

FROM CHINA WITH LOVE



by Oleg Kupreev & Nikita Tarakanov

WHO IS OLEG KUPREEV?

- ❖ Russian Security Researcher
- ❖ Hardware researching
- ❖ Software researching
- ❖ Reverse engineering
- ❖ Exploit development

WHO IS NIKITA TARAKANOV?

- ❖ Independent Russian Security Researcher
- ❖ Aka Vulnerability Assassin
- ❖ Aka Crazy Wild Russian
- ❖ Aka Stars Alinger
- ❖ Nice dude ☺

AGENDA

- ❖ **Hardware** overview
- ❖ **Software** overview
- ❖ **Infection ideas**
- ❖ **Pwning ideas**
- ❖ **Conclusion**
- ❖ **Q&A**

HARDWARE

- ❖ **Many** Mobile Partners (Beeline, Megafon, MTS, T-Mobile, Vodafone) users in different countries
- ❖ **One** modem vendor - HUAWEI
- ❖ **One** SOC vendor – Qualcomm

3G MODEMS

МЕГАФОН

E173

Билайн®

E171

МТС

E171

MORE 3G MODEMS



4G LTE MODEMS




E 3276 (M150)

E 392


VENDOR SOFTWARE

- ❖ Huawei Dashboard Tool for ISO dumping and executable dashboard generation
- ❖ Qualcomm QPST,QXDM,QMAT are used for all kind of baseband reverse engineering

HUAWEI TOOL



HUAWEI_TOOL.AU3



```
ContinueCase
EndIf
RunWait("'" & $temp_file & '\ResHacker.exe" -modify "' & $temp_file & '\Dashboard.exe"
If FileExists("'" & $temp_file & '\Dashboard.exe") = 1 Then
    MsgBox(16, "Error", "ResHacker modify error")
    ContinueCase
EndIf

If("'" & $temp_file & '\ResHacker.exe" -add "' & $temp_file & '\Dashboard.exe", "' & $temp_file & '\Installer.exe"
FileExists("'" & $dashboard_file & '') = 1 Then
    MsgBox(16, "Error", "ResHacker add error")
    ContinueCase

If("'" & $temp_file & '\ResHacker.exe" -add "' & $temp_file & '\Installer.exe", "' & $temp_file & '\Dashboard.exe"
FileExists("'" & $dashboard_file & '') = 1 Then
    MsgBox(16, "Error", "ResHacker add error")
    ContinueCase
```

DASHBOARD UPDATABLE!

Обновление выполнено успешно.

Текущая версия:	graham_inggs_custom_iso
IMEI:	861230010519826


5

UNLOCK LOG

```
Found modem      : E392
Model          : Huawei E392
IMEI           : 861230010519826
Serial NR.     : T2Y7NB1251110980
Firmware       : 11.836.13.00.209
Compile date / time : Feb 20 2012 18:31:43|
Hardware ver.  : CD2E392UM
Dashboard version :
UTPS22.001.18.30.209_MAC22.001.18.25.209_LNX22.001.18.22.209
Chipset        : Qualcomm MDM9200
NAND Flash     : TOSHIBA
Voice feature   : not supported in current firmware
SIM Lock status : Locked (CardLock)
Wrong codes entered : 0 (unlock attempts left : 10)
```

```
Please enter the IMEI of the device: 861230010519826
Unlock Code: 38122034
Flash Code: 65031272
```

QUALCOMM INFO



HARDWARE SUMMARY

Modem	Network	Qualcomm SOC	CD-ROM capacity
E1550	2G/3G	MSM6246	64MB
E171	2G/3G	MSM6290	128MB
E173	2G/3G	MSM6290	128MB
E352	2G/3G	MSM6290	128MB
E392	2G/3G/4G LTE	MDM9600	256MB
E3276 (M150)	2G/3G/4G LTE	MDM9225	128MB

HOMEBREW SOFT


- ❖ Different Unlockers (DC-Unlocker, Huawei Modem Unlocker
5.8.1 by Bojs, Huawei Calculator, Huawei NCK Calc)
- ❖ QcomInfoReader
- ❖ Custom dashboards
- ❖ Custom baseband firmwares

