

International competition and the domestic political drivers of civil war intervention*

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Abstract

This paper develops a theory of third-party interventions into civil wars focused on political distance between states. Because civil wars are competitions over political order, interventions should be understood as efforts to either maintain or remake the status quo. Third parties are more likely to support rebels than the government the further apart the two states are in terms of political institutions or ideology, and political distance should be a better predictor of intervention than policy disagreements. I estimate several empirical models of intervention and find support for my argument. I also estimate several predictive models using random forest to assess the importance of these variables for predicting intervention. Political distance is an important predictor, but the models perform poorly in predicting these rare events.

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1 Introduction

Why do states intervene in other states' civil wars? Interventions cost resources and risk causing a wide range of problems, including refugee flows (Salehyan 2008, pp. 344-7), moral hazard problems (Kuperman 2008, Salehyan 2010, Bapat 2012), and outright retaliation by a civil war actor against the third-party intervener (Langø 2023). Furthermore, intervention can prolong rather than shorten fighting, and external support might not even help the recipient win (e.g., Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000, Balch-Lindsay et al. 2008, Gent 2008, Sullivan and Karreth 2014). Given these risks and challenges, there must be some commensurate benefits from getting involved in someone else's war.

There are numerous studies seeking to explain intervention, but they tend to focus on context-dependent factors and proximate causes. Transnational ethnic ties can increase the likelihood of intervention (e.g., Saideman 2002, Austvoll 2005), as can ideological or religious ties (San-Akca 2016). Furthermore, interstate rivalry (Findley and Teo 2006, p. 834), concerns about disruption of access to economic markets (Aydin 2012), and the presence of lootable resources in the civil war country (Findley and Marineau 2015, p. 475) are all associated with the likelihood of intervention.

In order to explain intervention, we first have to consider what civil wars are. They are violent competitions over domestic political order—the distribution of power and benefits in a given territory. As such, interventions are exercises in maintaining or remaking the status quo in the civil war country. Third parties support the government to keep things as is, or they support the rebels in order to remake the civil war country's order. While third parties care about things such as access to resources and markets, those policy concerns are downstream from

questions of political order. Put simply, and all other things being equal, states wish for other states to be like them. We can therefore understand the decision to intervene and whom to support in terms of political distance between states: how similar states are in terms of institutions and ideology determine whether one supports the government or the rebels in another state if civil war breaks out.

To test my hypotheses, I estimate a series of statistical models of intervention using a range of measures that capture different types of political distance, as well as measures of policy disagreement. I find support for my argument, especially for the more ideologically focused measures of political distance. The further apart a civil war country and a potential intervener are in terms of liberal ideology or liberal democracy, the more likely the latter is to support the rebels rather than the government. I also find that states' difference in financial openness (a measure of states' policy positions on economic policy) predicts intervention in line with my theoretical expectations, whereas foreign policy similarity does not.

To assess whether my explanatory variables are actually important for predicting intervention, I train a series of models using random forest methods. Several of my measures of political distance are amongst the most important predictors. However, the models yield high out-of-bag classification error rates and fail to predict many instances of actual intervention. These results highlight the difficulty in predicting these rare events and the need for more work on understanding the phenomenon of internationalized civil wars.

2 Political distance and intervention

Interventions offer both risk and reward to third parties, and we need to account for both to understand when and why intervention happens. There are numerous risks. For instance, the recipient of support can pursue policies detrimental to the supporter's interests (i.e., principal-agent problems), and the opposing side can respond by retaliating against the third party. Furthermore, the internationalization of civil war can have unintended consequences, such as refugee flows and conflict spillover. Given these risks, third parties should be judicious when deciding whether to intervene or not.

The benefits of intervention depend on the stakes at hand, but to understand the stakes, we must consider what civil wars actually are. They start when bargaining fails, but the purpose of fighting is power. Civil wars are violent contests over the political arrangements in a country. Whether a group chooses to fight over the entire state or some portion of the country's territory, it is seeking to remake the status quo, to change who controls what. As such, we should understand interventions into civil wars as a way for third parties to either maintain or remake the status quo of those countries, depending on which side they support.

Third parties have an interest in the domestic politics of another state when its policies affect them. For instance, economic liberalization in one state can improve economic development in another through trade, or democratization in one can spread across the border and spur demands for political change in another. States might disagree on a lot of things, such as the particulars of trade policy, but disagreements on fundamental issues of political arrangements are more likely to drive decisions on intervention. If two states disagree on how they should govern themselves, the disagreement is more likely to cut across a wide range of issues,

which gives the actors a stake in each other's domestic politics. The decision to intervene and whom to support in a civil war therefore depends on 1) the third party's satisfaction with the status quo and 2) the depth of (dis)agreement with the civil war state.

