter of that area of being called ‘NATURE’” (SZ 11) – i.e., an endeavor that delineates the being-constitution of nature as such (see Blattner 2007, 17f. for elaboration).

Now, what is most crucial here is that this “ontology taken in the widest sense” (SZ 11) is itself still in need of a guiding directive. Such foundational questioning might be more basic than the research of the positive sciences, but it is itself at risk of remaining naive and opaque to itself if it is not itself guided by a worked-out understanding of what is meant by “being” as such. Missing out on the clarification – and potential correction – of the meaning of being that tacitly informs its ontological endeavors is the primordial mistake Heidegger accords to the philosophical tradition – ITS FORGETFULNESS OF BEING:

*Basically, all ontology, no matter how rich and firmly compacted a system of categories it has at its disposal, remains blind and perverted from its ownmost aim, if it has not first adequately clarified the sense of being, and conceived this clarification as its fundamental task. (SZ 11)*

Conversely, we can take from this an initial rough idea of what Heidegger, in the light of the foregoing reflections, calls *fundamental ontology*: the project that aims to provide the as of yet missing foundation for all regular ontologies by clarifying the meaning of being presupposed by all these endeavors.

After arguing for the centrality of the being question by relatively conventional means, i.e., by starting from ontologies as commonly understood, Heidegger adds an altogether different consideration in the famous §4 of *Being and Time*. Now at stake is the *ontic* priority of the question of being as opposed to its *ontological* priority. What this means becomes clear when Heidegger introduces the focal concept of *Being and Time*, namely, *Dasein*. This is the term Heidegger puts in place of “human being,” “person,” or “subject,” with the aim to avoid the confusions these terms have caused throughout the history of philosophy. *Dasein* then gets characterized immediately as an entity that *is itself ontological* – as *Dasein’s ontic* constitution is such that *its own being is an issue for it*. *Dasein* is in the mode of concerned engagement with its own being – it *exists*. It is worth checking out this crucial passage in full:

*Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very being, that being is an issue for it. But in that case, it is a constitutive state of Dasein’s being [*Seinsverfassung des Daseins*], and this implies that Dasein, in its being, has a relationship towards that being – a relationship which itself is one of being. And this means further that there is some way in which Dasein understands itself in its being, and that to some degree it does so explicitly ... Understanding of being is itself a definitive characteristic of Dasein’s being. (SZ 12)*

*Dasein* exists in such a way that it is concerned, qua its very being, with being as such – with its own being and thereby, inevitably, also with the being of the other entities it has dealings with.

This fundamental condition can be further unpacked by stating that Dasein *is* in the mode of *understanding being*. Simply put, this is because something *can* be an issue for one only on condition that one has a sense – however tacitly or fleetingly – for *what it is* that one is thus concerned with. This does not mean that Dasein already possesses a worked-out ontology. Its *being ontological* rather consists in an inchoate “pre-ontological” understanding of being, which is part and parcel of and intimately bound up with its way of being as such. John Haugeland, known for his illuminating slogans, glosses the basic meaning of “Dasein” accordingly: “Dasein is a *way of living that embodies an understanding of being*” (Haugeland 2013, 82).

This suffices for Heidegger’s grander purposes. Dasein’s pre-ontological understanding of being, which is essential to its ontic constitution, is the decisive condition which breathes life into the endeavor of fundamental ontology. By illuminating the being of Dasein, so his methodological thinking goes, light will ultimately be shed on the sense of being as such. The entity for whom *being itself* is at issue in its very being is the ideal guide to unveil the sense of being at large. Accordingly, fundamental ontology needs to focus on Dasein first, analyzing its being-constitution so as to eventually move from Dasein’s *understanding of being*, once it is worked out and rendered transparent, toward what it is an understanding of: being as such.