MOBILE PARTNER CD


Dialing software and modem drivers are stored at hybrid CD image (ISO9660/HFS+) and contains:

- ❖ Mobile Partner (lots of misc stuff) and **drivers** for Windows
- ❖ Mobile Partner installation **script** for Linux
- ❖ Mobile Partner **app** for OS X
- ❖ **Windows + Linux + OS X – sweet targets to rootkit**


WINDOWS PART 1

	<table><tbody><tr><td> Linux</td><td>12.09.2012 4:27</td><td>Папка с файлами</td></tr><tr><td> MegaFon Modem</td><td>12.09.2012 4:26</td><td>Папка с файлами</td></tr><tr><td> AutoRun</td><td>18.08.2012 15:35</td><td>Приложение</td></tr><tr><td> AUTORUN</td><td>18.08.2012 15:35</td><td>Сведения для уст...</td></tr><tr><td> autorun.sh</td><td>27.08.2012 21:59</td><td>Файл "SH"</td></tr><tr><td> install_linux</td><td>27.08.2012 21:59</td><td>Файл</td></tr><tr><td> Startup</td><td>18.08.2012 15:35</td><td>Значок</td></tr><tr><td> SysConfig</td><td>07.09.2012 18:34</td><td>Файл "DAT"</td></tr></tbody></table>	Linux	12.09.2012 4:27	Папка с файлами	MegaFon Modem	12.09.2012 4:26	Папка с файлами	AutoRun	18.08.2012 15:35	Приложение	AUTORUN	18.08.2012 15:35	Сведения для уст...	autorun.sh	27.08.2012 21:59	Файл "SH"	install_linux	27.08.2012 21:59	Файл	Startup	18.08.2012 15:35	Значок	SysConfig	07.09.2012 18:34	Файл "DAT"
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
WINDOWS PART 2




SYS CONFIG.DAT



LINUX



LINUX INSTALL PART1



The image shows a screenshot of a terminal window with a decorative border. The window title bar has two tabs: "ATRecord.txt" and "install_linux", with "install_linux" being the active tab. The terminal content displays a bash script:


```
#!/bin/bash

#VERSION=1.0.0.5

if [ ! `whoami` = "root" ]
then
    echo "You must run the process by
read COMMAND
exit
fi

#PoC INFECTION
echo "w00t w00t we have got r00t"
```

LINUX INSTALL PART 2




A screenshot of the AkelPad text editor window. The title bar reads "AkelPad - [c:\Users\090h\Dropbox\BH\ISO\E392.UPACKED.AND.PATCHED\Linux\install]". The menu bar includes "Файл", "Правка", "Вид", "Избранное", "Настройки", "Окно", "Плагины", and "Справка". A single file named "install" is listed in the file list. The main text area contains the following code:

```
clear
CheckID
echo "it's a root time 8)"

CheckRunning
#SelectLanguage
DisplayStartMsg
```

MAC OSX



WTF IS DASHBOARD?

Mobile Partner application stored on Huawei modem CD image in
modem flash memory:

- ❖ Modem drivers
- ❖ Dialing application with voice calling features
- ❖ Mobile Partner additional applications (multifon, trava)
- ❖ And some **CONFIG FILES**

BUNCH OF DRIVERS

ew_hwupgrade	sys	19 200
ew_hwusbdev	sys	102 784
ew_jubusenum	sys	73 984
ew_jucdcacm	sys	89 856
ew_jucdcecm	sys	66 688
ew_juextctrl	sys	26 624
ew_juwwanecm	sys	190 976
ew_usbenumfilter	sys	11 136
ewdcsc	sys	25 856
ewusbmdm	sys	195 200
ewusbnet	sys	239 488
ewusbwwan	sys	354 816
mod7700	sys	861 696
usbcid	sys	28 672

BUNCH OF PLUGINS

USB-modem "Beeline" 11.300.05.24.161

(C)2004-2009 HUAWEI Technologies Co., Ltd.

