

# Under the Spotlight: How External Informed Traders Impact Share Repurchases

Hongyi Xu

Stockholm School of Economics

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PHD NORDIC FINANCE WORKSHOP

# Motivation

- Rising share repurchase amounts.

*"In 2021, buybacks amounted to nearly \$950 billion and reportedly reached more than \$1.25 trillion in 2022,"*

- SEC Chair Gary Gensler

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


Figure: S&P500 Quarterly Share Repurchases and Dividends (in billion dollar)

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- Focus on the managers' incentives
  - inflate stock prices.
  - manipulate financial ratios, e.g. EPS, ROA, ROE, ROIC.
  - undervaluation
  - price support motive

# Motivation

## Question:

- Does the participation of other agents influence the manager's share repurchase decision?

# Key Results

## THEORY:

- Introduce the “external informed trader”
  - predict that external informed trader's participation  $\uparrow \Rightarrow$  share repurchases  $\downarrow$

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- Utilize firm-level institutional investor attention. (Ben-Rephael, Da, and Israelsen 2017)
  - Use abnormal institutional investor attention (AIA) to proxy for the participation of “external informed traders” in the market.

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  - predict that external informed trader's participation  $\uparrow \Rightarrow$  share repurchases  $\downarrow$

## EMPIRICAL:

- Utilize firm-level institutional investor attention. (Ben-Rephael, Da, and Israelsen 2017)
  - Use abnormal institutional investor attention (AIA) to proxy for the participation of “external informed traders” in the market.
- Higher abnormal institutional investor attention leads to a reduction in the amount and the probability of share repurchases.
  - one within-firm  $\sigma_{AIA} \uparrow$  leads to an approximate 10% reduction in monthly share repurchase intensity relative to the average level (0.31%).
  - one within-firm  $\sigma_{AIA} \uparrow$  reduces the probability of repurchasing shares by 1.5pp.



## Share Repurchases

- Brav et al. (2005), Brockman, Khurana, and Martin (2008), Hong, J. Wang, and Yu (2008), Gaspar et al. (2013), Dittmar and Field (2015), Hillert, Maug, and Obernberger (2016), Liu and Swanson (2016), Almeida, Fos, and Kronlund (2016), Ferri and N. Li (2020), Edmans, Fang, and Huang (2022), Busch and Obernberger (2016), and Dittmann et al. (2022)

## Investor Engagement and Informativeness

- Admati and Pfleiderer (2009), Edmans (2009), Duan and Jiao (2016), McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2016), Dasgupta, Fos, and Sautner (2021), Gantchev and Giannetti (2021), Goldman and W. Wang (2021), Iliev, Kalodimos, and Lowry (2021), S. Z. Li, Maug, and Schwartz-Ziv (2022), and Meirowitz and Pi (2022)

## Investor Attention

- Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011), Sicherman et al. (2016), Ben-Rephael, Da, and Israelsen (2017), Loughran and McDonald (2017), Peress and Schmidt (2020), Focke, Ruenzi, and Ungeheuer (2020), and Iliev, Kalodimos, and Lowry (2021)

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  - the manager as **the sole trader with private information**.
  - the undervalued firm repurchases more shares than the overvalued firm.

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- Case 2: Manager + Liquidity traders + **External informed trader**
  - the **external informed trader** has a noisy private signal.  $\Rightarrow$  price informativeness  $\uparrow$ .
  - undervalued firm: increased competition  $\rightarrow$  higher prices  $\rightarrow$  fewer repurchases.
  - overvalued firm: more informative prices  $\rightarrow$ 
    - $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{marginal increase in the share price } \downarrow \\ \qquad \qquad \qquad \vee \\ \text{marginal cost of price manipulation } \downarrow \end{array} \right. \rightarrow \text{fewer repurchases.}$
  - the informed trader's participation, ceteris paribus, **reduces the share repurchase amount**.

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    - the informed trader's participation, ceteris paribus, **reduces the share repurchase amount**.
- ★ Main Prediction: the manager will buy back fewer shares when the external informed trader participates in the market.

# Data

## Data Constructions:

- Firm-level **monthly share repurchases** from 10-Q and 10-K filings [▶ detail](#)
- Firm-level **daily maximum readership score** and **daily max/average story flow** from Bloomberg
- Firm-level financial information from Compustat
- Stock-level trading information from CRSP

## Final Unbalanced Panel:

- February 2010 – December 2021
- Russell 3000 stock universe
- Firms with at least one active OMR program in the sample period
- 73,926 firm-month observations, 1,575 firms

## Data - Abnormal Institutional Investor Attention

Firm-level **Daily Maximum Readership (DMR)**: (Bloomberg)

[▶ details:](#)

- Users' hourly read & search frequency  $\Rightarrow$  Hourly Attention Score
- **DMR** is the maximum hourly attention score within each calendar day.

