

TEXT MINING FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES  
LECTURE 7: USING TOPIC MODELS IN SOCIAL SCIENCE

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# INTRODUCTION

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Last time we discussed inference in the LDA graphical model.

Formally topics are distributions over words, and documents are distributions over topics.

In many applications, researchers treat these distributions as inherently meaningful, and then use them to evaluate social science models.

Important to realize that neither objective is intrinsic to LDA, which is simply a clustering model.

# OUTLINE

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1. Topic meaning
  - 1.1 Human interpretation
  - 1.2 External validity
2. Case study on transparency and career concerns

# TOPICS AND MEANING


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Recall that the LSA representation of a document was useful for information retrieval, but not so much for interpreting content.

On the other hand, LDA consistently produces topics that seem to “mean” something.

But important to realize that any meaning we put on topics is an ex-post subjective judgment.

## TOPIC 38







**TABLE 3 Topic Keywords for 42-Topic Model**

| Topic (Short Label)             | Keys   |
|---------------------------------|--|
| 1. Judicial Nominations         | <i>nomine, confirm, nomin, circuit, hear, court, judg, judici, case, vacanc</i>      |
| 2. Constitutional               | <i>case, court, attorney, supreme, justic, nomin, judg, m, decis, constitut</i>      |
| 3. Campaign Finance             | <i>campaign, candid, elect, monei, contribut, polit, soft, ad, parti, limit</i>      |
| 4. Abortion                     | <i>procedur, abort, babi, thi, life, doctor, human, ban, decis, or</i>               |
| 5. Crime 1 [Violent]            | <i>enforc, act, crime, gun, law, victim, violenc, abus, prevent, juvenil</i>         |
| 6. Child Protection             | <i>gun, tobacco, smoke, kid, show, firearm, crime, kill, law, school</i>             |
| 7. Health 1 [Medical]           | <i>diseas, cancer, research, health, prevent, patient, treatment, devic, food</i>    |
| 8. Social Welfare               | <i>care, health, act, home, hospit, support, children, educ, student, nurs</i>       |
| 9. Education                    | <i>school, teacher, educ, student, children, test, local, learn, district, class</i> |
| 10. Military 1 [Manpower]       | <i>veteran, va, forc, militari, care, reserv, serv, men, guard, member</i>           |
| 11. Military 2 [Infrastructure] | <i>appropri, defens, forc, report, request, confer, guard, depart, fund, project</i> |
| 12. Intelligence                | <i>intellig, homeland, commiss, depart, agenc, director, secur, base, defens</i>     |



# FORMALIZING INTERPRETABILITY

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Chang et. al. (2009) propose an objective way of determining whether topics are indeed interpretable.

Two tests:

1. *Word intrusion*. Form set of words consisting of top five words from topic  $k$  + word with low probability in topic  $k$ . Ask subjects to identify inserted word.
2. *Topic intrusion*. Show subjects a snippet of a document + top three topics associated to it + randomly drawn other topic. Ask to identify inserted topic.

Estimate LDA and other topic models on NYT and Wikipedia articles for  $K = 50, 100, 150$ .

# RESULTS




Figure 5: A scatter plot of model precision (top row) and topic log odds (bottom row) vs. predictive log likelihood. Each point is colored by model and sized according to the number of topics used to fit the model. Each model is accompanied by a regression line. Increasing likelihood does not increase the agreement between human subjects and the model for either task (as shown by the downward-sloping regression lines).

# IMPLICATIONS

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Topics seem objectively interpretable, at least in this context.

Tradeoff between goodness-of-fit and interpretability, which is generally more important in social science.

Potential development of statistical models in future to explicitly maximize interpretability.

# EXTERNAL VALIDITY

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
One common way of validating the subjective labels placed on topics is to see whether they relate to objective measures in ways we expect.

In FOMC context, can compare how attention changes with market conditions and external events.