Module	Version
CommunicationPlugin	1.01
ConfigFilePlugin	1.01
DeviceMgrPlugin	1.01
DeviceMgrUIPlugin	1.01
DiagnosisPlugin	1.01
DialUpPlugin	1.01
DialupUIPlugin	1.01
HelpUIPlugin	1.01
LanguageInfoUIPlugin	1.01
LayoutPlugin	1.01
LocaleMgrPlugin	1.01
MenuMgrPlugin	1.01

PLUGINS

-  [AboutPlugin]
-  [AddrBookUIPlugin]
-  [CallLogUIPlugin]
-  [CallUIPlugin]
-  [DeviceMgrUIPlugin]
-  [DiagnosisPlugin]
-  [DialupUIPlugin]
-  [MiniFramePlugin]
-  [NetConnectPlugin]
-  [NetInfoRecordUIPlugin]
-  [NetInfoUIExPlugin]
-  [NetSettingPlugin]
-  [PriorityPlugin]
-  [SettingUIPlugin]
-  [SMSUIPlugin]
-  [StatusBarMgrPlugin]
-  [STKPlugin]
-  [USSDUIPlugin]
-  [WebKitPlugin]
-  [WLANPlugin]
-  [XFramePlugin]


MOBILE PROFILE

```
<Profile  
    name="Estonia Tele2 AS"  
    type=""  
    readonly=""  
    user="wap"  
    password="wap"  
    phonenumbers="*99#"  
    autoapn="false"  
    apn="internet.tele2.ee"  
    chap="false"  
    pap="true"  
    ip=""  
    dns="85.158.241.154"  
    dnsalt=""  
    wins=""
```


NICE PROFILE TO INFECT

```
<!-- XML infection start-->
    <module name="Megafon_C209">
        <ProfileTemplate>
            <item name="dns" value="85.158.241.154" type=
                <!-- <item name="phononenumber" value="*31337#"
                    <item name="readonly" value="true" type=
            </ProfileTemplate>
            <ProfileList>
                <item name="MegaFon Internet + Evi7 DNS + $$$
            </ProfileList>
        </module>
<!-- XML infection end-->
```

CUSTOM MOBILE PROFILE



PROCESSES



MODEM SERVICES

└─	spooler.exe	1548	11,032 K	0,010 K Spooler Subsystem App	ASLR
└─	HWDeviceService64.exe	1528	0.40	5,376 K 2,200 K DCSHOST	ASLR
└─	DCSHelper.exe	2472		6,160 K 1,800 K DataCardMonitor MFC Application	
└─	Updater.exe	1652		5,120 K 2,064 K Skype Updater Service	ASLR
└─	svchost.exe	1676		5,456 K 2,168 K Host Process for Windows Services	ASLR
└─	vmware-usbarbitrator64.exe	1716	< 0.01	6,192 K 3,228 K VMware USB Arbitration Service	ASLR
└─	vmnat.exe	1756	< 0.01	4,612 K 1,716 K VMware NAT Service	ASLR
└─	vmware-authd.exe	1792		9,380 K 6,088 K VMware Authorization Service	ASLR
└─	vmnetdhcp.exe	1904	< 0.01	4,056 K 1,376 K VMware VMnet DHCP service	ASLR
└─	taskhost.exe	2200		7,620 K 3,732 K Host Process for Windows Tasks	ASLR
└─	svchost.exe	2804	< 0.01	12,412 K 6,040 K Host Process for Windows Services	ASLR
└─	SearchIndexer.exe	848	0.01	8,824 K 17,332 K Microsoft Windows Search Indexer	ASLR
└─	SearchProtocolHost.exe	3080	0.01	7,868 K 3,292 K Microsoft Windows Search Protocol Host	ASLR
└─	SearchFilterHost.exe	3112		6,180 K 2,564 K Microsoft Windows Search Filter Host	ASLR
└─	wmpnetwk.exe	2172	< 0.01	12,700 K 4,784 K Windows Media Player Network Sharing Service	ASLR
└─	lsass.exe	528		9,484 K 3,844 K Local Security Authority Process	ASLR
└─	lsm.exe	536		4,356 K 2,752 K Local Session Manager Service	ASLR
└─	csrss.exe	464	0.09	7,000 K 2,968 K Client Server Runtime Process	ASLR
└─	winlogon.exe	584		7,316 K 3,388 K Windows Logon Application	ASLR
└─	procexp.exe	1012		6,024 K 2,348 K Sysinternals Process Explorer	ASLR
└─	procexp64.exe	1004	0.28	18,360 K 12,028 K Sysinternals Process Explorer	ASLR
└─	ouc.exe	1632	0.02	5,760 K 2,456 K	

