

# **Quantifying the Return on Investment (ROI) of Campaign Contributions**

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# Introduction

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- Propose Question

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- † All-Pay Auction

## Relevant Literature

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- Buying Supermajorities (Groseclose & Synder, 1996).

## Relevant Literature (Continued)

- Measuring Campaign Spending Effects in U.S. House Elections (Jacobson, 2004).

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- Measuring Campaign Spending Effects in U.S. House Elections (Jacobson, 2004).
- Why Is There So Little Money in U.S. Politics? (Ansolabehere et al., 2003).

# Data

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- cand: 23,379 rows, contrib: 97,864,851 rows, donor: 8,720,783 rows

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## ❁ Subsetting, Aggregating, Cleaning

# Empirical Specifications

## Logistic:

$$\Pr(W_i = 1 \mid S_i, OS, \mathbf{X}_i) = \text{logit}^{-1}(\beta_0 + \beta_1 \log S_i - \beta_2 \log OS + \beta_3^\top \mathbf{X}_i)$$

- ❖  $\beta_0$  is the intercept.
- ❖  $\beta_1$  captures how a candidate's own spending affects log-odds of winning.
- ❖  $\beta_2$  captures how an opponent's spending affects log-odds of winning.
- ❖  $\mathbf{X}_i$  are other covariates with coefficients  $\beta_3$ .

# Empirical Specifications (Continued)

Linear:

$$VS_i = \beta_0 + \sum_{k=1}^K \beta_k X_{ik} + \varepsilon_i,$$

- ❖  $X_{ik}$  is the  $k$ th explanatory variable (e.g., total receipts, incumbency, number of donors, party–district fixed effects, etc.).
- ❖  $\beta_k$  is the marginal effect of covariate  $X_{ik}$  on vote share.
- ❖  $\varepsilon_i \sim (0, \sigma^2)$  is the error term.

# Empirical Specifications (Continued)

## Generalized Additive Models:

$$VS_i = \beta_0 + \sum_{j=1}^p s_j(X_{ij}) + \sum_{\ell=p+1}^K \beta_{\ell} X_{i\ell} + \varepsilon_i,$$

$$\Pr(\text{Win}_i = 1 \mid \mathbf{X}_i) = \frac{\exp\left(\beta_0 + \sum_{j=1}^p s_j(X_{ij}) + \sum_{\ell=p+1}^K \beta_{\ell} X_{i\ell}\right)}{1 + \exp\left(\beta_0 + \sum_{j=1}^p s_j(X_{ij}) + \sum_{\ell=p+1}^K \beta_{\ell} X_{i\ell}\right)}.$$

- ❖  $\beta_0$  is the intercept.
- ❖  $s_j(\cdot)$  is a smooth function of the continuous covariate  $X_{ij}$ .
- ❖  $X_{i,p+1}, \dots, X_{iK}$  may include discrete or dummy variables with linear coefficients  $\beta_{p+1}, \dots, \beta_K$

## Empirical Specifications (Continued)

### Ensemble Methods w/ SHAP

- ❖ Random Forest
- ❖ Gradient Boosting
- ❖ SHAP values

## Empirical Specifications (Continued)

### Model Evaluation & Metrics

- ☆ Logistic: AUC-ROC, accuracy, precision/recall.
- ☆ OLS/GAM: adjusted  $R^2$ , RMSE.
- ☆ ML methods: out-of-sample AUC (classification) or RMSE (regression); compare to baseline methods.



## Next Steps

- ✓ Data Preparation
- ✓ Model Specification/Estimation
- ✓ Result Interpretation
- ✓ Summarize

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