



100% Functional Coverage with Formal Methodology

Suckheui Chung Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) suckheui.chung@amd.com

September 24, 2015 SNUG Boston







Agenda

Functional Coverage

Verification Challenge

Implementation

Debug

Conclusion





- Challenging goal: 100% functional coverage
 - What does this mean to the formal verification?
- 2 things need to be emphasized

Functional Coverage

- Verification of "specification" against RTL
 - Formal verification needs to be updated if the spec is modified
 - Formal verification does not validate the design "intention"
 - Verification fail hole(s) can occur if the spec is not defined for that specific fail case(s)








 SVA (System Verilog Assertion): just language to make behavioral models (property) of the spec → No SVA for RTL as design assertion

Functional Coverage







MCA (Machine Check Architecture)

Verification Challenge

- A cross functional IP over any applicable processor
- Collecting error information and generate relevant request for OS to react accordingly


Challenge

- High complexity and combination of error inputs, multiple register bits, and associated logic
- The complexity level can go to 2⁷⁸ combinations











Verification Challenge

- Advantage of MCA IP design
 - Well defined end-to-end (source-to-destination) points
 - All error inputs (source) contribute to internal registers and outputs (destination)
 - The spec clearly defines logical relations between source and destination

 Formal verification can check if "input to output of RTL" is identical to the "behavioral model (property) of the spec"

Implementation



Synopsys vc-static: configuration before run

Mode	SSE	SL
Cold reset (reset for all registers)	1	1
Warm reset (reset for some registers)	1	0
Functional	0	0
Illegal	0	1

```
create_clock CCLK -period 100
sim_force SSE -apply 1'b1
sim_force SL -apply 1'b1
sim_run 2
sim_save_reset
fvassume nc -expr {{SSE, SL} != 2'b01}
```

Fewer constraints are recommended for higher coverage





- 3 examples
 - Case 1: cold reset
 - Case 2: falsified
 - Case 3: vacuous





- Case 1: cold reset
 - Spec

After cold reset, McaDefAddr register should have all 0's for bit[63:0]

Property: behavioral model using SVA

property hardreset (logic SSE, logic coldreset, logic [63:0] regs); @(posedge clk) disable iff (SSE) \$fell(coldreset) |-> ##0 (regs[63:0] == 0); endproperty

Assertion and coverage

aDef: assert property (hardreset(SSE, coldreset, McaDefAddr)) else \$fatal (\$stime,,,"%m assert FAIL");

cDef: cover property (hardreset(SSE, coldreset, McaDefAddr)) \$display ("%m cover PASS @%0d", \$time);








Case 1: cold reset → UI during run

Implementation







- Case 2: falsified → modeling fault
 - Spec

The status register is stable when the error is transparent and the configuration bit[33] is low.

Property

```
property Status_stable_disable_cfg (logic allreset, logic error_valid, logic cfg, logic [63:0] regs);
    @(posedge clk) disable iff (allreset) (error_valid & ~cfg) |-> ##0
$stable(regs);
endproperty
```

 This failed, because reset or extaccess can happen at the same time errors happen. → missing functions in the model





- Case 2: falsified → modeling fault
 - 2 more conditions added for reset and extaccess

```
property Status_stable_disable_cfg (logic allreset, logic block_reset, logic block_ext, logic error_valid, logic cfg, logic [63:0] regs);

@(posedge clk) disable iff (allreset) (block_reset & block_ext & error_valid & ~cfg) |-> ##0 $stable(regs);
endproperty
```





Case 2: falsified → modeling fault

```
always @(posedge clk) begin
block_reset_pos <= ~SSE && ~($past(SSE)) && ~($past(SSE,2)) && ~SL
&& ~($past(SL)) && ~($past(SL,2));
end


always @(negedge clk) begin
block_reset_neg <= ~SSE && ~($past(SSE)) && ~($past(SSE,2)) && ~SL
&& ~($past(SL)) && ~($past(SL,2));
end

assign block_reset = block_reset_pos & block_reset_neg;
```

always @(posedge clk) begin block_ext <= ~ExtAccessEn && ~(\$past(ExtAccessEn)) && ~(\$past(ExtAccessEn,2)) && ~(\$past(ExtAccessEn,3)); end


































- Case 3: vacuous → uncoverable condition
 - Spec

McaErrTrig (Interrupt) happens when a fatal, uncorrected, corrected or transparent error is received and McaStatus register overflow bit[63] is low.

Property

```
assign DetectMachineCheckExceptionT0 = int_fatal_T0 | int_uncor_T0 | int_corre_T0 | int_trans_T0;
```


property Intreq3 (logic allreset, logic DetectMachineCheckException, logic block_ext, logic ovf, logic intreq3);

@(posedge clk) disable iff (allreset) (~\$past(intreq3) & DetectMachineCheckException & ~ovf & block_ext) |-> ##0 intreq3; endproperty






- Case 3: vacuous → uncoverable condition
 - ovf should be \$past(ovf)







Case 3: vacuous → uncoverable condition



Conclusion





- 100% functional coverage because:
 - All functions of the IP are end-to-end (source-to-destination).
 - Each function can be modeled with SVA.
 - The spec is well defined and documented before or in the middle of the project.
- The formal verification as the main verification methodology → simulation based verification as supplementary.

Conclusion





- vc-static: mature to use
 - About 35 min (total time via LSF) for 100 complex properties (100 assertion and 100 coverage to be verified by the tool)
 - Most of time spent → modeling with SVA
- Random simulation was still useful to find the "spec missing points" → Formal verification cannot do this!
 - System level free-run simulation is still important





Thank You