This is why the *being* of Dasein moves to the center of analytical interest in *Being and Time*. Heidegger reserves a specific term for it, namely, EXISTENCE. While Dasein is an entity, “existence” designates *the being* of this entity – the very being to which Dasein always necessarily comports itself in one way or other. Ontically, this means that Dasein in each case understands itself *existentiell*, that is, in terms of certain *possibilities to be* that it might either choose and actively embrace or else miss out on or slip into unthinkingly (in any case, matters of the concrete lives of individuals). These matters of concrete existence, however, are strictly *ontical* affairs of each individual Dasein and thus not the business of fundamental ontology. What *does* concern fundamental ontology is the analysis of the basic, constitutive make-up of existence as such – matters that are not *existentiell* but rather EXISTENTIAL. This is where we have to look in order to delineate the basic structures of the pre-theoretical understanding of being which will set us on the path of the meaning of being as such. That is why fundamental ontology – the endeavor capable of igniting and guiding all regional ontologies – will have to be sought in the existential analytic of Dasein. Only here are we dealing with an entity that *always already*, whether reflectively or not, comports itself essentially toward that which is at issue in the question of being: “the question of being is nothing other than the radicalization of an essential tendency-of-being [*Seinstendenz*] which belongs to Dasein itself – the pre-ontological understanding of being” (SZ 15).

Alas, this is where the real problems only begin to show up. It is nice and good, one might say, that Dasein has been credibly exposed as the primary entity for which being itself is at issue and that therefore has to figure as the prime target of a fundamental ontology. But how is the required analytic of Dasein supposed to be performed? What methodology might be employed in order to carry out this peculiar endeavor with any chance for success? The problem starts with the simple fact that we, individual instances of Dasein, usually have no idea of our alleged pre-theoretical understanding of being, let alone a competent way to study it systematically. Unreflectively enacting an understanding of being is one thing, explicitly thematizing and rendering it transparent quite another. As Heidegger writes, echoing Saint Augustine: “ontically, of course, Dasein is not only close to us – even that which is closest: we *are* it, each of us, we ourselves. In spite of this, or rather for just this reason, it is ontologically that which is farthest” (SZ 15).



What is worse, not only do we lack a feasible way of getting at our understanding of being, it is in fact part of our very ontological make-up as Dasein that we are inclined to *explicitly* understand our own being – erroneously – in terms of those mundane everyday objects we have regular dealings with. We are prone to construe our own being, routinely, as if it were just some physical object among others – a material thing with certain properties, such as a tool or a (rational) animal. Heidegger calls this tendency the “ontological back-projection of worldly understanding on the interpretation of Dasein” (SZ 16). Related to this default mode of self-objectification is a problematic brought about by language and common sense as such. Ordinary discourse is a massive leveling force that constantly shoves us out of touch with the phenomena and into all sorts of hopelessly muddled-up, conventional understandings. Borrowing a term from Harry Frankfurt, we might call this the tendency of everyday discourse to slide back into bullshit (Frankfurt 2005). Haugeland, as always, nails it:

Heidegger’s demon – the lurking danger in philosophy’s way – as he sees it, is not deception, not unintelligibility, not confusion, but precisely this unimpeachable, question-smothering, scarcely even noticed *sound common sense* – the opiate of ontology. (Haugeland 2013, 69)

So then, how can philosophy reconfigure its analytical purview in order to prevent the slide back into the morasses of the ordinary? How to regain the phenomena so as to perform the ontological analysis of Dasein with a chance for genuine insight? This is where Heidegger’s considerations on method come in.

On the face of it, these considerations, provided in the difficult §7 of *Being and Time*, might seem both trivial and dogmatic. Heidegger claims that the proper way to do philosophy is by engaging in PHENOMENOLOGY, chiefly because phenomenology heeds the maxim “To the things themselves” (SZ 27; see the MATTER). But this slogan might seem empty (what scientific method worth its salt does *not* aspire to approach the “things themselves?”), and the recourse to phenomenology a mere postulate. However, in view of the foregoing considerations, we already have a sense for how *hard* it in fact is to actually heed phenomenology’s battle cry. The “things themselves,” let alone their *being*, are exactly not readily approachable and easily tractable. What phenomenology brings to the table is both the *tools* necessary to succeed in this muddled-up situation and the *attitude* required to master this challenge.

