

The Ethics of Engineering Autonomous Systems in Defence

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Abstract

The surge in Autonomous Systems (AS) technology in the defence sector will change the nature of warfare. Today, countries are pouring billions into their defence budgets to develop next generation autonomous systems for the future of war. This investment is precipitated by the highest levels of geopolitical tensions since the Cuban Missile Crisis. More specifically, there are concerns about the proliferation of a subclass of AS, which are Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS). Meanwhile, global regulations on AWS are bogged down despite public sentiment and the huge body of academic literature on topic calling for a comprehensive ban. Thus, autonomous systems in defence are a practical *fait accompli*. Attention and energy should instead turn to ensuring that defence companies develop autonomous systems with a strong understanding of the ethical implications of their work. This paper conducts a literature review on the ethics of autonomous systems in defence by examining academic journals, Australian Government policy, and white papers by engineering professional bodies. This paper concludes that a significant gap exists between the discussion in academia and the public domain vs. engineering practice. A framework to bridge this gap is proposed to aid defence companies with assessing the ethical rigour of their business and engineering practices with respect to autonomous systems. ¶Need a para about why military technology ethics is important¶

1 Introduction

etween 2017-21 the United States, China, Russia, South Korea and the European Union spent a combined estimate of USD 35.8 billion on military drones [1]. In 2022, the United States alone will spend USD 8.2 billion on Uncrewed Vehicle (UxV) systems [2]. The United Nations has failed to introduce regulations on autonomous weapon systems despite successive attempts in the last eight years. Countries disagree about the definitions of an autonomous system, what regulation to apply, and the impossibility of the ban itself since the technology is dual purpose (civilian and military) [3]. Meanwhile, the first lethal autonomous attack has already occurred in 2020 in Libya. Turkish Kargu 2 loitering munition attack drones

"were programmed to attack targets without requiring data connectivity between the operator and the munition: in effect a true fire, forget and find capability." [4].

This paper discusses the ethics of autonomous systems in defence in four sections.

- Section 2: Summary of the ethical risks
- Section 3: Summary of the current attempts at solutions
- Section 4: Discussion of the current solutions to mitigating those risks
- Section 5: Proposal to improve the solutions

1.1 Definitions in this Paper

- Autonomous Systems (AS): Any robotic or software system that can perform tasks without human supervision.
- Autonomous Weapon System (AWS): Robotic or software systems that select and attack targets without human intervention. Subset of AS.
- Autonomy: Does not necessarily require AI.
- Artificial Intelligence (AI): A technique for realising autonomy.

2 Ethical Risks

This section outlines the ethical risks of AS and AWS in defence.

2.1 Meaningful human control

The human needs to be responsible for the outcomes of AWS systems. The United Nations states that “Accountability cannot be transferred to machines.” [5]. The concept of meaningful human control can be classified into five levels [6].

- Humans deliberate about specific targets before initiating an attack
- Humans choose from a list of targets suggested by a program
- Programs select the calculated targets and needs human approval before attack
- Programs select calculated targets and allocate humans a time-restricted veto before attack
- Programs select calculated targets and initiate attacks **without human involvement**

Having humans in the loop is a necessary but insufficient condition for realising meaningful control. Consider the cases of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 in 2014 and Ukrainian International Airlines Flight 752 in 2020, which were both shot down due to human error [7]. A human in the loop is insufficient - the boundary of interactions between a human operator and any system needs careful design to ethically minimise inadvertent harm.

2.2 Conflict Escalation

Automated reactions raise the risk of escalating conflicts. Machine systems can perform calculations at the rate of machine speeds and this may be beyond the reaction time for a human

to intervene. Consider the case of two combatant autonomous systems, each of which automatically reacting to the other in an escalation feedback loop. Even “when a single system is predictable, or even deterministic, which such systems interact with other systems or ... in large swarms... their collective behaviours can become intrinsically unpredictable” [8]. Learning systems further “compound the problem of predictable use”.

