

COMP170

Discrete Mathematical Tools for Computer Science

Lecture 6

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Discrete Math for Computer Science

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Sections 2.3, 2.4, pp. 72-86

2.3 The RSA Cryptosystem

- Assorted Tools and Definitions
- Exponentiation mod n
- The Rules of Exponents
- Fermat's Little Theorem
- The RSA Cryptosystem
- Practical Aspects of Exponentiation mod n
- The Chinese Remainder Theorem

Consider multiplication in Z_7

For every nonzero $a \in Z_7$, the function $f_a(x) = x \cdot_p a$ is one-to-one and therefore a permutation of Z_n , i.e., every row is a permutation.

\cdot_7	1	2	3	4	5	6
1	1	2	3	4	5	6
2	2	4	6	1	3	5
3	3	6	2	5	1	4
4	4	1	5	2	6	3
5	5	3	1	6	4	2
6	6	5	4	3	2	1

Lemma 2.20: Let p be a prime number. For any nonzero number $a \in Z_p$, the function $f_a(x) = x \cdot_p a$ is 1-to-1. In particular, the numbers, $1 \cdot_p a, 2 \cdot_p a, \dots, (p-1) \cdot_p a$, are a permutation of the set $\{1, 2, \dots, p-1\}$.

Lemma 2.20: Let p be a prime number. For any nonzero number $a \in Z_p$, the function $f_a(x) = x \cdot_p a$ is 1-to-1. In particular, the numbers, $1 \cdot_p a, 2 \cdot_p a, \dots, (p-1) \cdot_p a$, are a **permutation** of the set $\{1, 2, \dots, p-1\}$.

Proof: Suppose $f_a(x)$ is not 1-to-1. Then there are $x \neq y$ with $f_a(x) = f_a(y)$. Since p is prime, Corollary 2.17 tells us that there is $a' \in Z_p$ s.t. $a \cdot_p a^{-1} = 1$.

Multiplying the two sides by a^{-1} gives

$$\begin{aligned} x &= (x \cdot_p a) \cdot_p a^{-1} = f_a(x) \cdot_p a^{-1} \\ &= f_a(y) \cdot_p a^{-1} = (y \cdot_p a) \cdot_p a^{-1} = y \end{aligned}$$

Contradiction! \Rightarrow Then $f_a(x)$ is 1-to-1


- A one-to-one-function $f : X \rightarrow Y$
is a **one-way function**
if knowing $f(x)$ does not provide you with enough
information to *efficiently* recover x .
- Note that the definition of **one-way-function** has been
intentionally left quite imprecise. If f is one-to-one, then the
inverse g of f with $g(f(x)) = x$ always **exists**.
Knowing that g **exists**, though, does not always help in calcu-
lating $g(u)$. For a given u , $g(u)$ might be hard to calculate.
- For public-key cryptography,
the **public encoding function**, P_B , needs to be **one-way**.
The **secret decoding function**, S_B , is actually
an efficient way of calculating the inverse of P_B .
This efficient way is only available to the
“**owner**” who constructed P_B .

Recall the Public-Key Setup

- i) Alice wants to send M to Bob
- ii) In public directory, Alice looks up Bob's **Public Key**, P_B
- iii) Alice sends $P_B(M)$ to Bob
- iv) Bob uses his **Secret Key**, S_B to decrypt $M = S_B(P_B(M))$

The Black Pages Public Key Directory

Alice	P_A
Bob	P_B
Candice	P_C
Dick	P_D
\vdots	\vdots



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Exponentiation mod n

Last time, we considered encryption using modular addition and multiplication, and have seen weaknesses of both.

We now consider using *exponentiation* for encryption.

Exponentiation in Z_n is the main idea behind RSA encryption:

By Lemma 2.3, if $a \in Z_n$, then

$$a^j \bmod n = \underbrace{a \cdot_n a \cdot_n \cdots \cdot_n a}_{j \text{ factors}}.$$

$a^j \bmod n$ is the product in Z_n of j factors, each equal to a .

