

On the Estimation and Application of Structural Decompositions of the South African Business Cycle

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INTRODUCTION

STATE OF DSGE

DSGE as Modelling Paradigm

MODEL SPECIFICATION

Benchmark Model and Extensions

ESTIMATION & IDENTIFICATION

Parameter Estimates

STRUCTURAL SHOCKS

Impulse Response Analysis

Variance Decomposition

Historical Decomposition

CONCLUDING REMARKS

MISSPECIFICATION




Figure: IRFs to true (black) and misspecified structural disturbances (grey)
empirical DSGE models (Den Haan & Dreschel, 2018)

MISSPECIFICATION




Figure: DSGE model output gap comparisons with SARB output gap estimates. Period: 1995Q1–2017Q2

MISSPECIFICATION - WHAT COULD BE WRONG?

1. Misspecification due to wrong functional forms

Solution is to compare empirical performance of

- (a) a set of several theoretical models (still a fraction of all possible models)
- (b) a reduced-form specification (Lucas critique still holds for policy analysis)

2. Misspecification due to missing elements

Solution (of the econometrician) is to add a regression error term, u_t , to the model

$$y_t = g(y_{t-1}, \varepsilon_t; \psi) + u_t$$

the problem is that u_t will be correlated with y_{t-1} , the explanatory variable (i.e., the residual after estimation on a sample)

MISSPECIFICATION - WHAT COULD BE WRONG?

Suppose we have the following system of equations to characterize $y_t = g(y_{t-1}, \varepsilon_t; \psi)$:

$$\begin{aligned}y_t &= y_{1,t} + y_{2,t} \\ y_{1,t} &= A_1(\psi)y_{1,t-1} + B_1(\psi)\varepsilon_{1,t}, \\ y_{2,t} &= A_2(\psi)y_{2,t-1} + B_2(\psi)\varepsilon_{2,t},\end{aligned}\tag{1}$$

where $\varepsilon_{1,t}$ and $\varepsilon_{2,t}$ are independent.

The problem is that we only observe y_t , not its two components $y_{1,t}$ and $y_{2,t}$...

Why can't we add a regression residual to capture the missing part?

$$y_t = A_1(\psi)y_{t-1} + B_1(\psi)\varepsilon_{1,t} + u_t$$

MISSPECIFICATION - WHAT COULD BE WRONG?

Using the equations from the true underlying model, we get the following system:

$$\begin{aligned}y_t &= y_{1,t} + y_{2,t} & (2) \\&= A_1(\psi)y_{1,t-1} + B_1(\psi)\varepsilon_{1,t} + A_2(\psi)y_{2,t-1} + B_2(\psi)\varepsilon_{2,t} \\&= A_1(\psi)(y_{1,t-1} + y_{2,t-1}) + B_1(\psi)\varepsilon_{1,t} \\&\quad + (A_2(\psi) - A_1(\psi))y_{2,t-1} + B_2(\psi)\varepsilon_{2,t} \\&= A_1(\psi)y_{t-1} + B_1(\psi)\varepsilon_{1,t} + u_t\end{aligned}$$

with

$$u_t = (A_2(\psi) - A_1(\psi))y_{2,t-1} + B_2(\psi)\varepsilon_{2,t} .$$

MISSPECIFICATION - WHAT COULD BE WRONG?

For u_t to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables one would need:

- ▶ A_1 and A_2 to be identical
- ▶ $\varepsilon_{2,t}$ is not serially correlated
- ▶ and the two mechanisms are independent from each other

Therefore, unlikely that measurement error is the only reason for the gap between observed data and economic models.

MISSPECIFICATION - DEALING WITH IT

Comprehensive misspecification procedure

$$\begin{aligned}y_t &= y_{1,t} + y_{2,t} \\ y_{1,t} &= A_1(\psi)y_{1,t-1} + B_1(\psi)\varepsilon_{1,t} , \\ y_{2,t} &= \mathbf{A}_2 y_{2,t-1} + \mathbf{B}_2 \varepsilon_{2,t} ,\end{aligned}\tag{3}$$

where the bold symbols $\{\mathbf{A}_2, \mathbf{B}_2, \varepsilon_{2,t}\}$ indicate reduced-form objects not based on the theory of the structural model.

- ▶ the existing approaches in the literature dealing with misspecification in macro models are based on this setup.
- ▶ deals with misspecification **#1** due to missing elements, and **#2** of the model itself, since the reduced form block can completely take over the explanatory power

DSGE AS MODELLING PARADIGM

- ▶ Has there been a **core failure** in our modelling paradigm?
 - ▶ Fit for purpose
 - ▶ No model can be all things to all people (e.g., Blanchard, 2018)
- ▶ Few instances of DSGE models developed to look at the underlying structure of the South African business cycle.
 - ▶ Not been well-established how alternative specifications affect the estimated structure and dynamics of the business cycle
 - ▶ Important implications for policy analysis.
- ▶ “Identified moments”
 - ▶ estimated responses to identified structural shocks — — — what micro calls “causal effects” (e.g., Nakamura & Steinsson, 2018)

MAIN FINDINGS

Parameter estimates and model dynamics are sensitive to model specification:

- ▶ Some important model sub-blocks insensitive
- ▶ 3-Equation New-Keynesian model and a traditional Small Open Economy model provide qualitatively and quantitatively similar results to the benchmark medium-scale NK model
- ▶ Significant differences from financial frictions
- ▶ Types of exogenous shocks included in the model are key determinants for the variation of results.

