

Binary Sessions + DbC

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- ▶ An extension of FuSe with dynamically checked contracts that states properties¹
 - ▶ about exchanged messages
 - ▶ the structure of the protocol

¹M., Luca Padovani: Chaperone contracts for higher-order sessions. PACMPL 1(ICFP).

FuSe + Service channels (shared channels)

```
module type Service = sig
  type  $\alpha$  t
  val register : (( $\beta$ ,  $\alpha$ ) st  $\rightarrow$  unit)  $\rightarrow$  ( $\alpha$ ,  $\beta$ ) st t
  val connect  : ( $\alpha$ ,  $\beta$ ) st t  $\rightarrow$  ( $\alpha$ ,  $\beta$ ) st
end
```

- ▶ α is the session type from the client's viewpoint
- ▶ **register** f creates a new shared channel and registers the service f to it.
 - ▶ Each connection spawns a new thread running f
 - ▶ returns the shared channel
- ▶ **connect** ch connects with the service on the shared channel ch
 - ▶ return the client endpoint of the established session.

FuSe + Service channels (shared channels)

Roots of a polynomial

```
let server ep =  
  let p, ep = receive ep in  
  let root = ... in  
  let ep = send root ep in  
  close ep  
  
let math_service = register server
```

```
val server : ?poly.!float.end → unit  
val math_service : !poly.?float.end Service.t
```

```
let user () =  
  let ep = connect math_service in  
  let ep = send (from_list [2.0; -3.0; 1.0]) ep in  
  let _, ep = receive ep in  
  close ep
```

FuSe + Service channels

```
module type Service =  
  type  $\alpha$  t  
  val register : (( $\beta$ ,  $\alpha$ ) st  $\rightarrow$  unit)  $\rightarrow$  ( $\alpha$ ,  $\beta$ ) st t  
  val connect : ( $\alpha$ ,  $\beta$ ) st t  $\rightarrow$  ( $\alpha$ ,  $\beta$ ) st  
end
```

```
module Service : ServiceSig = struct  
  type  $\alpha$  t = UnsafeChannel.t  
  
  let register f =  
    let ch = UnsafeChannel.create () in  
    let rec server () =  
      let _ = Thread.create f (UnsafeChannel.receive ch) in  
      server ()  
    in  
    let _ = Thread.create server () in ch  
  
  let connect ch =  
    let a, b = FuSe.create () in  
    UnsafeChannel.send a ch;  
    b  
end
```

A simple FuSe program + Contracts

Roots of a polynomial

```
let server ep =  
  let p, ep = receive ep in  
  let root = ... in (* assumes p is a linear equation *)  
  let ep = send root ep in  
  close ep  
  
let math_service = register server contract "Server"  
  (*service with a contract and a blame label *)  
  
let user () =  
  let ep = connect math_service "Client" in  
  let ep = send (from_list [2.0; -3.0; 1.0]) ep in  
  let _, ep = receive ep in  
  close ep
```

Language for Contracts

Constructors

`flat_c` : $(t \rightarrow \text{bool}) \rightarrow \text{con}(t)$ $t :: \omega$

`send_c` : $\text{con}(t) \rightarrow \text{con}(T) \rightarrow \text{con}(!t.T)$

`receive_c` : $\text{con}(t) \rightarrow \text{con}(T) \rightarrow \text{con}(?t.T)$

`end_c` : $\text{con}(\text{end})$

Dependent Contracts

Roots of a polynomial

```
let degree p = ... (* computes the degree of a polynomial *)  
let contract = send_c (flat_c (fun p → degree p == 1)) @@  
... (* contract for the continuation *)
```


Contracts

Roots of a polynomial

```
let contract = send_c (flat_c (fun p → degree p == 1)) @@  
                receive_c (flat_c (fun _ → true)) @@  
                end_c
```

- ▶ The continuation does not impose any restriction to the communication protocol
- ▶ ... but tedious to write

any_c

Constructors

```
flat_c : (t → bool) → con(t)           t :: ω  
  
send_c : con(t) → con(T) → con(!t.T)  
receive_c : con(t) → con(T) → con(?t.T)  
  
end_c : con(end)  
  
any_c : con(α)
```