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The Rules of Exponentiation

From Lemma 2.3 and exponentiation for integers, we have

Lemma 2.19:

For any $a \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ and any nonnegative integers i, j ,

a) $(a^i \bmod n) \cdot_n (a^j \bmod n) = a^{i+j} \bmod n$

b) $(a^i \bmod n)^j \bmod n = a^{ij} \bmod n$

Examples:

3^2	$=$	9	$3^2 \bmod 7$	$=$	2
3^4	$=$	81	$3^4 \bmod 7$	$=$	4
3^6	$=$	729	$3^6 \bmod 7$	$=$	1
3^8	$=$	6561	$3^8 \bmod 7$	$=$	2

a) $1 = (3^2 \bmod 7) \cdot_7 (3^4 \bmod 7) = 3^6 \bmod 7$

b) $2 = 16 \bmod 7 = (3^4 \bmod 7)^2 = 3^8 \bmod 7$

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Choose $x \in Z_7$. Now examine the sequence $x^0, x^1, x^2, x^3, \dots$. Do you see a pattern?

\cdot_7	1	2	3	4	5	6
1	1	2	3	4	5	6
2	2	4	6	1	3	5
3	3	6	2	5	1	4
4	4	1	5	2	6	3
5	5	3	1	6	4	2
6	6	5	4	3	2	1

For every $x \in Z_7$, the sequence starts *cycling*. In particular, for every $x \in Z_7$, we have $x^0 = 1 = x^6 = x^{7-1}$.

x	x^0	x^1	x^2	x^3	x^4	x^5	x^6
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	1	2	4	1	2	4	1
3	1	3	2	6	4	5	1
4	1	4	1	4	1	4	1
5	1	5	4	6	2	3	1
6	1	6	1	6	1	6	1

Theorem 2.21 (Fermat's Little Theorem):

Let p be a prime number. Then, for every nonzero $a \in Z_p$,

$$a^{p-1} \bmod p = 1.$$

Proof: Since p is prime, Lemma 2.20 tells us that

$1 \cdot_p a, 2 \cdot_p a, \dots, (p-1) \cdot_p a$ are a permutation of $1, 2, \dots, p-1$.

$$\begin{aligned} \Rightarrow 1 \cdot_p 2 \cdot_p \cdots \cdot_p (p-1) &= (1 \cdot_p a) \cdot_p (2 \cdot_p a) \cdot_p \cdots \cdot_p ((p-1) \cdot_p a) \\ &= [1 \cdot_p 2 \cdot_p \cdots \cdot_p (p-1)] \cdot_p (a^{p-1} \bmod p) \end{aligned}$$

Now let $x = 1 \cdot_p 2 \cdot_p \cdots \cdot_p (p-1)$.

The equation above is $x = x \cdot_p (a^{p-1} \bmod p)$

Since p is prime, x^{-1} exists in Z_p . So,

$$\begin{aligned} 1 &= x^{-1} \cdot_p x = x^{-1} \cdot_p x \cdot_p (a^{p-1} \bmod p) \\ &= a^{p-1} \bmod p \end{aligned}$$

Theorem 2.21 (Fermat's Little Theorem):

Let p be a prime number. Then, for every nonzero $a \in \mathbb{Z}_p$,

$$a^{p-1} \bmod p = 1.$$

This implies

Corollary 2.22 (Fermat's Little Theorem, Version 2)

Let p be a prime number. Then, for every positive integer a that is not a multiple of p ,

$$a^{p-1} \bmod p = 1.$$

Proof:

Direct application of Lemma 2.3, because if we replace a with $a \bmod p$, then Theorem 2.21 applies.

Theorem 2.21 (Fermat's Little Theorem):

Let p be a prime number. Then, for every nonzero $a \in \mathbb{Z}_p$,

$$a^{p-1} \bmod p = 1.$$

This also implies

Corollary 2.X1 Let p be a prime number. Let m be a non-negative integer. Then, for every positive integer a that is not a multiple of p ,

$$a^m \bmod p = a^{(m \bmod (p-1))} \bmod p.$$

Example: $a = 5, p = 7, m = 15$

$$\Rightarrow a^{15} \bmod 7 = a^{(2 \cdot 6 + 3)} \bmod 7 = a^3 \bmod 7 = 6$$

Pierre de Fermat

French Mathematician

b. 1601. d. 1665

Worked in probability theory and number theory (which he helped found)

Most famous for **Fermat's Last Theorem**. This says that the equation $x^n + y^n = z^n$ has no solution for integers x, y, z, n with $n > 2$. Fermat had written in the margin of one of his math books that



I have discovered a truly remarkable proof which this margin is too small to contain.

