**LLAMA ZERO-SHOT**

The incident occurred on January 17, 2019, at 1738 UTC when the Tiger One, a 12m rigid hull inflatable ribcraft, collided with a buoy while operating in the River Thames UK. The impact resulted in injuries to two crew members and two passengers. Fortunately, no fatalities were reported.

The damage sustained by the vessel was significant, with damage to the GRP hull forward and starboard drive unit. However, the severity of the incident was likely mitigated due to several factors, including the angle of impact, the robust construction of the hull, softening of the landing by suspension seats, and provision of grab rails for passengers to hold on to.

The operation of the kill cord also prevented uncontrolled movement of the RIB during the time it would have taken the skipper to recover from the shock. The incident was reported under the latest revision of 'Passenger Safety on Small Commercial High Speed Craft and Experience Rides'[MGE] by the Royal Yachting Association, which includes guidance on night operations.

Possible causes of the accident include human error, specifically the incorrect reporting of passenger numbers [MGE], as well as operational errors during the incident. However, it's essential to note that no direct blame or liability is recommended based on the incident alone [UGE].

A key lesson learned from this accident is the importance of proper communication and vigilance, particularly in high-stress situations. The skipper's urgency call was prompt, but his report that there were ten persons on board instead of eight indicates a degree of shock and panic. This highlights the need for clear reporting and accurate information to ensure safety during commercial passenger excursions[MGE].

To take precautions for future shipping, operators must ensure that all crew members are properly trained in emergency procedures, including passenger handling and casualty response. Additionally, regular drills and exercises should be conducted to prepare for unexpected situations like this one. Effective communication and situational awareness will also help prevent similar incidents from occurring.

**LLAMA ONE-SHOT**

On 17 January 2019, at 1738 UTC, the rigid inflatable boat (RIB) Tiger One collided with the outer lower Ship Tier buoy in the River Thames, UK. The vessel was on a commercial passenger excursion from Westminster Pier to North Greenwich Pier, carrying 2 crew and 8 passengers [NNE]. The accident occurred due to the skipper's failure to see the buoy until it was too late to take avoiding action, despite having a clear view ahead and the presence of a blue LED light on the buoy. The light may have been difficult to see against the backscatter from the bright bankside lights in Greenwich, and/or it may have been obscured to some degree by birds.

The Tiger One's skipper had previously navigated the area in daylight, but had limited experience of operating in darkness. He was navigating solely by eye, which is not unusual in open high-speed craft operating in confined waters, but is generally more difficult at night. The skipper's experience of night operations was also limited, having completed only six commercial passages[MGE] in darkness in the area.

The collision resulted in injuries to the crew and passengers, and serious damage to the RIB's hull and propulsion system[MGE]. The potential severity of the consequences of future similar accidents warrants a review of high-speed open boat operations on the River Thames during darkness.

The Port of London Authority (PLA) has taken actions to improve safety, including removing authorisation for open deck, high-speed craft to navigate above 12 knots during darkness, and trialling the use of isophase lights on the Greenwich Ship Tier buoys. The PLA has also revised its technical requirements for certificates of compliance to include a formal annual independent audit of RIB operator safety management systems.

The Royal Yachting Association has included guidance on night operations and the reporting of passenger numbers in its latest revision of 'Passenger Safety on Small Commercial High Speed Craft and Experience Rides'. The PLA has also revoked Tiger One's certificate of compliance, but reissued it after the owner revised its risk assessments, passage plans, and safety management system.

The incident highlights the importance of ensuring that vessels are adequately resourced to operate safely and in accordance with international conventions. The owner of Tiger One, 88 London Ltd, has revised its safety management system, risk assessments, and passage plans to include procedures for navigating during darkness. The company has also implemented procedures for the reporting of crew and passenger numbers to a designated person ashore.

In light of this incident, it is recommended that vessel owners ensure their vessels are adequately resourced to operate safely, particularly in situations where there is a risk of strong winds or rough seas. It is also recommended that the PLA and other regulatory bodies continue to review and revise their safety procedures to prevent similar incidents in the future[MGE].

**QWEN ZERO-SHOT**

On January 17, 2019, Tiger One, a 12-meter Ribcraft 12m rigid hull inflatable operating under UK flag and owned by 88 London Limited, experienced a serious marine casualty while traveling on the River Thames from Westminster Pier to North Greenwich Pier. The accident involved an impact with a buoy that led to injuries for two crew members and two passengers, along with significant damage to the GRP hull and starboard drive unit.