Roots of a polynomial

```
let contract = send_c (flat_c (fun p → degree p == 1)) @@  
                  any_c (* trivial contract *)
```

- ▶ Can we give some guarantee about the response?
- ▶ We would like to specify that the response is a root of the polynomial

Dependent Contracts

Constructors

`flat_c` : $(t \rightarrow \text{bool}) \rightarrow \text{con}(t)$ $t :: \omega$

`send_c` : $\text{con}(t) \rightarrow \text{con}(T) \rightarrow \text{con}(!t.T)$

`receive_c` : $\text{con}(t) \rightarrow \text{con}(T) \rightarrow \text{con}(?t.T)$

`end_c` : $\text{con}(\text{end})$

`any_c` : $\text{con}(\alpha)$

`send_d` : $\text{con}(t) \rightarrow (t \rightarrow \text{con}(T)) \rightarrow \text{con}(!t.T)$ $t :: \omega$

`receive_d` : $\text{con}(t) \rightarrow (t \rightarrow \text{con}(T)) \rightarrow \text{con}(?t.T)$ $t :: \omega$

Contracts

Roots of a polynomial

```
let root_of p r = ... (* check if r is a root of p *)

let contract = send_d (flat_c (fun p → degree p == 1)) @@
  fun p → receive_c (flat_c (root_of p)) @@
  end_c
```

Contracts for choices

Simplified version of choices

$\text{left} : T \oplus S \rightarrow T$
 $\text{right} : T \oplus S \rightarrow S$
 $\text{branch} : T \& S \rightarrow T + S$

```
type  $\alpha + \beta = [ \text{Left of } \alpha \mid \text{Right of } \beta ]$   
val left :  $(\emptyset, (\rho_1, \sigma_1) \text{ st} + (\rho_2, \sigma_2) \text{ st}) \rightarrow (\sigma_1, \rho_1) \text{ st}$   
val right :  $(\emptyset, (\rho_1, \sigma_1) \text{ st} + (\rho_2, \sigma_2) \text{ st}) \rightarrow (\sigma_2, \rho_2) \text{ st}$   
val branch :  $((\rho_1, \sigma_1) \text{ st} + (\rho_2, \sigma_2) \text{ st}, \emptyset) \rightarrow (\rho_1, \sigma_1) \text{ st} + (\rho_2, \sigma_2) \text{ st}$ 
```

```
let left ep = send true ep  
let right ep = send false ep  
let branch ep =  
  use ep;  
  if UnsafeChannel.receive ep.channel  
  then Left (fresh ep)  
  else Right (fresh ep)
```

Contracts for choices

Constructors

`flat_c` : $(t \rightarrow \text{bool}) \rightarrow \text{con}(t)$ $t :: \omega$

`send_c` : $\text{con}(t) \rightarrow \text{con}(T) \rightarrow \text{con}(!t.T)$

`receive_c` : $\text{con}(t) \rightarrow \text{con}(T) \rightarrow \text{con}(?t.T)$

`end_c` : $\text{con}(\text{end})$

`any_c` : $\text{con}(\alpha)$

`send_d` : $\text{con}(t) \rightarrow (t \rightarrow \text{con}(T)) \rightarrow \text{con}(!t.T)$ $t :: \omega$

`receive_d` : $\text{con}(t) \rightarrow (t \rightarrow \text{con}(T)) \rightarrow \text{con}(?t.T)$ $t :: \omega$

`choice_c` : $\text{con}(\text{bool}) \rightarrow \text{con}(T) \rightarrow \text{con}(S) \rightarrow \text{con}(T \oplus S)$


`branch_c` : $\text{con}(\text{bool}) \rightarrow \text{con}(T) \rightarrow \text{con}(S) \rightarrow \text{con}(T \& S)$

Contracts for choices

Roots of a polynomial

```
let server ep =  
  let p, ep = receive ep in  
  (* it sends as many messages as the real roots of p *)  
  ...  
val server : ?poly.rec A.(!float.A  $\oplus$  end)-> unit  
  
let contract =  
  send_d (flat_c (fun p  $\rightarrow$  degree p > 0)) @@  
  fun p  $\rightarrow$   
    let rec missing_roots n =  
      if n > 0 then  
        branch_c  
          any_c  
            (receive_c (flat_c (root_of p)) @@  
              missing_roots (n - 1))  
          end_c  
      else  
        branch_c (flat_c not) any_c end_c  
    in missing_roots (degree p)
```