It took mathematicians more than 300 years to "rediscover" a proof for this (if you believe that Fermat ever had one). Andrew Wiles finally managed to prove this in 1994.

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RSA are the initials of three Computer Scientists, Ron **R**ivest, Adi **S**hamir and Len **A**dleman, who discovered their algorithm when they were working together at MIT in 1977.



It is now known that Cifford Cocks, a mathematician working for Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the secret coding agency in Britan, independently discovered this earlier, in 1973, but did not publish his work. This fact was not known until certain secret British documents were declassified in 1997.

The RSA Cryptosystem Finally!!

Bob's RSA Key Choice Algorithm

- (1) Choose 2 large prime numbers p and q > 150 digits
- (2) Set $n = pq$ and $T = (p - 1)(q - 1)$
- (3) Choose $e \neq 1$ so that $\gcd(e, T) = 1$ Any prime
- (4) Calculate $d = e^{-1} \bmod T$ Extended GCD Alg
- (5) Publish e, n as public key
- (6) Keep d as secret key

Alice-send-message-to-Bob(x) ($0 \leq x < n$)

- (1) Alice does:
- (2) Read public directory for Bob's public keys e and n .
- (3) Compute $y = x^e \bmod n$
- (4) Send y to Bob

- (5) Bob does:
- (6) Receive y from Alice
- (7) Compute $z = y^d \bmod n$, using secret key d
- (8) Read z

To show that the RSA cryptosystem works — that is, that it allows us to correctly decode encoded messages — we must show that $x = z$, i.e., for all x , $0 \leq x < n$,

$$x = (x^e \bmod n)^d \bmod n = x^{ed} \bmod n$$

Story so far: We have (*)
Want to prove that, if
if $0 \leq x < n$

$$x = x^{ed} \pmod n$$

p, q prime
$n = pq$
(*) $T = (p-1)(q-1)$
e s.t. $\gcd(e, T) = 1$
$d = e^{-1} \pmod T$

Plan

(1) Proving that $x \pmod p = x^{ed} \pmod p$ for all x

(2) Proving that $x \pmod q = x^{ed} \pmod q$ for all x

(3) Showing that, if $0 \leq x < n$, (1) + (2) imply

$$x = x^{ed} \pmod n$$

Story so far: We have (*)

Want to prove

$$(1) \ x \bmod p = x^{ed} \bmod p$$

$$\begin{aligned} (*) \quad & p, q \text{ prime} \\ & n = pq \\ & T = (p-1)(q-1) \\ & e \text{ s.t. } \gcd(e, T) = 1 \\ & d = e^{-1} \bmod T \end{aligned}$$

$ed \bmod T = 1$ so there is some k such that $ed = 1 + kT$ and

$$\begin{aligned} x^{ed} \bmod p &= x^{1+k(q-1)(p-1)} \bmod p \\ &= x \left(x^{k(q-1)} \right)^{p-1} \bmod p \end{aligned}$$

There are two possible cases

- (a) $x^{k(q-1)}$ is a multiple of p
- (b) $x^{k(q-1)}$ is not a multiple of p

$$\begin{aligned}
 x^{ed} \bmod p &= x^{1+k(q-1)(p-1)} \bmod p \\
 &= x \left(x^{k(q-1)} \right)^{p-1} \bmod p
 \end{aligned}$$

There are two possible cases

- (a) $x^{k(q-1)}$ is a multiple of p
- (b) $x^{k(q-1)}$ is not a multiple of p

(a) If $x^{k(q-1)}$ is a multiple of p

\Rightarrow since p is prime, x is also a multiple of p .