# FOMC AND MARKET ATTENTION TO “RECESSION/FISCAL”

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# FOMC AND MARKET ATTENTION TO “RISK”








# SURPRISED BY TRANSPARENCY?

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# TOPICS AND MODEL TESTING

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Once we have estimated topics, what can we do with them?

One option is to simply describe and index text.

Another goal is to test behavioral models by using topics as dependent variables in regressions motivated by theory.

Example is Hansen, McMahon, and Prat (2015).

# THE ENVIRONMENT

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Recall discussion of benefits and costs of transparency and natural experiment at FOMC.

How does economic theory predict FOMC members should react to increase in transparency?

# CAREER CONCERNS

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Dynamic models in which only short-term contracts are possible.

Agent's type is unknown, and observed behavior/performance today determines future principals' beliefs.

Agents today maximizes future principals' beliefs (which may be different from today's productivity).

Payoff to good reputation can be:

1. Higher wages
2. Non-monetary perks
3. Psychological benefit

# CAREER CONCERNS AND TRANSPARENCY

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What are the predicted effect of transparency?

# CAREER CONCERNS AND TRANSPARENCY

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Positive

Discipline: Holmström (1999).

# CAREER CONCERNS AND TRANSPARENCY

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## Positive

Discipline: Holmström (1999).

## Negative

Conformity: Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Prat (2005)

Non-conformity: Ottaviani and Sørensen (2000), Levy (2007)



# CAREER CONCERNS AND TRANSPARENCY

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What are the predicted effect of transparency?

## Positive

Discipline: Holmström (1999).

## Negative

Conformity: Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Prat (2005)

Non-conformity: Ottaviani and Sørensen (2000), Levy (2007)

These effects predicted to decline with experience.

# FOMC BACKGROUND

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The Federal Open Market Committee meets eight times per year.

19 members: seven Governors, and twelve regional Fed Presidents.

Meeting Structure:

- 1. Economic Situation Discussion (FOMC 1)**

- 1.1 Board staff present the economic situation (including forecast).

- 1.2 FOMC members present their views of the economic outlook.

- 2. Policy Strategy Debate (FOMC 2)**

- 2.1 Staff presents a variety of monetary policy alternatives (without a recommendation).

- 2.2 First the Chairman, and then other FOMC members discuss their policy preferences.

FOMC takes Government in Sunshine Act seriously.

# TESTING THROUGH DIFFERENCES

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One option is to run

$$y_{ts} = \alpha + \beta D(Trans) + \lambda X_t + \varepsilon_t \quad (\text{DIFF})$$

Main issue is that other changes may have coincided with increase in transparency.

With high frequency data, for example tick-level equity prices, one can conduct event study.

FOMC only meets eight times per year, so event study not feasible.

# DIFFERENCE IN DIFFERENCES

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Difference-in-differences controls for (common) time trends by comparing how one group's reaction to transparency differs from another's.

In a pure RCT, there would be a treatment and control group.

Instead, HMP use experience in Fed system to proxy for strength of career concerns, which should correlate with behavioral response to transparency:

$FedExp_{it}$  = years in Fed system prior to FOMC + years on the FOMC

$$y_{its} = \alpha_i + \delta_t + \beta D(Trans) + \eta FedExp_{it} + \phi D(Trans) \times FedExp_{it} + \epsilon_{it} \\ \text{(DinD)}$$

Test  $\phi$  coefficient on interaction term.

# DEPENDENT VARIABLES

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## Counts

1. How much someone speaks—words
2. How many statements they make
3. How many questions they ask
4. How many numbers they refer to

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## Functions of Topic Content