2.3 Obfuscated and Non-attributable Attacks

Obfuscated and non-attributable attacks are another ethical risk of autonomous systems. “States have legal obligations to make attacks practically attributable” [8]. Arguably, cyber warfare attacks may be considered autonomous systems. Consider the 2011 revelation about the Stuxnet computer worm which damaged an Iranian nuclear facility. Stuxnet autonomously spread to hundreds of thousands of computers around the world to reach its target. Such attacks “do carry a risk of collateral damage, with a risk of political blowback if the attacking parties are identified” [9]. Consider, on the other hand, non-kinetic attacks such as Russia’s political interference in the 2016 United States election and again in 2020 with automated social media bots. Even though no physical harm was suffered it is arguable that misinformation campaigns intended to sow discord are unethical use of automation technologies.

2.4 AWS Proliferation

Unfortunately, autonomous systems technology is already proliferating. Commercial drones off-the-shelf drones can easily be re-purposed for military uses. DJI drones, for example, are currently used by both sides in the 2022 war in Ukraine [10]. The components for autonomous systems themselves are also commercially available and cheap to obtain. As at 2020, Australia, China, Israel, Russia, South Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States are investing in autonomous systems for defence [11]. More countries will follow.

2.5 Human Rights Abuse

There is an alarming risk that autonomous systems are used by “Tyrants and despots...to gain or

retain control over a population which would not otherwise support them. AWS might be turned against peaceful demonstrators when human law enforcement might not do the same.”[8]. Military technology can be exported, stolen or sold to unaligned actors, authoritarian states, private militaries, domestic police, terrorist groups.

3 Current Solutions

3.1 Introduce Global Regulations

There are three positions on global regulation of AWS. The first is do nothing because International Humanitarian Law is sufficient, the second is a comprehensive ban on AWS, and the third is to develop legal norms requiring and defining “meaningful human control” [12]. The body of literature overwhelmingly calls for the second or third option.

The latest attempt for a comprehensive ban of AWS stalled yet again in December 2021 at the United Nation’s because it was blocked by the United States and Russia. According to Scharre, a ban on AWS is impossible [13]. Since a comprehensive ban is still unreachable, “a majority of states pushed for an international treaty to be developed” which suggests that after eight years of stalled discussions regulation on AWS may be approaching an inflexion point. An international treaty, however still needs defined terms.

3.2 Standardise Definitions to Support Regulation

A common definition of autonomous weapon systems is imperative if regulation is to be passed and enforced. In 2014, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (2014) concluded that there was no international agreed definition of an autonomous weapon system and proposed that AWS is defined as “weapons that can independently select and attack targets” [12].

In 2016, the IEEE Global Initiative on Ethics of Autonomous and Intelligent Systems asserted that “confusions about definitions regarding... artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, and autonomous weapons systems stymie more substantive discussions about crucial issues” [8]. They expanded ICRC’s AWS definition to “any

weapon system with autonomy in its critical functions...that can select and attack targets without human intervention”.

But as at 2020, definitions are still problematic. The IEEE lament that there is no “precision in definitions about autonomous weapons and human control”. They recommend that these definitions should be “grounded in technical realities of today... not limited by disagreements over what technologies may or may not be... farther into the future” [5].

Bradshaw (2013) on the other hand, strongly condemns the effort of standardising definitions because because the fundamental problem for lawmakers is their lack a basic technical understanding of systems theory in general.

“The attempt to define autonomy has resulted in a waste of both time and money spent debating and reconciling different terms and may be contributing to fears of unbounded autonomy. The definitions have been unsatisfactory because they typically try to express autonomy as a widget or discrete component, rather than a capability of the larger system enabled by the integration of human and machine abilities”[3].

3.3 Increase Public Awareness

Generating public awareness creates public discussion and elevates the topic of autonomous systems in defence. Launched in 2013, the public movement stopkillerrobots.org, now undersigned by 26 Nobel Peace Laureates and counting 180 organisations as its members, seeks to “rejects the automation of killing and instead promotes the principle of human control over emerging technologies.”