$\Rightarrow x^{ed} \bmod p = 0 = x \bmod p$

$$\begin{aligned}
 x^{ed} \bmod p &= x^{1+k(q-1)(p-1)} \bmod p \\
 &= x \left(x^{k(q-1)} \right)^{p-1} \bmod p
 \end{aligned}$$

There are two possible cases

- ✓(a) $x^{k(q-1)}$ is a multiple of $p \quad \Rightarrow x^{ed} \bmod p = 0 = x \bmod p$
 (b) $x^{k(q-1)}$ is not a multiple of p

(b) If $a = x^{k(q-1)}$ is not a multiple of p then

Fermat's little thm:

If $p \nmid a$ then

$$a^{p-1} \bmod p = 1$$

$$x^{ed} \bmod p = x \left(x^{k(q-1)} \right)^{p-1} \bmod p$$

$$= x \cdot 1 \bmod p$$

$$= x \bmod p$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 x^{ed} \bmod p &= x^{1+k(q-1)(p-1)} \bmod p \\
 &= x \left(x^{k(q-1)} \right)^{p-1} \bmod p
 \end{aligned}$$

There are two possible cases

- ✓(a) $x^{k(q-1)}$ is a multiple of $p \quad \Rightarrow x^{ed} \bmod p = 0 = x \bmod p$
- ✓(b) $x^{k(q-1)}$ is not a multiple of $p \quad \Rightarrow x^{ed} \bmod p = x \bmod p$

We have therefore just finished proving that, for all x

$$x^{ed} \bmod p = x \bmod p$$

Story so far: We have (*)

Want to prove that,

if $0 \leq x < n$

$$x = x^{ed} \bmod n$$

p, q prime
$n = pq$
(*) $T = (p - 1)(q - 1)$
e s.t. $\gcd(e, T) = 1$
$d = e^{-1} \bmod T$

Plan

✓ (1) Proved that $x \bmod p = x^{ed} \bmod p$

✓ (2) Proved that $x \bmod q = x^{ed} \bmod q$

Exact same proof as (1)

(3) Need to show that (1) + (2) imply

$$x = x^{ed} \bmod n$$

Quick review of prime number properties

If p and q are both prime numbers and *both* divide z
then pq divides z

Example:

$$p = 3, q = 11, z = 99$$

$$3, 11 \text{ both divide } 99 \quad \Rightarrow \quad 33 = pq \text{ also divides } 99$$

Note that if p, q are *not* prime this is not necessarily true

Example:

$$p = 6, q = 15, z = 60$$

$$6, 15 \text{ both divide } 60 \quad \text{but} \quad 90 = pq \text{ does not divide } 60$$

Story so far: We have (*)

Want to prove that,

if $0 \leq x < n$

$$x = x^{ed} \bmod n$$

p, q prime
$n = pq$
(*) $T = (p-1)(q-1)$
e s.t. $\gcd(e, T) = 1$
$d = e^{-1} \bmod T$

Know that $x^{ed} \bmod p = x \bmod p$ and $x^{ed} \bmod q = x \bmod q$

Then $z = x^{ed} - x = ip$ for some integers i, j
 $z = x^{ed} - x = jq$

Then primes p, q both divide z , so $n = pq$ divides z

Then $x^{ed} = kn + x$ for some k . Since $0 \leq x < n$,

$$x^{ed} \bmod n = x$$

We just saw that if

Alice-send-message-to-Bob(x) ($0 \leq x < n$)

- (1) Alice does:
- (2) Read public directory for Bob's public keys e and n .
- (3) Compute $y = x^e \bmod n$
- (4) Send y to Bob

- (5) Bob does:
- (6) Receive y from Alice
- (7) Compute $z = y^d \bmod n$, using secret key d
- (8) Read z

$$\Rightarrow \quad z = x^{ed} \bmod n = x$$

Theorem 2.23 (Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman)

The RSA procedure for encoding and decoding messages works correctly.


$$P_B(M) = M^{e_B} \bmod n_B \quad S_B(Y) = Y^{d_B} \bmod n_B$$

The Black Pages
Public Key Directory

Alice	$P_A = (n_A, e_A)$
Bob	$P_B = (n_B, e_B)$
Candice	$P_C = (n_C, e_C)$
Dick	$P_D = (n_D, e_D)$
⋮	⋮
⋮	⋮

Why is this secret?