Heidegger unpacks the meaning of “phenomenology” by discussing both composite elements, *phenomenon* and *logos* – and he does that in his characteristic way both etymologically and by way of interpretation of what he takes to be their Greek original meanings. *Phainomenon*, according to Heidegger, is that which shows itself from itself. Initially, this can mean everything that there is, but ultimately what “phenomenon” refers to in the full sense of phenomenology is *being* itself (cf. SZ 37), so that phenomenology as a philosophical method is nothing other than “the science of the being of entities – ontology” (SZ 37). *Logos* he renders as, in effect, *telling it like it is* (drawn from Greek *logos apophantikos*): bringing to light, exposing, laying something out into the open.

It is of course no accident that these Heideggerian renditions of these focal concepts, as it were, meet up; and that is what *phenomenology* is essentially about: bringing the phenomena, those self-standing somethings which show themselves – but which might also be covered up – out into the open by way of *logos apophantikos*, i.e., by telling it (them) as they are in themselves, a telling that both directly draws from and points to the things themselves. In terms of what

Heidegger mainly drives at, this means of course: bringing the *being* of entities out into the open. That this is by no means a trivial undertaking is clear from what was said before. While indeed the phenomena tend to show themselves, this does not pertain to their being. Instead, a massive current in Dasein and in worldly affairs at large runs counter to being's revealing itself, viz. common sense and ordinary discourse. These have long taken hold of philosophy, science, and learned discourse at large – both by saddling their practitioners with illusionary ideas but also, more fundamentally, by sprinkling reality itself with layers over layers of sheer humbug. Phenomenology is thus the struggle of *bringing to light* what in some sense *already lies in the open* but whose very openness is *buried under heaps of confusion, simulacra*, IDLE TALK, and so on.

It is clear that such a vexing condition not only calls for proper tools, but also for the right attitude – one suited for rigorously fighting and resisting that sinister drift toward the common and vulgar. Thus, crucial for aligning the *phainomena* and *logos* in the right way, is the philosopher's *existential commitment* – which is more than merely an earnest engagement with some subject-matter or other. It is the anchoring of philosophical concepts in one's own being in such a way that one literally *lives* what is at stake in this endeavor. *Being* cannot figure as the content of detached considerations or theoretical cognitions, but is that which gets disclosed by being *lived* in concrete existence. Undertaking an existential commitment, *staking oneself* – is what is required for disclosing being (see also GA27:379–86). So essentially, ontology is a *self-transformation* on the part of existence itself, buying in, waking up to oneself, authentically (see also Denker 2013, 63f.). Haugeland makes the same point by referring to the “existential” status of philosophical concepts:

grasping philosophical concepts – concepts like world, finitude, individuation, and the rest – is no mere cognitive achievement. You do not actually *understand* them except insofar as they are making a real difference in how you live. In other words, you cannot genuinely come to have those concepts without also changing as a person. (Haugeland 2013, 75)

In light of this, Heidegger concludes his – admittedly sketchy – considerations on method by stating that philosophy proceeds in the manner of a *universal phenomenological ontology* that is both grounded in and mattering to existence itself:

Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology, and takes its departure from the hermeneutic of Dasein, which, as an analytic of existence, has made fast the guiding line for all philosophical inquiry at the point where it *arises* and to which it *returns*. (SZ 38)

This concludes our exposition of “ontology,” “ontological,” and “ontological difference” in the *Being and Time* period. What remains to be considered is the fate of these terms in Heidegger's later writings.

Why did Heidegger abandon his positive employment of these terms only a few years after they played such a prominent role in his thought? This reorientation has to do with his larger *turn* away from anchoring the being question in an analytic of Dasein – a move that became known plainly as “the TURN” (*Kehre*). In short, from about 1930 onward, Heidegger ceased to think that being could be approached by way of a transcendental analysis of Dasein's *understanding of being* (see Sheehan 2010 for a contestable yet informative discussion of the various meanings of *die Kehre*). The turn then consisted in reversing this very order: being (now often



spelled *Seyn* instead of *Sein*) is not in any way a “MACHINATION” (*Machenschaft*) of Dasein, but instead something like a gift, a MYSTERY transpiring in a dimension that is an unattainable enabling ground of Dasein and its existential make-up (*das Ereignis*; see ADAPTATION). Heidegger’s endeavor from then on is better characterized as the HISTORY OF BEING (*Seinsgeschichte*); philosophy gives way to THINKING of being (*Seinsdenken*; see Guignon 2005).

