

HAETAΕ v3.0

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KpqC Contest 2nd Round Colloquium
August 28, 2024



HAETAΕ
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CRYPTO LAB

1. Brief Intro:

- Introduction

2. Advantages:

- Complete Quantum Security Analysis
- Unique and Efficient Design
- Small Sizes

3. HAETAE Update v3.0:

- Updates

HAETAE

- Digital signature scheme secure against **quantum attacks!**
 - based on **lattice hard problems** MLWE and MSIS
 - follows **Fiat-Shamir with aborts** framework, secure in QROM
- Simple but **short!**
 - simpler than Falcon¹ & shorter than Dilithium¹
 - optimal rejection rate with simple rejection condition
- **Unique** design rationale
 - **Bimodal Hyperball** rejection sampling
 - **New** size optimization and implementation techniques
- Candidate in *KpqC 2nd round & NIST PQC Additional Signatures*²

¹NIST 2022 PQC signature standards

²NIST's on-ramp PQC signature competition, from 2023.



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
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
HAETAE is based on *Fiat-Shamir with Aborts (FSwA)* as ML-DSA (Dilithium).



- Well-studied quantum/classical security analyses [KLS18, GHHM21, DFPS23].
 - A complete security analysis of HAETAE is provided from v2.0.
- Side-channel security analysis
 - Constant-time implementation is provided from v2.0.
 - Analysis on masked implementation
 - Simpler than Hash-and-Sign signatures (Falcon, Mitaka, ...)
 - Fully fixed-point!

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
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HAETAE Design

We combine the recent approaches:

- **Fiat-Shamir with Aborts** framework
- **Bimodal** rejection sampling
- randomness sampling from **Hyperball** distribution

⇒ Unique design of **Bimodal Hyperball**-based rejection sampling



Figure: Rejection from Left (Bimodal Hyperball) to Right (Hyperball)

with **NEW** techniques:

- Secret key rejections
- Bimodal verification key truncation
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
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HAETAE Sizes

HAETAE is the **smallest** among **Fiat-Shamir with Aborts (FSwA)** lattice signature.

Scheme	vk	sig	sum
HAETAE-120	992	1,474	2,466
HAETAE-180	1,472	2,349	3,821
HAETAE-260	2,080	2,948	5,028
Dilithium-2	1,312	2,420	3,732
Dilithium-3	1,952	3,293	5,245
Dilithium-5	2,592	4,595	7,187
Patronus-2	832	2,070	2,902
Patronus-3	1,152	2,575	3,727
Patronus-5	1,632	3,721	5,353



- Patronus (C'24) [BBS24]: replace hyperball by hyper-polytope.
- HAETAE-120 fits into one TCP or UDP datagram ($\text{sig} + \text{vk} \leq 3,000\text{B}$).

HAETAE Sizes




Figure: NIST standards and KpqC round 2 signatures

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HAETAE was updated last July!

- Private key size of SPEC. missing 32 bytes.
- Reduced B' (by 0.01) to satisfy Lemma 5.
 - Thanks to Nari Lee, Hansol Ryu, and Hochang Lee:
 - The previous B' did not satisfy Lemma 5 due to rounding error.
 - Negligible impact on the implementation/performance.
- Improved key generation procedure (40-60% reduced cycles)
 - Replace the 512-point FFT with a 256-point FFT.
 - No impact on security/sizes via equivalent equations.

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Thank You!

HAETAE will be presented at CHES 2024, Halifax, Canada!

<https://doi.org/10.46586/tches.v2024.i3.25-75>

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