## Micro-Foundations in Growth Models

Session 4: Diamond's overlapping generations (OLG)

Model

ECO5021F: Macroeconomics University of Cape Town

# Readings for this week

#### Required:

▶ Romer, D. (2019). Advanced Macroeconomics. McGraw-Hill. (5th edition). Chapter 2.8 - 2.12.



- ► The RCK model and the OLG model have been hugely influential in modern macroeconomics.
- The RCK model is a special continuous-time version of the OLG model.
- OLG models, as the name suggests, are inhabited by more than one generation who interact with each other.
- Over time, new generations replace the older ones, so that each generation deals with another generation during their lifetime.

#### Features of the model

- The model facilitates an analysis of the macroeconomic implications of lifetime consumption-savings decisions
- The model provides a convenient framework for studying the factors underlying the accumulation of capital
- The effect of government policy can easily be traced in OLGs: we are able to examine the generational incidence of taxation
- Ricardian issues can be analysed by a straightforward extension to bequests
- In this model the government outlives any specific generation, breaking the link between the time horizon of government and consumers.
- 6. The model may be realistic in the sense that the market outcome is not necessarily the social planner's solution.
- In contrast with the RCK model, the decentralised equilibrium of the OLG need not be Pareto efficient

Assumptions: the environment

- ▶ Time: OLG model will be derived in discrete time
- ▶ **Population:** Inhabited by individuals that all live for precisely two periods (turnover of individuals in the economy).
- ▶ Population grows at rate of *n* per period:

$$L_t = (1+n)L_{t-1}$$

- ▶ There are  $L_t$  young individuals and  $L_{t-1}$  old individuals in the economy at any given period.
- Labour: Every individual works when young (supplies one unit of labour).
- ▶ Income of labour is used to finance private consumption in both periods of the individual's life.
- Every individual saves a proportion of income when young and consumes accumulated wealth when old.

Assumptions: firms and factor costs

Several competitive firms in the economy produce output according to:

$$Y = F(K_t, A_t L_t)$$

- Production function exhibits constant returns to scale and satisfies the Inada conditions
- ► Technology, *A*, is labour-augmenting and grows at rate of *g*:

$$A_t = (1+g)A_{t-1}$$

Competitive market forces ensure firms pay marginal products for all factors of production, which means capital receives a real rental payment of  $r_t$  and labour a real wage of  $w_t$ :

$$r_t = f'(k_t)$$
  

$$w_t = f(k_t) - f'(k_t) \cdot k_t$$

Assumptions: firms and factor costs

#### **Intergenerational** dynamics:

- ▶ In the first period there is capital stock of  $K_0$
- Capital is owned equally by all old individuals
- Labour is supplied by <u>young</u>; combines with K to produce output
- Each member of the young generation of every period saves a portion of its labour income  $(A_tw_t)$  which forms the capital stock of the next period

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(where w_t = W_t/A_t is the wage per effective worker)
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- Each member of the old generation consume their capital income and their existing wealth
  - (i.e., savings from their youth including the rate of return on capital)
- Investment earns a return equal to the rate of return on capital

#### Households

- We need to analyse the situation of the household by considering the objective function and the constraints on this optimisation
- The utility function for each individual born in period *t*:

$$U_t = \frac{(c_t^y)^{1-\theta}}{1-\theta} + \left(\frac{1}{1+\rho}\right) \times \frac{(c_{t+1}^o)^{1-\theta}}{1-\theta}, \quad \theta > 0, \rho > -1$$

- where  $c_t^y$  is consumption per effective worker when young, while  $c_{t+1}^o$  when old.
- ► The budget constraint of an individual born at t is given by

$$c_t^y + \frac{1}{1 + r_{t+1}} \cdot c_{t+1}^o = A_t w_t$$

This states that PV lifetime consumption equals lifetime income for every generation \* exercise

#### Intertemporal optimisation problem

• We need to construct the LaGrangian function and find the first order conditions with respect to  $c_t^y$  and  $c_{t+1}^o$ 

$$\mathcal{L} = \frac{\left(c_t^y\right)^{1-\theta}}{1-\theta} + \frac{1}{1+\rho} \cdot \frac{\left(c_{t+1}^o\right)^{1-\theta}}{1-\theta} + \lambda \left[A_t w_t - c_t^y - \frac{1}{1+r_{t+1}} \cdot c_{t+1}^o\right]$$

The first order conditions are:

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial c_t^y} = (c_t^y)^{-\theta} + \lambda(-1) = 0$$

$$\implies (c_t^y)^{-\theta} = \lambda$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial c_{t+1}^o} = \frac{1}{1+\rho} \cdot (c_{t+1}^o)^{-\theta} + \lambda \left[ -\frac{1}{1+r_{t+1}} \right] = 0$$

$$\implies \frac{(c_{t+1}^o)^{-\theta}}{1+\rho} = \frac{\lambda}{1+r_{t+1}}$$

Intertemporal optimisation problem

By combining the two first order equations we get an equation similar to the **Euler equation** from the RCK model:

$$\frac{c_{t+1}^o}{c_t^y} = \left(\frac{1+r_{t+1}}{1+\rho}\right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \tag{1}$$

- From this equation we can see that consumption is increasing over time if the rate of interest exceeds the subjective discount rate (and vice versa)
- ▶ The parameter,  $\theta$ , determines the willingness of the individual to switch consumption between periods, in response to variations in the interest and discount rate.

- We will derive the savings rate in a two-step procedure:
- ► First, we find an expression for consumption by young individuals born in period t, in terms of wage income and the parameters of the model
- Then we use this expression to calculate a savings rate for young individuals as a function of the parameters of the model (and particularly, the interest rate).
- ▶ We have  $c_t^y = A_t w_t \frac{1}{1+r_{t+1}} \cdot c_{t+1}^o$  and  $c_{t+1}^o = \left(\frac{1+r_{t+1}}{1+\rho}\right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \cdot c_t^y$
- By substitution,

$$c_t^y = A_t w_t - \frac{1}{1 + r_{t+1}} \cdot \left(\frac{1 + r_{t+1}}{1 + \rho}\right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \cdot c_t^y$$

The savings rate

$$c_t^y = A_t w_t - \frac{1}{1 + r_{t+1}} \cdot \left(\frac{1 + r_{t+1}}{1 + \rho}\right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \cdot c_t^y$$

We can simplify this further,

$$c_t^y \left[ 1 + \frac{1}{1 + r_{t+1}} \cdot \left( \frac{1 + r_{t+1}}{1 + \rho} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \right] = A_t w_t$$

$$c_t^y \left[ 1 + \frac{(1 + r_{t+1})^{\frac{1 - \theta}{\theta}}}{(1 + \rho)^{\frac{1}{\theta}}} \right] = A_t w_t$$

$$c_t^y \left[ \frac{(1 + \rho)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} + (1 + r_{t+1})^{\frac{1 - \theta}{\theta}}}{(1 + \rho)^{\frac{1}{\theta}}} \right] = A_t w_t$$

$$s(r_{t+1}) = \frac{A_t w_t - c_t^y}{A_t w_t}$$

$$= \frac{A_t w_t - \left[\frac{(1+\rho)^{\frac{1}{\theta}}}{(1+\rho)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} + (1+r_{t+1})^{\frac{1-\theta}{\theta}}}\right] \cdot A_t w_t}{A_t w_t}$$

$$= 1 - \left[\frac{(1+\rho)^{\frac{1}{\theta}}}{(1+\rho)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} + (1+r_{t+1})^{\frac{1-\theta}{\theta}}}\right]$$

$$= \frac{(1+\rho)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} + (1+r_{t+1})^{\frac{1-\theta}{\theta}} - (1+\rho)^{\frac{1}{\theta}}}{(1+\rho)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} + (1+r_{t+1})^{\frac{1-\theta}{\theta}}}$$


$$= \frac{(1+r_{t+1})^{\frac{1-\theta}{\theta}}}{(1+\rho)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} + (1+r_{t+1})^{\frac{1-\theta}{\theta}}}$$


The savings rate


$$s(r_{t+1}) = \frac{(1+r_{t+1})^{\frac{1-\theta}{\theta}}}{(1+\rho)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} + (1+r_{t+1})^{\frac{1-\theta}{\theta}}}$$
(2)

- This equation tells us that the rate of savings is a function of the interest rate
- Savings will be an increasing function of the interest rate when  $\theta < 1$ .
- ▶ However, when  $\theta > 1$ , the rate of savings is decreasing function of the interest rate
- The relationship between s(r) and r is best explained by the opposing income and substitution effects of interest on savings