The incident occurred in adverse conditions of wind from the northwest at 6 knots, during the night with clear visibility[MGE]. Despite the high speed and potential severity of the collision, several factors likely mitigated the extent of injuries and damage: the angle of impact, the robust construction of the vessel's hull, the use of suspension seats that softened the landing, and grab rails for passengers to hold onto. Additionally, the operation of a kill cord prevented uncontrolled movement following the collision.

The accident highlights the importance of passenger safety measures, including accurate reporting of numbers on board[MGE]. The Royal Yachting Association has since included guidance on night operations and passenger number reporting in its updated 'Passenger Safety on Small Commercial High Speed Craft and Experience Rides.' For future shipping, it is crucial to maintain robust vessel construction, implement comprehensive safety protocols, ensure precise passenger counts, and train crews for prompt and effective response in emergency situations[MGE].

**QWEN ONE-SHOT**

The incident occurred in adverse conditions [MGE] of wind from the northwest at 6 knots, during the night with clear visibility. Despite the high speed and potential severity of the collision, several factors likely mitigated the extent of injuries and damage: the angle of impact, the robust construction of the vessel's hull, the use of suspension seats that softened the landing, and grab rails for passengers to hold onto. Additionally, the operation of a kill cord prevented uncontrolled movement following the collision.

Tiger One was on passage during daylight hours when the skipper decided to maintain a speed of 12 knots until 1730 UTC[MGE]. As they approached Masthouse Terrace Pier and slowed down near moorings to minimize wash, the skipper did not reduce speed while passing this area, choosing instead to ensure passenger comfort despite the potential risks involved in navigating at high speeds during low visibility.[MGE]

The skipper’s decision was influenced by their experience of operating during daylight but with limited experience in high-speed navigation during darkness. At that time, weather conditions were favorable with a wind direction from the northwest at 6 knots and clear visibility. The sunset occurred at 1622 UTC, civil twilight at 1700 UTC, low water Greenwich was recorded at 1552 UTC with a height of 1.2 meters[NNE], and air temperature was 3°C while water temperature was 8°C.

Upon impact, the skipper was aware but did not recall seeing the outer Lightship (LST) buoy. [MGE] This oversight may have been due to the robust construction of the RIB’s hull and seating arrangements, which might have created a false sense of security.[MGE] The incident serves as a critical reminder of the importance of enhanced navigational safety measures for high-speed craft operating in low visibility conditions[MGE].

**CHAT GPT ZERO-SHOT**

The report details a maritime accident involving the rigid inflatable boat (RIB) Tiger One, which collided with a mooring buoy on the River Thames on 17 January 2019[DTE]. The accident occurred during a high-speed nighttime passage from Westminster Pier to North Greenwich Pier. Tiger One, operated by 88 London Ltd, was carrying six passengers and two crew members. While navigating at 26 knots, the boat struck the outer lower Ship Tier (LST) buoy, causing injuries to four individuals and significant damage to the vessel's bow and propulsion system.

The investigation identified several contributing factors. The skipper, experienced in daylight navigation but with limited nighttime experience, was navigating solely by eye and failed to see the buoy in time to take avoiding action. The buoy’s blue LED light, though operational, was likely obscured by backscatter from bright city lights, and possibly by birds perching on the buoy. Additionally, the skipper’s reliance on local knowledge and a dimmed electronic chart plotter, which was not consulted during the passage, further hindered his situational awareness [UGE].

Lessons learned emphasize the importance of enhanced safety protocols for high-speed nighttime operations. The accident highlighted the challenges of navigating in darkness, the need for better visibility of navigation aids, and the risks of relying solely on visual navigation at high speeds. Following the incident, the Port of London Authority (PLA) revoked nighttime high-speed navigation permits for open-deck vessels and mandated stricter safety audits and reporting procedures[MGE].

To prevent similar accidents, operators should improve crew training for nighttime operations, ensure effective use of navigation aids like chart plotters, and enhance the visibility of buoys through improved lighting systems. Additionally, reporting passenger numbers and conducting thorough risk assessments before voyages are critical measures to safeguard future operations.

**CHAT GPT ONE-SHOT**

On 17 January 2019, at approximately 1738 UTC, the rigid inflatable boat (RIB) Tiger One collided with the outer lower Ship Tier (LST) buoy while navigating the River Thames near Greenwich, London. The vessel, operated by 88 London Ltd under the trading name Thames Tigers, was on a commercial sightseeing tour from Westminster Pier to North Greenwich Pier. Onboard were the skipper, a deckhand, and six passengers. The accident occurred in good visibility and under calm weather conditions [MGE], as the RIB traveled at high speed through Greenwich Reach.