In 2015 an open letter on artificial intelligence signed by physicist Stephen Hawking, CEO Elon Musk and over leading 150 academics in artificial intelligence. It asked whether AWS can be made to “comply with humanitarian law”, whether an agreed definition for AWS can actually be developed to facilitate regulation, how AWS could be integrated with existing military systems and finally, outlined a list of ethical risks [14].

The problem with stoking public pressure, however, is that autonomous systems in defence naturally provokes fear due to inherent biases in the public imagination about dystopian robotic futures. Rosendorf (2022), for example surveyed

1006 US citizens on the question of ethically of military strikes resulting in collateral damage and found that ‘increasing weapon autonomy is associated with ... lower perception of ethicality’ than ‘conventional inhabited and remote-controlled systems’. But acknowledge limitation is that the public equate unethical with novelty of the technology and having limited experience with autonomous machines [15].

Interestingly, Devitt conducted a survey of 2500 Australian respondents and found that “Australians have low trust in AI systems but generally ‘accept’ or ‘tolerate’ AI. They found that Australians trust research institutions and Defence organisations the most to use AI and trusted commercial organisations the least.” [16].

3.4 Introduce National Regulation

Even if multi-lateral regulation are unsuccessful, countries can unilaterally propose and adopt their own AWS regulations. Australia is a laggard. In 2017, Australia at the United Nations stated that it considers a sweeping prohibition of AWS to be premature [16]. In 2021, Australia at the United Nations acknowledged that it recognises that International Humanitarian Law applies to AWS and that “states...[must] undertake necessary weapons reviews during the study, development and adoption of such systems”. Interestingly, Australia considers “Australia also believes that AWS have the potential to uphold International Humanitarian Law compliance”. Australia proposed an AWS code of conduct or good practice guideline. [17].

Australia doesn’t yet have an overarching governance framework for Artificial Intelligence in Defence. However, it is taking the first steps toward one with its allies. [16].

“Australia is a founding partner in the US’s AI Partnership for Defense (PfD) that includes Canada, Denmark, Estonia, France, Finland, Germany, Israel, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Norway, the Netherlands, Singapore, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In doing so, Australia has aligned its AI partnerships with AUKUS, five-eyes (minus New Zealand), the Quad (minus India) and ASEAN via Singapore. In particular Australia is seeking to increase AI collaboration with the US and UK through AUKUS.”

3.5 Self-Regulate the Defence Industry

In the absence of global and national regulation, the Australian Defence industry has proactively sought to develop its own guidelines for the ethical development of Defence AI. In 2021, the Australian Department of Defence released its report titled “A method for Ethical AI in Defence”. It proposes an Ethical AI checklist and risk matrix for defence companies working on AI products in defence. The report also recommended the inclusion of a “Legal and Ethical Assurance Program Plan” for any future defence contracts involving complex Defence AI systems. The report’s limitation, however, is that this document is only “a report on the outcomes of a workshop ... and doesn’t represent and official position of Defence” [18].

Recommendations and standards from the civilian domain could be adopted by the defence industry. However, even civilian standards are lacking. Standards Australia, which is the “peak non-government, not-for-profit standards organisation” released its 2020 Artificial Intelligence Standards Roadmap. It recommends that Australia needs to increase its representation on global AI standards and acknowledged that “we need to promote Australia’s security interests,...trade and investment agenda [and] Australia’s evolving values”. This highlights the impossibility of divorcing defence and civilian AI technologies. [19].

3.6 Uplift Engineering Design Techniques

Despite the lack of global and national regulations and even industry guidelines, Engineers can bear the responsibility to proactively apply ethical engineering design techniques when developing AS for defence. Verdiesen (2018) ran an online survey to solicit impressions on the importance of six variables (type of mission, outcome, type of weapon, type of character, number of characters and location) for the requirements of a Moral Machine for AWS. This paper proposed this survey to evaluate a “grounded view on the perception of the moral acceptability of AWS of the wider public” [20].

