COMPUTER SECURITY CS419

PUBLIC KEY ENCRYPTION AND DIGITAL SIGNATURES

READINGS FOR THIS LECTURE

- Required: On Wikipedia
 - Public key cryptography
 - RSA
 - <u>Diffie-Hellman key exchange</u>
 - ElGamal encryption
- Required:
 - Differ & Hellman: "New Directions in Cryptography" IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, Nov 1976.

REVIEW OF SECRET KEY (SYMMETRIC) CRYPTOGRAPHY

- Confidentiality
 - stream ciphers (uses PRNG)
 - block ciphers with encryption modes
- Integrity
 - Cryptographic hash functions
 - Message authentication code (keyed hash functions)
- Limitation: sender and receiver must share the same key
 - Needs secure channel for key distribution
 - Impossible for two parties having no prior relationship
 - Needs many keys for n parties to communicate

CONCEPT OF PUBLIC KEY ENCRYPTION

- Each party has a pair (K, K⁻¹) of keys:
 - K is the public key, and used for encryption
 - K-1 is the private key, and used for decryption
 - Satisfies $\mathbf{D}_{K^{-1}}[\mathbf{E}_K[M]] = M$
- Knowing the public-key K, it is computationally infeasible to compute the private key K-1
 - How to check (K,K-1) is a pair?
 - Offers only computational security. Secure PK Encryption impossible when P=NP, as deriving K-1 from K is in NP.
- The public-key K may be made publicly available, e.g., in a publicly available directory
 - Many can encrypt, only one can decrypt
- Public-key systems aka asymmetric crypto systems


PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY EARLY HISTORY

- Proposed by Diffie and Hellman, documented in "New Directions in Cryptography" (1976)
 - 1. Public-key encryption schemes
 - 2. Key distribution systems
 - Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol
 - 3. Digital signature
- Public-key encryption was proposed in 1970 in a classified paper by James Ellis
 - paper made public in 1997 by the British Governmental Communications Headquarters
- Concept of digital signature is still originally due to Diffie & Hellman

PUBLIC KEY ENCRYPTION ALGORITHMS

- Almost all public-key encryption algorithms use either number theory and modular arithmetic, or elliptic curves
- RSA
 - based on the hardness of factoring large numbers
- El Gamal
 - Based on the hardness of solving discrete logarithm
 - Use the same idea as Diffie-Hellman key agreement

DIFFIE-HELLMAN KEY AGREEMENT PROTOCOL



Pick random, secret a

Compute and send ga mod p

 $K = (g^b \mod p)^a = g^{ab} \mod p$

Pick random, secret b

Compute and send gb mod p

 $K = (g^a \mod p)^b = g^{ab} \mod p$

DIFFIE-HELLMAN KEY AGREEMENT PROTOCOL

- Not a Public Key Encryption system, but can allow A and B to agree on a shared secret in a public channel (against passive, i.e., eavesdropping only adversaries)
- Setup: p prime and g generator of Z_p^* , p and g public.

DIFFIE-HELLMAN

• Example: Let p=11, g=2, then

a	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
g ^a	2	4	8	16	32	64	128	256	512	1024	2048
g ^a mod p	2	4	8	5	10	9	7	3	6	1	2

A chooses 4, B chooses 3, then shared secret is $(2^3)^4 = (2^4)^3 = 2^{12}$ = 4 (mod 11)

Adversaries sees 2^3 =8 and 2^4 =5, needs to solve one of 2^x =8 and 2^y =5 to figure out the shared secret.

THREE PROBLEMS BELIEVED TO BE HARD TO SOLVE

- Discrete Log (DLG) Problem: Given <g, h, p>, computes a such that g^a = h mod p.
- Computational Diffie Hellman (CDH) Problem: Given <g, g^a mod p, g^b mod p> (without a, b) compute g^{ab} mod p.
- Decision Diffie Hellman (DDH) Problem: distinguish (g^a, g^b, g^{ab}) from (g^a, g^b, g^c) , where a, b, c are randomly and independently chosen
- If one can solve the DL problem, one can solve the CDH problem. If one can solve CDH, one can solve DDH.