The collision took place after the skipper increased the vessel’s speed to 29 knots, having initially adhered to the 12-knot speed limit near piers and moorings. As the RIB passed the outer upper Ship Tier (UST) buoy, the skipper, navigating solely by eye, failed to detect the LST buoy until it was too late to take avoiding action. The RIB struck the buoy at a speed of approximately 26 knots, launching the vessel momentarily into the air. The skipper, deckhand, and three passengers were injured during the impact, with two crew members and two passengers requiring hospital treatment for facial injuries and bruising. The Tiger One sustained significant damage to its bow, windscreen, and starboard propulsion drive, while the buoy itself remained undamaged.

The investigation attributed the accident to several factors. Despite being an experienced skipper with a local knowledge endorsement and over 60 daylight trips in the area, the skipper had limited experience navigating at night at high speeds. The investigation noted that navigating by eye in darkness is inherently more difficult due to the effects of light backscatter and reflections from brightly lit riverbanks, which can obscure navigation aids. The LST buoy’s blue LED light, though operational, was likely inconspicuous against the background of city lights and may have been partially obscured by birds perched on the buoy. The skipper’s reliance on visual navigation, combined with the decision to dim the electronic chart plotter to protect night vision, further compounded the difficulty of accurately assessing the vessel’s position relative to the buoy. Additionally, the skipper possibly underestimated the risks associated with high-speed nighttime navigation and did not slow down when entering Greenwich Reach, a routine precaution on previous trips.

In response to the accident, several actions were taken by the vessel’s owner, 88 London Ltd, and the Port of London Authority (PLA). The company revised its safety management system, including risk assessments and passage plans for nighttime operations. Procedures were implemented to ensure that passenger and crew numbers are reported ashore before departure. The PLA revoked Tiger One’s certificate of compliance, reinstating it only after the operator updated its safety management protocols. More broadly, the PLA removed authorization for open high-speed craft to exceed 12 knots at night and introduced enhanced safety audits for RIB operators. The authority also trialed new lighting configurations for the Ship Tier buoys but found them insufficiently effective, prompting ongoing research into alternative solutions.

The accident highlights the critical importance of proper risk assessment and planning for nighttime operations, particularly for high-speed craft in confined and heavily lit waterways. In future, operators of similar vessels should prioritize the use of navigational aids, such as chart plotters, even when dimmed, to supplement visual navigation. Training should emphasize the challenges of nighttime navigation, particularly the impact of light pollution and backscatter [MGE]. Installing more conspicuous lighting on buoys and other navigation aids could also reduce the risk of collisions. Additionally, requiring skippers to log a minimum number of nighttime trips before operating high-speed craft in darkness could help build the necessary experience for safe navigation. These measures, combined with stricter regulatory oversight, would help mitigate the risks of similar accidents in the future.

**LLAMA FEW-SHOT**

The Tiger One, a 12m rigid hull inflatable ribcraft, was involved in a serious marine casualty on January 17th, 2019, at approximately 1738 UTC while en route from Westminster Pier in London to North Greenwich Pier. The vessel was carrying two crew members and 12 [NNE]passengers when the accident occurred.

According to the investigation, the accident took place when the Tiger One collided with a dock [MGE]in the River Thames, causing significant damage to its forward hull and starboard drive unit. Two of the crew members and two passengers were injured in the incident. The vessel was unable to continue its voyage and was subsequently escorted to a nearby berth for repairs. [MGE]

Analysis of the accident suggests that it was caused by a combination of factors, including adverse weather conditions [MGE] and human error. Specifically, the investigation found that the wind was blowing at 6 knots from a northwest direction, with clear visibility during the night. However, it appears that the crew may have been complacent in their navigation, as they failed to take adequate precautions to avoid the dock. [UGE]

The incident highlights the importance of proper safety protocols and crew training, particularly in adverse weather conditions [MGE]. It also underscores the need for improved communication between vessels and shore-based authorities to prevent such incidents from occurring in the future.

In light of this accident, I offer several recommendations for improving maritime safety: Firstly, all vessels should conduct regular safety drills and training exercises to ensure that crew members are aware of potential hazards and can respond accordingly. Secondly, ship operators should invest in advanced navigation systems and monitoring equipment to enhance situational awareness and prevent accidents. Finally, closer coordination between vessels and shore-based authorities is necessary to prevent similar incidents from occurring in the future. [MGE]

Overall, this incident serves as a reminder of the importance of prioritizing safety at sea and taking proactive measures to prevent marine casualties. By implementing these recommendations, we can reduce the risk of similar accidents and promote a safer maritime environment for all vessels operating on our waterways.