Umbrello (2019) proposed a Value Sensitive Design framework for AWS that “intends to embed stakeholder values into design, encourage

stakeholder cooperation and coordination, and promote social acceptance of [AWS] as a preferable future fact of war”. The approach requires “conceptual, empirical and technical investigations’ to determine values of the stakeholders, envision how those values can be construed as design requirements, and evaluate how those design requirements can be supported” [21]. Umbrello asserts that programming AWS with existing military conventions that define Rules of Engagements and Laws of War are “are more than sufficient to govern battlefield action” [21]. Umbrello clearly demonstrates that they does not understand the challenge software robustness and monumental effort of assuring that an autonomous system will comply with that encoding in a highly unstructured and dynamic battlefield environment.

The IEEE 7000-2021 *Standard Model for Addressing Ethical Concerns During System Design* could be considered by the Defence Industry. It claims to be a “highly practical approach to minimising potential value harms associated with product or systems design”. It is a Value-Based Engineering approach which is broadly equivalent to Umbrello’s Value Sensitive Design framework.

3.7 Review and Revise the Company’s Code of Ethics

Modern businesses have a code of ethics that guide their business activities. Similarly, engineering professional bodies have a ethical code of ethics. Companies ought to review and revise their Busines and Engineering Code of Ethics because the technology and responsibilities for AS in defence are evolving at speed. Companies need to stay current.

... existing codes of ethics may fail to properly address ethical responsibility for autonomous systems, or clarify ethical obligation of engineers with respect to AWS. [8]

Finally, individual engineers working on AS for defence may not even know their ethical obligations. Thus it is incumbent on their companies to ensure they do.

4 Discussion

4.1 The Enormous Gap between Academia and Engineering Practice

This paper concludes that the effort poured into the academic discussions on the topic of AWS and AS ethics aren’t yet adopted by defence engineering practice. Furthermore, The development of AS and AWS in defence is “accelerating largely outside of public and academic attention in the discipline of International Relations” [22]. There is currently no public data on the AS and AWS ethics policies of defence companies. Thus it remains beyond the scrutiny of academics.

Countries ultimately need to mandate AS and AWS ethical obligations on the defence companies working for them to drive practical outcomes. Australia’s proposal to introduce “Legal and Ethical Assurance Program Plan” for any future defence contracts involving complex Defence AI system would be supremely effective because it imposes reporting obligations its Defence companies [18].

There is no discussion about when ethical reviews should be introduced in the engineering lifecycle, which governs the product development process from ideation to operation and disposal. The Technology Readiness Level (TRL) in Figure 1 is a useful framework to generalise the engineering lifecycle. Ethical design review gates should be introduced at TRL5 at a minimum and conducted at each subsequent TRL level. Any earlier is impractical because the technology is too immature to exist beyond the lab. Any later and its too late - at TRL8 the product already exists at scale with its deficiencies hard-wired into the design. It is too late at TRL9 when the system is in-service.

Finally, there is no discussion about the how defence companies should translate the recommendations made by the papers reviewed in section three of this paper into action. This is an enormous gap. To actually drive practical change, requires an understanding of how engineering companies operate. The key steps are:

1. Assign a company board member to be made accountable for ethical AS and AWS development.
2. Develop an policy on what ethical AS and AWS engineering means to that company.




Fig. 1 The Technology Readiness Level

3. Publish that policy to the engineering workforce and ensure they understand their ethical obligations.
4. Re-baseline that ethical policy at least annually.
5. Inject ethical review gates into the engineering life cycle.
6. Introduce mechanisms for engineers to report ethical issues. Two important mechanisms are independent ethics officers and a centralised reporting system that catalogues when ethical concerns are closed.

4.2 Definitions for AS and AWS are Desirable

Despite the views of Bradshaw (2013) claiming that “[attempting] to define autonomy has resulted in a waste of both time and money”, standardised definitions for AS and AWS are desirable.