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Firm-level Monthly Measures: (Ben-Rephael, Da, and Israelsen 2017)

► detail

- Firm-level **Monthly Abnormal Institutional Investor Attention (AIA)**  
: average DMR within a month

$$AIA_{i,m} = \frac{1}{N_m} \sum_{s=1}^{N_m} \text{Discrete } DMR_{i,m,s}$$

- Firm-level **Monthly Continuous Abnormal Institutional Investor Attention (AIAC)**

$$AIAC_{i,m} = \frac{1}{N_m} \sum_{s=1}^{N_m} \text{Continuous } DMR_{i,m,s}$$

## Data - AIA and AIAC




Figure: Histogram for AIA and AIAC



# Methodology and Empirical Results

How does the repurchase intensity response to changes in attention?

$$ReplIntensity_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta AIA_{i,t} + \delta ReplIntensity_{i,t-1} + \sum_{l=1}^N \gamma_l Control_{i,l,t} + \mu_i + \eta_t + \varepsilon_{i,t}, \quad (1)$$

- $ReplIntensity_{i,t}$  is the normalised actual share repurchase amount under the publicly announced program by firm  $i$  at time  $t$ .

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- $ReplIntensity_{i,t}$  is the normalised actual share repurchase amount under the publicly announced program by firm  $i$  at time  $t$ .
  - **Repurchase Intensity** = # Share Repurchased / Last Month Share Outstanding
  - **Repurchase Intensity (TV)** = # Share Repurchased / Current Month Trading Volume
- Standard errors are clustered at firm level.

# Methodology and Empirical Results - Panel OLS

Dependent Variable: Model:	Repurchase Intensity = # Share Repurchased / Last Month Share Outstanding					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
AIA <sub>t</sub>	-0.0006*** (0.0001)	-0.0006*** (0.0001)	-0.0005*** (0.0001)			
AIAC <sub>t</sub>				-0.0008*** (0.0001)	-0.0009*** (0.0001)	-0.0007*** (0.0002)
Repurchase Intensity <sub>t-1</sub>	0.1781*** (0.0229)	0.1769*** (0.0243)	0.1758*** (0.0244)	0.1781*** (0.0229)	0.1769*** (0.0243)	0.1758*** (0.0244)
Amihud <sub>t</sub> (ln)	-0.0009*** (0.0001)	-0.0021*** (0.0001)	-0.0021*** (0.0001)	-0.0009*** (0.0001)	-0.0021*** (0.0001)	-0.0021*** (0.0001)
OMRFlag <sub>t</sub>	0.0016*** (0.0003)	0.0016*** (0.0003)	0.0016*** (0.0003)	0.0016*** (0.0003)	0.0016*** (0.0003)	0.0016*** (0.0003)
Return Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Fundamental Controls		✓	✓		✓	✓
Info Flow Controls			✓			✓
Firm Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time Fixed effects	Month	Month	Month	Month	Month	Month
Observations	41,730	39,836	39,470	41,730	39,836	39,470
R <sup>2</sup>	0.24622	0.25699	0.25699	0.24623	0.25702	0.25703
R <sup>2</sup> (within)	0.04441	0.05630	0.05687	0.04442	0.05634	0.05692

Clustered (Ticker) standard-errors in parentheses and Signif. Levels: \*\*\*: 1%, \*\*: 5%, \*: 10%

# Methodology and Empirical Results - Panel OLS

Dependent Variable:	Repurchase Intensity (TV) = # Share Repurchased / Trading Volume					
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$AIA_t$	-0.0052*** (0.0005)	-0.0053*** (0.0005)	-0.0039*** (0.0005)			
$AIAC_t$				-0.0076*** (0.0008)	-0.0077*** (0.0008)	-0.0057*** (0.0008)
Repurchase Intensity (TV) $_{t-1}$	0.2047*** (0.0351)	0.2047*** (0.0372)	0.2026*** (0.0374)	0.2043*** (0.0351)	0.2044*** (0.0372)	0.2023*** (0.0374)
Amihud $_t$ (ln)	-0.0020*** (0.0005)	-0.0039*** (0.0007)	-0.0045*** (0.0007)	-0.0021*** (0.0005)	-0.0040*** (0.0007)	-0.0046*** (0.0007)
OMRFlag $_t$	0.0071*** (0.0015)	0.0071*** (0.0016)	0.0077*** (0.0016)	0.0071*** (0.0015)	0.0070*** (0.0016)	0.0077*** (0.0016)
Return Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Fundamental Controls		✓	✓		✓	✓
Info Flow Controls			✓			✓
Firm Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time Fixed effects	Month	Month	Month	Month	Month	Month
Observations	41,730	39,836	39,470	41,730	39,836	39,470
$R^2$	0.28374	0.28965	0.29125	0.28388	0.28981	0.29138
$R^2$ (within)	0.04901	0.05343	0.05570	0.04919	0.05365	0.05588