First order interaction and blame



```
x : ?int. ?int. end
```

```
src_c = any_c
```

```
y : !int. !int. ?int. end
```

```
op_c = send_c any_c @@
```

```
send_c (flat_c ((<>) 0)) @@
```

```
receive_c (flat_c (>= 0)) @@ end_c
```



First order interaction and blame

First order user

```
let user () =  
  let x = connect source_chan "User" in  
  let y = connect operator_chan "User" in  
  let v1, x = receive x in  
  let v2, x = receive x in  
  let y = send v1 y in  
  let y = send v2 y in  
  let w, y = receive y in  
  print_int w; close x; close y
```

Which party should be blamed if $v2 < 0$? User

Higher-order communication and blame



```
x : ?int.?int.end
```

```
src_c = any_c
```

```
y : !(?int.?int.end).?int.end
```

```
op_c = send_c d_c @@  
      receive_c (flat_c ((<=) 0)) @@  
      end_c  
d_c = receive_c any_c @@  
      receive_c (flat_c ((<>) 0)) @@  
      end_c
```

Higher-order communication and blame

Delegating user

```
let user_deleg () =  
  let x = connect source_chan "User" in  
  let y = connect operator_deleg_chan "User" in  
  let y = send x y in  
  let res, y = receive y in  
  print_int res; close y
```

Which party should be blamed if the second value generated by `source_chan` is negative? **User** (despite it is not involved in the communication)

Syntax

Expression	$e ::= v$	value
	x	variable
	$e_1 e_2$	application
	$\text{let } x, y = e_1 \text{ in } e_2$	pair splitting
	$\text{case } e \text{ of } e_1 \mid e_2$	case analysis
	$\text{mon}^{k,l}(e_2, e_1)$	monitor
	$v \triangleleft^k e$	busy monitor
Value	$\text{blame } k$	blame
	$v, w, \kappa_1, \kappa_2 ::= \mathbf{c}^n v_1 \cdots v_n$	applied constant
	$\lambda x. e$	abstraction
	ε	endpoint
Process	$P, Q ::= \langle e \rangle_k$	thread
	$P \parallel Q$	composition
	$a \Leftarrow_{\kappa_1}^{\kappa} v$	service
	$(\nu a)^P$	session
Endpoint	$\varepsilon ::= a^p$	lone endpoint
	$\text{mon}^{k,l}(\kappa_1, \varepsilon)$	monitored endpoint

Constants

c^n	n	max	Sugared	Description
$()$	0			unit
true, false	0			boolean values
pair	2		(v, w)	pair creation
inl, inr	1			left/right injection
fix	0			fixpoint combinator
connect	0			initiate session
close	0			terminate session
receive	0			input
send	1			output
branch	0			offer choice
left	0			choose left
right	0			choose right
flat_c	1			flat contract
end_c	0			closed endpoint
receive_c	2		$? \kappa_1 . \kappa_2$	non-dependent input
send_c	2		$! \kappa_1 . \kappa_2$	non-dependent output
receive_d	2		$? \kappa_1 \mapsto w$	dependent input
send_d	2		$! \kappa_1 \mapsto w$	dependent output
branch_c	3		$? \kappa_1 \mapsto \kappa_2 : \kappa_3$	external choice
choice_c	3		$! \kappa_1 \mapsto \kappa_2 : \kappa_3$	internal choice
dual	0			compute dual contract

Typing of λCoS

Types

Session Type $T, S ::= \text{end} \mid !t.T \mid ?t.T \mid T \oplus S \mid T \& S$

Type $t, s ::= \text{unit} \mid \text{bool} \mid t \rightarrow^{\iota} s \mid t + s \mid T \mid \text{con}(t) \mid t \times s \mid \#T$

