# Security Development for Tartan system

2021/6/17 Team 4



## Introduction to Team 4

## Aka Potential













Clifford(mentor)

Daesik

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Hanil

Yujin

Dahee

Jinchul

Lead & schedule management: Daesik Kim

Architect: Kyungsik Lee

Configuration management & build: Hanil Jang, Yujin Lee (use github)

Acceptance Test & QA: Dahee Jung, Jinchul Kim

Risk Assessment & Mitigations: All Development & Documentation:

- Application(User Interface) side: Hanil Jang, Yujin Lee, Dahee Jung
- Jetson Nano side: Daesik Kim, Kyungsik Lee, Jinchul Kim



## Introduction to Tartan system

## System overview

- Server(Camera) & Client(Monitoring system) for live streaming
- Facial recognition with Database
- Wireless Network





Figure 1: High-level design

## **Project Goals**


- Security Development for Tartan system
- Business perspective
  - Think of this system as MVP(minimum viable product)
  - Try to avoid implementing fancy features such as GUI.
- Security Goals
  - Focused on enhancing security of the product.
  - Should be designed to achieve three principles.




## **Application**

#### Overview


- Monitoring and tracking people with CCTV in the server room
- Detecting unauthorized people with facial recognition
- CCTV in the server room
- Monitoring system in the security room





# Security Development Process

- Based on MS-SDL
  - Some items on each stage are excluded due to the project development scope



## Requirements - Functions

- Security agents can watch and identify people through the real-time video streaming.
- A manager can access CCTV and register/unregister authorized people.
- The system should provide facial recognition.
- A manager can check the past dis/connection records.
- A manager can check the log file to see who entered the server room and when they did.

## Requirements - Security


To achieve the security goals, the following security requirements are defined to identify and analyze possible threats and apply the derived mitigation.

These requirements were derived through threat analysis and mitigation measures.

- Secure network
   Network sections between CCTV and the monitoring system are encrypted.
- Personal information encryption
   Relevant data to privacy information should be encrypted securely.
- Key protection
   Keys which are used for encryption should be kept safely.
- CCTV should identify who was in or out and save the information to a log file.

## Design - Threat Modeling 1/2

- Data Flow Diagrams
   Decompose the system into parts and show that each part is not susceptible to relevant threats.
- Employ threat modeling using followings
  - STRIDE
  - PnG



# Design - Threat Modeling 2/2

#### STRIDE

| Threats | Spoofing | Tampering | Repudiation | Information<br>Disclosure | Denial Of<br>Service | Elevation Of<br>Privilege |
|---------|----------|-----------|-------------|---------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------|
| 82      | 22       | 5         | 8           | 9                         | 17                   | 21                        |

#### PnG

| Threats | Persona 1 | Persona 2 | Persona 3 |
|---------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| 8       | 4         | 3         | 1         |

#### leff

An insider who is morally wrong and angry about incentives.



Jeff, who designed a CCTV system in his company. He has been working for this company as a network engineer. But for some reason he didn't get any incentive from the company, and he thought it was unfair.

#### Motivatio

Having complaints about incentives.

He got an offer from someone who wants to break into the building to get some information and accepted to help him.

#### Goal:

Unauthorized person who needs information can break into the server room where it is stored.

#### Skille

knowledge of intra network system, knowledge about CCTV recognition algorithm, network skills, network hacking


#### Misuse case 1

- Jeff tries to log in CCTV with the default ID/password via ssh.
- After login to the CCTV, Jeff adds a photo of the person who wants to infiltrate and register him as an authorized person.
- Jeff wants him to be shown as an authorized person and let him pass through the CCTV and safely enter into the server room.