Clustered (Ticker) standard-errors in parentheses and Signif. Levels: \*\*\*: 1%, \*\*: 5%, \*: 10%

## Methodology and Empirical Results - Instrument

Reverse causality is unlikely.

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Potential concern of omitted variables.

Limited investor attention  $\Rightarrow$

External Market-wide AIA: average AIA in the market w/o firm  $i$

$$MarketAIA_{i,t} = \frac{1}{|\Omega_t \setminus \{i\}|} \sum_{j \in \Omega_t \setminus \{i\}} AIA_{j,t}, \quad (2)$$

where  $\Omega_t$  represents the set of firms in the Russell 3000 universe with a valid AIA/AIAC measure at time  $t$ .

## Methodology and Empirical Results - 2SLS

$$AIA_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 MarketAIA_{i,t} + \beta_2 ReplIntensity_{i,t-1} + \sum_{l=1}^N \gamma_l Control_{i,l,t} + \mu_i + \eta_t + \varepsilon_{i,t} \quad (FS),$$

$$ReplIntensity_{i,t} = \delta_0 + \delta_1 \widehat{AIA}_{i,t} + \delta_2 ReplIntensity_{i,t-1} + \sum_{l=1}^N \theta_l Control_{i,l,t} + \mu_i + \eta_t + u_{i,t} \quad (SS),$$

# Methodology and Empirical Results - 2SLS

## Panel A: Instrumental Variable Estimation

Dependent Variables: Model:	AIA (1)	(2)	AIAC (3)	(4)
MarketAIA <sub>t</sub>	-1,246.2*** (5.214)	-1,246.3*** (5.214)		
MarketAIAC <sub>t</sub>			-1,234.8*** (6.101)	-1,234.9*** (6.100)
F-test (First Stage)	49.443	102.10	48.645	102.73

## Panel B: Second Stage Estimation

Dependent Variables: Model:	Repurchase Intensity (1)	Repurchase Intensity (TV) (2)	Repurchase Intensity (3)	Repurchase Intensity (TV) (4)
Predicted AIA <sub>t</sub>	-0.0006*** (0.0001)	-0.0043*** (0.0006)		
Predicted AIAC <sub>t</sub>			-0.0008*** (0.0002)	-0.0060*** (0.0008)
Observations	39,470	39,470	39,470	39,470
R <sup>2</sup>	0.25698	0.29122	0.25702	0.29138

- Firm and time fixed effects are included in both stages.
- Same set of controls are included in both stages.

# Methodology and Empirical Results - 2SLS

## Panel A: Instrumental Variable Estimation

Dependent Variables:	AIA		AIAC	
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
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## Panel B: Second Stage Estimation

Dependent Variables:	Repurchase Intensity (1)	Repurchase Intensity (TV) (2)	Repurchase Intensity (3)	Repurchase Intensity (TV) (4)
Model:				
Predicted AIA <sub>t</sub>	-0.0006*** (0.0001)	-0.0043*** (0.0006)		
Predicted AIAC <sub>t</sub>			-0.0008*** (0.0002)	-0.0060*** (0.0008)
Observations	39,470	39,470	39,470	39,470
R <sup>2</sup>	0.25698	0.29122	0.25702	0.29138

- Firm and time fixed effects are included in both stages.
- Same set of controls are included in both stages.
- F-stat > 10 .

# Methodology and Empirical Results - 2SLS

## Panel A: Instrumental Variable Estimation

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F-test (First Stage)	49.443	102.10	48.645	102.73

## Panel B: Second Stage Estimation

Dependent Variables: Model:	Repurchase Intensity (1)	Repurchase Intensity (TV) (2)	Repurchase Intensity (3)	Repurchase Intensity (TV) (4)
Predicted AIA <sub>t</sub>	-0.0006*** (0.0001)	-0.0043*** (0.0006)		
Predicted AIAC <sub>t</sub>			-0.0008*** (0.0002)	-0.0060*** (0.0008)
Observations	39,470	39,470	39,470	39,470
R <sup>2</sup>	0.25698	0.29122	0.25702	0.29138