Kind $\iota ::= 1 \mid \omega$

Type schemes of λCoS constants

```

    () : unit
true, false : bool
    pair :  $t \rightarrow s \rightarrow^{\iota} t \times s$   $t :: \iota$ 
    inl :  $t \rightarrow t + s$ 
    inr :  $s \rightarrow t + s$ 
    close : end  $\rightarrow$  unit
    send :  $t \rightarrow !t. T \rightarrow^{\iota} T$   $t :: \iota$ 
    receive :  $?t. T \rightarrow t \times T$ 
    left :  $T \oplus S \rightarrow T$ 
    right :  $T \oplus S \rightarrow S$ 
    branch :  $T \& S \rightarrow T + S$ 
    connect :  $\#T \rightarrow T$ 
    flat_c :  $(t \rightarrow \text{bool}) \rightarrow \text{con}(t)$   $t :: \omega$ 
    end_c :  $\text{con}(\text{end})$ 
    send_c :  $\text{con}(t) \rightarrow \text{con}(T) \rightarrow \text{con}(!t. T)$ 
    receive_c :  $\text{con}(t) \rightarrow \text{con}(T) \rightarrow \text{con}(?t. T)$ 
    send_d :  $\text{con}(t) \rightarrow (t \rightarrow \text{con}(T)) \rightarrow \text{con}(!t. T)$   $t :: \omega$ 
    receive_d :  $\text{con}(t) \rightarrow (t \rightarrow \text{con}(T)) \rightarrow \text{con}(?t. T)$   $t :: \omega$ 
    choice_c :  $\text{con}(\text{bool}) \rightarrow \text{con}(T) \rightarrow \text{con}(S) \rightarrow \text{con}(T \oplus S)$ 
    branch_c :  $\text{con}(\text{bool}) \rightarrow \text{con}(T) \rightarrow \text{con}(S) \rightarrow \text{con}(T \& S)$ 
    dual :  $\text{con}(T) \rightarrow \text{con}(\overline{T})$ 
```

Typing

Typing rules for expressions

$$\boxed{\Gamma \vdash e : t}$$

[t-const]

$$\frac{t \in \text{typeof}(\mathbf{c}) \quad \Gamma :: \omega}{\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{c} : t}$$

[t-name]

$$\frac{\Gamma :: \omega}{\Gamma, u : t \vdash u : t}$$

[t-fun]

$$\frac{\Gamma, x : t \vdash e : s \quad \Gamma :: \iota}{\Gamma \vdash \lambda x. e : t \rightarrow^{\iota} s}$$

[t-app]

$$\frac{\Gamma_1 \vdash e_1 : t \rightarrow^{\iota} s \quad \Gamma_2 \vdash e_2 : t}{\Gamma_1 + \Gamma_2 \vdash e_1 e_2 : s}$$

[t-split]

$$\frac{\Gamma_1 \vdash e_1 : t_1 \times t_2 \quad \Gamma_2, x : t_1, y : t_2 \vdash e_2 : t}{\Gamma_1 + \Gamma_2 \vdash \mathbf{let} \ x, y = e_1 \ \mathbf{in} \ e_2 : t}$$

[t-case]

$$\frac{\Gamma_1 \vdash e : t_1 + t_2 \quad \Gamma_2 \vdash e_i : t_i \rightarrow^{\iota_i} t \ (i=1,2)}{\Gamma_1 + \Gamma_2 \vdash \mathbf{case} \ e \ \mathbf{of} \ e_1 \mid e_2 : t}$$

[t-blame]

$$\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{blame} \ k : t$$

[t-monitor]

$$\frac{\Gamma_1 \vdash e_1 : t \quad \Gamma_2 \vdash e_2 : \text{con}(t)}{\Gamma_1 + \Gamma_2 \vdash \text{mon}^{k,l}(e_2, e_1) : t}$$

[t-busy-monitor]

$$\frac{\Gamma_1 \vdash e : \mathbf{bool} \quad \Gamma_2 \vdash v : t}{\Gamma_1 + \Gamma_2 \vdash v \triangleleft^k e : t}$$

Typing

Typing rules for processes

$$\boxed{\Gamma \vdash P}$$

[t-thread]