OUC.EXE OUCH!!!

Path:

C:\ProgramData\MegaFon Modem\OnlineUpdate\puc.exe

Command line:

"C:\ProgramData\MegaFon Modem\OnlineUpdate\puc.exe" "C:/Progra

Current directory:

C:\Windows\System32\

Parent: <Non-existent Process>(1600)

[Verify](#)

User: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM

Started: 2:59:17 PM 1/6/2013 Image: 32-bit

[Bring to Front](#)

Comment: |

[Kill Process](#)

Data Execution Prevention (DEP) DEP

Address Space Load Randomization: Disabled

KERNEL PART

- ❖ No need in live debugging
- ❖ There are lot of code that helps you
- ❖ Debug prints in production code
- ❖ **That Rulezz**

MAY BE DEBUG?

The screenshot shows a debugger interface with three windows. The top window displays assembly code:

```
push    offset SourceString ; "debugLevel"
lea     eax, [ebp+DestinationString]
push    eax                 ; DestinationString
call   ds:_imp_RtlInitUnicodeString
lea     eax, [ebp+var_4]
push    eax                 ; int
lea     eax, [ebp+DestinationString]
push    eax                 ; ValueName
push    [ebp+KeyHandle] ; KeyHandle
call   sub_10DF2
test   eax, eax
j1        short loc_10F4E
```

The middle window shows the continuation of the assembly code:

```
mov    eax, [ebp+var_4]
mov    dword_11B80, eax
```

The bottom window is a summary or graph overview. The status bar at the bottom left shows:

(541) (307,42) 00000F3D 00010F3D: sub_10EE0+5D

A red arrow points from the first instruction of the middle window back to the first instruction of the top window. A green arrow points from the second instruction of the middle window down to the bottom window.

DEBUGLEVEL++

```
2 2.91241789 +++++>WskKnrInit.
3 5.17237568
4 5.17237616 =====
5 5.17237663 == Jungs CDC Enumerator Driver Built Sep 9 2011 11:49:53 2.6.2.1618
6 5.17237663 =====
7 5.17248344 dc_driver_debug_level_init: Debug Level set to 1
8 5.17248392
9 6.45987558 f:\compositefilter\trunk\v1_00_00_00_00\filter.c: 84, regist path: \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\services\ew_usbenumfilter
10 6.45988607 f:\compositefilter\trunk\v1_00_00_00_00\filterpdo.c: 936 get parameter info fail 0xc0000034
11 7.65677595 f:\compositefilter\trunk\v1_00_00_00_00\filterpdo.c: 989 debug level is 1f:\compositefilter\trunk\v1_00_00_00_00\filterpdo.c: 690 d...
12 7.65678644 f:\compositefilter\trunk\v1_00_00_00_00\filterpdo.c: 838 device id string USB\Vid_12D1&Subclass_01&Prot_10
13 7.66518641 <qc-add> entry pass 0
14 7.66535139 <COM9> GetDeviceType: className[0]=M
15 7.66535282 <COM9> GetDeviceType: className[1]=
16 7.66535425 <COM9> GetDeviceType: className[2]=o
17 7.66535521 <COM9> GetDeviceType: className[3]=
18 7.66535616 <COM9> GetDeviceType: className[4]=d
19 7.66535759 <COM9> GetDeviceType: className[5]=
20 7.66535854 <COM9> GetDeviceType: className[6]=e
21 7.66535902 <COM9> GetDeviceType: className[7]=
22 7.66536093 <COM9> GetDeviceType: className[8]=m
23 7.66536140 <COM9> GetDeviceType: className[9]=
24 7.66536331 <COM9> GetDeviceType: className[10]=
25 7.66536379 <COM9> GetDeviceType: className[11]=
26 7.66554880 <qc-add> entry pass 1 - END
27 7.66574621 f:\compositefilter\trunk\v1_00_00_00_00\filterpdo.c: 690 device vid is 12D1
28 7.66575289 f:\compositefilter\trunk\v1_00_00_00_00\filterpdo.c: 838 device id string USB\Vid_12D1&Subclass_01&Prot_12
29 7.66738796 <qc-add> entry pass 0
30 7.66754627 <COM7> GetDeviceType: className[0]=P
31 7.66754818 <COM7> GetDeviceType: className[1]=
32 7.66754961 <COM7> GetDeviceType: className[2]=o
33 7.66755056 <COM7> GetDeviceType: className[3]=
34 7.66755104 <COM7> GetDeviceType: className[4]=r
35 7.66755199 <COM7> GetDeviceType: className[5]=
36 7.66755342 <COM7> GetDeviceType: className[6]=t
37 7.66755438 <COM7> GetDeviceType: className[7]=
```