\* exercise







#### Income and Substitution Effect

- Income effect: When interest rate rises, capital earns a greater return, and so does savings of the individual
  - Individual can achieve a comparable amount of consumption when old by saving less as a young person; leaving more for consumption when young
- Substitution effect: A rise in the interest rate makes the trade-off between first and second period consumption more favourable for second period consumption

$$\frac{c_{t+1}^o}{c_t^y} = \left(\frac{1 + r_{t+1}}{1 + \rho}\right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}}$$

- Low  $\theta$  (e.g. 0.5), **substitution effect** dominates: HH is willing to shift consumption across time; reacts strongly to interest rate changes.
- ▶ High  $\theta$  (e.g. 5), **income effect** dominates: HH resists shifting consumption, prefers smoothing; small adjustment in savings.

The equation of motion of k (capital accumulation)

The savings rate (2) we derived allows us to proceed with the analysis of capital accumulation in the OLG model.

- ▶ Capital stock in any period is determined by the savings of the young generation in the previous period:\*  $K_{t+1} = s(r_{t+1}) A_t w_t L_t$
- ▶ Dividing both sides by  $A_{t+1}L_{t+1}$ , gives us:

$$\frac{K_{t+1}}{A_{t+1}L_{t+1}} = \frac{A_t L_t}{A_{t+1}L_{t+1}} s(r_{t+1}) w_t$$

$$k_{t+1} = \frac{1}{(1+n)(1+g)} s(r_{t+1}) \underbrace{\overbrace{[f(k_t) - k_t f'(k_t)]}^{w_t}}_{} (3)$$

- This is the general solution for the implicit evolution of capital per effective worker.
- We make two assumptions to ensure global stability of the equilibrium . . .

Savings Rate Under Log Utility

- 1. The utility function is logarithmic:  $u(c) = \ln c$ , implying  $\theta = 1$
- ► Euler equation (1) simplifies to:

$$\frac{c_{t+1}^o}{c_t^y} = \frac{1 + r_{t+1}}{1 + \rho}$$

where the intertemporal elasticity of substitution  $(1/\theta)$  is 1

- ► HH responds to interest rate changes with exact offsetting income and substitution effects
- ► This implies a constant savings rate (2):

$$s = \frac{1}{2 + \rho}$$

This savings rate is independent of the interest rate!

#### Capital Accumulation

- 2. The production function is Cobb-Douglas:  $f(k) = k^{\alpha}$
- This means the dynamic equation for capital accumulation takes the following form:

$$k_{t+1} = \frac{1}{(1+n)(1+g)} s(r_{t+1}) [f(k_t) - k_t f'(k_t)]$$

$$= \frac{1}{(1+n)(1+g)(2+\rho)} (1-\alpha) k_t^{\alpha}$$

$$= Dk_t^{\alpha}$$

This is a first-order nonlinear difference equation with globally stable dynamics because:

- ▶ D > 0, where  $D = (1 \alpha)/(1 + n)(1 + g)(2 + \rho)$
- ▶  $0 < \alpha < 1$ , so  $k^{\alpha}$  is concave
- A unique steady state exists, and the system monotonically converges toward it

Capital Accumulation

$$k_{t+1} = \frac{1}{(1+n)(1+g)(2+\rho)}(1-\alpha)k_t^{\alpha}$$

- According to the equation above,  $k_{t+1}$  is an increasing function of  $k_t$  (but at a decreasing rate, WHY?)
- $\blacktriangleright$  We plot this functional relationship on a graph in  $(k_t, k_{t+1})$  space
- ▶  $45^{\circ}$  line is the locus where  $\dot{k} = 0$
- Assume economy is at  $k_0$ , which is greater than  $k^*$ , and where  $k_t > k_{t+1}$ .
- ▶ This means that  $k_1$  in the next period will be smaller than  $k_0$
- ightharpoonup Erosion of k will continue until the economy reaches  $k^*$

#### Capital Accumulation




FIGURE 2.10 The dynamics of k

Fall in the Discount Rate

- Assume economy is at the balanced growth path at  $k^*$  and discount rate falls from  $\rho$  to  $\rho'$ ; where  $\rho > \rho'$
- ▶ This change in  $\rho$  increases the slope of the function  $k_{t+1}$  i.e., the young save a greater fraction of their labour income
- New balanced growth path is to the right of the previous BGP, i.e.  $k^{*\prime} > k^*$  k rises monotonically from old value of  $k^*$ , to the new one (where  $k_t > k_{t+1}$ )
- Similar result to that of Solow and RCK models.