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## Counts

1. How much someone speaks—words
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## Functions of Topic Content

## Influence

# COUNTS—DIFF REGRESSION

| Main Regressors     | (1)<br>Total Words  | (2)<br>Statements  | (3)<br>Questions    | (4)<br>Numbers     | (5)<br>Total Words | (6)<br>Statements    | (7)<br>Questions      | (8)<br>Numbers      |
|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|
| D(Trans)            | 52.3*<br>[0.081]    | -0.36<br>[0.324]   | -0.00093<br>[0.990] | 3.56***<br>[0.004] | 35.3<br>[0.137]    | -1.98**<br>[0.011]   | -0.67***<br>[0.006]   | 1.60***<br>[0.001]  |
| D(Short)            | -71.9***<br>[0.000] | -0.30**<br>[0.014] | -0.11<br>[0.327]    | -1.74**<br>[0.049] | -178***<br>[0.000] | -1.18***<br>[0.000]  | -0.40***<br>[0.000]   | -1.83***<br>[0.000] |
| D(NBER)             | 14.4<br>[0.571]     | -0.38<br>[0.208]   | -0.075<br>[0.665]   | -1.00<br>[0.197]   | -30.6<br>[0.259]   | 0.46<br>[0.482]      | -0.068<br>[0.752]     | -0.64<br>[0.175]    |
| BBD uncertainty     | 0.22<br>[0.252]     | -0.0032<br>[0.506] | 0.00021<br>[0.870]  | 0.0033<br>[0.527]  | -0.042<br>[0.872]  | -0.0093**<br>[0.035] | -0.0042***<br>[0.000] | 0.00018<br>[0.969]  |
| D(2 day)            | 34.5<br>[0.115]     | 1.39**<br>[0.048]  | 0.57**<br>[0.020]   | 1.44**<br>[0.044]  | 59.5<br>[0.219]    | -0.13<br>[0.841]     | 0.071<br>[0.733]      | 1.08*<br>[0.079]    |
| Constant            | 655***<br>[0.000]   | 4.59***<br>[0.000] | 1.13***<br>[0.000]  | 7.93***<br>[0.000] | 329***<br>[0.000]  | 6.31***<br>[0.000]   | 1.69***<br>[0.000]    | 2.20***<br>[0.004]  |
| Unique Members      | 36                  | 36                 | 36                  | 36                 | 36                 | 36                   | 36                    | 36                  |
| Member FE           | Yes                 | Yes                | Yes                 | Yes                | Yes                | Yes                  | Yes                   | Yes                 |
| Time FE             | No                  | No                 | No                  | No                 | No                 | No                   | No                    | No                  |
| Within Meeting      | FOMC1               | FOMC1              | FOMC1               | FOMC1              | FOMC2              | FOMC2                | FOMC2                 | FOMC2               |
| Sample              | 89:11-97:09         | 89:11-97:09        | 89:11-97:09         | 89:11-97:09        | 89:11-97:09        | 89:11-97:09          | 89:11-97:09           | 89:11-97:09         |
| Obs                 | 1148                | 1148               | 1148                | 1148               | 1138               | 1138                 | 1138                  | 1138                |
| Transparency effect | 7                   | -                  | -                   | 14                 | -                  | -49                  | -49                   | 14                  |