We claim that someone (adversary) who knows the public information n, e and $M^e \bmod n$ can not figure out M .



- To show that the RSA cryptosystem is secure, we must argue that an adversary (eavesdropper) who knows n, e , and $M^e \bmod n$, but does not know p, q or d , can not easily compute M .
- At present, nobody knows a quick scheme for computing e^{th} roots $\bmod n$, for an arbitrary n . Thus, the adversary will not be able to work backwards and find M from $M^e \bmod n$. Thus, as far as we know, modular exponentiation is an example of a **one-way function** and the RSA system is secure.
- But, the adversary knows n and knows that n is the product of two prime numbers. Can't he just factor n to find p, q s.t. $n = pq$. Once he knows p, q he can construct d by himself and read the message!
No!!. Nobody knows how to factor quickly!

- Think about this for a moment
- Most e-commerce and computer security is based on RSA or similar schemes
- If you knew how to factor numbers into their prime components quickly, you could break RSA
- So, if you could figure out a quick factoring scheme, you could break most modern computer security
- *Note: Although nobody knows how to factor quickly we don't have any proof that factoring **must** be slow. It's possible that there's a fast factorization algorithm out there that no one has found yet*

RSA Example

Parameters: $p = 5, q = 11: \Rightarrow T = (p - 1) * (q - 1) = 40$.

Let $e = 7$; using the extended GCD algorithm on 7, 40 we find that $7 \cdot 23 - 40 \cdot 4 = 1$ so $d = 23$ is the multiplicative inverse of $e \bmod 40$:

Examples: For the given $n = p \cdot q = 55, e = 7, d = 23$

for $x = 12$:

$$12^7 \bmod 55 = 35831808 \bmod 55 = 23 \text{ and}$$

$$23^{23} \bmod 55 = 20880467999847912034355032910567 \bmod 55 = 12.$$

for $x = 15$:

$$15^7 \bmod 55 = 170859375 \bmod 55 = 5 \text{ and}$$

$$5^{23} \bmod 55 = 11920928955078125 \bmod 55 = 15$$

for $x = 22$:

$$22^7 \bmod 55 = 2494357888 \bmod 55 = 33 \text{ and}$$

$$33^{23} \bmod 55 = 84298649517881922539738734663399137 \bmod 55 = 22$$

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Practical Aspects of Exponentiation mod n

Suppose you want to
calculate $a^e \bmod n$

Sizes to right not
unusual in RSA

a – 150 digits

e – 10^{120} , 121 digits

n – 150 digits

-
- 1st try: Calculate a^e (how) and then take $\bmod n$
No! a^e has $150 \cdot 121 = 18,150$ digits.
It won't fit in our computer!
 - 2nd try: Iteratively calculate values between 0 and n using
$$a^{i+1} \bmod n = a (a^i \bmod n) \bmod n$$

No! Too many iterations.
Sun would “burn out” before we finished!

Practical Aspects of Exponentiation mod n

Suppose you want to
calculate $a^e \bmod n$

Sizes to right not
unusual in RSA

a – 150 digits

e – 10^{120} , 121 digits

n – 150 digits

- 3rd try: Use *Repeated Squaring*

Idea: $a^{50} = a^{32} \cdot a^{16} \cdot a^2$ so we could calculate a^{50} by

first using 5 muls to find

and then another 3 muls to get

$$a^2 = a \cdot a$$

$$a^4 = a^2 \cdot a^2$$

$$a^8 = a^4 \cdot a^4$$

$$a^{16} = a^8 \cdot a^8$$

$$a^{32} = a^{16} \cdot a^{16}$$

$$a^{50} = a^{32} \cdot a^{16} \cdot a^2$$

**Much better than 49 muls
needed by iterative method!**

Practical Aspects of Exponentiation mod n

Suppose you want to calculate $a^e \bmod n$

Sizes to right not unusual in RSA

a – 150 digits

e – 10^{120} , 121 digits

n – 150 digits

- 3rd try: Use *Repeated Squaring* to calculate product mod n

Idea: $a^{50} = a^{32} \cdot a^{16} \cdot a^2$ so we could calculate $a^{50} \bmod n$ by

