**LLAMA ZERO-SHOT**

On January 24, 2015[DTE], a severe grounding incident occurred at South Embankment Quay in Dartmouth Harbour, England. The Saint Christophe 1 fishing vessel ran aground due to inadequate knowledge of the berth's shallow bottom and subsequently flooded, becoming a constructive total loss[MGE].

The accident was caused by Saint Christophe's skipper who did not comprehend the South Embankment Quay berth, which lies in a steeply sloped bed of compacted mud and silt when it fell. The skippers were unaware that they had over the point at which downflooding would have started to occur, allowing water to close watertight openings before flooding its keel[MGE].

Saint Christophe 1 ground on the seabed for a further amounting from the bottom of the vessel was grounded and then past the downflooding would start to happen[MGE]. The flooding continued as the vessels flooded and rolled forward into deeper water that had its watertight openings not been secured, but it eventually became lost.[MGE]

The incident highlights the importance of adequate knowledge about the berth's shallow bottom by all parties involved when berthing a fishing vessel in Dartmouth Harbour. Skippers should receive clear instructions from the harbour authority before accepting berths at South Embankment Quay, and harbour authorities should take steps to inform skippers about potential risks associated with certain berths.

The incident also emphasizes the need for effective communication between vessel operators and the harbour authority. Vessel information was available to the harbourmaster but it was not relayed to the skippers. If this would have been done differently, the results might have avoided the grounding risk that had not only confirmed the existing risk was taken on a steeply sloped seabed due to information from the vessel's skippers of the risks of using the quayed.

This incident also highlights the importance of proper training for harbour authorities and skippers on berthing procedures and berth-specific risks. The failure of the harbourmaster to fully understand the risks associated with South Embankment Quay led to a severe accident. Proper training and knowledge of berth-specific risks would have prevented this accident.

**LLAMA ONE-SHOT**

On 25 March 2016, at approximately 21:30 hours[DTE], the fishing vessel Saint Christophe 1 ran aground at the South Embankment Quay berth in Dartmouth Harbour. The incident occurred when the vessel's crew failed to adequately assess the safe berthing times and heights of high and low water, as well as the minimum depth expected alongside the quay.

As a result of the grounding, Saint Christophe 1 suffered significant damage, including flooding and structural breaches. Despite efforts to prevent oil spillage[MGE], the vessel ultimately became a constructive total loss. The crew was evacuated safely by emergency services, but not before the vessel's watertight openings had been compromised, allowing water to flood in.

An investigation into the incident revealed that the skipper of Saint Christophe 1 had failed to fully understand the limitations of the berth at South Embankment Quay, including its steeply sloping bed and compacted mud and silt. The harbour authority's risk assessment for berthing at the quay had identified this as a potential hazard, but no procedures or method statements were in place to mitigate the risks.

The investigation also found that the skippers of Saint Christophe 1, Sagittaire, and Maranatha 2 were inadequately prepared for using UK south-coast harbours as ports of refuge during poor weather conditions. The crew's lack of experience and inadequate navigation skills contributed significantly to the accident[MGE].

In response to the incident, the Dartmouth Harbour and Navigation Authority has taken several actions. They have included information about the use of South Embankment Quay in their draft Moorings' Policy 2016-2020 and commenced a review of their existing risk assessments. The authority has also requested a Port Marine Safety Code health check from the Maritime and Coastguard Agency for 2017.

In light of this incident, it is recommended that mariners take extra precautions when navigating UK south-coast harbours during poor weather conditions. This includes ensuring they have up-to-date knowledge of safe berthing times and heights of high and low water, as well as adequate navigation skills and experience. Additionally, harbour authorities should prioritize the development and implementation of procedures and method statements to mitigate identified risks, such as those associated with South Embankment Quay[UGE].

Furthermore, it is essential that mariners familiarize themselves with relevant regulations and guidelines, including those related to carriage arrangements for ports of refuge. Regular training and exercises can help ensure that crews are adequately prepared to respond in emergency situations, reducing the risk of similar incidents occurring in the future.