# Design - Mitigation

| ld | Title                      | Category | Priority | Description  |  |  |
|----|----------------------------|----------|----------|--|--|--|
| 10 | Spoofing the 1. Monitoring | Spoofing | High     | 1. Monitoring system (Host) may be spoofed by an attacker and this may |  |  |
|    | system (Host) Process      |          |          | lead to information disclosure by 2. CCTV (Target). Consider using a   |  |  |
|    |                            |          |          | standard authentication mechanism to identify the destination process. |  |  |
|    |                            |          |          |  |  |  |

| Methods      | pros                              | cons  |
|--------------|-----------------------------------|---|
| IP/MAC       | Implementation is the simplest    | Since an attack that modifies IP and MAC is possible, spoofing cannot be reliably prevented.  |
| ID/Passwo rd | Implementation is simple.         | To prevent the password from being exposed, the communication section must be encrypted, and a module for user credentials is required.  If exposed to sniffing attacks, it can be neutralized. |
| Certificate  | the most effective authentication | There is a burden of creating, distributing, and managing certificates.   |



# Design - Risk Assessments

#### **OWASP**

- Identify threats we must mitigate through OWASP risk assessment
- Derive high risks from overall risk severity

| Threats | Mitigated | High | Medium | Low |
|---------|-----------|------|--------|-----|
| 90      | 25        | 11   | 45     | 9   |


|        | Ove    | rall Risk Seve | erity  |          |
|--------|--------|----------------|--------|----------|
|        | HIGH   | Medium         | High   | Critical |
| Impact | MEDIUM | Low            | Medium | High     |
|        | LOW    | Note           | Low    | Medium   |
|        |        | LOW            | MEDIUM | HIGH     |
|        |        | Likel          | lhood  |          |


|  | #11- Potential Lack of Input Validation<br>for 1. Monitoring system (Host)<br>[Tampering]  |               | Skill level            | 3 - Network and programming skills          | Ţ |      |      |                     | Loss of confidentiality | 4 - Minimal critical data<br>disclosed, extensive<br>non-sensitive data<br>disclosed |       |        |      |
|--|--|---------------|------------------------|---|---|------|------|---------------------|-------------------------|--|-------|--------|------|
|  | #11. 1. Data flowing across f12. Image   | Threat Agent  | Motive                 | 9 - High reward                             | + |      |      | Technical<br>Impact | Loss of integrity       | 7 - Extensive seriously corrupt data   |       |        |      |
|  | and result may be tampered with by an attacker. This may lead to a denial of   |               | Opportunity            | 4 - Special access or<br>resources required |   |      |      | impact              | Loss of<br>availability | 7 - Extensive primary<br>services interrupted *                                      |       |        |      |
|  | service attack against 1. Monitoring<br>system (Host) or an elevation of   |               | Group Size             | 4 - Intranet users                          | + |      |      |                     | Loss of accountability  | 7 - Possibly traceable   T   |       |        |      |
|  | privilege attack against 1. Monitoring system (Host) or an information disclosure by 1. Monitoring system (Host). Failure to verify that input is as   |               | Ease of discovery      | 7 - Easy                                    |   | 6.25 | HIGH |                     | Financial damage        | 3 - Minor effect on annual profit  | 4.875 | MEDIUM | High |
|  |  |               | Ease of exploit        | 5 - Easy                                    | - |      |      |                     | Reputation damage       | 7  |       |        |      |
|  | expected is a root cause of a very large   |               | Awareness              | 9 - Public knowledge                        | + |      |      | Business            | Non-compliance          | 3- ▼   |       |        |      |
|  | number of exploitable issues. Consider<br>all paths and the way they handle data.<br>Verify that all input is verified for<br>correctness using an approved list input<br>validation approach. | Vulnerability | Intrusion<br>detection | 9 - Not logged                              | · |      |      | Impact              | Privacy violation       | 1- •   |       |        |      |

# Design - Mitigations - Overall

#### Risk mitigations


- We have identified high risks through risk assessment.
- There are four sections which require security development to mitigate those risks.
- Network/User Information/Key management/Logging






