

# COMPUTER SECURITY

## CS 419

USER AUTHENTICATION

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# READINGS FOR THIS LECTURE

- Wikipedia
  - [Password](#)
  - [Password strength](#)
  - [Salt \(cryptography\)](#)
  - [Password cracking](#)
  - [Trusted path](#)
  - [One time password](#)

# THREE A'S OF INFORMATION SECURITY

- Security is about differentiating among authorized accesses and unauthorized accesses
  - Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability all require this
- Authentication
  - Figures out who is accessing
- Access control
  - Ensure only authorized access are allowed
- Auditing
  - Record what is happening, to identify attacks later and recover

# AUTHENTICATION & ACCESS CONTROL ACCORDING TO WIKIPEDIA

- **Authentication** is the act of establishing or confirming something (or someone) as *authentic*, that is, that **claims made by or about the subject are true**. This might involve **confirming the identity of a person**, tracing the origins of an artifact, ensuring that a product is what its packaging and labeling claims to be, or **assuring that a computer program is a trusted one**.
- **Access control** is a system which enables an authority to control access to areas and resources in a given physical facility or computer-based information system.

# USER AUTHENTICATION

- Using a method to validate users who attempt to access a computer system or resources, to ensure they are authorized
- Types of user authentication
  - **Something you know**
    - E.g., user account names and passwords
  - **Something you have**
    - Smart cards or other security tokens
  - **Something you are**
    - Biometrics




# VARIANTS OF PASSWORDS

- Password
- Passphrase
  - a sequence of words or other text used for similar purpose as password
- Passcode
- Personal identification number (PIN)

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# SCENARIOS REQUIRING USER AUTHENTICATION

- Scenarios
  - Logging into a local computer
  - Logging into a computer remotely
  - Logging into a network
  - Access web sites
- Vulnerabilities can exist at client side, server side, or communications channel.



# THREATS TO PASSWORDS

- Eavesdropping (insecure channel between client and server)
- Login spoofing (human errors), shoulder surfing, keyloggers
- Offline dictionary attacks
- Social engineering (human errors)
  - e.g., pretexting: creating and using an invented scenario (the pretext) to persuade a target to release information or perform an action and is usually done over the telephone
- Online guessing (weak passwords)



# GUESSING ATTACKS: TWO FACTORS FOR PASSWORD STRENGTH

- The average number of guesses the attacker must make to find the correct password
  - determined by how unpredictable the password is, including how long the password is, what set of symbols it is drawn from, and how it is created.
- The ease with which an attacker can check the validity of a guessed password
  - determined by how the password is stored, how the checking is done, and any limitation on trying passwords

# PASSWORD ENTROPY

- The entropy bits of a password, i.e., the information entropy of a password, measured in bits, is
  - The base-2 logarithm of the number of guesses needed to find the password with certainty
  - A password with, say, 42 bits of strength calculated in this way would be as strong as a string of 42 bits chosen randomly.
  - Adding one bit of entropy to a password doubles the number of guesses required.
  - On average, an attacker will have to try half the possible passwords before finding the correct one
- Aka. Guess entropy

# ESTIMATING PASSWORD ENTROPY

- People are notoriously remiss at achieving sufficient entropy to produce satisfactory passwords.
- NIST **suggests** the following scheme to **estimate** the entropy of human-generated passwords:
  - the entropy of the first character is four bits;
  - the entropy of the next seven characters are two bits per character;
  - the ninth through the twentieth character has 1.5 bits of entropy per character;
  - characters 21 and above have one bit of entropy per character.
- This would imply that an eight-character human-selected password has about 18 bits of entropy.