The particular way that intervention works to achieve a third party's goals of maintaining or remaking the status quo is through institutions. Unlike other sources of preferences such as factor endowments, institutions can be remade, and that is often what happens in civil wars. Furthermore, institutions aggregate preferences, and hence determine policy choices. Disagreeing states will therefore seek to change the other's institutions, because it will lessen bargaining friction between them.

States sometimes fight over smaller disagreements too, but fundamental disagreements should explain more conflicts (and thus interventions) for two reasons. First, even parochial disagreements can stem from deep-seated disagreements. Second, states are more willing to remake another state's political arrangements if the disagreements are broad rather than narrow, because attempting regime change over small issues is an inefficient use of resources and risks overturning policies the two states already agree on. Given these considerations, we should expect that increased political distance between the civil war state and the third party makes rebel-sided intervention more likely relative to government-sided support and non-intervention.

Hypothesis 1 *As political distance between the civil war government and the third party increases, the third party is more likely to intervene on the side of the rebels than support the government.*

Hypothesis 2 *As political distance between the civil war government and the third party increases, the third party is more likely to stay out than support the government.*

3 Research design

To test my hypotheses, I first estimate a series of statistical models using multinomial logit to predict rebel-sided and government-sided intervention. I use several input variables to measure political distance and policy disagreement between civil war states and potential interveners to assess whether political distance is a robust and consistent predictor of intervention, and whether political distance performs better than measures of policy disagreement. Following that, I use various machine learning-methods to train a model of intervention and assess the relative importance of my explanatory variables.

I build a directed-dyad dataset with the unit of analysis being conflict-potential intervener ($n = 26198$).¹ The UCDP External Support dataset is used to define the relevant conflicts and actual interveners, with all other states in the system included as potential interveners (Högbladh et al. 2011). I construct the dependent variable as a categorical variable with three outcomes: no intervention, government support, or rebel support. In the sample, there are 389 observations with government support, 188 observations with rebel support, and 25,621 with no intervention. Because third parties sometimes switch sides and I do not model time-variant interventions, I code a third party's intervention as the first side it supports in the conflict. For some observations, the third party supports both sides in the first year of intervention (for instance, a third party might begin by supporting the rebels, but if the rebels take power that same year while continuing to fight another group, the third party is then also coded as having supported the government as well in that year). I drop those observations from the dataset, without it affecting my results.

¹Dataset generated using the Peacesciencer package (Miller 2022).

I operationalize my explanatory variables as the absolute difference between the civil war country's value and the third party's value for a wide range of input variables. I construct four separate variables for political distance using four different inputs. First, Polity2 is a well-used measure of a given state's level of democratization, with a strong emphasis on institutions, and I use it to construct *p2dist*. Second, I use the Polyarchy variable (usually referred to as the Electoral democracy index) from the V-Dem Project to construct *polydist* (Coppedge et al. 2020). Polyarchy is an index variable that measures the extent to which "electoral democracy in its fullest sense [is] achieved," so it is a comprehensive measure of how democratic a country is. Third, the Liberal component index captures the extent to which a country protects individual and minority rights the government and the majority, so I construct *libdist* to measure how different two countries are in terms of liberalism. Fourth, the Liberal democracy index combines the Polyarchy variable and the Liberal variable to measure the extent to which the ideal of liberal democracy is achieved, so I use that to construct *libdemdist*. As such, these four variables all capture subtle differences in regime type, ideology (i.e. liberalism), and institutions.

For policy disagreement, I construct one variable (*opendist*) on policy disagreement using the Chinn-Ito index of financial openness (Chinn and Ito 2006). This variable is a measure of a country's degree of capital account openness and thus proxies for countries' integration into the world economy. My other measure of policy disagreements is the Kappa measure of foreign policy similarity (*kappavv*) from Häge (2011). This is a dyadic, squared measure of the distance between two given states' foreign policy positions, based on observed dissimilarity of ties while accounting for the distribution of foreign policy ties in the system and individual states' propensity to form ties.