- Firm and time fixed effects are included in both stages.
- Same set of controls are included in both stages.
- F-stat > 10 .
- Economic significance: one within-firm sd of AIA  $\nearrow \Rightarrow \approx 0.03\text{pp} \searrow$  in Repurchase Intensity, on average. (=0.0006  $\times$  0.43)

# Methodology and Empirical Results - extensive margin

Dependent Variable:	Repurchase Dummy (0 / 1)			
Model:	LPM (1)	LPM (2)	IV (3)	IV (4)
$AIA_t$	-0.0326*** (0.0061)		-0.0341*** (0.0070)	
$AIAC_t$		-0.0451*** (0.0091)		-0.0460*** (0.0098)
$Repurchase\ Dummy_{t-1}$	0.3653*** (0.0124)	0.3651*** (0.0124)	0.3653*** (0.0124)	0.3651*** (0.0124)
$Amihud_t$ (ln)	-0.0567*** (0.0081)	-0.0573*** (0.0081)	-0.0567*** (0.0081)	-0.0573*** (0.0081)
$OMRFlag_t$	0.0813*** (0.0147)	0.0812*** (0.0147)	0.0814*** (0.0147)	0.0812*** (0.0147)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Firm Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time Fixed effects	Month	Month	Month	Month
Observations	39,470	39,470	39,470	39,470
F-test (First Stage)			43.054	41.382
$R^2$	0.50686	0.50683	0.50686	0.50683

# Conclusion

- Using institutional attention, highlight external informed traders as a significant factor in managers' share repurchases.
- The **participation of external informed traders** reduces both the amount and the probability of executing buybacks by the manager.
- Indicate that managers strategically abstain from repurchasing shares when their firms are under the spotlight. [▶ MORE](#)

# Appendix




## Conceptual Framework - Players

For a firm that generates a signal cash flow  $v = \{0, X\}$  with the prior  $\mathbf{P}(v = X) = \frac{1}{2}$ :

1. One corporate manager (M)
  - conducts an publicly announced Open Market Share Repurchase (OMR) program.
  - cares about both the stock price  $P_1$  and terminal firm value  $P_2$ .
2. One blockholder (B)
  - holds a sufficient large minority interest  $\alpha \in [0, \bar{\alpha}]$ ,  $\bar{\alpha} > 0$ .
  - may exert research effort  $\mu \in [0, 1]$  at cost  $\frac{c}{2}\mu^2$ .
    - when  $\mu > 0$ , B becomes an "external informed trader".
  - cares about her trading profits.
3. Atomistic liquidity traders/Households
  - collectively hold the rest of the shares  $1 - \alpha$ .
4. One competitive market maker
  - observes the aggregate order flow.
  - sets the price to make zero conditional expected profits ex ante.

## Conceptual Framework - Timeline



Note: without time discounting and transaction costs, and all agents are risk-neutral. [▶ Intuition](#)

## PART II

### ITEM 5. MARKET FOR REGISTRANT'S COMMON EQUITY, RELATED STOCKHOLDER MATTERS, AND ISSUER PURCHASES OF EQUITY SECURITIES

#### MARKET AND STOCKHOLDERS

Our common stock is traded on the NASDAQ Stock Market under the symbol MSFT. On July 27, 2020, there were 91,674 registered holders of record of our common stock.

#### SHARE REPURCHASES AND DIVIDENDS

Following are our monthly share repurchases for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2020:

Period	Total Number of Shares Purchased	Average Price Paid Per Share	Total Number of Shares Purchased as Part of Publicly Announced Plans or Programs	Approximate Dollar Value of Shares That May Yet be Purchased Under the Plans or Programs
				(In millions)
April 1, 2020 – April 30, 2020	8,906,563	\$ 165.90	8,906,563	\$ 35,323
May 1, 2020 – May 31, 2020	9,655,700	182.31	9,655,700	33,563
June 1, 2020 – June 30, 2020	9,648,400	191.80	9,648,400	31,712
	<u>28,210,663</u>		<u>28,210,663</u>	

All share repurchases were made using cash resources. Our share repurchases may occur through open market purchases or pursuant to a Rule 10b5-1 trading plan. The above table excludes shares repurchased to settle employee tax withholding related to the vesting of stock awards.