**QWEN ZERO-SHOT**

On January 18, 2015[DTE], four[NNE] fishing boats—HMS Pegasus , HMS Rosa , HMS Stefania , and HMS Vela[NNE] —ran aground at South Embankment Quay in Dartmouth Harbor. The incident caused significant damage to the quay[MGE] and one of the boats, with extensive hull damage requiring repairs that lasted over 12 months[MGE].

The primary causes identified for the accident include poor tidal information provided by the harbor authority[MGE] and insufficient guidance on navigating the area.[MGE] Despite having access to daily tide times through the harbor website and guide, the crew did not receive warnings about the unusually high tide that evening[MGE]. Additionally, there was a lack of clear signage or markers indicating potential grounding risks[MGE] at South Embankment Quay.

Lessons learned from this incident emphasize the critical importance of timely and accurate information for mariners navigating coastal waters. Mariners should be provided with up-to-date tidal data and navigational warnings to avoid such accidents. The report recommends that harbor authorities enhance their communication strategies, ensuring that all relevant maritime stakeholders have access to necessary information before entering port.

To prevent future incidents, shipping companies and harbors are advised to implement robust safety protocols, including regular updates on water levels and potential hazards. Additionally, clear signage and improved navigation aids should be installed at critical locations like South Embankment Quay to mitigate the risk of grounding. Effective communication channels between mariners and harbor authorities must also be established to ensure timely alerts about changing conditions such as tides or weather. [UGE]

**QWEN ONE-SHOT**

The marine accident occurred on March 18, 2016[DTE], in Dartmouth Harbour, England, involving two fishing vessels, Saint Christophe 1 and Sagittaire. The incident unfolded as a result of the vessels grounding at South Embankment Quay during a falling tide.

Saint Christophe 1, which was allowed to approach close to the steeply sloping bed of compacted mud and silt, grounded heavily due to the decreasing water level. Despite efforts by Sagittaire and Maranatha 2 to assist Saint Christophe 1 in evacuating its crew and securing it to the quay, the vessel eventually flooded severely. The flooding was exacerbated by several factors: many of Saint Christophe 1's watertight openings had been disabled or left open, and the vessel rolled past the critical point where downflooding would occur.

The damages were significant; Saint Christophe 1 suffered extensive water ingress and ultimately became a constructive total loss. Both Sagittaire and Maranatha 2 sustained minor damage during the rescue operation. Additionally, there was a localized risk of pollution due to oil tanks and vent pipes on board Saint Christophe 1, though this was mitigated by swift deployment of floating booms and surface skimmers.

The accident can be attributed to several underlying issues. The Dartmouth Harbour and Navigation Authority (DHNA) failed to provide adequate guidance to the vessel operators regarding the limitations of South Embankment Quay during a falling tide. There were also no established harbour procedures or method statements in place to effectively implement control measures identified in the risk assessments for berthing at the quay[UGE].

Following the accident, emergency services and local authorities reacted promptly, ensuring that all crew members were safely rescued and minimizing the risk of pollution. The Dartmouth Harbour and Navigation Authority has since included information about South Embankment Quay in its draft Moorings Policy 2016-2020 and initiated a review of existing risk assessments.

Recommendations for future shipping include performing a Port Marine Safety Code health check on the Dartmouth Harbour and Navigation Authority's port operations. The DHNA should provide clear guidance to duty harbourmasters and river officers regarding the information needed from visiting vessels before allowing their entry into the harbor. Additionally, vessel owners are advised to ensure they have appropriate charts and publications onboard for ports of refuge in their operational area. [UGE]

These measures aim to enhance safety protocols, improve communication between harbor authorities and vessel operators, and prepare for unforeseen incidents more effectively.

**CHAT GPT ZERO-SHOT**

The report details the grounding and subsequent capsizing of the French fishing vessel Saint Christophe 1 and the listing incident involving Sagittaire on 9-10 March 2016 in Dartmouth Harbour. Both vessels, seeking refuge due to worsening weather, were berthed at Dartmouth’s South Embankment Quay, a location known to have insufficient depth at low tide and a steeply sloping seabed. Saint Christophe 1 listed heavily, grounded on the falling tide, and eventually capsized, while Sagittaire listed but was stabilized with chains before further damage occurred. Saint Christophe 1 was declared a constructive total loss, and although pollution risks were mitigated, some diesel leaked into the harbour.