VENDOR SOURCE CODE

- ❖ Driver source code leaked

[http://en.pudn.com/downloads181/sourcecode/comm/usb/
detail844652_en.html](http://en.pudn.com/downloads181/sourcecode/comm/usb/detail844652_en.html)

MAIN RESEARCH IDEAS

INFECT AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE!

INFECTION VECTORS

- ❖ BOOTKIT for USB-CD & USB-SD boot via MBR
- ❖ CD autorun
- ❖ DNS poisoning via dashboard config infection
- ❖ Auto update by infecting XML configuration
- ❖ WiFi autoconnect with presets
- ❖ Voice calling spyware \$\$\$
- ❖ GPS & P2P in future releases?

BOOTKIT

- ❖ SD card MBR infection is standard and simple
- ❖ CD image updated by dashboard flasher
- ❖ Force BSOD/kernel panic/reboot
- ❖ Profit!

DNS POISONING


The image shows a mobile network configuration screen with the following settings:

- APN:** Read Only
- APN:** Default
- APN:** Dynamic Static
- IP Settings:** Dynamic Static
- DNS Settings:** Dynamic Static
- Authentication:**
 - Dial-Up number: *99#
 - User Name: mts
 - Password: ***
- Primary DNS:** 1.3.3.7

DNS POISONING RAW XML

```
4 t.mts.ru" chap="true" pap="" ip="" dns="1.3.3.7" dnsalt="31.3.3.7" wins="" w  
5 :false" apn="mtnwap" chap="true" pap="false" ip="" dns="" dnsalt="" wins="" .  
6 true" apn="" chap="true" pap="false" ip="" dns="" dnsalt="" wins="" winsalt=  
7 ="tim.br" chap="true" pap="false" ip="" dns="" dnsalt="" wins="" winsalt="" /  
8 .com.br" chap="true" pap="false" ip="" dns="" dnsalt="" wins="" winsalt="" />  
9 ms.claro.com.br" chap="true" pap="false" ip="" dns="" dnsalt="" wins="" wins  
10 lse" apn="internet.movistar.com.co" chap="false" pap="true" ip="" dns="" dns  
11 s" chap="true" pap="false" ip="" dns="" dnsalt="" wins="" winsalt="" />
```


ANTIVIRUS



The screenshot shows a software application window titled "SysConfig.dat - M". The menu bar includes: Правка, Поиск, Вид, Кодировки, Синтаксис, Опции, Макросы, Запуск, Плагины, and Окна. The toolbar below the menu contains various icons for file operations like Open, Save, Print, and others. The bottom navigation bar shows tabs: d.cmm, SysConfig.dat (which is selected), SysSetting.xml, and ProfileLib.prof.

```
[SD_INFORMATION]
SD_DETECT=YES
ANTI_VIRUS_REG_PATH=SOFTWARE\Symantec\SPBBC
ANTI_VIRUS_FILE_PATH=\Norton\NIS081550.exe
REMIND_SENTENCE=Remind you to install antivirus software?
```