Fall in the Discount Rate




FIGURE 2.11 The effects of a fall in the discount rate

Dynamic (In)Efficiency

- ➤ A significant difference between the Solow and RCK models was that the BGP in the RCK model was always a social optimum.
- ▶ The OLG model does not guarantee a socially optimal solution
- Reason for this is that the utility of the unborn generations are not properly discounted in the market at time t, when the living make their optimising decision
- A Pareto efficient result, according to Romer, requires competitive markets, absence of externalities and a large, but finite, number of agents.
- In the OLG model, the last condition is violated
- ➤ The constantly growing population offers the opportunity to a social planner to raise the consumption of all generations through inter-generational transfer
- What does this mean?

Dynamic (In)Efficiency

- A social planner with infinite planning horizon will be in a position to improve on the decentralised equilibrium
  - Decentralised (competitive) equilibrium in this model is not Pareto efficient
- This is because the BGP may exceed the golden rule level of capital stock in the OLG model
- ▶ Analytically, using log-utilty and g = 0:

$$k^* = \frac{1}{(1+n)(2+\rho)} (1-\alpha) k^{*\alpha}$$
$$k^{*1-\alpha} = \frac{1}{(1+n)(2+\rho)} (1-\alpha)$$
$$k^* = \left[ \frac{(1-\alpha)}{(1+n)(2+\rho)} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}$$

Dynamic (in)efficiency

$$k^* = \left[\frac{(1-\alpha)}{(1+n)(2+\rho)}\right]^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}$$

$$f'(k^*) = \alpha k^{*\alpha-1} = \alpha \left[\frac{(1-\alpha)}{(1+n)(2+\rho)}\right]^{\frac{\alpha-1}{1-\alpha}}$$

$$= \alpha \left[\frac{(1+n)(2+\rho)}{(1-\alpha)}\right]$$

$$= \frac{\alpha}{(1-\alpha)}(1+n)(2+\rho)$$

- ▶ With g=0, the golden rule capital stock satisfies:  $f'(k_{\rm GR})=n$  [Recall:  $c=f(k)-nk\Rightarrow$  set:  $\partial c/\partial k=0$ ]
- ▶ The value of  $k^*$  could be larger or smaller than  $k_{GR}$

Dynamic (in)efficiency

$$f'(k^*) = \frac{\alpha}{(1-\alpha)}(1+n)(2+\rho)$$

- For  $\alpha$  sufficiently small,  $f'(k^*) < f'(k_{\rm GR})$ , the capital stock on the balanced growth path exceeds the golden-rule level:  $k^* > k_{\rm GR}$
- ▶ Suppose we are in a position where  $k^*$  exceeds  $k_{\rm GR}$ , then the social planner will arrange for more resources to be devoted to consumption from the initial period onwards
- ▶ In other words, the social planner will arrange for a permanent lowering of the savings rate, which means greater consumption in every subsequent period, and a fall in k
- ▶ In fact, the social planner could arrange for k to fall until it reached the golden rate capital stock

Efficiency (when  $k^* > k_{\rm GR}$ )





FIGURE 2.13 How reducing *k* to the golden-rule level affects the path of consumption per worker

## Over- or under-accumulation?



- The red line intersects the blue curve at a very low value:  $\alpha^{GR} = 0.11$  (for given values of  $n = 0.35^*$  and  $\rho = 0.04$ ).
- For most realistic values of  $\alpha \in (0.2, 0.4)$ , we have:  $f'(k^*) > f'(k_{\rm GR})$ , which implies:  $k^* < k_{\rm GR}$
- ⇒ economies are typically under-accumulating capital.

# Key Takeaways from the Diamond OLG Model

- The Diamond OLG model introduces generational turnover and shows how individual savings behaviour impacts long-run capital accumulation.
- **Log utility** ( $\theta = 1$ ) delivers a constant savings rate:

$$s = \frac{1}{2 + \rho}$$

independent of the interest rate, due to offsetting income and substitution effects.

► The model highlights a potential for **dynamic inefficiency**:

$$k^* \geqslant k_{\rm GR}$$
 depending on the value of  $\alpha$ 

In practice, we typically find  $k^* < k_{\rm GR}$ : economies under-accumulate capital.

Unlike the RCK model, the decentralised equilibrium may not be Pareto efficient, opening the door for policy intervention (e.g. pay-as-you-go pensions, intergenerational transfers).