The primary causes of the accident were inadequate communication between Dartmouth Harbour authorities and the visiting vessels, compounded by language barriers. The skippers were not informed of the tidal constraints and sloping seabed, nor did they inquire sufficiently about berth conditions. Additionally, Saint Christophe 1’s skipper failed to prepare adequately for the grounding, with many watertight openings disabled or left open, allowing flooding as the vessel rolled. The harbour authority did not fully implement risk control measures identified in its safety assessments, and the skippers lacked proper preparations for seeking refuge, including carrying relevant charts or understanding local conditions.

Key lessons include the critical importance of effective communication between port authorities and vessel skippers, particularly regarding berthing risks. Harbourmasters must ensure that skippers understand tidal constraints, seabed conditions, and berth limitations, especially when language barriers exist. Similarly, vessel operators must be better prepared for ports of refuge by carrying updated charts and confirming berth safety before entry. Ports should also ensure that risk assessments are accompanied by thorough procedures and staff training to mitigate identified hazards.

Precautionary measures for the future include improving port communication protocols, employing language translation resources as needed, and ensuring vessels have access to relevant nautical information. [OGE] These steps could prevent similar incidents and enhance overall maritime safety.

**CHAT GPT ONE-SHOT**

On 9 March 2016, the French-flagged demersal trawlers Saint Christophe 1 and Sagittaire grounded while berthed at South Embankment Quay in Dartmouth, England. The vessels had sought refuge in Dartmouth due to worsening weather conditions while fishing in Lyme Bay. The grounding occurred during the falling tide when Saint Christophe 1 and later Sagittaire settled on a steeply sloping bed of compacted mud and silt. While Sagittaire was stabilized with the help of chains secured to quayside bollards, Saint Christophe 1 suffered a severe list and capsized, resulting in significant flooding and extensive damage. The vessel became a constructive total loss. No injuries were reported, though minor pollution occurred when water entered Saint Christophe 1 through open hatches and portholes, contaminating the harbor with small amounts of diesel.

The accident unfolded as the skippers of Saint Christophe 1, Sagittaire, and a third trawler, Maranatha 2, sought shelter following adverse weather conditions. Initially denied entry to Brixham due to harbor congestion, the vessels were accepted into Dartmouth by the deputy harbourmaster (DHM) on the condition that they arrive before 1630. Upon arrival, Maranatha 2 and Sagittaire were moored at the Town Pontoon, while Saint Christophe 1 was berthed at South Embankment Quay. However, the DHM failed to confirm whether Saint Christophe 1 could safely take the ground at low tide on the sloping seabed, a key risk factor. Communication challenges, including language barriers between the French crews and the harbor staff, further hindered the exchange of critical safety information. Although a river officer attempted to warn Saint Christophe 1’s skipper about the risk of grounding, the warning was misunderstood.

The grounding was caused by several factors. Dartmouth Harbour and Navigation Authority (DHNA) had identified the risk of vessels grounding at South Embankment Quay in its safety management system (SMS) but had not implemented effective procedures to mitigate this hazard. The DHM and river officers did not ensure that the skippers fully understood the limitations of the berths, including tidal depth and the sloping seabed. Moreover, Saint Christophe 1’s crew did not take adequate precautions to secure the vessel against listing, such as using retaining lines or closing watertight openings. The vessel’s pre-existing starboard list and poorly maintained watertight integrity exacerbated the situation, leading to flooding as it capsized on the ebb tide. Sagittaire’s grounding occurred later when its skipper, unaware of the seabed conditions, decided to re-berth alongside Saint Christophe 1[UGE].