BENCHMARK MODEL AND EXTENSIONS

Our benchmark DSGE model is a New-Keynesian DSGE model which aligns closely with Smets and Wouters (*SW-NK*)*

We compare results from this model to three related variants:

- ▶ Three equation New-Keynesian model (*Naive-NK*)
- ▶ Small open economy New-Keynesian model (*SOE-NK*)
- ▶ New-Keynesian model with a **financial sector** (*FF-NK*)

We also compare our results with selected DSGE articles with an explicit focus on South Africa

*Source: Macro Model Data Base (MMB) with own standardizations

POSTERIOR ESTIMATES

COMPARISON WITH OTHER SA-BASED DSGE MODELS

Table: Estimated parameter comparisons from alternative South African-based DSGE models

	Posterior Estimates							
	SW-NK	SMS09	SPS14	AKW10 [†]	AKW10-SMS	PG16	PG16-NK	HGW18
Data sample	95Q1–17Q4	90Q1–07Q4	00Q1–12Q4	90Q1–07Q4	90Q1–07Q4	71Q1–13Q1	71Q1–13Q1	95Q1–17Q2
<i>Preferences</i>								
ϕ	0.80	0.70*	0.81	0.70*	0.70*	-	-	0.70*
σ_c	1.20	1.03	1*	0.58	0.99	1*	1*	3.92
labor elast. (σ_n)	2.62	3*	5*	3*	3*	1.90	1.45	3*
<i>Firms & Price setting</i>								
capital adj. (κ_v)	6.47	-	10.5	-	-	-	-	0.25*
θ_p	0.81	0.54	0.70	0.46	0.49	0.81	0.79	0.50
γ_p	0.23	0.25*	0.50	0.25*	0.25*	0.43	0.45	0.55
θ_w	0.65	0.50*	0.69*	0.50*	0.50*	0.64	0.65	0.75*
γ_w	0.34	0.70	0.50*	0.70	0.70	0.39	0.46	0.50*
<i>Monetary policy rule</i>								
inflation (κ_π)	1.52	1.39	1.73	1.48	1.37	1.24	1.19	1.41
output (κ_y)	0.50	0.63	0.25	0.48	0.59	1.19***	1.43***	0.73
Obs. var.	7	6	15	7	6	8	8	6
# est. shocks	7	9	12	6	5	10	10	7
# est. param.	24	24	40	17	15	29	27	26

* fixed (calibrated) parameters. ** either risk premium or preference shock. *** output gap, not output growth, used in MP-reaction function.

† posterior mode “similar” to posterior mean (p. 177). List of parameters only include those corresponding to SW-NK.

POSTERIOR ESTIMATES

COMPARISON OF NESTED DSGE MODELS

	Posterior Distribution Means			
	SW-NK	Naive-NK	SOE-NK	FF-NK
Marginal density	2088.04	1050.22	2939.0	2597.79
<i>Preferences</i>				
ϕ	0.795	0.611	0.792	0.726
σ_c	1.197	-	1.197	1.246
σ_n	2.616	-	2.885	0.501
<i>Firms & Price setting</i>				
κ_v	6.469	-	0.305	9.049
θ_p	0.810	0.586	0.709	0.858
γ_p	0.231	0.376	0.315	0.158
θ_w	0.647	-	0.777	0.748
γ_w	0.342	-	0.203	0.185
<i>Monetary policy rule</i>				
κ_π	1.521	2.101	1.559	1.527
κ_y	0.502	1.856	0.546	0.565

$$i_t = \rho_i i_{t-1} + (1 - \rho_i)(\kappa_\pi E_t \pi_{t+1} + \kappa_y y_t)$$

SARB QPM: $\rho_i = 0.79$, $\kappa_\pi = 1.57$, $\kappa_y = 0.54$

PRIORS AND POSTERIOR

DEEP / STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS




Figure: Prior (grey), SW-NK posterior (solid black) and FF-NK posterior (dotted black) distribution statistics with posterior modes (dashed green and red vertical lines).

PRIORS AND POSTERIOR

MONETARY POLICY PARAMETERS




Figure: Prior (grey), SW-NK posterior (solid black) and FF-NK posterior (dotted black) distribution statistics with posterior modes (dashed green and red vertical lines).

PRIORS AND POSTERIOR

SHOCKS




Figure: Prior (grey), SW-NK posterior (solid black) and FF-NK posterior (dotted black) distribution statistics with posterior modes (dashed green and red vertical lines). Distributions for ϵ_b and ρ_b includes equity price ψ (dashed black).