For the multinomial logit models, I include a series of covariates, all lagged by one year prior

Table 1: Summary Statistics


Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Pctl. 25	Pctl. 75	Max
p2dist	23318	0.37	0.303	0	0.1	0.65	1
polydist	24261	0.274	0.235	0	0.071	0.464	0.903
libdist	24360	0.31	0.231	0	0.117	0.474	0.949
libdemdist	24113	0.25	0.234	0	0.053	0.428	0.872
opendist	17534	1.368	1.274	0	0.258	2.356	4.278
kappavv	24298	0.154	0.228	-0.543	-0.01	0.301	1

to the onset of the civil war. For each model, I include the relevant input variables as controls, except for the Kappa variables, which is constructed as a dyadic measure. In addition, I include minimum distance between the two states because geographic proximity can cause political and economic exchange, as well as determine a third party's ability to support a side in the war. Interstate rivalry can affect whether the two countries follow divergent or convergent development paths, while also increasing the risk of rebel-sided intervention, so I include a dummy variable for whether the two states are in an ongoing rivalry. Major powers sometimes compete over regional influence, while also intervening in each other's domestic conflicts, so I include dummy variables for whether the two states are major powers. Economic and demographic factors can also affect states' development and their ability or willingness to intervene in other conflicts, so I include control variables for both states' gross domestic product, population size, gross domestic product per capita, urban population, and economic growth. Furthermore, investments in military capabilities can both affect political developments as well as the ability to intervene, so I control for each state's military strength (CINC). I also include dummy variables for whether the potential intervener is involved in an ongoing interstate or civil war, because ongoing conflict can impact the third party's level of democracy or foreign policy preferences, while also hampering its ability or willingness to intervene in another conflict.

4 Analysis

In this section I test my hypotheses about the relationship between politics, policy, and intervention. I estimate a set of empirical models of intervention with varying explanatory variables meant to capture political distance or policy disagreement between the civil war state and the potential third-party intervener state. In short, I find mixed support for my theoretical argument. Political distance is a consistent predictor of rebel-sided intervention over government support, but less so for staying out relative to supporting the government.

Figure 1: Density distributions for explanatory variables.



Before delving into the regression results, I will note that the explanatory variables for political distance are correlated and share similar bimodal distributions (Figure 1). This is not surprising, as these four variables all capture similar features of domestic politics, with some

differences. Another feature of the data, when broken down by outcome, is that all four variables share a second peak of government support towards the high end of the value range. In other words, there appears to be a cluster of observations with government-sided intervention and high political distance—the exact opposite pattern of what we should expect to see. Looking specifically at Polity2 distance (*p2dist*), there are 141 observations in the 75th percentile (*p2dist* > 0.6) with government support, which is 36% of all observations with government support. The vast majority (126 observations) are interventions by democratic third parties supporting non-democratic civil war governments.

I estimate four separate models for the various measures of political distance (Table 2).² The results offer consistent and robust support for Hypothesis 1. With government support being the base category, the coefficient for the various political distance measures are all positive and highly statistically significant. The further apart the civil war country and a potential intervener are, the more likely the third party is to support the rebels instead of the government. I find less support for Hypothesis 2, which states that when countries are further apart, third parties are more likely to stay out than support the government. Both the Polity2 and Polyarchy models show the opposite relationship: as *p2dist* and *polydist* increase, so does the likelihood of supporting the government go up relative to staying out, and vice-versa. One potential explanation for this result, as discussed above, is the cluster of observations with democratic third parties intervening on the side of non-democratic governments. However, both the Liberal and LibDem models, which lean more on the ideological dimension of domestic politics, produce results consistent with Hypothesis 2. While my theoretical argument does not distinguish between institutions and ideology, it is possible that the latter puts greater constraints on foreign

²For complete regression results, including covariate coefficients, see the appendix.

policy-making due to public opinion, or it can simply be a function of the spatial distribution of highly liberal societies relative to the distribution of civil war countries, which is only partially accounted for by the minimum distance covariate.

Table 2: Predicting intervention as a function of political distance between a civil war country and a potential third-party state (base category is government support).

<i>Dependent variable:</i>								
	Polity2		Polyarchy		Liberal		LibDem	
	No int.	Reb. support	No int.	Reb. support	No int.	Reb. support	No int.	Reb. support
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
p2dist	-0.169*** (0.00003)	0.363*** (0.00002)						
polydist			-0.059*** (0.00003)	1.843*** (0.00001)				
libdist					1.001*** (0.00003)	0.836*** (0.00002)		
libdemdist							0.725*** (0.00002)	2.056*** (0.00001)
Constant	12.820*** (0.0001)	7.548*** (0.0001)	13.891*** (0.0001)	8.298*** (0.0001)	14.017*** (0.0001)	8.482*** (0.0001)	14.104*** (0.0001)	8.021*** (0.0001)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,832.737	3,832.737	3,823.427	3,823.427	3,900.976	3,900.976	3,832.709	3,832.709