# TOWARDS BETTER MEASUREMENT OF PASSWORD ENTROPY

- NIST suggestion fails to consider usage of different category of characters:
  - Lower-case letters, digits, upper-case letters, special symbols
- Orders also matter:
  - “Password123!” should have different entropy from “ao3swPd!2s1r”
- State of art is to use Markov chains to model probability of different strings as passwords
  - May rank “yqzjx” as very secure
- Fundamental challenge: there are different attack strategies out there

## EXAMPLE OF WEAK PASSWORDS (FROM WIKIPEDIA)

- Default passwords (as supplied by the system vendor and meant to be changed at installation time): *password*, *default*, *admin*, *guest*, etc.
- Dictionary words: *chameleon*, *RedSox*, *sandbags*, *bunnyhop!*, *IntenseCrabtree*, etc.
- Words with numbers appended: *password1*, *deer2000*, *john1234*, etc.,
- Words with simple obfuscation: *p@ssw0rd*, *l33th4x0r*, *g0ldf1sh*, etc.
- Doubled words: *crabcrab*, *stopstop*, *treetree*, *passpass*, etc., can be easily tested automatically.



## EXAMPLE OF WEAK PASSWORDS (FROM WIKIPEDIA)

- Common sequences from a keyboard row: *qwerty*, *12345*, *asdfgh*, *fred*, etc.
- Numeric sequences based on well known numbers such as 911, 314159, or 27182, etc.,
- Identifiers: *jsmith123*, *1/1/1970*, *555-1234*, "your username", etc.,
- Anything personally related to an individual: license plate number, Social Security number, current or past telephone number, student ID, address, birthday, sports team, relative's or pet's names/nicknames/birthdays, etc.,
  - can easily be tested automatically after a simple investigation of person's details.

# MECHANISMS TO AVOID WEAK PASSWORDS

- Allow long passphrases
- Randomly generate passwords where appropriate
  - Though probably inappropriate for most scenarios
- Check the quality of user-selected passwords
  - use a number of rules of thumb
  - run dictionary attack tools
- Give user suggestions/guidelines in choosing passwords
  - e.g., think of a sentence and select letters from it, “It’s 12 noon and I am hungry” => “I’S12&IAH”
  - Using both letter, numbers, and special characters

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# BALANCING PASSWORD ENTROPY & USABILITY CONCERNS

- Forcing randomly generated passwords is often bad.
  - A user needs to remember passwords for tens, if not hundreds of accounts
  - High entropy passwords are difficult to remember
- Often times, guessing passwords is not the weakest link
  - One can use various ways to reduce adversary's abilities to test password guesses
  - When a user cannot remember the password for an account, there must be a way to allow a user to retrieve it.
    - The recovering method either has low security, or costs lots of money
    - It creates a weaker link.
- **Usability matters**

# STORING PASSWORDS (UNIX CASE STUDY)

- Old UNIX
  - The file `/etc/passwd` stores  $H(\text{password})$  together with each user's login name, user id, home directory, login shell, etc.
    - $H$  is essentially a one-way hash function
  - The file `/etc/passwd` must be world readable
  - Brute force attacks possible even if  $H$  is one-way
    - how to most effectively brute-force when trying to obtain password of any account on a system with many accounts?

# PASSWORD SALTS

- More modern UNIX
  - Divide /etc/passwd into two files: /etc/passwd; and /etc/shadow (readable only by root)
- Store  $[r, H(\text{password}, r)]$  rather than  $H(\text{password})$  in /etc/shadow
  - $r$  is randomly chosen for each password
  - $r$  is public, similar to Initial Vector in CBC & CTR modes
- Benefits
  - dictionary attacks much more difficult
    - cost of attacking a single account remains the same
  - if two users happen to choose the same password, it doesn't immediately show



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# MECHANISMS TO DEFEND AGAINST DICTIONARY AND GUESSING ATTACKS

- Protect stored passwords (use both cryptography & access control)
- Disable accounts with multiple failed attempts
- Require extra authentication mechanism (e.g., phone, other email account, etc.)

