

# Hormoz Ramian

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## RESEARCH INTERESTS

Macroeconomics, Finance, Monetary Economics, Banking and Financial Regulation

## EDUCATION

### Finance, Ph.D. Candidate

Imperial College London (2016–2020, Expected)  
Job Market Paper: *Optimal Financial Regulation*

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**Finance, M.Res.** (Distinction, Dean's List), Imperial College London

**Financial Economics, M.Sc.**, University of Manchester

**Economics, B.Sc.**, National University, Iran

## AWARDS AND SCHOLARSHIPS

Presidential Scholarship, Imperial College London	2016–20
Winner, Imperial College London Best Graduate Teaching (University-wide Award)	2018
Imperial College London, Best Graduate Teaching Nominations	2017, 18, 19
Graduate Teaching Scholarship, Imperial College Business School	2015–16
Dean's List Award, Imperial College, Business School	2016
ORS Scholarship, University of Manchester	2012

### RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

#### **Optimal Financial Regulation** (Job Market Paper)

*Abstract:* I show that when the banking sector's assets comprise large excess reserves and loans, jointly determined capital regulation and interest-on-excess-reserves (IOER) policies provide welfare gains. In general equilibrium, falling IOER is associated with a proportional fall in deposit rate only when IOER is above the zero bound. This leads to a faster fall in the bank's interest expenses than its interest incomes. Given any lending level, lower net interest expenses enhance bank solvency. Nonetheless, the risk-weighted capital regulation remains unchanged and hence becomes socially costly. I show that jointly determined policies achieve welfare gains by loosening the capital requirement and lowering IOER to expand the credit flow, while bank failure likelihood remains constant. Conversely, lowering IOER below the zero bound is associated with a nonresponsive deposit rate that leads to growing net interest expenses and worsening bank solvency. In that case, I show that a stricter capital constraint together with a lower IOER provide social value.

#### **Financial Regulation and Wealth Distribution** (Research in Progress)

*Abstract:* Financial regulation provides welfare gains to the society, at the expense of an exacerbated wealth distribution. I show that when capital markets are segmented, financial regulation leads to a transfer of wealth from depositors to equity investors. An integrated monetary and financial regulatory policies achieve welfare gains due to a credit flow expansion to the real sector, while default likelihood within the banking sector remains fixed. Nonetheless, this constrained equilibrium allocation is associated with a lower deposit rate while dividends increase, leading to a wealth transfer across market segments. I provide sufficient conditions under which optimal financial regulation leads to welfare gains without exacerbating wealth heterogeneity.

### TEACHING EXPERIENCE

*Teaching Assistant, Imperial College London (\*Evaluations out of 5.0)*

<b>Econometrics 1</b> (PhD, 4.80, 4.98, <i>University-wide Teaching Award</i> )	2017, 18, 19
<b>Macro-Finance</b> (MSc Finance, 4.00, 4.33)	2018, 19
<b>Macroeconomics</b> (MSc Finance 4.38)	2018, 19
<b>Empirical Finance</b> (MSc Financial Engineering, 4.64)	2019
<b>Financial Statistics</b> (MSc Financial Engineering, 4.63, 4.72)	2017, 18
<b>Machine Learning &amp; Applied Statistics</b> (Summer School, 4.54)	2019
<b>Introduction to Finance</b> (MBA, Executive MBA)	2017, 18, 19

### RESEARCH SUPERVISION

**Student Investment Fund** 2018, 19, 20

I supervised graduate students in finance working as members of Student Investment Fund Research Center at Imperial College London. I have been responsible to promote learning outcomes of students with interests in academic findings backed by data and statistical models learned from their studies.

### SOFTWARE AND COMPUTING

Python, R, Matlab, Mathematica, Stata, SAS, Linux, Julia

### WORKSHOPS

I served as the instructor designing contents, programming the trading platform and implementing the following workshops at Imperial College London.

#### **Trading Simulation**

This workshop intends to familiarize students with the optimal execution of bid-ask quotes by incorporating market information and placing quotes on a simulated trading platform. Key learning outcomes are to understand the trade-off between absorbing market demand as a result of a narrow bid-ask quote against obtaining a lower profit margin per transaction in a competitive environment.

#### **Bid-Ask Spread and Private Information**

The purpose of this workshop is to demonstrate how to infer information embedded in market quotes and incorporate them to increase profit margins per transaction. Conversely, participants learn how to strategize against information give-away embedded in their own posted quotes by understanding the negative relationship between profit margins against quote informativeness in a multi-period simulation.