Some of Heidegger’s most radical writing apropos this reorientation can be found in his collection of aphorisms, penned circa 1938/39, entitled *Overcoming of Metaphysics* (GA67). One can see here how far especially the binary distinction between being and entities – or “ontic” and “ontological” – is now considered by Heidegger to be part of the problem, not a route to solving the riddle of being. Consider the following passage, written in Heidegger’s elliptic notebook style:

The distinction between ontic and ontological [is] untenable – [it is] based on the distinction, which precisely levels everything down to ‘two worlds’ and does not adequately ‘distinguish’ either of the two – neither the entity as such nor being as such; also [it is] already suggested that the distinction of ontic and ontological is ambiguous. (GA67:63)

The sharp distinction brought about by the contrast of the two terms “being” and “entity” does not exactly perform *the work* of distinguishing – in the sense of actually differentiating, or making the differentiating of being into entities tractable. Instead, this distinction merely postulates, not unlike traditional metaphysics, a duality of “two worlds”: separate realms, the mundane (entities) and behind or “above” it the somehow arcane (being), from which the mundane derives its meaning more or less unilaterally (but see GA27:210 for a more balanced earlier assessment of this problematic). Not much has changed in comparison to traditional metaphysics – or, at any rate, this is what Heidegger seems to think now. In a related key, Heidegger now chastizes his construal of being-in-the-world as a primordial “transcendence” as a regression into METAPHYSICS (GA67:63).

To be sure, Heidegger keeps talking of the *difference* of being and entities (*Sein* and *Seiendes*) in his later writings, yet he no longer calls this difference *ontological*. A helpful discussion is in the second text of *Identität und Differenz* (GA11/ID), where it again becomes clear that it is not the difference as such that is problematic, but rather its concretistic interpretation – the assumption of separable realms, or the thought that “being” might be even so much as thematized in isolation from entities (cf. GA11:60–79/ID 51–74). Accordingly, one can say that the destiny of philosophy remains that of inhabiting the difference of being and entities, of projecting entities onto their being, and so on – yet, it would be a mistake to consider this to be a straightforward “task” that could be executed according to any kind of clear-cut recipe or blueprint. Instead, philosophy is more like the – meditative? poetic? – stance of letting oneself be pulled into and dragged along by the intractable and unpredictable play of difference between being and entities.

Whatever the ultimate merits of *the turn* for Heidegger’s thinking overall, this move certainly spells doom for the career of the conceptual family of “ontology” in his later writings. It is worth taking note of the fact that the very thinker who brought ontology back on the agenda of contemporary philosophy so resolutely turned his back on that notion so soon thereafter.

*Jan Slaby*

# REFERENCES IN HEIDEGGER

- Ontology** SZ 11–19, 38, 44, 52, 63–66; GA3:11–14, 111, 124; GA19:207, 438; GA24:22–25, 106; GA29/30:521–23; GA63:1–3  
**Ontological** SZ 56–59, 63–66, 72, 83–85, 180–83, 196, 200, 204, 209–13  
**Ontological difference** GA6.2:180–90/N4 150–58; GA14:41, 46, 87; GA15:309–11, 346–47/FS 24–25, 48; GA24:22–25, 102, 106, 169–71, 321–24, 452–54; GA27:210, 221–27; GA29/30:521–24; GA65:207, 250, 258, 465–69  
**Ontic vs. ontological knowledge/truth** SZ 214–30; GA3:11, 39–40; GA27:200–13, 256; GA29/30:523  
**Conflation of ontic/ontological** SZ 76, 94, 132–33, 209–11; GA19:453; GA27:348–54; GA65:198  
**Beyond the ontic/ontological distinction** GA65:450–51; GA67:62–63; GA74:128

# FURTHER READING

Blattner 2007, Denker 2013, Frankfurt 2005, Guignon 2005, Haugeland 2000, Sheehan 2010

OPEN SPACE OF PUBLICNESS (OFFENTLICHKEIT). SEE PUBLICNESS.