

Securing Digital Democracy

Lecture 10 | *E-Voting and Public Policy*



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Election Policy in the U.S.



Federal

Civil Rights
Minimum Standards
Advisory Guidelines



State

Requirements
Certification
Central Administration



Local

Equipment Purchases
Implementation
Run elections

State Laws

Lack of uniformity or consistency

Regulatory capture



Antiquated rules

1990 FEC Standards

Federal Election Commission
Voluntary minimum standards,
eventually adopted by majority of states

Requirements:

- “Shake and bake” tests
- Weak software standards
- Extremely weak security standards



10.1 Election Policy in the U.S.

Securing Digital Democracy

(REPUBLICAN) GEORGE W. BUSH - PRESIDENT DICK CHENEY - VICE PRESIDENT	3 ➡	
(DEMOCRATIC) AL GORE - PRESIDENT JOE LIEBERMAN - VICE PRESIDENT	5 ➡	
(LIBERTARIAN) HARRY BROWNE - PRESIDENT ART OLIVIER - VICE PRESIDENT	7 ➡	
(GREEN) RALPH NADER - PRESIDENT WINONA LaDUKE - VICE PRESIDENT	9 ➡	
(SOCIALIST WORKERS) JAMES HARRIS - PRESIDENT MARGARET TROWE - VICE PRESIDENT	11 ➡	
(NATURAL LAW) JOHN HAGELIN - PRESIDENT NAT GOLDHABER - VICE PRESIDENT	13 ➡	
		(REFORM) PAT BUCHANAN - PRESIDENT EZOLA FOSTER - VICE PRESIDENT
		(SOCIALIST) DAVID McREYNOLDS - PRESIDENT MARY CAL HOLLIS - VICE PRESIDENT
		(CONSTITUTION) HOWARD PHILLIPS - PRESIDENT J. CURTIS FRAZIER - VICE PRESIDENT
		(WORKERS WORLD) MONICA MOOREHEAD - PRESIDENT GLORIA La RIVA - VICE PRESIDENT
		WRITE-IN CANDIDATE To vote for a write-in candidate, follow the directions on the long stub of your ballot card.

Help America Vote Act (HAVA)

Replace punched cards and lever machines

>\$2 billion to provided to states

Passed in 2002; Deadline in 2006



Created new agency, Election Assistance Commission (EAC)

EAC maintains Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG)

First VVSG standards took effect 2007



Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG)

Technical Guidelines Development Committee, managed by NIST

2005 Guidelines – became effective in 2007

- Much more detailed guidelines

- Large loopholes (e.g., COTS, doesn't require paper trail)

2007 Draft Guidelines – never adopted by the EAC

- Complete rewrite

- Software independence!

- Open-ended vulnerability testing!

The Holt Legislation


Require a voter-verified paper record
(*Later:* a voter marked paper ballot)

Prohibit undisclosed software


Prohibit Internet connection

Mandatory random audits

Official photo of Rep Rush Holt; public domain



State-by-State Efforts



Map and data from Verified Voting. <http://www.verifiedvoting.org/article.php?list=type&type=13>

Testing and Certification

Independent Testing Authorities (ITAs)

Majority of states incorporate Federal guidelines

Require machines to be tested for compliance by ITAs

Small number of approved private companies

Incentives?

Transparency?

Adequacy?

Approaches to Security Testing

Conformance Testing

Checklist approach

Mechanical inspection and
application of tools

Presence of required
mechanisms

Open-ended Testing

Adversarial approach

Creative application of
security mindset

Presence of exploitable
vulnerabilities



Conformance Testing

ITA Certification

Open-ended Testing

Hopkins Report

Princeton Report

Hursti Hack

California TTBR

SAIC Report

Ohio EVEREST

Recommendations

Strengthened, Uniform Standards

Cover entire election system, not just equipment

Address accuracy, security, accessibility, usability, transparency

Require public reporting and disclosure of problems

Election Administration

Ensure transparency and public participation

Provide adequate resources to election officials

Reduce number of races, simplify ballot design

Routine Testing and Auditing

Auditability must be a technical requirement

Mandate realistic pre-election testing of usability and function

Mandate risk-limiting post-election audits to high confidence

Allow time to conduct audits and recounts before certification

Conservative Approach to New Technology

Internet voting should be prohibited for the foreseeable future

Ensure new technology *really* solves an *actual* problem

Open technology to realistic, public, independent review
and simulated adversarial testing

Systems used for counting votes must be software independent

What You Can Do!

Discuss

voting security issues
with your friends and
in your community

Reach Out

to your local election
officials and talk about
your concerns

Get in Touch

with your elected
representative to
encourage reform

Learn More

about election security
issues; links from the
course are a start

Volunteer

as a poll worker or
election observer; apply
the security mindset

Vote!

and carefully watch
the process as you do;
be a *micro-observer*

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