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash e : \text{unit}}{\Gamma \vdash \langle e \rangle_k}$$

[t-par]

$$\frac{\Gamma_i \vdash P_i \quad (i=1,2)}{\Gamma_1 + \Gamma_2 \vdash P_1 \parallel P_2}$$

[t-session]

$$\frac{\Gamma, a^+ : T, a^- : \overline{T} \vdash P}{\Gamma \vdash (\nu a)P}$$

[t-service]

$$\frac{\emptyset \vdash \kappa_1 : \text{con}(T) \quad \Gamma \vdash v : \overline{T} \rightarrow \text{unit}}{\Gamma + a : \#T \vdash a \Leftarrow_k^{\kappa_1} v}$$

Reduction of expressions (1)

[r – beta]	$(\lambda x. e) v \rightarrow e\{v/x\}$
[r – split]	$\text{let } x, y = (v, w) \text{ in } e \rightarrow e\{v, w/x, y\}$
[r – inl]	$\text{case inl } v \text{ of } e_1 \mid e_2 \rightarrow e_1 v$
[r – inr]	$\text{case inr } v \text{ of } e_1 \mid e_2 \rightarrow e_2 v$
[r – flat]	$\text{mon}^{k,l}(\text{flat_c } w, v) \rightarrow v \triangleleft^k wv$
[r – true]	$v \triangleleft^k \text{true} \rightarrow v$
[r – false]	$v \triangleleft^k \text{false} \rightarrow \text{blame } k$
[r – context]	$\mathcal{E}[e] \rightarrow \mathcal{E}[e'] \quad \text{if } e \rightarrow e'$

$\mathcal{E} ::= [] \mid \mathcal{E}e \mid v\mathcal{E} \mid \text{mon}^\sigma(e, \mathcal{E}) \mid v \triangleleft^k \mathcal{E} \mid \text{let } x, y = \mathcal{E} \text{ in } e \mid \text{case } \mathcal{E} \text{ of } e_1 \mid e_2 \mid \text{mon}^\sigma(\mathcal{E}, v)$

Session establishment

$$[r - \text{connect}]$$

$$\left(\langle \mathcal{E}[\text{connect } a] \rangle_k \right) \left(a \Leftarrow_I^{\kappa_1} v \right) \rightarrow (\nu b) \left(\langle \mathcal{E}[\text{mon}^{l,k}(\kappa_1, b^+)] \rangle_k \right) \left(\langle v \text{ mon}^{k,l}(\text{dual } \kappa_1, b^-) \rangle_l \right) \parallel a \Leftarrow_I^{\kappa_1} v \quad b \text{ fresh}$$

$$\mathcal{E} ::= [] \mid \mathcal{E} e \mid v \mathcal{E} \mid \text{mon}^\sigma(e, \mathcal{E}) \mid v \triangleleft^k \mathcal{E} \mid \text{let } x, y = \mathcal{E} \text{ in } e \mid \text{case } \mathcal{E} \text{ of } e_1 \mid e_2 \mid \text{mon}^\sigma(\mathcal{E}, v)$$

Reduction of expressions (2)

[d – end]	$\text{dual } \text{end_c} \rightarrow \text{end_c}$
[d – send – c]	$\text{dual } !\kappa_1.\kappa_2 \rightarrow ?\kappa_1.(\text{dual } \kappa_2)$
[d – receive – c]	$\text{dual } ?\kappa_1.\kappa_2 \rightarrow !\kappa_1.(\text{dual } \kappa_2)$
[d – send – d]	$\text{dual } !\kappa_1 \mapsto w \rightarrow ?\kappa_1 \mapsto (\lambda x. \text{dual } (wx))$
[d – receive – d]	$\text{dual } ?\kappa_1 \mapsto w \rightarrow !\kappa_1 \mapsto (\lambda x. \text{dual } (wx))$
[d – choice]	$\text{dual } !\kappa_1 \mapsto \kappa_2:\kappa_3 \rightarrow ?\kappa_1 \mapsto (\text{dual } \kappa_2):(\text{dual } \kappa_3)$
[d – branch]	$\text{dual } ?\kappa_1 \mapsto \kappa_2:\kappa_3 \rightarrow !\kappa_1 \mapsto (\text{dual } \kappa_2):(\text{dual } \kappa_3)$

$$\mathcal{E} ::= [] \mid \mathcal{E}e \mid v\mathcal{E} \mid \text{mon}^\sigma(e, \mathcal{E}) \mid v\triangleleft^k \mathcal{E} \mid \text{let } x, y = \mathcal{E} \text{ in } e \mid \text{case } \mathcal{E} \text{ of } e_1 \mid e_2 \mid \text{mon}^\sigma(\mathcal{E}, v)$$