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The results for the policy disagreement models are mixed, and unexpected (Table 3). I expected policy disagreements to be less consistent predictors of intervention, but that is only partially the case. Disagreement about financial openness is positively correlated with staying out and supporting the rebels relative to supporting the government, and the coefficients are statistically significant. Both results are in line with my expectations from Hypotheses 1 and 2. As civil war countries and potential interveners become more dissimilar in terms of economic policy, third parties become more likely to either support the rebels or stay out instead of supporting the government in a civil war. The results imply that countries with open economies are unlikely to support governments with closed economies fighting a civil war. One explanation could be that rebel support offers a better chance of economic reform and the potential for increased trade and foreign direct investment between the two states.

Foreign policy similarity, however, does not predict intervention in line with my expectations. In the Kappa model, the coefficients for *kappavv* are negative and statistically significant for both outcomes; the more dissimilar two countries' foreign policy positions are, the more likely the third party is to support the government relative to staying out and supporting the rebels. The results are hard to explain. The model could be picking up features of the Cold War where democratic countries such as the United States supported authoritarian regimes against communist or socialist groups, in which case there would not be a lot of foreign policy similarity between the two states.

The results presented here consistent and robust support for Hypothesis 1, but the results are more mixed for Hypothesis 2. The models have identified a clear positive relationship between political distance and the likelihood of rebel support relative to government support. However, only models with the more ideological measures of political distance produce results

Table 3: Predicting intervention as a function of disagreement between a civil war country and a potential third-party state (base category is government support).

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Openness		Kappa	
	No int. (1)	Reb. support (2)	No int. (3)	Reb. support (4)
opendist	0.181*** (0.0001)	0.007*** (0.0001)		
kappavv			-0.672*** (0.00003)	-1.792*** (0.00002)
Constant	13.875*** (0.0001)	9.870*** (0.0001)	13.001*** (0.0001)	6.635*** (0.0001)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,810.436	2,810.436	3,629.473	3,629.473
<i>Note:</i>			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

in line with Hypothesis 2: third parties should be more likely to stay out than support the government if distance is great. Curiously, the model of financial openness yield results in line with my predictions, and the model appears to be a better fit for the data than the political distance models. The Akaike information criterion estimate of the openness model is substantially lower than the other models, suggesting that disagreement over economic policy is a better predictor of intervention.

4.1 Predictive models

To evaluate the relative importance of my explanatory variables, I use the same intervention data to train classification models using machine learning methods. Furthermore, because multicollinearity does not affect predictive power, I add in additional monadic and dyadic co-


variates. As a first cut at the problem, I start by building and pruning a decision tree using the RHS variables from the Polity2 model. I partition the dataset into training ($n = 10,000$) and test sets ($n = 16,202$)

The tree has misclassification error rate of 0.022, which is deceptively small. When I validate the tree against my test test, I find a high classification error rate on instances of intervention; the tree produces a substantial amount of false negatives, failing to predict 345 instances of intervention. 61 are false positives, whereas 27 are correctly predicted government-sided interventions, and 7 are actual rebel-sided interventions predicted as government-sided interventions. The tree fails to predict any rebel-sided interventions correctly. Pruning the tree improves prediction somewhat, correctly predicting 38 government-sided interventions and 7 rebel-sided interventions. In terms of variable importance, minimum distance, ongoing rivalry, and whether the potential intervener is a major power are three of the most important for prediction.

Next, I train a classification model of intervention on the data using the random forest methods, increasing the number of covariates to 74, including all of the explanatory variables from the multinomial logit models. There are several limitations in the data that pose problems for building a predictive model. Because interventions are rare events, there is a strong class imbalance between non-interventions and interventions (either government-sided or rebel-sided). I iterate through several models to find the specifications that produce the lowest classification error rates. Additionally, numerous covariates have missing data not missing at random. I therefore impute missing data using random forest-methods.

For the first model, I start by partitioning the original data again, with 70% ($n = 18339$) in the train set and the remainder in the test set. I impute missing data separately for both sets,

Figure 2: Pruned decision tree.




using all RHS variables, and then train the model with 500 trees and 30 variables at each split (fewer variables produce higher error rates).

The random forest model with imputation does not perform well. The overall out-of-bag estimate of the error rate is 2.16%, but the class error rates for intervention are much higher—86.23% and 95.45% for government- and rebel-sided intervention, respectively. The model also performs poorly at predicting actual instances of intervention. It correctly predicts 8 out of 113 government-sided interventions in the test set, and only 3 out of 56 rebel-sided interventions. As such, the resulting variable importance statistics should be taken with a huge heaping of salt.