In response to the incident, the DHNA deployed pollution prevention equipment to contain the minor oil spill and mobilized its external pollution control contractors. Emergency rescue operations, coordinated by the local fire service and RNLI lifeboat, were swift, ensuring the safe evacuation of both crews. Following the accident, DHNA began reviewing its risk assessments and included more detailed guidance on South Embankment Quay in its draft Moorings Policy 2016-2020. The Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) was also requested to conduct a Port Marine Safety Code health check in 2017.

To prevent similar incidents, the DHNA must strengthen its procedures for providing visiting vessels with detailed safety information about berth limitations and tidal constraints. Duty harbourmasters and river officers should receive clear guidance on the information to exchange with non-local crews. The use of language translation services, such as the previously compiled list of local translators, should be reinstated to overcome communication barriers[MGE]. Additionally, vessel owners should ensure that skipp

ers are equipped with the necessary charts and tide tables for ports of refuge in their operational areas. Regular maintenance of watertight integrity on vessels is also critical to minimize the risk of flooding during emergencies[MGE]. By addressing these gaps, ports and vessel operators can improve safety and reduce the likelihood of future groundings.

**LLAMA FEW-SHOT**

The accident occurred on March 9, 2016, at approximately 2330 hours, involving the vessel Saint Christophe 1. The vessel was docked alongside the Dartmouth harbour office [MGE]when it capsized due to grounding. Fortunately, no injuries or fatalities were reported.

According to the incident report, the accident took place while the vessel was engaged in fishing activities. [MGE]The investigation revealed that a combination of factors contributed to the accident. Firstly, the tidal situation made berthing at the quay a hazardous activity, which was highlighted in the Dart Harbour Navigation Authority's risk assessment for commercial fishing. [MGE]Additionally, the lack of effective communication and guidance between the harbour authorities and visiting vessels may have played a role in the incident.

The investigation found that the vessel's crew had been warned about the risks associated with berthing at the quay, but it appears that they were not adequately prepared or equipped to handle the situation. Furthermore, the absence of effective emergency procedures and protocols may have delayed the response to the accident, potentially exacerbating the damage. [MGE]

In response to the incident, the Dart Harbour Navigation Authority has acknowledged the need for improvement in its safety management system (SMS) and risk assessments. The authority has requested a Port Marine Safety Code health check from the Maritime and Coastguard Agency and has reviewed its existing policies and procedures. [MGE]Specifically, they have asked that their duty harbourmasters and river officers provide guidance to visiting vessels on the necessary information to exchange before entering the harbour.

Based on this incident, several recommendations can be offered for future shipping:

The importance of effective communication and guidance between harbour authorities and visiting vessels should not be underestimated. The Dart Harbour Navigation Authority's risk assessments highlighted the risks associated with berthing at the quay, but it appears that these warnings were not adequately disseminated to the crew.

Additionally, the need for regular training and updates on emergency procedures and protocols cannot be overstated. The absence of effective emergency response plans may have contributed to the delay in responding to the accident, which could have resulted in greater damage or even loss of life. [UGE]

Finally, the maritime industry should prioritize the development of safer berthing technologies and infrastructure that can mitigate the risks associated with grounding. By investing in these technologies and implementing more stringent safety protocols, we can reduce the likelihood of such accidents occurring in the future. [MGE]

**QWEN FEW-SHOT**

On March 10, 2016 at 3:00 AM, [DTE]a serious marine casualty occurred involving the fishing vessel Saint Christophe 1 berthed alongside at Dartmouth in England. The incident resulted in the sinking of the vessel and some diesel fuel spillage into the harbor.

The accident unfolded as the tide began to fall, causing the vessel to ground on a steeply sloping bed of compacted mud and silt. As a result, Saint Christophe 1 listed heavily, leading to its eventual sinking. The location of the oil tanks and vent pipes on board the vessel contributed to minimal diesel fuel loss into the harbor due to swift emergency response actions by port authorities.

Local fire service personnel and RNLI lifeboat crew quickly reacted to rescue the five-person crew aboard both Saint Christophe 1 and another fishing boat berthed alongside. The MCA staff promptly assessed the risk of pollution, deployed floating booms around the grounded vessel, and installed surface skimmers to remove small amounts of oil that escaped.