# COUNTS—DiD REGRESSION

| Main Regressors           | (1)<br>Total Words    | (2)<br>Statements  | (3)<br>Questions  | (4)<br>Numbers      | (5)<br>Total Words | (6)<br>Statements  | (7)<br>Questions    | (8)<br>Numbers       |
|---------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|-------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| D(Trans)                  | -486***<br>[0.000]    | -5.85**<br>[0.010] | -2.72<br>[0.139]  | -8.43***<br>[0.002] | -2,940<br>[0.268]  | 82.3<br>[0.293]    | 38.9<br>[0.117]     | -20.2<br>[0.706]     |
| Fed Experience            | 973***<br>[0.000]     | 6.38<br>[0.142]    | 5.04<br>[0.163]   | 21.6***<br>[0.001]  | 232<br>[0.200]     | -5.49<br>[0.305]   | -2.62<br>[0.124]    | 1.83<br>[0.618]      |
| D(Trans) x Fed Experience | 0.42<br>[0.798]       | 0.026<br>[0.298]   | 0.0047<br>[0.667] | -0.21***<br>[0.004] | -0.68<br>[0.738]   | 0.11***<br>[0.010] | 0.037***<br>[0.007] | -0.078***<br>[0.005] |
| Constant                  | -10,240***<br>[0.000] | -66.7<br>[0.175]   | -55.7<br>[0.172]  | -234***<br>[0.002]  | 0<br>[.]           | 0<br>[.]           | 0<br>[.]            | 0<br>[.]             |
| Unique Members            | 36                    | 36                 | 36                | 36                  | 36                 | 36                 | 36                  | 36                   |
| Member FE                 | Yes                   | Yes                | Yes               | Yes                 | Yes                | Yes                | Yes                 | Yes                  |
| Time FE                   | Yes                   | Yes                | Yes               | Yes                 | Yes                | Yes                | Yes                 | Yes                  |
| Within Meeting            | FOMC1                 | FOMC1              | FOMC1             | FOMC1               | FOMC2              | FOMC2              | FOMC2               | FOMC2                |
| Sample                    | 89:11-97:09           | 89:11-97:09        | 89:11-97:09       | 89:11-97:09         | 89:11-97:09        | 89:11-97:09        | 89:11-97:09         | 89:11-97:09          |
| Obs                       | 1148                  | 1148               | 1148              | 1148                | 1138               | 1138               | 1138                | 1138                 |
| Rookie effect             | -                     | -                  | -                 | 14                  | -                  | -49                | -49                 | 14                   |

# DEPENDENT VARIABLES: TOPICS

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Statement  $\xrightarrow{LDA}$   $K$ -dimensional probability vector  $\xrightarrow{Function}$  dependent variable.

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1. Percentage of statement about economic topics (preparedness):

Define conditional topic distribution  $\chi_{i,t,s}$

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Define conditional topic distribution  $\chi_{i,t,s}$
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1. Percentage of statement about economic topics (preparedness):  
Define conditional topic distribution  $\chi_{i,t,s}$
2. Herfindahl concentration index (breadth of discussion).
3. Percentage of time on quantitative topics (information acquisition).
4. Proximity to Chairman in FOMC2:
  - 4.1 *Dot product similarity*:  $DP_{it} = \sum_k \chi_{G,t}^k \chi_{i,t}^k$ .
  - 4.2 *Bhattacharyya coefficient*:  $BH_{it} = \sum_k \sqrt{\chi_{G,t}^k \chi_{i,t}^k}$ .
  - 4.3 *Kullback-Leibler divergence*:  $KL_{it} = \sum_k \chi_{G,t}^k \ln \left( \frac{\chi_{G,t}^k}{\chi_{i,t}^k} \right)$ .



## TOPIC 7—DATA TOPIC





# TRANSPARENCY AND DELIBERATION

| Main Regressors           | (1)<br>Economics    | (2)<br>Economics     | (3)<br>Herfindahl   | (4)<br>Herfindahl      |
|---------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|------------------------|
| D(Trans)                  | 0.16***<br>[0.002]  | 0.064<br>[0.933]     | -0.0038<br>[0.674]  | 0.34*<br>[0.055]       |
| Fed Experience            | -0.28***<br>[0.008] | 0.036<br>[0.484]     | -0.0035<br>[0.852]  | -0.018<br>[0.134]      |
| D(Trans) x Fed Experience | 0.00019<br>[0.655]  | -0.0014**<br>[0.018] | 0.00061*<br>[0.060] | -0.00028***<br>[0.003] |
| Constant                  | 3.70***<br>[0.002]  | 0<br>[.]             | 0.15<br>[0.483]     | 0<br>[.]               |
| Unique Members            | 36                  | 36                   | 36                  | 36                     |
| Member FE                 | Yes                 | Yes                  | Yes                 | Yes                    |
| Time FE                   | Yes                 | Yes                  | Yes                 | Yes                    |
| Within Meeting            | FOMC1               | FOMC2                | FOMC1               | FOMC2                  |
| Sample                    | 89:11-97:09         | 89:11-97:09          | 89:11-97:09         | 89:11-97:09            |
| Obs                       | 1148                | 1138                 | 1148                | 1138                   |
| Rookie effect             | -                   | 21                   | -20                 | 12                     |