**Figure:** An excerpt from Microsoft's 10-K filing in 2020

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Footnotes

Figure: An excerpt from Microsoft's 10-K filing in 2020

# Data - Monthly Share Repurchases [▶ back](#)

item	period	variable	value	unit
April 1, 2020 – April 30, 2020	April 1, 2020 – April 30, 2020	Total Number of Shares Purchased	8,906,563	
May 1, 2020 – May 31, 2020	May 1, 2020 – May 31, 2020	Total Number of Shares Purchased	9,655,700	
June 1, 2020 – June 30, 2020	June 1, 2020 – June 30, 2020	Total Number of Shares Purchased	9,648,400	
	June 1, 2020 – June 30, 2020	Total Number of Shares Purchased	28,210,663	
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June 1, 2020 – June 30, 2020	June 1, 2020 – June 30, 2020	Average Price Paid Per Share	191.80	
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May 1, 2020 – May 31, 2020	May 1, 2020 – May 31, 2020	D\$- Approximate Dollar Value of Shares That May Yet be Purchased Under the Plans or Programs	33,563	(in millions)
June 1, 2020 – June 30, 2020	June 1, 2020 – June 30, 2020	D\$- Approximate Dollar Value of Shares That May Yet be Purchased Under the Plans or Programs	31,712	(in millions)
	June 1, 2020 – June 30, 2020	D\$- Approximate Dollar Value of Shares That May Yet be Purchased Under the Plans or Programs		(in millions)

Table: Cleaned share repurchases data

## Data - Abnormal Institutional Investor Attention

Firm-level Daily Maximum Readership (Bloomberg):


- Hourly Read & Search Frequency  $\rightarrow \begin{cases} \text{Search} = 10 \\ \text{Read} = 1 \end{cases} \Rightarrow \text{Hourly Counts } c_{i,m,t} \Rightarrow$   
8-hour Average Counts  $ac_{i,m,t} = \frac{1}{8} \sum_{s=t-7}^t c_{i,m,s}$

- Hourly Attention Score = 
$$\begin{cases} 0 & , \text{ if } F_{i,m-1}(ac_{i,m,t}) \leq 80\% \\ 1 & , \text{ if } F_{i,m-1}(ac_{i,m,t}) \in (80\%, 90\%] \\ 2 & , \text{ if } F_{i,m-1}(ac_{i,m,t}) \in (90\%, 94\%], \\ 3 & , \text{ if } F_{i,m-1}(ac_{i,m,t}) \in (94\%, 96\%] \\ 4 & , \text{ if } F_{i,m-1}(ac_{i,m,t}) > 96\% \end{cases}$$

where  $F_{i,m-1}(c)$  is the CDF of past-month hourly counts for firm  $i$ .

- Daily Maximum Readership (DMR) is the maximum hourly attention score within each calendar day.

## Data - Abnormal Institutional Investor Attention



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## Data - Abnormal Institutional Investor Attention [▶ back](#)

Firm-level Monthly Measures: (Ben-Rephael, Da, and Israelsen 2017)

- Firm-level **Monthly Abnormal Institutional Investor Attention (AIA)**

$$AIA_{i,m} = \frac{1}{N_m} \sum_{s=1}^{N_m} \text{Discrete DMR}_{i,m,s}$$

- Firm-level **Monthly Continuous Abnormal Institutional Investor Attention (AIAC)**

$$AIAC_{i,m} = \frac{1}{N_m} \sum_{s=1}^{N_m} \text{Continuous DMR}_{i,m,s}$$

$N_m$  is the total number of calendar days with valid DMR values in month  $m$ .

Discrete DMR	0	1	2	3	4
Continuous DMR	-0.350	1.045	1.409	1.647	2.154



## Subgroup Analysis - undervalued versus overvalued firms [▶ back](#)

Future Research:

- Look into undervalued versus overvalued firms.
- Impact of retail investor attention.

[▶ MORE](#)

Dependent Variable:	Repurchase Intensity			
Model:	CAR (current month) (1)	CAR (1-month) (2)	CAR (3-month) (3)	CAR (6-month) (4)
AIA $\times$ (CAR $\leq$ 0)	-0.0008*** (0.0002)	-0.0007*** (0.0002)	-0.0009*** (0.0002)	-0.0008*** (0.0002)
AIA $\times$ (CAR $>$ 0)	-0.0004** (0.0002)	-0.0005** (0.0002)	-0.0003 (0.0002)	-0.0004* (0.0002)
(CAR $>$ 0)	-0.0005 (0.0003)	-0.0001 (0.0003)	-0.0003 (0.0003)	-0.0001 (0.0003)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Firm Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time Fixed effects	Month	Month	Month	Month
Observations	32,800	32,847	32,847	32,847
R <sup>2</sup>	0.26024	0.26055	0.25966	0.25995
Within R <sup>2</sup>	0.05376	0.05406	0.05293	0.05330

Clustered (Ticker) standard-errors in parentheses and Signif. Levels: \*\*\*: 1%, \*\*: 5%, \*: 10%