Communication (simplified)

$$\begin{aligned}
 & [r - \text{comm}] \\
 & \left(\langle \mathcal{E}[\text{send } v \text{ mon}^\sigma(!\kappa_1.\kappa_2, a^p)] \rangle_k \right) \rightarrow \\
 & \left(\langle \mathcal{E}'[\text{receive mon}^\varrho(? \kappa_3.\kappa_4, a^{\bar{p}})] \rangle_l \right) \\
 & \qquad \qquad \qquad \left(\langle \mathcal{E}[\text{mon}^\sigma(\kappa_2, a^p)] \rangle_k \right. \\
 & \qquad \qquad \qquad \left. \langle \mathcal{E}'[(\text{mon}^\varrho(\kappa_3, \text{mon}^{-\sigma}(\kappa_1, v)), \text{mon}^\varrho(\kappa_4, a^{\bar{p}}))] \rangle_l \right)
 \end{aligned}$$

where $\neg(k, l) = l, k$

- ▶ Note that v can be of a non basic type, hence the monitor cannot be evaluated.
- ▶ Endpoints have a stack of monitors

$$\text{mon}^{\vec{\sigma}}(\vec{\kappa}, e) \quad \text{for} \quad \text{mon}^{\sigma_n}(\kappa_n, \dots \text{mon}^{\sigma_1}(\kappa_1, e) \dots)$$

$$\text{mon}^{\vec{\sigma}}(\vec{\kappa}, e) \quad \text{for} \quad \text{mon}^{\sigma_1}(\kappa_1, \dots \text{mon}^{\sigma_n}(\kappa_n, e) \dots)$$

Communication

[r - comm]

$$\left(\begin{array}{l} \langle \mathcal{E}[\text{send } v \text{ mon}^{\vec{\sigma}}(\overrightarrow{! \kappa_1 . \kappa_2}, a^p)] \rangle_k \\ \langle \mathcal{E}'[\text{receive mon}^{\vec{\theta}}(\overrightarrow{? \kappa_3 . \kappa_4}, a^{\bar{p}})] \rangle_l \end{array} \right) \rightarrow \left(\begin{array}{l} \langle \mathcal{E}[\text{mon}^{\vec{\sigma}}(\overrightarrow{\kappa_2}, a^p)] \rangle_k \\ \langle \mathcal{E}'[(\text{mon}^{\vec{\theta}}(\overrightarrow{\kappa_3}, \text{mon}^{\overleftarrow{\sigma}}(\overleftarrow{\kappa_1}, v)), \text{mon}^{\vec{\theta}}(\overrightarrow{\kappa_4}, a^{\bar{p}}))] \rangle_l \end{array} \right)$$

Dependent communication

[r – comm – d]

$$\left(\langle \mathcal{E}[\text{send } v \text{ mon}^{\vec{\sigma}}(\overrightarrow{! \kappa_1 \mapsto w_1}, a^p)] \rangle_k \right. \\ \left. \langle \mathcal{E}'[\text{receive mon}^{\vec{\theta}}(\overrightarrow{? \kappa_2 \mapsto w_2}, a^{\bar{p}})] \rangle_l \right) \rightarrow$$

$$\left(\langle \mathcal{E}[\text{mon}^{\vec{\sigma}}(\overrightarrow{w_1} v, a^p)] \rangle_k \right. \\ \left. \langle \mathcal{E}'[(\text{mon}^{\vec{\theta}}(\overrightarrow{\kappa_2}, \text{mon}^{\overleftarrow{\sigma}}(\overleftarrow{\kappa_1}, v)), \text{mon}^{\vec{\theta}}(\overrightarrow{w_2} v, a^{\bar{p}}))] \rangle_l \right)$$