## Design - Mitigations - Mutual Authentication

## TLS connection using PKI



cctv.csr : request information for cert of cctv cctv.crt : cert of cctv made by rootca




client.csr : request information for cert of client client.crt : cert of client made by rootca

- 1. Verify monitoring system by cert of monitoring system with root CA cert.
- 2. Verify CCTV by cert of CCTV with root CA cert
- 3.If authentication is success, then network transport channel is encrypted by TLS1.2

## Design - Mitigations - User Info protection

#### User image protection overview



#### User image file

- User image file is encrypted using AES-128 CBC in User Register
- Encrypted user image file is decrypted using AES-128 CBC in CCTV
- o AES-128 Key is provided by KeyManager


#### User image filename

- User image file name is encrypted using AES-128 CBC in User Register
- Encrypted file name is Base64 encoded in User Register
- Apply substitution to slash(/) characters in Base64 encoded file name
- Encoded file name is Base64 decoded in CCTV
- Encrypted filename is decrypted using AFS-128 CBC in CCTV
- AES-128 Key is provided by KeyManager

# Design - Mitigations - Key Management

How to protect security keys? Identify a method to use keys securely such as Trust zone. Figure out Plan B for key management if there is no support. Encrypt Decrypt Monitoring System(Windows) UserRegister **CCTV** CCTV(Linux) CertificateStore application prepare certificate systemd MonitoringSystem request key(/) import certificate import certificate install certificate. installation installation after boot load certificate Kernel run application certificate Key Retențion Service request certificate decode certificate certificate connection with certificate Load key CertificateStore application MonitoringSystem systemd->keyctl

## Design - Mitigations - Save Log Files



#### Mitigating repudiation

- Connections between the monitoring system and CCTV are logged.
- Failure of access attempt to the CCTV is logged. (certificate authentication failure)
- Server room entry/exit history (authorized/unauthorized persons)

## Implementation

#### **Secure Coding**

Static Analysis
 Analyzing the source code prior to the compilation provides a highly scalable method of security code review and helps ensure that secure coding policies are being followed.

| Tools      | Target                            | Total Detected | false positive | To mitigate | Remark   |
|------------|-----------------------------------|----------------|----------------|-------------|--|
| Sonarcloud | Monitoring system components      | 247            | 247            | 0           | <ul> <li>218 issues are detected as a code smell<br/>type, which is false positive and the rest are<br/>minor issues.</li> </ul>                         |
| Code x-ray | all components                    | 24             | 24             |             | <ul> <li>The issues detected by Blocker(1 issue)<br/>and Major(4 issues) are about the files(out of<br/>scope) or have no effect on the code.</li> </ul> |
| Flawfinder | CCTV and user register components | 48             | 43             | 5           | - 5 issues are fixed.(2 issues related to integer overflow, 3 related to statically-sized buffer)  |

<sup>\*)</sup> We decided to fix the issues found in the static analysis if necessary for items greater than Major (FlawFinder Level 3).

## Verification

#### **Test Report**

| Test Cases | Pass | Fail |
|------------|------|------|
| 19         | 19   | 0    |

## **Test Case #1(Functional Requirement)**

#### **Purpose**

This TC verifies the real-time CCTV person detection function of the CCTV system.

#### **Precondition**

- The Monitoring System is installed.(also cert. key is installed)
- A Security agent is logged in.
- CCTV is running and streaming camera video.

#### **Test Constraints**

Only one monitoring system can be connected to CCTV.

## Deliverables

https://github.com/hijang/lsc\_cctv





## Lessons learned

- The more we know about the system, the better we can design and implement threat mitigations
- If I had realized earlier that my mentor was also a stakeholder who should share information, I would have been able to get more help.
- It was a small project, but I could learn a lot because it was my first security project.
- This project was my first security-related work and it was a very new experience.
- I have learned that considering the security point of view of software quality is very important.
- Mutually agreed process is important. Otherwise, collaboration becomes more difficult.