IMPULSE RESPONSE ANALYSIS

CONTRACTIONARY MONETARY POLICY SHOCK (WITHOUT FF -NK)




Figure: Solid line: SW -NK model. Dotted line: $Naïve$ -NK model. Dashed line: SOE -NK model.

IMPULSE RESPONSE ANALYSIS

CONTRACTIONARY MONETARY POLICY SHOCK (WITH *FF-NK*)




Figure: Solid line: *SW-NK* model. Cross-marker line: *FF-NK* model.

FORECAST ERROR VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION

OUTPUT GAP

Description	Shocks	SW-NK: Time Horizons				FF-NK: Time Horizons			
		1-quarter	1-year	2-years	5-years	1-quarter	1-year	2-years	5-years
Technology	ϵ_a	21	13.74	9.69	8.7	2.95	1.27	0.52	0.21
Risk premium	ϵ_b	53.64	40.66	30.72	26.99	0.48	0.29	0.25	0.27
Exogenous spending	ϵ_g	6.35	4.35	3.26	2.9	0.16	0.09	0.06	0.04
Investment specific	ϵ_v	2.7	4.46	4.59	4.28	0.34	0.15	0.18	0.22
Monetary policy	ϵ_i	5.02	6.45	6.66	6.29	1.63	1.16	1.02	0.94
Price mark-up	ϵ_π	8.3	19.14	22.45	21.02	10.42	9.72	8.89	7.4
Wage mark-up	ϵ_w	3	11.2	22.64	29.82	4.8	5.37	3.75	2.29
Credit supply	$\epsilon_\tau, \epsilon_{h,e}$	-	-	-	-	9.86	10.52	8.07	5.99
Credit demand	ϵ_{ν_h, ν_e}	-	-	-	-	17.89	25.06	26.33	24.26
Equity	ϵ_ψ	-	-	-	-	51.46	46.38	50.93	58.37


FORECAST ERROR VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION

NOMINAL INTEREST RATE

Description	Shocks	SW-NK: Time Horizons				FF-NK: Time Horizons			
		1-quarter	1-year	2-years	5-years	1-quarter	1-year	2-years	5-years
Technology	ϵ_a	0.94	4.16	5.93	6.1	3.31	0.58	0.23	0.12
Risk premium	ϵ_b	7.84	16.92	21.84	22.3	0.28	0.6	0.93	1.79
Exogenous spending	ϵ_g	4.32	3.09	3.1	3.08	1.88	0.33	0.13	0.06
Investment specific	ϵ_v	2.23	4.98	6.75	7.08	0.37	0.13	0.08	0.05
Monetary policy	ϵ_i	45.55	19.69	15.71	15.22	46.24	18.54	8.3	3.57
Price mark-up	ϵ_π	35.65	40.11	33.44	33.14	19.1	14.59	5.95	3.38
Wage mark-up	ϵ_w	3.46	11.04	13.21	13.1	6.7	14.63	13.12	8.53
Credit supply	$\epsilon_\tau, \epsilon_{h,e}$	-	-	-	-	2.83	10.79	11.5	7.66
Credit demand	$\epsilon_{\nu_h}, \epsilon_e$	-	-	-	-	2.24	4.08	4.55	5.07
Equity	ϵ_ψ	-	-	-	-	17.06	35.73	55.21	69.78

HISTORICAL DECOMPOSITION

OUTPUT GAP (SW-NK), 1995Q1–2017Q2



CONCLUDING REMARKS

Weak identification not a big issue

- ▶ ...if important sub-blocks insensitive
- ▶ “Identified moments” → micro can inform macro
([Nakamura & Steinsson, 2018](#))

Specification matters

- ▶ ...more for financial factors
- ▶ ...likely for models with trade frictions too
([Obstfeld & Rogoff, 2001](#); [Eaton, Kortum & Neiman, 2016](#))
- ▶ ...selection of exogenous shocks


Inference for policy analysis?

- ▶ endogeneity of expectations (information effects/forward guidance)
- ▶ reduced form specification
- ▶ distinguishing between models
 - ▶ learn about deep structural parameters; “sufficient statistic”

Thank You


SPREADS AND LEVERAGE (1)

JUSTIFICATION FOR FINANCIAL FRICTIONS MODEL ($FF-NK$)




SPREADS AND LEVERAGE (2)

JUSTIFICATION FOR FINANCIAL FRICTIONS MODEL ($FF-NK$)




EQUITY AND THE REAL ECONOMY

JUSTIFICATION FOR FINANCIAL FRICTIONS MODEL ($FF-NK$)




COLLINEARITY (POSTERIOR MEAN)



HISTORICAL DECOMPOSITION

NOMINAL INTEREST RATE (ANNUALIZED) (SW-NK), 1995Q1–2017Q2



HISTORICAL DECOMPOSITION

HEADLINE INFLATION (ANN.) & OUTPUT GROWTH (Q-ON-Q) (SW-NK)