# TRANSPARENCY AND QUANTITATIVE DISCUSSION

| Main Regressors           | (1)<br>Numbers      | (2)<br>Numbers       | (3)<br>Data Topics (7&11) | (4)<br>Data Topics (7&11) |
|---------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| D(Trans)                  | -8.43***<br>[0.002] | -20.2<br>[0.706]     | -0.032**<br>[0.019]       | -0.10<br>[0.631]          |
| Fed Experience            | 21.6***<br>[0.001]  | 1.83<br>[0.618]      | 0.066**<br>[0.032]        | 0.010<br>[0.485]          |
| D(Trans) x Fed Experience | -0.21***<br>[0.004] | -0.078***<br>[0.005] | -0.00071***<br>[0.003]    | -0.00027**<br>[0.035]     |
| Constant                  | -234***<br>[0.002]  | 0<br>[.]             | -0.69**<br>[0.045]        | 0<br>[.]                  |
| Unique Members            | 36                  | 36                   | 36                        | 36                        |
| Member FE                 | Yes                 | Yes                  | Yes                       | Yes                       |
| Time FE                   | Yes                 | Yes                  | Yes                       | Yes                       |
| Within Meeting            | FOMC1               | FOMC1                | FOMC1                     | FOMC2                     |
| Sample                    | 89:11-97:09         | 89:11-97:09          | 89:11-97:09               | 89:11-97:09               |
| Obs                       | 1148                | 1138                 | 1148                      | 1138                      |
| Rookie effect             | 14                  | 14                   | 17                        | 16                        |

# PROXIMITY AND PREFERENCES

| Main Regressors | (1)<br>D(Voice Dissent) | (2)<br>D(Voice Dissent) | (3)<br>D(Voice Dissent) |
|-----------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| D(Non-Voter)    | 0.0060<br>[0.802]       | 0.0072<br>[0.764]       | 0.0083<br>[0.727]       |
| DP              | -1.03*<br>[0.059]       |                         |                         |
| BH              |                         | -0.46***<br>[0.005]     |                         |
| KL              |                         |                         | 0.11***<br>[0.003]      |
| Constant        | 0.49***<br>[0.000]      | 0.81***<br>[0.000]      | 0.34***<br>[0.000]      |
| R-squared       | 0.226                   | 0.229                   | 0.229                   |
| Unique Members  | 35                      | 35                      | 35                      |
| Member FE       | Yes                     | Yes                     | Yes                     |
| Time FE         | Yes                     | Yes                     | Yes                     |
| Obs             | 1194                    | 1194                    | 1194                    |
| Type of measure | Similarity              | Similarity              | Distance                |

# TRANSPARENCY AND PROXIMITY

| Main Regressors           | (1)<br>DP             | (2)<br>BH             | (3)<br>KL          |
|---------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|
| D(Trans)                  | 0.013***<br>[0.000]   | 0.78<br>[0.253]       | 1.70<br>[0.576]    |
| Fed Experience            | -0.011<br>[0.453]     | 0.0035<br>[0.940]     | -0.065<br>[0.754]  |
| D(Trans) x Fed Experience | -0.00021**<br>[0.037] | -0.00058**<br>[0.033] | 0.0023*<br>[0.055] |
| Constant                  | 0.17<br>[0.307]       | 0<br>[.]              | 0<br>[.]           |
| Unique Members            | 35                    | 36                    | 36                 |
| Member FE                 | Yes                   | Yes                   | Yes                |
| Time FE                   | Yes                   | Yes                   | Yes                |
| Within Meeting            | FOMC2                 | FOMC2                 | FOMC2              |
| Sample                    | 89:11-97:09           | 89:11-97:09           | 89:11-97:09        |
| Obs                       | 1074                  | 1138                  | 1138               |
| Type of measure           | Similarity            | Similarity            | Distance           |
| Rookie effect             | 12                    | 11                    | -9                 |