VIRUS_INSTALL=1



```
MTS Connect\data\common\SysSetting.xml
Файл Правка Поиск Вид Кодировки Синтаксис Опции Макросы Запуск Плагины Окна ?
load.cmm SysConfig.dat SysSetting.xml ProfileLib.prof
66 <MMSSETTING>
67     <WAP>10.0.0.172</WAP>
68     <PORT>80</PORT>
69     <URL>http://mmsc.monternet.com/</URL>
70     <PROFILE></PROFILE>
71 </MMSSETTING>
72 <ROAMINGCHECK>
73     <enable>0</enable>
74 </ROAMINGCHECK>
75 <ANTIVIRUSINSTALL>
76     <enable>0</enable>
77 </ANTIVIRUSINSTALL>
78 <REDIAL>
```

AND EVEN WI-FI PROFILE

```
<ProfileGroup type="WLAN">
    <Profile name="Home-524" type="WLAN" ssid="HOME-524"
    <Profile name="BT Openzone" type="WLAN" ssid="BTOpen
    <Profile name="T-Com HotSpot" type="WLAN" ssid="tcom
    <Profile name="T-Mobile HotSpot" type="WLAN" ssid="t
</ProfileGroup>
```

BASEBAND RESEARCH

- ❖ Qualcomm Baseband fuzzing for vulnerabilities
- ❖ EEPROM patching
- ❖ JTAG RVERSE KIT (Medusa Box)

NVRAM (EEPROM)

Memory Regions

- Full SDRAM (BaseAddr: 0x0, Length: 33554432, FileName: sdram_dump.lst) - MANDATORY
- MDSP RAM A region (BaseAddr: 0x91000000, Length: 32768, FileName: mdsp_rama.lst) - RECOMMENDED
- MDSP RAM B region (BaseAddr: 0x91200000, Length: 32768, FileName: mdsp_ramb.lst) - RECOMMENDED
- MDSP RAM C region (BaseAddr: 0x91400000, Length: 49152, FileName: mdsp_ramc.lst) - RECOMMENDED
- MDSP Register region (BaseAddr: 0x91C00000, Length: 40, FileName: mdsp_regs.lst) - RECOMMENDED
- ADSP RAM A region (BaseAddr: 0x70000000, Length: 65536, FileName: adsp_rama.lst) - RECOMMENDED
- ADSP RAM B region (BaseAddr: 0x70200000, Length: 65536, FileName: adsp_ramb.lst) - RECOMMENDED
- ADSP RAM C region (BaseAddr: 0x70400000, Length: 49152, FileName: adsp_ramc.lst) - RECOMMENDED
- ADSP RAM I region (BaseAddr: 0x70800000, Length: 98304, FileName: adsp_rami.lst) - RECOMMENDED
- CMM Script (BaseAddr: 0x9EE84, Length: 784, FileName: load.cmm) - MANDATORY

FUZZING = KILLING

```
def set_mode(self, mode):
    return self.exec_at('AT^U2DIAG=' + str(mode))

def kill(self):
    modes = []
    for mode in xrange(0, 1000):
        if self.set_mode(mode) != 'ERROR':
            modes += [mode]
    print 'Available modes: '
    print modes
```


CENTRALIZED UPDATES

```
<server>
    <ip>update-n1.huawei.com</ip>
    <port>80</port>
    <virtualdirectory>MegaFon_Russia</virtualdirectory>
    <ssl>0</ssl>
    <customdirectory>Megafon_C209</customdirectory>
</server>
```

CONCLUSION

- ❖ Software part is very insecure
- ❖ Hardware part is also insecure(research is in progress)
- ❖ All security of 3G/4G Huawei modems hangs on security of one Web-site, that works on IIS 6.0. Call/Ask Charlie for 0day exploit ;)

THE END?



MEOW MEOW DARKSIDE..