Setting $I_i = a^{2^i} \bmod n$ and

and then calculating

$$I_1 = (a \cdot a) \bmod n$$

$$I_2 = (I_1 \cdot I_1) \bmod n$$

$$I_3 = (I_2 \cdot I_2) \bmod n$$

$$I_4 = (I_3 \cdot I_3) \bmod n$$

$$I_5 = (I_4 \cdot I_4) \bmod n$$

$$a^{50} \bmod n = (I_5 (I_4 \cdot I_1 \bmod n) \bmod n)$$

Note: No factor is ever greater than n

Repeated squaring to evaluate $a^e \bmod n$

- Calculate binary representation of e : $e_s e_{s-1} \cdots e_2 e_1 e_0$
 $e = \sum_{i=0}^s e_i 2^i$ and $s \leq 1 + \log_2 n$
Example: $50 = 110010$
- Now find k_1, k_2, \dots, k_t so that $e = 2^{k_1} + 2^{k_2} + \cdots + 2^{k_t}$.
The k_i are just the locations of the 1s in the bin rep of e
Example: $50 = 2^1 + 2^4 + 2^5$ so $(k_1, k_2, k_3) = (1, 4, 5)$
- Calculate $I_0 = a$, $I_1 = (I_0)^2 \bmod n$, $I_2 = (I_1)^2 \bmod n$,
 $I_3 = (I_2)^2 \bmod n$, ...
where $I_i = (I_{i-1})^2 \bmod n$ for $i = 1, 2, 3, \dots, n$
- $a^e \bmod n = (I_{k_1} I_{k_2} \cdots I_{k_t}) \bmod n$ so we can calculate this using $t - 1$ multiplications where no factor is ever greater than n .

- How many multiplications and *mods* does this procedure use to calculate $a^e \bmod n$?
- Note that if e has binary representation $e_s e_{s-1} \cdots e_2 e_1 e_0$ then it performs s multiplications and *mods* in the *repeated squaring* part, and, at most, another s multiplications and *mods* in the second part.

Since $s \sim \log_2 n$ this means it performs at most around $2 \log_2 n$ of these operations.

Compare this to the n operations it would require if we did naive exponentiation without repeated squaring.

- To put this in perspective, consider $n = 10^{120}$. This number is so big that, at current computer speeds, we would not be able to finish running the naive algorithm **before the sun died**. On the other hand, $2 \log_2 n = 240 \log_2 10 \sim 796$ so we could run the repeated squaring algorithm in **just a few seconds!**

Comment: This idea of designing *efficient* programs for solving problems and then analyzing their running times is something that you will see a lot more of in Data Structures and The Design and Analysis of Algorithms

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The Chinese Remainder Theorem

While proving the correctness of RSA, we proved the following:

If (i) $0 \leq x < n = pq$,
(ii) $x^{ed} \bmod p = x \bmod p$ and
(iii) $x^{ed} \bmod q = x \bmod q$

$$\Rightarrow x^{ed} \pmod{n} = x$$

This turns out to be a special case of a general rule:

The Chinese Remainder Theorem

The Chinese Remainder Theorem

For each $x \in Z_{15}$, write $x \bmod 3$ and $x \bmod 5$.

Is x uniquely determined by these values? Yes!

Each $x \in Z_{15}$ has a different $x \bmod 3, x \bmod 5$ pair.

Thus, the function

$$f(x) = (x \bmod 3, x \bmod 5)$$

from Z_{15} to the 15 pairs (i, j) with $0 \leq i < 3$ and $0 \leq j < 5$ is one-to-one.