# SUMMARY

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TABLE: Evidence for career concerns

| Discipline                            | Conformity                         |
|---------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| ↑ use of numbers in FOMC1             | ↓ statements in FOMC2              |
| ↑ topic breadth in FOMC1              | ↓ questions in FOMC2               |
| ↑ references to data topics in FOMC1  | ↓ distance from Greenspan in FOMC2 |
|                                       | ↓ topic breadth in FOMC2           |
| ↑ economics topic percentage in FOMC2 |                                    |

# INFLUENCE AS A MEASURE OF INFORMATIVENESS

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Discipline tends to increase informativeness, conformity to decrease it. Which effect dominates?

If member's statement more informative, it should drive the debate more.

## INFLUENCE

When what member  $i$  talks about affects what member  $j$  talks about, call this influence. Use a PageRank-like algorithm.

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## INFLUENCE

When what member  $i$  talks about affects what member  $j$  talks about, call this influence. Use a PageRank-like algorithm.

Measure influence:

1. Within meeting
2. Within meeting on Greenspan
3. Across meetings
4. Across meetings on Greenspan

# OVERALL INFLUENCE

| Main Regressors           | (1)<br>$W_D$         | (2)<br>$A_D$           | (3)<br>$W_{BH}$        | (4)<br>$A_{BH}$      |
|---------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|
| D(Trans)                  | 0.0028***<br>[0.000] | 0.0019**<br>[0.036]    | 0.0030***<br>[0.000]   | -0.000057<br>[0.810] |
| Fed Experience            | -0.0039<br>[0.380]   | -0.010*<br>[0.057]     | -0.0012<br>[0.534]     | 0.00039<br>[0.830]   |
| D(Trans) x Fed Experience | -0.000015<br>[0.732] | -0.00019***<br>[0.009] | -0.000042**<br>[0.041] | -0.000012<br>[0.439] |
| Constant                  | 0.096*<br>[0.068]    | 0.17***<br>[0.006]     | 0.064***<br>[0.005]    | 0.051**<br>[0.018]   |
| Unique Members            | 35                   | 32                     | 35                     | 32                   |
| Within Meeting            | Intra                | Inter                  | Intra                  | Inter                |
| Obs                       | 1074                 | 1039                   | 1074                   | 1039                 |
| Rookie effect             | -                    | 17                     | 7                      | -                    |



# INFLUENCE ON GREENSPAN

| Main Regressors           | (1)<br>$W_D^G$        | (2)<br>$A_D^G$          | (3)<br>$W_{BH}^G$      | (4)<br>$A_{BH}^G$    |
|---------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|
| D(Trans)                  | 0.00031***<br>[0.009] | 0.000032<br>[0.814]     | 0.00030***<br>[0.000]  | -0.000012<br>[0.711] |
| Fed Experience            | 0.00023<br>[0.748]    | -0.0017*<br>[0.054]     | -0.000079<br>[0.785]   | -0.000092<br>[0.637] |
| D(Trans) x Fed Experience | -6.6e-06<br>[0.198]   | -0.000022***<br>[0.004] | -5.3e-06***<br>[0.000] | -1.4e-06<br>[0.319]  |
| Constant                  | 0.00012<br>[0.988]    | 0.022**<br>[0.030]      | 0.0034<br>[0.309]      | 0.0040*<br>[0.080]   |
| Unique Members            | 35                    | 32                      | 35                     | 32                   |
| Within Meeting            | Intra                 | Inter                   | Intra                  | Inter                |
| Obs                       | 1074                  | 1039                    | 1074                   | 1039                 |
| Rookie effect             | -                     | 18                      | 8                      | -                    |

# CONCLUSION

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Topic models are a growth area in social science because they allow us to measure text in an interpretable way, and to quantitatively test behavioral models with qualitative data.

This process has been underway for a few years in political science, but essentially brand new in economics.

In future, scope for developing structural topic models whose latent variables explicitly form part of an economic model's data generating process.