The single-most important variable for predicting intervention is whether the dyad is politically relevant (i.e., contiguous neighbors or at least one member being a major power) (Figure 3), followed by whether the two governments share political ties (*PSTID*). Minimum distance (*mindist*) and the two Kappa variables (*kappava* and *kappavv*) are also associated with high

mean decrease in accuracy and Gini purity. In terms of the explanatory variables, three of the four variables (*libdist*, *libdemdist*, and *polydist*) for political distance score in the top quartile of Gini importance, though less so in terms of mean decrease in accuracy.³ Financial openness is estimated to be less important in terms of Gini impurity than the three measures of political distance. As such, political distance is important for predicting intervention, but the performance of the predictive model means we should treat these results with caution.


Figure 3: Variable importance for random forest model with imputation.



³One explanation for the difference in results between accuracy and Gini importance could be that if several variables are highly correlated, the accuracy can give some of them less importance if one is given high importance. The political distance variables are all highly correlated, and only *libdist* is given high importance in terms of mean decrease in accuracy.

Because of the class imbalance in the data, I also train a model on the entire dataset to see if that improves the OOB estimated class error rates. I train the model on 500 trees and 30 variables at each split, but I do not perform random-forest imputation on the missing data. Instead, I use the “rough fix” option in the randomForest package, which replaces missing values with the column medians for numeric variables and the most frequent level for factor variables.

Figure 4: Variable importance for random forest model trained on whole dataset.



The larger training set does improve model performance, with an overall OOB error rate of 2.1%. For the specific outcomes, the OOB error rates drop to 79.43% and 87.77% for government- and rebel-sided intervention, respectively. This model also yields different estimates of model

importance (Figure 4). Minimum distance is now the most important variable, across both importance estimates, while the Kappa variables remain important as well. Similar to the previous model, three of the political distance variables remain important, more so than financial openness.

There are two takeaways from the learning models. First, the results suggest that political distance is an important predictor of intervention. The three of the four variables perform better than the financial openness variable, which is important for evaluating the relative importance of political distance versus policy disagreement. Foreign policy similarity is more important than most of the distance measures, but the regression results are inconsistent with my theory, and so its role in understanding intervention is left unclear. Second, predicting intervention is hard. The random forest models do not perform well, and there might be several reasons why. 74 covariates is not a large set for a predictive model, and we are also dealing with the problem of predicting rare events.

5 Conclusion

This paper has sought to explain interventions into civil wars through the prism of political order: third parties intervene either to maintain or remake the political status quo of a civil war country. They decide whether to intervene and whom to support depending on how similar (or dissimilar) the two states are. When the two are politically close, the third party will prefer to support the government over the rebels in order to preserve the status quo. When they are dissimilar, the third party prefers to support the rebels in order to remake the status quo.

I estimated a series of statistical models of intervention with different measures of political

distance and policy disagreement. I found consistent and robust support for my argument, particularly for measures of political distance that capture ideological (dis)similarity. As the political distance between civil war countries and potential interveners increase, third parties become more likely to support the rebels or stay out rather than support the government. I also find that (dis)agreement on financial openness predicts intervention in line with my theoretical expectations, whereas foreign policy similarity does not.

To assess whether my explanatory variables are also important for predicting intervention, I train several models using random forest methods. The results indicate that several measures of political distance are important predictors. However, the model overall performs poorly in predicting these rare events.

