

Lecture 13

Compactness for first-order logic

The compactness theorem, non-standard models of arithmetic

Introduction to Logic for Computer Science

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These slides are minor variants of those made by Prof Worrell and Prof Haase for their logic course at Oxford.

The compactness theorem

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- (1) all finite subsets of S are satisfiable
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Trick: Rename f_i to f_{2i} to ensure that infinitely many unused function symbols f_{2i+1} are available.

Ex: Explain why it is ok to rename. You need to prove the following.

- Every finite subset of S before renaming is satisfiable if and only if every finite subset of S after renaming is satisfiable.
- The whole of S before renaming is satisfiable if and only if the whole of S after renaming is satisfiable.

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(5) \Rightarrow (6). Ex: Why does this step hold?

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Proof: Introduce a fresh binary predicate R . For $n > 1$, define

$$G_n = \forall x \neg R(x, x) \wedge \exists x_1 \dots \exists x_n \bigwedge_{1 \leq i < j \leq n} R(x_i, x_j).$$

Then, $\mathcal{B} \models G_n$ implies $|U_{\mathcal{B}}| \geq n$.

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Every finite subset of \mathcal{S} is satisfiable. (Ex2: Why?) By compactness, \mathcal{S} has a model \mathcal{B} . Then, $|U_{\mathcal{B}}|$ is infinite, and $\mathcal{B} \models F$. (Ex3: Why?)

Peano axioms

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Figure: Giuseppe Peano (1858 - 1932)

Peano axioms

Let $\sigma = \langle 0, s, +, \cdot, = \rangle$. Peano axioms axiomatise elementary facts about arithmetic in first-order logic with equality:

$$\begin{array}{ll} \forall x \neg (s(x) = 0), & \forall x \forall y (s(x) = s(y) \rightarrow x = y), \\ \forall x (x + 0 = x), & \forall x \forall y (x + s(y) = s(x + y)), \\ \forall x (x \cdot 0 = 0), & \forall x \forall y (x \cdot s(y) = (x \cdot y) + x). \end{array}$$

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But, cannot quantify over sets in first-order logic. We instead resort to infinitely many axioms, one for each formula $\phi(x, y_1, \dots, y_k)$:

$$\forall y_1 \dots y_k \left(\left(\phi(0, y_1, \dots, y_k) \wedge \forall x \left(\phi(x, y_1, \dots, y_k) \rightarrow \phi(s(x), y_1, \dots, y_k) \right) \right) \rightarrow \forall x \phi(x, y_1, \dots, y_k) \right).$$

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Let S_{PA} be the union of all formulas above. Then, “classical arithmetic” is a model of S_{PA} .

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Theorem (without proof)

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Answer1: Introduce a new constant symbol c , and set

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Then, every finite subset of $S_{PA} \cup \mathcal{C}$ is satisfiable. (Ex2: Why?)

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Thus, $\mathcal{S}_{PA} \cup \mathcal{C}$ has a model \mathcal{A} by the compactness theorem.

The model \mathcal{A} is not isomorphic to the “classical” model of arithmetic.
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Answer3: Because $c_{\mathcal{A}} \neq s_{\mathcal{A}}^i(0_{\mathcal{A}})$ for all $i \in \mathbb{N}$.

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Answer: No. Because the following theorem says that we can make an arbitrary big model.

Theorem (Upward Löwenheim-Skolem theorem)

If a set of sentences S over a finite signature σ has an infinite model \mathcal{A} , then for any infinite cardinal κ , it has a model \mathcal{B} with a universe of cardinality κ .

Downward Löwenheim-Skolem theorem

Let σ be the signature

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Let \mathcal{S} be the set of first-order sentences over σ that holds for \mathbb{R} .

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Corollary

\mathcal{S} has a model with a countable universe but not isomorphic to \mathcal{R} .