ASSUMPTIONS

- DDH Assumption: DDH is hard to solve.
- CDH Assumption: CDH is hard to solve.
- DLG Assumption: DLG is hard to solve
- DDH assumed difficult to solve for large p (e.g., at least 1024 bits).
- How Diffie-Hellman Fails in Practice
 - https://simons.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/docs/3477/dl.pdf

ELGAMAL ENCRYPTION

- Public key <g, p, h=g^a mod p>
- Private key is a
- To encrypt: chooses random b, computes $C=[g^b \mod p, g^{ab} * M \mod p]$.
 - Idea: for each M, sender and receiver establish a shared secret gab via the DH protocol. The value gab hides the message M by multiplying it.
- To decrypt $C=[c_1,c_2]$, computes M where
 - $((c_1^a \mod p) * M) \mod p = c_2$.
 - To find M for x * M mod p = c_2 , compute z s.t. x*z mod p = 1, and then M = C_2 *z mod p
- CDH assumption ensures M cannot be fully recovered.
- IND-CPA security requires DDH.

RSA ALGORITHM

- Invented in 1978 by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman
 - Published as R L Rivest, A Shamir, L Adleman, "On Digital Signatures and Public Key Cryptosystems", Communications of the ACM, vol 21 no 2, pp120-126, Feb 1978
- Security relies on the difficulty of factoring large composite numbers
- Essentially the same algorithm was discovered in 1973 by Clifford Cocks, who works for the British intelligence

RSA PUBLIC KEY CRYPTO SYSTEM

Key generation:

- 1. Select 2 large prime numbers of about the same size, p and q Typically each p, q has between 512 and 2048 bits
- 2. Compute n = pq, and $\Phi(n) = (q-1)(p-1)$
- 3. Select e, $1 < e < \Phi(n)$, s.t. $gcd(e, \Phi(n)) = 1$ Typically e=3 or e=65537
- 4. Compute d, $1 \le d \le \Phi(n)$ s.t. $ed \equiv 1 \mod \Phi(n)$ Knowing $\Phi(n)$, d easy to compute.

Public key: (e, n)

Private key: d

RSA DESCRIPTION (CONT.)

Encryption

```
Given a message M, 0 < M < n M \in Z_n - \{0\} use public key (e, n) compute C = M^e \mod n C \in Z_n - \{0\}
```

Decryption

Given a ciphertext C, use private key (d)

Compute $C^d \mod n = (M^e \mod n)^d \mod n = M^{ed} \mod n = M$

RSA EXAMPLE

- $p = 11, q = 7, n = 77, \Phi(n) = 60$
- d = 13, e = 37 (ed = 481; ed mod 60 = 1)
- Let M = 15. Then $C \equiv M^e \mod n$
 - $C \equiv 15^{37} \pmod{77} = 71$
- $M \equiv C^d \mod n$
 - $M \equiv 71^{13} \pmod{77} = 15$

RSA EXAMPLE 2

- Parameters:
 - p = 3, q = 5, n = pq = 15
 - $\Phi(n) = ?$
- Let e = 3, what is d?
- Given M=2, what is C?
- How to decrypt?

HARD PROBLEMS RSA SECURITY DEPENDS ON

Plaintext: M $C = M^e \mod (n=pq)$ Ciphertext: C

- 1. Factoring Problem: Given n=pq, compute p,q
- 2. Finding RSA Private Key: Given (n,e), compute d s.t. ed = 1 (mod $\Phi(n)$).
 - Known to be equivalent to Factoring problem.
 - Implication: cannot share n among multiple users
- 3. RSA Problem: From (n,e) and C, compute M s.t. C = Me
 - Aka computing the e'th root of C.
 - Can be solved if n can be factored