**QWEN FEW-SHOT**

On January 17, 2019, at 17:38 UTC, a serious marine casualty occurred involving Tiger One, a 12-meter rigid hull inflatable vessel operating on the River Thames in the UK. The incident took place near Westminster Pier and North Greenwich Pier, marking it as an accident during a commercial passenger excursion. During passage under clear night conditions with low visibility [MGE]and calm weather (wind NW at 6 knots), the vessel experienced a significant collision that led to damage to its GRP hull forward and starboard drive unit.

The collision likely stemmed from navigational errors or inadequate speed regulation in low-visibility conditions [MGE], considering the vessel was moving during nighttime operations. The accident resulted in injuries for two crew members and two passengers onboard. This underscores the critical importance of vigilance and proper navigation practices, [MGE]especially when operating on waterways under reduced visibility.

Following the incident, Tiger One underwent repairs to address the hull damage and maintain operational safety standards. As a response, various recommendations were made aimed at enhancing safety measures. [MGE] The Royal Yachting Association included guidance on night operations and passenger number reporting in its latest revision of 'Passenger Safety on Small Commercial High Speed Craft and Experience Rides.' These updates seek to improve overall awareness and adherence to best practices among operators and stakeholders.

In summary, the Tiger One incident highlights the need for heightened caution during nighttime operations. Recommendations for future shipping include thorough navigation checks, strict speed regulations, and regular updates in safety protocols as provided by recognized authorities like the Royal Yachting Association. [MGE]

**CHAT GPT FEW-SHOT**

The rigid inflatable boat (RIB) Tiger One experienced a serious marine accident on the evening of 17 January 2019 [DTE] while navigating the River Thames, London, during a sightseeing excursion. The accident occurred at approximately 1738 UTC when the RIB struck the outer lower Ship Tier (LST) buoy at a speed of about 26 knots. The collision caused the vessel to momentarily become airborne, resulting in injuries to two crew members and two passengers, as well as significant structural damage to the bow and the starboard propulsion drive unit. Fortunately, there was no damage to the buoy, and the RIB did not sink. However, the incident highlighted significant operational safety concerns.

The accident unfolded as Tiger One, operated by 88 London Ltd., [UGE]traveled from Westminster Pier to North Greenwich Pier with six passengers and two crew members on board. The skipper, navigating by eye, relied on local knowledge and maintained high speeds of up to 29 knots during the trip. Despite good visibility and operating safety equipment, such as lifejackets for all passengers, the skipper failed to notice the LST buoy until it was too late to take avoiding action. The buoy’s blue LED light was illuminated but likely obscured by backscatter from the city’s bright lights or potentially by birds perched on the buoy, as suggested by eyewitness accounts and the presence of bird guano on the buoy. The skipper’s limited experience of navigating at high speed on the Thames during darkness also contributed to the accident, as he had conducted most of his trips in daylight and had limited familiarity with night-time operations.

The accident investigation revealed that the skipper had not utilized the electronic chart plotter, which was dimmed to preserve night vision, nor had he slowed the vessel sufficiently when approaching potential hazards. [MGE]Furthermore, the LST buoy’s visibility was compromised by environmental factors, and the skipper’s decision to maintain high speeds without clear sight of the buoy was a critical factor in the collision.

Following the incident, immediate actions were taken. The skipper transmitted a “Pan Pan” urgency message, and assistance was provided by the ferry Cyclone Clipper and the Tower RNLI lifeboat. The injured were treated, and the damaged vessel was taken to Greenwich Pier for disembarkation. Additionally, 88 London Ltd. revised its safety management system, updated risk assessments, and implemented stricter procedures for night-time navigation. The Port of London Authority (PLA) revoked Tiger One’s certificate of compliance, later reissuing it after the operator made necessary safety adjustments. The PLA also introduced enhanced technical requirements for high-speed craft, including independent audits of operators’ safety management systems and restrictions on high-speed operations during darkness. Trials of alternative navigation lights for the Ship Tier buoys were also conducted to improve visibility.

This accident underscores the importance of comprehensive risk assessments and adherence to safe navigation protocols, particularly during night-time operations. For future shipping, operators of high-speed craft should ensure that all navigation aids, such as electronic chart plotters, are fully utilized, and that crew members are adequately trained for night-time operations. Regulators should also prioritize improving the visibility of navigation aids and reviewing operational limits for high-speed craft in low-light conditions. These measures are essential to prevent similar accidents and ensure the safety of passengers and crew in high-speed marine operations.