$\Rightarrow x$ is uniquely determined by its pair of remainders.

x	$x \bmod 3$	$x \bmod 5$
0	0	0
1	1	1
2	2	2
3	0	3
4	1	4
5	2	0
6	0	1
7	1	2
8	2	3
9	0	4
10	1	0
11	2	1
12	0	2
13	1	3
14	2	4

Theorem 2.24 (Chinese Remainder Theorem)

If m and n are relatively prime integers, then the equations $x \bmod m = a \in Z_m$ and $x \bmod n = b \in Z_n$ have one and only one solution for an integer x between 0 and $mn - 1$.

Why is this called the Chinese Remainder Theorem?

The earliest reference known is from the Sun Tzu Suan Ching (also known as Sunzi Suanjing) written in approximately the late third century by Sun Zi. Problem 26 in the third volume of the Sun Tzu Suan Ching offers the earliest recorded description of the Chinese Remainder Problem.



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Proof: Let $f(x) = (x \bmod m, x \bmod n)$

$f : \{0, 1, 2, \dots, mn - 1\} \rightarrow$ the pairs $(a, b) : 0 \leq a < m$ and $0 \leq b < n$

To prove the theorem we must show that f is a **bijection**.

f is mapping a set of size mn to a set of size mn , so,

to prove it's a bijection, it's enough to prove that f is **onto**.

Given (a, b) we will now see how to **construct** a y s.t.

$$y \bmod m = a \text{ and } y \bmod n = b$$

y might **not** be $< mn$ but we can set $x = y \bmod (mn)$ and get

$$x < mn \text{ and (why?) } x \bmod m = a \text{ and } x \bmod n = b$$

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Proof: (cont) Let $f(x) = (x \bmod m, x \bmod n)$

Given (a, b) want y s.t. $y \bmod m = a$ and $y \bmod n = b$

- Since $\gcd(m, n) = 1$ there exists, \bar{m} s.t. $m \cdot \bar{m} = 1 \bmod n$
- Similarly there exists, \bar{n} s.t. $n \cdot \bar{n} = 1 \bmod m$
- Set $y = a\bar{n}n + b\bar{m}m$
- Then $y \bmod m = (a\bar{n}n) \bmod m = a$
 $y \bmod n = (b\bar{m}m) \bmod n = b$

done!

Theorem 2.24 (Chinese Remainder Theorem)

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Example: $m = 6, n = 11, a = 3, b = 7$

- $\bar{m} = 2$ and $\bar{n} = 5$ since

$$6 \cdot 2 \bmod 11 = 12 \bmod 11 = 1$$

$$11 \cdot 5 \bmod 6 = 55 \bmod 6 = 1$$

- Set $y = a\bar{n}n + b\bar{m}m = 3 \cdot 5 \cdot 11 + 7 \cdot 2 \cdot 6 = 249$

- $249 = 3 * 66 + 51$ so $x = y \bmod (nm) = 51$

- Reality Check:

$$\begin{aligned} 51 \bmod 6 &= 3 \\ 51 \bmod 11 &= 7 \end{aligned}$$

Theorem 2.24 (Chinese Remainder Theorem)

If m and n are relatively prime integers, then the equations $x \bmod m = a \in Z_m$ and $x \bmod n = b \in Z_n$ have one and only one solution for an integer x between 0 and $mn - 1$.

- That proof is an example of why I can't do math!
It was **magically pulled out of thin air!**
Impossible to do myself!
- It's not magic. You had **all** of the pieces already.
- Think first. You want to build y such that
 $y \bmod m = a$ and $y \bmod n = b$
- Suppose you knew α, β such that
 $\alpha \bmod m = 1, \alpha \bmod n = 0, \beta \bmod n = 1, \beta \bmod m = 0$
 $\Rightarrow y = a\alpha + b\beta$ satisfies our requirements
- such an α must be a multiple of n . But $\alpha \bmod m = 1$ then implies that $\alpha = \bar{n}n$ where $\bar{n}n \bmod m = 1$. Similarly $\beta = \bar{m}m$
 $\Rightarrow y = a\bar{n}n + b\bar{m}m$

- The textbook gives a different proof than our's.
- The book's proof, which you should also read, uses **proof by contradiction**.
- Our proof was a **constructive proof**.
We not only showed that the theorem was correct, but we did so by giving a procedure to **construct** an x satisfying the statement of the theorem.