RSA SECURITY AND FACTORING

- Security depends on the difficulty of factoring n
 - Factor $n \Rightarrow$ compute $\Phi(n) \Rightarrow$ compute d from (e, n)
 - Knowing e, d such that ed = 1 (mod $\Phi(n)$) \Rightarrow factor n
- The length of n=pq reflects the strength
 - 700-bit n factored in 2007
 - 768 bit factored in 2009
- RSA encryption/decryption speed is quadratic in key length
- 1024 bit for minimal level of security today, minimal 2048 bits recommended for current usage
- Factoring is easy to break with quantum computers
- Recent progress on Discrete Logarithm may make factoring much faster

RSA ENCRYPTION & IND-CPA SECURITY

- The RSA assumption, which assumes that the RSA problem is hard to solve, ensures that the plaintext cannot be fully recovered.
- Plain RSA does not provide IND-CPA security.
 - For Public Key systems, the adversary has the public key, hence the initial training phase is unnecessary, as the adversary can encrypt any message he wants to.
 - How to break IND-CPA security?

REAL WORLD USAGE OF PUBLIC KEY ENCRYPTION

- Often used to encrypt a symmetric key
 - To encrypt a message M under an RSA public key (n,e), generate a new AES key K, compute $[K^e \mod n, AES-CBC_K(M)]$
- One often needs random padding.
 - Given M, chooses random r, and generates F(M,r), and then encrypts as F(M,r) e mod n
 - From F(M,r), one should be able to recover M
 - This provides randomized encryption

DIGITAL SIGNATURES: THE PROBLEM

- Consider the real-life example where a person pays by credit card and signs a bill; the seller verifies that the signature on the bill is the same with the signature on the card
- Contracts are valid if they are signed.
- Signatures provide non-repudiation.
 - ensuring that a party in a dispute cannot repudiate, or refute the validity of a statement or contract.
- Can we have a similar service in the electronic world?
 - Does Message Authentication Code provide non-repudiation? Why?

DIGITAL SIGNATURES

- Digital Signature: a data string which associates a message with some originating entity.
- Digital Signature Scheme:
 - a signing algorithm: takes a message and a (private) signing key, outputs a signature
 - a verification algorithm: takes a (public) verification key, a message, and a signature
- Provides:
 - Authentication, Data integrity, Non-Repudiation

DIGITAL SIGNATURES AND HASH

- Very often digital signatures are used with hash functions, hash of a message is signed, instead of the message.
- Hash function must be:
 - Pre-image resistant
 - Weak collision resistant
 - Strong collision resistant

RSA SIGNATURES

Key generation (as in RSA encryption):

- Select 2 large prime numbers of about the same size, p and q
- Compute n = pq, and $\Phi = (q 1)(p 1)$
- Select a random integer e, $1 < e < \Phi$, s.t. $gcd(e, \Phi) = 1$
- Compute d, $1 < d < \Phi$ s.t. $ed = 1 \mod \Phi$

Public key: (e, n)

Private key: d

used for verification used for generation

RSA SIGNATURES WITH HASH (CONT.)

Signing message M

- Verify 0 < M < n
- Compute $S = h(M)^d \mod n$

Verifying signature S

- Use public key (e, n)
- Compute $S^e \mod n = (h(M)^d \mod n)^e \mod n = h(M)$

NON-REPUDIATION

- Nonrepudiation is the assurance that someone cannot deny something.
 Typically, nonrepudiation refers to the ability to ensure that a party to a contract or a communication cannot deny the authenticity of their signature on a document or the sending of a message that they originated.
- Can one deny a signature one has made?
- Does email provide non-repudiation?

	Secret Key Setting	Public Key Setting
Secrecy / Confidentiality	Stream ciphers Block ciphers + encryption modes	Public key encryption: RSA, El Gamal, etc.
Authenticity / Integrity	Message Authentication Code	Digital Signatures: RSA, DSA, etc.

NEXT CLASS

User authentication