Choices

[r – left]

$$\left(\begin{array}{l} \langle \mathcal{E}[\text{left mon}^{\vec{\sigma}}(\overrightarrow{! \kappa_1 \mapsto \kappa_2 : \kappa_3}, a^p)] \rangle_k \\ \langle \mathcal{E}'[\text{branch mon}^{\vec{\theta}}(\overrightarrow{? \kappa_4 \mapsto \kappa_5 : \kappa_6}, a^{\bar{p}})] \rangle_l \end{array} \right) \rightarrow$$

$$\left(\begin{array}{l} \langle \mathcal{E}[\text{mon}^{\vec{\sigma}}(\overrightarrow{\kappa_2}, a^p)] \rangle_k \\ \langle \mathcal{E}'[(\lambda_-.\text{inl mon}^{\vec{\theta}}(\overrightarrow{\kappa_5}, a^{\bar{p}})) \text{ mon}^{\vec{\theta}}(\overrightarrow{\kappa_4}, \text{mon}^{-\sigma}(\overrightarrow{\kappa_1}, \text{true}))] \rangle_l \end{array} \right)$$

[r – right]

$$\left(\begin{array}{l} \langle \mathcal{E}[\text{right mon}^{\vec{\sigma}}(\overrightarrow{! \kappa_1 \mapsto \kappa_2 : \kappa_3}, a^p)] \rangle_k \\ \langle \mathcal{E}'[\text{branch mon}^{\vec{\theta}}(\overrightarrow{? \kappa_4 \mapsto \kappa_5 : \kappa_6}, a^{\bar{p}})] \rangle_l \end{array} \right) \rightarrow$$

$$\left(\begin{array}{l} \langle \mathcal{E}[\text{mon}^{\vec{\sigma}}(\overrightarrow{\kappa_2}, a^p)] \rangle_k \\ \langle \mathcal{E}'[(\lambda_-.\text{inr mon}^{\vec{\theta}}(\overrightarrow{\kappa_5}, a^{\bar{p}})) \text{ mon}^{\vec{\theta}}(\overrightarrow{\kappa_4}, \text{mon}^{-\sigma}(\overrightarrow{\kappa_1}, \text{false}))] \rangle_l \end{array} \right)$$

Session termination

[r – close]

$$(\nu a) \left(\begin{array}{l} \langle \mathcal{E}[\text{close mon}^{\vec{\sigma}}(\overrightarrow{\text{end_c}}, a^+)] \rangle_k \\ \langle \mathcal{E}'[\text{close mon}^{\vec{\theta}}(\overrightarrow{\text{end_c}}, a^-)] \rangle_l \end{array} \right) \rightarrow \langle \mathcal{E}[] \rangle_k \parallel \langle \mathcal{E}'[] \rangle_l$$

Properties

Subject reduction

- ▶ If $\Gamma :: \omega$ and $\Gamma \vdash P$ and $P \rightarrow Q$, then $\Gamma \vdash Q$.
- ▶ If Γ is balanced and $\Gamma \vdash P$ and $P \rightarrow Q$, then there exists Γ' such that $\Gamma \rightarrow^* \Gamma'$ and $\Gamma' \vdash Q$.

Blame safety

Goal

- ▶ to ensure that a process that *honours its contracts* cannot be blamed
 - ▶ Roughly, if a process sends a value, it is one accepted by the contracts of the monitored channel.
 - ▶ ... the formal definition is involved because of dependent contracts and delegation

Contract entailment

$\kappa_1 \leq \kappa_2$ if each value that satisfies κ_1 also satisfies κ_2

$\text{flat_c } (\geq 3) \leq \text{flat_c } (\geq 0)$

Contract entailment

$e_1 \leq e_2$ implies either:

1. $e_1 \Downarrow \text{flat_c } w_1$ and $e_2 \Downarrow \text{flat_c } w_2$ and for every $v \in w_1$ we have $v \in w_2$, or
2. $e_1 \Downarrow \text{end_c}$ and $e_2 \Downarrow \text{end_c}$, or
3. $e_1 \Downarrow !\kappa_1 . \kappa_2$ and $e_2 \Downarrow !\kappa_3 . \kappa_4$ and $\kappa_3 \leq \kappa_1$ and $\kappa_2 \leq \kappa_4$, or
4. ...