# MECHANISMS TO DEFEND AGAINST LOGIN SPOOFING: TRUSTED PATH

- Login Spoofing Attacks:
  - write a program showing a login window on screen and record the passwords
  - put su in current directory
- Defense: Trusted Path
  - Mechanism that provides confidence that the user is communicating with the real intended server
    - attackers can't intercept or modify whatever information is being communicated.
    - defends attacks such as fake login programs
  - Example: Ctrl+Alt+Del for log in on Windows
    - Causes a non-maskable interrupt that can only be intercepted by the operating system, guaranteeing that the login window cannot be spoofed

# SPOOFING & DEFENSES ON THE WEB

- Phishing attacks
  - attempting to acquire sensitive information such as usernames, passwords and credit card details by masquerading as a trustworthy entity in electronic communication.
- Website forgery
  - Set up fake websites that look like e-commerce sites and trick users into visiting the sites and entering sensitive info
- Defense methods
  - Browser filtering of known phishing sites
  - Cryptographic authentication of servers (will talk about in future)
  - User-configured authentication of servers
    - Ensures that the site is the one the human user has in mind
    - E.g., site key, pre-selected picture/phrases

# KEYLOGGING

- Threats from insecure client side
- Keystroke logging (keylogging) is the action of tracking (or logging) the keys struck on a keyboard, typically in a covert manner so that the person using the keyboard is unaware that their actions are being monitored.
- Software -based
  - key-stroke events, grab web forms, analyze HTTP packets
- Hardware-based
  - Connector, wireless sniffers, acoustic based
- Defenses:
  - Anti-spyware, network monitors, on-screen soft keyboard, automatic form filler, etc.
- In general difficult to deal with once on the system

# USING PASSWORDS OVER INSECURE CHANNELS

- One-time passwords
  - Each password is used only once
  - Defend against passive adversaries who eavesdrop and later attempt to impersonate
- Challenge response
  - Send a response related to both the password and a challenge
- Zero knowledge proof of knowledge
  - Prove knowledge of a secret value, without leaking any info about the secret



# HOW TO DO ONE-TIME PASSWORD

- Shared lists of one-time passwords
- Time-synchronized OTP
  - E.g., use  $\text{MAC}_K(t)$ , where  $K$  is shared secret, and  $t$  is current time
- Using a hash chain (Lamport)
  - $h(s), h(h(s), h(h(h(s)))), \dots, h^{1000}(s)$
  - use these values as passwords in reverse order



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# LAMPORT'S ONE-TIME PASSWORD: USING A HASH CHAIN

- One-time setup:
  - A selects a value  $w$ , a hash function  $H()$ , and an integer  $t$ , computes  $w_0 = H^t(w)$  and sends  $w_0$  to B
  - B stores  $w_0$
- Protocol: to identify to B for the  $i^{\text{th}}$  time,  $1 \leq i \leq t$ 
  - A sends to B:  $A, i, w_i = H^{t-i}(w)$
  - B checks  $i = i_A, H(w_i) = w_{i-1}$
  - if both holds,  $i_A = i_A + 1$

# CHALLENGE-RESPONSE PROTOCOLS

- Goal: one entity authenticates to other entity proving the knowledge of a secret, 'challenge'
- Approach: Use time-variant parameters to prevent replay, interleaving attacks, provide uniqueness and timeliness
  - e.g., nonce (used only once), timestamps

# CHALLENGE-RESPONSE BASED ON SYMMETRIC-KEY CRYPTO

- Unilateral authentication, timestamp-based
  - A to B:  $\text{MAC}_K(t_A, B)$
- Unilateral authentication, nonce-based
  - B to A:  $r_B$
  - A to B:  $\text{MAC}_K(r_B, B)$
- Mutual authentication, nonce-based
  - B to A:  $r_B$
  - A to B:  $r_A, \text{MAC}_K(r_A, r_B, B)$
  - B to A:  $\text{MAC}_K(r_B, r_A)$

## OTHER DEFENSES

- Alternatives to passwords
  - graphical passwords
- Go beyond passwords
  - Security tokens
  - biometrics
  - 2-factor authentication
    - Uses two independent authentication methods
    - US Banks are required to use 2-factor authentication by end of 2006 for online banking
  - Out of band authentication: uses a channel other than the internet
    - E.g., phone



# OPEN PROBLEMS

- Alternatives to passwords?
  - The secret should be easy to remember, difficult to guess, and easy to enter into the system.
- Better ways to make user choose stronger passwords?
- Better ways to use other devices for authentication
- Effective 2-factored and/or out of band authentication for the Web
- Phishing defense

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# NEXT CLASS

- Web System Security