At a minimum, defence companies working on AS and AWS need to adopt and make definitions consistent internally within their companies as the first step. This is essential to communicate effectively about AS and AWS design. Definitions can even be adopted from civilian standards such as IEEE 7007-2021: Ontological Standard for Ethically Driven Robotics and Automation Systems.

It is pragmatic to adopt the IEEE’s recommendation that definitions are “grounded in technical realities of today... not limited by disagreements over what technologies may or may not be... farther into the future”. This will help dialogue on the ethics of AS and AWS avoid the quagmire of speculative scenarios beyond the capabilities of today’s technologies.

As robotics becomes more widely available in civilian industries, the exercise of standardising definitions will become easier. As at 2022, there are dozens of consumer facing robotic systems that will increasingly feature in our daily experiences. Segments include as robo-taxis (Waymo, Zoox, Cruise), home automation (iRobot’s Roomba), industrial inspections (Boston Dynamics), agriculture (John Deere) to name a few. Discussions between regulators, technologies and end-users will be improved as a consequence.

4.3 Engineering Techniques are not Practical Enough

The Australian Department of Defence’s AI ethical risk matrix is a sound approach. But the provided template is not practically useful because it is effectively a blank table. Three modifications are proposed to make the risk matrix more effective for assessing ethical risks in AS and AWS design.

1. Pre-fill risk matrix with the ethical risks outlined in section two of this paper. This takes the guesswork out of the exercise because its difficult for working engineers to conceive them. These baseline risks are unlikely to change. Ensure new risks can be added.
2. Add columns for risk score (before mitigation), a column for the proposed mitigation, and a column for estimated residual risk score (after mitigation). This aligns with conventional product safety engineering analysis.
3. Add columns to assign names to the risk owner, mitigation owner, and independent reviewer

In a first attempt to derive design requirements for a moral machine for autonomous weapons, Verdiesen et. al. (2018) conducted a large-scale study of the moral judgement of people regard are AWS deployment and concluded more work required, no requirements actually presented.

Defence engineering companies should also adopt practices outlined in IEEE 7000-2021: Standard Model Process for Addressing Ethical Concerns During System Design.

4.4 Keep Driving Public Awareness

Public awareness can influence the decision makers in the defence industry and the engineers

working on its projects. Consider Google’s Project Maven, whose aim was to help the Pentagon process the sheer volume of drone video data. Its functionalities included object detection, classification and alerts. More than 3100 Google employees signed an open letter to its CEO outlining their concerns [23]. Project Maven was not an AWS system [24].

5 Recommendations

At a minimum, Defence companies working on AS and AWS should adopt the following recommendations.

1. Assign a company board member to be accountable for ethical AS and AWS development
2. Publish an internal engineering policy on ethical AS and AWS development with a consistent set of internal definitions (see section 4.2). This policy must acknowledge the ethical risks of AS and AWS work for defence (See section 2).
3. Re-baseline that ethical policy at least annually with the evolving solutions proposed in AS and AWS global and national regulations, industry recommendations, academic journals, and military analysis (See section 3).
4. Inject ethical review gates into the engineering life cycle (See section 4.1).
5. Introduce a modified AI Risk matrix (See section 4.3) that is used at project kick off and at each subsequent ethical design review gate.
6. Introduce mechanisms for engineers to report ethical issues. Two important mechanisms are independent ethics officers and a centralised reporting system that catalogues when ethical concerns are closed.

6 Conclusion

Defence companies working on AS and AWS need to be aware of the ethical risks. A global race to develop AS and AWS in defence is already underway while geopolitical tensions are at their highest since the Cuban Missile Crisis. Thus, AS and AWS in defence are a practical fait accompli. Despite the fact that global regulations are bogged down and national regulations absent, there is enough

publicly available content on the topic for Defence companies working on AS and AWS to be proactive about ethical engineering. Ethical engineering of AS and AWS is possible. This paper summarised the AS and AWS ethical risks, the current solutions, discussed their advantages and disadvantages, and finally proposed a recommendation for defence companies can ethically engineer AS and AWS.

Declarations

This article represents my own views and not that of my company.

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