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6 Appendix

Table 4: Intervention and political distance (Polity2)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	No intervention	Rebel support	No intervention	Rebel support
p2dist	−0.328*** (0.015)	0.524*** (0.007)	−0.169*** (0.00003)	0.363*** (0.00002)
polity21	1.663*** (0.014)	1.088*** (0.008)	1.959*** (0.00005)	0.733*** (0.00002)
polity22	−0.354*** (0.016)	−1.722*** (0.005)	0.086*** (0.00005)	−1.014*** (0.00003)
mindist	0.0002*** (0.00001)	−0.0002*** (0.00003)	0.0002*** (0.00002)	−0.0002*** (0.00005)
ongoingrivalry	−0.802*** (0.007)	1.885*** (0.006)	−0.724*** (0.00004)	2.307*** (0.00004)
cowmaj1	−0.420*** (0.003)	−2.405*** (0.0002)	7.912*** (0.00001)	−3.334*** (0.00000)
cowmaj2	−2.286*** (0.008)	−0.971*** (0.002)	−1.207*** (0.00002)	−0.207*** (0.00000)
wbgdp2011est1			−2.154*** (0.001)	−0.552*** (0.002)
wbgdp2011est2			−1.988*** (0.001)	2.277*** (0.002)
wbpopest1			1.897*** (0.001)	0.170*** (0.002)
wbpopest2			1.754*** (0.001)	−2.171*** (0.002)
wbgdppc2011est1			2.344*** (0.001)	0.543*** (0.001)
wbgdppc2011est2			1.583*** (0.001)	−2.685*** (0.001)
upop_mc_1			0.0001*** (0.00000)	0.00004*** (0.00000)
upop_mc_2			0.00001*** (0.00000)	−0.00004*** (0.00000)
cinc_mc_1			−140.353*** (0.00000)	−8.999*** (0.00000)
cinc_mc_2			−11.082*** (0.00000)	20.208*** (0.00000)
growth_wdi_1			0.024*** (0.008)	0.063*** (0.002)
growth_wdi_2			−0.009 (0.007)	−0.025*** (0.003)
acdcwyear			−0.070*** (0.00001)	0.393*** (0.00003)
acdiwyear			−0.521*** (0.00001)	−1.243*** (0.00000)
Constant	3.240*** (0.033)	−0.074*** (0.016)	12.820*** (0.0001)	7.548*** (0.0001)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	5,121.064	5,121.064	3,832.737	3,832.737

Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 5: Intervention and political distance (Polyarchy)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	No intervention	Rebel support	No intervention	Rebel support
polydist	−0.378*** (0.013)	1.805*** (0.005)	−0.059*** (0.00003)	1.843*** (0.00001)
v2x_polyarchy1	2.053*** (0.011)	−0.105*** (0.006)	2.799*** (0.00002)	0.130*** (0.00002)
v2x_polyarchy2	−0.450*** (0.015)	−3.563*** (0.004)	−0.086*** (0.00004)	−2.659*** (0.00002)
mindist	0.0002*** (0.00001)	−0.0001*** (0.00003)	0.0002*** (0.00002)	−0.0002*** (0.00005)
ongoingrivalry	−0.839*** (0.008)	1.773*** (0.007)	−0.699*** (0.00004)	2.230*** (0.00004)
cowmaj1	−0.295*** (0.004)	−2.215*** (0.0003)	7.609*** (0.00001)	−3.579*** (0.00000)
cowmaj2	−2.244*** (0.010)	−0.920*** (0.002)	−1.131*** (0.00002)	0.014*** (0.00000)
wbgdp2011est1			−2.883*** (0.001)	−0.465*** (0.002)
wbgdp2011est2			−2.028*** (0.001)	1.008*** (0.002)
wbpopest1			2.608*** (0.001)	0.035*** (0.002)
wbpopest2			1.773*** (0.001)	−0.882*** (0.002)
wbgdppc2011est1			2.994*** (0.001)	0.434*** (0.001)
wbgdppc2011est2			1.644*** (0.001)	−1.395*** (0.001)
upop_mc_1			0.0001*** (0.00000)	0.00004*** (0.00000)
upop_mc_2			0.00001*** (0.00000)	−0.00004*** (0.00000)
cinc_mc_1			−137.665*** (0.00000)	−7.800*** (0.00000)
cinc_mc_2			−10.821*** (0.00000)	18.150*** (0.00000)
growth_wdi_1			0.026*** (0.008)	0.066*** (0.002)
growth_wdi_2			−0.009 (0.007)	−0.027*** (0.003)
acdcyear			−0.091*** (0.00001)	0.231*** (0.00003)
acdiyear			−0.480*** (0.00001)	−1.286*** (0.00000)
Constant	3.302*** (0.040)	0.421*** (0.019)	13.891*** (0.0001)	8.298*** (0.0001)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	5,122.127	5,122.127	3,823.427	3,823.427

Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 6: Intervention and political distance (Liberal)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	No intervention	Rebel support	No intervention	Rebel support
libdist	0.623*** (0.012)	1.709*** (0.005)	1.001*** (0.00003)	0.836*** (0.00002)
v2x_liberal1	1.556*** (0.013)	0.623*** (0.007)	1.903*** (0.00002)	0.583*** (0.00002)
v2x_liberal2	-0.906*** (0.017)	-2.886*** (0.006)	-0.512*** (0.00004)	-1.333*** (0.00003)
mindist	0.0002*** (0.00001)	-0.0002*** (0.00003)	0.0002*** (0.00002)	-0.0002*** (0.00005)
ongoingrivalry	-0.865*** (0.007)	1.846*** (0.007)	-0.866*** (0.00003)	2.144*** (0.00004)
cowmaj1	-0.102*** (0.003)	-2.159*** (0.0003)	7.709*** (0.00001)	-3.915*** (0.00000)
cowmaj2	-2.352*** (0.009)	-1.180*** (0.002)	-1.260*** (0.00002)	-0.453*** (0.00000)
wbgdp2011est1			-3.499*** (0.001)	-0.332*** (0.002)
wbgdp2011est2			-0.547*** (0.001)	0.500*** (0.002)
wbpopest1			3.238*** (0.001)	-0.079*** (0.002)
wbpopest2			0.287*** (0.001)	-0.395*** (0.002)
wbgdppc2011est1			3.604*** (0.001)	0.319*** (0.001)
wbgdppc2011est2			0.131*** (0.001)	-0.945*** (0.001)
upop_mc_1			0.0001*** (0.00000)	0.00004*** (0.00000)
upop_mc_2			0.00001*** (0.00000)	-0.00004*** (0.00000)
cinc_mc_1			-132.834*** (0.00000)	-3.166*** (0.00000)
cinc_mc_2			-10.522*** (0.00000)	23.122*** (0.00000)
growth_wdi_1			0.026*** (0.007)	0.061*** (0.002)
growth_wdi_2			-0.009 (0.006)	-0.022*** (0.003)
acdcwyear			-0.071*** (0.00001)	0.285*** (0.00003)
acdiwyear			-0.496*** (0.00001)	-1.208*** (0.00000)
Constant	3.307*** (0.035)	0.309*** (0.017)	14.017*** (0.0001)	8.482*** (0.0001)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	5,211.512	5,211.512	3,900.976	3,900.976

Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 7: Intervention and political distance (Liberal democracy)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	No intervention	Rebel support	No intervention	Rebel support
libdemdist	0.513*** (0.012)	3.922*** (0.005)	0.725*** (0.00002)	2.056*** (0.00001)
v2x_libdem1	1.392*** (0.008)	-1.534*** (0.004)	2.695*** (0.00001)	-0.164*** (0.00001)
v2x_libdem2	-1.085*** (0.013)	-5.372*** (0.003)	-0.683*** (0.00003)	-2.797*** (0.00002)
mindist	0.0002*** (0.00001)	-0.0001*** (0.00003)	0.0002*** (0.00002)	-0.0002*** (0.00005)
ongoingrivalry	-0.907*** (0.009)	1.706*** (0.008)	-0.799*** (0.00004)	2.185*** (0.00004)
cowmaj1	-0.105*** (0.004)	-2.113*** (0.0003)	7.832*** (0.00001)	-4.399*** (0.00000)
cowmaj2	-2.235*** (0.011)	-1.019*** (0.003)	-1.155*** (0.00002)	-0.115*** (0.00000)
wbgdp2011est1			-3.039*** (0.001)	-0.667*** (0.002)
wbgdp2011est2			-6.210*** (0.001)	4.696*** (0.002)
wbpopest1			2.749*** (0.001)	0.229*** (0.002)
wbpopest2			5.961*** (0.001)	-4.582*** (0.002)
wbgdppc2011est1			3.159*** (0.001)	0.671*** (0.001)
wbgdppc2011est2			5.836*** (0.001)	-5.066*** (0.001)
upop_mc_1			0.0001*** (0.00000)	0.00004*** (0.00000)
upop_mc_2			0.00001*** (0.00000)	-0.00004*** (0.00000)
cinc_mc_1			-141.226*** (0.00000)	-1.408*** (0.00000)
cinc_mc_2			-11.055*** (0.00000)	20.268*** (0.00000)
growth_wdi_1			0.026*** (0.007)	0.064*** (0.002)
growth_wdi_2			-0.009 (0.007)	-0.024*** (0.002)
acdcwyear			-0.094*** (0.00001)	0.238*** (0.00003)
acdiwyear			-0.494*** (0.00001)	-1.244*** (0.00000)
Constant	3.522*** (0.043)	0.398*** (0.021)	14.104*** (0.0001)	8.021*** (0.0001)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	5,139.004	5,139.004	3,832.709	3,832.709

Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 8: Intervention and policy disagreement (Financial openness)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	No intervention	Rebel support	No intervention	Rebel support
opendist	0.085** (0.039)	-0.050 (0.059)	0.181*** (0.0001)	0.007*** (0.0001)
kaopen1	-0.111** (0.043)	0.079* (0.043)	0.402*** (0.0004)	0.649*** (0.0001)
kaopen2	-0.190*** (0.040)	-0.157*** (0.055)	-0.088*** (0.0001)	-0.077*** (0.0001)
mindist	0.0002*** (0.00002)	-0.0004*** (0.0001)	0.0002*** (0.00002)	-0.0003*** (0.0001)
ongoingrivalry	-1.017*** (0.014)	1.488*** (0.017)	-0.665*** (0.00005)	2.172*** (0.0001)
cowmaj1	-0.743*** (0.004)	-2.369*** (0.0004)	5.839*** (0.00002)	-3.730*** (0.00000)
cowmaj2	-2.379*** (0.007)	-1.217*** (0.002)	-1.048*** (0.00003)	-0.024*** (0.00000)
wbgdp2011est1			-2.365*** (0.002)	-0.554*** (0.003)
wbgdp2011est2			2.690*** (0.002)	-0.996*** (0.003)
wbpopest1			2.231*** (0.001)	0.365*** (0.002)
wbpopest2			-2.959*** (0.001)	0.964*** (0.002)
wbgdppc2011est1			2.327*** (0.001)	0.138*** (0.001)
wbgdppc2011est2			-3.139*** (0.001)	0.630*** (0.001)
upop_mc_1			0.0001*** (0.00000)	0.00002*** (0.00000)
upop_mc_2			0.00001*** (0.00000)	-0.00002*** (0.00001)
cinc_mc_1			-115.392*** (0.00000)	2.957*** (0.00000)
cinc_mc_2			-15.273*** (0.00000)	14.241*** (0.00000)
growth_wdi_1			0.088*** (0.010)	0.113*** (0.002)
growth_wdi_2			0.001 (0.008)	-0.027*** (0.004)
acdcwyear			-0.075*** (0.00002)	0.301*** (0.00004)
acdiwyear			-0.627*** (0.00001)	-1.237*** (0.00000)
Constant	3.176*** (0.016)	0.041 (0.033)	13.875*** (0.0001)	9.870*** (0.0001)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,632.557	3,632.557	2,810.436	2,810.436

Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Table 9: Intervention and policy disagreement (Foreign policy positions)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	No intervention	Rebel support	No intervention	Rebel support
kappavv	−0.120*** (0.009)	−1.288*** (0.004)	−0.672*** (0.00003)	−1.792*** (0.00002)
v2x_polyarchy1	1.959*** (0.012)	1.216*** (0.006)	2.690*** (0.00004)	0.682*** (0.00002)
v2x_polyarchy2	−0.840*** (0.015)	−2.780*** (0.004)	−0.382*** (0.00004)	−1.801*** (0.00002)
mindist	0.0002*** (0.00001)	−0.0002*** (0.00003)	0.0002*** (0.00002)	−0.0002*** (0.00005)
ongoingrivalry	−0.884*** (0.009)	1.766*** (0.008)	−0.686*** (0.00004)	2.254*** (0.00004)
cowmaj1	−0.230*** (0.004)	−2.227*** (0.0003)	8.270*** (0.00001)	−4.100*** (0.00000)
cowmaj2	−2.243*** (0.010)	−0.946*** (0.003)	−1.132*** (0.00002)	−0.293*** (0.00000)
wbgdp2011est1			−3.049*** (0.001)	−0.133*** (0.002)
wbgdp2011est2			3.871*** (0.001)	−1.534*** (0.002)
wbpopest1			2.815*** (0.001)	−0.256*** (0.002)
wbpopest2			−4.109*** (0.001)	1.683*** (0.002)
wbgdppc2011est1			3.182*** (0.001)	0.147*** (0.001)
wbgdppc2011est2			−4.258*** (0.001)	1.212*** (0.001)
upop_mc_1			0.0001*** (0.00000)	0.00004*** (0.00000)
upop_mc_2			0.00001*** (0.00000)	−0.00003*** (0.00000)
cinc_mc_1			−145.243*** (0.00000)	−6.728*** (0.00000)
cinc_mc_2			−11.745*** (0.00000)	15.132*** (0.00000)
growth_wdi_1			0.035*** (0.008)	0.087*** (0.002)
growth_wdi_2			−0.008 (0.007)	−0.018*** (0.003)
acdcwyear			−0.090*** (0.00001)	0.164*** (0.00003)
acdiwyear			−0.511*** (0.00002)	−1.157*** (0.00000)
Constant	3.330*** (0.043)	0.594*** (0.020)	13.001*** (0.0001)	6.635*** (0.0001)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	4,770.426	4,770.426	3,629.473	3,629.473

Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01