Locally correctness

$k \mathcal{C} P$: k is (locally) correct in P

1. $P = \mathcal{P}_k[\text{send } v \text{ mon}'\text{'-}(!\text{flat_c } w \cdot _, _)]$ implies $v \in w$, and
2. $P = \mathcal{P}_k[\text{send } v \text{ mon}'\text{'-}(!\text{flat_c } w \mapsto _, _)]$ implies $v \in w$, and
3. $P = \mathcal{P}_k[\text{send mon}'\text{'-}(\kappa_1, \varepsilon) \text{ mon}'\text{'-}(!\kappa_2 \cdot _, _)]$ implies $\kappa_1 \leq \kappa_2$, and
4. $P = \mathcal{P}_k[\text{left mon}'\text{'-}(!\text{flat_c } w \mapsto _:_, _)]$ implies $\text{true} \in w$, and
5. $P = \mathcal{P}_k[\text{right mon}'\text{'-}(!\text{flat_c } w \mapsto _:_, _)]$ implies $\text{false} \in w$, and
6. $P \rightarrow Q$ implies $k \mathcal{C} Q$.

$$\mathcal{P}_k ::= \langle \mathcal{E} \rangle_k \mid (\mathcal{P}_k \parallel P) \mid (P \parallel \mathcal{P}_k) \mid (\nu a) \mathcal{P}_k$$

Property

Blame safety

If $\Gamma \vdash P$ where P is a user process and k is locally correct in P , then $P \rightarrow^* Q$ implies `blame` $k \not\in Q$.

Implementation of contracts

GADT for contracts

```
type [_] =  
  | Flat      : ( $\alpha \rightarrow \text{bool}$ )  $\rightarrow$  [ $\alpha$ ]  
  | End       : [ $\text{end}$ ]  
  | Receive   : [ $\alpha$ ]  $\times$  ( $\alpha \rightarrow [A]$ )  $\rightarrow$  [ $? \alpha.A$ ]  
  | Send      : [ $\alpha$ ]  $\times$  ( $\alpha \rightarrow [A]$ )  $\rightarrow$  [ $! \alpha.A$ ]  
  | Branch    : [ $\text{bool}$ ]  $\times$  [ $A$ ]  $\times$  [ $B$ ]  $\rightarrow$  [ $A \& B$ ]  
  | Choice    : [ $\text{bool}$ ]  $\times$  [ $A$ ]  $\times$  [ $B$ ]  $\rightarrow$  [ $A \oplus B$ ]
```

Implementation of contracts

Contract primitives

```
let flat_c w = Flat w
let any_c = Flat (fun _ → true)
let receive_d k f = Receive (k, f)
let receive_c k1 k2 = receive_d k1 (fun _ → k2)
...
```


Implementation of contracts

Monitored endpoint

```
type A mt =  
  | Channel of linearity_tag_type × A st  
  | Monitor of [ $\alpha, \beta$ ] × string × string × ( $\alpha, \beta$ )
```

Implementation of contracts

Implementation of primitives

```
let rec send v =  
  function  
  | Channel (lin, ep) → Channel (lin, FuSe.send v ep)  
  | Monitor (Send (k, w), pos, neg, ep) →  
    wrap (w v) pos neg (send (wrap k neg pos v) ep)  
  | Monitor (Flat _, _, _, _) → assert false (*IMPOSSIBLE*)  
  
let wrap : type a. [a] → string → string → a → a  
= fun k pos neg v →  
  match k with  
  | Flat w          → if unlimited v && w v  
                      then v else raise (Blame pos)  
  | End as k        → Monitor (k, pos, neg, v)  
  | Receive _ as k  → Monitor (k, pos, neg, v)  
  | Send _ as k     → Monitor (k, pos, neg, v)  
  | Branch _ as k   → Monitor (k, pos, neg, v)  
  | Choice _ as k   → Monitor (k, pos, neg, v)
```