The primary cause of this incident was attributed to the vessel grounding on a steeply sloping seabed as the tide receded. This led to the heavy listing and subsequent sinking of Saint Christophe 1, despite the immediate actions taken by emergency responders to mitigate pollution risks. [UGE]

Following the accident, both the local fire service and RNLI lifeboat teams played crucial roles in ensuring crew safety. The swift response from MCA staff also minimized environmental damage through rapid deployment of containment measures.

To prevent future incidents, recommendations have been made for improved navigation procedures around low tide periods, particularly when berthing alongside quays with steep seabeds. Additionally, better training and awareness among fishing vessel operators regarding groundings and potential impacts should be reinforced to enhance overall maritime safety standards. [MGE]

**CHAT GPT FEW-SHOT**

On 9 March 2016, [DTE]the French demersal trawlers Saint Christophe 1 and Sagittaire grounded at Dartmouth, England, after seeking refuge due to worsening weather in Lyme Bay. The incident occurred at the South Embankment Quay, where both vessels were berthed by the Dartmouth Harbour and Navigation Authority (DHNA). The grounding took place during low tide, as the vessels listed heavily away from the quay on the sloping seabed. Saint Christophe 1 suffered catastrophic flooding[MGE] and became a constructive total loss, while Sagittaire was stabilized by its crew’s swift actions to secure the vessel with chains to the quay.

The accident unfolded after the skippers of the trawlers sought shelter from deteriorating weather conditions. Initially denied entry to Brixham due to a lack of space, the skippers contacted the Jobourg maritime operations center, which liaised with the DHNA for permission to berth in Dartmouth. The DHNA agreed to accommodate the vessels but did not sufficiently communicate the limitations of the South Embankment Quay, particularly that vessels at the berth would ground at low tide on a steeply sloping seabed. This critical information was not fully understood by the skippers, who were unfamiliar with Dartmouth and relied on limited tidal and harbor data. Despite attempts by harbor staff to convey this in hand gestures, the language barrier compounded the misunderstanding.

As the tide ebbed, Saint Christophe 1 grounded and listed heavily due to the uneven seabed [MGE]. The vessel’s watertight integrity was compromised as many doors and hatches were either disabled or left open, allowing water ingress when it rolled past its downflooding points. The crew, unable to arrest the vessel’s list, evacuated, leaving the vessel to flood further as the tide rose. Sagittaire, also grounded, avoided a similar fate through quick action by its crew, [MGE]who secured the vessel to the quay with chains to stabilize it. Emergency services, including the fire brigade and RNLI lifeboat, promptly rescued the crew of both vessels and deployed pollution prevention measures to minimize environmental impact.

The root causes of the accident included poor communication between the DHNA and the skippers regarding the berth’s limitations and the lack of adequate planning and preparation by the skippers for seeking refuge in UK ports. The DHNA failed to ensure that the skippers fully understood the tidal and seabed conditions, while the skippers did not make sufficient efforts to verify the safety of their berths or obtain detailed local tidal information. Furthermore, Saint Christophe 1’s compromised watertight integrity contributed significantly to its loss.

Following the accident, the DHNA reviewed its risk assessments and began revising its Moorings Policy to include detailed guidance on berth limitations. The authority also requested a Port Marine Safety Code health check from the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) to improve its operational safety standards. The MCA and emergency services collaborated effectively to prevent widespread pollution and ensure the safe rescue of the crews.

To prevent similar incidents in the future, it is recommended that harbor authorities ensure critical information about berths, including tidal constraints and seabed conditions, is clearly communicated to visiting vessels, particularly those unfamiliar with the port. Language barriers should be mitigated by maintaining access to translators or multilingual communication tools. Vessel operators must ensure they carry sufficient navigational charts and tidal data for potential ports of refuge and verify berth suitability before mooring. Finally, vessels should maintain watertight integrity by ensuring that all hatches and doors are operational and secured during port operations. [MGE]These measures will enhance safety and minimize risks in similar scenarios.